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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/19/2016

File Folder ARMS CONTROL-PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (9/20/83-10/3/83)

FOIA

F2003-004

Box Number 11

SKINNER

37

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
185727	PAPER	RE ACTION PLAN FOR INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	10	8/25/1983	B1
185728	CALENDAR	OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL	5	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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RECEIVED 20 SEP 83 13.

TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 20 SEP 83

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 1/29/03

KEYWORDS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

ARMS CONTROL

INF

START

NATO

USSR

SUBJECT: ACTION PLANS RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY & ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 23 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~RAYMOND~~

SIMS

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, C

KRAEMER

LEHMAN, R

SOMMER

ROBINSON

FORTIER

LENCZOWSKI

LINHARD

MYER

COMMENTS

No need to send to Jefe. This was noted at SPG 20 Sept.

REF# 8328259

LOG

NSCIFID

(MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 9/21 no further action

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *- PACT*



8328259 6617 ✓
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 20, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Public Diplomacy Action Plans

The Coordinating Committee on Arms Control and Defense Issues has approved the attached action plans prepared by the INF and START/Nuclear Freeze working groups.

Barbara H. ...
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - INF Action Plan
Tab 2 - START/Nuclear Freeze
Action Plan

UNCLASSIFIED W/SECRET ATTACHMENTS
DECL: QADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 1/29/03

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SECRETV. INF Implementation Timetable and Responsibility

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>DUE DATE</u>	<u>STATUS/COMMENTS</u>
A. <u>Action Plan</u>	State/EUR	8/22 to SPG	Draft July 20; revision 8/5; to IG 8/15
B. <u>High-Level Statements</u>			
1. Presidential speech			Possibly geared to negotiations
2. Presidential statements			As required to underline US position/counter Soviet moves
3. Other High-Level statements (Shultz,			Geared to key events such as opening of UNGA, negotiation watersheds, NATO Ministerials
C. <u>Speakers Program</u>			
1. Revised Speakers List	State/EUR	8/15	8/14 WG requested to update previous list by 8/11
2. FSI Course			
a. funding	State/M		EUR/PM memo to M sent 7/27
b. curriculum devlpmt/selection of participants	PM/EUR/PA/ACDA	8/30	Discussion with FSI begins 8/9 Curriculum currently being worked out
c. course begins		mid-September	
3. INF Speakers Book	State	9/1	Updated and revised briefing book is in final stages of review
4. Speaking Engage- ments	State/PA		contingency basis

D. Communication Tools

1. GISTS

- a. INF EUR 9/15
- b. CSCE/CDE EUR 9/15

- c. START START WG
- d. verification START WG
- e. strategic balance START WG
- f. nuclear freeze START WG

completed 5/83; update 10/15
EUR/RPM tasked to prepare CDE
gist for circulation after
Madrid wrap up 9/7-8

2. Charts/graphics OSD

INF component discussed at 8/4
WG meeting

3. Film/Videocassette ACDA/PA
on Arms Control

INF component to be included

4. INF Press package State/PA
ACDA/PA

Package prepared 6/83.
Revised packet due 8/30

5. Media/Public Initiatives

- a. direct line State/PA; USIA
interviews/
backgrounders

Tied to key events such as
beginning and end of INF round,
announcement of new arms
control initiatives, and
Soviet actions

- b. special briefings State/DOD/USIA/ACDA/NSC
on European
security issues

For resident foreign
journalists keyed to negotia-
tions, special events

- c. visit to NATO; State/USIA
key allied
countries

For US regional editors

- | | | | |
|----|--|----------------|---|
| d. | Conferences/
Briefings, for
opinion leaders | State/PA; USIA | |
| e. | articles/
Op-Ed pieces | State | |
| f. | USG interviews
and access to
US military
facilities | State/USIA/OSD | Aimed at visiting foreign
journalists in position
to be helpful to us |
| g. | use of USIA
satellite
facilities | USIA | To gain prime time radio/TV
spots for key administration
figures |
| h. | mailing lists | USIA/State | |

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22

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA CN DATE 12/19/10

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Public Diplomacy Action Plan for START
and the Nuclear Freeze

1. Summary

As we move toward the fall, public concern and debate about nuclear strategy and arms control will continue in the U.S. and abroad. Over the long-term, the U.S. public diplomacy objective is to translate this concern into support for eventual arms control agreements, and to build domestic and foreign consensus in favor of U.S. initiatives and approaches to arms control and defense issues. The nuclear freeze movement will be one factor complicating the effort to build such consensus, and therefore will have to be addressed in the context of explaining the merits of our approach to the negotiations. However, the focus of our efforts should be the START negotiations, and the opportunity they present to achieve deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and promote a safer, more stable international environment.

Our public diplomacy effort should give priority to reaching mixed or undecided groups and individuals who, in turn, will reach out and influence the views of others; the Congress -- where key votes on arms control and defense modernization will take place this fall; and the media. The themes we should emphasize are the seriousness of our commitment to arms reductions, the fairness and flexibility of our proposals, and the contribution they would make to stability and reducing the risk of war. In addition, we should ensure careful coordination of our public diplomacy efforts on other issues, such as INF (which has become of increased interest to the U.S. public) and defense modernization issues with our START/Nuclear Freeze public diplomacy actions.

2. Background

Public concern and debate about nuclear strategy and arms control policy will continue to form a backdrop against which U.S. policies will be scrutinized and criticized. Our purpose should be to shift the public debate from the nuclear freeze to the opportunities for successful arms control negotiations, and to increase public support and understanding of our national security policies. Over the long-term, our public diplomacy objective is to translate public concern into support for eventual arms reductions agreements, and to build domestic and international consensus in favor of U.S. arms control and defense policies. This Plan outlines the steps to be taken to fulfill the strategies outlined earlier and approved by the SPG.

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The Nuclear Freeze

Public opinion polls continue to show that a substantial majority of Americans (70-30) favor a nuclear freeze, but much of the support for a freeze is "soft", and represents, in part, a desire for continuing arms control efforts on the part of the Administration. The freeze movement does not appear to be gaining momentum, and is attracting far less media attention than a year ago. Nevertheless, the nuclear freeze movement will continue to criticize Administration positions, lobby to block funding for U.S. modernization efforts. In addition, the nuclear freeze movement has indicated that it will give priority to blocking INF deployments in Europe this year, and will be stimulating domestic U.S. public interest and concern about this issue. All this would complicate the task of our negotiators in Geneva.

START

Although there is greater public awareness of U.S. initiatives in START and other arms control negotiations, public understanding of the issues remains shallow, at best. For a large part of the public, the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to arms control is more important than the specific content of our proposals. Media and other critics' portrayal of the negotiations as "stalled" or doomed to lengthy and fruitless years of wrangling because of the inherent unfairness and one-sidedness of the U.S. approach strike a responsive chord with a public impatient for concrete results, and generates further pressures for the U.S. to modify its proposals. In addition, numerous Congressional and other arms control specialists have developed alternative approaches to the negotiations for which they seek a hearing. More thorough and timely information on the U.S. proposals, their effect on stability and the rationale for our approach are essential to forming more positive perceptions of the negotiations, and of our serious commitment to achieving a balanced and verifiable agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals.

Soviet Propoganda Initiatives

We also anticipate that Soviet propaganda and disinformation efforts will intensify as we move into the fall and winter. Their campaign will probably assert that the U.S. is continuing to seek military superiority in its defense programs, the U.S. is "stalling" or holding up progress at the negotiations by its unrealistic and unfair demands, and that U.S. proposals are inherently unbalanced, one-sided and impact

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disproportionately on Soviet systems. Soviet front groups, led by the World Peace Council, will certainly step up their activities. They will also have a number of "new" initiatives -- such as their recent ASAT ban proposal -- aimed primarily at Western public opinion, by which they will try to capture the peace offensive.

We should be prepared to respond promptly and convincingly to these initiatives, anticipating them if possible, and ensuring that our responses convey our seriousness of purpose with respect to mutual, equitable, and verifiable arms control.

3. Objectives

Our public diplomacy objectives for the remainder of the year are to:

- promote increased understanding of our START proposals and the rationale behind them;
- maintain and increase support for our START negotiating approach in the Congress and among publics in the U.S. and abroad;
- ensure balanced and accurate coverage in the media of our START proposals and initiatives; and
- maintain and increase Congressional and public support for our strategic modernization programs as necessary incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for mutual and verifiable reductions in strategic arsenals.

4. General Themes and Facts to Highlight

U.S.G. spokesmen should concentrate on themes and facts which highlight our arms control initiatives and our continuing efforts to achieve substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions, rather than dwelling on the drawbacks of the nuclear freeze proposal or other alternative approaches. This effort will be most effective when it addresses the underlying concerns of the public about the danger of nuclear war and the growth in nuclear arsenals, showing how U.S. proposals and initiatives promote a stable peace and safer future.

Although specific points and level of argumentation will vary with the audience, the general themes we should emphasize are:

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26

- We all agree that nuclear war would have catastrophic consequences. Our highest priority, as the President said, is to prevent war.
- We have a two-part strategy to achieve that goal: maintaining our own deterrent strength and negotiating with the Soviet Union to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals.
- Deterrence requires having sufficient forces to convince a potential adversary that the risks of aggression would outweigh any gains he could hope to make, and that his objectives would be thwarted. This cornerstone of our national security policy has:
 - o long-term bipartisan support in Congress;
 - o the strong endorsement of our Allies and friends;
 - o contributed to the prevention of nuclear war for almost forty years.
- Our defense modernization programs will ensure that we have effective and credible deterrent forces for the foreseeable future.
- At the same time, we are actively pursuing negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear arsenals substantially to equal and verifiable levels, and to agree on measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

START

- Our START proposals offer real hope for substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions, not merely the preservation of already high levels of strategic arms.
- Our proposals are fair and reasonable: although the Soviet Union would have to make greater reductions in some areas, this is because they have much larger forces. The U.S. too would have to reduce more in other areas, but the outcome we seek is equality, and greater stability.
- Our negotiator has been given great flexibility to explore every serious opportunity to achieve agreement.

- We will continue to do everything in our power to move this difficult and complex process forward, and to address Soviet security concerns.
- Ensuring effective measures for verification has been a problem in many previous arms control negotiations. In START, the U.S. is proposing more far-reaching measures than those agreed upon in the past. So far the Soviets have been unwilling to agree to measures beyond those unsatisfactory provisions in past agreements.
- If the Soviets negotiate in the same spirit, the prospects for a sound and stabilizing agreement will be very good.

Confidence-Building Measures

- We have also proposed to the Soviet Union a series of measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. These would supplement and expand upon agreements already in effect.
- These include such steps as expanded exchange of information on military forces, pre-notification of ballistic missile launches and major military exercises, and improvements to communications facilities.
- We have discussed these proposals with the Soviet Union in the Geneva negotiations. We have also had an exchange of views in Moscow on improvements to communications facilities between our two countries, particularly in time of crisis.
- Much work remains to be done in this area, but both our countries recognize the importance of reducing the possibility of misunderstanding and misinterpretation between us.

Nuclear Freeze

- We are already beyond the freeze in the START and INF negotiations where we are discussing genuine reductions, rather than merely capping forces at already high and unequal levels. A freeze would be a step backward;

-- A freeze now would not reduce the risk of war, nor help achieve the reductions in nuclear arsenals which we all seek because it would:

- o freeze inequalities;
- o prevent necessary modernization of U.S. forces;
- o reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate for reductions;
- o take time to negotiate, and thus delay prospects for reaching agreement on reductions;
- o not be effectively verifiable, and
- o we can and must do better than a freeze.

-- We have an unprecedented opportunity to reverse the growth in nuclear arsenals, achieve equitable and verifiable agreements that could strengthen our security and international stability in the negotiations in Geneva.

-- An essential ingredient for the success of these negotiations is the unity and support of the American people, the Congress and our Allies and friends around the world.

5. Target Audiences

To employ our limited resources most effectively, we should concentrate our efforts on the most influential and important audiences on whom we can make the greatest impact, and make greater use of electronic and print media to reach priority audiences.

A. Congress. Active Congressional support for U.S. arms control proposals and defense modernization program is crucial to our efforts to reach agreement in Geneva, and guarantee our defense needs. In addition to direct Congressional action on arms control and modernization issues, Congress both reflects and leads domestic public opinion. Our Allies and the Soviets are sensitive to views aired in Congress. Vocal Congressional criticism of our arms control programs inevitably draws media attention and in turn may reinforce negative public perceptions of our policies.

29

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- 7 -

We should therefore give very high priority to Congressional audiences, particularly Congressmen and relevant staffers who are undecided, not very familiar with the START negotiations and not wholeheartedly committed to the nuclear freeze. Specifically, we should:

- Continue to provide periodic briefings by Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze on the negotiations in Geneva, and supplement those where appropriate with briefings by other Administration officials.
- Supply Congressmen with arguments and materials on U.S. arms control proposals and nuclear policy which they can use or provide constituents.
- Respond on a priority basis to requests by Congressmen for Administration speakers on nuclear arms control issues in their districts.
- Complete study of the (Nunn-Cohen) builddown concept and how it may be applied to our START proposals. Preliminary results were discussed with the relevant Congressional leaders before the Summer recess, and will be presented in greater detail in September. The fulfillment of the President's commitment to give the builddown serious consideration in the context of our overall START objectives is viewed by a number of Senators as the touchstone of the Administration's good faith on arms control, and will influence their position on U.S. arms control and defense modernization policies.

B. Domestic Public Audiences. Public opinion data suggest that those individuals most likely to support and those least likely to support or be critical of U.S. arms control proposals can be divided into the following illustrative categories. These are by no means rigid or all-inclusive:

Non-supporters

- higher income
- college educated
- politically liberal
- young adult (30-44)
- live in Northeast and/or major metropolitan areas

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Supporters

- lower to middle income
- non-college educated
- politically conservative
- middle age (over 44)
- live in South and/or rural areas

Groups which have expressed concern about nuclear war or endorsed a nuclear freeze include professionals, women, students, scientists, city and county governing bodies, religious associations and some labor unions. Our primary objective would be to encourage the leadership among these groups to take a more active role in support of our arms control initiatives at the local level. Many of these groups would welcome having an Administration speaker address their national conventions. In addition, leadership elements of these groups would be invited to briefings at the Department and ACDA. ACDA is prepared to host a number of such groups and provide them with an overview of its facilities.

In order to have the greatest impact, we should assign our speakers to address groups according to the following criteria:

- a. Mixed/undecided groups that can reach and influence others;
- b. Potentially critical but not activist groups that may be receptive;
- c. Known or potentially supportive groups, especially activists, whose support should be sustained; and
- d. Known or potentially critical groups that are also activist, whose opposition is firm.

In assigning speakers, we should also take into account: audience size, prestige, media coverage, level of other speakers participating, and the potential media impact of non-appearance. We may want to consider sending speakers to some high-visibility "hostile" forums where failure to send a USG representative would cause serious negative media coverage or public reaction to the event. Generally speaking, we should be careful about accepting platforms debating West Europeans, Soviet officials and should shun entirely those sponsored by Soviet front groups where there is unlikely to be a balanced program. The Bureau of Public Affairs will examine invitations in light of these priorities and work with representatives of priority audience groups on their requests for Administration speakers on arms control.

31

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- 9 -

C. Domestic Media. There is still a considerable amount of confusion and misinformation about our arms control policies, even among sophisticated commentators. Given the importance of the media in shaping public opinion, we should concentrate on reaching them with timely and convincing explanations of our policies, updates on significant developments in the negotiations, and person-to-person contacts wherever and whenever possible.

The media should be a major focus of our public diplomacy effort for the remainder of the year. Media opportunities are usually defined by "newsworthy" events, nevertheless opportunities to address the media--and specific actions--fall roughly into three categories:

-- major national print and networks. High level Administration officials to discuss important developments in the negotiations and background on our position are needed. Systematic planning in advance for such events is needed to maximize the impact of our policies.

-- regional, local stations and newspapers. Ensuring that speakers try to do backgrounders, editorial board sessions and local talk programs whenever they visit a particular area is essential. Moreover, reaching these groups through "Direct Line" contacts and supplying them with background materials has proved a very cost-effective communication tool.

-- specialized press. Although potentially the most difficult media in which to place articles/commentaries, the specialized press can be an effective vehicle for reaching key segments of the domestic public. We have had some success in placing articles in the religious press (in connection with the Bishops Pastoral Letter on War and Peace) and should make a concerted effort to gain entry to other specialized journals, i.e. women's, professional, young peoples', etc. We will pursue this informally with our media contacts to see if there is interest in such articles, and then assign specific drafting responsibilities.

D. Foreign Audiences. U.S. START postures are watched closely by many nations, especially those reliant on the American strategic guarantee for their own security. But they are most immediately relevant to European publics (and governments) now sensitized to nuclear policies in general by the INF negotiations and public debate. Those audiences are alert, in particular, for indicators about the seriousness of the United States' commitment to arms control, and they

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understand START developments in that light. Some anti-nuclear activists and freeze proponents are hostile toward the United States in general. The most radical among them are unlikely to be persuaded of the sincerity and merit of U.S. arms control postures regardless of any argumentation that the U.S. advances. Most Europeans, however, are basically friendly to the United States, skeptical of the Soviet Union, concerned about their national and collective defense capabilities, and supportive of NATO. But many in this group have yet to be persuaded that the evidence clearly demonstrates American sincerity about regulating and reducing nuclear armaments.

Additionally, a sizable minority in almost all NATO nations, although in general favorably disposed toward the United States, remains doubtful or uncertain of American aims. They perceive the U.S. as pursuing inconsistent, often irresponsible, policies. In some cases, such as U.S. actions in Central America, they tend not to distinguish between U.S motives and those of the USSR in Eastern Europe or Afghanistan. For them, the two superpowers also seem intent on managing their strategic relationship in ways which no others can effect.

The most important European audience--a middle, "swing" group oriented favorably toward the United States but unsure of our aims--is the critical group to be targeted. It has two overriding concerns relevant to START:

- Is the U.S. acting responsibly on behalf of its allies, as well as the non-nuclear world, in START? Or is the U.S. behaving as a unilateralist in strategic affairs, serving first and foremost its own power interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?
- Is the United States genuinely committed to the process of arms control?

Contributing significantly to the perceptions of this group are segments of the European media which tend to portray the U.S. as inconsistent, unilateralist, and short-sighted in its global conduct, and as insufficiently sensitive to the special responsibilities associated with possession of a vast nuclear arsenal. Other equally influential media elements are more generous in their assessment of U.S. behavior, but remain attentive for proof one way or the other on the issues of responsible leadership and serious pursuit of arms control.

Themes for European Audiences

1) The United States has kept its allies fully informed about its arms control approach in general and about the specifics of its START position via consultations and Ambassador Rowny's periodic briefings of the NAC. The American proposal was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers at the May 1982 NATO summit. The NATO leaders called on the Soviet Union to join the U.S. in pursuing substantial reductions with a focus on the most destabilizing elements of the strategic confrontation.

2) The United States is committed to achieving substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions in U.S and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and to reducing the risk of war. American negotiators seek verifiable agreements which will lead to significant mutual reductions, and which will protect the security of the United States and its allies. The U.S. is also mindful of the need to accommodate legitimate Soviet security concerns in order to reach an agreement that will truly stabilize this most dangerous aspect of the East-West political competition.

3) Because the American focus is on reductions, and because the Soviets appear to have been persuaded to discuss reductions too, proposals which would freeze armaments at current levels are considerably less useful than those American negotiators are putting forward.

4) The U.S. posture has gone to the very heart of the matter, addressing the most destabilizing of strategic systems: land based ICBM's. Other systems are also addressed in a comprehensive U.S. negotiating proposal which, while flexible, takes its bearings from a constant, serious purpose to reduce weaponry and promote security and stability.

6. Means of Communication

Speakers Program: We have found articulate and well-informed speakers to be an effective means of conveying our arms control policies to the public. However, we have too few individuals to fill the many worthwhile opportunities and requests we receive.

We have received funding for a speakers' training course at FSI to train additional speakers on nuclear arms control issues. The course is tentatively scheduled to begin September 19, and to last for five days. We are working on a curriculum and recruiting suitable candidates for the course. The training

will emphasize the U.S. approach to arms control, its relationship to other foreign policy and national security objectives, and the arms reduction initiatives underway. Participants who successfully complete the course will be expected to commit themselves to filling public speaking engagements in the U.S. and Europe.

Additional publications/printed materials:

- We are updating and revising the Speakers' book on nuclear arms control issues (by end of August). Items from the book will be used to train new speakers, and will be considered for possible public release.
- GISTs on START and Verification Issues are in draft. Additional GISTs on the Nuclear Freeze (before Senate action on an arms control resolution), the Strategic Balance, CBMs, and the CSCE/CDE will also be prepared.
- START Awareness Program: We will continue to provide our diplomatic posts on a regular (bi-weekly where appropriate) basis with unclassified material on the START negotiations and related issues which they can use with host government publics and media.
- We plan to produce a pamphlet of Qs and As on arms control and nuclear strategy to address in simple and non-technical language the most frequently asked questions about these issues. This publication is intended for general audiences ranging from high-school students to civic and religious groups.
- A package of materials (themes, Qs and As, summary, bibliography of articles) on the Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on Peace and War has been assembled and is being cleared for use by USG speakers', our diplomatic posts, and interested military personnel.
- Charts, graphs, and other visual aids: OSD is taking the lead in revising and updating these materials for use by USG speakers, and possible public distribution.
- Film, videocassette, slide show. The Working Group recommends production of a videoprogram on US arms control and national security policy, and has asked the Coordinating Committee to explore feasibility and financing of such a project.

Priority attention should be given to use of the electronic and print media to inform the public about our arms control and strategic policies. Specifically, we will aim:

- to make greater use of State's "Direct Line" facilities to provide backgrounders for journalists, editors and radio communicators. Stations and papers which subscribe to State's publications will be informed of the availability of this service;
- to produce one OpEd piece, article or letter to the editor per agency or bureau per month. PM and PA will look out for suitable opportunities or flag pieces to which an Administration reply would be appropriate. "Press Packages" on US arms control proposals and national security policy are being prepared.
- to secure additional newspaper coverage by scheduling central-office backgrounders for the three largest newspaper chains that have a centralized editorial policy: Copley (580,000 circ.), Scripps-Howard (2.2 million circ.), and Hearst (1.5 million circ.). This would entail visits or direct-line interviews with Copley and Scripps-Howard offices in DC, and Hearst offices in New York.
- A conference for journalists/editorial writers at NATIS is being planned for the fall. American and European participants would have an opportunity to meet with arms control officials and receive extensive briefings on arms control issues

The work program implementation schedule is at TAB 1.

7. Political Component

In addition to the events listed in the calendar (TAB 2), there are a number of actions which can further our public diplomacy objectives. Most of these are still awaiting a substantive policy decision. Nevertheless, we should consider the public handling aspects to maximize potentially favorable press and public reaction.

A. CDE/CSCE: Agreement on the mandate and convening of the CDE will be the first major arms control agreement reached by the Administration. This can be portrayed as a modest step in the arms control process, and evidence of the Administration's continuing efforts to engage in constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and to move forward on a variety

of arms control and European security issues. Careful consideration should be given to the public handling of the Conference and the Madrid wrap-up which has already provoked some media criticism.

B. Shultz-Gromyko Meetings at Madrid and New York: The meetings will provide an opportunity to show that dialogue on important issues is continuing, and that we are pursuing all opportunities to resolve our differences through negotiations and discussions.

C. The Guaranteed Builddown Principle: For a number of Congressmen and Senators, the Administration's attitude toward the builddown principle is a touchstone of its good faith on arms control. Therefore, convincing the Congress that we have given the principle a fair and positive hearing will be essential if we are to maintain support for our arms control proposals. The SFRC is to markup an arms control resolution on September 20.

Results of the Administration study of the build-down proposal should be ready before the SFRC markup of an arms control resolution September 20. Public and Congressional handling strategy should emphasize the Administration's continued flexibility, consultations, and efforts to move the negotiations forward.

8. Calendar of Events

A full calendar of opportunities and challenges is at TAB 2.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 Sec 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
 White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
 BY NARA W, DATE 12/18/16

START/NUCLEAR FREEZE/CBMs ACTION PLAN

7/27/83

<u>TEM</u>	<u>PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>DUE DATE</u>	<u>STATUS/ COMMENTS</u>
ATION PLAN	State PM	9/1/ 83 to CC	Draft 7/20 Revision 7/29 To START IG 8/26
Speakers' Program	State PA		
A. Revised Speakers' List	"	8/3	Contributions to <u>Stat PA</u> by 8/1/83, to be revised as need
Screening	PA/PM/ACDA	Continuous	
B. FSI Course			
1. Funding	STATE (M)		Approved
2. Curriculum development/ Selection of Participants	PM/EUR/PA/ACDA	9/7	
3. Course begins		9/19-22	
C. Speakers' Book		9/6	Draft Circulated
D. Speaking Engagements	PAs		
1. Priorities	SPG Decision		Decision on Action Plan
2. Implementation	PAs		
Communication Tools			
A. GISTS			
1. Verification	ACDA/PM	9/1	2nd Draft circulat
2. START	PM	9/5	
3. Strategic Balance	OSD		
4. Nuclear Freeze		9/15	

31

Charts/Graphics	OSD	9/1	Discussion at 7/27 Meeting
Bishops Package	ACDA/OSD/PM	9/1	Third Draft 8/24
New Publications			
1. Basic Qs and As	ACDA	9/15	
Briefing Materials			
1. START Press Package	PM/OSD/ACDA	9/15	
2. Arms Control -General	PM/EUR/ACDA/PA	9/8	
Film/Videocassette on Arms Control	ACDA/PA		
Media/Public Initiatives			
1. Direct Line Interviews/Backgrounders	State PA		Tied to newsworthy events such as beginning and end of START round, announcement of new arms control initiatives (CDE, CBMs negotiations, build-down proposal)
2. Conferences/Briefings For Opinion Leaders	State PA, ACDA		
-- Regional Labor Leaders	(P)		
3. Articles/Op Ed pieces			One per month per agency, bureau
4. START Awareness Cables	PM/ACDA		bi-weekly, #6 due 8/30
Research Requirements			
A. Polling Data	Request SPG guidance		

Political Initiatives

Timing

Public Diplomacy Action

A. Decision on Builddown

August-September

NSC lead

B. Consultations with Soviets
and Allies on Communications
Measures and Nuclear Incidents

August 8-14

Press Guidance Ready, refer to
CBMs in public pronouncements

C. CSCE Meeting in Madrid
Possible Shultz-Gromyko

September 7

Coordinated press guidance,
ensure media coverage of U.S.
initiatives, backgrounders

UNGA
Possible Shultz-Gromyko
Other Meetings
Soviet Nuclear Freeze Proposal

September 15-30

Be prepared to respond to new
Soviet initiatives, have press
packages on arms control issues
ready, U.S. officials to do
backgrounders, briefings

CDE Prepcon

Mid-Late October

Presidential Speech on
Arms Control

Ensure European and other posts
are briefed, have follow-up
Qs and As, texts of statements
etc.

~~SECRET~~

7/27/83

62

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Proposed Action</u>
September 15-16	HLG START Consultations Including Builddown	
September 19-25	UNGA	-Be prepared for Soviet initiatives, U.S. speeches, backgrounders
September 20	SFRC Markup of Arms Control Resolutions	- Respond to requests for informati briefings
September 26	Possible Shultz Speech at UNGA Shultz-Gromyko	- Ensure European coverage, press guidance, etc. ready
September 29	MBFR Round Resumes "	
October 5	START Round V Begins!	- Pre-departure Rowny meeting with President, photo opportunity
?	Vice President Visit to Basing Countries Statement on US Position	
October 7	SCG	
?	Congressional Consideration and Conference on FY 84 DOD Appropriations Bill	
?	Senate Consideration of Arms Control Resolution	
October 20	CDE Prep Con in Helsinki	
?	Possible Presidential Speech on Arms Control at UNGA	
October 27-28	NPG in Ottawa	
November 2-16	President's Asia Trip	

of

CALENDAR OF ARMS CONTROL OPPORTUNITIES/CHALLENGES

7/27/83

Key events on which we should focus our attention will be:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Proposed Action</u>
August 2	End of START Round IV	- Rowny Briefing of Allies at NAC - START DEL available for domestic public appearances, interviews, talk shows
August 5	Congress recesses	- Consultations START DEL
August 8-14	Initial Consultations with Soviets and Allies on Communications Measures and Nuclear Terrorism	- Press Guidance Ready
August/September	Administration Decision on Cohen-Nunn Builddown	- Congressional Briefings/Consultations - Backgrounders by Senior Administration Officials - Press Releases Ready
August 29	SCG Meeting	
September 6	INF Round VI begins	- Nitze pre-departure meeting with President Photo opportunity at White House
September 7	CSCE in Madrid Possible Shultz-Gromyko	- Press Guidance ready, prepared for backgrounders, briefings,
September 8	Senate Returns	
September 12-18	FY 84 Defense Appropriations Hearings & Votes - Sept-Oct	- Respond to requests for information, briefings. PM- Jonathan Howe to testify before SFRC in closed hearing 9/14
September 12	House Returns	

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Proposed Action</u>
November 10	SCG	
November 15	North American Summit (?)	
December 5-11	End START Round V DPC & NAC Ministerials	
December 8	End MBFR Round	
End/December	INF Deployment Soviet Reaction	

1

7/27/83

42

RECEIVED 28 SEP 83 15

TO CLARK FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 22 SEP 83

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CRS NARA, Date 11-29-03

KEYWORDS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT STATUS RPT 32 RE ARMS REDUCTION & SECURITY ISSUES 5 - 9 SEP &
12 - 16 SEP

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY DUE: STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

KRAEMER

LEHMAN, R

LEHMAN, C

MATLOCK

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LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS No further action

REF# LOG 8306614 NSCIFID (VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

6888



September 22, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Chairman, International Political Committee

The Honorable
Gerald B. Helman
Chairman, Public Diplomacy Committee

FROM: Charles Z. Wick
Director

SUBJECT: Status Report No. 32 -- Arms Reduction and
Security Issues (Weeks of September 5-9 & 12-16)

HIGHLIGHTS

Tass Displeased with Agency Product:

- In a report from Washington, the international service of Tass September 7 attached the USIA pocket handbook on INF and other security issues, calling it further evidence of the Administration's campaign to "brainwash" the public. Saying "it would be useless to seek an objective statement of facts in this falsification", Tass asserts that this "latest fruit of the organizers of psychological warfare has turned out to be rotten." This reaction follows a similar treatment of the Agency's INF question and answer pamphlet in New Times one month ago.

Vice President Briefs on His Trip, KAL:

- On September 8, Vice President Bush briefed foreign correspondents on his trip to North Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The journalists, selected by the Washington Foreign Press Center, questioned the Vice President on Lebanon and the KAL incident. After this session, Vice President Bush gave five individual interviews to correspondents from Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria--all countries on his itinerary. This was the third time the Vice President has granted such interviews, which in the past have generated excellent television placement in the host countries.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Charles Z. Wick
Declassify or Downgrade on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

BY

CS NARA DATE

11/15/15
17/9/16

45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Agency Facilitates Visit of Dutch Journalists Accompanying Parliamentarians:

- The Washington Foreign Press Center established a series of briefings for a group of 25 Dutch parliamentary journalists who accompanied five MPs to Washington on a fact-finding tour. Although the group of five parliamentarians, which included the floor leaders of the three major Dutch parties, occupied much of the journalists' attention, many of the sessions were closed, enabling the correspondents to participate in separate briefings. Meetings were arranged with DAS John Kelly (EUR) and DAS Craig Johnstone (ARA), as well as with Presidential Special Assistant Ron Lehman and DOD Principal Director for European Policy George Bader. The group also met with ACDA Chief of Theater Nuclear Affairs Stanley Riveles and with Alexander Vershbow (EUR/SOV).

Bonn reports that the visit of Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) to the FRG from September 7 to 10 resulted in a series of high-level meetings and considerable media attention. Highlighting the visit was a 45-minute meeting with Chancellor Kohl, at which Senator Lugar delivered personal greetings and a letter from the President. Following a series of meetings with Bundestag members, Senator Lugar saw Defense Minister Woerner and then, on September 9, delivered a major address at a German-American Tricentennial celebration sponsored by the state of Rhineland-Pfalz, at which he delivered a statement by President Reagan. Bonn reports that this ceremony received ample national and regional press coverage, which featured extensive quotes from the President's statement on the occasion.

The Washington Foreign Press Center arranged for a group of leading European defense correspondents to visit Fort Hood, Texas from September 10 to 12 to observe preparations for the annual REFORGER exercise, which will take place this year in the Netherlands and the FRG. The correspondents arrived in Texas from Germany on a Luftwaffe aircraft, and were returned to Europe aboard the REFORGER airlift, accompanied by First Cavalry Division units.

The September 6 visit of Helmut Sonnenfeldt to The Hague as an American Participant resulted in high-level contacts, including a call on the Foreign Minister and a private dinner with the editor of the important daily NRC-Handelsblad. In addition, Sonnenfeldt met with a series of Dutch academics, think-tank members and government officials concerned with security issues, as well as with a group of 22 Dutch journalists. Among Sonnenfeldt's key points were the need for Europeans to react with more than emotions and misperceptions to U.S. policy in Latin America, and the necessity to recognize that, if properly constructed, deterrence will work--as it has done in Europe for 38 years. The Hague reports that Sonnenfeldt, as usual, was "totally in control of discussion" at each event.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

The Washington Foreign Press Center arranged for a team from Dutch television's weekly foreign affairs program, "Pamoramiek", to interview Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle in Stockholm. The program was broadcast in the Netherlands on September 11, just before the Dutch parliamentary group left for consultations in Washington.

From September 12-16, a number of appointments were arranged for Hella Pick, senior international affairs correspondent for The Guardian. Interviewed by Pick were ACDA Director Adelman; Under Secretary Eagleburger; EUR Deputy Assistant Secretaries Palmer and Dobbins; START delegation representative James Goodby; EUR/EE Director Richard Combs; and EUR/RPM Director John Hawes.

Eric Laurent, Radio France, was given briefings during the week of September 12 with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, William Hyland and William Maynes (Editor of Foreign Policy), for a broadcast he will produce on "detente".

The Washington Foreign Press Center also assisted Jan Peter Helgesen, of Norway's Stavanger Aftenblad, on a story on prepositioning of Marine Corps supplies in Norway.

CBS's Mike McIvor is scheduled to go aloft in a B-52 from Griffiss AFB next week for his story on ALCMs.

BBC Radio's David Wheeler, preparing a program on yellow rain, interviewed an army chemical researcher; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theodore Gold; and State Department Legal Advisor Michael Matheson.

New requests for FPC assistance are from Michelle Pare, of CBC's French Service, for interviews on cruise missile testing in Canada, and from Tuevo Mallinen, from Finland's provincial daily, Kaleva, for DOD interviews on NATO-related matters.

On September 5, ACDA Deputy Director Emery held a meeting with ranking officials of New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chairing the session in Wellington was Deputy Foreign Secretary Ian Templeton, who introduced local and South Pacific concerns, including nuclear-powered warship visits, French nuclear testing, and the South West Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Concept.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-4-

Among items carried during this reporting period in the Wireless File was a VOA editorial, "Controlling Moscow's Missiles", which urged comparisons between Moscow's deeds and its actions, as well as the text of INF negotiator Nitze's press briefing, at which he stressed the Administration's intention to carry on with negotiations despite the KAL incident.

The File has also carried texts of the various expressions of intention to continue negotiations which have been forthcoming from the President and others in the wake of the Flight 007 tragedy.

CONFIDENTIAL

- cc: Judge William P. Clark, Jr., SPG
- Secretary George P. Shultz, SPG
- Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, SPG
- Administrator M. Peter McPherson, SPG

48

RECEIVED 03 OCT 83.19

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FROM POINDEXTER

DOCDATE 03 OCT 83

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DUBERSTEIN, K

03 OCT 83

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 1/29/13

LEHMAN, C

03 OCT 83

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

MEDIA

SUBJECT: SP RE PRES PUBLIC STATEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: OBE PER TYSON

DUE:

STATUS X

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TYSON

LEHMAN, C

SIMS

COMMENTS

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National Security Council
The White House

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Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>mm</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>OCT 0 4 1983</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

cc: VP Moose Baker done DISTRIBUTION Judge
Deaver Other John

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*Handcarried Orig to Deaver
10/3 - 8:05 pm*

Received SS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____

50

1983 OCT -3 PM 8:00

7040

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON BUILD-DOWN AND START

DATE: Tuesday, October 4, 1983

LOCATION: Roosevelt Room

TIME: 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK ^{RMK}
KENNETH DUBERSTEIN ₆₀₇

I. PURPOSE

To preview for the members your decision regarding U.S. START negotiating positions.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting will provide an opportunity to meet with a wider group of Senators and Congressmen than the "group of six" and present to them the basic outlines of your START/Build-down decisions before you announce them publicly. After your introductory remarks Ron Lehman will give a brief presentation of the decisions and then there will be a brief period for questions.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List attached.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11:30-11:35 a.m. Introductory remarks by the President.

11:35-11:45 a.m. Presentation by Ron Lehman.

11:45-12:00 noon Questions and answers.

Attachments

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B List of Participants

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By CS NARA, Date 1/29/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Prepared by:
Christopher Lehman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7040

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: CHRISTOPHER M. LEHMAN *CL*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Congressional Members, October 4, 1983, 11:30 a.m., Roosevelt Room

As a follow-on to the October 3 meeting with the "group of six", a meeting for a wider group of Senators and Congressmen is planned for tomorrow.

The memo for your signature at Tab I provides the President a brief background and talking points. After the President's remarks, Ron Lehman will give a presentation and then there will be a brief period for questions.

CL Ron Lehman and Ken Duberstein concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve RMK Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B List of Participants

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 1/29/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

SENATE

- Howard Baker (R-Tennessee)
- Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
- Charles Percy (R-Illinois)
- William S. Cohen (R-Maine)
- * John Tower (R-Texas)
- John Warner (R-Virginia)
- Larry Pressler (R-South Dakota)
- Warren Rudman (R-New Hampshire)
- * Jake Garn (R-Utah)
- Arlen Specter (R-Pennsylvania)
- Slade Gorton (R-Washington)
- Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minnesota)
- * Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas)

- Robert C. Byrd (D-West Virginia)
- Sam Nunn (D-Georgia)
- John Stennis (D-Mississippi)
- * Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
- * Lawton Chiles (D-Texas)
- Dennis DeConcini (D-Texas)
- * Howell Heflin (D-Alabama)
- Bennett Johnston (D-Louisiana)
- Russell Long (D-Louisiana)
- Jennings Randolph (D-West Virginia)
- Edward Zorinsky (D-Nebraska)
- Dave Boren (D-Oklahoma)
- J.J. Exon (D-Nebraska)

HOUSE

- Bob Michel (R-Illinois)
- Jack Edwards (R-Alabama)
- William L. Dickinson (R-Alabama)
- * George O'Brien (R-Illinois)
- Joel Pritchard (R-Washington)
- * Larry Coughlin (R-Pennsylvania)
- John McKernan (R-Maine)
- * Olympia Snowe (R-Maine)
- Joseph McDade (R-Pennsylvania)
- * Carl Pursell (R-Michigan)

* Regrets

Norman Dicks (D-Washington)
Al Gore (D-Tennessee)
Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin)
Vic Fazio (D-Wisconsin)
Steny Hoyer (D-Maryland)
Tom Foley (D-Washington)
Jim Murtha (D-Pennsylvania)
Elliott Levitas (D-Georgia)

STAFF

Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver
Bill Clark
Ken Duberstein
Dick Darman
Dave Gergen
Larry Speakes
M. B. Oglesby
Pam Turner
Nancy Risque
Chris Lehman
Ron Lehman