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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

Withdrawer

KML 2/28/2012

File Folder U.S.-SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (04/17/1985-09/30/1985)

FOIA

M10-326/2

Box Number 11

PARRY

64

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
132393	MEMO	JOHN LENCZOWSKI TO ROBERT KIMMITT RE SEMANTICS	2	4/24/1985	B1
132394	PAPER	RE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CURRENT SOVIET PROPOGANDA TECHNIQUES (WITH AGENDA ATTACHMENT FOR MEETING)	4	ND	B1
132395	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS FIRST TWO PAGES OF DOC 132394	2	ND	B1
132396	PAPER	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY PAPER	6	ND	B1
132402	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE R 3/29/2017 M326/2	2	9/10/1985	B1
132397	MEMO	JOHN LENCZOWSKI TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE (WITH NOTATIONS) R 6/8/2018 M326/2	1	8/1/1985	B1
132398	MEMO	WILLIAM LASALLE TO WILLIAM MARTIN RE INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE	2	7/12/1985	B1
132399	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE R 6/8/2018 M326/2	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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132400	MEMO	JOHN LENCZOWSKI TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE (WITH NOTATIONS) <i>R 6/8/2018 M326/2</i>	2	7/15/1985	B1
132401	PAPER	RE RECORD OF MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE	4	9/20/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Colby:

I would like to thank you for sharing with the NSC your memorandum entitled "Bolshevik Rhetoric Fools the West." It arrived just at the time that we began setting up a couple of interagency working groups to deal with this question. There are several people in the Administration and on the NSC staff who recognize the problem of semantic corruption and who have a personal commitment to dealing with it on a government-wide basis.

As you know, however, this is not a problem that can be solved overnight: it requires a sustained process of education about communism in general and strategic deception and semantics in particular. We welcome your many contributions to this process and look forward to receiving any further work you do on this subject that may assist our efforts.

We are using your paper as background material for some special reports and glossaries which we hope to publish and distribute both inside and outside the government. Please be assured that we are working on sensitizing the highest levels of government to these questions.

With many thanks for your contribution,

Sincerely,

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Mr. Roy Colby
2633 Summit Drive
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80909

0968

2633 Summit Drive
Colorado Springs CO 80909
January 31, 1985

Mr. Robert M. Kimmit
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Washington DC 20506

Dear Mr. Kimmit:

The enclosed article is intended to expose the ideological sense of terminology likely to be used in the upcoming Geneva talks on reduction of nuclear arms.

A retired Foreign Service Officer and former college language professor, I have written two books on the misuse of words to further communist revolution around the world. A third book on this theme, The War of Words, is to be published later this year.

In its 1983 report to the President and the Congress, the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy made the following recommendation:

The Commission recommends that a task force be created under the National Security Council to assess the problem of semantics in the international "war of words" and propose an institutionalized means to counter misleading terminology and increase the accuracy of international political discourse.

Has anything been done to implement this important recommendation?

It is requested that this article be made available to the members of the Council.

Your comments are invited.

Sincerely yours,

Roy Colby
Roy Colby

Enclosure:
Article, "Bolshevik Rhetoric Fools the West."

5

Bolshevik Rhetoric Fools the West

Roy Colby

We should all be grateful to William F. Buckley for focusing attention on an important subject that other writers usually neglect. In a syndicated column he ably set forth his views on Soviet semantics, a field of study that needs more examination than it is getting in these days of cautious rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

In his inimitably skillful and witty fashion he discharged both literary barrels at what he called the "indiscriminate use of the term 'arms race,'" with reference to its apparently unnecessary repetition in the joint communique issued by Messrs. Schultz and Gromyko at the close of the Jan. 7-8 Geneva talks.

"The first psychological objective of the Soviet government," he said, "is to brand our strategic defensive initiative as aggressive in intent. Mind you, it is exactly that in Bolshevik dialect." He went on to say that the Bolshevik dialect is filled with "such systematic perversion," much as that "of a patient convinced that grasshoppers roost all over him, or that the world is flat, or that only Democrats are compassionate." Hence, he continued, "It is not difficult to understand Soviet terminology...." Those who use it, he seemed to be saying, belong in an institution for the mentally ill.

Buckley was admittedly disturbed, and for good reason, by the "willingness of normal people to incorporate into their own vocabulary the distorted vocabulary of the Soviet Union."

He devoted the major portion of his column to an effective refutation of charges that we were guilty of aggression and of heating up the arms race by proceeding with our "Star Wars" project.

Most of Buckley's readers, I daresay, agree with his course of thought. I would have agreed, too, if it had not been for one thing: his apparent assumption that there is only one basis for making judgments, the one we are accustomed to, the Judeo-Christian ethic.

My studies in ideological semantics have convinced me that there exists in the world today a formidable rival ethic competing for attention with our Western system of values and its attendant word meanings. Furthermore, we seem blissfully unaware of this fact.

To understand the behavior patterns of, say, the Saudi Arabians, one must study their culture and the Islamic religion. Similarly, to understand the behavior patterns of the Soviet leaders, one must study not only Russian culture but also their religious substitute, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Rousseau once said that those who treat politics and morality apart would never understand the one or the other.

On a certain occasion during Reagan's first term in office, the president called the U.S.S.R. an "evil empire." The Soviets naturally responded with a barrage of hate words denying the charge -- a logical response for people whose ethical guidelines reverse the sense of the concepts good and evil.

Cutting through the semantical jungles, I offer the gist of the Soviet denial in plain English: "No, Mr. President," they were saying, "you are lying; it is you who are evil for making such a preposterous accusation; it is the United States that has the evil empire, not the benevolent Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics; we Soviets are good people and we always tell the truth."

Now follow, if you will, the reasoning which undergirds the Soviet denial. The Communist Party is considered to be the sole possessor of the truth. This ideological version of truth is based on the Marxist-Leninist precept of whether or not world revolution is being advanced or retarded. Moreover, member states of the U.S.S.R., the "fraternal socialist states" of Eastern Europe, and the Soviet dependencies of Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Vietnam, North Yemen, and so on, are considered to be "real democracies."

World leaders such as Gromyko, Chernenko, Gorbachev, Deng Xiaoping, (yes, Deng), Castro, and Ortega, who have been making the headlines lately, are all creatures of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. They are fundamentally different from Western statesmen for two reasons. First, they embrace the restricted Leninist concept of reality, which relates everything to one thing: the progress, or lack thereof, being made toward an all-communist world.

Second, Marxist-Leninists vocalize their thoughts in a parasitical international language (called "Communes" by Reed Irvine and others) by which double meanings are conveyed, the normal meaning intended for the West, and the hidden sense for their followers. Westerners tend to take the normal meanings at face value, while communists of any nationality easily get new policy and instructions via the ideological message.

If it is true that Marxist-Leninists relate all values to their unwavering goal of world conquest, then of necessity their representation of morality must be consonant with this restricted view of reality. What is communist morality? Lenin called it "class morality," by which he meant that communists are obliged, once having acquired a "revolutionary conscience," to do anything, repeat anything, without remorse, that the Communist Party asks them to do.

It is extremely difficult for Westerners, who make judgments in accordance with a reality unfettered by political concerns, to grasp the horrendous significance of class morality. Once understood, however, the justification for the heinous crimes, inhumane acts, and language perversion committed under Marxist-Leninist direction makes a great deal of sense.

How did Communes originate? Stephan Possony, lately of the Hoover institute, provides the answer. In the early 1900's, he told a Congressional investigating committee, ~~that~~ when the Bolsheviks under Lenin's tutelage were secretly striving to overthrow the Tsar, they used code words to fool the Russian censors. The word "revolution," for instance, slipped by as "reform." Later, Stalin was to say that the most important weapon in his arsenal was the dictionary.

According to Possony, the communists developed a "revolutionary language" which they used in their doctrinal works and propaganda. This sectarian language, which is not to be confused with Lenin's "code" language, came to backfire on them. The Politburo discovered that certain terminology such as "class warfare," "terrorism," and "revolution," had become counter-productive in that these words revealed the true nature of communism.

The Seventh World Congress of the Comintern called by the Kremlin in 1935 sought to remedy the situation. A decision was made to substitute euphemisms for terminology deemed to be offensive, e.g., class warfare could now become known as "political activity," terrorism as "heroic deeds," and revolution as "liberation." Later, "aggression" became a unilateral term in the Soviet vocabulary for application only to the enemy. When communists themselves committed aggression, they disguised their action as "self-defense."

By this political warfare device, Leonid Brezhnev was being ideologically truthful in telling President Carter that Soviet troops had been "invited" to enter Afghanistan in late 1979. In Communes the concept of invitation has traditionally implied compulsion. Therefore, Soviet troops had indeed been invited

to invade Afghanistan on Kremlin orders.

The United States as the number one enemy of world revolution is therefore the number one target of Soviet word inversion. The ceaseless railings spewed forth by the Soviet propaganda apparatus unrelentlessly brand everything pertaining to us as "bad" and everything pertaining to the Soviet Union as "good." In keeping with this propaganda, naturally we come out smelling like the city dump. We become, for example, warmongering, imperialistic, freedom-hating, lying, untrustworthy, dishonest, oppressive, regressive, aggressive, and so on.

On the other hand, the Soviets depict themselves as being peace-loving, truly democratic, freedom-loving, truthful, trustworthy, honest, benevolent, progressive, defensive, and so on. They come out smelling like Chanel No. 5.

Has anyone ever heard of Gromyko referring to the Soviet Union as warmongering or the United States as peace-loving?

The Kremlin seems to have agreed with Hitler that the more times a lie is repeated the greater its chances of getting believed. This may account for what Buckley called the "indiscriminate use of the term 'arms race'" in the Schultz-Gromyko communique. The Soviets are trying to palm off on "world opinion" the idea that the United States is causing an arms race by our trying to catch up with the Soviet Union. Repetition, remember, is an integral part of Communese.

In early 1985, what are the prospects for successful future negotiations with the Soviet Union? Very poor, I would say. Why? Because the two sides will be striving to achieve different objectives, even though dealing with the same concepts of international law. In March the United States and the Soviet Union are scheduled to have more talks. These talks will deal with the reduction of intermediate and long-range nuclear weapons and ways to prevent an arms race in space. Some of the terms likely to be bandied about are the following:

reduction of nuclear arms, arms race, negotiation, treaty, aggression, peace,
and detente.

Voltaire once said that whoever wanted to talk with him must first define his terms. Do you suppose our negotiators will ask their Soviet counterparts to define the terms listed above? It seems to me the foremost item on any East-West agenda should be the definition of terms. Suppose that in a burst of confidence, after a few vodkas, Gromyko should reveal to Schultz the true meaning of pertinent terms. The explanation, from his ideological viewpoint, would be something like the following:

Reduction of nuclear arms. We want the United States to reduce both intermediate and long-range missiles unilaterally. We may agree to reduce ours, but we will never give you the opportunity to verify that we have done so. In fact, we have no intention of doing so.

Arms race. An arms race is considered to be the efforts of the United States to catch up with us and maybe surpass us in nuclear weaponry. This includes your "Star Wars" planning. Our principal reason for having talks is to make you abandon the strategic defensive initiative, as you call it. Never mind that we have such a defense already in place around Moscow. That's our business, not yours. We wouldn't know how to heat up an arms race if we tried; we only defend ourselves against your aggressive actions.

Negotiation. This is a political warfare device by which you do all the giving and we do all the taking, as Khrushchev once put it. The negotiating table is an excellent propaganda locale for us to influence world opinion to accept our views.

Treaty. Haven't you Americans caught on yet what treaty means to us? After all those treaties we've made with you over the years? Our Lenin, may his soul rest in peace, considered a treaty as a means of gaining strength,

neither more nor less. We don't accept the decadent bourgeois notion that treaties are solemn agreements to be kept by both sides. That's outmoded. Whenever a treaty has outlived its usefulness, we break it like you would a piecrust.

Aggression. We certainly reject your definition of aggression. For us, aggression takes place whenever you or any other so-called free nation opposes any phase of our plans for world revolution; whether militarily or diplomatically, it makes no difference. For example, the United States is committing aggression right now because your negotiators refuse to cancel the "Star Wars" project. On the other hand, we Soviets can never truthfully be charged with aggression because we are always defending ourselves against your aggression. That's the way we see things.

Peace. Ah, this is one of our favorite terms because everybody is in favor of it. Peace usually means a victory for us. We consider anything to be peaceful that promotes our goals. Hence, diplomatic victories at the negotiating table and military victories on the battlefield are seen as peaceful acts. In a broader sense, world peace will be achieved only when the last capitalist nation is under Soviet control. So, you see, if you Americans would just stop committing aggression against us, our kind of world peace would be sooner in coming.

Detente. Detente is practically the same thing as peaceful coexistence. Lenin used the Russian word "peredyska" to describe peaceful coexistence, which in actuality is a "breathing space" for communists when they feel weak and need your help to get them out of some sort of predicament. What we communists do is pretend to be friendly and you capitalists fall over each other trying to help us. A major objective of the arms talks is to convince you that detente is the only reasonable political climate to govern Soviet-U.S. relations. Frankly, we're tired of the Cold War and yearn for the halcyon days of the seventies.

If the foregoing interpretations reveal the real Soviet intent, how can the two sides reach any meaningful agreement? How can two nations so far apart in values and semantics agree on anything except to have more talks? And they have already done that. Future talks are likely to result in nothing gained for us but a great deal of time gained for the Soviets to influence world opinion against us. Any concessions we might make in the hope of achieving reciprocal agreements will be, as in the past, our loss and their gain.

But to get back to Bill Buckley and his notion of Soviet wackiness. He appears to have judged the behavior of the Soviet leaders from our value system rather than theirs. In his defense, however, I must say that practically everybody else does the same thing, even our foreign policy experts, including the negotiators. They make an unconscious assumption not based on fact.

Charles T. Baroch aptly labeled this unconscious assumption "the mirror-image fallacy." By this fallacy, we tend figuratively to gaze into a mirror and see Soviet leaders as people just like us and then assess their goals and behavior according to our own. Doing this, we come to strange conclusions and call them liars or lunatics when their behavior puzzles us.

We must get our blinders off and see things from the Soviet ideological viewpoint, or we'll never be able to negotiate a treaty that will be binding from our viewpoint.

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132394	PAPER RE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CURRENT SOVIET PROPOGANDA TECHNIQUES (WITH AGENDA ATTACHMENT FOR MEETING)	4	ND	B1

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
132395	PAPER	2	ND	B1

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132394

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Gov Rep 200

W/R

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

April 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES E. COURTNEY
Acting Chairman
International Information Committee

SUBJECT: IIC Strategy Paper on Soviet Fears

Please see informal staff suggestions. You will get a formal response, but keep in mind the marginalia as you work the problem.

Wet

Walter Raymond, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
President

Attachment

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

2/28/12

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132396	PAPER RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY PAPER	6	ND	B1

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ID 8504483

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TO PRESIDENT FROM WICK, C

DOC DATE 31 MAY 85

KEYWORDS: USIA USSR

SUBJECT: WICK 31 MAY MEMO FWDS BOOKLET BY PRESS & PUBLICATIONS SERVICE OF USIA
RE PRES SPEECHES ON US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY DUE: 10 JUN 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

LENCZOWSKI

MATLOCK

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SESTANOVICH

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**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

#305134

Director



USIA

4483

May 31, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

Hot off the press! I thought you would appreciate seeing a booklet produced today by the Press and Publications Service of USIA of your recent speeches on U.S.-Soviet relations.

The five speeches, beginning with your address from the White House prior to the opening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (January 16, 1984) and ending with your address less than a month ago to the European Parliament, are eloquent and they are consistent. They leave no doubt about your will to engage in constructive negotiation with the Soviet Union and your determination "to try and try again" in this difficult but essential task.

United States Embassies around the world will very soon have copies of this booklet, "Realism, Strength, Dialogue," for distribution to key contacts--policy makers and executers--in each country. I know that your words presented in this form will go far to help convince world leaders that you seek peace.

With warmest personal regards.


Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

P.S. This has been
cleared by State,
NSC, etc.

The President
The White House

28



RECENT
PRESIDENTIAL
ADDRESSES
ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JUNE 03, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES THEIR RECENTLY PRODUCED BOOKLET OF
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ALFRED KINGON	ORG	85/06/04		
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>NSC McFARLANE</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>85/06/03</i>		<i>1/1</i>
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| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

F us/sov 30
P.D.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The 40th Anniversary of the victory in Europe is an occasion for both our countries to remember the sacrifice of those men and women everywhere who gave the last full measure of devotion to the cause of fighting tyranny. Together with our other allies, our two countries played a full part in that long struggle. We demonstrated that despite our differences we can join together in successful common efforts.

I believe we should also see this solemn occasion as an opportunity to look forward to the future with vision and hope. I would like our countries to join in rededication to the task of overcoming the differences and resolving the problems between us, and in renewed progress toward the goals of making peace more stable and eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. By pursuing those goals, we will truly honor those whose memory we commemorate today.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

END PAGE

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547



JUN 28 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Steve Steiner
 Director of International
 Communications and Information
 National Security Council

FROM : Charles E. Courtney *Sam C.*
 Associate Director - Designate
 for Programs

SUBJECT : Pamphlet on Presidential Addresses on
 U.S.-Soviet Relations

The U.S. Information Agency has just produced a compendium of statements by President Reagan on arms control and U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. entitled "Realism, Strength, Dialogue: Recent Presidential Addresses on U.S.-Soviet Relations." A copy is enclosed for your information.

A total of 10,000 copies in English has been printed and shipped to our posts around the world. A Spanish edition of 3,600 copies is also underway.

Because Public Law 80-402, basic enabling legislation of the U.S. Information Agency, prohibits domestic dissemination of USIA program material, this complimentary copy is sent for your personal and private use only.

SS
JAT
~~*WR*~~ = ~~*F*~~
~~*F*~~ - ~~*F*~~
US/Sov P.O.
Steve
the intro
to pamphlet
is very
good,
substantive
statement
of policy

good idea

why only Spanish?

But the rest
of the pamphlet
lacks visual
interest. Hard
to go thru
40 pages
of speech
text to who
some
maps
in

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

See Prop

WR
6322

INFORMATION

August 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*
SUBJECT: Soviet Use of American Public Relations Firm

You asked me to do some research on the background of the "North American Precis Syndicate, Inc.," an organization described as distributing Soviet Embassy press releases around the U.S. The report at Tab I indicates that the firm is a legitimate one which performs the same function for a number of other countries. It is legally registered as a "foreign agent for the Soviet Union."

Attachment

Tab I Back to Raymond Memo, w/atch

cc: Karna Small
 Ed Djerejian
 Jack Matlock
 Ken deGraffenreid

TO: Walt Raymond

FROM: Bill Bach

Subject: North American Precis Syndicate, Inc.

The subject firm distributes radio and press releases for a dozen or so foreign governments and private concerns, as well as various American ones. Among the foreign governments for which the firm works are France, Mexico, Taiwan, Austria, Canada, Romania, India and the Soviet Union.

The Registration Unit of Justice's Criminal Division says that North American Precis is legally registered as a foreign agent for the Soviet Union. The Registration Unit is investigating several instances in which the American firm reportedly omitted the disclaimer that identifies the source of the news releases as the USSR. This disclaimer is required by U.S. law and the Registration Unit is handling the matter administratively.

Joe Clarkson of Justice is following the administrative action and will advise us if anything further develops concerning the firm.

Attachments: AP article on North American Precis

SOVIET PRESS RELEASES sent out by N.Y. firm

ASSOCIATED PRESS

Soviet Embassy officials, normally secretive sorts, have paid a New York firm to distribute press releases written like news stories to newspapers and radio stations around the country.

So far this year, North American Precis Syndicate Inc. has shipped out three Soviet government-inspired releases to 3,800 newspapers and 5,000 radio stations.

Justice Department officials said there is nothing illegal about the practice so long as the syndicate files under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which it has done.

The Soviet stories generally stress the strong bonds between the two countries and the need for more cooperation.

There's a glowing account of a July 1975 U.S.-Soviet space effort, Apollo-Soyuz, in which Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov remembers Americans and Soviet astronauts meeting as friends.

Mr. Leonov is quoted as saying he joins others "who stand for international peaceful cooperation in space."

Then there's a story, with picture, about the close bonds and friendships formed by U.S. and Russian soldiers who met on the banks of the Elbe River in Germany in April 1945 at the end of World War II.

Ronald N. Levy, the syndicate's president, said the news releases are sent out accompanied by a separate piece of paper noting that the syndicate is paid by the embassy.

That procedure is required by the Justice Department, but agency spokesman Robert Sharp said there was no way to ensure adherence to that policy because the department doesn't check the cover letters.

It's unclear how many of the stories have found their way into print, but Soviet Embassy official Yuri Subbotin said he has been pleased with the results.

He said he was unable to provide the names of the papers using the Soviet material. Besides, he said, "The names

mean nothing to me. . . . They are not big, like the New York Times."

Mr. Subbotin said that when North American Precis Syndicate approached him about joining its business, he figured, "Yes, why not?"

Mr. Levy said the syndicate sends out regular packages of material to 3,800 newspapers, predominantly weeklies, and 5,000 radio stations.

Media outlets can use the material for free, with Levy promising between 100 and 400 clippings per release and 200 radio placements.

The syndicate's clients, including the Soviet, Canadian and South African embassies and the Caribbean and Romanian tourist organizations, pay between \$1,750 and \$2,950 for a newspaper release. A radio spot costs \$1,450.

The newspaper material, including features such as recipes, travel advice and household tips, is ready to be inserted into the paper without editing changes. Radio spots are written so they can be read on the air.

"It's a nice package — very slick," said Eddie Dodd, editor of the 2,000-circulation Abbeville Herald in Abbeville, Ala. Nonetheless, Mr. Dodd said, "I generally just throw it away."

Mr. Dodd said he didn't remember any Soviet material, but he "wouldn't be exactly happy" if the stories were not clearly marked.

Although he is paid for his services, Mr. Levy defends his business as in the public's best interest.

"One reason I distribute their information for them — and gladly — is that I think it pays for us to listen to what they have to say and to see them as human beings," he said in a letter.

"Not listening to them could be like not looking at the bathroom scale or not listening to a doctor who tells you you have high blood pressure," Mr. Levy said.

"Sometimes it can be better to look and listen and deal with a situation than ignore it."



Peak

the U.S. Virgin Islands for Puerto
complete its voyage from England
cause sponsors were worried that
sailing to Virginia. The
on has been made on when the
April 30 to re-create the 1607
settlers to the New World.

s U.S. on Sikh training

In a telephone interview after the June crash of an Air India airliner off the east coast, Washington Times special correspondent Barry Brown was told by a commander of a commando-style survival camp in Alabama that one of two Sikh fugitives wanted by the FBI on charges of conspiring to assassinate Mr. Gandhi during his May visit to Washington was trained at the camp last year in the use of weapons and explosives.

The fugitive also was sought by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in connection with the Air India crash and an almost simultaneous Canadian Pacific air bomb explosion in the Tokyo airport.

the town of Dolomite, Ala., near Birmingham, beginning just one week after the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in November 1984.

According to Mr. Camper, the Rondo survival course is well known to the authorities, and the camp is often "bothered" by agencies such as the FBI seeking information on those who enroll.

Sikh agitation stems from a struggle in India's northern Punjab state where militants are staging a bloody campaign for autonomy. There are 14 million Sikhs in India, a nation of more than 740 million, and Punjab is the only state in which

same day of a package at Tokyo's airport that killed two baggage handlers. The crash is still under investigation.

The FBI on May 5 arrested five Sikhs, charging them with planning to murder Mr. Gandhi and to attack a number of targets in India, including government buildings and a nuclear power plant.

An FBI affidavit said the five men arrested, plus two Sikhs suspected in the Air-India crash, Lal Singh and Ammand Singh, had planned to begin training May 6 in terrorist tactics at a camp in northern New Jersey.

Mr. Gandhi told Blitz the Indian government had a videotape of training provided at one of several private camps in the United States.

He also said the United States recently

Raymond

35

File: Uf-fv.
CR NT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1985

Dear Dr. Bitterman and Students:

Since returning home from visiting your country in May, I have wanted to respond to your letter expressing your willingness to host a group of American and Soviet youth in your homes in the interest of improving relations between our two countries. I applaud your suggestion and your offer of hospitality. I believe the tripartite project which you propose is more likely to meet your expectations if it is developed in the context of existing youth exchange arrangements that depend on the support of a variety of organizations.

In the broader political context, we have been working hard in a number of different arenas to improve and stabilize our relations with the Soviet Union. My first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev is scheduled for this November in Geneva. Further, we expect a new U.S.-Soviet Cultural Agreement to be completed this year. This should increase exchanges between Americans and Soviets dramatically during the next few years. Consequently, our first task is to reinstitute the personal ties between Soviets and Americans reduced drastically during the late 1970's and early 1980's.

We are also actively involved in exchanges of American and German youth. If you do not already have a partner American school through the German American Partnership Program (GAPP) administered by the Foreign Ministry, I strongly recommend that you contact the Ministry to learn how to initiate the process. This would be a logical first step

on your part to begin the tripartite exchange proposal. After you have had the experience of hosting and participating in a U.S.-German youth exchange, you may wish to invite a Soviet school to participate in a similar exchange. I recommend that you work closely with your Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the development of such a relationship. If you succeed in establishing bilateral West German-Soviet and West German-American relationships, you would then be in an excellent position to host students from the two schools in the laudable tripartite project you describe.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Dr. Michael Bittermann
and his students
Technisches Gymnasium
Kleiststrasse 44
D-3190 Wolfsburg
West Germany

REFERRAL

DATE: 15 SEP 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: KIMMITT

SOURCE: MCFARLANE

DATE: 17 MAY 85

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

GERMANY F R

WICK, C


USSR

SUBJ: INTL YOUTH EXCHANGE / GERMAN PROPOSAL

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 18 SEP 85

COMMENTS:



for William Martin
Executive Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3947

September 16, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES S. WICK
Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: International Youth Organization

The President is interested in proceeding with the proposal made to him by a group of West German students to set up a tripartite U.S.-Soviet-West German youth exchange. Specifically, they proposed to host American and Soviet students in their homes (see letter at Tab A). The President has responded to them with a letter recommending that they initiate the project by establishing a partnership with an American school as your staff suggested (see Tab B). We would like you to assist this endeavor further by having the PAO in Bonn approach the appropriate German authorities to see how they could expedite this process. We also request that you explore the possibility of enlisting Rotary International or a similar organization to help set up the exchange.

Attachments:

Tab A Student's Letter to the President
Tab B President's Letter to Dr. Bitterman




J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs



THE WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Michael Bittermann
and his students
Technisches Gymnasium
Kleiststrasse 44
D-3190 Wofsburg
West Germany



157

The students of a course
in social studies
Dr. Michael Bittermann
Technisches Gymnasium
Kleiststraße 44
D-3180 Wolfsburg

West-Germany

Dear

Mr. President,

we would like to invite soviet and american students into our families. The reason for our intention is to contribute to the understanding among peoples and on the long run to destroy national prejudices. Up to now we have written several letters to the Kremlin and to the White House. Unfortunately without getting any answer.

Our greatest desire is to ask you to become patron of our project!

We kindly request you to transmitt our ideas - which we hope are shared by yourself - to the Chancelor of our country and to Mr Gorbartschow.

To start practising our project our course and our school would be delighted to start an exchange with an highschool from a city of your home state California.

Perhaps such a projekt might be a first step to realise international understanding by mean of students' modest ideas and a Presidents Help!

We hope, trust in and rely on you

Dr. Michael Bittermann

Carola Esslering
Jean-Peter Junke

Carola Schulte

Folke Grundmann

Dirk Thiede

" " " "

Jochim Birk

Rainer Gropf
Frank Kuch

Ralf Thiede

Brigitte Birkholz
Matthias Busch

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

3974

Received THE WHITE HOUSE Received
1985 SEP 10 AM 8:11 WASHINGTON 1985 SEP 10 PM 8:11

132402

~~SECRET~~

September 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RCM

SIGNED

SUBJECT: International Youth Exchange

Issue

Whether we should proceed with a proposal to have West German students' families host American and Soviet students to promote mutual understanding, and if so, how?

Facts

As you recall, a group of West German students wrote you with a request to help them arrange a tripartite exchange whereby they would host American and Soviet high school students in their homes. USIA looked into the idea and noted that, in spite of some likely and potential difficulties, we should be able to find a way to set it up.

There are no organizational mechanisms that are readily equipped to begin such a complex project immediately. There are also certain infrastructural weaknesses in Germany's youth exchange programs, such as the difficulty in arranging homestays and the paucity of links between German and Soviet youth organizations. Nevertheless, the apparent eagerness of your German student correspondents indicates that we may be able to overcome these difficulties fairly easily. In addition, we could explore the possibility of having Rotary International or some similar group assist the Germans with this project.

Discussion

If you feel we should give this idea a try, USIA has recommended that we respond to the German students by suggesting that they first establish a link with an American high school through the German-American Partnership Program. Then, after cementing this tie, the Germans could undertake to develop a similar relationship with a Soviet school which could ultimately result in a link between the two exchanges.

cc: Vice President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M320/2 #132402

BY *AW*

NARA DATE 3/29/17

This suggestion, of course, would take some time to be fully realized. So to try to speed it up, we propose to make a demarche to the German government so that both we and the Germans could make available the necessary resources to put the program into effect.

Recommendation

OK

RR

No

That you sign the response at Tab A to the German students suggesting that they establish two separate exchange programs that can eventually be linked.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

23

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 23, 1985

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: International Youth Exchange

I have reworked the attached memoranda per your instructions (see Tab IV).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____
2. That you sign the memo to Charlie Wick at Tab II.
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Presidential Letter to German Students
- Tab II Memorandum to Charles Wick
- Tab III Tripartite Youth Exchange Proposal Background Material
- Tab IV Original Lenczowski/McFarlane Memoranda

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3A(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA KML, DATE 2/28/12

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

132397

ax

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3974
Add-on

August 1, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JK*

SUBJECT: International Youth Exchange

*Pls. read
pg 2 of Tab I
to make it
"Sign"*

I have reworked the memo from you to the President on the German students' proposal for a tripartite U.S.-Soviet-German youth exchange (Tab I). It recommends that we give the project a try in spite of potential difficulties.

I have added a memo from you to Charlie Wick requesting that he mobilize some resources to assist in this project, that his people look into possible assistance by Rotary International, and that our PAO in Bonn approach the German Government to explore the best way to set up this exchange (Tab III).

At Tab II is a letter from you to the German students for your signature if the President agrees.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *m* Disapprove _____

2. That, if the President agrees, you sign the letter to the German students at Tab II.

Let's make it a little more personal & ask him to sign it
Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. That, if the President agrees, you sign the memo to Charlie Wick at Tab III.

Approve *Kim* Disapprove _____
send now

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to The President
- Tab ~~II~~ Letter to German Students
- Tab III Memorandum to Wick
- Tab IV Tripartite Youth Exchange Proposal Background Material
- Tab V Original Lenczowski/McFarlane Memo (7/15/85)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *m326/2* # *132397*
BY *kw* NARA DATE *6/8/18*

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name

Raymond, Walter: Files

Withdrawer

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File Folder

U.S.-SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (04/17/1985-09/30/1985)

FOIA

M10-326/2
PARRY

Box Number

11

64

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
132398	MEMO WILLIAM LASALLE TO WILLIAM MARTIN RE INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE	2	7/12/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

Dear :

Your letter of May 1985 to President Reagan was forwarded to me for response. Your willingness to receive a group of American and Soviet youth in your homes in the interests of improving relations between our two nations is commendable. We applaud your suggestion and your offer of hospitality.

Perhaps for the first time in several years, our relations with the Soviet Union appear to be improving. The first summit meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev is scheduled for November 1985 in Geneva. This will be the first time an American President and Soviet leader will meet since summer 1979. Further, we expect a new U.S.-Soviet Cultural Agreement to be completed within 1985. This should increase exchanges between Americans and Soviets dramatically during the next few years. Consequently, our first task is to reinstitute the personal ties between Soviet and Americans reduced drastically during the early 1980s.

We are also actively involved in exchanges of American and German youth. If you do not already have a partner American school through the German American Partnership Program (GAPP) administered by the German Foreign Ministry, I strongly recommend you contact the Foreign Ministry to learn how to initiate the process. After you have had the experience of hosting and participating in an U.S.-German youth exchange, you may wish to invite a Soviet school to participate in a similar exchange. I recommend that you work closely with your Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the development of such a relationship. If you succeed in establishing bilateral West German-Soviet and West German-American relationships, you would then be in an excellent position to host students from the two schools in the laudable tripartite project you describe.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

132399

28

MEMORANDUM

3974

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: International Youth Exchange

Issue

Whether we should proceed with a proposal to have West German students' families host American and Soviet students to promote mutual understanding, and if so, how?

Facts

As you recall, a group of West German students wrote you with a request to help them arrange a tripartite exchange whereby they would host American and Soviet high school students in their homes. USIA looked into the idea and noted that in spite of some likely and potential difficulties, we should be able to find a way to set it up.

Currently, there are no organizational mechanisms that are readily equipped to begin such a complex project immediately. There are also certain infrastructural weaknesses in Germany's youth exchange programs, such as the difficulty in arranging homestays and the paucity of links between German and Soviet youth organizations. Nevertheless, the apparent eagerness of your German student correspondents indicates that we may be able to overcome these difficulties fairly easily. In addition, we could explore the possibility of having Rotary International or some similar group assist the Germans with this project.

Discussion

If you feel we should give this idea a try, USIA has recommended that we respond to the German students by suggesting that they first establish a link with an American high school through the German-American Partnership Program. Then, after cementing this tie, the Germans could develop a similar relationship with a Soviet school which could ultimately result in a link between the two exchanges.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M326/2 #132399
BY rw NARA DATE 6/8/18

SECRET

This suggestion, of course, would take some time to be fully realized. If we were to try to speed it up, it would be necessary to make a demarche to the German Government so that both we and the Germans could make available the necessary resources to put the program into effect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OK

NO.

—

—

1. That you ^{sign the} ~~authorize me to send~~ a response to the German students suggesting that they establish two separate exchange programs that can eventually be linked; (TAB A)

—

~~—~~

2. That you authorize us to make an approach to the West German Government to expedite setting up such a tripartite exchange.

Do this anyway →

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Since returning home
from visiting your country
in May I have
wanted to

Dear Dr. Bitterman and students:

The President asked me to respond to your letter ^{expressing} to him of ~~May 1985~~ ¹⁹⁸⁵. Your willingness to receive a group of American and Soviet youth in your homes in the interests of improving relations between our two nations ~~is commendable~~. We applaud your suggestion and your offer of hospitality ^{and} we believe the tripartite project which you propose is more likely to meet your expectations if it is developed in the context of existing youth exchange arrangements that depend on the support of a variety of organizations.

In the broader context, we have been working hard in a number of different arenas to improve and stabilize our relations with the Soviet Union. The first meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev is scheduled for November 1985 in Geneva. Further, we expect a new U.S.-Soviet Cultural Agreement to be completed within 1985. This should increase exchanges between Americans and Soviets dramatically during the next few years. Consequently, our first task is to reinstitute the personal ties between Soviet and Americans reduced drastically during the late 1970's and early 1980's.

We are also actively involved in exchanges of American and German youth. If you do not already have a partner American school through the German American Partnership Program (GAPP) administered by the Foreign Ministry, I strongly recommend that you contact the Foreign Ministry to learn how to initiate the process. This would be a logical first step on your part to begin the tripartite exchange proposal. After you have had the experience of hosting and participating in an U.S.-German youth exchange, you may wish to invite a Soviet school to participate

5

in a similar exchange. I recommend that you work closely with your Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the development of such a relationship. If you succeed in establishing bilateral West German-Soviet and West German-American relationships, you would then be in an excellent position to host students from the two schools in the laudable tripartite project you describe.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Dr. Michael Bittermann
and his students
Technisches Gymnasium
Kleiststrasse 44
D-3190 Wolfsburg
West Germany

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES. Z. WICK
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: International Youth Exchange

The President has

The President is interested in proceeding with the proposal made to him by a group of West German students to set up a tripartite U.S.-Soviet-West German youth exchange. Specifically, they proposed to host American and Soviet students in their homes (see letter at Tab A). ~~I have~~ responded to them with a letter recommending that they initiate the project by establishing a partnership with an American school as your staff suggested (see Tab B). We would like you to assist this endeavor further by having the PAO in Bonn approach the appropriate German authorities to see how they could expedite this process. We also request that you explore the possibility of enlisting Rotary International or a similar organization to help set up the exchange.

Attachments

Tab A Students' Letter to The President
Tab B ~~McFarlane~~ Letter to Dr. Bitterman

President's

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 15 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: International Youth Exchange

*Leave out the
supplimentary
logging & read
that we recommend
what*

USIA has consulted with its posts in Bonn and Moscow about the tripartite youth exchange proposal submitted by students at a German school. The idea, as you recall, is to have German students' families host Soviet and American high school students in their homes. USIS Moscow and USIS Bonn have strong reservations about the idea as presented (See Tab III):

-- It is not clear at all that the program could reduce national prejudices or promote a consensus of views.

-- Since Soviet participants in such an arrangement would be carefully selected and controlled, and since teenagers are virtually never included in such exchanges, it is hard to see how our interests would be served by this idea or how we could achieve the desired effect on the Soviet side.

-- We would have neither program nor administrative control and would be dependent on a third party for these vital components.

-- USIS Bonn questions the ability of a West German school or youth organization to handle such a complex project given certain infrastructural weaknesses in Germany, such as the extreme difficulty in arranging homestays.

-- Few if any German youth organizations have ties with Soviet counterparts.

Given these problems, USIA says that an expansion of regular bilateral exchanges would advance our interests much better than this proposal. Nevertheless, if we have special reasons for pursuing this particular arrangement, USIA recommends that we send a response to our German student correspondents suggesting that they establish a link with an American high school through the German-American Partnership Program, and then, after cementing this tie, develop a similar relationship with a Soviet school which could ultimately result in a link between the two exchanges.

*Let the
Russians
turn
down
US; not*

*No one pretends
it
would*

*There is no harm
in trying -- put
the onus
on Russia
Do we mistrust the FRG administrators?*

*Couldn't we enlist
Rotary International &
help*

So what?

*This is
OK*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM326/2 #132400

BY RW NARA DATE 6/8/18

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I think that USIA's analysis of the difficulties of this proposal is sound. In addition to the logistical difficulties, the proposal merits pessimism because the Soviets can be expected to confound precisely those objectives we seek in a normal, open exchange -- namely to reduce the political-ideological hostility the Soviet Union harbors toward our country. It is no accident that the Soviets are evacuating thousands of teenagers from Moscow so that they will have no "exchanges" with the visiting delegates to the Moscow youth festival.

At Tab I is a memo from you to the President explaining the difficulties of this proposal, but indicating a couple of options by which we can try to arrange it if he wishes. At Tab II is a draft letter from you to the German students making USIA's suggestions on how to begin this project.

H for Raymond, *H for* Matlock, *H for* Sommer and *H for* Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That, if the President chooses this option, you sign the letter to the German students at Tab II

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab II Letter to German Students
- Tab III Tripartite Youth Exchange Proposal

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