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NUCLEAR FREEZE
FILE 1

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

March 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on U.S. Arms Control
Policy

At Tab A is Al Haig's latest proposed statement for your use. Gene Rostow has provided his proposal at Tab B. My staff is working on this issue and I will have an edited draft to you by mid-day Monday.

Since you are probably thinking about arms control over the weekend, I thought you might like to have this raw input for ideas. If you feel any of this is appropriate, please mark it and we will have it included in our draft.

Tab A - Al Haig's Input
Tab B - Gene Rostow's Input

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S/S 8208361



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 27, 1982

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

FOU

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Statement on US Arms Control Policy

Attached is a revision of the proposed text of a Presidential statement on US Arms Control Policy we sent you on March 25. This revision includes additional points Secretary Haig suggests the President make.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Proposed text.

RR 12/20/11

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

12/20/11

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON US ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Arms control is an essential part of my Administration's approach to national security. Last November I laid out the basic objectives of American arms control policy. I stressed our commitment to negotiate in good faith the reduction of both nuclear and conventional arms. I made a specific proposal to eliminate entirely two types of new US missiles about which the Soviet Union has expressed concern, if the Soviet Union would eliminate its missiles of similar type.

We remain committed to these objectives. In Geneva we have put forward the text of a treaty with the Soviet Union which embodies the proposals on intermediate range missiles I made on November 18. In Vienna we are negotiating, along side our Allies, on reductions on non-nuclear forces in Europe. Here in Washington we are completing our preparations for negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons.

I share the sense of urgency expressed by many in this country and abroad that we move ahead in these areas. But we must move forward on the basis of carefully thought-out proposals. It is not enough to want progress. The substance of our position is critical to the success of negotiations, and to the value of resulting

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

agreement. Negotiations with the Soviet Union must produce results which will receive the approbation of the international community, the support of the American people and the approval of the American Congress.

In recent weeks a number of different proposals for a freeze on nuclear weapons have received wide attention. As I have said before, I believe we must go beyond a freeze to achieve reductions. A freeze under current circumstances would perpetuate an unstable and unequal strategic balance, and would remove any incentive for the Soviets to reduce their arsenal. It would also be impossible to verify; thus having us base American security on trust of the Soviet Union.

Last week a distinguished group of Congressmen submitted a resolution calling for significant reductions to equal force levels. These are essential elements of truly effective arms control.

The concerns of those who support a freeze on nuclear weapons are also my concern. But a freeze is not enough. We must do better. That is why I have and will continue to put forward realistic proposals for arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. Such agreements will reduce the risk of war, lower the level of armaments, and enhance global security. We can accept no less.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

March 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Statement on START

After a good deal of fiddling around, I conclude that the attached is the most persuasive way to answer the question you put to me. As you will see, it attempts to combine the decision about starting START with the problem of the "freeze" resolutions. While I have warm words for the Jackson-Warner Resolution, I carefully interpret it as supporting the essential idea of the November 18 speech, and say that the President will seek to clarify it at a few points so that we can go into the negotiations with the backing of Congress. You will note a number of other points the statement makes, all designed to nail down our position and to present the "starting START" decision as a normal incident in the process of Government.

I strongly recommend that Senator Jackson and other key supporters of the resolution be invited to meet with the President prior to the public release of the President's statement. Scoop has remarked to me several times (without rancor) that he has found it hard to see the President.



Attachment:

Proposed Statement
re: START

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Draft of Possible Presidential Statement
at Press Conference

I have instructed Secretary of State Haig and ACDA Director Rostow to take up with the Soviet Union the question of a date for the opening of the START talks -- that is, the talks on reducing nuclear arms of intercontinental range. We shall propose opening the negotiations in Geneva late in the spring or early in the summer. Our preparations for the START talks are nearly complete, and it is clear that we will be ready to move ahead by that time.

I have said in the past that nuclear arms talks between the Soviet Union and the United States constitute a special category in East-West relations. In view of our unfortunate experience with SALT during the past decade, I have stressed that careful preparations are a key factor in determining when negotiations could begin. Of course, negotiations of this kind do not occur in a vacuum. Events in Poland, Afghanistan, the Caribbean, and other areas of Soviet-American tension cast a long and ominous shadow even on talks about nuclear arms. But fair and verifiable nuclear arms agreements based on the principle of equal deterrence are in the common interest of mankind. They should be pursued except under the most extraordinary circumstances. I hope the condition of world politics will permit us to achieve success in these negotiations.

During recent weeks our people have been increasingly conscious of the world crisis which presses on every aspect of our lives. That crisis is caused by the Soviet policy of expansion based on the menace of the Soviet military buildup. Our citizens are right to be concerned about the state of the world. And they are right in asking their government to do everything possible to avert the risks of war. I welcome their counsel, which will strengthen our negotiating position in the months and years ahead.

Naturally, the advice I am getting about how to reach sensible arms control agreements with the Soviet Union varies greatly in practical merit.

I am glad to note that nobody is recommending unilateral disarmament or unilateral restraint that would set the Soviet Union "a good example." That course has been tried repeatedly in the past and has always failed, as we all now understand.

Some of our people are recommending that we accept a variant of Mr. Brezhnev's proposal for a nuclear arms freeze at current levels to be followed by negotiations to reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides. In my judgment this course would be a trap. A freeze at current levels would remove all incentives for the Soviet Union to accept reductions to equal levels later on. And it would perpetuate the current balance which is unequal in several vital respects. If one counts only the number of warheads on each side, the Soviet and American nuclear forces are roughly comparable. But all warheads are not equal in accuracy, vulnerability, or destructive power. During the last decade, the Soviet Union has built up its conventional and nuclear forces while ours have remained stable. In this period, the Soviet Union has achieved distinct superiority in ground based ballistic missiles which are accurate and immensely destructive. As a result, the balance has been upset, because some of the forces on which we have relied to deter aggression are now vulnerable to preemptive Soviet attack. This instability increases the likelihood that the Soviets could use their military advantage for coercion and intimidation. A freeze at current levels would freeze the present Soviet advantage and prevent us from restoring a more stable balance.

The Resolution sponsored by a distinguished group of Senators led by Senators Warner, Jackson, Baker, Byrd, and a number of their colleagues is in a different class. While it uses the word "freeze," which could be misunderstood here and abroad, it does not propose freezing at current levels; instead, it endorses the essential idea of the proposals I made last November -- substantial reductions leading to equal and verifiable limits for each side, especially with respect to the most destabilizing weapons. I am pleased to have the support of these outstanding Senators. I hope through consultations with them to

clarify several ambiguities in the present text of their Resolution. It would be highly desirable to go into the START negotiations with the backing of a unanimous Resolution of the Congress supporting the basic principles of our approach.

Our goal in START and in the INF talks now proceeding in Geneva is an agreement or agreements which assure each side an equal capacity to deter the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons for purposes of aggression. To that end, we shall seek, in the first instance, radical cuts to equal levels in the number of ballistic missiles on each side, the forces with first-strike potential which pose the greatest threat to stability. Our proposals will take into account not only the number of weapons, but their size and destructive power. These proposals will be incorporated in a treaty of indefinite duration, subject to review at regular intervals. The treaty will contain provisions to ensure that it is verifiable, and to prevent the circumvention of its purposes through the deployment of heavy missiles or bombers, or through other means.

The nuclear arms agreements I am seeking through negotiations would achieve long-term, mutual, and verifiable limitations on intermediate range and intercontinental nuclear weapons. These agreements should be viewed as a first step towards a more comprehensive understanding with the Soviet Union. There is only one possible basis for such an understanding: mutual and reciprocal respect for the rules of the United Nations Charter which forbid the international use of force except in self-defense or pursuant to decisions of the Security Council. Nuclear deterrence is an important goal of our foreign and defense policy. But it is not a sufficient goal. Nuclear deterrence cannot be a license for aggression as usual by conventional forces, subversion, or terrorism. There is no way to draw a sharp line between conventional and nuclear warfare. Small wars, after all, can become big ones. In order to banish the unthinkable threat of nuclear war, we must rededicate ourselves once more, as we did in 1945, to the task of abolishing war itself. The nuclear weapon is so awful, and its menace is so universal, that it should fulfill Nobel's great dream, and compel the nations to realize that peace is indivisible. There is no rational alternative.

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Some misunderstanding has arisen regarding my response to President Brezhnev's recent proposal for a moratorium on nuclear missiles. While I welcome any overture by the Soviets suggesting a reduction to the threat of nuclear destruction, I do not believe his proposal went far enough.

It would leave the Soviet Union in a dangerous position of nuclear superiority by most measures while doing nothing to reduce the excessive level of nuclear warheads now in place. It would also be unverifiable.

My abiding goal is to reverse the uncivilized trend toward ever higher levels of nuclear weapons. At the same time history has proven that we cannot afford, in today's world, to act alone. We have tried that on several occasions in the past, only to witness an acceleration of Soviet programs. We can however by sensible, mutual agreement substantially reduce the numbers. I will wholeheartedly support and work for significant, verifiable reductions and an equitable balance.

Today the Soviets have 900 nuclear warheads mounted on 300 new intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching all of Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. NATO has no corresponding system able to strike the Soviet Union. To maintain effective deterrence, our NATO allies in 1979 proposed the deployment of cruise missiles and the Pershing II starting next year.

Last November I proposed that we forego that deployment in exchange for Soviet agreement to dismantle their intermediate range systems already in place. Our representatives in Geneva have tabled a draft treaty to this effect.

Here at home we are making plans for talks with the Soviet Union aimed at a substantial reduction of long-range strategic nuclear systems both here and in the Soviet Union. I am absolutely committed to this goal. If the Soviets will enter these talks with a corresponding commitment, we can achieve an equitable, verifiable agreement at reduced levels.

If the Soviets will cooperate in such an undertaking, we just might bring about an advance in civilized discourse among nations.

There has been some confusion voiced regarding my response to President Brezhnev's recent proposal for a moratorium on nuclear missiles. While I welcome any overture by the Soviets suggesting a reduction to the threat of nuclear destruction, I do not believe his proposal went far enough.

It would leave the Soviet Union in a dangerous position of nuclear superiority while doing nothing to lessen the danger inherent in the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads now in place.

Earlier in this century the civilized world abided by rules of warfare that protected civilian populations from attack. Then came World War II and the barbarious concepts of "total war"; a repudiation of civilization itself. Now in the name of national security military strategy is based on the ability to incinerate by the millions, men, women, children -- the non-combatants of the world.

Possibly put this line later.

Are we incapable of returning to that earlier level of civilization we had once achieved? (No nation can afford, in today's world, to unilaterally give up such weapons.)* We can however by sensible, mutual agreement substantially reduce them in number. I will wholeheartedly support and work for this to achieve a verifiable reduction and an equitable balance.

Today on the Western European front the Soviets have 900 nuclear warheads mounted on 300 intermediate-range missiles. These are capable of reaching all of Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. We in turn are building nuclear weapons requested by our European Allies to be deployed in Western Europe as a deterrent.

Last November I proposed the total elimination of these weapons -- ours and theirs. Our representatives are in Geneva trying to negotiate such an agreement.

Here at home we are making plans for talks with the Soviet Union aimed at a substantial reduction of long-range strategic nuclear missiles both here and in the Soviet Union. If this can be achieved there must be mutual verification so as to eliminate suspicion and doubt.

If the Soviets will cooperate in such an undertaking we just might bring the world to an advance in civilization.

OR 91

For the sake of our children and our continuing efforts to enhance the prospects for world peace. That is particularly necessary in view of the ~~conflict~~

~~There has been~~ some confusion voiced regarding my response to President Brezhnev's recent proposal for a moratorium on nuclear missiles. While I welcome any overture by the Soviets suggesting a reduction to the threat of nuclear destruction, I do not believe his proposal went far enough.

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Earlier in this century the civilized world abided by rules of warfare that protected civilian populations from attack. Then came World War II and the barbarious concepts of "total war"; a repudiation of civilization itself. Now in the name of national security military strategy is based on the ability to incinerate by the millions, men, women, children -- the non-combatants of the world.

Are we incapable of returning to that earlier level of civilization we had once achieved? (~~No nation can afford, in today's world, to unilaterally give up such weapons.~~)*

We can however by sensible, mutual agreement substantially reduce ~~them~~ ^{these monstrous submersible weapons} in number. ~~The world nation can afford to take such action unilaterally but together we can.~~ I will wholeheartedly support and work for this to achieve a

verifiable ~~reduction and~~ an equitable balance ~~at a greatly reduced number.~~ ^{When that is achieved we can then talk about an end to further production.}

Today on the Western European front the Soviets have 900 nuclear warheads mounted on 300 intermediate-range missiles ~~those~~

~~are~~ capable of reaching all of Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. ~~Our allies have nothing in the way of a deterrent to this threat -~~ We ~~therefore~~ are building nuclear weapons requested

by our European Allies to be deployed in Western Europe ~~and~~ ^{to provide such} a deterrent.

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Last November I proposed ^(INSTEAD) the total elimination of these weapons -- ours and theirs. Our representatives are in Geneva trying to negotiate such an agreement.

Here at home we are making plans for talks with the Soviet Union aimed at a substantial reduction of long-range strategic nuclear missiles both here and in the Soviet Union. If this can be achieved there must be mutual verification so as to eliminate suspicion and doubt.

If the Soviets will cooperate in such an undertaking we just might bring the world to an advance in civilization.

I'm pleased to endorse a measure now before the Congress -- the ~~bill~~ resolution introduced by Sen. Jackson, ~~Warner & Brown~~ which calls for ~~the~~ substantial reduction in all nuclear weapons.

LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

Q: Do you believe that it would be possible to keep a nuclear war limited?

A: American policy toward deterring conflict remains the same as it has been for years. Our strategy remains one of flexible response. But as all Presidents have acknowledged, any use of nuclear weapons would have the most profound consequences. In a nuclear war, all mankind would lose.

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Q. Mr. President, does your statement mean that you do not support a freeze on nuclear weapons?

A: I want to avoid the use of catch words which are easily misunderstood, both here and abroad. I would rather say exactly what I mean which is that the United States will seek through negotiations with the Soviet Union substantial reductions in nuclear weapons to equal and verifiable levels.

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NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE

Q. Do you believe that it would be possible to limit nuclear war to Europe?

A. No.

-- Soviet suggestions that the United States could even consider fighting a nuclear war at Europe's expense is an outright deception. The essence of United States nuclear strategy is that no aggressor should believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Europe could reasonably be limited to Europe.

-- It is the joint European-American commitment to share the burden of our common defense which assures the peace. Thus, we regard any military threat to Europe as a threat to the United States itself.

-- Three hundred seventy-five thousand United States servicemen provide the living guarantee of this unshakeable United States commitment to the peace and security of Europe.

FIRST USE

Q: Can you imagine circumstances in which the U.S. would be the first to use nuclear weapons?

A: NATO is a defensive alliance. The U.S., and NATO as a whole, will never use its weapons except in response to an attack. At the same time, NATO has always relied upon the U.S. nuclear deterrent in helping to assure against a Soviet invasion, particularly in view of the massive Soviet threat.

(NSC/Bakshian)
March 30, 1982
9:10 p.m.

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NUCLEAR ARMS OPENING STATEMENT

Tonight I want to touch briefly on ^{what I view as} ~~our continuing efforts~~
~~my foremost responsibility -- keeping the~~ ^{safeguarding} ~~to control the nuclear arms race.~~ ^{the} ~~peace,~~

If there is one ^{contribution} ~~thing I would like~~ this Administration
~~to be remembered for above all else, it is the role of peace-~~
^{could make to the betterment of mankind it would be to achieve}
~~maker.~~ ^{a permanent reduction of nuclear arms.}

Twice in my lifetime I have seen the world plunge
blindly into tragic global wars that inflicted untold suffering
on millions of innocent people. I share the determination of
today's young people that such a tragedy -- which would be
rendered even more terrible by the monstrous, inhumane weapons
in the world's nuclear arsenals -- must never happen again.
My goal is to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically, and to
do so in a way that will assure lasting peace and security.

But protecting peace and security requires more than ~~a~~
^{sentiment} ~~vague vision.~~ We must move forward with ^{serious} ~~carefully-thought-out~~
proposals that are verifiable and will work.

That is what we are doing ^{in Geneva.} Last November I laid out the
basic objectives of American arms control policy. I stressed our
commitment to negotiate in good faith the reduction of both
nuclear and conventional arms. I made a specific proposal to
eliminate entirely intermediate range missiles in Europe.

~~We~~ ^I remain committed to ^{the goal} ~~these objectives.~~ In Geneva we
have put forward the text of a treaty with the Soviet Union
which embodies the proposals on intermediate range missiles I
made on November 18th. In Vienna, along with our allies, we
are negotiating reductions of non-nuclear forces in Europe.

Here in Washington, we are completing preparations for talks with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons reductions. I hope those negotiations can begin this summer.

We know all too well from past experience that negotiations with the Soviet Union must be carefully prepared if they are to produce worthy results. We cannot afford to repeat past mistakes, to hastily arrive at an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

Last week a distinguished group of Senators and Congressmen submitted resolutions to the Senate and House calling for major, verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to equal force levels. This is an important move in the right direction, and these points are essential elements of a truly effective arms control agreement -- elements which are consistent with ^{my} ~~the~~ views of this Administration. I commend Senators Jackson and Warner and all those who joined with them in this important initiative.

I also understand the concern of those who call for a freeze of nuclear weapons. But a thorough examination of proposals to freeze nuclear forces at present levels has convinced me that they simply do not go far enough and are not fair enough.

A freeze under current conditions would perpetuate an unstable and unequal strategic balance. It would do nothing to reduce the danger inherent in the thousands of nuclear warheads now in place. Most importantly, a freeze would virtually wipe out the possibility of negotiating any new reductions

in nuclear weapons since the Soviets would have no incentives whatsoever to bargain seriously.

We must be honest with ourselves. The Soviets have only been prepared to negotiate seriously when the West showed that it was prepared to respond to a Soviet military buildup if necessary. A freeze on the current status quo would eliminate this indispensable Soviet incentive. Finally, a freeze would be virtually impossible to verify; our security would have to rely on the word of the Soviet Union alone.

We must do better than that. This is why I have and will continue to put forward realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments, and enhances global security. We can accept no less.

America's national security policy is based on enduring principles. Our leaders and our allies have long understood that the objective of our defense efforts has always been to deter conflict and reduce the risk of war, conventional or nuclear. For over a third of a century we and our allies have preserved the peace through a strategy of deterrence. In plain words, this has meant preventing war by presenting the other side with risks that far exceed any conceivable gain he could make by attacking.

Together with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance, every President in the post-war period has followed this strategy --

and it has worked. It has earned the overwhelming bipartisan support of the Congress and the country at large, and it has kept world peace.

I intend to hold true to this tested policy for peace: first, by maintaining a military balance that will deter aggression and foster peace and, secondly, by negotiating in good faith to lower the level of armaments so that the risk of war is further diminished and both the free peoples of the west and those who live under the Soviet system can turn more of their resources to building a better, more abundant life for their people.

This will be my policy in the ^{months}~~days~~ ahead.

Yesterday, with the successful completion of the Columbia Space Shuttle's latest mission, we were all reminded of the great things the human race can achieve when it harnesses its best minds and efforts to a positive goal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have written proud chapters in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

I invite the Soviet Union to join with us now to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth.

(NSC/Bakshian)
March 30, 1982
9:10 p.m.

State changes 24

NUCLEAR ARMS OPENING STATEMENT

Tonight I want to touch briefly on ~~our continuing efforts~~ ^{what I view as} ~~to control the nuclear arms race.~~ ^{my foremost responsibility -- keeping the safeguarding the peace,}

If there is one ~~thing I would like~~ ^{contribution} this Administration ~~could make to the betterment of mankind it would be to achieve~~ ^{to be remembered for above all else, it is the role of peace-} ~~to be remembered for above all else, it is the role of peace-~~ ^{a permanent reduction of nuclear arms.} ~~makers.~~

Twice in my lifetime I have seen the world plunge blindly into tragic global wars that inflicted untold suffering on millions of innocent people. I share the determination of today's young people that such a tragedy -- which would be rendered even more terrible by the monstrous, inhumane weapons in the world's nuclear arsenals -- must never happen again. My goal is to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically, and to do so in a way that will assure lasting peace and security.

But protecting peace and security requires more than ~~a~~ ^{sentiment} ~~vague vision.~~ We must move forward with ~~carefully-thought-out~~ ^{serious} proposals that are verifiable and will work.

That is what we are doing ^{in Geneva.} Last November I laid out the basic objectives of American arms control policy. I stressed our commitment to negotiate in good faith the reduction of both nuclear and conventional arms. I made a specific proposal to eliminate entirely intermediate range missiles in Europe.

~~We~~ ^{the goal} remain committed to ~~these objectives.~~ In Geneva we have put forward the text of a treaty with the Soviet Union which embodies the proposals on intermediate range missiles I made on November 18th. In Vienna, along with our allies, we are negotiating reductions of non-nuclear forces in Europe.

Here in Washington, we are completing preparations for talks with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons reductions. [I hope those negotiations can begin this summer.]

state
1

We know all too well from past experience that negotiations with the Soviet Union must be carefully prepared if they are to produce worthy results. We cannot afford to repeat past mistakes, to hastily arrive at an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

Last week a distinguished group of Senators and Congressmen submitted resolutions to the Senate and House calling for major, verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to equal force levels. This is an important move in the right direction, and these points are essential elements of a truly effective arms control agreement -- elements which are consistent with ^{my} ~~the~~ views of this Administration. [I commend Senators Jackson and Warner and all those who joined with them in this important initiative.]

state
2

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in nuclear weapons since the Soviets would have no incentives whatsoever to bargain seriously.

We must be honest with ourselves. The Soviets have only been prepared to negotiate seriously when the West showed that it was prepared to respond to ^{the} a Soviet military buildup. [if necessary.] A freeze on the current status quo would eliminate this indispensable Soviet incentive. Finally, a freeze would be virtually impossible to verify; our security would have to rely on the word of the Soviet Union alone.

We must do better than that. This is why I have and will continue to put forward realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments, and enhances global security. We can accept no less.

America's national security policy is based on enduring principles. Our leaders and our allies have long understood that the objective of our defense efforts has always been to deter conflict and reduce the risk of war, conventional or nuclear. For over a third of a century we and our allies have preserved the peace through a strategy of deterrence. In plain words, this has meant preventing war by presenting the other side with risks that far exceed any conceivable gain he could make by attacking.

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I invite the Soviet Union to join with us now to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1982
10:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: WILLIAM P. CLARK ✓
JIM BAKER

FROM: DAVE GERGEN *DS*

SUBJECT: Arms Control Statement
(Tuesday Evening Version)

Here is the latest draft from Aram Bakshian, based upon the material received this evening. It tries to preserve the policy of the earlier material while revising some of the rhetoric.

Two points deserve further attention:

(1) Treatment of the freeze -- Recognizing the problems that come with endorsing the concept, do we really need to attack it so vigorously? What are we gaining?

(2) Treatment of START -- Given the fact that we are not going to be forthcoming on the freeze issue, can we say something more forthcoming about START? We have added a couple of items here that were not in the original ("hope talks can begin this summer"... "I want a strategic arms agreement that lowers the level of armaments, etc..."). Can we say this? can we say more?

NUCLEAR ARMS OPENING STATEMENT

Tonight I want to touch briefly on our continuing efforts to control the nuclear arms race.

If there is one thing I would like this Administration to be remembered for above all else, it is the role of peacemaker. Twice in my lifetime I have seen the world plunge blindly into tragic global wars that inflicted untold suffering on millions of innocent people. I share the determination of today's young people that such a tragedy -- which would be rendered even more terrible by the monstrous, inhumane weapons in the world's nuclear arsenals -- must never happen again. My goal is to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically, and to do so in a way that will assure lasting peace and security.

But protecting peace and security requires more than a vague vision. We must move forward with carefully-thought-out proposals that are verifiable and will work.

That is what we are doing. Last November I laid out the basic objectives of American arms control policy. I stressed our commitment to negotiate in good faith the reduction of both nuclear and conventional arms. I made a specific proposal to eliminate entirely intermediate range missiles in Europe.

We remain committed to these objectives. In Geneva we have put forward the text of a treaty with the Soviet Union which embodies the proposals on intermediate range missiles I made on November 18th. In Vienna, along with our allies, we are negotiating reductions of non-nuclear forces in Europe.

Here in Washington, we are completing preparations for talks with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons reductions. I hope those negotiations can begin this summer.

We know all too well from past experience that negotiations with the Soviet Union must be carefully prepared if they are to produce worthy results. We cannot afford to repeat past mistakes, to hastily arrive at an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

Last week a distinguished group of Senators and Congressmen submitted resolutions to the Senate and House calling for major, verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to equal force levels. This is an important move in the right direction, and these points are essential elements of a truly effective arms control agreement -- elements which are consistent with the views of this Administration. I commend Senators Jackson and Warner and all those who joined with them in this important initiative.

I also understand the concern of those who call for a freeze of nuclear weapons. But a thorough examination of proposals to freeze nuclear forces at present levels has convinced me that they simply do not go far enough and are not fair enough.

A freeze under current conditions would perpetuate an unstable and unequal strategic balance. It would do nothing to reduce the danger inherent in the thousands of nuclear warheads now in place. Most importantly, a freeze would virtually wipe out the possibility of negotiating any new reductions

in nuclear weapons since the Soviets would have no incentives whatsoever to bargain seriously.

We must be honest with ourselves. The Soviets have only been prepared to negotiate seriously when the West showed that it was prepared to respond to a Soviet military buildup if necessary. A freeze on the current status quo would eliminate this indispensable Soviet incentive. Finally, a freeze would be virtually impossible to verify; our security would have to rely on the word of the Soviet Union alone.

We must do better than that. This is why I have and will continue to put forward realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments, and enhances global security. We can accept no less.

America's national security policy is based on enduring principles. Our leaders and our allies have long understood that the objective of our defense efforts has always been to deter conflict and reduce the risk of war, conventional or nuclear. For over a third of a century we and our allies have preserved the peace through a strategy of deterrence. In plain words, this has meant preventing war by presenting the other side with risks that far exceed any conceivable gain he could make by attacking.

Together with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance, every President in the post-war period has followed this strategy --

and it has worked. It has earned the overwhelming bipartisan support of the Congress and the country at large, and it has kept world peace.

I intend to hold true to this tested policy for peace: first, by maintaining a military balance that will deter aggression and foster peace and, secondly, by negotiating in good faith to lower the level of armaments so that the risk of war is further diminished and both the free peoples of the west and those who live under the Soviet system can turn more of their resources to building a better, more abundant life for their people.

This will be my policy in the days ahead.

Yesterday, with the successful completion of the Columbia Space Shuttle's latest mission, we were all reminded of the great things the human race can achieve when it harnesses its best minds and efforts to a positive goal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have written proud chapters in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

I invite the Soviet Union to join with us now to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth.

NUCLEAR ARMS OPENING STATEMENT

Tonight I want to touch briefly on our continuing efforts to control the nuclear arms race.

If there is one thing I would like this Administration to be remembered for above all else, it is the role of peace-maker. Twice in my lifetime I have seen the world plunge blindly into tragic global wars that inflicted untold suffering on millions of innocent people. I share the determination of today's young people that such a tragedy -- which would be rendered even more terrible by the monstrous, inhumane weapons in the world's nuclear arsenals -- must never happen again. My goal is to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically, and to do so in a way that will assure lasting peace and security.

But protecting peace and security requires more than a vague vision. We must move forward with carefully-thought-out proposals that are verifiable and will work.

That is what we are doing. Last November I laid out the basic objectives of American arms control policy. I stressed our commitment to negotiate in good faith the reduction of both nuclear and conventional arms. I made a specific proposal to eliminate entirely intermediate range missiles in Europe.

We remain committed to these objectives. In Geneva we have put forward the text of a treaty with the Soviet Union which embodies the proposals on intermediate range missiles I made on November 18th. In Vienna, along with our allies, we are negotiating reductions of non-nuclear forces in Europe.

Here in Washington, we are completing preparations for talks with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons reductions. I hope those negotiations can begin this summer.

We know all too well from past experience that negotiations with the Soviet Union must be carefully prepared if they are to produce worthy results. We cannot afford to repeat past mistakes, to hastily arrive at an arms control process that sends hopes soaring only to end in dashed expectations.

Last week a distinguished group of Senators and Congressmen submitted resolutions to the Senate and House calling for major, verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to equal force levels. This is an important move in the right direction, and these points are essential elements of a truly effective arms control agreement -- elements which are consistent with the views of this Administration. I commend Senators Jackson and Warner and all those who joined with them in this important initiative.

I also understand the concern of those who call for a freeze of nuclear weapons. But a thorough examination of proposals to freeze nuclear forces at present levels has convinced me that they simply do not go far enough and are not fair enough.

A freeze under current conditions would perpetuate an unstable and unequal strategic balance. It would do nothing to reduce the danger inherent in the thousands of nuclear warheads now in place. Most importantly, a freeze would virtually wipe out the possibility of negotiating any new reductions

in nuclear weapons since the Soviets would have no incentives whatsoever to bargain seriously.

We must be honest with ourselves. The Soviets have only been prepared to negotiate seriously when the West showed that it was prepared to respond to a Soviet military buildup if necessary. A freeze on the current status quo would eliminate this indispensable Soviet incentive. Finally, a freeze would be virtually impossible to verify; our security would have to rely on the word of the Soviet Union alone.

We must do better than that. This is why I have and will continue to put forward realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments, and enhances global security. We can accept no less.

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WHSR
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McFarlane	C
Poindexter	C
WHEELER	C
Merchant	
NSC S/S	C

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S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 00353 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages 5
 FROM: C. E. McManaway S/S 23126 6224
 (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Bremer-Clark on Nuclear Freeze

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Mr. W. P. Clark</u>	<u>62255</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: This is an advance, the original will follow.

S/S Officer: C. E. McManaway



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 31, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Questions and Answers on Nuclear Freeze

Attached is a set of Q's and A's concerning a nuclear freeze and related questions about nuclear weapons for use in preparation for the President's press conference.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Q. Mr. President, does your statement mean that you do not support a freeze on nuclear weapons?

A: I want to avoid the use of catch words which are easily misunderstood, both here and abroad. I would rather say exactly what I mean which is that the United States will seek through negotiations with the Soviet Union substantial reductions in nuclear weapons to equal and verifiable levels.

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NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTION

Background: Senators Warner and Jackson have introduced a resolution calling for nuclear arms reductions to equal and verifiable levels. While this resolution thus endorses the Reagan Administration approach to arms control, it does use the term "freeze" but at "equal and sharply reduced levels." We must be careful that the Warner-Jackson resolution not be called a freeze resolution. So far, the press has drawn a clear distinction between this resolution and the Kennedy-Hatfield (see attached article).

- NO ONE MORE CONCERNED OVER DANGER NUCLEAR WAR THAN PRESIDENT
- PROPOSAL FOR FREEZE AT CURRENT LEVELS GAINING SOME GROUND:
 - BAD FOR SECURITY: CODIFIED SOVIET ADVANTAGES, U.S. VULNERABILITIES
 - UNDERCUTS NEGOTIATIONS
 - DIFFICULT TO VERIFY ALL FREEZE ASPECTS
- APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO FOCUS ON MORE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE:
 - REDUCTIONS AT EQUAL, SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED LEVELS
 - VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS
- HOWEVER, FREEZE LANGUAGE IN YOUR RESOLUTION CAN CAUSE CONFUSION: BLURS DISTINCTION BETWEEN YOUR RESOLUTION AND KENNEDY-HATFIELD, EVEN BREZHNEV'S. WE MUST CONTINUE TO MAKE DISTINCTION CLEAR.
- NEED TO WIDEN SUPPORT IN CONGRESS AND WITH PUBLIC FOR REDUCTIONS RATHER THAN FREEZE.
 - BEST BET FOR MAINTAINING LEVERAGE IN INF
 - FOR START

12/20/11
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE

Q. Do you believe that it would be possible to limit nuclear war to Europe?

A. No.

-- Soviet suggestions that the United States could even consider fighting a nuclear war at Europe's expense is an outright deception. The essence of United States nuclear strategy is that no aggressor should believe that the use of nuclear weapons in Europe could reasonably be limited to Europe.

-- It is the joint European-American commitment to share the burden of our common defense which assures the peace. Thus, we regard any military threat to Europe as a threat to the United States itself.

-- Three hundred seventy-five thousand United States servicemen provide the living guarantee of this unshakeable United States commitment to the peace and security of Europe.

FIRST USE

Q: Can you imagine circumstances in which the U.S. would be the first to use nuclear weapons?

A: NATO is a defensive alliance. The U.S., and NATO as a whole, will never use its weapons except in response to an attack. At the same time, NATO has always relied upon the U.S. nuclear deterrent in helping to assure against a Soviet invasion, particularly in view of the massive Soviet threat.

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LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

Q: Do you believe that it would be possible to keep a nuclear war limited?

A: American policy toward deterring conflict remains the same as it has been for years. Our strategy remains one of flexible response. But as all Presidents have acknowledged, any use of nuclear weapons would have the most profound consequences. In a nuclear war, all mankind would lose.

There has been some confusion voiced regarding my response to Pres. Brezhnev's recent proposal ~~agreed~~ for a moratorium on nuclear missiles. While I welcome any overture by the Soviets suggesting a reduction ~~to~~ the threat of nuclear destruction I do not believe his proposal went far enough.

It would leave the Soviet U. in a dangerous position of nuclear superiority while doing nothing to lessen the danger inherent in the 10's of 1000's of nuclear warheads now in place.

Earlier in this century the civilized world abided by rules of warfare that protected civilian populations from attack. Then came W.W.II and the barbarous concept of "total war," a repudiation of civilization itself. Now in the name of national security military strategy is based on the ability to incinerate by the millions, men, women, children - the non-combatants of the world.

Are we incapable of returning to that earlier level of civilization we had once achieved? No nation can afford, in today's world, to unilaterally give up such weapons. We can however by sensible, mutual agreement substantially reduce them in

Research
for this
letter

reduction of long range strategic nuclear missiles
both here & in the Soviet U. If this can be
achieved there must be mutual verification so as to
eliminate suspicion & doubt.

If the Soviets will cooperate in such an
undertaking we just might bring the world to
an advance in civilization.