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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 1/6/2005

**File Folder** MITTERRAND/CLARK-6:30PM 10/27/1982: II  
BACKGROUND (2)

**FOIA**

2000-147

**Box Number** 4

CLARK

72

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1747	NOTE	TO CLARK, RE ATTACHMENTS <b>PAR 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	1	10/20/1982	<del>B1</del> B3
1748	MEMO	TO CLARK, RE ATTACHMENTS <b>PAR 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	1	3/10/1982	<del>B1</del> B3
1749	MEMO	FOR THE PRESIDENT <b>PAR 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	3	3/10/1982	B1 B3
1750	PAPER	RE FRANCE <b>PAR 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	3	3/3/1982	B1 B3
1751	PAPER	RE FRANCE <b>PAR 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	6	7/9/1982	<del>B1</del> B3
1752	PAPER	IMPLICATIONS... <b>PAR 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	5	9/7/1982	<del>B1</del> B3
1753	PUBLICATION	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	5/15/1981	B1 B3
1754	PAPER	MITTERRAND'S... <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	6	5/15/1981	B1 B3
1755	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	5/14/1982	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1756	PUBLICATION	FRANCE: SOCIALIST ECONOMIC THOUGHT <i>PAR 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	15	9/1/1981	B1 <i>B3</i>
1757	PUBLICATION	FRANCOIS MITTERRAND:... <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	16	10/1/1978	B1 <i>B3</i>
1758	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	2	9/22/1982	B1 B3
1759	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	2	8/24/1982	B1 B3
1760	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	2	9/9/1982	B1 B3
1761	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	2	8/27/1982	B1 B3
1762	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	1	5/3/1982	B1 B3
1763	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	2	9/23/1981	B1 B3
1764	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	1	11/30/1981	B1 B3
1765	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	2	4/30/1982	B1 B3

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1766	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	6/18/1982	B1 B3
1767	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	5/17/1982	B1 B3
1768	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	5/4/1982	B1 B3
1769	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	1	4/30/1982	B1 B3
1770	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	1	3/8/1982	B1 B3
1771	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	1	8/3/1982	B1 B3
1772	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	1	5/14/1982	B1 B3
1773	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	8/26/1982	B1 B3
1774	SUMMARY	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	10/6/1982	B1 B3
1775	PAPER	RE FRANCE <b>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</b>	2	5/11/1982	B1 <b>B3</b>

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1776	PUBLICATION	JACQUES ATTALI SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE <i>D 1/3/2011 F2000-147/1</i>	23	3/1/1982	B1 <i>B3</i>

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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
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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge Clark

I apologize for the rough nature of some of  
of this material, but I thought it better to err  
on the side of inclusion.



FOIA(b)(3)

RCM HAS SEEN

Date 20 Oct 82

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/31/11

FOIA(b)(3)

*French production file*

Executive Registry  
13-2617/1

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505



10 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs


SUBJECT: An Assessment of President Mitterrand's  
Foreign Policy

Here's an interesting analysis of Mitterrand's foreign policy objectives which you requested for the President.

The President might want to again thank Mitterrand for his help and cooperation in dealing with the pirating of western technology by the Soviets and remind him that there's much more to be done to bring this under control.

*Will*  
William J. Casey

Attachment  
~~SECRET~~



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NLRRF00-147#1748  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/3/11

10 5 1982

10 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: An Assessment of President Mitterrand's  
Foreign Policy

Like de Gaulle, Mitterrand believes that France's security and ability to play an independent role in world affairs are tied to the existence of an East-West military balance. He also believes--as did de Gaulle--that France's activist role in the Third World serves its economic interest, enhances its prestige, and reduces chances of a superpower conflict. Mitterrand is more inclined than his predecessors to work closely with the United States, but he holds that some US policies--particularly in the Third World--are short-sighted, and he will not be easily dissuaded from following his own course. [REDACTED]

#### France Between the Superpowers

The Soviet military buildup has convinced Mitterrand that France can no longer distance itself from the Alliance or openly cast doubt on the US commitment to defend Europe. He has stated publicly that the USSR could gain a strategic edge between 1985 and 1990, and his gloomy outlook for relations with Moscow apparently is reinforced by his belief that Soviet military leaders are becoming more influential in Moscow's decisionmaking process. [REDACTED]

Mitterrand's worries concerning Soviet pressures on the Alliance are heightened by his growing nervousness over the political problems of Chancellor Schmidt. Mitterrand fears that Schmidt's fall would lead to a period of instability in West Germany. A wavering Bonn, perhaps beset by a new wave of perceived neutralist sentiment, would leave Paris isolated in its efforts to carve out a position between the superpowers. French policymaking would then face a painful choice: seeking a modus vivendi with Moscow or accepting an uncomfortably close alignment with Washington. [REDACTED]

Mitterrand therefore has sought to bolster Schmidt's prospects by supporting INF modernization. Over the longer term, the French President wants to achieve greater harmony of defense and foreign policies among the West Europeans. Mitterrand sees improved European security cooperation as necessary to meet the Soviet threat, to counter neutralist tendencies in Bonn, and to reduce reliance on the United States. Although Mitterrand will not rejoin NATO's integrated command, he apparently favors enhanced practical cooperation with the Alliance. [REDACTED]

The French President sees obstacles, however, to improving US-West European relations. He is opposed to what he views as US efforts within the Alliance to limit non-strategic trade with the East; the French have important economic stakes

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/3/11

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in such trade and see it as a potentially moderating influence on Soviet behavior. Paris' recent tightening of controls on export to the East of sensitive technologies and collaboration with the US in this area should, in his view, satisfy French security interests and vital US concerns. [REDACTED]

He is also concerned that high interest rates in the US might undermine West European economic recovery and support for necessary defense expenditures. To some extent his public declarations on this score are self-serving, deflecting domestic criticism of his economic program. [REDACTED]

### Third World Issues

Mitterrand believes his Third World policies are complementary to his stand on European security issues. Expanding markets in the Third World are essential, in his view, to French--and West European--economic recovery, which, in turn, is necessary for his defense and social programs. He probably views as unrealistic US efforts to stimulate Third World economic development through emphasis on private investment, although Paris--its rhetoric notwithstanding--is unwilling to bankroll its proposal for a massive transfer of resources to LDCs. Also, aid to former French colonies often leads to increased French exports to them. In any event, Mitterrand's view of France's pragmatic interest in the Third World is reinforced by his Socialist humanitarian ideals and by traditional French aspirations in Third World countries. [REDACTED]

The French President is also firmly wedded to the notion that Soviet gains in the Third World can be reversed by a subtle dosage of diplomacy, economic and occasionally military assistance to "progressive" regimes. His role in weaning African nationalists such as Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny from the Communists during the 1950s, and his success in reducing the Communist electorate at home, apparently have convinced him that he can outmaneuver the Communists elsewhere in the Third World. Along these same lines, he believes that US leaders repeatedly "pushed" revolutionaries into Soviet and Cuban hands--a theory widely accepted in French Socialist circles. [REDACTED]

Mitterrand is prepared for--and may even relish--US criticism of aspects of his Third World policies, particularly in Central America. Several factors will convince him not to back down:

- The Socialist party strongly supports an activist role in Central America. For example, party leaders recently returned from the region are recommending that Paris step up economic aid to the Sandinistas--despite the leaders' concerns over the Cuban presence there--and to Costa Rica.
- His independent stance in the Third World helps to mollify leftist critics of his perceived "Atlanticist" tendencies. He probably is concerned that Washington might be considering unilateral military action in Central America--a step which would provoke widespread opposition in the French left, perhaps calling into question his cooperation with the US on Alliance questions. Indeed, by making the French presence felt in Central America, Mitterrand might be hoping to deter the US from such a move.


- He probably believes that Washington eventually will see advantages in Paris' strategy; for example, he apparently fancies himself a possible intermediary between the United States and Cuba.
- Paris also believes it can play a useful role in lessening international tensions over El Salvador. In the UN, for example, the French, with the Dutch and the Mexicans, are supporting a human rights resolution on El Salvador and are reportedly attempting to soften a more severe Mexican draft of the resolution on the human rights situation in El Salvador. [REDACTED]

Mitterrand's policies in Central America also probably are influenced by a circle of advisers and friends [REDACTED] whose leftist biases eventually could steer the President toward riskier involvement on the side of revolutionary groups. Although we have little information on which to judge its sway over Mitterrand's thinking, this sort of "ideological kitchen cabinet" could reinforce his tendency to underestimate US sensitivity to developments in a region where US interests are substantial and those of France remain marginal. [REDACTED]

#### Middle East

Mitterrand's confidence in his ability to achieve progress on seemingly intractable problems probably has increased as a result of his recent visit to Israel. Although he failed to budge the Israelis on the Palestinian question, he apparently has succeeded in establishing his credibility in Jerusalem without seriously damaging relations with the Arabs. [REDACTED]

There are indications that Paris intends to step up its behind-the-scenes effort to develop an Arab consensus on the Fahd proposals following Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Mitterrand believes, however, that only the United States can obtain concessions from the Israelis on the Palestine question, and he probably sees an opportunity for cooperation with Washington to move the Israelis in that direction. At a minimum, he probably wants to work in tandem with the United States to dissuade Israel from taking any provocative action such as an attack in southern Lebanon. [REDACTED]

  
William J. Casey

FRANCE - MIDDLE EAST: Mitterrand's Visit to Israel

[REDACTED]

*President Mitterrand's three-day visit to Israel, the first of a French head of state, probably augurs better bilateral relations. The improvement is not likely to be as great, however, as Jerusalem may have hoped--or some Arab leaders feared--immediately following Mitterrand's election. The French leader continues to regard himself as a potential mediator in the Middle East peace process, but he is disinclined for now to launch a French plan for a comprehensive settlement.*

[REDACTED]

The decision to seek improved relations with Israel, which have been strained since de Gaulle stopped arms deliveries in 1967, reflects Mitterrand's commitment to its security. This commitment stems in part from his previous ties with prominent Israelis, especially in the Labor Party, and from his many visits to Israel before becoming President.

[REDACTED]

Mitterrand also believes that increased French influence in Israel eventually will enhance his credibility with Arab leaders as a possible peace broker. To a lesser extent, he wants to distinguish his policy from that of former President Giscard and to consolidate his considerable support among Jewish voters at home.

[REDACTED]

The French have shown interest in expanding commercial ties with Israel, although any major agreement probably will not be signed until the French-Israeli joint economic commission meets this month for the first time in 10 years. Increased cultural and scientific exchanges may be announced during Mitterrand's stay.

[REDACTED]

--continued

~~Top Secret~~

[REDACTED]

3 March 1982

Contentious Issues

Mitterrand will point to his public support for the Camp David accords and for French participation in the Sinai peacekeeping force as evidence of his support for practical steps toward peace. At the same time, he will suggest that the Camp David process cannot resolve the Palestinian issue and that a supplementary approach is needed. Mitterrand believes that to preserve its independence and security, Israel eventually will have to accept the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The President may cite the proposals outlined last year by Saudi Prince Fahd as constructive. He will take care, however, to disassociate France from some aspects of those proposals, such as making Jerusalem the capital of a Palestinian state.

Mitterrand doubts that Prime Minister Begin can be persuaded to alter his approach to the peace process. French officials apparently fear that Begin soon may take some provocative action, possibly an attack on southern Lebanon. They probably believe that France's counsel will be received more favorably by elements of the Labor Party.

The French leader will attempt to assuage Begin's concerns over French nuclear cooperation with Iraq. He probably will argue that renewed cooperation would be tied to Baghdad's acceptance of strict safeguards, preventing the diversion of French equipment and technology for military purposes.

Mending Fences With Arab Leaders

Syrian President Assad and PLO officials already have criticized Mitterrand's visit, with the PLO now asking Mitterrand to invite Yasir Arafat to Paris--a

--continued

request Mitterrand is likely to refuse. The trip also may undermine Renault's efforts to end the Arab boycott against it. [REDACTED]

French officials appear confident, nevertheless, that relations with leading Arab partners will not be seriously affected. Paris recently has attempted to reassure Arab leaders that France will not soften its position supporting the Palestinians or change its policy of seeking closer ties with the Arab states. Mitterrand is likely to reiterate such assurances during subsequent visits to Jordan and Iraq. [REDACTED]

### Outlook

Despite its reservations, Paris probably will increase behind-the-scenes efforts to develop a unified Arab endorsement of the Fahd proposals after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. The French also may seek to promote a reconciliation between Egypt and other Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. French officials apparently believe that renewed Egyptian leadership in the Arab world would help bring other Arab states closer to peace with Israel. [REDACTED]

The French also will continue to encourage Israel to be more forthcoming on the Palestinian issue. France's insistence on this, combined with its efforts to broaden considerable ties with the Arab states, will limit the improvement of relations with Israel. [REDACTED]

Mitterrand may eventually offer suggestions of his own on the peace process--probably after consultations with France's EC partners--if he sees a consensus developing among key interested parties. He probably will take pains, however, to ensure that France is viewed as supporting initiatives from within the region rather than proposing a formula from outside. [REDACTED]

Paris is unlikely to make any such move until it has a clearer picture of US policy toward the region. French officials apparently believe that only Washington can hope to obtain significant concessions from the Israelis but that US officials have yet to focus on the Palestinian issue. Paris probably will remain skeptical that a strategic consensus on resisting possible Soviet threats to the region can be achieved until the Palestinian issue is resolved. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

FRANCE

Economic Relationship with the United States

Last year exports to the United States accounted for 5.2 percent (\$5.6 billion) of total French exports, and imports from the United States represented 8.2 percent (\$9.8 billion) of total French imports. Historically, France has run trade deficits with the United States. Last year's deficit with the United States was equal to over one-third of the French trade deficit with all Western industrialized nations.

France is heavily dependent on the United States for certain raw materials and manufactured goods as well as some foodstuffs. It buys from this country two-thirds of the cereals, 84 percent of the soybeans, 37 percent of the coal, 48 percent of the computer equipment and 70 percent of the aircraft and aircraft parts that it imports. French exports to the United States have traditionally included food and farm products as well as some raw materials and luxury goods.

France is eager to increase its investment in the United States, which represented 4 percent of total foreign investment in this country in 1980 (compared with 9.1 percent for West Germany and 6.6 percent for Japan). Some major French companies have bought US firms e.g., (Elf-Aquitaine's and LaFarge's takeovers of two multibillion-dollar US groups, TexasGulf and General Portland, and Gervaise's \$84.3 million takeover of

~~SECRET~~

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/3/11

Beatrice Foods' Dannon, all in 1981. Others have opened up plants (Michelin) or sales offices (Perrier) in the United States. The number of small and medium-sized firms entering the US market is also on the rise. Most of the large French banks have representative offices or subsidiaries in the United States.

██████████

The US subsidiaries of newly nationalized companies include Howmet Aluminum and Howmet Turbine Components Corporation, owned by the metals and chemicals group Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann; two recently acquired petrochemical plants and several other subsidiaries, owned by France's largest chemical group Rhone-Poulenc; Certain-teed, a manufacturer of insulation products, owned by the glassmaking, steel pipe, and insulation conglomerate Saint-Gobain; and Phoenix Steel and Refinement International, owned by the financial group Empain-Schneider. US firms' equity in the parent companies or major subsidiaries of the newly nationalized industrial firms other than the electronics firm CII-HB (47 percent US owned) and ITT-France (99 percent US owned) is relatively small. Joint ventures in France between nationalized companies and US firms include Eurotechnique (Saint Gobain and National Semi-Conductor), Matra-Harris, and a Matra-Harris joint venture with Intel. ██████████

In recent years about one-fourth of total foreign direct investment in France has come from the United States. The book value of US direct investment soared from \$217 million in 1950 to

\$6 billion by the end of 1976. US investment is considerable in the instrumentation, petroleum, rubber, machinery, cinematographic, and automobile industries. [REDACTED]

The Socialist government continues to welcome foreign investment on a selective basis, particularly where it (1) does not result in takeovers of French firms, (2) introduces technical expertise in sectors of the economy from which it has been missing, (3) occurs in export-oriented industries, and (4) is channeled into firms located in the less prosperous regions of the nation. [REDACTED]

France has bought some important licenses for US technology. Most notable in this regard are the pressurized water reactor produced by Framatome and used in France's nuclear program -- under license from Westinghouse -- and Alsthom-Atlantique's license from GE to produce rotors suitable for the Yamal gas pipeline. The French understanding of the licensing arrangement is that, while it prevents France from selling technology to a third party, there are no restrictions on product sales and no requirement that the French company give either the US company or the US government prior notice of a product sale. The US company officially learns of sales through royalty payments. French companies generally value their cooperative relations with US companies and are reluctant to jeopardize them. [REDACTED]



Ties with the Soviet Bloc

Despite the relatively low level of French trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Paris views this relationship as important, both because of its economic worth and because of its value in demonstrating France's political independence and role as an intermediary in East-West communications. Last year exports to the Soviet Union represented only 1.8 percent -- \$1.9 billion -- of total French exports; exports to Eastern Europe were 1.9 percent -- \$2.1 billion -- of total French exports. The Soviet Union accounted for 2.8 percent -- \$3.4 billion -- of total French imports while Eastern Europe supplied one percent -- \$1.6 billion -- of total French imports. Energy accounted for nearly 83 percent of French imports from the Soviets; food and agricultural products comprised the bulk of exports, followed by metals, machinery and transport equipment, and chemicals.

Paris hopes both to continue its surpluses with Eastern Europe and to reduce its trade deficit with the Soviet Union, primarily through continued use of government and commercial credits. A slight improvement can be expected next year. Last year was a banner year for new contracts -- \$1.2 billion worth were signed, of which \$800 million were directly related to the Yamal gas pipeline; the remaining contracts related to steel, automobiles, and gas exploration and exploitation.

The French have been firm in their refusal to restrict exports or deny credits to the Soviets. Moreover, President

[REDACTED]

Mitterrand has repeatedly stated that France will not engage in economic warfare against the USSR, viewing acquiescence in new US sanctions involving Alsthom Atlantique's rotors for the pipeline as a move in that direction. The decision earlier this year by a group of state-owned French banks to lend the Soviets \$140 million to finance purchases of French equipment for the Yamal pipeline provided the final amount needed to finance French sales for the project. [REDACTED]

#### Reactions to US Trade Measures

Responding to the recent US legal measures on steel, President Mitterrand accused the United States of reneging on the compromises reached at Versailles and called the measures "restrictive" and "protectionist." The French believe that the United States has dealt them a hard commercial blow, one that probably hurts their direct interests much more than the US pipeline measures. As a result of the measures, the French steel industry -- which sells 14 percent of French exports to the United States -- will lose over a million tons of exports unless the US formula used to calculate the degree of subsidization is changed. [REDACTED]

Paris has long argued that government loans and assistance to its steel industry do not constitute export subsidies under the GATT and that imports from France have not been a source of injury to the United States. They also point out that even without restrictions on steel France has a deficit of over \$4

billion with the United States. The French firms involved may ask the French government to take the matter to GATT. Because of high unemployment in France, there have been union pressures to close off French imports and to export at any price. The latest US economic measures could lead to increased labor pressure on the government for reprisals against US exports. [REDACTED]

With regard to US economic measures on the pipeline, French officials argue that Alsthom-Atlantique's sale of rotors to the Soviets would not undercut US sanctions, since GE was not one of the "principal and direct" suppliers in the pipeline deal. Alsthom officials acknowledge that their license from GE is subject to certain US prohibitions but question whether such prohibitions can be applied retroactively or to product sales. From a technical standpoint, Alsthom could proceed -- without reference to GE -- in building the 40 rotors already contracted for by the Soviets, as well as any others on which they might choose to bid. However, Alsthom officials are reluctant to destroy their 20-year cooperative relationship with GE by delivering the rotors. A final decision to go ahead would likely be more political than economic. Mitterrand may be tempted to use the sanctions issue to demonstrate his independence from the United States. [REDACTED]

7 September 1982

FOIA(b)(3)

Implications of Mitterrand's Economic Policies

Francois Mitterrand took office in May 1981 committed to halting a rapid rise in unemployment and reviving the recession-ridden economy. His gamble that France could buck international economic trends failed, however, and the government has been obliged to undertake an economic retrenchment that is both severe and politically risky.

The austerity program launched this June brings French economic policy more into line with the OECD mainstream: stricter limits on public sector deficits, closer attention to monetary growth targets, a bold attempt to end wage indexation, and some shifting of income to the corporate sector. If the government's new resolve does not falter because of union wage demands or electoral considerations, we believe the French economy has the capacity to bounce back.

The question remains, however, how the longer-term structural changes implemented by the Socialists, such as the nationalization program and increased worker participation in company management, will affect the economy's performance in the competitive international environment. The effects of these changes are likely to be felt long after Mitterrand's -- and perhaps the Socialists' -- term ends in 1988. The push toward state control of the economic machinery and the increasing bureaucratization of economic decisionmaking may have set in motion a process of secular deterioration.

On the other hand, the program could turn out to be less damaging than might be assumed. Important aspects of Mitterrand's program resemble or extend actions taken over the past several decades by conservative

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governments. They also are consistent with patterns of French political and economic behavior.

#### The Short-Run: Sticking With the System

The Socialists' initial strategy was conventional: stimulate consumption by increasing transfer payments and creating public sector jobs if necessary. To finance this program while maintaining other priorities, such as defense, they opted for more government borrowing and a package of tax increases directed at the wealthy and higher-income wage earners.

The increased domestic demand generated by the recovery program predictably resulted in an increased trade deficit. This deterioration of the French trade balance -- in combination with stagnating receipts in the normally-surplus services account, large capital outflows prompted by nervousness over Socialist intentions, and pessimistic financial market appraisals of the future -- led to two devaluations of the franc. The devaluation of October 1981 was accompanied by half-hearted measures intended as much to bolster financial market confidence as to begin fighting inflation in earnest. Although responsibility for this first devaluation could be shared with the Giscard government, the second devaluation in June 1982 demonstrated how badly the Mitterrand government had miscalculated in trying to push ahead with its stimulus program. A world-wide recovery, which would have spurred French exports, lagged; for a variety of reasons, including a generalized lack of confidence and increased business costs deriving from government measures to promote hiring, private investors showed no inclination to step up capital spending.

By June, when the need for remedies could no longer be avoided, the Socialists rejected the opportunity to carry through with a total "break with the system." Such a break probably would have meant giving up on fighting inflation, resorting to outright protectionism and, in the process, condemning France to a declining standard of living and lesser influence internationally. Their acceptance, instead, of external constraints argues strongly that they take seriously their commitment to keep France in the European Community, participate in an open world trading system, and maintain a mixed economy.

Even if the current policy orientation is maintained, the price paid for the Socialists' expansionary policies will be the loss of nearly two years in the fight to reduce inflation to the level of France's principal trading partners. This task has been complicated by the franc's depreciation against the dollar and EMS currencies since Mitterrand's victory and by some increased difficulty in obtaining foreign loans and investment to balance the current account.

These are not, however, irremediable problems. If the government maintains its present course, the economy can probably be restored in a couple of years to its pre-1981 condition. In effect, the experience of the first years of the Giscard presidency would recur. Prime Minister Jacques Chirac's 1975 stimulative program, similar in magnitude to that of Mitterrand and Mauroy, led to essentially the same results after about 18 months. It fell to Chirac's successor, Raymond Barre, to institute an austerity program to bring the budget and current account deficits back into line and to restore the franc.


## The Long-Run: Has the Balance Finally Been Tipped?

Socialist economic doctrine holds that the state should use its power to direct resources toward "broader" goals than mere profit. The nationalization program is thus more than a bow to Marxist principle. It is also an attempt to give the state control over a part of French industry large enough to serve as the "locomotive" for the rest of the economy. Most of the banks remaining in private hands were included in the program so that the government could more freely allocate credit toward priority activities and sectors. The government intends to define these areas through a planning process reminiscent of the successful multi-year plans of the post-war years.

In the French context, much of Mitterrand's program is not especially new. The wave of nationalizations in 1981 was the third in this century. Government involvement in the economy -- referred to as "dirigisme" -- has been building up steam since the Bourbons. French governments since the war have used their extensive control of the economy to promote high technology or prestige ventures, such as the Concorde, the nuclear energy program, and various schemes to develop an indigenous, top-of-the-line electronics industry. Some of these have been successful, some have not. The Mitterrand government intends nonetheless to try again by picking international "winners" of its own.

On the labor front, changes in labor relations tend to be spasmodic -- an upheaval of sorts followed by a protracted period when everybody gets back to work. Under the present government, higher labor productivity and better labor-management relations are to be promoted by means of legislation increasing worker participation in decisionmaking.

At this point, France remains an open economy. Accession to the European Community in 1959 lowered some of the barriers that once made the French economy something of a closed system flourishing at the expense of competition. Thus, there is a danger that the Socialist program could lead history to repeat itself. The increases in state control and worker participation could produce a bureaucratized, inflexible economy that is both inefficient and cumbersome. The effect would be a slow process of deterioration likely to leave France less and less able to compete internationally. It is too early, however, to draw conclusions concerning the possibilities for such a process getting under way -- and once under way for stopping it.





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# France: Socialist Economic Thought



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
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# France: Socialist Economic Thought



## An Intelligence Assessment

*Information available as of 1 September 1981  
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

The author of this assessment is [redacted]  
[redacted] Office of  
Economic Research. Comments and queries are  
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, [redacted]  
[redacted] OER, [redacted]

The assessment was coordinated with the Offices of  
Political Analysis and Central Reference and with  
the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe.



France:  
Socialist Economic Thought

**Key Judgments**

French Socialists want to launch a transformation of French society that combines political pluralism with some form of collective organization of the economy. They reject the Communist model because they consider it undemocratic and statist. They are critical of north European social-democratic governments because these governments have essentially accepted the capitalist model without trying to change it.

The French Socialists believe that what makes their brand of socialism distinctive is their insistence that economic decisionmaking—and, by extension, all decisionmaking—be democratic. This idea is embodied in their concept of “autogestion,” or “self-management,” which, in its simplest form, implies collective participation in and responsibility for economic decisions by all employees of a firm. Having learned from the Soviet experience, the French Socialists do not insist that the private sector be abolished or even that the need for nationalization is widespread. In line with the “autogestion” principle, they make a distinction between state *ownership* and state *control* of enterprises because they fear that such control can lead to bureaucratization and centrally imposed decisions.

The “autogestion” principle is also the way in which the Socialists attempt to combine the democratic process with more rigorous economic planning. The national Plan is no longer to be handed down by Paris; rather, all economic and social players are to have the opportunity to contribute to the final product.

Although President Mitterrand’s principal economic advisers all support the general thrust of “autogestion,” they possess differing ideological attitudes that range from Marxist to something close to social-democratic. The realities of exercising power have already tended to cause some to take positions more in accordance with ministerial responsibility than with ideological predilection. Mitterrand will have the final say, but his views on economic matters remain a puzzle. He will probably tend toward consensus solutions on issues with little ideological content. On issues of Socialist dogma, however, he may assert the need for rigorous implementation.

The French Socialists will have difficulty in reconciling democracy with their brand of collective organization of society. The successful replacement of individual self-interest with a commitment to what is supposedly best for the whole has little historical or psychological underpinning. The French Socialists may be tempted to try to hasten the process of transforming society but, if they accept economic and social realities, their experience in governing France will more likely demonstrate that there is little to distinguish them from social democrats.

*The above information is*





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France:  
Socialist Economic Thought

Neither Communist Nor Social-Democratic

French socialism aspires to be different. It easily rejects the Soviet model because it is undemocratic and statist, characteristics that are anathema to the French Socialists. Although French Socialists share, with the social-democratic governments of northern Europe, a commitment to the democratic process, they are uncomfortable with the way in which these governments have essentially accepted the capitalist economic model. The Socialists argue that the social democrats have contented themselves with using governmental power to manage the system in order to enhance the welfare state rather than to change the system itself. For example, French Socialists find much to admire in the Swedish experience with social-democratic governments but insist that the Swedes are not socialists in the true sense because they have chosen not to alter the capitalist structure.

French Socialists also point out that the links between organized labor and political parties of the left are, by tradition, less forthright and formalized in France than they are in European countries where social-democratic governments have been in power. French Socialists believe that the absence of a close bond between party and unions has deprived them of both a solid electoral base and an effective means to use the capitalist industrial system for the betterment of workers.

Finally, the French Socialists distinguish themselves from north European social democrats by pointing to the existence of a powerful Communist Party in France vying for the allegiance of the workers. This has forced French socialism to define its ideology in more rigid terms than has been necessary in north European socialist parties. For domestic consumption French Socialist rhetoric often is strident and replete

with Marxist jargon in contrast with the more moderate note it frequently strikes for foreign audiences.

**The Socialist Solution: "Autogestion"**

The goal of French Socialists is to combine political pluralism with a distinctive kind of collective organization of the economy. The collective organization they have in mind is not necessarily centered on the idea of property ownership passing from private hands to the state. Nationalization is, of course, a matter of dogma and therefore little open to question; dogma nevertheless has been tempered by experience. French Socialists recognize that extensive state assumption of control over property is a "solution" that the vast majority of the French oppose. As a result, the Socialists insist that nationalizations be carried out in accordance with strictly defined criteria and be limited in scope. (Not surprisingly, this tack has been a source of fierce contention with the French Communist Party and was an important factor in the breakdown of the Union of the Left prior to the 1978 legislative elections.)

The Socialists, having learned from the example of the USSR and the Bloc countries, also insist that state *ownership* must be distinguished from state *control*.<sup>1</sup> They believe such control runs the risk of becoming bureaucratized by a class of state-appointed managers who have little concern for anything but self-perpetuation and who rely on centrally imposed solutions. French Socialists are very much aware that, at worst, the result is totalitarianism, as in the USSR. This concern prompts the accusations of "dirigisme" and "Colbertisme" so often levied by the Socialists against their opponents on the right, whom they see as being

<sup>1</sup> A much-used Socialist theme is "Nationaliser n'est pas étatiser." This nuanced statement has no easy literal translation but essentially means that nationalization is not total state control of all the means of production.

quite comfortable with technocratic decisionmaking and top-down state intervention in the French economy.<sup>2</sup>

What makes their socialism distinctive, French Socialists believe, is their insistence that economic decisionmaking be democratic. This concept is embodied in the term "autogestion," a neologism which means "self-management" and implies the exercise of responsibility for management of an enterprise by all who work there. By extension, the concept applies to the whole of society—a sort of perpetual town meeting. The French Socialists admit that this idea is close to that being tried in Yugoslavia, but they insist that France is different because it is more highly developed industrially and culturally and because the Yugoslav regime still tends to restrict freedoms.

"Autogestion" is also the concept by which the French Socialists combine their commitment to democratic processes and individual liberty with the idea of planning, which is the preferred method for transforming society along socialist lines. The apparent contradiction between the two is resolved by decreeing that the national Plan will be elaborated by means of thorough discussion at all levels of national life, so that all the economic and social players have a say in the final product. This approach is contrasted with the previous practice of preparing the Plan at the national level and soliciting only minimal participation by regional councils or local authorities. The Socialists explain the previous tendency by citing the "dirigiste" tradition as well as the malign influence of the multinationals—both French-based and foreign—which, they say, have an interest solely in enforcing on France participation in an international division of labor, at the expense of French jobs.

### **Economic Policy Players**

Just where the principal economic officials in the Mitterrand government fit in the spectrum of French Socialist thought is difficult to sort out. The task is complicated by the intricate and convoluted past of

French socialism and now by the exigencies of governing, which inevitably act to blur distinctions. For example, there is already evidence that ministers, however compatible their views may have been when out of power, have found themselves in opposition on specific issues, more in keeping with ministerial responsibility than with ideological predilection.

Mitterrand himself is a puzzle. He is known to have little interest in economics, although the extent to which others can influence his economic thinking is unclear. As the unifying force in his government he is likely to tend toward consensus solutions on issues that have little or no ideological content. On issues of Socialist dogma, however, Mitterrand might be more inclined to assert the need for rigorous application. The speed with which the nationalization program is being carried out could be a case in point. It could also be argued, of course, that Mitterrand is merely acting quickly to take advantage of his stunning victory and that stubborn economic problems must be dealt with by more traditional means.

The left wing of the Socialist Party is represented by a faction known as Ceres (Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et d'Education Socialiste). Members of this faction tend to be more strongly anticapitalist, more Marxist, and more given than the rest of the party to proposing doctrinaire (or "maximalist") solutions. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, Minister of Research and Technology, is the leader of Ceres. Chevenement, on whose support Mitterrand has relied in preelection intraparty leadership struggles, appears to have had some success thus far in enhancing the power of his ministry at the expense, in particular, of the Ministry of Industry, led by moderate Pierre Dreyfus. This observation may, however, tell more about Chevenement's personal relationship with Mitterrand than it does about the influence of his ideas.

At the other end of the spectrum are those who appear to be social democrats, although they might dispute the characterization. Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy seems close to this group and has, in fact, been called "our German socialist" by party members. Others are

<sup>2</sup> The mercantilist Colbert was Controller-General of Finance under Louis XIV in the 17th century.

Economy and Finance Minister Jacques Delors, Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, Minister of the Plan Michel Rocard, and Industry Minister Dreyfus. With little or no inclination to alter economic structures radically, the members of this group are basically "minimalists," although each appears linked to the party by an affinity for certain specific Socialist ideas.

The problem is to define the elusive center. For the moment it seems best to assume that this grey area is represented by Mitterrand and his closest adviser Jacques Attali, who appears basically a centrist who has little use for Marxian analysis and no use for Communist practice.

The balance between the forces will shift, depending upon the issues to be addressed and on tactical considerations. Mitterrand will have the final say, however, and many of his ministers are tied to him by personal loyalties that may override their own views on specific questions.

### Outlook

The "autogestion" principle and its relationship to the Plan lie behind the Mitterrand government's rush to legislate the devolution of some powers to regional and local authorities. The idea is that these less centralized bodies must be assured of their powers vis-a-vis the central government before they are asked to participate in the new planning process. Presumably, the Socialist concept of planning will be fully implemented during the work on the 1983-88 Plan, which is to supercede the interim, two-year version now being prepared by the Ministry of the Plan.

In the area of economic organization the nationalized firms might become the laboratory for experimenting with the concept of "autogestion." Because it pretends to universality, however, "autogestion" remains a utopian concept and one that the Socialists admit could only be achieved after years of experience. In the workplace, for example, the Socialists know they will have to be careful to preserve lines of authority and responsibility in order to avoid paralysis in decisionmaking or, worse, a tendency for short-term

claims, especially for higher wages, to dominate. According to theory, increased worker participation should tend to dampen demands for increased compensation at the expense of the firm's long-term needs, such as investment. Such "psychic benefits" will not, however, put bread on the table.


The apparent contradiction between "autogestion" and planning will be more difficult to resolve than the Socialists believe. Whatever their intention, the Socialists do have a vision of society—of "socialist man"—and this vision is very likely to run afoul of the individual and his obstinate persistence in pursuing private goals. It remains to be seen how the Socialists will adjust to the frustrations of reality. They know that achieving their concept of Socialist transformation will be, at best, a drawn-out process. Will they be content to wait, thereby running the risk of having their work undone by being turned out of office? Or will they be tempted to hasten the process of transformation by diluting their proposals for increased popular participation in decisionmaking and decentralization of political authority? If the Socialists adhere to principle, they will be content to wait.


As a unifying concept, "autogestion" serves Socialist Party needs by providing a theoretical basis for reconciling democracy with a collectivist impulse intended to do away with capitalist exploitation. Its assumption that individual self-interest can over time be replaced by a commitment to what is supposedly best for the whole has, however, little historical or psychological underpinning. This reality suggests that the Socialist experience in governing France is likely to demonstrate that, after all, there is little to distinguish the Socialists from the social-democrats whose acceptance of the capitalist order they find so questionable.

The above information is



**Appendix A**





## Appendix B

### French Socialist Economic Policies

The following, based on various campaign documents and statements of key advisers, summarizes explanations by the Socialists of their planned economic policies.

#### Macroeconomic Policy

In its broadest conception, Socialist economic policy seeks to:

- Reestablish and maintain full employment.
- Remove structural causes of inflation.
- Carry out necessary social changes, specifically greater individual participation in decisionmaking and a reduction in inequality (without attempting to eliminate it entirely).

Medium- and long-term methods to achieve these goals are:

- Decentralization, including increasing the political and fiscal resources of regional and local authorities.
- Increasing worker participation in enterprises ("autogestion" in its strictest sense).
- Determination of economic goals through a democratic planning process and rigorous adherence to the Plan once it has been decided.
- A program of nationalizations to increase collective control over the economy.
- Reformation of the tax structure.
- Definition of an industrial policy to increase economic independence.

Specific measures designed to work toward these goals—many of which have already been taken—are:

- Stimulating demand to increase consumption, boost capacity utilization, and elicit higher investment.
- Creating socially desirable public employment.
- Reducing the length of the work week and offering earlier retirement.
- Supporting job-creating investments, including preferential rates of interest.
- Increasing assistance to jobseekers, especially the young.

- Increasing the real purchasing power of the minimum wage and of transfers to the aged, handicapped, and those with large families.
- Protecting small savers through indexation of some financial instruments and mobilizing savings in favor of productive investment.
- Increasing aid to housing construction.
- Reducing inequality by reducing the span of wage structures and by taxing large fortunes.
- Accentuating exports in sectors that are most competitive.
- Reducing imports by favoring domestic producers and encouraging substitution.

#### Nationalizations and the Private Sector

The Socialist program of limited additional nationalizations is intended to:

- Reduce the power of large enterprises that tend to hold monopolies over domestic distribution and prices.
- Prevent these large enterprises from leaving French control.
- Increase the scope of worker participation in decisionmaking in key industrial sectors.
- Assure the success of long-term planning by increasing collective control over key sectors, particularly the financial sector, which is to provide necessary credits for desired investment.
- Facilitate industrial restructuring to meet goals of increased national self-sufficiency and greater international competitiveness.

Nationalization is not intended to be statist and centralized:

- Within the framework of the Plan—defined to include such goals as profit, employment, and social utility—managers are to possess considerable freedom to conduct operations.

- The state will guarantee necessary financing to nationalized enterprises once a contract that defines responsibilities has been signed—a key justification for full control over the banking sector.
- Worker participation in management of nationalized industries will assure the primacy of the public interest.

The importance of the private sector will be recognized, although it will undergo transformation over time to accord with new concepts of management (“autogestion”) and new definitions of profit and social utility (the Plan). These changes are expected to be self-initiated and self-forcing because their value is self-evident; the state’s responsibility will be to provide the framework.

### **Budget and Tax Policy**

In contrast with past practice, which treated the budget as merely a means to finance unforeseen government expenditures, budget policy must be an integral part of the Plan:

- Budget deficits are not necessarily to be criticized unless their cause is not clearly understood or anticipated.
- To stimulate growth, a larger budget deficit than heretofore thought tolerable is acceptable. The increase must, however, take cyclical factors into account, because too great a stimulus, in the absence of Socialist structural transformation, merely leads to a larger balance-of-payments deficit and higher inflation. The deficit must be financed, to the extent possible, by mobilizing savings rather than by having recourse to the banking system.

Tax policy should have the following goals:

- To implement decentralization of political authority, the tax resources of local authorities should be increased.
- The role of indirect taxes should be decreased because these taxes are indiscriminant and regressive; the role of direct taxes should, on the other hand, be increased and the income tax made more progressive.
- Large fortunes should be taxed to reduce inequality; a tax on net business assets may also be imposed, although the threshold must be high in order to protect small- and medium-sized firms.

- Steps must be taken to reduce tax fraud.
- The basis of corporate taxation must be redefined to exclude deductible expenditures which are, in fact, merely a redistribution of profits in favor of management.

### **Industrial Policy**

In its specifics, industrial policy will be subject to the planning process; general orientations should, however, encompass the following considerations:

- The importance of creating new jobs.
- National autonomy sufficient to permit Socialist transformation.
- Consideration of the needs of workers and consumers as defined collectively (“autogestion”).
- Production of consumer goods emphasizing quality and durability.
- Production of industrial goods favoring those with high value added.

Industrial sectors and enterprises in difficulty will be handled on a case-by-case basis:

- Troubled sectors may be accorded financial aid to permit investment or develop new products; workers in sectors judged not worth saving will be assisted in adjusting.
- Study groups will be created to consider assistance to individual firms in danger of failure. Workers and local authorities will be asked to signal situations in which mismanagement threatens a firm.

Foreign investments will be treated realistically. They will be welcome to the extent that they accord with the Plan and may be expected to benefit France.

Research and development efforts, particularly in high-technology industries, will be emphasized and given increased financial support.

### **Planning and Decentralization**

The Socialists view the Plan as fulfilling three essential objectives:

- By enabling society to escape the short-term perspective of the market, the Plan establishes the goals for transforming society and sets the framework (methods, timing) for their realization.



- By removing economic control from the hands of large industrial groups, including multinationals, it increases popular control over decisionmaking. "Autogestion" is the guiding principle for this process.
- The Plan defines the means by which France may reduce its economic dependency and become better able to assert national priorities, such as employment and exports.

The Plan will preserve the private sector and ensure that it has the financial means to operate confidently and efficiently. Particular emphasis will be given to small- and medium-sized enterprises, which, under capitalism, have tended increasingly to become a kind of proletariat in thrall both to big business and to the banks.

Opinions of regional and local authorities will be integral to the national Plan; once the national Plan is established, these authorities will be permitted to prepare their own plans in consonance with it.

**International Economic Issues**

The Socialists recognize the benefits that participation in an open world trading and financial system has brought France and will maintain the French commitment to it:

- Protectionism risks retaliation and is to be avoided, although carefully conceived measures to protect employment in endangered sectors might prove necessary as a last resort.
- Foreign investment in France will be welcome if it conforms to national goals, such as an enhanced technological base. Investment abroad by French public and private firms will be encouraged so as to strengthen national export capabilities, secure access to raw materials, and solidify relationships with other, especially Third World, countries.

The Socialists accept French membership in the European Community and will work to strengthen its institutions:

- Concerted action to develop high-technology industries will be sought as a means to ensure European independence.

- EC members must work together to solve structural adjustment problems, but greater attention must be given to the social consequences of actions taken.
- Community cooperation with the Third World should be increased and improved, with particular attention to increasing investment in LDCs and to stabilizing LDC commodity export earnings.
- A Community code governing the practices of multinationals should be developed.

France will continue to play an active role in international financial institutions, including the European Monetary System:

- Means to restore order to foreign exchange markets should be developed.
- Collectively managed reserve mechanisms must be sought in order to reduce the influence of the dollar.
- International financial institutions should be made more responsive to developing country needs.

A new, more forthcoming approach to the Third World is required:

- Work on establishing a new international economic order must be pushed.
- France will progressively increase its official development aid to a level of 0.7 percent of GNP, henceforth excluding assistance to French overseas departments and territories.
- Bilateral aid should stress a contractual relationship so that both parties understand clearly what their obligations are.

The above information is



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1757	PUBLICATION  FRANCOIS MITTERRAND:...	16	10/1/1978	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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1758	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	9/22/1982	B1 B3

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1759	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	8/24/1982	B1 B3

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1760	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	9/9/1982	B1 B3

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1761	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	8/27/1982	B1 B3

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1762	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	1	5/3/1982	B1 B3

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1763	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	9/23/1981	B1 B3

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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1764	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	1	11/30/1981	B1 B3

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1765	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	4/30/1982	B1 B3

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1766	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	6/18/1982	B1 B3

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1767	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	5/17/1982	B1 B3

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1768	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	5/4/1982	B1 B3

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1769	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	1	4/30/1982	B1 B3

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1770	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	1	3/8/1982	B1 B3

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1771	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	1	8/3/1982	B1 B3

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1772	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	1	5/14/1982	B1 B3

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1773	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	8/26/1982	B1 B3

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

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1774	SUMMARY RE FRANCE	2	10/6/1982	B1 B3

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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1775	PAPER  RE FRANCE	2	5/11/1982	B1

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1776	PUBLICATION  JACQUES ATTALI SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE	23	3/1/1982	B1

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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
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