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U.S.-SOVIET EXPERTS MEETINGS

BACKGROUND INFORMATION - FOR CONTINGENCY USE ONLY

Q: Can you comment on the recent increase in U.S.-Soviet bilateral meetings? Please delineate the schedule of meetings across the board.

A: -- AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE AGREED TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS ON A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES BETWEEN NOW AND THE SEPTEMBER 19-20 MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE.

-- THE PURPOSE OF THESE MEETINGS IS TO HELP PREPARE FOR THE MINISTERIAL MEETING, TO FACILITATE PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHED NEGOTIATING FORA, AND TO SUPPORT PREPARATIONS FOR A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT LATER THIS FALL.

— THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE ALSO PART OF THE OVERALL U.S.-SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PROCESS ON ALL FOUR AREAS OF OUR AGENDA: ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES, AND BILATERAL MATTERS.

- 2
- NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS: AN EXPERTS MEETING WAS HELD AUGUST 11-12 IN MOSCOW ON DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS. ANOTHER EXPERTS MEETING WILL BE HELD ON SEPTEMBER 5-6 IN WASHINGTON.
  
  - CONVENTIONAL ARMS: U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION (MBFR) NEGOTIATIONS ROBERT BLACKWILL MET WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR MIKHAILOV AUGUST 6-7 IN MOSCOW. A SECOND MEETING WILL BE HELD IN THE SECOND WEEK OF SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON. AMBASSADOR BARRY, OUR NEGOTIATOR AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE (CDE), MET WITH HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, AUGUST 14-15 IN STOCKHOLM.
  
  - CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD) DONALD LOWITZ AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR ISSRAELYAN MET ON AUGUST 18 AND 20 IN GENEVA FOR DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE PROPOSED TREATY FOR A GLOBAL CW BAN, WHICH WE HAVE TABLED AT THE CD. CONCERNING CW NON-PROLIFERATION, U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS MET ON THIS SUBJECT ON MARCH 5-6 IN BERN LAST MARCH, AND WILL MEET AGAIN ON SEPTEMBER 4-5 IN BERN.

-- NUCLEAR TESTING: U.S. AND SOVIET TECHNICAL EXPERTS  
MET FOR DISCUSSIONS JULY 25 - AUGUST 1 IN GENEVA. THE  
HEADS OF THE DELEGATIONS WERE DR. ROBERT BARKER OF THE  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND SOVIET  
AMBASSADOR PETROSYANTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE  
COMMITTEE ON UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY. ANOTHER  
MEETING IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN SEPTEMBER 4 IN GENEVA.

-- NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS: A SECOND ROUND OF  
TALKS WILL BE HELD AUGUST 24-25 IN GENEVA. THE FIRST  
ROUND OF EXPERT-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WAS HELD MAY 5-6 IN  
GENEVA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RICHARD PERLE,  
AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, COLONEL ROBERT  
LINEARD OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WILL AGAIN  
LEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION. AMBASSADOR ALEXEI OBUKHOV  
WILL HEAD THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

-- REGIONAL ISSUES: A MEETING ON REGIONAL ISSUES WILL BE HELD AUGUST 26-27 IN WASHINGTON. UNDER SECRETARY MICHAEL ARMACOST WILL HEAD OUR GROUP. EXPERTS TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN WILL BE HELD SEPTEMBER 2-3 IN MOSCOW. WE HAVE ALREADY HELD EXPERTS TALKS THIS YEAR ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, AND EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

-- BILATERAL ISSUES: COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED THE WEEK OF JULY 22 IN MOSCOW AND HAVE CONTINUED HERE IN WASHINGTON DURING THE VISITS OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH (JULY 25-29) AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS USA AND CANADA DIVISION, VITALIY MIKOL'CHAK (AUGUST 12-15). WE ANTICIPATE ANOTHER MEETING ON BILATERAL ISSUES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. DATES WILL BE DETERMINED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

-- ATOMIC ENERGY: EXPERTS FROM THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY MET AUGUST 18-22 IN MOSCOW.

-- SPACE COOPERATION: EXPERTS TALKS WILL BE HELD IN  
MOSCOW IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. DATES WILL BE DETERMINED  
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

-- PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES: DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD IN  
WASHINGTON ON JULY 29-AUGUST 5. WE ANTICIPATE A  
SECOND MEETING IN MOSCOW IN SEPTEMBER.

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**RESEARCH REPORT**

SOVIET ELITES SPLIT OVER U.S. POLICY  
AND OTHER FOREIGN-AFFAIRS ISSUES

Results of Surrogate Interviews



**USIA**

**Office of Research  
United States Information Agency**



8

SOVIET ELITES SPLIT OVER U.S. POLICY  
AND OTHER FOREIGN-AFFAIRS ISSUES

Results of Surrogate Interviews

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R-23-86

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December 1986

## SUMMARY

This report describes how members of Soviet professional and bureaucratic elites view U.S. policy toward the USSR and other foreign-affairs issues. It is based on interviews with more than 50 Americans and West Europeans who have had extensive recent contact with the elites. Interviews were conducted from spring to fall 1986; the most recent were done shortly after the Chautauqua Institution-sponsored "town meeting" in Latvia in mid-September.

### Soviet Elites Assign High Priority to Relations with the U.S.

Soviet elite members view the U.S. as the USSR's chief international competitor and consider negotiations with the U.S. on arms control issues extremely important. Many, especially officials, feel that the U.S. seeks military superiority and fear that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative will lead to the development of a powerful offensive weapons system. Aside from arms specialists, however, few understand SDI technology or have knowledge of Soviet research on strategic defense.

### Elites Divide Over Military Needs, Afghanistan, Other Issues

Compared to officials and others in the political establishment, intellectuals and members of the creative professions are more likely to adopt a favorable view of the U.S. and U.S. policy. Unlike officials, artists and intellectuals attach little importance to building up Soviet military might; rather, they stress the need to expand personal and artistic freedom and to strengthen human rights. Artists and intellectuals are less likely to feel that the U.S. and the USSR have mainly conflicting interests, to strongly believe that the U.S. seeks to achieve military superiority, to view SDI as a first-strike system, and to regard the U.S. as an unreliable trading partner.

Artists and intellectuals are also more inclined to criticize their government's role in Afghanistan than persons in the political establishment are. Half of the intelligentsia is thought to regard the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as shameful. Because dissenting views are seldom expressed outside a close circle of family and friends, however, opposition to the war remains passive and fragmented.

### Elites Are Uncertain About Prospects for U.S.-Soviet Relations

The November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev summit was widely viewed as a step toward renewed dialogue and better understanding. Yet, many officials question whether the U.S. has the political will to improve relations or reach a major arms control agreement. Some are pessimistic, saying that the "military-industrial complex" has a stranglehold on U.S. policymaking and will not let relations improve.

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


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## I. INTRODUCTION

This report describes how members of Soviet professional and bureaucratic elites view U.S. policy toward the USSR and some other major foreign-affairs issues. It is based on interviews, with more than 50 "surrogates" -- Americans and West Europeans who have had extensive recent contact with the elites. Most interviews were done in the spring of 1986. A few, however, were conducted in the fall (before the October 11-12 Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland) in order to gain information on recent developments.<sup>1</sup>

This study focuses on Soviet senior and mid-level elite members involved with foreign affairs, education and science, the mass media, and the arts. These individuals are mainly Russians who live in Moscow. By Soviet standards, a high proportion have traveled abroad and have had professional contact with Westerners for many years. Findings should not be generalized to the entire Soviet population or necessarily equated with the views of the highest-level policymakers.

### A Note on Methodology

As in the three prior USIA surrogate studies, the information for this report was derived primarily from interviews with non-Soviet "surrogates."<sup>2</sup> The interviews followed a protocol in

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<sup>1</sup>Perceptions of the Gorbachev leadership and Soviet domestic affairs are examined in a separate report. See Richard B. Dobson and Steven A. Grant, "Soviet Elite Views: The Gorbachev Leadership," USIA Research Report (R-20-86), September 1986. The authors wish to express their gratitude to the individuals who participated in this study and to the officers at the USIS posts who helped to arrange the interviews.

<sup>2</sup>See U.S. International Communication Agency (USICA), "Soviet Perceptions of the U.S.: Results of a Surrogate Interview Project," Research Memorandum (M-16-80), June 17, 1980; Gregory Guroff and Steven Grant, "Soviet Elites: Worldview and Perceptions of the U.S.," USICA Research Report (R-18-81), September 29, 1981; Richard B. Dobson, "Soviet Elite Attitudes and Perceptions: Domestic Affairs," USIA Research Report (R-25-84), November 1984; and Richard B. Dobson, "Soviet Elite Attitudes and Perceptions: Foreign Affairs," USIA Research Report (R-4-85), February 1985.



which most questions were open-ended (that is, they invited the surrogates to recount what the Soviets they know had said on specific issues). In addition, several techniques were used to make a quantitative assessment of elite attitudes:

1. One questionnaire asked surrogates to assess how important various tasks facing the Soviet Union are for a particular elite group.
2. Another questionnaire asked respondents to estimate what proportion of the Soviet citizens in a particular elite group would agree with certain statements about major domestic and international issues.
3. In a "simulated poll," surrogates were asked to indicate how particular types of persons in the elites would respond to a series of statements.
4. The interviewees themselves were evaluated on a 15-point scale according to five criteria -- their knowledge of the USSR, range of contacts with Soviet citizens, degree of intimacy, accuracy of recall, and command of the Russian language. This scale was used as a screening and weighting factor for the quantitative analysis.

Use of the questionnaires and the simulated poll made it possible to estimate with greater precision gradations of opinion within elite groups and differences between groups. These techniques also allowed cross-checks to see whether the several approaches yielded consistent results. The fact that they did show much the same results on all major issues increases our confidence in the accuracy and reliability of the study's conclusions.<sup>3</sup>

In this study, variations within the elite strata are examined along two dimensions. First, a distinction is made between the political establishment and artists and intellectuals. The former consists primarily of government officials responsible for foreign relations, but also includes policy analysts, social scientists, and professionals in the mass media. The latter includes members of the creative professions as well as academics and scientists in the fields less closely tied to policy. Second, a distinction is made according to age and status. Simply stated, the senior elite is composed of persons aged 55

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<sup>3</sup>The methodology is explained more fully in Appendix A, and data are presented in Appendix B. The elites' views of American society are briefly discussed in Appendix C.

or over who have attained positions of prominence or responsibility. The mid-level elite consists of younger persons who have been successful professionally, but have not yet attained such high status.

Even under the most favorable circumstances, of course, it is difficult to gain an accurate picture of what Soviet citizens think. The Soviet Communist Party limits, manipulates, and directs public expressions of opinion through various means, including Party control over the mass media, censorship, restricted and predetermined "elections," political limits on the legal system, and the suppression of independent organizations.

In investigating Soviet elite views, one must bear in mind that there is an official position on major policy issues and that deviations from the official line are likely to elicit sanctions -- a fact that obviously impedes frank and honest expressions of opinion. Such constraints may be strongest when Soviet citizens encounter foreigners from countries viewed as unfriendly to the USSR.

As a rule, the closer a Soviet citizen is to the center of the official policymaking establishment, the more guarded he tends to be. Foreign-affairs specialists at research institutes, social scientists, and journalists usually speak somewhat more freely than party and government officials. Creative artists and academics in fields not closely tied to policy are commonly the most open in expressing their views to foreigners.

Furthermore, the Soviet citizens who identify most closely with official policy are likely to repeat the official line to their Western interlocutors. At some times, they may believe what they say; at others, they may be altogether disingenuous. Soviet attempts to mold Western opinion clearly pose a special problem for anyone who seeks to gauge Soviet elite opinion.

On many foreign policy issues, elite members tend to line up behind their government. In part, their support for official positions reflects a tendency to identify with the Soviet state in the face of perceived threats from the outside world. Yet, it also derives to some degree from the influence of communist ideology and propaganda on their psychology. The pervasive system of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, Soviet propaganda campaigns, and the regime's control over promotions through the nomenklatura system all constrain independent thinking on the part of the Soviet elites.

Because of such constraints, it is all the more noteworthy that the elites are far from monolithic in their worldview. As we


noted in our recent report on the Gorbachev leadership, the intelligentsia (i.e., scholars in fields not closely tied to policy and persons in the creative professions) often have quite different views about domestic issues than members of the political establishment do. One of the principal findings of the present study is that such differences are also evident in the elites' attitudes and opinions regarding foreign affairs.

## II. ELITE PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

What do the elites consider the most important foreign policy issues facing the Soviet Union? In an attempt to answer this question, surrogates were asked to estimate the importance of 18 "tasks" for the specific elite group with which they had the closest contact. Though not exhaustive, the list that they were given to consider included six issues pertaining to foreign relations and 12 others relating to Soviet domestic affairs.

Figure 1 presents average ratings, standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100, for the six foreign-affairs issues. The ratings were calculated separately for members of the political establishment ("officials & related") and for intellectuals and members of the creative professions ("artists & intellectuals"). The higher the issue's score, the more important it is thought to be. Little, if any significance should be attached to differences of just a few points on this scale.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 1.  
IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN-AFFAIRS ISSUES FOR ELITES



Ratings, based on surrogates' estimates, range from 0 to 100.

<sup>4</sup>For ratings on all 18 issues, see Appendix B.

Importance of Issues for the Elites

From Figure 1, it is evident that there are points of consensus between the two elites. Like officials and others in the political establishment, intellectuals and members of the creative professions are thought to regard stopping the arms race and improving relations with the U.S. as extremely important. These two issues rank very high on the list of 18 tasks rated, along with such tasks as raising the population's standard of living and improving housing and medical care. The two elites are thought to assign much less importance to providing additional assistance to underdeveloped countries that are friendly to the USSR. In both groups, this task (labelled "Aid to Third World") was ranked lowest out of the 18 rated.<sup>5</sup>

There are some striking differences between the two elites as well. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the two groups diverge most sharply over one issue -- how much of its resources the USSR should devote to the military. For the political establishment, matching or surpassing U.S. military capabilities is ranked fourth in importance with a score of 76; for artists and intellectuals, it is in seventeenth place with a score of 32.

Officials and other members of the political establishment generally believe that the USSR should do everything it can to match or surpass U.S. military might. For this elite, Soviet military power is important not only for defending the USSR and for promoting Soviet interests throughout the world, but also as a symbol of the USSR's status as a superpower. In contrast, intellectuals and members of the creative professions attach little importance to keeping up with or exceeding U.S. military might.

On two other issues, there are more modest differences in emphasis between the elites. In comparison to artists and intellectuals, officials are judged to assign somewhat more importance to improving relations with China. On the other hand, artists and intellectuals are thought to feel that ending the war in Afghanistan is a more important issue than it is for officials.

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<sup>5</sup>Testimony from the surrogate interviews suggests that large proportions of both the official and nonofficial elites believe that military competition with the U.S. makes heavy demands on the Soviet economy and that arms-control agreements with the U.S. might enhance Soviet national security and well-being.

Perspectives on the U.S. and China


Judging from the surrogate interviews, the Soviet-American relationship remains the most important international concern of the Soviet elites. The downturn in bilateral relations that occurred since the late 1970s may even have highlighted the number of issues affected by the relationship and enhanced its centrality in the elite members' worldview.

The Soviet elites continue to view the United States as the Soviet Union's chief competitor and its principal point of comparison for military and economic power. As such, the U.S. elicits both admiration and apprehension. For officials and others who identify closely with the Soviet state, the U.S. represents the primary obstacle to the Soviet Union's achieving its foreign policy objectives throughout the world.

Results of the simulated poll, in which surrogates responded to statements as they thought Soviet elite members would, shed light on how the elites perceive Soviet-American relations. It is estimated that three-fifths of the officials and others in the political establishment would agree with the statement, "The USSR and the U.S. have few interests in common -- for the most part, their interests conflict" (Figure 2). Three-quarters

**Figure 2.**  
**ELITES DIVIDE OVER WHETHER SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTERESTS CONFLICT**

"The U.S. and the USSR have few interests in common.  
For the most part, their interests conflict."



15a

of the artists and intellectuals are thought to disagree. Perhaps because they are less inclined simply to view the U.S. through the prism of Marxist-Leninist ideology, artists and intellectuals perceive more of a commonality of interests between the two nations.

The elites' views of Sino-Soviet relations do not diverge as sharply as their opinions about Soviet-American relations do. According to the simulated poll, large majorities of both elites are thought to believe that China and the USSR have conflicting interests (see Appendix B). The findings suggest that artists and intellectuals are even more inclined than officials to perceive a conflict of interests -- a reversal of the pattern with the U.S.<sup>6</sup>

#### Contrasting Opinions about Afghanistan

As Figure 1 indicated, ending the war in Afghanistan is not judged by surrogates to be among the elites' highest priorities. Stopping the war ranks in thirteenth place out of 18 issues for officials and others of the political establishment; it is in ninth place for artists and intellectuals.

However, results of the simulated poll indicate that the two groups differ significantly in how they evaluate the war: 52 percent of the officials and other members of the political establishment are thought to agree with the statement, "The Soviet government is doing what is right in Afghanistan." In contrast, only 34 percent of the artists and intellectuals are thought to endorse the government's policy (Figure 3).<sup>7</sup>


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<sup>6</sup>Perhaps officials give more weight to the fact that the USSR and China are both Marxist-Leninist states, whereas artists and intellectuals focus more on the cultural and historical differences between the two. Previous USIA surrogate studies also concluded that China is often viewed with enmity and mistrust by the elites, even though it has a Marxist-Leninist system.

<sup>7</sup>There are also notable generational differences: 59 percent of the senior elite, but only 29 percent of the mid-level elite are thought to believe that the Soviet government is doing the right thing in Afghanistan. These results coincide with findings from the 1983-84 surrogate study showing that a majority of the mid-level elite felt that the decision to intervene was a mistake. See Dobson, "Soviet Elite Attitudes and Perceptions: Foreign Affairs," pp. 30-31.


**Figure 3.**  
**MOST ARTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS ARE CRITICAL OF**  
**SOVIET POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN**

"The Soviet government is doing what is right in Afghanistan."



**Figure 4.**  
**HALF THE INTELLIGENTSIA FINDS SOVIET**  
**ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN SHAMEFUL**

% Estimated to Agree



STATEMENT: "What the Soviet government is doing in Afghanistan is a shame for our people."



16a

When surrogates were asked to estimate what proportion of the elite members would agree with the statement, "What the Soviet government is doing in Afghanistan is a shame for our people," clear differences between the two elites once again emerged. As Figure 4 indicates, half the artists and intellectuals ("artists") were judged to regard Soviet actions as shameful. On the other hand, only a quarter of the officials, policy analysts, journalists, and others in the political establishment ("officials") were thought to view the war as morally repugnant.

Judging from surrogates' reports, Afghanistan continues to be a particularly troubling matter for many of the more reflective members of the elites. While many Russians justify the war in geopolitical terms, stressing Afghanistan's proximity to the Soviet border and their country's right to intervene, others express serious misgivings and condemn the war on moral grounds. Dissenting views, however, are usually shared only with close and trusted friends and family members; consequently, opposition to the war remains passive, private, and fragmented.

### III. U.S. POLICY AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

#### Views of U.S. Policy

In 1986, large segments of the elites continue to regard U.S. intentions with suspicion and to view the U.S. as aggressive and threatening. Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tend to be defensive, nationalistic, and antagonistic in discussing U.S. policy. As in earlier years, they complain that the U.S. does not accord the USSR the "respect" they feel it deserves as a superpower. Before and after the 1985 Geneva summit, some officials, intellectuals, and artists further alleged that there has been a growth of "anti-Soviet hysteria" in American society, fanned by U.S. government propaganda and such "anti-Soviet" films as Rambo and Red Dawn.

As evidence of U.S. militarism and aggression, officials and nonofficials alike frequently mention several themes: the U.S. military buildup, a purported lack of seriousness on the part of the U.S. in arms control negotiations, U.S. support for the Contras who oppose the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, and U.S. assistance to the "bandits" in Afghanistan. In the spring, they also referred to various recent events as proof of U.S. aggressiveness (e.g., the "provocative" U.S. naval operations in the Black Sea in March 1986, the resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing in April, and the April 14 bombing of Libya).<sup>8</sup>

The aspects of the Soviet-American relationship that generate the most concern have shifted in recent years, no doubt largely in response to changes in official propaganda. In 1983-84, NATO's planned deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) was the foremost worry among the elites.

After the Pershing-II and cruise missiles had begun to be deployed and the Soviet government had muted its propaganda

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<sup>8</sup>Many elite members condemned the April 14 U.S. air strike against Libya as an unjustified and totally disproportionate attack. Heavy Soviet media coverage, which portrayed the U.S. raid as a terrorist attack on innocent civilians, appears to have colored their views. For days, Soviet TV ran footage showing devastated Libyan neighborhoods and wounded civilians. Few Soviets appeared able to comprehend or empathize with Western concern about terrorism, which seemed to them a distant, "foreign" problem. The Soviet media have given much less coverage than Western media to acts of terrorism and have downplayed or denied the involvement of Soviet allies.

campaign, the "Euromissiles" receded as a perceived threat. In 1984-85, when the Kremlin targeted its propaganda on "preventing the militarization of outer space," the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) became a central concern for the elites.

In 1986, issues highlighted in recent Soviet propaganda -- Gorbachev's January 15 proposal to do away with all nuclear weapons by 2000 and his repeated calls for a moratorium on nuclear testing -- moved to the forefront. Elite members commonly contrast Gorbachev's "bold," "flexible" arms control initiatives with alleged U.S. intransigence. They express perplexity and disapproval regarding the apparent lack of response from the U.S. "What more can we do?" they ask rhetorically.

Of course, some well-placed Soviets, especially artists and intellectuals outside the political establishment, take issue with the official line. Some intellectuals go so far as to strongly endorse the President's efforts to build up U.S. power and to oppose Soviet expansionism, asserting that Soviet leaders only understand demonstrations of strength.

In other respects, too, there have been changes in opinion since 1983-84. Soviet elite members less often make derogatory comments about President Reagan personally and less often characterize his rhetoric as strident and insulting. Although many still feel apprehensive about a possible Soviet-American confrontation, they speak less frequently about the prospect of war than they did in 1983-84, especially following the Soviet withdrawal from the INF negotiations in November 1983.

#### The 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit

The November 1985 meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev was regarded as a significant development in Soviet-American relations by all segments of the elite. Many elite members experienced a sense of relief from the very fact that the two leaders were talking to one another, and virtually all agreed that continuing dialogue between the super-powers is essential.

During the summit, many Soviets measured Gorbachev against President Reagan, noting with some satisfaction that their leader appeared young, able, and articulate. Most credited Gorbachev with a good performance and expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting. They commented favorably on the joint statement (particularly the section in which both sides assert that it is impossible to win a nuclear war) and applauded the signing of a bilateral exchanges agreement.

In short, most elite members viewed the 1985 Gorbachev-Reagan meeting as an important step toward renewed dialogue and better understanding. Apparently as a consequence of the summit, the climate of bilateral relations improved a bit, and Soviet bureaucrats became somewhat more cordial, forthcoming, and cooperative than they had been for several years in the experience of the surrogates who come in contact with them.

The fact that, at the end of the summit, President Reagan was shown live on Soviet television, without commentary, was interpreted by some Soviets as a significant change in internal policy. Some also inferred, perhaps without justification, that a major breakthrough had occurred in the two countries' relationship. In subsequent months, however, Soviets more often expressed disillusionment with what they saw as a lack of substantive results from the meeting.

#### Changing Perceptions of President Reagan

Over the past year, as Soviet elite members (especially persons outside the official foreign policy establishment) gained more exposure to President Reagan, their image of him changed. Quite a few read the interview with the President that was published in Izvestiya in early November 1985, saw him on television during the summit that same month, or watched his message to the Soviet people that was carried (without advance publicity) by Soviet TV on New Year's Day. Meanwhile, official spokesmen and the Soviet mass media have tended to portray the President in less negative terms than in the past.

On the whole, elite members gained a positive impression of Reagan from his appearances on Soviet television. Many said that he looked confident, impressive, and surprisingly well for a man of his age. Those who saw the New Year's message found him self-assured but not threatening. Some spoke of the President's warmth and informality, noting the family photos in the background.

Thus, during the past year, a segment of the elite members seems to have formed an image of President Reagan as a less threatening, more statesman-like figure than they had earlier envisioned him. A few intellectuals and artists even went so far as to describe him as a strong, vigorous leader who represents the entrepreneurial spirit that has made America great.

Concurrently, however, a new theme emphasizing the limits of the President's power has become more conspicuous in informal talks. In comparison to 1983-84, more Soviets are inclined to characterize President Reagan, not as a blind ideologue who is

determined to lead an anti-communist crusade, but as a mere figurehead, a pawn of the "ruling circles" and "military-industrial complex." (This theme has figured prominently in Soviet media commentary, especially since the 1985 Geneva summit and following the October 1986 meeting in Reykjavik.) Officials continue to direct their ire at Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and his assistant, Richard Perle, who are consistently portrayed as aggressive, anti-Soviet point men for the military-industrial complex.

### Perceived U.S. Quest for Military Superiority

Surrogates report that foreign ministry officials and specialists at the Institute of the USA and Canada contend, as in prior years, that the Reagan administration seeks to acquire and maintain military supremacy. This view is said to be shared by a great many academics and persons in the arts.

According to the simulated poll, the great majority of elite members are thought to believe, in keeping with Soviet propaganda, that the U.S. seeks to achieve military superiority over the USSR (Figure 5). Most are also thought to accept the official view that the USSR does not seek superiority over the U.S. (Much the same findings were obtained in the 1983-84 surrogate study.) It is noteworthy, however, that despite constant official propaganda on this subject, about a third agree that the USSR seeks to achieve superiority over the U.S.


Furthermore, there are some notable differences in the degree to which the elites accept their government's propaganda about U.S. intentions. Persons in the political establishment are much more inclined than artists and intellectuals to "strongly agree" that the U.S. seeks military superiority (56 to 25 percent). The proportion that "strongly agrees" is also much higher among senior elite members than among younger, mid-level elite members (59 to 25 percent).

### Reactions to the Strategic Defense Initiative


Aside from a small group of arms control experts and scientists, few Soviets have a grasp of the technology involved in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, and few possess knowledge of Soviet research programs related to anti-missile defense. In conceptualizing SDI, many nonspecialists conjure up images of countless nuclear weapons circling around the earth. Most nonspecialists have doubts about the feasibility of SDI and about the Soviet Union's ability to match a concerted U.S. research effort.

**Figure 5.**  
**ELITES STILL THINK THE U.S. -- NOT THE USSR --**  
**SEEKS MILITARY SUPERIORITY**

"The U.S. seeks to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union."




"The USSR seeks to achieve military superiority over the U.S."



- STRONGLY DISAGREE
- ▨ DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
- ▩ AGREE SOMEWHAT
- STRONGLY AGREE

**Figure 6.**  
**MOST VIEW SDI AS A**  
**POTENTIAL FIRST-STRIKE SYSTEM**

% Estimated to Agree



STATEMENT: "The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is an attempt to gain a first-strike capability against the USSR."

For a broad segment of the elites, SDI has come to symbolize the costs and perils of a continuing arms race and the perceived U.S. effort to gain military supremacy. In line with Soviet propaganda, most elite members regard SDI as a potential offensive weapons system. If developed and deployed, they maintain, SDI would enable the U.S. to launch a first strike against the USSR and fend off retaliation.<sup>9</sup>

As Figure 6 shows, surrogates estimate that four-fifths of those in the political establishment ("officials") and over half the artists and intellectuals ("artists") feel that SDI is "an attempt to gain a first-strike capability against the USSR." But the regime has clearly not been fully successful in instilling the view that SDI is an offensive system. Surrogates estimate that about a fifth of the officials and two-fifths of the intelligentsia do not accept this basic tenet of Soviet propaganda.

Indeed, a sizable fraction of the elites explicitly reject key points of official propaganda. Some intellectuals, for example, ridicule Soviet pronouncements against the "militarization of space." "What nonsense!" they say. "Everyone knows that we've been doing this since Gagarin!" Even these critics, however, tend to regard SDI as undesirable, believing that it will stimulate the arms race and impose a heavy burden on the Soviet economy.

Among foreign-affairs officials and specialists authorized to conduct research on arms control, discussions of arms control center on SDI. Unless the U.S. agrees to limit development and deployment of a space-based weapons system, they maintain, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty will become a dead letter, and arms control efforts over the past two decades will have been in vain.<sup>10</sup> Deep reductions in offensive missiles would be ruled out, and the way would be opened for a substantial expansion of offensive weapons. While not minimizing the threat which they feel that SDI poses, some Soviet officials and scientists assert that the USSR could easily offset it by multiplying its offensive missiles.

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<sup>9</sup>For a more thorough discussion of Soviet propaganda themes on SDI, see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "The Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative," ACDA Publication 122, August 1986.

<sup>10</sup>In light of the outcome of the October 1986 meeting in Reykjavik, it is unlikely that these views have changed.

#### IV. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

##### A Sense of Uncertainty

From the standpoint of the elites, the outlook for U.S.-Soviet relations remained clouded in the spring of 1986. Following the U.S. airstrike against Libya in April, the Soviet government postponed a scheduled meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze which was to lay the groundwork for a possible second Reagan-Gorbachev summit in the United States in 1986. While some officials continued to believe that a summit would be held in the U.S. in 1986, others were pessimistic.

In private conversations, most officials repeated the Soviet position that any summit should lead to tangible results. Many expressed the hope that the summit, if it were to be held, would address Gorbachev's January 15 proposal and ways to stop the militarization of space. (Few spoke of the need for the the summit to address regional issues or human rights, matters whose importance the U.S. has repeatedly emphasized.) Some officials and foreign policy specialists maintained that Reagan had a greater need for the summit than Gorbachev because of the November 1986 congressional elections.

Few, if any officials predicted a major breakthrough on arms control issues in the near future. While many outside of the official foreign-affairs establishment appeared to find it difficult to accept the prospect of long, drawn-out negotiations before an agreement is reached, some officials intimated that under certain circumstances limited accords might be feasible. For example, it might be possible, they suggested, for the two sides to agree to a two-year moratorium on nuclear testing.

However, a sizable share of the foreign policy establishment questioned whether the U.S. has the political will to improve relations or to negotiate a major arms control agreement. Some argued that the USSR would have to wait for another president to be elected, adding that the successor could not possibly be harder to deal with than Reagan. Others were even more pessimistic, saying that the U.S. military-industrial complex has a stranglehold on U.S. policymaking and will not let relations improve. Some elite members (by all indications a minority) forecast a progressive deterioration in relations, a more threatening international environment, and a greater chance of war in the years ahead.



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Support for Trade and Cultural Exchanges

Despite uncertainty about arms control negotiations, there continues to be substantial elite support for expanded trade with the U.S. It is widely believed that continued growth in the Soviet economy depends on the importation of Western technology, that advanced American know-how would benefit their country, and that the scale of American enterprise corresponds to Soviet needs.

At the same time, however, many Soviet officials recall with bitterness the trade sanctions imposed by the Carter and Reagan administrations in response to Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland. Officials commonly characterize the sanctions as crude attempts at economic blackmail and evidence that the U.S. cannot be counted on to honor commercial agreements. Trade officials nonetheless give every indication that the Soviet government would very much like to gain "Most Favored Nation" status for trade with the U.S.


Surrogates' estimates provide graphic evidence of the elites' contradictory views on this issue. Three-fifths of the officials and other members of the political establishment and four-fifths of the artists and intellectuals are thought to favor expanding trade with the U.S. as much as possible (Figure 7). On the other hand, it is estimated that more than half of the officials and about a quarter of the artists and intellectuals doubt U.S. reliability as a trading partner (Figure 8).

The broad support that academics and persons in the creative arts give to Soviet-American trade appears to reflect a desire for widened contacts of all kinds. Scientists, scholars, writers, and performing artists desire to maintain contact with their Western counterparts, to obtain Western publications, and to travel abroad. Cultural contacts and exchanges with the U.S. also have a symbolic and psychological dimension for these Soviets, providing confirmation that their work, as well as their national culture, is "recognized" and accorded respect by the international community. Thus, these groups feel that they suffered from the cutbacks in exchanges and other contacts that resulted from the U.S. response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and to Soviet support for the suppression of the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland.

On the other hand, some official commentators have insinuated in the Soviet media that contacts with Westerners are dangerous because they may lead to "ideological contamination." In the view of surrogates, however, most elite members find such fears unfounded or exaggerated. Once again, there is a contrast between officials and the intelligentsia. Surrogates estimate

Figure 7.  
MOST FAVOR EXPANDED TRADE WITH THE U.S.


% Estimated to Agree



STATEMENT: "It is in the USSR's interest to expand trade with the U.S. as much as possible."

Figure 8.  
BUT A MAJORITY OF OFFICIALS CONSIDER THE U.S. AN UNRELIABLE TRADE PARTNER

% Estimated to Agree




STATEMENT: "The United States cannot be trusted to be a reliable trading partner."

Z/a.

Figure 9.  
FEW REGARD CULTURAL AND ACADEMIC  
EXCHANGES AS DANGEROUS

% Estimated to Agree



STATEMENT: "Cultural and academic exchanges are dangerous -- they bring harmful ideas into our society."

that a quarter of the officials and just 12 percent of the artists and intellectuals feel that "cultural and academic exchanges are dangerous -- they bring harmful ideas into our society" (Figure 9).

For many Moscow elite members, the most tangible achievement of the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev summit was the signing of the agreement on cultural, educational, and other types of exchanges. (The previous agreement had lapsed in 1979.) Although persons in academia and the arts hailed the new agreement, few were euphoric. Many remained wary, fearing that the U.S. might again cut back the exchanges if it deemed that political considerations warranted it.

#### Concluding Observations

From their informal comments, it appears that many members of the Soviet elites were uncertain about what foreign policy course the Gorbachev leadership would take. In the spring, there was much speculation among foreign-affairs specialists and officials about the theme of "interdependence" which Gorbachev discussed at the 27th Party congress in February.

There was also some debate about whether the USSR could or would adopt a more multipolar foreign policy that is less oriented toward the U.S.

Some foreign policy officials and specialists implied that Soviet policy was in a state of flux, pointing to a number of recent high-level appointments that would affect future relations with the U.S. In March 1986, Anatoliy Dobrynin, the former ambassador to the U.S., assumed new responsibilities as chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. Aleksandr Yakovlev' became head of the Propaganda Department under the Central Committee and then, apparently, party secretary for propaganda and culture. Meanwhile, a large number of Americanists and East-West specialists have moved up, both in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Central Committee Secretariat. When interviews were conducted in the spring, Soviet foreign-affairs specialists implied that they did not yet know what impact these appointments would have on Soviet dealings with the U.S.

Events of recent months -- including the Soviet detention and release of American correspondent Nicholas Daniloff, the bilateral discussions conducted in Latvia in September under the auspices of the Chautauqua Institution, and especially the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland (October 11-12) -- have probably not altered the climate of Soviet elite opinion to an appreciable degree.

From the surrogate interviews, it is evident that -- despite the regime's persistent attempts to manipulate citizens' attitudes and opinions -- there is a pronounced diversity of views among the elite members. It is also clear that on a range of issues, intellectuals and members of the creative professions part company with officials, policy analysts, social scientists, and others in the "political establishment."

Artists and intellectuals are more likely than members of the political establishment to depart from official policy positions and to adopt a more favorable view of the U.S. and U.S. policy. In comparison to officials, the intelligentsia do not assign great importance to building up Soviet military might; instead, they stress the importance of expanding personal and artistic freedom and of strengthening human rights. According to surrogates' estimates, artists and intellectuals are much less likely than officials to feel that the U.S. and the USSR have basically conflicting interests. They are also less likely to "strongly agree" that the U.S. seeks to achieve military superiority, to view SDI as an offensive, first-strike system, and to regard the U.S. as an unreliable trading partner.

27a.

The cleavages between the two elites extend to other issues as well. Compared to officials, for example, artists and intellectuals are less inclined to believe that the Soviet government is doing the right thing in Afghanistan; they are more inclined to feel that Soviet actions in Afghanistan are ignominious.

Although it is unlikely that such views will determine Soviet policy, they will no doubt play a role in the debate over foreign policy in the USSR. If, as a result of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' (openness), there is more room to express divergent views in the press and society, dissenting views may become more conspicuous and, perhaps, more influential.

APPENDIX A:  
METHODOLOGY

Interview Procedures

Between April and June 1986, Soviet specialists from the USIA Office of Research interviewed 54 "surrogates." These interviews were supplemented by a small number of interviews in the fall preceding the October 11-12 meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. Interviewees were assured that they would not be identified or asked the names of any Soviet citizens whom they knew. All willingly participated without compensation.

The interviews covered a range of domestic and international issues and consisted primarily of open-ended questions that asked what Soviet citizens had said in private conversations on these topics. They also included three techniques, discussed more fully below, that provided quantitative estimates of elite opinion: (a) estimates of the proportion of Soviet citizens in a particular bureaucratic or professional group who would agree with a series of statements, (b) estimates of the importance of "tasks facing the Soviet Union" for a particular elite group, and (c) a simulated poll in which surrogates responded to statements as they believed certain types of elite members would. The average interview lasted an hour and a half.

Types of Persons Interviewed

Interviewees were selected because they were known, or reputed, to be knowledgeable about the USSR and to have had recent, sustained contact with Soviet citizens. The great majority had lived in the USSR for several months or more and could speak Russian; and two-thirds were living in Moscow at the time of the interview. Most were American citizens; the remainder were West Europeans. Surrogates were drawn from various professions, including government service (48 percent), journalism (25 percent), education and science (20 percent), and other fields (7 percent). Thirty percent of the interviewees had participated in a prior USIA surrogate study.

Problems in the Study of Soviet Elite Opinion

To ensure that the information derived from surrogate interviews is valid and reliable, several problems must be addressed:

1. Inasmuch as the information comes from non-Soviet intermediaries, it is only as good as the interviewees' ability to

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provide accurate reflections of Soviet views, rather than their own opinions. An effort was made to keep this distinction clear in the minds of interviewees and to separate the two in analyzing the interview transcripts. In addition, the three techniques that yielded the quantitative estimates provided cross-checks for the responses to the open-ended questions.

2. Many factors can cause distortions in the opinions that Soviet citizens express; for instance, they may be afraid to express to a foreigner views at variance with the party line or may seek to ingratiate themselves. In the interviews and the subsequent analysis, there was a conscious attempt to correct for such possible distortions by ascertaining the rapport existing between the interviewees and their Soviet acquaintances and the context in which the conversations took place. For instance, was the Soviet citizen's opinion expressed in confidence, with the suggestion of intimacy, conviction, or soul-searching? Was it stated in a setting that would allow the expression of personal views, such as a private walk, as contrasted with a public forum? In this way, it was possible to separate the more authentic expressions of personal opinion from those likely to have been distorted or disguised.

3. Some observers are better than others. The researchers found, as they had anticipated, that surrogates differed considerably in the degree to which they had established close ties with Soviets, had discussed issues in depth, and could faithfully recall details of conversations. Greater confidence was placed in the reports from interviewees who had a wide range of contacts, had maintained contacts over a long period of time, and had established close rapport with their Soviet acquaintances. These persons had "sampled" a wider range of expressions of opinion and were in a better position to evaluate them than the ones whose contacts were few, short-term, or superficial. Furthermore, interviewees who possessed a good command of the Russian language generally had been more successful in communicating with their Soviet acquaintances and in detecting nuances of expression, constraints the Soviets felt, and so on.

#### Evaluation of Interviewees

To take account of these variations, the researchers systematically evaluated all surrogates on five dimensions: their knowledge of the USSR, number of contacts, degree of intimacy, accuracy of recall, and command of the Russian language. For each dimension, interviewees were given a rating on a four-point scale that ranged from poor (0) to excellent (3). The sum of these ratings constituted the interviewee's "credibility

score." Thus, a person who was judged to be excellent on all five dimensions would receive the maximum score of 15, whereas a person judged poor on all would receive the minimum, 0. The distribution of the surrogates' credibility scores is shown in Table 1.

Table 1  
Distribution of Credibility Scores

<u>Score</u>	<u>Number of Interviewees</u>
6 or less	2
7-9	18
10-12	22
13-15	<u>12</u>
Total	54

Weighting of Responses. The credibility scale was then used as a screening and weighting factor for the quantitative analyses discussed below. Interviewees whose score was less than 7 were excluded from the quantitative analysis; and those with scores of 7 or more were given a weight proportionate to the score on this scale. The weight consisted of the credibility score divided by 7. In other words, a person with a score of 7 was given a weight of 1, whereas a person with a score of 13 was given a weight of 1.86.

#### Quantitative Measures

A. Estimates for Items on Questionnaire A. About two-thirds of the way through the interview, the interviewer said: "Earlier, you mentioned that you have had close contact with individuals in [name of group]. Now, when I give you this short questionnaire, I would like you to estimate approximately what proportion of the individuals in that group would agree with the statement. In answering, try to judge how the individuals...really feel -- that is, how they would respond if each were writing in a private journal, strictly for himself, or talking to a close and trusted friend." After receiving the one-page questionnaire, the interviewee checked the appropriate box opposite the statement. There were five possible responses, ranging from "Few (0-20%)" to "The overwhelming majority (80-100%)," in addition to "Don't know."



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In order to tabulate the data, a number of steps were taken. First, estimates were coded according to the specific professional group referred to by the interviewee (e.g., mid-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, journalists, performing artists, or historians). Second, the groups were consolidated into larger aggregates that consisted of persons engaged in similar types of activities: (1) party and government officials; (2) journalists and other professionals in the mass media; (3) scholars in policy-related fields (foreign-affairs analysts and social scientists); (4) scholars and scientists in the less-political fields (the humanities and the natural sciences); and (5) the creative professions (writers, actors, musicians, painters, dancers, etc.). (Groups that did not fit into one of these categories were dropped from the analysis.) Third, in view of the small number of cases in each category, these five groups were consolidated into the two basic groups used in this report: (1) the political establishment, which includes all officials, journalists and other professionals in the mass media, and scholars in policy-related fields; and (2) artists and intellectuals, which includes members of the creative professions as well as scholars and scientists in the less-political fields.

For the computation of percentages, each response category was assigned its median value -- 10 percent for "Few (0-20%)," 30 percent for "Some (20-40%)," etc. "Don't know" responses were dropped from the analysis. Using these values (weighted according to the credibility scores discussed above), averages for the two basic groupings were calculated.

It should be noted that surrogates were not asked to fill out a questionnaire unless they had demonstrated in the course of the interview that they had had close contact with at least one group. Questionnaires were completed by 40 respondents. Since a few surrogates filled out two questionnaires (for different groups), 49 questionnaires were used for the calculations.

#### B. Estimates of the Importance of Tasks (Questionnaire B).

After surrogates had completed the first questionnaire, they were handed "Questionnaire B" which also referred to the group with which they had had the closest contact. The instructions read: "For persons in this group, what are the most important tasks facing the Soviet Union?" They were then asked to rate, with this specific group in mind, a series of tasks in terms of their importance on a scale going from 0 to 5. Scores of 5 were used to designate the most important (or necessary) tasks; scores of 0 indicated the least important (or least necessary) ones. The respondent was instructed to leave the space blank if he did not know.

Though not exhaustive, the list of 18 "tasks" on Questionnaire B includes a range of issues which have been considered important by Soviet officials and ordinary citizens. Six of the tasks pertain to foreign affairs (e.g., "Improve relations with China"); six refer to Soviet economic matters (e.g., "Produce or import more food"); and six concern other domestic problems (e.g., "Allow more personal and artistic freedom").

Thirty-two surrogates filled out a single questionnaire; and eight completed questionnaires for two different groups. Thus, 48 questionnaires were available for analysis. Reference groups were coded and aggregated following the procedure described for Questionnaire A. Surrogates' responses on the scale going from 0 to 5 were converted to a scale running from 0 to 100 by multiplying scores by 20; and they were weighted according to the credibility score as described above. Results are presented in Appendix B.

C. Simulated Poll. The simulated poll entailed a more complicated procedure. If surrogates demonstrated that they had had close contact with one or more of the groups of interest, they were assigned two "profiles" that described Soviet citizens resembling those whom they knew. They were then asked to put themselves in the position of these Soviets and to answer as they believed they would. They did this by placing each card containing a statement on a board that had three rows and four columns. The columns showed the Soviet citizen's opinion -- that is, whether the person would strongly disagree, disagree somewhat, agree somewhat, or strongly agree with the statement. The rows, on the other hand, showed how confident the surrogate was that the Soviet citizen would respond in that fashion (that is, whether he was very sure, somewhat sure, or unsure). As with the questionnaire, the interviewee was asked to judge "how that person would respond if he were writing in a private journal, strictly for himself, or talking to a close and trusted friend."

The profiles, which had been prepared in advance, described fictional Soviet citizens who had achieved professional success in one of the elite groups studied. All of the persons described in the profiles were urban residents with Russian family names who had traveled to the West (and who were therefore presumably trusted by the authorities). They differed according to two sets of traits: age/status and affiliation/specialty. One set of profiles described senior persons (55-65 years of age) who occupied positions of prominence or responsibility; the second set described "up-and-coming" middle-level persons (35-45 years old). The individuals described belonged to various professional and bureaucratic groups. One was an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a second was a

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correspondent for a major newspaper; a third was a specialist on Western economics employed at a research institute, and so on. There were 21 different occupational types; and since each type included both a senior and a mid-level person in the same line of work, there were 42 profiles in all.

Before being tabulated, data were coded according to the characteristics of the persons described in the profiles and the responses attributed to them, so that the data could be broken down according to the elite members' affiliation/specialty and age/status. The age/status breakdown allowed a comparison of senior and mid-level elite groups; the affiliation/specialty breakdown made it possible to compare members of the political establishment with artists and intellectuals (a distinction comparable to the ones used for Questionnaires A and B). In the tabulations, cases were weighted in the manner described above.

In all, 30 surrogates participated in the simulated poll. When weights were applied, the number of cases came to 45 for both senior and mid-level elite members (hence, to 90 when the two sets were combined).

APPENDIX B:  
DATA FROM QUESTIONNAIRES AND THE SIMULATED POLL

I. Issues Rated in Terms of Importance for Elites

The following 18 "tasks" were rated by surrogates for the particular elite group with which they had had the closed contact.

<u>Issues</u>	<u>Score and (Rank)</u>	
	<u>Officials &amp; Related</u>	<u>Artists &amp; Intellectuals</u>
Stop the arms race	86 (1)	85 (3)
Improve relations with the U.S.	81 (2)	79 (6)
Raise the population's standard of living	78 (3)	90 (1)
Match or surpass U.S. military capabilities	76 (4)	32 (17)
Combat alcohol abuse	75 (5)	67 (13)
Improve housing and medical care	73 (6)	82 (4)
Produce or import more food	72 (7)	81 (5)
Increase material incentives (widen wage differentials)	70 (8)	76 (7)
Strengthen discipline in society	68 (9.5)	61 (14)
Introduce computers throughout the economy	68 (9.5)	58 (15)
Fight against corruption (bribetaking, <u>blat</u> , etc.)	67 (11)	75 (8)
Protect the natural environment	60 (13)	70 (11)
Improve relations with China	60 (13)	40 (16)
End the war in Afghanistan	60 (13)	72 (9)
Allow more personal and artistic freedom	47 (15)	88 (2)
Make the economy more responsive to market forces	46 (16)	70 (11)
Reduce the privileges of Communist Party officials	40 (17)	70 (11)
Increase assistance to underdeveloped countries that are friendly to the USSR	30 (18)	14 (18)

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II. Proportions Estimated to Agree with Statements

The following statements from Questionnaire A are ranked according to the overall percentage of Soviet elite members estimated to agree with them. Brackets have been placed around percentages if there was a high degree of variance in the surrogates' estimates.

	Percentage in Group Estimated to Agree <sup>a</sup>		
	All	Political Establish- ment	Artists & Intel- lectuals
1. The USSR will never start a nuclear war with the United States.	77	77	77
2. It is in the USSR's interest to expand trade with the U.S. as much as possible.	71	63	80
3. The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is an attempt to gain a first-strike capability against the USSR.	68	79	[57]
4. The USSR can gain the world's respect only if its military might is second to none.	[54]	[63]	48
5. The U.S. will never start a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.	[43]	[39]	[47]
6. The United States cannot be trusted to be a reliable trading partner.	[41]	56	28
7. What the Soviet government is doing in Afghanistan is a shame for our people.	37	23	[50]
8. Cultural and academic exchanges are dangerous -- they bring harmful ideas into our society.	18	25	12
Number of weighted responses used to calculate estimates	(75)	(34)	(41)

<sup>a</sup>Based on estimates by non-Soviet surrogates. Brackets indicate responses with a high degree of variance (the standard deviation is greater than or equal to 25 percent). Parentheses indicate the number of responses used to calculate the estimates, weighted as explained in Appendix A.

III. Responses from the Simulated Poll

1. Responses to the statement, "The U.S. and the USSR have few interests in common. For the most part, their interests conflict."

	Distribution in Percent				
	All	By Age & Status		Officials & Related	Artists & Intel.
		Senior	Mid-Level		
Strongly agree	14	19	9	24	2
Agree somewhat	29	25	33	33	21
Disagree somewhat	25	28	22	20	33
Strongly disagree	32	29	36	23	44
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases (weighted)	(90)	(45)	(45)	(50)	(40)

2. Responses to the statement, "China and the USSR have few interests in common. For the most part, their interests conflict."

	Distribution in Percent				
	All	By Age & Status		Officials & Related	Artists & Intel.
		Senior	Mid-Level		
Strongly agree	29	36	24	16	45
Agree somewhat	53	45	59	55	50
Disagree somewhat	15	12	17	22	5
Strongly disagree	3	7	0	6	0
Total percent	100	100	100	99	100
Number of cases (weighted)	(90)	(45)	(45)	(50)	(40)

3. Responses to the statement, "The Soviet government is doing what is right in Afghanistan."

	Distribution in Percent				
	All	By Age & Status		Officials & Related	Artists & Intel.
		Senior	Mid-Level		
Strongly agree	16	22	9	20	10
Agree somewhat	29	37	20	32	24
Disagree somewhat	39	27	50	42	37
Strongly disagree	16	14	21	6	29
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases (weighted)	(90)	(45)	(45)	(50)	(40)

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4. Responses to the statement, "The U.S. seeks to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union."

	Distribution in Percent				
	All	By Age & Status		Officials & Related	Artists & Intel.
		Senior	Mid-Level		
Strongly agree	42	59	24	56	25
Agree somewhat	46	27	65	38	55
Disagree somewhat	12	14	11	6	20
Strongly disagree	0	0	0	0	0
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases (weighted)	(90)	(45)	(45)	(50)	(40)

5. Responses to the statement, "The USSR seeks to achieve military superiority over the U.S."

	Distribution in Percent				
	All	By Age & Status		Officials & Related	Artists & Intel.
		Senior	Mid-Level		
Strongly agree	9	6	11	12	5
Agree somewhat	24	25	22	18	32
Disagree somewhat	24	20	29	22	27
Strongly disagree	43	48	39	48	36
Total percent	100	99	101	100	100
Number of cases (weighted)	(90)	(45)	(45)	(50)	(40)

APPENDIX C:  
VIEWS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY

The 1986 interviews suggest that elite attitudes and perceptions of U.S. society have changed little since the 1981 and 1983-84 surrogate studies.<sup>1</sup> America continues to be pictured as a land of bewildering contrasts -- of affluence and poverty, unbridled commercialism and religious fundamentalism, peaceful suburbs and dirty, crime-ridden cities. Well-educated urban Soviets not only have contrasting images of U.S. society, but are also both attracted and repelled by many features of American life.

America is viewed as a large, powerful, dynamic society which presents a compelling image of modernity and innovation. This image leads a very large segment of the elite to regard it as the natural yardstick for Soviet achievements and as the standard to be emulated in many scientific and technical fields. The United States is also widely regarded as the epitome of the "consumer society," where goods are available in dazzling abundance, and as a trendsetter, particularly for music, art, and lifestyles.

Although often struck by the ways in which the U.S. and the USSR differ, some elite members comment on significant similarities between them as well. Some view both nations as "frontier societies," whose territorial expanse is paralleled by a breadth of vision: Americans, like Russians, "think big" and undertake great challenges. Others observe that Americans are open and friendly, "just like Russians," as contrasted with the more stuffy and tradition-bound Europeans. These similarities are sometimes said to promote a natural rapport between the two peoples.<sup>2</sup>

Elite members' understanding of the United States continues to be very uneven. Specialists in American affairs who travel to

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<sup>1</sup>See Guroff and Grant, "Soviet Elites: Worldview and Perceptions of the U.S.," pp. 18-20, 24-31; and Dobson, "Soviet Elite Attitudes and Perceptions: Foreign Affairs," pp. 18-22.

<sup>2</sup>In speaking with Western Europeans, however, some Russians emphasize the historical legacy and interests that they share with their neighbors to the West. Such Russians may draw a sharp distinction between "us Europeans" and Americans, who are described as uncivilized, dominating, violent, and unable to understand the values and interests of Europeans.



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the U.S. and frequently meet with Americans are clearly the most knowledgeable. A select group of foreign-affairs specialists impress their American acquaintances by their detailed knowledge of Washington politics, for instance, and certain economists can cite a wealth of statistics about U.S. industrial production. On the whole, however, surrogates were more impressed by what the Soviet elites do not understand about the United States than by what they do comprehend. Even specialists often lack a feel for American life and fail to understand or willfully misinterpret many basic issues: for example, the two-party system and the role of a "loyal opposition," the often adversarial stance of a free press, the free enterprise system, U.S. welfare programs, the status of blacks in American society, and the values that hold American society together.

In part, of course, lack of understanding derives from limited or inaccurate information. Official Soviet sources -- whether schools, the mass media, or political lectures -- present a purposely slanted view of the U.S., one that emphasizes economic dislocations, social problems, and conflict. In 1985-86, for example, Soviet TV programs, including a miniseries based on Irving Shaw's novel Rich Man, Poor Man, "The Man From Fifth Avenue," and "From Chicago to Philadelphia," showed a society plagued by unemployment, homelessness, crime, and racial strife. Even though the great majority of elite members do not accept information from official sources uncritically and have some access to nonofficial sources, such as foreign radio broadcasts, the official version influences their attitudes, if only because of its coherence and frequent repetition and the difficulty of confirming reports on foreign events. Soviets often have difficulty placing bits of information gleaned from foreign broadcasts in the broad U.S. context.

More deep-rooted sources of misunderstanding are cultural and ideological -- the different values and conceptual frameworks that Americans and Russians possess. For example, recurrent comments by Soviets in elite positions suggest that they have a different conception of freedom than Americans do. Freedom, in the Soviet view, connotes not only individual opportunity and personal rights, but license, insecurity, and anarchy. The negative aspects of freedom appear prominently in Soviets' discussions. Economic freedom translates into insecurity -- the risk of losing one's job or of a firm's going bankrupt, while political freedom conjures up images of civil unrest or of demagogues who mislead the masses. Furthermore, the Marxist-Leninist worldview that Soviet elite members have been instilled with since childhood often shapes their perceptions: many seem to have difficulty in understanding features of the American political system, economy, and society that do not fit neatly into the Marxist paradigm.



**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



F-45-Sm. Pd.

August 4, 1986

*Circ to*  
*1. ~~Admiral~~*  
*2. ~~St. ...~~*  
*3. ~~H. ...~~*  
*4. ~~Joint~~*  
*5. ~~Linhan~~*  
*6. ~~Attent~~*  
*7. Raymond*  
*(return to)*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *ZW*  
Director

SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 32"

Attached is the latest "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by our Office of Research.

Summary

During the period April 22 - July 7:

- o Kremlin spokesmen increasingly took their case directly to the court of world public opinion.
- o Moscow put forth a spate of arms control proposals, including a major Warsaw Pact initiative in mid-June.
- o Soviet media fumbled on the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and then tried to recover with increased openness and attacks on Western coverage of the event.
- o The CPSU and the Soviet Foreign Ministry substantially reorganized their propaganda/information departments.

Attachment:  
"Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 32"

Vice Admiral John F. Robinson  
Assistant to the Assistant for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Charles W. Wick  
Director

FROM:

"Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 12"

SUBJECT:

Attached is the latest "Soviet Propaganda Alert" prepared by  
our Office of Research.

Summary

During the period April 22 - 23, 1952:

- o Khrushchev's recent visit to the United States has directly  
to the cause of world peace.
- o Moscow has issued a series of aims control proposals  
including a major disarmament initiative.
- o Soviet media headlines on the Chernobyl nuclear disaster  
and their failure to recover with increased speed and  
attacks on Western coverage of the event.
- o The CPSU and the Soviet Foreign Ministry are continuing  
to intensify their propaganda in the United States.

Attachment:

"Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 12"

# **Soviet Propaganda Alert**

NO. 32

July 29, 1986

## SUMMARY

This report examines Soviet propaganda between April 22 and July 7. In this period the CPSU and the Foreign Ministry made major personnel and organizational changes affecting their international propaganda.

Two issues dominated Soviet commentary: the Chernobyl events and arms control questions.

### Reinvigorating Soviet Propaganda..... See pp. 1-2

General Secretary Gorbachev and other key spokesmen have gone increasingly to the court of world public opinion to try to win their case on crucial political questions. Challenge to the U.S.: Match the Soviet "charm offensive," which has moved ahead at full steam.

### Chernobyl ..... See pp. 2-4

The Ukrainian nuclear disaster was followed immediately by silence, then by dribbles of information, angry accusations against alleged anti-Soviet hysteria, and some constructive suggestions about nuclear safety. Challenge to the U.S.: Continue to press the USSR for full disclosure about the accident; show how differently nuclear incidents have been handled in the West; and deal effectively with Soviet proposals of merit.

### Arms Control Issues ..... See pp. 5-8

In mid-June the Warsaw Pact put forth, and pushed hard, a major new package of arms control proposals; the USSR reacted quickly and predictably to the U.S. announcement on interim restraint; and the Kremlin continued to promote a series of old and new initiatives on troop reductions and missiles in Europe, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons. Challenge to the U.S.: Keep U.S. and world publics well-informed on complex arms control issues; respond seriously and in timely fashion to any worthwhile Soviet initiatives.

U.S.-Soviet and East-West Relations ..... See pp. 8-12

Soviets continually tied a 1986 summit in the U.S. to arms control progress and other aspects of the bilateral relationship; President Reagan's Glassboro speech met with disdain, caution, and a little hope; the Tokyo economic summit was attacked as imperialist; the Bern Conference ended on a sour note for the USSR; and the Soviets stepped up attacks on Western "subversion." Challenge for the U.S.: Keep up steady pressure on the USSR for a summit without preconditions; maintain consultations and close working relations with our allies on East-West issues.

Other Issues ..... See pp. 13-14

Nicaragua, Libya, and Syria provide more grist for the Soviet anti-U.S. mills.

## REINVIGORATING SOVIET PROPAGANDA

### Gorbachev Goes to the People

In the past two months the USSR has taken several major steps to reinvigorate its propaganda activities. Most importantly, Mikhail Gorbachev appears increasingly to be making direct appeals to foreign publics and influential political figures. Most pregnant in this respect may have been his reference, in an interview after the Polish Communist Party Congress, to "what is happening in the U.S. society itself, and even in the Congress." He realized, he said, that in the U.S. also "such worries [about the arms race] exist. If there are such worries, we hope that reason will finally prevail" (Warsaw TV, June 30).

Gorbachev may be trying to "go over the heads" of Administration officials to the Congress and the U.S. public to make his case for arms control. While the Soviets have been burned in the past by such efforts to influence other countries' domestic politics -- witness the German elections of the early 1980s -- they may believe that they have mastered the technique enough to try it again.

### Institutional Reorganizations and Personnel Notes

In May the CPSU abolished the International Information Department (IID) of the Central Committee, merging its functions with that of Aleksandr Yakovlev's Propaganda Department. Leonid Zamiatin, former head of the IID, has become ambassador to Great Britain. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also replaced its chief spokesman, Vladimir Lomeiko, with a deputy head of Novosti, Gennadii Gerasimov, and reorganized its press and information department.

A simultaneous development of note is the rapid emergence of former Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatolii Dobrynin as a major force in Soviet foreign policy, not just behind the scenes (as one might expect from a Central Committee secretary) but also more and more in public. In recent weeks he has met with a large number of prominent public figures and foreign diplomats, including many Americans. He has also published authoritative articles on major international affairs topics.

New deputy foreign ministers Vladimir Petrovskii and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, two other top Americanists, have been utilized frequently in similar ways in recent weeks. Both have appeared at press conferences and briefings on arms control issues

(along with Defense Ministry spokesmen). Dobrynin and these two high-level MFA spokesmen are all shrewd students of American psychology and politics. Knowing U.S. sensibilities, they argue most effectively and forcefully for Soviet foreign policy in the current Kremlin worldwide efforts to manipulate public opinion.

### Implications

These developments shed light on how Soviet propagandists today are attempting to utilize all available public forums to press Soviet views and positions on the world public. Western Europe has seen a veritable explosion of Soviet press conferences and briefings, especially in connection with the November 1985 summit in Geneva. Public opinion is the key to Gorbachev's current propaganda offensive, and more and more the Soviet Union is taking its case directly to foreign publics.

## CHERNOBYL

### The Aftermath of an Accident

The Chernobyl nuclear reactor incident occurred on Saturday, April 26. The initial TASS report, prodded by Western inquiries, came on Monday, April 28. The terse announcement, replayed on the TV evening news, stated:

An accident has occurred at the Chernobyl atomic power plant as one of the atomic reactors was damaged. Measures are being undertaken to eliminate the consequences of the accident. Aid is being given to those affected. A government commission has been set up.

Within 40 minutes of its first dispatch TASS also issued a disinformation report that the Chernobyl accident "is the first one in the Soviet Union." TASS alleged that thousands of similar incidents have occurred in the U.S., presumably in an effort to reassure its own people and to warn the West about casting stones.

### For Domestic and Foreign Consumption

The real pattern of Soviet reportage and propaganda emerged within days:

- o Satellite use by Moscow-based Western reporters was abruptly cancelled by Soviet authorities, abetting an already acute shortage of accurate information about the accident.



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- o Radio Moscow English service linked Chernobyl to the need to "abolish all nuclear weapons once and for all" (April 29).
- o Commentators called for better international cooperation to overcome such disasters as nuclear accidents and the space shuttle tragedy (Radio Moscow English, April 29).
- o Spokesmen criticized the U.S. for its coverage of Chernobyl (Radio Moscow English, April 30).

The last two themes became the hallmark of Soviet handling of the incident. Paralleling in some ways the treatment of the KAL shootdown in 1983, Soviet media carried the simultaneous messages that nothing bad had happened, but, if it had, the West was somehow to blame for it.

#### Gorbachev's Speech

The climax of this trend came more than two weeks after the accident, when General Secretary Gorbachev addressed the Soviet nation and the world. In a televised speech on May 14, he gave an account of what had allegedly occurred and was still taking place in the Ukraine, thanked all those at home and abroad who were helping the USSR respond to this disaster, and then got to his political agenda.

Referring to "the governments, political figures, and the mass media in certain NATO countries, especially the USA," Gorbachev declared:

They launched an unrestrained anti-Soviet campaign. ... Generally speaking, we faced a veritable mountain of lies -- most dishonest and malicious lies. [The campaign's] organizers ... needed a pretext to exploit in trying to defame the Soviet Union [and] its foreign policy, to lessen the impact of Soviet proposals on the termination of nuclear tests and on the elimination of nuclear weapons, and at the same time, to dampen the growing criticism of U.S. conduct on the international scene and of its militaristic course.

Gorbachev went on to propose convening an international conference in Vienna to discuss a range of nuclear issues, establishment of "an international regime of safe development of nuclear power on the basis of close cooperation of all nations dealing with nuclear power engineering," a meeting with President Reagan (in Hiroshima, no less), and agreement to a ban on nuclear testing.

### The IAEA Proposals

Having owned up belatedly to its troubles and having attempted to divert some criticism to outsiders, Moscow continued to try to shift attention away from the negative. One means was to pursue Gorbachev's plan for international cooperation on nuclear safety.

When the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) met in Vienna to deal with Chernobyl, the Soviet delegation revealed Moscow's decision to extend until August 6 its moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The Soviets also pressed for deepening cooperation under IAEA auspices on nuclear safety (TASS English, May 21 and 22). The Soviet media played up these ideas over several days.

### The Issue Recedes

For a month Soviet propagandists harped on the same themes: Washington had ordered up scare stories about Chernobyl to divert attention from the real (U.S.-engendered) threat of nuclear war (domestic radio, May 8); U.S. concern was "hypo-critical," and anti-Soviet "radiation" lingered (Sovetskaia Rossiia and Pravda, both May 8); competent and impartial outsiders (IAEA officials) were "satisfied" with Soviet willingness to cooperate and divulge information, and were also critical of Western reporting (Pravda, May 10, and TASS, May 12 and 14).

Then the issue began to fade from Soviet media. Parting shots -- attacks on the U.S. in particular -- continued through the end of the month, but by late May Chernobyl was no longer the center of attention. On occasion the incident and its aftermath were trotted out to serve propaganda purposes, especially on arms control:

The nuclear epoch, by virtue of all its realities, dictates the need to redouble, to increase tenfold, the struggle for the elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of reliable international cooperation in the utilization of the peaceful atom. (Izvestiia, May 20)

In June, almost the only reports on Chernobyl in Soviet media concerned the cleanup, health and food problems, and its effect on energy supply. Praise for the heroes of rescue work and severe criticism of certain officials' incompetence or dereliction of duty were also prominent.

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## ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

### Jejune Accusations and Recycled Proposals

Before Chernobyl had an impact, Soviet propaganda on arms control stuck to a familiar litany of charges:

Hypnotizing itself and its allies with the imaginary attributes of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," the [Reagan] Administration is pushing these plans through Congress regardless of consequences and is aiming to ensure the allies' participation in their implementation.... This is the actual background of Washington's unwillingness to abandon nuclear tests and to continue its policy of a nuclear arms race. The present U.S. Administration, more than any of its predecessors, is fanatically committed to the idea of attaining military superiority over the USSR .... (Krasnaia zvezda, April 29)

In a reply to an appeal from the leaders of Argentina, India, Tanzania, Sweden, Mexico, and Greece, Gorbachev stressed:

The Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to consider and use such verification measures, including those suggested by you, that would ensure absolute certainty that an accord on the termination of nuclear testing, should it be reached, is strictly observed by all. (Pravda, May 4)

### U.S. Actions on SALT II

On May 27 President Reagan announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the unratified SALT II treaty because of Soviet noncompliance and unwarranted military build-up. This could hardly have come as a shock to Soviet commentators, who had been reporting for weeks that this was the Administration's intention (e.g., Moscow TV, May 14; TASS English, May 16).

Soviet media nevertheless reacted quickly and caustically to the announcement. Pravda (June 1) charged:

The United States Government has taken a step that again reveals in all obviousness the essence of the current U.S. foreign policy course aimed at an arms race spiral in every way, at militarizing space, and at heightening international tension.

Moscow TV (May 30), citing American critics of the decision, said that "this time the maniacs have gotten the upper hand in the debate on the issue of respecting SALT II."

Gorbachev was most scornful of the reason given by the U.S. for its action. In his speech at the Polish party congress on June 30, he said that Reagan Administration officials try

to justify their sabotage of this sacred cause [of peace] by fabrications about imagined violations by us of this or that provision in the treaties concluded with the United States.... One could be humorous about such claims by the U.S. Administration to act as a school-master, allotting marks for behavior to sovereign states. But this is not a subject for jokes. After all, what is at risk is no more, no less than the survival of mankind, and we think that all politicians are obliged to approach the problem with supreme seriousness. (Moscow TV, June 30)

Former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called the White House action a "major gaffe," according to Western press accounts (AFP, June 3). A Moscow TV commentator said (June 6) that the "appetite of the U.S. military complex is growing from day to day," adding, "To the military mind, which has been agitated by the scope and prospects of the Star Wars program, it is very hard to remain in the framework of any agreement, including SALT II."

The USSR also responded by calling for an emergency meeting of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission in July to examine the U.S. move.

#### A New Offensive

Soviet propaganda on arms control seemed to increase even more in the wake of Chernobyl and the American interim restraint decision. Most significant in this respect was the ballyhoo surrounding the Warsaw Pact initiatives of mid-June. When the Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest ended on June 11, the group issued a lengthy communique.

The "appeal," as it was called in Soviet media, primarily fleshed out an earlier Gorbachev proposal of April 18, made at the East German Communist Party Congress. According to Pravda (June 12), the final document called for:

- o Cessation of nuclear tests
- o Total liquidation of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe
- o Substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments on a global and regional level

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- o Concrete accords at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva
- o Elimination of chemical weapons and other means of mass annihilation, as well as the industrial base for their manufacture, by the end of the century
- o Effective verification in all fields and at all stages of arms reduction and disarmament.

The aspects of the Pact initiative stressed most by Moscow propagandists appear to be those concerning large reductions in both conventional and tactical nuclear (medium-range missile) forces in Europe (Moscow TV and Izvestiia, June 15; Pravda, June 16).

#### Gorbachev's CC Plenum Speech

The next step in the escalation of Soviet propaganda on arms control came on June 16, in the General Secretary's speech to a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In this comprehensive review of Soviet arms control positions, Gorbachev appeared to make revisions in several previous negotiating stances. The most significant points of his talk, as reported by TASS English June 16:

- o American "forward-based systems" need not count as strategic weapons
- o SDI laboratory research would be permissible, if the U.S. agrees to abide by the 1972 ABM treaty for 15 years more and to define what research that treaty prohibits
- o Medium-range missiles in Europe could be the subject of negotiations separate from those on strategic offensive weapons.

#### The Polish Congress Initiative

Continuing to build momentum for his own arms control agenda, General Secretary Gorbachev used his speech at the Polish Communist Party Congress in late June to press for U.S. reaction to a range of earlier proposals.

After ticking off a long list of Soviet moves in arms control (his January 15 speech, the April 18 and June 11 proposals on European reductions, and the nuclear test moratorium), he stated:

Our policy will continue to be a responsible policy, patiently laying the foundations to smooth out Soviet-U.S. relations. We are in favor of dialogue, but this should be a dialogue in which both sides want to reach real results. It must not be permitted that talks turn into a smokescreen concealing the arms race. We are not partners for Washington in such a deception of the world public.

Peace can only be preserved by joint efforts of all states and peoples. It is necessary for everyone in the West to understand. Any launch of a missile carrying nuclear weapons is in fact an act not only of murder but also of suicide. (Moscow TV, June 30)

### The Goodwill Games Politicized

Finally, the Soviet leadership did not waste the opportunity of a major media event -- athletic competition -- to promulgate their favorite ideas to millions of sports fans. The General Secretary gave a ten-minute opening address to thousands of athletes assembled in Moscow (and television viewers worldwide) for the opening of the so-called Goodwill Games on July 5. In his remarks Gorbachev constantly referred to Soviet desire for peace and an end to the arms race.

During a mammoth, glitzy opening ceremony, however, the Soviets did not have enough goodwill to maintain the high ground of advocating peace in general. In one set of stadium card stunts, an atomic bomb explosion was clearly labeled "Hiroshima."

## U.S.-SOVIET AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

### Summit Prospects

Throughout this period, Soviet media and General Secretary Gorbachev expressed caution about the possibility of a summit in 1986, and pressed for progress on arms control talks as almost a sine qua non for a meeting.

On May 20 Central Committee Secretary Anatolii Dobrynin stated:

The USSR is in favor of such a meeting. But ... at least two things are essential in order to hold a summit: an appropriate political atmosphere and willingness to achieve a tangible practical result there, if only in one or two issues worrying the whole world. Otherwise, a summit would be senseless. (TASS International)

Responding to a question on West German television about prospects for a summit this year, Valentin Falin, head of the Novosti Press Agency, expressed skepticism, adding:

I do not know what would really satisfy the Americans at the moment -- perhaps if we declared ourselves to be the 51st U.S. state.... Regardless of what we suggest to the Americans, regardless of what we are prepared to offer them as a compromise, the Americans are not content with it. The Americans do not seek the points of rapprochement between the two sides, they look for what drives the two sides away from each other. (Hamburg ARD TV, May 30)

Valentin Zorin on Moscow TV (Vremia, June 5) was similarly dubious about prospects for a summit: "One gets the impression that the upper hand in the U.S. capital is being gained by those who are heading full-steam ahead on a course toward wrecking Soviet-U.S. dialogue."

#### Gorbachev and Bovin on a Summit

Gorbachev has said, in his speech to the June plenum (TASS, June 17):

We are not slamming shut the door. A new meeting with the President of the United States is possible, but, clearly, this requires an atmosphere that would open up prospects for the attainment of real accords.... do they in Washington really want a new meeting? Or is talk about it simply an attempt to delude world public opinion?

Perhaps the most pessimistic comment, however, came from one of Moscow's most astute commentators, Izvestiia's Aleksandr Bovin, on June 24. Stopping briefly to ridicule American fears that the USSR could violate arms accords by testing in deep space ("beyond Mars"), he wrote:

We have before us a well thought-out political line. A line toward the worsening of Soviet-American relations, spurring on the arms race, and exacerbating international tension. I may be mistaken, but I form the impression that the White House has decided, come what may, to block a new summit meeting. Provided, of course, one does not have in mind a meeting "beyond Mars" ....

### The Glassboro speech

When President Reagan addressed a graduating class in Glassboro, N.J., on June 19, Soviet media seemed somewhat uncertain how to play the event. The President's remarks were called "crammed with anti-Soviet cliches" by TASS (June 21). Pravda quoted the TASS dispatch and echoed its negative assessment (June 23).

But at least one Moscow radio commentator on June 21 noted something different. Seeing the Glassboro address as a response to Gorbachev's June 16 plenum speech, the U.S.-based correspondent noted that the President made positive reference to the latest Soviet proposals and "for the first time in many months abstained from sweeping the Soviet proposals aside from the outset." He saw the speech as a reflection of "the aspiration of wide political and public circles of the United States for concrete steps."

On June 26 Pravda columnist Tomas Kolesnichenko charged:

The White House is now maneuvering. The other day the President even delivered a speech in Glassboro that his entourage is propagandizing as "conciliatory." But judgments are made on the basis of actions, not words. The attitude to SALT II is the touchstone against which the White House's loudest "peace-loving" statements are checked.

At the same time, Soviet officials conceded "privately" (but obviously for public consumption) that the speech reflected a positive though minor shift in Washington's policy (Washington Post, June 23). But the Soviet media did not carry a full text of the President's remarks, a signal that the Kremlin has adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the Glassboro speech.

### The Tokyo Summit Condemned

Soviet media commentary on the "economic summit" of the seven leading industrial democracies, held in Tokyo May 4-6, was uniformly negative and/or hostile. The three basic complaints or accusations:

- o The meeting revealed a "mass of contradictions; the hallmark "economic declaration" admits that these capitalist countries suffer from mass unemployment, economic instability, sharp shifts in currency exchange rates, protectionism in foreign trade, and other "chronic ailments" (TASS English, May 6)



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- o The declaration on terrorism and sanctions against Libya, gained by "Washington arm-twisting," masked the partners' disunity, imperialist Western policies, and Reagan Administration state terrorism (TASS English and Moscow TV, May 5)
- o Under U.S. pressure the summit took "a tough stand on the developing countries," greedily adopting a "neo-colonialist predatory policy" which condemns the Third World nations to massive problems, especially because of the debt burden (TASS English, May 6).

### U.S. Intransigence at the Bern Conference

When the Bern conference of experts on human contacts ended in that Swiss capital on May 27, Soviet propaganda immediately launched an all-out attack on the U.S. for refusing to sign the final document.

Bern witnessed an unpardonable political striptease by Washington's "champions of human rights." They tried from the very beginning to transform the conference on human contacts into some kind of trial of socialist countries, a base propaganda show whose scenario was written in advance in Washington according to the worst "cold war" traditions. (Pravda, May 28)

Vladimir Bolshakov wrote in the same paper three days later that "U.S. diplomacy has perhaps never before been the object of such destructive comment in West European capitals and the press. The reason for this is the veto imposed by the United States on the final document, which was agreed upon in advance ...."

While defending its own human rights record, and claiming Warsaw Pact credit for almost half of the proposals registered at the conference, the Soviet Union castigated the U.S. for disregarding the "interests of Europe" and the "needs and aspirations of millions of people" (TASS English, June 2).

It ultimately showed that the talk about human contacts and human rights is nothing more for the United States than a smokescreen under which to stage anticommunist campaigns and psychological warfare.

### Increased Attacks on Western "Subversion"

While portraying itself as struggling to keep alive the "spirit of Geneva" in the face of hostile American rhetoric and actions, the USSR made a number of accusations of spying, intelligence

work, and subversion by Western nations, particularly the United States. The Soviet Union has a well-known tendency to circle the wagons when under fire and warn its citizens to avoid contacts with foreigners which might embarrass the regime.

In this case, the debacle of Chernobyl was apparently a strong stimulus to cut off their citizens more than usual from the outside world. The Soviets have expelled, with appropriate fanfare, several American diplomats in recent months for spying, including a defense attache in early May.

#### Oleg Tumanov Denounces Radio Liberty

In mid-May the Soviets trotted out a redefector, Oleg Tumanov from Radio Liberty, to denounce the Munich-based station as a nest of spies and seditious activity. (Unfortunately for Soviet purposes, the Tumanov story was largely buried by the crush of other, more important world events and the media play accorded them. Still, the episode was instructive of the knee-jerk tendency in Soviet propaganda to go on the offensive when under attack.)

Tumanov called human rights activist Anatolii Shcharanskii, released at the time of the summit in Geneva, a "decoy duck of the CIA" (TASS, May 19); spoke of the close ties allegedly uniting the CIA, Radio Liberty, and the American Embassy in Moscow (TASS English, May 20); and warned of the subversive activity carried out by the station, which he claimed is headed by "a regular officer of U.S. military intelligence" (Moscow TV, June 2).

#### The CIA and "Neoglobalism"

On June 9 a Moscow TV commentator fanned the current "vigilance" campaign with a story on the CIA. He claimed that the agency's increase in "annual secret allocations" for covert activities "has exceeded even today's record rate of growth in the Pentagon budget" and warned ominously that "behind the increase in financial allocations is a considerable enhancement of the CIA's role in implementation of U.S. foreign aims." The CIA, he charged, has taken the lead in Washington's policy of "neoglobalism."

A lengthy piece in Izvestiia (June 25) hammered home the message:

The conclusion is unequivocal: The United States is attempting to expand intelligence activity against our country.... The American special services have joined frantically in the "crusade" against our country. They are hotly pursuing our defense secrets.

OTHER ISSUES

Terrorism: The Libya Raid

As the U.S. continued to substantiate its charges of Libyan terrorism worldwide, and possible Syrian collusion in terrorist acts, the Soviet media searingly attacked the United States on the terrorist issue. The results of the Tokyo summit in this respect have already been discussed.

TASS English warned on May 6 of possible further U.S. attacks against Libya. Pravda (May 1) tried to justify Moscow's lack of military help during the raid, and Radio Moscow accused the U.S. of trying to draw its NATO allies into the fray with Libya (May 4). And, in a revealing article in the military newspaper Krasnaia zvezda (April 26), Libya was linked to Nicaragua:

The facts irrefutably attest that Washington intends to use the experience of the piratical raid on the Libyan Jamahiriyyah for armed interference in the affairs of other independent countries pursuing a policy that for some reason does not suit the United States....

Addressing a gathering of "hawks," the U.S. President chose Nicaragua as the next target of his threats. He laid against the Sandinist government just as absurd charges of "supporting international terrorism" as official Washington had long been making against Libya before subjecting its peaceful cities to brutal bombing.

The Threat to Syria

On May 17, referring to American news stories, Pravda alleged that "official Washington recently launched a campaign of open threats against Syria," and Literaturnaia gazeta (May 21) accused the United States of gearing up for an attack on Syria. But because of the great costs Washington incurred in the Arab world from the Libya raid, claimed the Soviet writer, the U.S. would rely on Israeli forces the next time. President Reagan would support an attack on Syria engineered by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin, "through whom he wants to 'punish' Syria," the newspaper charged.

Nicaragua: Contra Aid . . .

The Contra aid votes in June provided ample occasion for Soviet media to denounce U.S. policy in Latin America. TASS complained on June 23 that "the White House is in fact attempting to torpedo the Contadora process ... and thereby prepare the ground for direct U.S. military interference in the region's affairs."

President Reagan's direct appeal to the Congress to support his aid package was labeled "crude pressure" by TASS English correspondent Nikolai Turkatenko (June 24). Radio Moscow on the same day detailed what it claimed was the Administration's "breaking" of the House of Representatives by "playing cleverly on congressmen's desire for compromise, on their class hatred for the Sandinistas, and on the fears of members of Congress of appearing to be spineless politicians on the eve of this year's midterm elections to Congress.

. . . And The World Court Decision

When the International Court of Justice held, in late June, that the United States was guilty of a form of aggression against Nicaragua, the U.S. reiterated that it would not be bound by this decision. The Soviet media did not lose a beat. "The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the U.S. is not going to stop the aggression [against Nicaragua]," proclaimed TASS English (June 27). "Moreover, it will step it up in every way."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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December 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT RAYMOND  
JUDYT MANDEL

FROM: TY COBB 

Ian Brzezinski, who's now working for Van, drafted the attached comparison of the Geneva and Reykjavik Summits. It's a pretty good piece of work by a promising young analyst. Although he is committed to working in the Secretariat he does have an interest in helping the professional staff out. He seems particularly interested in public diplomacy and East-West policy so I have encouraged him to work with you two -- as I believe he has been doing.

November 17, 1986

TO: TY COBB  
FM: IAN BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: THE GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK SUMMITS

In light of the President's success at the 1985 Geneva Summit, I would like to compare it to the Reykjavik summit and then draw some conclusions specific to the Iceland meetings and to summitry in general.

I. NEGOTIATING POSITIONS:

1985: President Reagan benefited from unprecedented political stature both at home and abroad. An overwhelming reelection reconfirmed his popular support and strengthened his influence upon Congress. Reagan's proven leadership abilities and America's successful economic recovery added to the President's esteem within the Western Alliance. NATO's support for the administration's approach to East-West relations, and arms control in particular, was affirmed through the European deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles and British participation in SDI research (soon followed by the Germans and Italians). Though these events fueled and radicalized the nuclear disarmament movements, President Reagan was still perceived as a powerful leader who had coalesced a united Western consensus.

Most importantly, Reagan arrived in Geneva with the Soviets on the defensive. In contrast to Reagan's political position, Gorbachev's control over the Kremlin was much more uncertain, having been instated as General Secretary just seven months prior. Moreover, SDI gave the President an upper-hand in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Gorbachev and his colleagues feared that Reagan's commitment to SDI would create a new technological competition between the two powers reminiscent of the 1960's space race. A full-fledged American strategic defense effort would not only outdistance Soviet programs but could also undermine their offensive and retaliatory strike capacities. Due to America's technological superiority, SDI would produce numerous non-military spin-offs. The Kremlin was concerned that a "strategic defense race" would dramatically lengthen and broaden the United States' technological lead over the Soviet Union. The threat of SDI's potentials forced the Soviets back to the arms control table, and ultimately drew Gorbachev to Geneva.

1986: From the Soviet perspective, President Reagan's negotiating position at Reykjavik was no longer invulnerable. Gorbachev arrived in Iceland believing that the political uncertainties facing the future of the President's strategic visions could be used to leverage concessions from the United States. Reagan's presidency was two years into a lame duck term; and, all indicators pointed to a successor of less powerful

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stature. Domestic Congressional races this November and upcoming parliamentary elections in Britain and Germany further raised the prospects of a more liberal -- in Soviet eyes, a more accommodating -- Allied consensus.

Last minute events also served to undermine the President's negotiating position. The White House's agreement with Congress over nuclear testing and the temporary clamp on the Democrat's other extreme arms control demands did not guarantee the President's strategic programs unfettered passage into FY 1987. Secondly, in the Daniloff affair the principle of no-trade was marred by the administration's desire for a face-saving solution that protected the prospects of a Gorbachev visit this Fall. In light of these political and diplomatic developments, the Soviets interpreted the administration's acceptance of their Reykjavik invitation as a yearning to ensure a strategic legacy that would last beyond the Reagan presidency.

Gorbachev's political position in 1986 was one of much greater confidence than at Geneva. The General Secretary had strengthened his authority over the Kremlin through a long series of selective purges. The above mentioned events leading to Reykjavik meeting provided the Soviets new opportunities to weaken the appeal of Reagan's strategic vision. Gorbachev initiated the Reykjavik meeting with determination to attain what he failed to do at Geneva: to eliminate the threat of SDI or at minimum to politically undermine the American program.

## II. SUMMIT CONDUCT

A. Preparations: The Geneva Summit, announced several months in advance, was preceded by extensive preparations. Only two weeks preceded the Reykjavik summit. Though American proposals (ie., arms control) were shaped by months of negotiations, the U.S. team did not have sufficient time to prepare for the contingencies that surround their delivery at a summit. This was evident in the administration's handling of immediate post-summit public diplomacy.

B. Consultations: Both the Geneva Summit and the Reykjavik Meetings were preceded and followed by extensive consultations to Allied governments. The President's personal communications with the Allied heads of state and Secretary Shultz's briefings to their governments -- before and after each of the summits -- generated greater confidence that the United States negotiated with the Alliance's interests as a priority concern. Consultations for the Reykjavik summit were supplemented by the President's UN meeting with Alliance foreign ministers and by Secretary Weinberger's attendance at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group session in Scotland. These efforts were critical in preventing potentially disastrous allied reactions to both meetings' outcomes.

C. Personal Rapport: The strong rapport between President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev that occurred in Geneva continued in Reykjavik with both leaders engaging themselves extensively into the negotiations. Gorbachev, however, seemed to

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be more self-confident and aggressive than he was in 1985. This was probably due to confidence built over a year and a half as General Secretary coupled with the memory of being outdone by President Reagan in Geneva.

D. Presidential Involvement: One-on-one head of state discussions continued to be an effective means of summit dialogue. These sessions afforded both leaders greater insight into each other's policies and objectives. Secondly, one-on-one discussions between political principals can often overcome issues stalemating lower level negotiations. Reagan's exchanges with Gorbachev drew out Soviet concessions that brought the two nations significantly closer to INF and START agreements.

The Secretary of State's participation in some of the Reagan-Gorbachev meetings served to provide "issue expertise" necessary for far-reaching and substantive discussions. (Summit meetings should not get much larger than this to prevent them from becoming plenary sessions.) At the same time it should be noted that both leaders wisely avoided getting over-involved in technical issues.

### III. THE SUMMIT AGENDA:

-1985: The President controlled the agenda by keeping a focus on broad political issues. He negotiated around Soviet attempts to restrict the summit to arms control through a strict scheduling of the agenda. Reagan asserted both publicly and privately that his purpose at the Geneva Summit was to become better acquainted with the new General Secretary and more familiar with Soviet policies. He insisted that summit discussions would equally emphasize bilateral issues, regional conflicts, human rights, and arms control. Even when the Reagan-Gorbachev meetings unexpectedly deviated from the official schedule, the President remained committed to this principle. Linkage was thus preserved between these issues shaping U.S.-Soviet relations.

-1986: The Reykjavik agenda was skewed by a Soviet desire for an arms control summit. The broad ranging discussions desired and expected by senior administration officials and publicly expressed by the President quickly evaporated at Reykjavik into one session that was also partially taken up by arms control issues. While human rights, regional issues, and bilateral matters received only a brief exchange of understandings, three of the four head of state meetings were devoted to START, INF and nuclear testing. It seems that the President, lacking specific summit objectives, was drawn in by Soviet START proposals and thus baited by the prospects of "historical" arms control agreements.



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#### IV. LINKAGE:

-1985: Linkage between the various issues shaping the U.S.-Soviet relationship was reaffirmed in Geneva by the President's insistence on giving non-arms control issues fair emphasis and consideration.

-1986: A singular focus upon arms control in Iceland undermined linkage between issues shaping East-West relations. The Reykjavik meetings were similar to President Ford's Vladivostok Summit in that they lacked depth in defining our geo-strategic (as opposed to strategic) relationship with the Soviet Union. Summits serve as a reflection of East-West affairs and thus must emphasize the full range of issues defining this relationship. A focus upon arms control leads the public, our allies, and Congress to envision U.S.-Soviet relations only upon those terms. More importantly, one-dimensional summits allow the Soviets to determine the direction of our relations, granting them the opportunity to restrict our strategic programs -- their greatest threat -- while allowing them to continue aggressive regional policies.

#### V. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:

-1985: A tightly orchestrated public diplomacy program ensured that the euphoria/hysteria that surrounds summit meetings was minimized. Several months of consultations with our allies and the Congress and repeated public assertions that the Geneva Summit was solely for introductory purposes reduced public expectations. Finally a mutually adhered to media blackout during the summit was followed through by a coordinated communique to the press. The result was a controlled public reaction to the summit's outcome that strengthened the Western consensus.

-1986: Despite Administration efforts to control expectations, the media coverage of the Reykjavik Summit was, from the American perspective, uncontrolled. Soviet remarks to the press during the summit and the surprise fourth meeting fueled expectations for an arms control breakthrough. As a result, the stalemate over SDI produced an exaggerated disappointment that was compounded by Shultz's and Regan's disillusioning and highly publicized post-summit statements.

Two factors prevented the initial media reaction from snowballing into a longer-term and more politically damaging disappointment. Prior U.S. consultations with our allies influenced them to restrict apprehensions to diplomatic channels. Secondly, the democratic leadership at home was unwilling to engage in partisan criticism until they could confidently assess the public's perspective. A window of time was available for the administration to initiate a successful public diplomacy campaign to reshape perceptions of the summit outcome.

Pat Buchanan stated that such atmospheric hype was an "unavoidable product" of superpower summits. While that is

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true, summit atmospherics can to some degree be both contained and directed. In light of the administration's effective post-Reykjavik communications program (ie. high level back-grounders, speeches, and interviews) a more composed and thought-through approach to the press immediately after the fourth meeting was possible. One suggestion would have been a longer senior advisors meeting after the fourth Reagan-Gorbachev session just prior to initial contact with the press.

From the Soviet perspective such summit hype was clearly to their advantage. It is clear that their statements to the press during the summit meetings were a purposeful manipulation of the media against the U.S. By creating unnecessary expectations, the Soviets sought to generate greater political pressure upon the President's stance on SDI. When the President refused to sacrifice the strategic program, the negotiating stalemate and ensuing disappointment created the exaggerated and false impression that SDI was the remaining impediment to an arms control agreement.

#### VI. IMPACT:

-1985: The 1985 Geneva Summit was a success for the Reagan administration that greatly enhanced the President's image as a world statesman. The Reagan-Gorbachev meetings transformed the polemical tone of U.S.-Soviet relations into an atmosphere of limited cordiality. President Reagan's discussions with Gorbachev gratified the West Europeans, and silenced those accusing him of impeding progress toward East-West stability, and arms control in particular. Since Reagan made no political or strategic concessions -- especially on SDI -- the conservatives at home were also left satisfied. The Geneva Summit protected the President's strategic vision, strengthened Allied unity, and, most importantly, enabled the President to broadly define the East-West relationship as one of neither cooperation nor unlimited conflict.

-1986: The Iceland meetings, in the short term, did the reverse, devolving into a new competition in strategic oversimplifications. President Reagan's assertions that significant progress was achieved in merging the two nations arms control positions are entirely correct. However, this progress was encased in polemical proposals designed more for public consumption than for action. The concepts of Zero-Zero INF deployments, zero ballistic missiles, and reductions to zero nuclear weapons were construed in a manner substantively misleading and politically damaging.

Current reactions of the West European governments to the Zero-Zero INF proposal are hypocritical given the fact that it has been tabled for over five years. However, it is nonetheless true that legitimate European apprehensions were stimulated by the urgency and totality of the Reykjavik package (including the President's ballistic missile offer). NATO's European leadership fears that nuclear defense of the Alliance and the United States would be decoupled by the removal of American INF systems.

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Moreover, excessive reductions in NATO's nuclear arsenal could impair the Alliance's counter to the gross imbalance in conventional forces it faces against the Warsaw Pact. Politically, these concerns can only undermine NATO's confidence in America's commitment to her nuclear defense. This is especially true among those governments that despite the political liabilities supported the European deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles.

The START negotiations were characterized by offers to eventually eliminate all ballistic missiles and then later to destroy all nuclear weapons. Unrealistic as it is, the later was strongly emphasized by the Soviets who were probably very reluctant to sacrifice the ballistic systems which only recently enabled them to attain parity with the United States. Both proposals are illusionary when one must consider the problems of verification, the potentials for cheating, not to mention the need for third party compliance. Such exchanges of utopian proposals threaten to oversimplify the public perceptions of arms control. The START negotiations were thus initially understood not in terms of what was achieved but in terms of what was missed.

The immediate impact of the Reykjavik summit was its isolation of SDI as the impediment to arms control. In contrast little public attention has been given to Soviet intransigence on other significant issues blocking ~~to~~ nuclear reductions: matters of verification, definitions of sub-limits, and controls for balanced strategic modernization. For the Reagan Administration, SDI was forced into a politically precarious position. As a concept of deterrence SDI remains confusing and undefined to the general public and is thus vulnerable to Soviet manipulation and deception. Already a controversial program struggling to attain Congressional appropriations, the future of SDI can only be made more politically uncertain if it is debated as the impediment to arms control.

The Reykjavik summit was a tactical political success for the Soviets. As in Geneva, Gorbachev arrived in Iceland intent to undermine Reagan's strategic vision, but this time was able to achieve that objective by determining both the summit agenda and the tone of negotiations. A focus upon arms control allowed him to redefine East-West relations in those terms. The polemical tone of the summit's proposals was utilized by the Soviets to weaken America's position within the Western Alliance and to create the perception that progress in arms control -- and thus also in the broader relationship -- was hinged upon the future of SDI.

## VII. LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Avoid hasty summits. They threaten rushed and insufficient preparation for the unexpected contingencies that characterize these negotiations. Such summit meetings can quickly degenerate into damaging exchanges of polemics or worse yet could produce misunderstandings and hurried decisions.

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2. The President must have a specific purpose for meeting with his Soviet counterpart. Essentially there are three basic reasons for superpower summits: to allow the heads of state to discuss outstanding issues and interests; to forward negotiations; and, to highlight the signature of agreements.

The administration must also know what progress it can expect from summit meetings. A president entering negotiations without predetermined and set objectives forfeits the agenda and commences the summit at a disadvantage.

3. A unified Western consensus is the most powerful source of political leverage with which the United States can approach a summit with the Soviet Union. Consultations with the Allied governments both before and after summit meetings ensure them that the United States is not trying to unilaterally shape East-West relations. Though these efforts are essential to strengthen the president's political position prior to a summit, they do not always draw out the deeper concerns and interests of our allies.

4. The Soviets are primarily interested in summitry as a weapon of public diplomacy with America's strategic programs and allied unity as primary targets. Reflecting upon the 1959 Eisenhower-Khrushchev Summit, Shevchenko wrote, "We must work further at turning the United States against Europe, and Europe against the United States. That was the technique Vladimir Ilyich taught us."

5. A public diplomacy gameplan is an essential component of successful summitry. Carefully executed media relations ensure that public expectations and reactions to summit meetings and their outcomes are more controlled and predictable.

6. Summit agendas must reflect a geo-strategic -- not solely a strategic -- approach to the superpower relationship. A singular focus upon arms control permits the Soviets to determine the direction of our relations, allowing them to contain our strategic programs while simultaneously continuing their aggressive regional policies.

#### VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY:

Superpower summits are a potent form of diplomacy. Face-to-face meetings between the American and Soviet heads of state bear enough authority to reorient the direction of East-West relations. Secondly, as highly publicized and dramatized events, summit meetings influence the world's perceptions of this relationship. U.S.-Soviet summits have an immediate impact upon both the substance of East-West affairs and the support the President receives for his policies.

When the President approaches a summit with his Soviet counterpart, he must overcome a systemic disadvantage to his negotiating position. Soviet leaders share few of the

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"institutional entanglements" that burden the American chief executive. The President must contend with the political pressures of an independent Congress, public opinion (both at home and abroad), an unrestrained media, and the frequently divergent interests of our allies. Any coalition of support the President develops for his policies is inherently vulnerable to Soviet propaganda and deception efforts. A strong consensus is especially important for the President when one realizes that Soviet objectives at a summit are to undermine the political foundations of America's strategic programs and the unity binding the Western Alliance.

Each U.S.-Soviet summit is a unique public diplomacy event whose outcome is determined by a blend of politics, procedures, personalities, atmospherics, and substance. The President's negotiating position is founded not only on the balance of advantages and disadvantages the United States faces with respect to the Soviet Union, but also on his ability to derive support for his policies both at home and within the Western Alliance. Once at a summit, progress in East-West relations becomes a function of the agenda, the meetings' format, and the two leaders' personal abilities. Atmospherics, the public expectations and reactions aroused by the importance of U.S.-Soviet summits, have great impact upon their outcomes as political pressures can be created and manipulated to support or oppose either nations' positions. Superpower summitry is thus in some ways analogous to an election campaign. An effective summit strategy is based upon sound policies but also requires a strong coalition of political support, a predetermined agenda, and a public diplomacy gameplan.