RW 8/23/96

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NSC/S PROFILE ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ ID 8500936

RECEIVED 05 FEB 85 11

TO MCFARLANE FROM DOUGLASS DOCDATE 04 FEB 85

SABLE 04 FEB 85

KEYWORDS: MX CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT TIMING OF PEACKEEPER (MX) RPT

ACTION. FOR DECISION DUE: 06 FEB 85 STATUS X FILES ~~WH~~ PA

FOR ACTION: MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE:

FOR INFO: LEHMAN, R; LEHMAN, C; DONLEY

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 05 FEB 1985 Mcfalone approved both DH, RS

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

SECRET 33

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: BOB LINHARD

SUBJECT: Today's Requests

SIR:

At this morning's staff meeting, you asked two questions:

-- what is the planned timing for the MX report, and
-- what is the view of the community concerning the right length of the opening round in Geneva.

The attached package addresses the first of your questions. We would move the MX report as soon as possible (March 2) so that we set the legislative clock running.

With regard to the length of the opening round, all seem to agree that we would be better served by a shorter first round. Some feel (Tower) that this would let the negotiators help on MX on the hill. Others feel that this would let us better prepare before really getting deeply into substance with the Soviets in the second round -- and thus ensure that the three teams don't get cross-ways with each other.

I strongly agree with this second rationale. We need more preparatory time -- and a short first round could get us that. We do have to prepare a defense against the Soviets tabling a treaty text in that short period -- but we should be able to do this. No one is currently arguing for a longer first session.

SECRET

34 S.

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 0936

1560

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall	4	— has cy —	
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	6		N
Situation Room			

I = Information | A = Action | R = Retain | D = Dispatch | N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

35

0936

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN W. JWD DOUGLASS/RONALD K. SABLE RKS

SUBJECT: Timing of Peacekeeper (MX) Report

The schedule at Tab A outlines the key events we see ahead of us in February and March regarding the President's report to Congress, and the subsequent Congressional vote on release of the FY 85 (last year's) funds for the second 21 production missiles.

As you may recall, our original target date for having a draft here at the NSC was February 1. We have slipped this to February 8 because DOD is behind schedule in writing a draft that both OSD and the Air Force support. We have been hammering away at DOD to get a draft for NSC and interagency review as soon as possible. A phone call from you to Secretary Weinberger or a word or two at one of your meetings would help ensure the report stays on schedule. We have also asked B. Oglesby to mention the need for early coordination of the draft in tomorrow's interagency meeting. Action item.

Working level personnel at State, ACDA and DOD have seen and concurred with the approach outlined at Tab A. If you concur, we will use the proposed schedule as our baseline in reviewing other events which might impact on the MX vote.

After we successfully pass the votes in late March on the FY 85 missiles, we expect MX to follow a course similar to last year and be one of the last items addressed in the FY 86 bill. While we expect the early vote to be a watershed on MX, the deficit debate will have a large impact on the final disposition of our request for 48 missiles in FY 86. It is too early to predict the committee mark-ups on the FY 86 bill, but it is logical to assume we will face a series of committee and subcommittee votes through the summer on MX which could be influenced by events in Geneva.

Ron Lehman, Chris Lehman and Mike Donley MD concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the proposed schedule at Tab A.

Yes DCM No _____

That you mention to Secretary Weinberger the need for a draft by February 8.

Yes DCM No _____

Attachment

Tab A Proposed MX Schedule

CONFIDENTIAL

Proposed Schedule of Events
Relating to the President's Report

on the

Peacekeeper ICBM

Report due at NSC for review	8 February
NSC leads interagency review	9-14 February
Interagency Working Group meets	11 February
Final comments to OSD for final report	15 February
Report is printed	16-21 February
Final transmittal to NSC	22 February
Submission of report to President for signature	25 February
Delivery of report to Congress	2 March (due not earlier than 1 March)
Introduction of Joint Resolution of Approval	4 March
Resolution in Committee	*12 March - late March
Negotiations resume in Geneva	mid-March
Final votes	before 4 April recess

*Things get a bit fuzzy here depending on the legislative calendar, but the motion can only remain in Committee between 8 and 15 days.

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38

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