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Collection Name	CLARK,	WILLIAM: FILES	3	Withdrawer			wer
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1800 MEMO	ALFO UPDA		CH TO CLARK, RE	2	10/26/1982	B 1	
	R	9/20/2007	F00-147				
1801 CABLE	26035	2Z OCT 82		3	10/26/1982	B 1	B3
	D	1/3/2011	F2000-147/1				
1802 LETTER	TO CL	ARK, RE FRANCI	E	1	10/26/1982	B 1	B3
	PAR	1/3/2011	F2000-147/1				
1803 TALKING POINTS	FOR N	MEETING WITH M	ITTERRAND	2	ND	B 1	63
	D	1/3/2011	F2000-147/1				
1805 PAPER	RE FR	ANCE		2	ND	B 1	B3
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1806 PAPER	RE LI	ВҮА		2	ND	B 1	B3
	D	1/3/2011	F2000-147/1				
1807 NOTES	FROM	TRIP		2	ND	B 1	63
	D	1/3/2011	F2000-147/1				
1808 MEMO	SAME	TEXT AS 1800		2	10/26/1982	B 1	
	R	9/20/2007	F00-147				

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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National Security Council The White House ACCEIVED Package # 7417

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MEMORANDUM

SENSITIVE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

October 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH

SUBJECT:

Nicaraguan Subversion in Central America, an Update Since May 1982

Hard information on particular instances describing Nicaragua's export of revolution is difficult to acquire. Piecing the various bits of information together, however, provides evidence that Nicaragua continues to support revolutionaries in Central America, especially in El Salvador. As a result of Cuban and Nicaraguan support, the Salvadoran insurgency is a sophisticated and well-organized organization.

El Salvador

The best evidence that the supply lines remain in operation for the Salvadoran guerrillas is the offensive undertaken in mid-October. Several towns have been captured; in some instances, battles have been prolonged. Had the supply lines from Nicaragua been shut down, the guerrillas' ability to undertake operations on this scale would have been severely limited.

We have had substantial information over the past three years that Nicaragua has provided training and logistical support to Salvadoran insurgents as part of the government's policy of encouraging revolutionary movements in Central America. Interrogation of a guerrilla leader captured in August, 1982--Antonio CANADAS alias Alejandro MONTENEGRO--confirms that Nicaragua remains the primary source of insurgent weapons and ammunition for his unit, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), one of the main guerrilla groups operating in the country. Montenegro is the highest ranking Salvadoran guerrilla field commander in captivity. He has provided high-quality information, which has resulted in raids against safehouses in San Salvador and Tegucigalpa. Large quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives have been seized.

Montenegro stated that all weapons reach his front by vehicles from Nicaragua via Honduras and that no weapons were purchased by his organization on the black market. Vehicles, which were

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modified in Managua with concealment compartments, have been used to transport M-16 rifles, ammunition, explosives such as TNT, time fuses, blasting caps, and detonating cord. According to Montenegro, the arms flow to El Salvador has been relatively continuous since early 1981.

Beyond training and supply, we know that insurgent headquarters for the five guerrilla groups operating in El Salvador are located in Managua.

Honduras

Montenegro further revealed that the ERP had formed a joint Salvadoran/Honduran military and political command in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in late 1981, which included at least 50 members. The ERP and its Honduran group was responsible for the July 4, 1982 destruction of a Tegucigalpa power station and the August bombings in Tegucigalpa of the offices of IBM and Air Florida.

The September hostage incident in San Pedro Sula had among its principal aims to secure the release of Montenegro and several of his colleagues who had been captured in Honduras.

Costa Rica

The Nicaraguans clearly intend to intimidate Costa Rica. Since March, 1981, there has been an increasing number of terrorist incidents in the country. These have included kidnappings, assassination attempts, hijackings, and bombings. One example of terrorism was the bombing on July 4, 1982 of the Honduran National Airline office in San Jose. The act was perpetrated by a Colombian citizen who admitted to authorities that he had been recruited, trained, and directed for the operation by officials of the Nicaraguan Embassy in San Jose. As a result, the Nicaraguan officials were asked to leave the country.

SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/OBCON

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ADM. JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM:

SUBJECT: French Reactions to Events in Poland

AIR

December, 1981: French leaders joined in condemnation of Polish and Soviet governments for martial law declaration.

France "restrained" new non-humanitarian trade with Poland, while fulfilling old contracts.

January, 1982: France supported Allied consensus not to reschedule 1982 Polish debt.

France supported January 11 North Atlantic Council communique setting the three Western conditions for Poland and calling for each country to take individual actions against Poland and the USSR.

Mitterrand made a strong statement along with other Western leaders on the "Let Poland be Poland" program.

France signed contract with the Soviet Union for deliveries of natural gas from Siberian pipeline.

French officials openly denounced U.S. economic sanctions as ineffective.

February, 1982: French joined other Western nations in condemning both Poland and the Soviet Union at the CSCE meeting in Madrid.

> French joined the EC decision to limit several luxury imports from the Soviet Union in response to repression Poland.

Spring, 1982: French join OECD consensus decision to reclassify USSR to higher category of industrial development, resulting in higher minimum credit terms.

October, 1982: French response to the banning of Solidarity and police brutality in Poland only rhetorical, and muted, at that.

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-TOP SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

26 October 1982

The Honorable William P. Clark Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill,

Pursuant to our telephone conversation yesterday I send you herewith the following:

1. Our view of where Mitterrand is in tune with us, where he may be open to persuasion, where we have clearly diverging views, and where he is suspicious of us, together with the kind of specific US proposals to which Mitterrand may be responsive. This has been put in the form of possible talking points. (Tab A)

2. Our evaluation of the military advantages which the Soviets have derived from their success in obtaining Western technology. Much of our information and understanding on this comes from intelligence of which President Mitterrand apprised President Reagan at Ottawa

3. French attitudes towards Cocom and technology transfer. (Tab C)

Detail on terrorist training facilities in Libya. 4.

5. On Namibia, which may be a subject that he brings up, I would think it would be useful to have him understand that South Africa remains adamantly unwilling to withdraw without prior, withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Linkage of Namibia with Cuban withdrawal comes not from any US requirement but from the South African Government's perception of their internal politics and of their external security needing a buffer as long as the Cubans remain in Angola.

and talking points on the relationship between the 6. A map. Siberian pipeline and Soviet forced labor were sent to you yesterday.

Yours

William J. Casey

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
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1805	PAPER RE FRANCE	2	ND	B1	

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
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MEMORANDUM

SENSITIVE

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INFORMATION

October 26, 1982

82 UCT26 P2:26

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

ALFONSO SAPIA-BOSCH

SUBJECT:

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