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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LM 5/22/2019

**File Folder** SAUDI ARABIA PEACE PLAN 1981

**FOIA**

F2004-026

**Box Number** 8

COLLINS

349

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
236391	LETTER	BEGIN TO REAGAN	3	10/30/1981	B1
236392	MEMO	TO KEMP, RE SAUDI CROWN PRINCE CONSIDERS...	1	12/14/1981	B1

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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European Peace Plan, June, 1980

- 1) "... growing tensions affecting ... (the Middle East) constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever."

This particular use of comprehensive solution is a codeword for an alternative to the U.S.-led Camp David process.

- 2) "... the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige ... (Europeans) to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way toward peace."

This principle is West Europe's plea for a greater role in the Middle East peace process than Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. have so far encouraged.

- 3) "... the nine countries of the (European) community base (their position) on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 ..."

That the Europeans base their views on Resolutions 242 and 338 is in keeping with U.S. policy, but the context in which they mention 242 and 338 suggests that they reject Camp David. The U.S. view, however, is that Camp David derives from and builds upon 242's theme of peace in exchange for withdrawal.

- 4) "The right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

The U.S. has expressed agreement with both recognition for Israel and of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians but not in the same context. Juxtaposing Israel's right to exist alongside of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians implies that they are of equal value and/or are dependent upon one another.

- 5) "All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders ... The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, ..."

The advocacy of "secure and recognized" borders is an appeal to Israel since it uses a codeword out of Israel's political-military doctrine. Guarantees, however, are held in disfavor by Israel because either they decrease Israel's freedom of action or are infeasible. The U.S. has acknowledged Israel's need for secure and recognized borders.



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2

- 6) "A just solution must be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people ... must be placed in a position ... to exercise fully its right to self-determination."

This principle carries the favor of Palestinians; UN Resolution 242 fails to mention the word "Palestinians." Regarding self-determination, Camp David calls for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to play a role in the determination of their own future.

- 7) "These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will have to be associated with the negotiations."

The U.S. view, however, is that the PLO might participate in the peace process only after it accepts Israel's right to exist and Resolution 242.

- 8) "... any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem (will not be accepted) and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access of everyone to the holy places."

In keeping with U.S. policy, the Europeans do not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. They do acknowledge the right of Jews to have access to their holy sites.

- 9) "... Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. "... these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law."

The current U.S. position as stated by President Reagan is that the settlements are unhelpful to the peace process but that they are not illegal.

- 10) "... only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, ..."

The U.S. advocated that Egypt and Israel renounce the use of force as part of the Sinai II agreement in exchange for which Israel withdrew from part of Sinai. The principle of withdrawal in exchange for peace appears again in the Camp David accords of 1978 and in the Egypt Israel treaty of 1979. Renunciation of force without peace thus contrasts with the U.S. position.

- 11) The Europeans "... decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned."

This principle makes clear that the Europeans initiative on the Middle East will continue irrespective of the Camp David peace process.



(from the New York Times, June 14, 1980)

## Text of the Venice Declaration

Special to The New York Times

VENICE, June 13 — Following is the text of a declaration on the Middle East by the European Council issued at the conclusion of a two-day conference in Venice this afternoon:

[1]

The heads of state and government and the ministers of foreign affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.

[2]

The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way toward peace.

[3]

In this regard the nine countries of the Community base on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 34th United Nations General Assembly.

[4]

On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

[5]

All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the United Nations by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including guarantees on the ground.

[6]

A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not

simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

[7]

The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavoring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.

[8]

The Nine recognize the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access of everyone to the holy places.

[9]

The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

[10]

Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

[11]

The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.



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EUROPEAN COUNCIL: LUXEMBOURG 29/30 JUNE 1981

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE ON MIDDLE EAST AND LEBANON

MIDDLE EAST

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL NOTED THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENCY AS WELL AS MR VAN DER KLAUW'S ORAL COMMENTS ON HIS CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.

IT CONCLUDED THAT THE EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE TEN TO PROMOTE THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE CONTINUED ENERGETICALLY AND WITHOUT RESPITE, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTS OF THE MISSIONS DECIDED UPON IN VENICE.

ACCORDINGLY, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECIDED, ON THE BASIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION JUST COMPLETED BY THE PRESIDENT-IN-OFFICE, TO INSTRUCT MINISTERS TO ELABORATE FURTHER THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE TO EUROPE TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THROUGH INTERNAL REFLECTION, APPROPRIATE CONTACTS BEING MAINTAINED WITH ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES.

AS REGARDS THE ATTACK BY THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PLANT ON 7 JUNE 1981 THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL CAN ONLY ENDORSE THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE UN

LEBANON

RECALLING ITS EARLIER STATEMENTS CONCERNING LEBANON, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL NOTED WITH INTEREST THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE ARAB QUADRIPARTITE COMMITTEE. THE COUNCIL EARNESTLY HOPED THAT POSITIVE RESULTS WOULD BE OBTAINED AT THE COMMITTEE'S NEXT MEETING IN BEIT-ED-DINE, SO AS TO ACHIEVE A GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, WHICH CAN GIVE LEBANON INTERNAL SECURITY AND FOSTER ITS STABILITY IN PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS.



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Analysis of Saudi Prince Fahd's Peace Plan

August 1981

1. "That Israel should withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab-Jerusalem."

This is the standard Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The resolution, however, does not refer to "all" territory. It leaves open for negotiations the degree of Israel's withdrawal in exchange for peace with the Arab states.

2. "That Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 should be dismantled."

This is the standard Arab line. Our position does not call for dismantling of Jewish settlements. While the Carter Administration had called the settlements illegal and an obstacle to peace, President Reagan said they were not illegal, our State Department has fudged the issue of legality, but we have referred to the settlements as helpful.

3. "The guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in the holy places."

When Jordan controlled the Old City of Jerusalem during 1948-67, Jews were denied access to their Holy Sites in Arab (East) Jerusalem and elsewhere on the West Bank. The Saudis may be assuring Israel that their access to the Jewish Holy Sites will not be jeopardized if Israel withdraws from the eastern part of Jerusalem. U.S. officials favor an undivided Jerusalem and consider the issue of sovereignty to be a matter to be settled by the parties in the last stages of a peace process.

4. "An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and to compensate those who do not wish to return."

Repatriation refers to a UN General Assembly resolution of 1948 that the US supported at the time. The Israelis, however, have advocated resettlement of refugees in the Arab states rather than repatriation in Israel or compensation. It is noteworthy that the number of Jews who fled Arab states as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict is roughly equal to the number of Arabs who fled Israel.

5. "That the West Bank and the Gaza strip should have a transitional period under the auspices of the UN for a period not exceeding several months."

The Camp David accords of 1978 refer to a transitional period of 5 years after agreement has been reached on a self governing authority for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The Saudis recognize the need for a transitional period, but their plan assumes several months instead of the 5 years we agreed to at Camp David.

1. "That Israel should withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab-Jerusalem."

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4. "An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and to compensate those who do not wish to return."

Refers to a UN General Assembly resolution of 1948 that the US supported at the time but the situation is quite different today.

5. "That the West Bank and the Gaza strip should have a transitional period under the auspices of the UN for a period not exceeding several months."

The Camp David accords of 1978 refer to a transitional period of 5 years after agreement has been reached on a self governing authority for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza strip.

6. "That an independent Palestinian state should be set up with Jerusalem as its capital."

U.S. policy opposes a Palestinian state and is committed to the autonomy approach under Camp David.

7. "That all states in the region should be able to live in peace."

This is alleged to mean Saudi acceptance of Israel's right to exist; Saudi references to Israel as a "Zionist entity" cast doubt on this interpretation.

8. "That the UN or member states of the UN should guarantee the execution of these principles."

By bringing in the UN, the Saudis deemphasize their own role and thus they can use the plan as a point of departure in a bargaining process.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 22, 1981

FOR: Norm Bailey  
Doug Feith  
Geoff Kemp  
Jim Rentschler  
Chris Shoemaker

FROM: Ray Tanter *RT*

Attached for your information.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 22, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER RT

SUBJECT: Saudi and European Peace Plans

A Washington Post article of October 21, 1981 discussed the Saudi peace plan of August 1981 (Tab A) and the Venice Declaration by the European Common Market of June 1980 (Tab B). Under the assumption that the Camp David peace process will stalemate after Israel's withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982, the Saudis and Europeans are seeking an alternative to the Camp David autonomy talks.

The Saudi proposals' main points: 1) Israel's withdrawal from all territory seized in 1967; 2) a Palestinian state; 3) recognition of the right for all states to live in peace (presumably including Israel). The Saudi proposals will be a main item of discussion during the Arab Summit in Morocco during late November.

The Venice Declaration's main principles: "the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." Also, the principles "... apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will have to be associated with the negotiations." Foreign Secretary Carrington will discuss the Venice Declaration and the Saudi plan during his visit to Saudi Arabia in early November.

-- Consistent with U.S. policy, the European plan explicitly recognizes Israel's right to exist; presumably, the Saudi plan does so implicitly.

-- The European plan calls for recognition of legitimate rights of Palestinians, including the exercise of self-determination; the Saudi plan goes further in advocating creation of a Palestinian state, an advocacy that runs counter to U.S. policy.

-- The European Plan explicitly acknowledges a PLO role in the peace negotiations; the Saudi plan does not mention the PLO, an organization excluded by the U.S. from the peace process because it does not acknowledge Israel's right to exist and refuses to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338.



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Special to The New York Times

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On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

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Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

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The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.



Vance

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

October 28, 1981

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT  
FOLLOWING  
THE SENATE VOTE ON AWACS

The Oval Office

5:25 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I want to express my gratitude to the members of the United States Senate for their approval of the sale of the AWACS defense system to Saudi Arabia. Today I think we've seen the Upper Chamber at its best. The United States Senate has acted with statesmanship, with foresight, and with courage.

I can't fully express my gratitude to Senator Baker and the other Senate leaders, Democrats as well as Republicans, who played such a crucial role in this decision.

Today's action by the Senate will not only strengthen Saudi-American relations but will also protect our economic lifeline to the Middle East, win favor among moderate Arab nations, and most important, continue the difficult but steady progress toward peace and stability in the Middle East.

We've acted in concert to demonstrate that the United States is indeed a reliable security partner. Our friends should realize that steadfastness to purpose is a hallmark of American foreign policy while those who would create instability in this region should note that the forces of moderation have our unequivocal support in deterring aggression.

This vote alone doesn't mean that our security problems in that part of the world have been completely solved. This package is but a part of our overall regional security strategy. Our strategy seeks to enhance the capacity of friendly states to defend themselves and to improve our own ability to project our own forces into the region should deterrence fail. We'll continue to pursue efforts in both areas.

Our support for the security of Israel is, of course, undiminished by today's vote. The United States will maintain its unshakeable commitment to the security and welfare of the State of Israel, recognizing that a strong Israel is essential to our basic goals in that area.

Much work still remains ahead. I trust that all of us who disagreed openly and vigorously in recent days can now put aside our honest differences and work together for common goals: Friendship, security, and peace at last in the cradle

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of our civilization. Because of actions like today's by the Senate, the cause of peace is again on the march in the Middle East. For this, all of us can be grateful.

Lehage!

Q When did you know that you had won?

THE PRESIDENT: When they came in and handed me the votes.

Q Didn't you know earlier today -- that you could count it up?

THE PRESIDENT: A little while ago this afternoon, I felt that the count was -- that at least we were going to be assured of a tie, and that would have been a victory because it required a majority vote to stop this.

Q Do you think this will be an inducement to get the Saudis into the Middle East peace process now?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. I think that as a matter of fact, the Saudis have shown, by their own introduction of a peace proposal that they are willing to discuss peace in the Middle East.

Q Between Egypt and Israel?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q Between Egypt and Israel?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, they submitted a plan. We could not agree with all the points, nor could the Israelis, but it was the first time that they had recognized Israel as a nation and it is a beginning point for negotiations.

} !

Q What do you think this vote means for your ability to conduct the arms --

THE PRESIDENT: I think that it's going to be -- it's going to have a very good effect. We had heard from many leaders who had expressed their concern about what this could mean in the whole world scene, if it had not turned out the way it did.

Q Do you think it will help you put the budget fight ahead? The next budget round?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I don't know whether the two are connected at all.

Q What aspect of what you told the senators did you think was the convincing aspect and what final thing do you think turned the tide in the last few days?

THE PRESIDENT: Contrary to some of things that have been said, there have been no deals made. None were offered. I talked strictly on the merits of the proposal and basically I tried to point out in every instance, the progress that has been made so far in the Middle East towards stability and peace and the part that was played in that by Saudi Arabia, Prince Fahd, beginning with the cease fire that we were able to secure in Lebanon, in which they played a major role. And I simply played on that that this, I felt, was essential for the security of Israel, for the entire Middle East and for ourselves on the world scene.

Q Do you foresee any circumstance under which by 1985 this sale might be cancelled if the Saudis aren't cooperating



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with the lease?

THE PRESIDENT: I would think that the only thing that could happen to make us not fulfill that would be if by some chance, the radical elements that we know are there and that have made themselves tragically evident in the last few weeks, that if they should gain control in the Middle East and gain control of all of those governments we are talking about, I think the very fact of what we have done and the knowledge now that the United States and our allies are not walking away from the Middle East is going to contribute to the stability and make it very unlikely that the other can happen.

Q A big smile, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: I'm trying to smile with dignity. I don't want to look jubilant. (Laughter.)

END

5:39 P.M. EST

NSC/S PROFILE

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*Peace Plan*  
ID 8106373

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
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TO PRES

FROM BEGIN, MENACHEM

DOC DATE 30 OCT 81

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KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

SAUDI ARABIA

*J: file*

MIDDLE EAST

HS

SUBJECT: LTR FM BEGIN RE SAUDI PEACE PLAN

ACTION: PENDING S/S DRAFT / RECOMS DUE: 10 NOV 81 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

KEMP

TANTER

FEITH

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<b>Allen</b>	
<b>Nance</b>	<b>C</b>
<b>Colson</b>	<b>C</b>
<b>Poindexter</b>	<b>C</b>
<b>LENZ</b>	<b>C</b>

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

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**O = Original**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**WASHFAX RECEIPT**  
**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

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00:30 P 6:41

**B**

S/S #

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*Handwritten initials*

*Handwritten number 4*

MESSAGE NO. 000710 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 4

FROM: L.P. Bremer, III S/S 22540 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Bremer-Allen re Letter from Prime Minister Begin

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Allen Lenz</u>	<u>395-3044</u>	<u>376A</u>
	<i>Handwritten signature</i>		
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REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

S/S Officer: *Handwritten signature*  
L. P. Bremer (mp)



~~SECRET~~ 17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Begin

Ambassador Byron has just delivered to the Department the attached letter from Prime Minister Begin to the President.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

BY LM NARA, DATE 5/22/19

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

GDS 10/30/87

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

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*Withdrawer*

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SAUDI ARABIA PEACE PLAN 1981

*FOIA*

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RAY

SAUDI  
# PEACE  
PLAN

21

V. important

FBIS 43

PRINCE FAHD HOLDS DIALOGUE ON SAUDI PEACE INITIATIVE

TAKE 1--PRINCE FAHD DIALOGUE

LDO21424 RIYADH SPA IN ARABIC 1130 GMT 2 NOV 81

(TEXT) RIYADH, 2 NOV (SPA)--OWING TO THE INTEREST SHOWN BY POLITICAL AND INFORMATION CIRCLES ON THE LOCAL, WESTERN, ISLAMIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS IN THE PEACE INITIATIVE DECLARED BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS AMIR FAHD IBN 'ABD AL-'AZIZ, THE CROWN PRINCE, SPA HAS ASKED HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS TO CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE TO EXPLAIN ALL ASPECTS OF THIS INITIATIVE.

FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE DIALOGUE:

QUESTION: THERE WERE SEVERAL INTERPRETATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE OBJECTIVES AND THE REASONS BEHIND YOUR HIGHNESS' PEACE PROPOSAL, WHICH YOU SUBMITTED (?MORE THAN 2 MONTHS AGO). MAY WE HEAR FROM YOUR HIGHNESS AN EXPLANATION OF THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE PLAN?

ANSWER: TO START WITH, I WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY THAT THE SAUDI PEACE INITIATIVE IS NOT A PERSONAL PLAN BUT A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (?AS WE UNDERSTAND AND BELIEVE IN THE KINGDOM). THESE PRINCIPLES WERE DECLARED IN THE NAME OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN KINGDOM, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING. (PASSAGE INDISTINCT)

WE HAVE GRADUALLY BECOME AWARE OF THE SECRETS OF THE INTERNATIONAL GAME AND THE SECRETS OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN A WORLD RULED BY THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SURVIVAL OF THE STRONGER. WE HAVE COME TO BELIEVE THAT HAVING RIGHT ON OUR SIDE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO RECOVER OUR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS LONG AS OUR ZIONIST ENEMIES REMAIN SUPERIOR TO US IN DIRECTING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (WORD INDISTINCT).

IF THE 1967 DEFEAT HAD BAD RESULTS, IT ALSO BROUGHT ABOUT SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS IN THAT IT OPENED THE EYES OF THE WORLD TO ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS AND HELPED THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, REPRESENTED BY THE PLO, EMERGE AS A PRINCIPAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY FORCE ON THE STAGE OF EVENTS.

DESPITE THE HUGE SUCCESSES SCORED BY THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WITHIN A FEW YEARS, ISRAEL CONTINUED TO DOMINATE THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN THE POLITICAL AND INFORMATION FIELDS AFTER HAVING DOMINATED IT IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

THEN CAME THE CAMP DAVID ERA, WHICH THE ARABS OPPOSED AND REJECTED UNANIMOUSLY AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT. THEY DID SO IN A MANNER UNPARALLELED IN CONTEMPORARY ARAB HISTORY SO THAT THE WORLD CAME TO REALIZE THAT THE ARAB NATION HAS SAID NO TO CAMP DAVID IN BOTH FORM AND CONTENT. THANK GOD, THE ARAB STAND THAT APPEARED IN BAGHDAD IS STILL FIRM AND COHERENT IN REJECTING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS, DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE BESET THE ARAB NATIONS SINCE THEN.

THOUGH THIS WAS BY NO MEANS A SMALL ACHIEVEMENT IN VIEW OF THE CHALLENGES POSED BY THE CAMP DAVID ERA AND THE SHOCK CAUSED BY THE DEPARTURE OF EGYPT, THE BIGGEST OF THE ARAB SISTERS, FROM THE ARENA OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, THE ARAB POLITICAL CONCEPT REMAINED CONFINED TO CONTAINING THE CAMP DAVID WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO OFFER A RATIONAL AND BALANCED ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD MAKE THOSE WHO APPLAUDED, CHEERED AND ADMIRER CAMP DAVID--AND THEY ARE NUMEROUS--FEEL THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE THAT DIFFERS CATEGORICALLY FROM THAT OF CAMP DAVID AND IS WORTHY OF CONTEMPLATION AND STUDY.

Geoff

file

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BY LM NARA DATE 5/22/09



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THESE ARE PRECISELY THE AIMS BEHIND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SAUDI PRINCIPLES. THOUGH WE DO NOT CLAIM THAT THESE PRINCIPLES PROVIDE A PANACEA FOR ALL ILLS, THEY ARE NEVERTHELESS A MODEST ATTEMPT TOWARD THAT END. WE PLACE IT AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ARAB NATION TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS AND EXCHANGES OF VIEWS AND REACH CONCLUSIONS.

WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT THE SAUDI DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WILL BECOME A TOOL FOR UNITY AND UNIFICATION WITH WHICH WE CAN FACE OUR ENEMIES AND A MEANS TOWARD ENDING THEIR DOMINATION OF THE CONFLICT.

A LOOK, A QUICK LOOK AT THE REACTIONS TO THE SAUDI DECLARATION--PARTICULARLY THE REACTION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE EEC, THE FAR EAST AND THE THIRD WORLD, BOTH ASIAN AND AFRICAN-- INDICATES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR US TO ATTRACT THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD TO A FORMULA THAT COULD BE AN ALTERNATIVE TO CAMP DAVID AND THAT CATEGORICALLY DIFFERS FROM IT.

THIS WORLD SUPPORT FOR THE SAUDI DECLARATION HAS BEEN COUPLED WITH AN INTENSIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN WAGED BY WORLD INFORMATION MEDIA. THE ESSENCE OF WHAT IS BEING CALLED FOR IS: ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PALESTINIANS, THEIR RETURN, THE RETURN OF JERUSALEM AS THEIR CAPITAL AND THE REMOVAL OF THE SETTLEMENTS-- ELEMENTS THAT WERE OVERLOOKED BY THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS.

ALL THIS IS TAKING PLACE AT A TIME WHEN CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERS THAT SUPPORT CAMP DAVID HAVE BEGUN TO ADMIT FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS HAVE EXHAUSTED THEMSELVES AND HAVE REACHED A DEAD END.

QUESTION: YOUR HIGHNESS' EXTENSIVE REPLY ABOUT THE AIMS OF THE SAUDI PEACE INITIATIVE PROMPTS US TO ANOTHER QUESTION DEALING WITH THE TIMING OF THE INITIATIVE. WHY WAS THE INITIATIVE MADE AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME?

ANSWER: AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID IN MY PREVIOUS REPLY, WE IN THE KINGDOM HAVE BEEN THINKING FOR SOME TIME ABOUT AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FRAMEWORK OF CAMP DAVID SO THAT THE ARAB REJECTION WOULD NOT BE PURELY REJECTION AND SO THAT WE WOULD NOT LEAVE THE FIELD FREE FROM ISRAEL TO CLAIM THAT THE ARABS HAVE REJECTED CAMP DAVID BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WANT PEACE. UNDOUBTEDLY, A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS PROMPTED THE DECLARATION OF THE SAUDI PRINCIPLES AT THE TIME THEY WERE ANNOUNCED. BRIEFLY THEY ARE:

1. PRESIDENT ANWAR AS7SADAT PASSED INTO THE HANDS OF GOD AND THE ANNALS OF HISTORY. ONE CANNOT BUT SHOW MERCY TOWARD THE DEAD. OUR DIFFERENCES WITH HIM WERE NEVER PERSONAL INASMUCH AS THEY WERE OVER HIS POLICY WHICH LED TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. FOR THIS REASON WE MADE IT A POINT TO ANNOUNCE THE SAUDI PRINCIPLES AT THE TIME PRESIDENT AS7SADAT WAS IN WASHINGTON TRYING TO REVIVE THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS. THIS WAS A BASIC FACTOR IN TIMING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES. IT WAS INTENDED AS A REPLY TO THE REVIVAL ATTEMPT AND TO SHOW THAT THE ARABS HAVE A RATIONAL AND POSITIVE ALTERNATIVE.

THIS FACTOR IS ALSO CONNECTED WITH YET ANOTHER FACTOR: PRESIDENT AS7SADAT HAD GONE FAR IN PRAISING THE SAUDI ARABIAN KINGDOM'S ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. WE FELT IT NECESSARY TO PUT MATTERS IN THEIR TRUE PERSPECTIVE IN ORDER TO AFFIRM AGAIN THAT EACH OF US HAS HIS WAY AND THAT THE PRAISE HE Poured ON US WOULD NOT AFFECT OUR POSTURE TOWARD THE CAMP DAVID POLICIES.

(MORE)

2 NOV 1656Z BW/CAJ



23  
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Authority NLR-286-8-49-2-7

BY LM NARA DATE 5/22/19

FBIS 44

TAKE 2--43 (PRINCE FAHD DIALOGUE)

/// CAMP DAVID POLICIES.

LDO21450

(TEXT) 2. THE CONTINUED ISRAELI THREATS TO SYRIA WHICH CULMINATED DURING THE MISSILES CRISIS AND THREATEN AN EXPLOSION OF THE SITUATION IN THE WHOLE REGION.

3. THE STRIKE AT THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR AND THE RESULTING INCREASED TENSION AND FERMENTATION.

4. ISRAELI'S BARBARIC MILITARY ESCALATION IN LEBANON AND THE NEED TO CONTAIN IT AND REPLY TO IT.

5. THE REELECTION OF MENAHEM BEGIN AS HEAD OF THE RULING ISRAELI COVLITION BY A MAJORITY OF ONE VOTE ONLY AND THE FACT THAT THIS FLIMSY MAJORITY MIGHT PROMPT THAT FANATICAL ZIONIST TO RESORT TO THEATRICAL MILITARY ACTIONS TO PRESERVE HIS POSITION.

6. SHARON'S ASSUMPTION OF THE DEFENSE PORTFOLIO IN THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND WHAT THIS MEANS TO AN ADVENTURIST MILITARY MAN WHO HAS DECIDED TO DEDICATE HIS TIME AND EFFORTS TO ESTABLISHING NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND PLANT JEWISH SETTLERS IN THEM. A FEW DAYS AGO HE ANNOUNCED A PROGRAM FOR SETTLING 100,000 JEWS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES.

7. OUR DESIRE TO ANTICIPATE THE NEW STAGE OF AMERICAN-ISRAELI ELECTIONS. THE SIGNS OF THAT STAGE HAVE NOW BEGUN TO EMERGE THROUGH THE TALK ABOUT STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE FULL DETAILS OF WHICH ARE NOT YET KNOWN.

ALL THESE FACTORS, PUT TOGETHER, PROMPTED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SAUDI PLAN AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME.

QUESTION: NOW THAT YOUR HIGHNESS HAS SPOKEN IN YOUR TWO ANSWERS ABOUT THE AIMS AND TIMING OF THE INITIATIVE, IT MIGHT BE PROPER TO SPEAK TO US ABOUT THE CONTENTS OF THE INITIATIVE.

ANSWER: AT THE TIME OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INITIATIVE AND IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER WE HAD ANY PRACTICAL REALIZABLE VISION OF HOW A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION CAN BE ATTAINED, I LITERALLY REPLIED THUS: NATURALLY, WE CANNOT GO INTO DETAILS AT THIS MOMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES THAT CAN BE USED AS GUIDELINES FOR ATTAINING A JUST SETTLEMENT. THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED REPEATEDLY DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS. AS I HAVE SAID PREVIOUSLY, THESE PRINCIPLES WERE NOT OF MY OWN INVENTION BUT RATHER PRINCIPLES AND RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THEY CAN ALL BE CORRELATED TOGETHER IN ONE RESOLUTION THAT COULD BE ADOPTED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND FORM A FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST SETTLEMENT.



THIS IS WHAT I SAID ON THE DAY OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PEACE INITIATIVE. TODAY I CAN ADD THAT SOME OF THE INITIATIVE'S PROVISIONS WERE ALSO INSPIRED BY THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMITS AND PARTICULARLY THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT. AS A WHOLE, THE INITIATIVE EMBODIES THE PROGRAM FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AS DRAWN UP BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE PALESTINE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO EXERCISE THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHTS, ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 AND THE RIGHT OF ALL THE AREA'S COUNTRIES TO LIVE IN PEACE.

IF WE WERE TO GO INTO SOME DETAIL, WE COULD SAY THAT THE QUESTIONS OF ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL, THE ARAB CHARACTER OF EAST JERUSALEM AND THE SETTLEMENTS HAVE ALL BEEN APPROVED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS SUCCESSIVE RESOLUTIONS. THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO RETURN AND COMPENSATION TO THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH TO RETURN, ARE CONTAINED IN A RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN EVERY ANNUAL SESSION HELD SINCE 1948. ALL ARE AWARE OF THE NUMBER OF THE RESOLUTION, WHICH I BELIEVE IS 194.

THE RIGHTS TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENCE, ARE CONTAINED IN THE UN CHARTER AS BASIC PRINCIPLES AS WELL AS IN RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH HAS SINCE 1974 AFFIRMED EVERY YEAR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO RETURN AND TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE.

IT REMAINS FOR ME TO ADD ONE MORE THING: IN FORMULATING THE SAUDI PLAN WE WORKED WITH A MAXIMUM SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SERIOUSNESS SO THAT IT WOULD NOT REMAIN AS A MERE COLLECTION OF SLOGANS. HENCE OUR ANXIOUSNESS TO INCLUDE IN IT THE FULL PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AS CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE 7TH ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN RABAT WHILE PRESERVING SOME BALANCE SO THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO PENETRATE WITH IT THE HIGHEST OFFICIAL POLITICAL AND INFORMATION LEVELS IN THE WORLD.

QUESTION: IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THE PLAN DID NOT MENTION THAT THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WILL BE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO.

ANSWER: FIRST, IN THE STATEMENT WHICH INCLUDED THE SAUDI PLAN I SAID THAT REALIZING A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT DEPENDS ON THREE CONDITIONS, ONE OF WHICH IS ACCEPTING THAT THE PALESTINIAN NUMERAL--THUS BROTHER YASIR 'ARAFAT EXPRESSES HIMSELF--IS THE BASIC NUMERAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST EQUATION.

SECONDLY, IN THE SAME STATEMENT, I CALLED UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO BECAUSE IT IS A REALITY AND A FACT AND ANY COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION MUST DEPEND UPON (THIS REALITY) AND FACT.

THIRDLY, THE STAGE OF CASTING DOUBTS ABOUT THE PLO AND ITS LEADERSHIP IS OVER, FOR I HAVE NOT HEARD ABOUT ANY PALESTINIANS, INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY, WHO WANT AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PLO AS THEIR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE. I CANNOT IMAGINE THAT A PALESTINIAN STATE COULD BE SET UP WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE PLO'S LEADERSHIP. HENCE, NO PEACE WITHOUT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND NO PALESTINIAN STATE WITHOUT THE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. THIS IS NOT JUST OUR CONVICTION BUT THE CONVICTION OF THE WHOLE WORLD, INCLUDING THOSE WHO REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND TO HAVE DEALINGS WITH IT.

(MORE)



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BY LM NARA DATE 5/22/19

FBIS 45

TAKE 3 OF 3--43 (PRINCE FAHD DIALOGUE)

/// DEALINGS WITH IT.

LD021454

(TEXT) QUESTION: IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT NONE OF THE PARAGRAPHS OF THE SAUDI INITIATIVE MENTIONED THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO SELFDETERMINATION. WHAT IS YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS' COMMENT ON THIS?

ANSWER: AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, THE SAUDI PEACE INITIATIVE REPRESENTS A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WAS ONE OF THE EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF THE INITIATIVE. NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, AS IS COMMONLY KNOWN, IS THE HIGHEST STAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. WE HAVE DEFINED THE RIGHT TO SELFDETERMINATION IN THE SAUDI DECLARATION AS THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RETURN TO AND INDEPENDENCE IN THEIR HOMELAND.

QUESTION: SINCE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT SHOWN ANY READINESS TO ALTER ITS POLICY, WHICH IS PARTIAL TO ISRAEL, SOME ARAB QUARTERS CONSIDER IT FUTILE TO DIRECT THE SAUDI INITIATIVE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOPE OF SECURING A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. WHAT IS YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS' COMMENT?

ANSWER: I BELIEVE THAT THE LATEST STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN REGARDING THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN INCLUDES A NEW SIGN THAT I HOPE WILL BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER ENCOURAGING SIGNS. ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL REALITY AND THE BALANCE OF WORLD POWER, THE UNITED STATES, LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, IS ONE OF THE TWO BIG POWERS. IN ADDITION TO THIS, IT CONTAINS ZIONIST PRESSURE GROUPS THAT HAVE A HUGE INFLUENCE AND BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS ON OUR ISSUES.

NATURALLY, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A LESS RESPONSIBLE ROLE CONCERNING EVENTS IN OUR REGION. WAS THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE NOT HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE TWO MAJOR POWERS AND WITHIN THE FRAME-~~WORK~~ OF THE UNITED NATIONS? I WISH WE COULD DIVIDE THE ROLES TO PRESSURE THE TWO MAJOR POWERS IN ORDER TO REGAIN OUR RIGHTS AND PEACE IN OUR HOMELAND.

IN THIS CONTEXT, I MUST EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION BY THE SOVIET UNION TO UPGRADE THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE PLO TO EMBASSY LEVEL. I ALSO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STEP TAKEN BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE FULLY THE PLO. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT GREECE'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC ADDS SPECIAL MEANING TO THE GREEK STEP; ANY STANCE SUPPORTING THE RIGHTS AND STRUGGLE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE HAS OUR ATTENTION AND APPRECIATION.

QUESTION: DID SAUDI ARABIA CONSULT THE ARAB BRETHERN OR ANY OTHER STATE BEFORE SUBMITTING THE INITIATIVE? IS IT ALSO TRUE, AS SOME SAY, THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAS CONTRAVENED THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMIT AND UNILATERALLY MWDE PUBLIC THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN?



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ANSWER: THE SAUDI PLAN IS A COLLECTION OF PRINCIPLES. THE PRINCIPLES ARE CONSIDERED A PLAN FOR A FRAMEWORK OF PEACE, THE FINAL DETAILS OF WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OUTLINED. HENCE WE DID NOT CONSULT ANYONE WHEN WE SUBMITTED THE SAUDI PLAN. WE IN SAUDI ARABIA BELIEVE THAT THE KIND OF THINKING REFLECTED BY THE SAUDI PLAN IS WHAT IS ATTRACTING THE SUPPORT OF THE WORLD, GUARANTEEING ARAB RIGHTS AND PROVING THROUGH PRACTICAL EVIDENCE THE STERILITY OF CAMP DAVID.

HENCE OUR ACTIONS ARE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMIT, NOT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THEM. OUR GREATEST CONCERN IS TO SUPPORT THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE AND REGAIN ARAB RIGHTS. WE ONLY SEE THESE GOALS IN THE SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS. WE WILL, GOD WILLING, PLACE THE RESULTS OF THIS MOVE OF OUR AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ARAB BRETHREN FOR THEIR ASSESSMENT AND THEIR BENEFIT.

IN ORDER TO FORCE ISRAEL AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT IT TO ACCEPT THE SAUDI PEACE PRINCIPLES, WE MUST RESTORE OUR SOLIDARITY, SHOWN AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT IN 1978, WITH REGARD TO MOBILIZING AND MASSING ALL ARAB POTENTIALS AND ENERGIES AND DEPLOYING THEM IN THE SERVICE OF THE TARGETS WE SEEK. THE CONFRONTATION IS MULTIFACETED AND AS LONG AS ITS ELEMENTS ARE INCOMPLETE THEN IT IS FUTILE TO TO START IT.

QUESTION: DOES SAUDI ARABIA INTEND TO SUBMIT THE SAUDI PLAN TO THE NEXT ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN WES?

ANSWER: THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL HAS DECIDED TO ASK THAT THE PLAN BE INCLUDED ON THE AGENDA OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE. AND THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE HAS PROBABLY BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS.

QUESTION: NOW THAT THE DEAL TO SELL AIRCRAFT AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO SAUDI ARABIA HAS BEEN AGREED ON, DOES YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS SEE A LINK BETWEEN THIS AND A POSSIBLE RESPONSE BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO THE SAUDI PLAN?

ANSWER: WE IN SAUDI ARABIA GREATLY APPRECIATE THE STEADFASTNESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN IN CONFRONTING THE ZIONIST PRESSURE GROUPS WHICH WAGED A VICIOUS, DESPERATE BATTLE TO PREVENT THE PASSAGE OF DEAL. THIS IS PROOF, IN OUR VIEW, OF THE ADAGE: WHERE THERE'S A WILL, THERE'S A WAY.

WHAT IS NOW REQUIRED FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADMINISTRATION IS TO START THE BIGGER AND MORE IMPORTANT BATTLE IT MUST WAGE IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN OUR REGION. THIS PEACE WILL ONLY BE ACHIEVED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM THE WEST BANK, GAZA AND THE GOLAN; THE RETURN OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO THEIR HOMELAND; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS SET UP AFTER 1967. THESE ARE MATTERS WHICH ARE COMPLETELY IGNORED BY THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND WHICH ARE STIPULATED IN THE SAUDI DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

(ENDALL)

2 NOV 1739Z BW/CAJ



~~SECRET~~  
27  
LAST

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS~~

J: File p.1 only  
in Peace

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: NLR-788-8-49-3-6  
BY: M MARA DATE 5/22/19



Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Current Analysis Series

November 4, 1981

ARAB-ISRAELI HIGHLIGHTS

Israeli Reaction to the Fahd Peace Plan (Entire text: CONFIDENTIAL)

Given the Israeli rejection of the Fahd peace plan and their preoccupation with Saudi Arabia as a threat, the Israelis can be expected to mount an all-out effort to prevent the Fahd plan from gaining US support.

The fervor of Israel's rejection of the Fahd plan is not simply the result of the Israeli defeat on the AWACS sale or of the growing anxiety that close US-Saudi ties will ultimately undermine US-Israeli relations. The contents of the plan itself repel the Israelis.

Even the principal dovish newspapers in Israel strongly oppose the Fahd plan. Haaretz, the most intellectually distinguished newspaper, states that the purpose of the plan is "to destroy Israel from within...." What the Israelis view as the favorable US and European reaction to the plan is explained as "the dependence of the West on Saudi oil." The Labor Party's Davar, while making tactical criticisms of Begin's outright rejection of the plan, has advised the government to "give its tactical and partial okay" to certain portions of the plan, thus "turning world attention to Saudi Arabia's true positions." The small Mapam newspaper, Al Hamishmar, writes that "there is no such thing as a Saudi peace plan."

Israelis find Fahd's proposals on the issues of borders, settlements, a Palestinian state, and Jerusalem particularly unacceptable. There has been a consensus in Israel since 1967 that the pre-1967 borders are militarily indefensible and must be expanded. On the question of recognition, the predominant Israeli view is that the Fahd plan offers absolutely no recognition of Israel. "Israel" never appears in the plan, and there is no mention of negotiations.

However repellent the plan is to the Israelis, there is a growing fear in Israel that Saudi Arabia will be Israel's greatest threat as long as its oil gives it a hold on the US. Israelis have become convinced that the Saudis are out to destroy Israel. Prime Minister Begin referred to Fahd's plan, in his November 2 Knesset address, as "the Saudi annihilation plan." Even were Saudi Arabia to recognize Israel, however, the belief is widespread that recognition would be merely a ploy to enable the Saudis to achieve their objective--the elimination of Israel *through stages.*

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS~~



S.A. Peace  
Proposal  
6514  
28

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

November 6, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Peace Proposals

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for the President with copies to the Vice President, Meese, Baker, and Deaver per your request on my memo to you of October 27, 1981, (Tab II). The Saudi Peace Proposal is at Tab A and the European Peace Proposal is at Tab B.

Geoff Kemp *gk* Chris Shoemaker *CS*, and Doug Feith concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo to the President
  - A - Saudi Peace Proposal
  - B - European Peace Proposal
- Tab II - Tanter October 27, 1981 memo to you

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*5/22/19*



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Analysis of Saudi Prince Fahd's Peace Plan

August 1981

1. "That Israel should withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab-Jerusalem."

This is the standard Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The resolution, however, does not refer to "all" territory. It leaves open for negotiations the degree of Israel's withdrawal in exchange for peace with the Arab states.

2. "That Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 should be dismantled."

This is the standard Arab line. Our position does not call for dismantling of Jewish settlements. While the Carter Administration had called the settlements illegal and an obstacle to peace, President Reagan said they were not illegal, our State Department has fudged the issue of legality, but we have referred to the settlements as helpful.

3. "The guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in the holy places."

When Jordan controlled the Old City of Jerusalem during 1948-67, Jews were denied access to their Holy Sites in Arab (East) Jerusalem and elsewhere on the West Bank. The Saudis may be assuring Israel that their access to the Jewish Holy Sites will not be jeopardized if Israel withdraws from the eastern part of Jerusalem. U.S. officials favor an undivided Jerusalem and consider the issue of sovereignty to be a matter to be settled by the parties in the last stages of a peace process.

4. "An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and to compensate those who do not wish to return."

Repatriation refers to a UN General Assembly resolution of 1948 that the US supported at the time. The Israelis, however, have advocated resettlement of refugees in the Arab states rather than repatriation in Israel or compensation. It is noteworthy that the number of Jews who fled Arab states as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict is roughly equal to the number of Arabs who fled Israel.

5. "That the West Bank and the Gaza strip should have a transitional period under the auspices of the UN for a period not exceeding several months."

The Camp David accords of 1978 refer to a transitional period of 5 years after agreement has been reached on a self governing authority for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The Saudis recognize the need for a transitional period, but their plan assumes several months instead of the 5 years we agreed to at Camp David.

6. "That an independent Palestinian state should be set up with Jerusalem as its capital."

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State suggests that this principle leaves the Saudis with room for maneuver. By bringing in the UN, the Saudis deemphasize their own role and thus they can use the plan as a point of departure in a bargaining process.



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- 1) "... growing tensions affecting ... (the Middle East) constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever."

This particular use of comprehensive solution is a codeword for an alternative to the U.S.-led Camp David process.

- 2) "... the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige ... (Europeans) to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way toward peace."

This principle is West Europe's plea for a greater role in the Middle East peace process than Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. have so far encouraged.

- 3) "... the nine countries of the (European) community base (their position) on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 ..."

That the Europeans base their views on Resolutions 242 and 338 is in keeping with U.S. policy, but the context in which they mention 242 and 338 suggests that they reject Camp David. The U.S. view, however, is that Camp David derives from and builds upon 242's theme of peace in exchange for withdrawal.

- 4) "The right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

The U.S. has expressed agreement with both recognition for Israel and of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians but not in the same context. Juxtaposing Israel's right to exist alongside of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians implies that they are of equal value and/or are dependent upon one another.

- 5) "All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders ... The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, ..."

The advocacy of "secure and recognized" borders is an appeal to Israel since it uses a codeword out of Israel's political-military doctrine. Guarantees, however, are held in disfavor by Israel because either they decrease Israel's freedom of action or are infeasible. The U.S. has acknowledged Israel's need for secure and recognized borders.

- 6) "A just solution must be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people ... must be placed in a position ... to exercise fully its right to self-determination."

This principle carries the favor of Palestinians; UN Resolution 242 fails to mention the word "Palestinians." Regarding self-determination, Camp David calls for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to play a role in the determination of their own future.

- 7) "These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will have to be associated with the negotiations."

The U.S. view, however, is that the PLO might participate in the peace process only after it accepts Israel's right to exist and Resolution 242.

- 8) "... any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem (will not be accepted) and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access of everyone to the holy places."

In keeping with U.S. policy, the Europeans do not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. They do acknowledge the right of Jews to have access to their holy sites.

- 9) "... Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. "... these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law."

The current U.S. position as stated by President Reagan is that the settlements are unhelpful to the peace process but that they are not illegal.

- 10) "... only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, ..."

The U.S. advocated that Egypt and Israel renounce the use of force as part of the Sinai II agreement in exchange for which Israel withdrew from part of Sinai. The principle of withdrawal in exchange for peace appears again in the Camp David accords of 1978 and in the Egypt Israel treaty of 1979. Renunciation of force without peace thus contrasts with the U.S. position.

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This principle makes clear that the Europeans initiative on the Middle East will continue irrespective of the Camp David peace process.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 27, 1981

INFORMATIONDECLASSIFIED *rw 9/2/16*Authority *M397/1 #127135*BY *LM* NARA DATE *5/22/19*

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER <sup>RT</sup> (Geoff <sup>JAC</sup>Kemp and Doug <sup>HO</sup>Feith concur)

SUBJECT: Saudi and European Peace Plans re Hussein Visit

A Washington Post article of October 21, 1981 discussed the Saudi peace plan of August 1981 (Tab A) and the Venice Declaration by the European Common Market of June 1980 (Tab B). Assuming that the Camp David process has stalemated, the Saudis and Europeans are seeking an alternative.

From an American perspective, it would undermine Camp David for the U.S. to speak favorably about either plan. ✓

The Saudi proposals' main points: 1) Israel's withdrawal from all territory seized in 1967; 2) a new Palestinian state; 3) recognition of the right of all states to live in peace (query: does this include Israel?). The Saudi proposals will be a main item of discussion during the Arab Summit in Morocco during late November.

The Venice Declaration's main principles: "the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." Also, the principles "...apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will have to be associated with the negotiations."

Foreign Secretary Carrington will discuss the Venice Declaration and the Saudi plan during his visit to Saudi Arabia in early November.

-- Consistent with U.S. policy, the European plan explicitly recognizes Israel's right to exist; the Saudi plan is ambiguous on recognition of Israel.

-- The European plan calls for recognition of legitimate rights of Palestinians, including the exercise of self-determination; the Saudi plan goes further in advocating creation of a new Palestinian state, and advocacy that runs counter to U.S. policy.

-- The European Plan explicitly recommends a PLO role in the peace negotiations; the Saudi plan does not mention the PLO, an organization excluded by the U.S. from the peace process because it does not acknowledge Israel's right to exist and refuses to accept UN Resolution 242.

King Hussein has spoken favorably about the European plan and negatively about the Saudi plan because it was a unilateral initiative of the Saudis.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Rvw. on 10/27/87

*Helpful memo and analysis. Thanks*

A



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Analysis of Saudi Prince Fahd's Peace Plan

August 1981

1. "That Israel should withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, including Arab-Jerusalem."

This is the standard Arab interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The resolution, however, does not refer to "all" territory. It leaves open for negotiations the degree of Israel's withdrawal in exchange for peace with the Arab states.

2. "That Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 should be dismantled."

This is the standard Arab line. Our position does not call for dismantling of Jewish settlements. While the Carter Administration had called the settlements illegal and an obstacle to peace, President Reagan said they were not illegal, our State Department has fudged the issue of legality, but we have referred to the settlements as helpful.

3. "The guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in the holy places."

When Jordan controlled the Old City of Jerusalem during 1948-67, Jews were denied access to their Holy Sites in Arab (East) Jerusalem and elsewhere on the West Bank. The Saudis may be assuring Israel that their access to the Jewish Holy Sites will not be jeopardized if Israel withdraws from the eastern part of Jerusalem. U.S. officials favor an undivided Jerusalem and consider the issue of sovereignty to be a matter to be settled by the parties in the last stages of a peace process.

4. "An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and to compensate those who do not wish to return."

Repatriation refers to a UN General Assembly resolution of 1948 that the US supported at the time. The Israelis, however, have advocated resettlement of refugees in the Arab states rather than repatriation in Israel or compensation. It is noteworthy that the number of Jews who fled Arab states as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict is roughly equal to the number of Arabs who fled Israel.

5. "That the West Bank and the Gaza strip should have a transitional period under the auspices of the UN for a period not exceeding several months."

The Camp David accords of 1978 refer to a transitional period of 5 years after agreement has been reached on a self governing authority for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The Saudis recognize the need for a transitional period, but their plan assumes several months instead of the 5 years we agreed to at Camp David.

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42

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

*AG*

November 6, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Peace Proposals

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for the President with copies to the Vice President, Meese, Baker, and Deaver per your request on my memo to you of October 27, 1981, (Tab II). The Saudi Peace Proposal is at Tab A and the European Peace Proposal is at Tab B.

Geoff Kemp *gk* Chris Shoemaker *CS*, and Doug Feith concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

APPROVE  DISAPPROVE

Attachments

- Tab I - Memo to the President
  - A - Saudi Peace Proposal
  - B - European Peace Proposal
- Tab II - Tanter October 27, 1981 memo to you

*Thank,*  
*11/16/81*

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
*11/22/19*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 27, 1981

INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Rvw. on 10/27/87

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BY: HM NARA DATE: 5/22/19

helpful memo and analysis

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TO KEMP, RE SAUDI CROWN PRINCE  
CONSIDERS...

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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