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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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BLANTON

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
36818	MEMO	SVEN KRAEMER THROUGH RICHARD T BOVERIE TO WILLIAM P CLARK, RE YOUR 1/15 LETTER TO ARCHBISHOP BERNARDIN <i>R 6/22/2010 M129/1</i>	3	1/19/1983	B1
36819	CABLE	221451Z JAN 83 <i>R 6/22/2010 M129/1</i>	2	1/22/1983	B1

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *B*  
FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*  
SUBJECT: Your January 15 Letter to Archbishop Bernardin

Serious questions have arisen from last Saturday's decision to send a longer letter to Archbishop Bernardin on targeting issues, a decision we learned about on Monday afternoon. The following summary of the concerns involved is provided to you as we are likely to hear more about this issue in the future.

The letter (Tab A) which went out over your signature included extensive paragraphs on nuclear targeting issues -- paragraphs strongly opposed by the Office of Secretary of Defense and NSC staff and unvetted by the Department of State, ACDA, etc. When Bernardin passes the letter to his Commission staff members, Hehir and Russet, and as the letter is publicized, it will impact upon the Administration's deterrence policy and could undercut the Administration's previously carefully articulated discussion with the Bishops.

- Army Staff Draft. The offensive paragraphs (#4, 5, and 6) in the letter you signed were drawn directly from an original, awful draft (Tab D) forwarded from the Army Staff through Al Myer. The Army Staff letter, apparently drafted by General Robert Schweitzer's office, was not coordinated properly with the Office of Secretary of Defense, is inaccurate, and was not vetted within the NSC Staff (Boverie, Kraemer, Linhard). We did not learn until Monday evening that its inappropriate text had been forwarded across the street last week.
- OSD Objection. After receiving this project for action on Thursday evening, and noting severe problems in the Army Staff draft, I sought to work a substantially revised letter with Ron Lehman of the Office of Secretary of Defense and with Bob Linhard on Friday. Based upon OSD's strong objections, especially to the language concerning the public ambiguity of US targeting doctrine and the references to urban sanctuaries, and to purported, but unvalidated, statements by the JCS Chairman, etc., we prepared a new draft on a rush basis Friday afternoon.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-129#36818

RY *LM* NARA DATE 6/23/10



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2

OSD's markup of the Army draft is at Tab C. However, as I reported at Friday's Staff meeting, and reinforced in conversation with John Poindexter on Saturday, OSD objected to sending out even this revised language. OSD preferred the language used in your November 16 letter to Bernardin and in Lehman's January 7 discussion with the Bishops. OSD warned that to use even the revised language, would seriously prejudice US national security interests and would undercut our January 7 meeting. Lehman's judgment reflected the views of his office, as well as a conversation he had with Bishop O'Connor on Friday afternoon, which indicated that omission of the inappropriate paragraphs (given the remainder of the revised letter) would protect the Administration's interests without being harmful to the interests of Bishop O'Connor within the Bishops' Commission.

-- NSC Staff Recommendation. After noon on Saturday John Poindexter instructed preparation of the letter for your immediate signature. I therefore discussed with him a draft incorporating major OSD and NSC staff revisions (Tab B), but recommending strongly that we not overrule OSD and our own staff concerns on the controversial paragraphs. Instead, as indicated in the Tab B attachment, we agreed we should go with an abbreviated version. We agreed that this abbreviated version would meet both our security needs and the requirement for letting Bernardin and the Apostolic delegation know that you felt the January 7 briefing/discussion by Ron Lehman, et al, had clarified misunderstandings and allayed concerns. As pointed out in the cover memo to you, this abbreviated version could be sent without major risks, although the issue of clearance with OSD and State still remained something of a problem.

-- Letter Sent. Regrettably, the letter sent on Saturday failed to accommodate the grave concerns expressed earlier, and it unnecessarily provided inaccurate and highly sensitive commentary which will probably come back to haunt us, as Bernardin and his staff circulate it. OSD and State are asking for copies of the letter you sent and will be upset. Down the road, we may very well face a situation soon where we will be forced to modify some of the inappropriate sentences.

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3

In retrospect, it is difficult to understand why the serious reservations and recommendations expressed by OSD and by your staff were rejected, and why the inappropriate, unvetted, and unrevised Army Staff language was inserted, especially since Bishop O'Connor did not need more than your affirmation of Ron Lehman's January 7 briefing and of your November 16 letter.

Serious questions have now been raised concerning sensitive aspects of US targeting policy, OSD's trust in our judgment, the interagency clearance process, and concerning the careful and increasingly credible and successful relationship the Administration was developing with the Bishops. It will be difficult for us to justify this letter with OSD and other agencies (who have not yet seen it, but need to be briefed), and it appears impossible to get a revised version of the letter to Bernardin without causing more problems.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the above and the attachments; and that you assure a fully considered coordination process on addressing the sensitivities of the Administration's communications with the Bishops.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Archbishop Bernardin  
Tab B Revised Version by Poindexter and Kraemer  
Tab C Revised Version by Lehman, Linhard, and Kraemer  
Tab D Original Army Staff Draft

~~SECRET~~

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(LETTER AS SENT AND WEST WING MARK-UP)

Saturday - January 15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1983

Dear Cardinal Bernardin:

Permit me to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on your elevation to the College of Cardinals. This great honor and responsibility is a recognition of your own spiritual life, your leadership, and the importance of the position you occupy in the nation's largest archdiocese.

I have continued to reflect on the concerns of the Bishops concerning the role of nuclear weapons as a strategy to deter war and what this means for civilian populations. I was also pleased to hear about the discussion of January 7, which you and your colleagues on the Bishops' Commission had at the Department of State on issues addressed in your draft Pastoral Letter with representatives of U.S. agencies, including my deputy, Robert McFarlane, and Sven Kraemer of my staff. I understand it was possible to review our arms control efforts with you, and that Dr. Ronald Lehman of the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided substantial information at the meeting concerning U.S. deterrence and targeting policy, and our public approach to this issue. I hope this may have allayed some of the concerns and cleared up some of the misunderstandings.

Clearly, the goal of the United States Government, and the purpose of its military strategy, is the prevention of war by demonstrating the attacker could not possibly emerge from a conflict in a position of net gain. This would clearly convey to any potential aggressor that he could not hope to achieve significant political and or military objectives through either a resort to nuclear aggression or by a threat to do so.

For moral, political and military reasons, the United States does not target the Soviet civilian population as such. There is no deliberately opaque meaning conveyed in the last two words. We do not threaten the existence of Soviet civilization by threatening Soviet cities. Rather, we hold at risk the war-making capability of the Soviet Union -- its armed forces, and the industrial capacity to sustain war. It would be irresponsible for us to issue policy statements which might suggest to the Soviets that it would be to their advantage to establish privileged sanctuaries within heavily populated areas, thus inducing them to locate much of their war-fighting capability within those urban sanctuaries.



It is precisely because we do not want to make war upon innocent Soviet civilians -- or at all -- that we do not want to drive the Soviets into loading up their cities with offensive forces. Paradoxically, this is best avoided by using the kind of scholastic distinctions in our public expressions which then give rise to some of your concerns. However, recent public statements by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense and myself should make clear to reasonable men and women that Soviet cities and their populations are not the aim of a deterrent strategy developed to avoid war.

Additionally, the United States does not announce its targeting strategy publicly and unequivocally, nor should we, for to do so would give the Soviets a decided advantage. Ambiguity in this sense is as much a moral as a practical imperative for responsible U.S. officials. Ambiguity in deterrence is constructive because it fosters doubt which hinders the opponent's choice of one or another course of aggressive action.

To the extent the United States is able to influence Soviet behavior substantially, the American choice is to urge the Soviet Union to devote its considerable, but not infinite, resources to the spiritual and material betterment of its population, rather than to continue its unparalleled military buildup. However, the best evidence we have indicates that, regardless of what the United States has done, the Soviet leadership has devoted 13 to 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product or more to military expenditures, or more than twice our own rate. This is why we need both an effective deterrent and effective arms control.

I firmly believe that we have chosen the proper course in our deterrent policy, since it has deterred major war for an unprecedented period of time in the Western history. Together with our broad arms control agenda, our deterrent gives every promise of doing so in the future.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

His Eminence  
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin  
155 East Superior Street  
Post Office Box 1979  
Chicago, Illinois 60611



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Dear Cardinal Bernardin:

Permit me to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on your elevation to the College of Cardinals. This great honor and responsibility is a recognition of your own spiritual life, your leadership, and the importance of the position you occupy in the nation's largest archdiocese.

I have continued to reflect on the concerns of the Bishops concerning the role of nuclear weapons as a strategy to deter war and what this means for civilian populations. I was also pleased to hear about the discussion of January 7, which you and your colleagues on the Bishops' Commission had at the Department of State on issues addressed in your draft Pastoral Letter with representatives of U.S. agencies, including my deputy, Robert McFarlane, and Sven Kraemer of my staff. I understand it was possible to review our arms control efforts with you, and that Dr. Ronald Lehman of the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided substantial information at the meeting concerning U.S. deterrence and targeting policy, and our public approach to this issue. I hope this may have allayed some of the concerns and cleared up some of the misunderstandings.

Clearly, the goal of the United States Government, and the purpose of its military strategy, is the prevention of war by demonstrating that ~~the costs we could inflict in response to attack would far exceed any gains that any attacker would hope to make.~~ This would clearly convey to any potential aggressor that he could not hope to achieve significant political and or military objectives through either a resort to nuclear aggression or by a threat to do so.

attacker could not possibly emerge

→ <sup>ment A</sup> To the extent the United States is able to influence Soviet behavior substantially, the American choice is to urge the Soviet Union to devote its considerable, but not infinite, resources to the spiritual and material betterment of its population, rather than to continue its unparalleled military buildup. However, the best evidence we have indicates that, regardless of what the United States has done, the Soviet leadership has devoted 13 to 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product or more to military expenditures, or more than twice our own rate. That is why we need both an effective deterrent and effective arms control.

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I firmly believe that we have chosen the proper course in our deterrent policy, since it has deterred major war for an unprecedented period of time in the Western history. Together with our broad arms control agenda, our deterrent gives every promise of doing so in the future.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

His Eminence  
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin  
155 East Superior Street  
Post Office Box 1979  
Chicago, Illinois 60611



POINDEXTER/KRAEMER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

January 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE <sup>not seen</sup>

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER SK

SUBJECT: Letter to Cardinal Bernardin

The attached letter from you to Cardinal Bernardin represents a much abbreviated version, worked out today by John Poindexter and me, of a possible draft which OSD's Ron Lehman and I worked on yesterday per instructions to address the targeting/civilian casualties issue further. While Ron has not had an opportunity to review the attached, and while State has not seen it at all, I believe there is little risk in sending it as is.

The letter's principal purpose would be to let Bernardin know that you have had good reports about the January 7 meeting, and that you felt that a number of concerns had been allayed and misunderstandings clarified.

RECOMMENDATION

That you telegraph the attached letter to Bernardin (Tab A) and/or seek to transmit it via the Apostolic Delegate, with an information copy for the latter.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Cardinal Bernardin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By LOI NARA, Date 5/30/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Cardinal Bernardin:

Permit me to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on your elevation to the College of Cardinals. This great honor and responsibility is a recognition of your own spiritual life, your leadership, and the importance of the position you occupy in the nation's largest archdiocese.

I have continued to reflect on the concerns of the Bishops concerning the role of nuclear weapons as a strategy to deter war and what this means for civilian populations. I was also pleased to hear about the discussion of January 7, which you and your colleagues on the Bishops' Commission had at the Department of State on issues addressed in your draft Pastoral Letter with representatives of U.S. agencies, including my deputy, Robert McFarlane, and Sven Kraemer of my staff. I understand it was possible to review our arms control efforts with you, and that Dr. Ronald Lehman of the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided substantial information at the meeting concerning U.S. deterrence and targeting policy, and our public approach to this issue. I hope this may have allayed some of the concerns and cleared up some of the misunderstandings.

Clearly, the goal of the United States Government, and the purpose of its military strategy, is the prevention of war by demonstrating that the costs we could inflict in response to attack would far exceed any gains that any attacker would hope to make. This would clearly convey to any potential aggressor that he could not hope to achieve significant political and or military objectives through either a resort to nuclear aggression or by a threat to do so.

To the extent the United States is able to influence Soviet behavior substantially, the American choice is to urge the Soviet Union to devote its considerable, but not infinite, resources to the spiritual and material betterment of its population, rather than to continue its unparalleled military buildup. However, the best evidence we have indicates that, regardless of what the United States has done, the Soviet leadership has devoted 13 to 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product or more to military expenditures, or more than twice our own rate. That is why we need both an effective deterrent and effective arms control.

I firmly believe that we have chosen the proper course in our deterrent policy, since it has deterred major war for an unprecedented period of time in the Western history. Together with our broad arms control agenda, our deterrent gives every promise of doing so in the future.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

His Eminence  
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin  
155 East Superior Street  
Post Office Box 1979  
Chicago, Illinois 60611



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Reindexer/Kraemer  
Draft - Sat 2pm

Dear Cardinal Bernardin:

Permit me to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on your elevation to the College of Cardinals. This great honor and responsibility is a recognition of your own spiritual life, your leadership, and the importance of the position you occupy in the nation's largest archdiocese.

I have continued to reflect on the concerns of the Bishops concerning the role of nuclear weapons as a strategy to deter war and what this means to civilian populations. I was also pleased to hear about the discussion of January 7, which you and your colleagues on the Bishops' Commission had at the Department of State on issues addressed in your draft Pastoral Letter with representatives of U.S. agencies, including my deputy, Robert McFarlane, and Sven Kraemer of my staff. I understand it was possible to review our arms control efforts with you, and that Dr. Ronald Lehman of the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided substantial information at the meeting concerning U.S. deterrence, and targeting policy *and our public approach to this issue.*

*I hope this may have allayed some of the concerns and cleared up some of the misunderstandings.*  
In an effort further to illuminate the issue of civilian casualties, I wish to expand on the comments I made to you in my November 16, 1982 letter on American nuclear policy. For moral, political, and military reasons, the United States does not target the Soviet civilian population as such. There is no deliberately opaque meaning conveyed in the last two words. To deter aggression, we make clear that, in retaliation, we would target the war-making capability of the Soviet Union -- its armed forces and the industrial capacity to sustain war. It is not our nation's policy to deter by threatening the very existence of Russian civilization.

As you are aware, the United States must be most careful in how it ~~DESCRIBES~~ its policy to the Soviet Union. The U.S. does not announce its targeting with great precision and unequivocally; nor should we, for to do so would give the Soviets a decided advantage. A studied ambiguity hinders an aggressor's choice of one or another course of aggressive action. This has been U.S. deterrence policy for many years.

To the extent the United States is able to influence Soviet behavior substantially, the American choice is to urge the Soviet Union to devote its considerable, but not infinite, resources to the spiritual and material betterment of its population, rather than to continue its unparalleled military buildup. However, the best evidence we have indicates that, regardless of what the United States does, the Soviet leadership devotes 13 to 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product or more to military expenditures for the foreseeable future, or more than twice our own rate.

~~It is in the best interest of a more enduring peace, as well as the national security of the United States, which we are morally obliged to protect, that a substantial portion of Soviet military expenditures be devoted to defensive, rather than offensive, measures. Such expenditures, unwanted as they are in a larger ideal perspective, do not threaten the United States, and are far better than giving the Soviets the capability to spend these funds on offensive systems. A measure of deliberate public ambiguity in American nuclear strategy encourages Soviet leaders to devote a greater proportion of their resources to defensive, rather than offensive systems, than they otherwise would do.~~

Clearly, the goal of the United States Government, and the purpose of its military strategy, is the prevention of war by demonstrating that the costs we could inflict in response to attack would far exceed any gains that any attacker would hope to make. This would clearly convey to any potential aggressor that he could not hope to achieve significant political and/or military objectives through either a resort to nuclear aggression or by a threat to do so.

I firmly believe that we have chosen the proper course in our deterrent policy, since it has deterred major war for an unprecedented period of time in the Western history. Together with our broad arms control agenda, our deterrent gives every promise of doing so in the future.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

His Eminence  
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin  
155 East Superior Street  
Post Office Box 1979  
Chicago, Illinois 60611

LEHMAN/LINHARD/KRAEMER



DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
DRAFT  
WASHINGTON

Please review ASAP  
for transmittal today,  
if generally OK,

OSD Mark Up

Fri - 4:30 pm

Iven Kraemer

Dear Cardinal Bernardin:

Permit me to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on your elevation to the College of Cardinals. This great honor and responsibility is a recognition of your own spiritual life, your leadership, and the importance of the position you occupy in the nation's largest archdiocese.

I have continued to reflect on the concerns of the Bishops concerning the role of nuclear weapons as a strategy to deter war and what this means to civilian populations. I was also pleased to hear about the discussion of January 7, which you and your colleagues on the Bishops' Commission had at the Department of State on issues addressed in your draft Pastoral Letter with representatives of U.S. agencies, including my deputy, Robert McFarlane and Sven Kraemer of my staff. I understand it was possible ~~for us~~ to review our arms control efforts with you, and that Dr. Ronald Lehman of the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided substantial information at the meeting concerning U.S. deterrence and targeting policy.

~~To deter aggression~~

In an effort further to illuminate the issue of civilian casualties, I wish to expand on the comments I made to you in my November 16, 1982, letter on American nuclear policy. For moral, political, and military reasons, the United States does not target the Soviet civilian population as such. There is no deliberately opaque meaning conveyed in the last two words. ~~(We do not threaten the existence of Soviet civilization by threatening Soviet cities.)~~ Rather, ~~we hold at risk the war-making capability of the Soviet Union -- its armed forces and the industrial capacity to sustain war.~~ ~~It is not our nation's policy to deter by threatening the very existence of Russian civilization.~~

It would be irresponsible for us to issue policy statements that might suggest to the Soviets that it would be to their advantage to establish privileged sanctuaries within heavily populated areas, thus inducing them to locate such of their warfighting capability within those urban sanctuaries. It is precisely because we do not want to make war upon innocent Soviet civilians -- or at all -- that we do not want to drive the Soviets into filling their cities with offensive forces. Paradoxically, this is best avoided by

at no point in our policy of flexible response should the

US turn to the deliberate

we wish to state that, in retaliation, we would target

TO cover 11



DRAFT

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using the very kind of distinctions in our public expressions which may have given rise to some of your concerns. However, recent public statements by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense and myself including, should make clear to reasonable men and women that ~~Soviet states~~ and their populations are not the aim of a deterrent strategy developed to avoid war.

substantive decision

As you are aware, ~~the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense and myself~~

It must be very careful in how it details its policy of the deterrent. The U.S.

(Additionally) the United States does not announce its targeting strategy publicly and unequivocally; nor should we, for to do so would give the Soviets a decided advantage. A measure of ambiguity in this sense is as much a moral as a practical imperative for responsible U.S. officials. Such ambiguity in deterrence is constructive because it fosters doubt that hinders an opponent's choice of one or another course of aggressive action.

~~opponents~~ This has been U.S. deterrence policy for many years.

To the extent the United States is able to influence Soviet behavior substantially, the American choice is to urge the Soviet Union to devote its considerable, but not infinite, resources to the spiritual and material betterment of its population, rather than to continue its unparalleled military buildup. However, the best evidence we have indicates that, regardless of what the United States does, the Soviet leadership devotes 13 to 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product or more to military expenditures for the foreseeable future, or more than twice our own rate.

To Rome

It is in the best interest of a more enduring peace, as well as the national security of the United States, which we are morally obliged to protect, that a substantial portion of Soviet military expenditures be devoted to defensive, rather than offensive, measures. Such expenditures, unwanted as they are in a larger ideal perspective, do not threaten the United States, and are far better than giving the Soviets the capability to spend these funds on offensive systems. A measure of deliberate public ambiguity in American nuclear strategy therefore encourages Soviet leaders to devote a greater proportion of their resources to defensive, rather than offensive systems than they otherwise would do.

Clearly, the goal of the United States Government, and the purpose of its military strategy, is the prevention of war by demonstrating that the costs we could inflict in response to attack would far exceed any gains that any attacker would hope to make.

~~THIS~~ ~~AND~~ WOULD CLEARLY CONVEY TO ~~THE~~ THAT HE COULD NOT HOPE TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AND/OR MILITARY OBJECTIVES THROUGH EITHER A RESORT TO NUCLEAR AGGRESSION OR BY A THREAT TO DO SO.

ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR

DRAFT

3

I firmly believe that we have chosen the proper course <sup>is</sup> of our deterrent policy, since it has deterred major war for an unprecedented period of time in the Western history. Together with our broad arms control agenda, our deterrent gives every promise of doing so in the future.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

*Why not call  
our arms control initiatives  
more  
Lm*

His Eminence  
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin  
155 East Superior Street  
Post Office Box 1979  
Chicago, Illinois 60611



ARMY STAFF DRAFT  
(WITH INITIAL KRAEMER REVISIONS)

*before OSD review*

OSD

Dear Archbishop Bernadin,

SENSITIVE

(Initial SK mark up)  
Thurs - 8 pm.)

Permit me to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on your elevation to the College of Cardinals. This great honor and responsibility is a recognition of your own spiritual life, your leadership and the importance of the position you occupy in the nation's largest archdiocese.

I have continued to reflect on the concerns of the Bishops concerning the role of nuclear weapons as a strategy to deter war and what this means to civilian populations. In an effort to further illuminate the issue

of civilian casualties

I wish to expand on the comments I made to you in my 16 November 1982 letter on American nuclear policy.

For moral, political, and military reasons, the United States does not target the Soviet civilian population as such. There is no deliberately opaque meaning conveyed in the last two words. We do not threaten the existence of Soviet civilization by threatening Soviet cities. Rather, we hold at risk the war-making capability of the Soviet Union--its armed forces, and the industrial capacity to sustain war. It would be irresponsible for us to issue policy statements which might suggest to the Soviets that it would be to their advantage to establish privileged sanctuaries within heavily populated areas, thus inducing them to locate much of their war-fighting capability within those urban sanctuaries.

2

It is precisely because we do not want to make war upon innocent Soviet civilians--or at all-- that we do not want to drive the Soviets into loading up their cities with offensive forces. Paradoxically, this is best avoided by using the very kind of scholastic distinctions in our public expressions which then give rise to some of your concerns. However, recent public statements by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense and myself should make clear to reasonable men and women that Soviet cities and their populations are not the aim of a deterrent strategy developed to avoid war

2

⊕ I was also pleased to hear about the discussion of January 7 which you and your colleagues on the Bishops' commission had on issues addressed

Robert M. Farber  
L. Spry  
my self

SENSITIVE

Additionally, the United States does not announce its targeting strategy publicly and unequivocally, nor should we, for to do so would give the Soviets a decided advantage. Ambiguity in this sense is as much a moral as a practical imperative for responsible U.S. officials. <sup>A measure of</sup> Ambiguity in deterrence is constructive because it fosters doubt which hinders the opponent's choice of one or another course of aggressive action.

Were the United States able to influence Soviet behavior substantially, the American choice would be to urge the Soviet Union to devote all of its considerable, but not infinite, resources to the spiritual and material betterment of its population. However, the best evidence we have indicates that, regardless of what the United States does, the Soviet leadership will devote 13 to 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product to military expenditures for the foreseeable future, <sup>or more than twice our rate.</sup>

It is therefore in the best interest of a more enduring peace as well as the national security of the United States, which we are morally obliged to protect, that a substantial portion of those <sup>Soviet & military</sup> expenditures be devoted to defensive measures. Such expenditures, unwanted as they are in a larger ideal perspective, do not harm or even threaten the United States, and are far better than giving the Soviets the capability to spend these funds on offensive systems capable of power projection. <sup>A measure of public</sup> ~~The~~ deliberate ambiguity in American nuclear strategy therefore encourages Soviet leaders to devote a greater proportion of their resources to defensive <sup>rather than offensive</sup> systems than they otherwise would do.

Clearly, the goal of the United States government, and the purpose of its military strategy, is the prevention of war by demonstrating that the costs we <sup>could</sup> inflict in response to attack would far exceed any gains that <sup>we</sup> the attacker would hope to make.



I firmly believe that we have chosen the proper course, and articulation  
of our policy, since it has deterred major war for an unprecedented period  
of time in the Western World history, and gives every promise of doing  
so in the future.

Sincerely,

Judge Clark

UNCLASSIFIED  
SENSITIVE

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*American Bishops  
22 Jan*

36819

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 6448  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3782

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION #1 OF #2 ROME #1752

FROM VATICAN OFFICE  
E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC  
SUBJECT: VATICAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS;  
CONVERSATION WITH ARCHBISHOP BERNARDIN ON JANUARY 21

1. C- ENTIRE TEXT

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: CARDINAL DESIGNATE BERNARDIN BELIEVES THE VATICAN SPONSORED CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS USEFUL. AS A RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE THE DOCUMENT WILL BE MODIFIED SOMEWHAT TO DIFFERENTIATE MORE CAREFULLY BETWEEN GENERAL MORAL PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICABILITY. BERNARDIN SURMISED THAT THE THIRD AND FINAL DRAFT OF THE BISHOPS' LETTER WILL BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION. HE NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE MAJORITY OF AMERICAN BISHOPS CONTINUE TO DISAGREE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S NUCLEAR POLICY AND RHETORIC. END SUMMARY.

3. BERNARDIN SAID THE FRENCH AND GERMAN BISHOPS HAD SUGGESTED THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE TO THE VATICAN. THERE WERE THIRTY PARTICIPANTS IN THE TWO DAYS SESSION INCLUDING TEN FROM THE VATICAN. CARDINAL CASAROLI AND ARCHBISHOP SILVESTRINI HAD PARTICIPATED IN ALL THE SESSIONS WITH CASAROLI AND CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN CARDINAL RATZINGER DOING MOST OF THE TALKING FOR THE VATICAN. BERNARDIN CONFIRMED THAT THE POPE HAD NOT ATTENDED ANY OF THE SESSIONS BUT WAS RECEIVING THE AMERICAN GROUP LATER ON JANUARY 21ST TO DISCUSS THE CONFERENCE.

4. BERNARDIN DESCRIBED THE MEETING AS CORDIAL. IT HAD BEEN LED OFF BY FATHER JAN SCHOTTE OF THE VATICAN'S JUSTICE AND PEACE COMMISSION. SCHOTTE READ A 12 PAGE BRIEF OUTLINING THE VATICAN'S POSITION ON NUCLEAR ARMS. GENERAL DISCUSSION FOLLOWED. THERE WAS NO SET AGENDA. EACH PARTICIPANT HAD A COPY OF THE DRAFT LETTER AND IT WAS REFERRED TO CONSTANTLY IN THE SESSIONS.

5. BERNARDIN ADMITTED THAT DIFFERENCES STILL EXIST FOLLOWING THE MEETING. THE GERMAN BISHOPS IN PARTICULAR DIFFERED FROM THE AMERICANS ON THE NO FIRST USE QUESTION AND ON HOW DETERRENCE SHOULD BE APPLIED. HE SAID THE FRENCH BISHOPS HAD BEEN RATHER SILENT DURING THE MEETING AND HAD NOT CONTRIBUTED MUCH. THE ITALIANS, DUTCH AND BELGIANS HAD BEEN ADDED AT THE LAST MINUTE, HAD NOT HAD TIME TO PREPARE THEIR POSITIONS AND THUS DID NOT HAVE MUCH TO SAY. BERNARDIN REMARKED THAT THE AMERICAN BISHOPS' LETTER HAS SERVED AS A CATALYST FOR OTHER BISHOPS' CONFERENCES TO PREPARE THEIR OWN LETTERS ON NUCLEAR ARMS.

6. BERNARDIN CLAIMED THAT THE VATICAN HAS NOT IN ANY WAY BEEN CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN BISHOPS' EFFORT IN PREPARING THIS LETTER. THE BISHOPS NOW HAVE RECEIVED COMMENTS FROM THE VATICAN AND THE ADMINISTRATION AND OTHER BISHOPS' CONFERENCES AND WILL RETURN TO THE US AND REVISE SOME PARTS OF THE LETTER. THE FINAL DRAFT HAS TO BE READY FOR CIRCULATION IN TWO MONTHS.

7. BERNARDIN SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE COMMENTS THE BISHOPS HAVE RECEIVED THE FINAL DRAFT WILL BE MODIFIED IN WAYS WHICH WILL MAKE IT SOMEWHAT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION. IN REVISING THE DRAFT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN GENERAL MORAL PRINCIPLES (BINDING) AND THEIR APPLICABILITY (LESS BINDING). IF THE BISHOPS ARE EXPRESSING THEIR PERSONAL OPINIONS (AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM THEIR THEOLOGICAL ONES) THAT WILL BE NOTED. THE DRAFT LETTER WILL ALSO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S ONGOING NEGOTIATING EFFORTS. BERNARDIN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE THESE MODIFICATIONS THE ADMINISTRATION WILL PROBABLY STILL HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE DOCUMENT. HE SAID THE MAJORITY OF AMERICAN BISHOPS ARE IN DISAGREEMENT WITH THE NUCLEAR ARMAMENT POLICIES AND RHETORIC OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE WAY IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION IS IMPLEMENTING ITS DETERRENCE POLICIES.

8. BERNARDIN WAS IN A RUSH TO SAY MASS AND WE COULD NOT PURSUE THIS FURTHER. HE DID NOTE JUST BEFORE LEAVING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MINORITY ATTACHMENT TO THE LETTER. THE LETTER AND EACH OF ITS SECTIONS HAS TO BE APPROVED BY A TWO THIRDS MAJORITY. AFTER EACH SECTION OF THE

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BY KML NARA DATE 6/23/10

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MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE #1 ROME 1752  
EOB285 AN#07679

DTG: 221451Z JAN 83 PSN: #11683  
TOR: #22/1506Z CSN: HCE892

POSITIONS NOT APPROVED BY THE HOLY SEE.

DISTRIBUTION: FORT-#1 MYER-#1 DOBR-#1 KRAM-#1 LINH-#1 ROBN-#1  
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12. THE ROLE OF THE HOLY SEE WITH REGARD TO THE LETTER CAN BE DESCRIBED AS INFLUENCE WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT. OUR VATICAN SOURCES SUGGEST THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE CHURCH TO MAKE MORAL JUDGEMENTS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DETERRENCE POLICIES. THESE SOURCES CRITICIZE THE AMERICAN BISHOPS FOR ENTERING INTO DETAILS WHICH THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND. HORNBLow  
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 4829  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5578  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 7497  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 6449  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3783

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION #2 OF #2 ROME #1752

FROM VATICAN OFFICE  
E. O. 12356 DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, MNUC  
SUBJECT: VATICAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS;  
LETTER THE BISHOPS' VOTE WILL BE PRINTED.

9. COMMENT: THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT BERNARDIN'S ELEVATION TO CARDINAL MIGHT IN SOME WAY HELP TO DEFUSE THE BISHOPS' LETTER. WE DO NOT THINK HIS ELEVATION WILL MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. HE SEEMS TO BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THE LETTER IS A USEFUL AND IMPORTANT INITIATIVE AND SEEMS FIRM IN HIS OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S NUCLEAR ARMS AND DETERRENCE POLICIES.

10. WE HAVE HEARD FROM BOTH GERMAN AND FRENCH SOURCES THAT THE FRENCH BISHOPS PLAYED A MUCH STRONGER ROLE THAN BERNARDIN SUGGESTED. CARDINAL HOFFNER TOLD THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN TOUGHER ON THE AMERICANS THAN THE GERMANS. ARCHBISHOP SILVESTRINI TOLD FRENCH AMBASSADOR THAT THE FRENCH BISHOPS HAD BEEN "VERY POSITIVE AND REALISTIC." BOTH THE GERMAN AND FRENCH EMBASSIES AGREE THAT ONE RESULT OF THE SESSION WILL BE CLOSER COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND THE FRENCH BISHOPS CONFERENCES. CARDINAL HOFFNER FOR EXAMPLE WILL BE VISITING LYON FOR CONSULTATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

11. WE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE VATICAN'S COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT LETTER. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THE VATICAN WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT THIS INITIATIVE (THE BISHOPS' LETTER) HAD NEVER HAPPENED. BISHOPS CONFERENCES, HOWEVER, ARE GIVEN A GREAT DEGREE OF AUTONOMY AND THE VATICAN FEELS THAT IT CANNOT STOP THE LETTER OR DICTATE TO THE AMERICAN BISHOPS WHAT IT SHOULD CONTAIN. ARCHBISHOP SILVESTRINI IS KNOWN TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE AMERICAN BISHOPS' LETTER BECAUSE IT IS ON SUCH A GENERAL SUBJECT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS BEING BINDING ON NON AMERICAN CATHOLICS. THE AMERICAN BISHOPS THEREFORE WERE CAUTIONED STRONGLY NOT TO ENGAGE THE WORLDWIDE CHURCH INTO FOLLOWING

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