

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: System File
Folder Title: 8501046 - SDI and Public Diplomacy
in Europe
Box: RAC Box 4

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SYSTEM FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 8/27/2019

File Folder 8501044-8501075

FOIA

S9568

Box Number 5

SYSTEMATIC

18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
242580	MEMO	NICHOLAS PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE. U.S. LIAISON OFFICE IN NAMIBIA	3	2/8/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act • (5 U.S.C. 552(b))

- B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift

RW
8/27/19

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8501046

RECEIVED 08 FEB 85 14

TO POINDEXTER FROM STEINER

DOCDATE 08 FEB 85

KEYWORDS EUROPE EAST SDI
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SUBJECT INITIAL SDI PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

.....
ACTION. FOR INFORMATION DUE STATUS IX FILES PA
.....

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DR *C.T.*)

.....
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

----- *C.11* FEB 1985 *Poindexter noted* ----- *SS* -----

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (*C.T.*)

Unit 2

National Security Council
The White House

STAMPED

System # I

Package # 1046

FEB 8 11:33

1570

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

1 P _____

2 K _____

3 [Signature] I

4 _____

Bob Pearson

Bob Kimmitt

John Poindexter

Paul Thompson

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

STEINER

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SYSTEM FILES

Withdrawer

RB 8/27/2019

W

File Folder

8501044-8501075

FOIA

S9568

SYSTEMATIC

Box Number

5

18

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
242561	MEMO STEVEN STEINER TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE. SDI PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	1	2/8/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SYSTEM FILES

Withdrawer

RB 8/27/2019
W

File Folder

8501044-8501075

FOIA

S9568
SYSTEMATIC

Box Number

5

18

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
242562	PAPER RE. SDI PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WMI

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 1046

1570

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>I</u>
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	<u>4</u>		

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

AWJ
2/27/19

9

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8501046

RECEIVED 08 FEB 85 14

TO POINDEXTER FROM STEINER
STEINER

DOCDATE 08 FEB 85
11 FEB 85

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST SDI
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SUBJECT: INITIAL SDI PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: 13 FEB 85 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>c 2/19</i>	<i>noted by Poindexter</i>		<i>Steiner</i> ✓

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE *(Pa)* (C) *Ve*

~~10~~

National Security Council
The White House

System #

I

FEB 11

P

Package #

1046

1575

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		I
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	4	18 FEB 1985	N
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

February 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER *Steve*

SUBJECT: SDI Public Diplomacy in Europe

As part of our public diplomacy effort with Europe, we have now finalized our initial paper on themes (in Assertion/Fact form) for Europe (Tab I). This is an unclassified version of the one I sent you on Friday. It has now been cleared by all agencies. We will pass it out to our people at the London conference on Friday as initial Washington thinking on how to handle the issue in Europe. USIA will pass out a preliminary SDI strategy paper at the same time.

We will likely receive many comments from our people in Europe at the Conference and we want to adjust our effort accordingly. After the consultations at NATO with the Allies and the London conference, we will produce updated themes and a new strategy paper for Europe. I will also brief our new interagency group on public diplomacy as soon as we are back and task further actions in that group.

Attachment

Tab I SDI Public Diplomacy in Europe

cc: Bob Linhard
Bill Wright
Sven Kraemer
Peter Sommer
Ty Cobb
Jack Matlock
Walt Raymond
Karna Small
Bob Sims

SDI Public Diplomacy in Europe

In their Camp David meeting last December, the President and Prime Minister Thatcher reached agreement on four basic points on SDI:

- The aim of SDI is balance and not superiority.
- SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, be a matter for negotiations.
- The goal of SDI is to enhance deterrence.
- Negotiations on defense should enhance security and reduce levels of offensive systems on both sides.

There nonetheless seem to be certain misconceptions in Europe regarding SDI. Some of these assertions, and suggested points to refute them, are:

1. Assertion: SDI "could fuel a new arms race."

Facts:

- President Reagan has emphasized that we seek no military advantages with SDI.
- SDI is a research program.
- It seeks to determine whether new defensive technologies can remove incentives to proliferate offensive weapons.
- It deals with defensive technologies, i.e., establishing through research whether in the future there could be a defense against the threat of offensive ballistic missiles.
- Soviets have long been engaged in strategic defense (see Assertion 3).

2. Assertion: SDI would "militarize space."

Facts:

- This is what the Soviets are saying, and it is purposely misleading.
- Space has long been used for military purposes, beginning with the first Soviet ballistic missile tests in the 1950s. Indeed, the Soviets have even tested an orbital nuclear bomb, their fractional orbiting system.

-- Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. use space now for numerous defense-related activities, including communications and early warning. The U.S. also places heavy stress on space systems for arms control verification.

3. Assertion: The U.S. is upsetting the "balance" by going into a "new" area.

Facts:

-- Research is permitted under the ABM Treaty, and both sides have been conducting it for years.

-- The Soviets themselves are heavily into strategic defense, investing roughly as much in it as they do in their massive offensive programs.

-- The Soviets have the world's only deployed ABM system, which they are upgrading. They are engaged in several areas of advanced ABM research, have violated the ABM Treaty with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar and may be preparing -- through the aggregate of their ABM-related activities -- a territorial defense.

-- The U.S. research program is thus a prudent hedge against the rapidly developing potential for a Soviet breakout from the Treaty's constraint. And it also responds to the erosion of the strategic balance caused by the continuing Soviet buildup in offensive nuclear arms.

-- There is clearly a vital relationship between strategic offense and defense. The U.S. cannot afford to allow the Soviets a unilateral advantage in either area and must take Soviet activities in both areas into account in our efforts to stabilize the military balance. We intend to discuss this relationship with the Soviets in Geneva.

4. Assertion: SDI signals a "new" strategy, replacing deterrence.

Facts:

-- SDI research seeks to strengthen deterrence by seeking a more stable strategic environment.

-- Offense-dominated deterrence has worked, and we remain committed to it. But there are troubling trends, particularly when we look at combination of Soviet actions in both strategic offense and defense and the arms control compliance problems we have with the Soviets in both areas.

-- Increasingly difficult now to maintain deterrence by responding only to Soviet offensive buildup. Have to look at whole picture.

-- Deterrence can be strengthened both militarily and politically if, over time, we are able to base it less on the threat of retaliation with offensive nuclear forces and more on effective defense.

-- Our goal is to strengthen stability over time and to maintain the offense/defense balance. This, too, would strengthen deterrence.

5. Assertion: SDI would be decoupling.

Facts:

-- We see allied security as indistinguishable from our own and have made it clear that SDI research is addressed to our common security interests.

-- Research for defense against ballistic missiles includes the major threat to Europe (and Asia) posed by SS-20s and shorter range ballistic missiles.

-- Western cohesion guarantees the peace and was instrumental in bringing Soviets back to negotiating table.

-- Have new opportunity for arms control now. But Soviets are still seeking to divide the West. If they succeed, arms control prospects will be set back.

-- Consulting very closely with our allies on SDI and have expressed interest in their technological participation in the research program.

6. Assertion: SDI renders UK and French systems useless.

Facts:

-- SDI is a long-term research program. For foreseeable future, and at least through turn of century, each of us will continue to have need for our respective offensive nuclear deterrents.

-- Our arms control priority is for real reductions in U.S./Soviet offensive nuclear arsenals. If research bears out, SDI could help reinforce the prospects for this. In such a situation, the importance of the British and French national deterrents would be enhanced. And, in fact, an effective defense would enhance the survivability of European systems.

7. Assertions: SDI could complicate the new negotiations.

Facts:

-- To the contrary, along with NATO resolve on INF, SDI seems to have been a major factor in getting talks going again.

-- Defense (and space) will be discussed in separate group in Geneva. U.S., for its part, will do its best to promote progress in all areas even if difficulties are incurred in one. We hope Soviets will be equally constructive.

-- We all agree that strengthening deterrence and stability are desired arms control goals. The offense/defense relationship is vital to the military balance and thus crucial to both deterrence and stability.

-- Successful SDI research could reinforce the prospects for U.S.-Soviet reductions, and thereby enhance stability.

8. Assertion: SDI could make conventional war more likely.

Facts:

-- Even a successful SDI program will not be a panacea for all the world's problems. NATO obviously will need to maintain a strong conventional defense.

-- Nonetheless, anything that could reduce the possibilities for Soviet intimidation of the West, or reinforce U.S.-Soviet arms reductions prospects, strengthens the peace.

-- Furthermore, SDI technology could be applicable to defense against non-nuclear tactical missiles.

-- And, if SDI ultimately helps to make the West better defended, our credibility in protecting our common interests will be that much greater.