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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name Raymond, Walter: Files

Withdrawer

KML 2/27/2012

File Folder U.S.-SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (06/26/1984-06/30/1984)

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~Steve Steiner~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~1) WR - all~~
went very well. Pres. Remarks, Fact Sheet + Background all attached.

ACTION

June 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting Memo for U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, June 27, 1984

Attached at Tab I is the Presidential Meeting Memorandum for the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, June 27, 1984.

Steve

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

2) F - US/Sov P.D.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

505 { Bob Sims, Karna Small, Ron Sable, Ty Cobb and Steve Steiner concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Presidential Meeting Memo
- Tab A List of Participants
- Tab B Remarks

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH PARTICIPANTS IN CONFERENCE
ON U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES

DATE: June 27, 1984

LOCATION: East Room

TIME: 1:30 p.m. - 1:45 p.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To demonstrate our efforts to improve the U.S.-Soviet working relationship and to expand contacts with the peoples of the USSR.

II. BACKGROUND

A conference of representatives of private foundations and universities involved in U.S.-Soviet exchanges is being held at the Smithsonian, June 26-27. This is an excellent forum for a statement describing your efforts to improve the bilateral working relationship with the USSR and to expand exchanges. This is the third broad policy area laid out in your January speech on U.S.-Soviet relations and follows your recent statements on the first two areas, namely arms control and regional issues.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab A.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open press coverage.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

At 1:25 p.m. you go to Green Room to welcome leaders of the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, Professor Billington, Dr. Hamburg, Dr. Ellison and Mr. Brad Johnson. Senator Dick Lugar, who has been a key player in this area, may also be with this group. You proceed with them to East Room at 1:30 p.m. and address approximately 100 Conference attendees, as well as selected Members of Congress and senior Administration officials.

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

Attachment

Tab A	List of Participants
Tab B	Remarks

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Secretary of State George Shultz

Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council

Professor James Billington
Director, Wilson Center

Dr. David Hamburg
President
Carnegie Corporation of New York

Dr. Herbert Ellison
Secretary of Kennan Institute

Mr. Brad Johnson
Research Associate
Kennan Institute

and approximately 100 members of
the Conference, and selected
members of Congress and senior
Administration officials

REMARKS ARE BEING COORDINATED

BY AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AND SPEECHWRITERS

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Dan Amstutz, Under Secretary, USDA
 Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary Political Affairs, State
 Diana Arsenian, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
 Harley Balzer, Department of History, Georgetown University
 William Barlow, East-West Trade Development

Irving Becker, The William and Mary Greve Foundation
 Diana Bieliauskas, Office of International Affairs, National Academy of Science
 James Billington, Director, The Wilson Center
 Michael Brainerd, Director, Citizen Exchange Council
 Stephanie Bursenos, Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health

John A. Busterud, Attorney at Law, Palo Alto
 Maura Cantrill, The Kennan Institute
 Alan Campbell, The Wilson Center
 Jerome M. Clubb, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor
 Tyrus Cobb, National Security Council

Walter Connor, Foreign Service Institute
 Paul Cook, Department of State
 Harriet Crosby, President, Institute for Soviet-American Relations
 Karla Cruise, The Kennan Institute
 Barbara Dash, The Kennan Institute

Dan E. Davidson, Executive Director, American Council of Teachers of Russian
 George Demko, Office of Research, U.S. Department of State
 Mark Dillon, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency
 Alla Dombrowsky, U.S. Information Agency
 Honorable Thomas Downey, U.S. House of Representatives

Herbert J. Ellison, Secretary, The Kennan Institute
 Cynthia Ely, The Wilson Center
 Erick Erickson, U.S. Department of Agriculture
 Amy Evans, Environmental Protection Agency
 Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., Russian and East European Center, University of Illinois

Wesley A. Fisher, International Research and Exchanges Board
 Michael Flack, Washington, D.C.
 John Geraghty, International Affairs, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
 Robert H. Getz, The Kennan Institute
 Prosser Gifford, Deputy Director, The Wilson Center

Christine Glenday, National Academy of Sciences
 Nancy Graham, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Soviet-American Relations
 Damon Gray, Washington, D.C.
 Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times
 Jeffrey Hahn, Short-Term Visiting Grantee, Kennan Institute

David Hamburg, President, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
Alan Hart, Journalist, Smithsonian Institution
Stephen Hayes, Director, AFS International/Intercultural
Programs, Inc.

Allen Hecht, Director, National Climate Program Office, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

Ruth Hegyeli, National Institutes of Health

Kurt F. J. Heinrich, Office of International Relations, National
Bureau of Standards

Peter Henry, Office of International Health, U.S. House of
Representatives

John Holmfield, Science Policy Staff, U.S. House of Representatives

Michael Hurley, Visitor Program Service

Micnela Iozine, National Academy of Sciences

William James, Jackson School of International Studies,
University of Washington

Brad Johnson, Research Associate, The Kennan Institute

Robert Junghaus, Chief, International Activities Group, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

Madeleine Kalb

Allen Kassof, Executive Director, International Research and
Exchanges Board

Edward Keenan, Russian Research Center, Harvard University

John Kiser, Kiser Research, Inc.

Genevieve Knezo, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service

Helen Kodman, National Institutes of Health

Chris Kojm, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S.
House of Representatives

Alice LeMaistre, Office of European Affairs, U.S. Information Agency

Tod Leventhal, Voice of America

Julian MacDonald, The Council for International Exchange of Scholars

Gifford Malone, Acting Director, Office of Programs, U.S.
Information Agency

Suzanne Massie, Irvington, New York

Ambassador Jack Matlock, National Security Council

Rebecca B. Matlock, Washington, D.C.

David Maxwell, Dean, Undergraduate Studies, Tufts University

Honorable James McNulty, U.S. House of Representatives

Jacque McNulty, Washington, D.C.

John Mercer, International Policy Studies

John Metzler, U.S. Department of Energy

Laurence Mitchell, National Academy of Sciences

William Moody, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Frederick P. Mosher, The Carnegie Corporation of New York
International Education

Lewis Murray, Bureau of Legislative/Intergovernmental Affairs, State
Sherry Mueller Norton, Institute for Intergovernmental Education
Michael Oja, Washington, D.C.
Ned Ostenso, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
R. Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs,
U.S. Department of State

B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Affairs, State
Honorable Claiborne Pell, U.S. Senate
Grant Pendill, American Committee on East-West Accord
Jan Perkowski, Chair, CIEE Russian Language Program Consortium
Honorable Thomas Petri, U.S. House of Representatives

Vladimir Petrov, George Washington University
Michael Pillsbury, National Security Advisor, Senate Steering
Committee, U.S. Senate
Louise Platt, The Wilson Center
Cassandra A. Pyle, Director, The Council for International
Exchange of Scholars
Alexander Rabinowitch, Executive Director, Russian and East
European Institute, Indiana University

Victor Rabinowitch, National Academy of Sciences
Bernard Ramundo, U.S. Department of Transportation
Susan Rasky, The New York Times
Peter Reddaway, Kennan Institute; British Passport: 660933C
Marlin Remick, Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, USIA

Yale Richmond, National Endowment for Democracy
Robert Robertson, Occidental International
Erik Ronho de, Institute of International Education
Sophie Sa, Social Science Research Council
William Salmon, Senior Advisor for Science and Technology, U.S.
Department of State

Jack Schmidt, Fogarty International Center, National Institutes
of Health
Laurie Schultz, Office of Representative James Jeffords
Alex M. Shane, Director of International Programs, State
University of New York, Albany
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Gerson Sher, National Science Foundation

John Skillman, Deputy Director, Council on International
Education Exchange
Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Asst Secretary European/Soviet Affairs, State
Damon Smith, Washington, D.C.
Parker Snowe, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Jed Snyder, Research Associate, The Wilson Center

Edward Snyder, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Linwood Starbird, Department of State
Steven Steiner, National Security Council
Phillip Stewart, Associate, The Kettering Foundation
John Stremmler, Associate Director, International Relations, The
Rockefeller Foundation

Meredith Taylor, The Kennan Institute
John Thomas, U.S. Department of State
Richard Thompson, Deputy Director, Center for International
Education, Department of Education
Vladimir Toumanoff, Executive Director, National Council for
Soviet and East European Research
Donald Treadgold, Russian and East European Studies, University
of Washington

Ronald Trowbridge, USIA
Charles Trumbull, Science Applications, Inc.
Janice Tuten, The Wilson Center
Leon Twarog, Director, Center for Slavic and East European
Studies, Ohio State University
Paul Von Ward, President, Delphi Research Associates, Inc.

James Wertsch, Northwestern University
Charles E. Wick, Director, U.S. Information Agency
Honorable Timothy Wirth, U.S. House of Representatives
John Zimmerman, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, State

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 27, 1984

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT MEETING WITH
PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE
ON U.S./SOVIET EXCHANGE

The East Room

1:30 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you all very much. Well, Drs. Billington, Hamburg, Ellison, and Johnson, thank you for bringing your distinguished group to the White House. When I heard that you would be meeting at the Smithsonian to discuss U.S.-Soviet exchanges, I was eager to share my thoughts with you on this timely and important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie Corporation of New York; certainly nothing is more worthy of our attention than finding ways to reach out and establish better communication with the people and the government of the Soviet Union.

For many months, I have encouraged the Soviet Union to join with us in a major effort to see if we could make progress in these broad problem areas, reducing the threat and use of force in solving international disputes, reducing armaments in the world, and establishing a better working relationship with each other.

At the United Nations, at the Japanese Diet, at Georgetown University, and at the Irish Parliament I have explained our efforts to reduce arms, particularly nuclear arms, and to establish a useful dialogue on regional issues. Let me describe to you some of the many efforts that we're making to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We have informed the Soviet Government that we're prepared to initiate negotiations on a new exchanges agreement and we've completed our preparations for these negotiations. We propose to resume preparations to open consulates in New York and Kiev. We've taken steps to remove our -- or revive our agreements for cooperation in environmental protection, housing, health, and agriculture. Activities under these agreements have waned in recent years, because there've been no meetings of their joint committees to plan projects.

We've proposed that preparations begin for such meetings in order to increase the number of active projects. We're in the process of renewing several bilateral agreements that otherwise would have expired this year, and we've agreed to extend our fishing agreement for 18 months, and we're looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under the terms of the agreement.

MORE

cultural life suffers. At the same time, the rest of the world is deprived of the cultural riches of the Soviet people. What would classical music be without a Tchaikovsky or literature without a Tolstoy or chemistry without a Mendeleev.

Civilized people everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts, communication and creativity as broad, deep and free as possible. The Soviet insistence on sealing their people off and on filtering and controlling contacts and the flow of information remains the central problem.

When Soviet actions threaten the peace or violate a solemn agreement or trample on standards fundamental to the civilized world, we cannot and will not be silent. We cannot -- Well, to do so would betray our deepest values. It would violate our conscience and ultimately undermine world stability and our ability to keep the peace. We must have ways short of military threats that make it absolutely clear that Soviet actions do matter and that some actions inevitably effect the quality of the relationship.

These reactions do lead to a decrease in contacts with the people of the Soviet Union and this is a dilemma. However, our quarrel is not with the Russian people, with the Ukrainian people or any of the other proud nationalities in that multinational state. So we must be careful in reacting to actions by the Soviet government not to take out our indignation on those not responsible. And that's why I feel that we should broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better.

But our proposals to do that are not a signal that we have forgotten Afghanistan. We'll continue to demonstrate our sympathy and strong support for the Afghan people. The United States will support their struggle to end the Soviet occupation and to reestablish an independent and neutral Afghanistan.

Nor do our proposals mean that we will ignore violations of the Helsinki Final Act or the plight of Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, Anatoly Shcharansky, Yuri Orlov and so many others. The persecution of these courageous, noble people weighs very heavily on our hearts. It would be wrong to believe that their treatment and their fate will not effect our ability to increase cooperation. It will because our conscience and that of the American people and freedom-loving people everywhere will have it no other way.

Now, I know these thoughts do not resolve the dilemma we face. But it is a dilemma for all of us. And I'll value your advice.

You know, I don't think there's anything we're encouraging the Soviet leaders to do that is not as much in their interest as it is in ours. If they're as committed to peace as they say, they should join us and work with us. If they sincerely want to reduce arms, there's no excuse

MORE

for refusing to talk, and if they sincerely want to deal with us as equals, they shouldn't try to avoid a frank discussion of real problems.

Some say for the Soviet leaders peace is not the real issue; rather, the issue is the attempt to spread their dominance by using military power as a means of intimidation, and there is much evidence to support this view. But it should be clear by now that such a strategy will not work, and once they realize this, maybe they'll understand they have much to gain by improving dialogue, reducing arms, and solving problems.

The way governments can best promote contacts among people is by not standing in the way. Our administration will do all we can to stay out of the way and to persuade the Soviet Government to do likewise. Now we know this won't happen overnight, but if we're to succeed, you must stay involved and get more Americans into wider and more meaningful contact with many more Soviet citizens.

It may seem an impossible dream to think there could be a time when Americans and Soviet citizens of all walks of life travel freely back and forth, visit each other's homes, look up friends and professional colleagues, work together in all sorts of problems and, if they feel like it, sit up all night talking about the meaning of life and the different ways to look at the world.

In most countries of the world, people take those contacts for granted. We should never accept the idea that American and Soviet citizens cannot enjoy the same contacts and communication. I don't believe it's an impossible dream and I don't think you believe that, either.

So let me just conclude by saying thank you and God bless you for what you're doing. (Applause.)

END

1:43 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 27, 1984

FACT SHEET

U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS

In his speech today to participants in the Smithsonian's Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, the President refers to several proposals we have made to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- New Exchanges Agreement: We have been discussing a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation and will present a draft to the Soviets for formal negotiations in the very near future. The previous agreement, often referred to as the "Cultural Agreement," lapsed in 1979. It was one of a series of two-year agreements going back to 1958. Our new draft would provide for resumption of official support for inter alia exchanges of major exhibits, academic, cultural, and sports individuals and groups, and reactivation of film presentations. The American team in the formal negotiations will be headed by Ambassador Arthur Hartman in Moscow.

-- New Consulates General: In 1974 the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to establish new Consulates General in Kiev and New York City. We already have a Consulate General in Leningrad and the Soviets have one in San Francisco. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. Government suspended the agreement for new Consulates General. At the time of the suspension, we had an advance team in Kiev for nearly two years and were approximately six months away from officially opening the Consulate. The Soviets had a similar team in New York. Both advance teams were withdrawn. Since that time, we have discussed the consulates issue on numerous occasions, focusing over the past year on concrete steps that could be taken to pave the way for opening these consulates. We have recently proposed to move forward and suggested we send a team to Kiev to inspect available property.

-- Environmental Protection Agreement: The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection was signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972, by President Nixon and Chairman Podgorny. The agreement has been renewed three times for 5-year periods and is due to expire May 23, 1987. Activities under the Agreement have included seminars, joint publications, exchange visits, and joint projects in several topics including protecting endangered species, modeling of long-range air pollution, and earthquake prediction. EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus has assumed the U.S. co-chairmanship of the Joint Environmental Committee and will seek to use this forum as a means to reinvigorate the Agreement. Mr. Ruckelshaus is currently representing the United States at the Multilateral Conference on the Environment in Munich, where he has discussed the Agreement with Soviet officials.

-- Housing: The U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction was signed by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin on June 28, 1974, in Moscow. We decided in December 1983 to renew the Agreement for a third five-year period effective June 28, 1984. Besides exchange visits and seminars, the Agreement has supported joint projects in construction techniques in extreme climates and unusual geological conditions, sewage treatment in a permafrost environment, and fire prevention in the design of construction materials. The President's decision to expand the activities under the Agreement will lead to the convening of the first Joint Housing Committee meeting since 1978 and to an increase in the already extensive private sector involvement in joint projects. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel Pierce, Jr. will lead our efforts under this agreement.

-- Health: The United States and the Soviet Union entered into cooperation in the health area through two agreements signed in the early 1970s: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Medical Sciences and Public Health (signed May 23, 1972, at Moscow by Secretary of State Rogers and Minister of Health Petrovsky) and the Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development (signed at Moscow June 28, 1974 by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko). The Health Agreement has been extended until May 23, 1987, while the Artificial Heart Agreement will run until June 28, 1987. The President has directed that steps be taken in the near future to strengthen cooperation under these agreements through a renewal of high-level visits, joint committee meetings, and the initiation of new projects and possibly new agreements. The timing for such steps has not yet been set. The agreements have provided for joint research inter alia on laser treatment of glaucoma, congenital heart disease, mechanically assisted circulation in artificial hearts, and cancer treatment and prevention.

-- Agriculture: Signed at Washington June 19, 1973, by Secretary of Agriculture Butz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, the Agriculture Agreement has been extended three times and will not expire until June 19, 1988. The Department of Agriculture will now reactivate the Agreement (which has been dormant the past several years) through a Joint Committee meeting, high-level visits, and initiation of new projects. Earlier, the Agreement had supported plant, animal, and soil science research (germ plasm studies) and exchange of grain-related economic information. Exchange visits, especially those involving the private sector, had been particularly active. All of these programs will be reinvigorated.

-- Fishing Agreement: In April, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months (as opposed to the two previous 12 month extensions). Final approval is currently pending before Congress. The Fisheries agreement was initially signed in November 1976. The Soviet Union does not, however, have a directed fishing allocation. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States terminated allocations to the USSR to fish within our 200-mile zone. (The Soviet Union had been receiving a directed allocation of between 400,000 and 500,000 MT a year.) Soviet processing at sea of fish caught by U.S. fishermen as part of an existing joint venture was allowed to continue since it benefited U.S. fishermen. The U.S. is currently reviewing the U.S.-USSR fishing relationship to determine whether mutually beneficial steps can be taken to increase cooperation.

-- Long-Term Cooperation Agreement: The U.S. has proposed to extend for ten years the U.S.-USSR Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. The Agreement was signed by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev during the 1974 Moscow Summit. It is scheduled to expire June 28, 1984. The principal provisions of the Agreement call upon the parties to use their good offices to facilitate cooperation in economic, industrial, and technical areas. In practice, the Agreement has been exclusively economic and has facilitated certain business dealings between the two countries. If the Agreement is extended, our expectation is that there will be a meeting of the Working Group of Experts under Article III to examine prospects for trade. If that meeting is successful, then a Joint Commercial Commission meeting will be held when practical.

-- U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA): The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea established certain "rules of the road" to govern special situations involving naval surface vessels and aircraft of the two nations. It also set up agreed-upon navy-to-navy channels for the prompt resolution of any problems arising under this Agreement. Senior officers of the U. S. and Soviet Navies meet on an annual basis for a general review of the implementation of the agreement and discussion of ways in which it might be strengthened. The most recent review took place in Moscow in late May. At that time, the U.S. and Soviet sides agreed to a renewal of the INCSEA agreement for another three years.

-- World Oceans Agreement: The U.S.-USSR World Oceans Agreement was signed in 1973 and renewed for three years in 1981. It has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research and has involved seminars, exchange visits, and joint ocean research cruises. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has taken the U.S. lead on this agreement. The Agreement comes up for renewal in December.

-- Maritime Boundary: The United States and the Soviet Union have a difference relating to the precise cartographic depiction and location of the boundary line established by the 1867 Convention ceding Alaska. The difference relates to the fact that the U.S. depicts the 1867 Convention Line as the maritime boundary by arcs of great circles, while the Soviet Union depicts the Convention Line by rhumb lines. We have proposed a fair and equitable resolution to the issue. Three rounds of technical level discussions have been held and a fourth round is expected soon.

-- Space Rescue Mission: The U. S. proposal envisages cooperation between NASA and Soviet space officials on a joint simulated space rescue mission. A space shuttle would rendezvous with the Soviet space station to practice procedures that might be necessary to rescue each other's personnel. Details of the proposal would have to be worked out.

-- Consular Review Talks: The session of U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks (CRT) currently underway in Moscow is the latest round of a series of discussions which began in 1976, when representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met to attempt to resolve a number of consular issues outstanding between the two countries. Those issues primarily involved visa questions and administrative matters relating to the functioning of our diplomatic missions. CRT discussions have taken place in Moscow in 1976, and in Washington in 1979 and 1983.

-- Search and Rescue Talks: In October 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard was authorized to take the initiative to open direct lines of emergency communications with the Soviet maritime rescue authorities in the Pacific. As a result of subsequent exchanges in June 1983, agreement was reached to hold a working level meeting on a broad range of search and rescue topics. This meeting was scheduled for early December 1983, but was postponed at the request of the Soviet side. We have proposed rescheduling this meeting.

-- U.S.-Soviet Communications Improvements Talks: On the basis of the President's proposals of May 1983, a U.S. team has met with Soviet counterparts three times to discuss possible means by which U.S.-Soviet communications -- for use in both times of crisis and calm -- might be strengthened. The most recent meeting was in Moscow in late April. On the basis of those talks, significant progress has been made in working out agreement with the Soviets on the desirability of upgrading the existing Direct Communications Link (the Hotline) with secure facsimile transmission capabilities, which would increase the speed, reliability and versatility of that system. We expect another meeting shortly. Additionally, the U.S. has put forward proposals to upgrade the communications capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet embassies in each other's countries, to establish a Joint Military Communications Link to handle the exchange of time-sensitive technical data, and to facilitate consultations in the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or incident.

-- U.S.-Soviet Military Contact: With the exception of the special navy-to-navy talks under the 1972 INCSEA Agreement, there has been no channel for high-level military exchange between the U.S. and Soviet Union outside of specifically arms control-related talks since the one-time meeting of the Secretary of Defense and Chief of the Joint Staff with their Soviet counterparts during the 1979 Vienna Summit. Earlier this year, the President suggested to the Soviet leadership the desirability of exploring the possibility of regularizing some form of contact and discussion between those responsible for defense matters on both sides for the purpose of increasing mutual understanding and minimizing the potential for misinterpretation and miscalculation.

-- Human Rights Cases:

- ANDREI SAKHAROV: Dr. Andrei Sakharov, a physicist and Academy of Sciences member who played a major role in the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, has spoken out at length in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union. In 1975 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for those efforts. Since 1980 he has been required to live in internal exile in the closed city of Gorkiy. In early May he began a hunger strike to obtain permission for his wife, Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for necessary medical treatment; there has been no confirmed information of any sort on his health or his status since that time.

- YELENA BONNER: A doctor by training, Yelena Bonner is the wife of Dr. Sakharov, and was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group. She has served as his main channel of communications to the outside world during his exile in Gorky. She is also believed to have begun a hunger strike in early May to obtain permission to travel abroad for vital medical treatment; she suffers from both a heart condition and serious eye problems.

- Yuriy Orlov: A founder and leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Yuriy Orlov was long active on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union. He was a founding member of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International and a participant in unofficial scientific seminars organized for refusenik scientists. He was arrested in February 1977 and convicted in May 1978 of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Earlier this year he completed seven years in a strict-regime labor camp and began five years of internal exile.

- ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY: Anatoliy Shcharanskiy is a long-time activist on behalf of human rights and Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. A founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Shcharanskiy was also a leader of the Jewish emigration movement and a liaison between Western newsmen and Soviet dissidents. In March 1977 he was arrested and in July 1978 was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and "treason". He is currently in Chistopol' Prison; his wife, Avital, lives in Israel.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS

(Matlock
+Palmer)

June 27, 1984

The Roosevelt Room

9:35 A.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This is on background, but it's for your use as soon as the briefing is concluded. We'll do a transcript, and if others -- press -- want to know more about this issue, we'll provide it to them when we get it done later today.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you'll recall that the President made a major address January 16 when he outlined his approach to U.S.-Soviet relations -- particularly indicated the areas that he would like to move ahead and improve the relationship. In that speech he set out three areas, broad areas, in that he would like to see more cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

One of these was reducing the threat and use of force in settling international disputes; another was moving to reduce and control the high levels of armaments; and a third was in the area of improving our working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Well, as you know, he has had a lot to say recently in a number of speeches about our arms control and arms reduction proposals. Quite a bit has had to be said about our desire to engage the Soviets in a more productive dialogue on the regional issues.

And this week there is meeting at the Smithsonian Institution a group of scholars and representatives of foundations who are active in U.S.-Soviet exchanges. I think the President felt that this was a good time to describe the efforts he has made to improve the bilateral relationship.

In January he set out certain goals, concepts, and I think in the speech today he will be reporting on what we have done in the interim -- the sort of things we are proposing. And he will listen. There are a lot of these -- I'm not sure of the exact count -- but, close to 20 things that we have proposed in this bilateral area. And, in doing so, I think he wants to make it very clear the direction we would like to move to increase contacts, to improve the dialogue, to try to settle problems in the relationship.

Now, in the speech today, he will also be pointing out some of the difficult decisions that have to be made in this area. On the one hand, we do want to increase contacts and the quality of our dialogue with the Soviet government. On the other hand, we are faced, from time to time, with the sort of Soviet actions that require us to make it clear that certain types of actions are unacceptable. Or, they're unacceptable because they threaten the peace, or they violate agreements or understandings. Sometimes these actions do, in fact, have the effect of impeding contacts. But we have to have a way to make this point without resorting to military threats. I think we've seen, for example, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that brought a number of steps in limiting, for example, the level of meetings with Soviet officials.

And, obviously, we have problems from time to time when there are human rights abuses, violations of the Helsinki Final Act, when we just can't go ahead and do business as usual. And we shouldn't.

MORE

Now, I think the President will be talking about these problems, and some of them -- really confronting them -- and everyone else who deals with U.S. Soviet relations -- the dilemma -- dilemmas that aren't easy to solve.

But I think the thrust of what he will be saying is that we do want to improve our contacts. We do want to communicate more effectively. We're making a lot of proposals that we hope will be accepted to make this possible. And, although we know that we can't change the situation overnight, we're going to keep working on it with the aim of having a better and more productive working relationship with the Soviet government and better communication with the peoples in the Soviet Union.

Q I'm sure it's not going to come as any surprise to you that since -- that the timing of all of this -- it starts January -- it is being interpreted as an election year attempt, you know, aimed a lot more at voters than it is at the Soviet Union. Is there something you can point to to assure us that that is not the case?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it -- and, in fact, is a coincidence that these things are coming in a year divisible by four. That's the fact of the matter. If you look at the way our relations have developed with the Soviet Union, I think you will see that we have had to go through a period, following a whole series of Soviet actions in the 1970's, sort of culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan, to make clear to them that that sort of action is simply threatening to the peace and which we have to resist.

And, I think that we started efforts, and we started them last spring, to get -- to improve the dialogue, and to get into a better sort of working relationship. But, you know, things keep happening, and things that we don't do. We didn't shoot down a civilian airliner. And I think that anybody who thinks that any American President would not have reacted to something like that, or could have stayed silent, just really doesn't understand Americans --

Q Can I just follow up on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- therefore, I'm just saying that I think that one, really, if you're going to be objective, should look at this in the context of the dynamic of the relationship, and the election is really not a relevant factor in it.

Q If I could just look at it from the other side, then, is it a relevant factor, do you think, in the Soviet response? Have the -- these 20 things that you've outlined, has there been any kind of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said almost 20, I'm not -- haven't counted the exact number --

Q Okay. Whatever. I mean, do you think the Soviet response is somehow tied to the election year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'd have to ask them that. You know, I can't speak for their perceptions.

Q At the same time that the President is holding out the olive branch, we see such things as the Marine general at the Navy War college talking about a limited war with the Soviet Union being an almost inevitable probability; and the next day we see a report of a Navy admiral drawing a line against Cuba. Putting ourselves in the other guys' shoes, doesn't this confuse the signal that's coming out of here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that first instance, I think it was explained that he was speaking not from a clear text, and not, certainly not speaking on behalf of the President; and the

President does not share the view that was expressed. And just -- it seems to me, that if the Soviets want to understand what we're saying, they'll watch what the President says, what the Secretary of State says. These are the authoritative spokesmen.

Q You refer to January when the President outlined new improved relations with the Soviets. We're now in June. Despite all of these extensions of doves and olive branches, what's the problem? Why haven't relations improved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that, first of -- well, the question really is better directed at the Soviet side --

Q Well, I'm asking for your analysis of the situation. What do you all see?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, I think that sometimes the degree that relations are bad is exaggerated in the public mind. One thing I think we should understand is that, though relations are not good, and they are -- have not -- the Soviets have not been as cooperative as we would have hoped in acting positively on our suggestions up to now, that it is not a more dangerous relationship in terms of the possibility of U.S.-Soviet direct confrontation. If anything, we have a safer relationship than we've had for some time, in that respect.

Now, I do think, without trying to speculate on all, what all the precise reasons would be, one should bear in mind -- and this really relates to one of the earlier questions, that the Soviets in the last three years have gone through -- they've had three different leaders. And, they have had changes in the leadership. There has been a good bit of, one might say, organization of new administrations -- to put it in our terms. Their system is, of course, quite different, but they're as affected as any other when the leadership of the system changes.

Now, I think one must recognize they have not -- probably have not been in the best position to make major decisions, or to make new decisions. So, it seems to me that you have to be a little patient, if one is expecting something new.

My colleague -- do you have anything to add?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think that's right.

Q The President --

Q What happened -- oh, sorry --

Q The President seems to have recently been moving away from the hardline stance about a summit in terms of desiring a set agenda, knowing exactly where it's going -- can you give us some characterization about his feelings, the administration's feelings, about a U.S.-Soviet summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he's expressed very clearly what his feelings are; and I don't think it needs any more elaboration. I think, I hope you'll look at what he said. I'm sure the press office can get you copies if you don't recall --

Q I know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very clear. And I think any -- you know, I just don't think it's necessary to go beyond it.

Q When do you think one might happen?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think anyone can say, because, obviously, it takes agreement with two parties to have one.

Q Has this been specifically discussed in any of this quiet diplomacy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, all of our quiet diplomacy is directed at trying to find ways that we can solve some of the problems. One result of this could be, you know, eventually, a decision that it would be useful to have a meeting at the high level to -- if it seemed that that would be useful.

So, in that sense, you can say it's always implicit in any of the diplomatic contacts that we have. But I don't really think I should go beyond that, if we're going to keep our diplomatic communications confidential, as they should be.

Q What happens next? Shultz and Dobrynin had this three hour meeting. Is another meeting scheduled between them? Or is some meeting scheduled somewhere between American and Soviet officials?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials almost every day. And I think you'll see, when you see his speech, that obviously since all of these things have been proposed there have been a lot of meetings and a lot of ways to propose it.

At the moment, I don't know of any specific dates that have been set at, let's say, the Foreign Minister level. But, contacts with American officials at various levels go on all the time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think one of the things you'll note in the speech is that we have not just posed things, we've actually had delegations in Moscow. There have been Soviet delegations here on a broad range of subjects. And that pattern will continue.

The President will point out that in a number of areas we're expecting soon to have further talks with the Soviets. So, there is a -- as my colleague says -- there is a tremendous amount of back-and-forth going on; not all of it as productive as we'd like, but still a lot of process.

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Q I'd like to take it back to the statement you made earlier --

Q Can I just follow up?

Q Surely.

Q One second.

What about the Soviet journalists who refuse to meet with the Secretary of State, which I read in the paper this morning? Have you got any reaction to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, just -- it seems to me it does illustrate one of the problems we have in dealing with them. We are proposing what dialogue, across the board. And they have not always accepted our offer. They have not always expressed a willingness even to confront some of these issues. I think that's unfortunate, but, obviously, you should ask them for a comment as to why.

Q What are these 20 steps, or nearly 20 steps? Are they proposals? Are they meetings? What is it you're talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These are proposals which we have made to the Soviet Union with the object of improving our bilateral working relationship with them.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that they're likely to take up any of these between now and the election, that there is any sign of improved relations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would hope so. I think some are pretty close to agreement. Some are not.

Q Can you say -- are close or what we're talking about more specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at this point.

Q I'd like to take it back to the statement you made earlier about the degree to which Soviet-American relations are -- being exaggerated and that the -- talking about the reduced danger of war. The contrary viewpoint is expressed by General Brent Scowcroft. He says that Soviet-American relations are as bad as he can remember. And Ambassador Kennedy, for whom the seminar is named that the President will be addressing today, talks about the current atmospherics bearing the unmistakable characteristic of a march toward war. Are these people uninformed? Or how do they reach that judgment? There seems to be a dichotomy --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly don't agree that there's a march toward war. Quite the contrary. But you can say that certainly I, and I think many of the rest of us, simply read it different ways.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'd just like to point out that it was at the height of detente, 1973, when we came as close as we have at any time in the last 20 or 30 years to a military situation. And that was over the Middle East situation, Israeli-Egyptian conflict, when we went to DEFCON III and the Soviets took various preparations as well.

If you contrast that or the '62 Cuban missile crisis, for example, we just aren't in that kind of environment right now at all. There is no place in the world where you can pinpoint that

we are near a confrontation that could, in turn, lead to war.

I think it's also very important to remember that the basis of peace is, of course, military balance. We are in a much stronger position today in terms of military balance and the Soviets respect for our strength than we were, say, in the latter part of the 1970's when the Soviets were openly saying in their literature that the corrolation of forces had shifted and was continuing to shift in their direction and they were beginning to take a number of very risky steps in a large part of the world, Afghanistan, southern Africa, Ethiopia. I mean, the list is a long one.

We haven't had any example of that recently. And I think the reason is very clear: The Soviets are reassessing how far they can go with us. And the situation is, therefore, more stable, more peaceful.

Q Given the lack of dialogue now, you can think of all kinds of -- the Syrians-Israeli standoff in Bekaa, the Persian Gulf situation. Any one of these, it would seem, could go to a DEFCON III like that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have discussed all of those situations with the Soviets over the last months, both with Gromyko and with Dobrynin here. So there is no lack of communication about those situations.

Q So you are communicating about the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. We see them, as my colleague said, we see them regularly at those levels.

Q Can we just get back one more time to this -- the political -- or non-political aspects of this? You say, well, we -- you know, KAL, you sort of mentioned kind of as a benchmark. I mean, that you didn't -- we didn't do it, that that was them and that, obviously, is detrimental to relations -- Has something happened between -- Do we just think, "Okay. They've gotten the point." Or what's happened between September 1st and January 13th? What happened in that time period to make the President believe that now is the time to move and say, "Okay. Let's go ahead -- "

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, my point was it was already moving before that. Now, obviously, unexpected events, like KAL, and expected events, given their policies, like the implementation of NATO's decision in December, the dual-track decision to deploy American missiles in Western Europe, these had an impact on one's ability to move ahead in -- this is just -- it seems to me -- obvious to anyone who thinks about it. And the -- But the views the President expressed in January were not new views. It was -- They were put together in a comprehensive form, but he had expressed all those before.

Q Oh, but it was a new tone, you know, as you know. I mean, we were -- you know, I mean, this is a man who came into office --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But look at the tone in September UN speech, when he made the proposals regarding INF.

No, I don't think it was a totally new tone. It was a comprehensive laying out of how we wanted to put the relation together. But I think that you will find the logic of explaining these in the context of all that was happening in U.S.-Soviet relations, both expected and unexpected, rather than in the domestic political situation here. That's my point.

Q Has the Soviet Union made proposals to the United States to improve relations?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have made a number of proposals, most of them in the -- sort of the arms control area, which we have taken seriously, and some of which we have -- the President has indicated we'll move on. For example, their proposals for a non-use of force treaty or declaration at Stockholm. He announced of course, in his speech to the Irish Parliament that we would consider that in conjunction with Soviet consideration of the concrete confidence-building measures that we and our NATO allies had proposed. So we've shown forthcomingness in looking at theirs.

We do have problems with some of them, and serious problems with some of their proposals, which we consider rather one-sided. But we haven't excluded talking about these. We feel that we do want to continue talking and negotiating about the central issues. And I think everybody recognizes, for example, that nuclear arms are as important as any other. And we just have to keep expressing our desire to move ahead on those negotiations, on intermediate-range and strategic weapons. The Soviets keep refusing, for reasons that, perhaps, they better explain. I think it's incomprehensible, if their policies are what they say they are, that they would refuse to negotiate on these central issues. But they are.

Q Does the President feel that expanded scientific and cultural exchanges are a necessary first step toward arms control talks being resumed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think he's going to put it in the context of a first step, but in the context of something that is desirable for both countries to expand. And I don't think we're looking at this as necessarily tied to other things, except in the loose sense, that the better we're communicating, presumably, the better we'll be able to solve some of these other problems. But I don't think he's looking at, you know, that it will inevitably lead to anything specific.

Q But it's the only thing you've got, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, it's not the only thing we've got. We're talking, as we've said, in many other areas. The reason -- It's simply that he has not had the occasion before -- and it wasn't timely, because we needed some time to make these proposals and to discuss them in diplomatic channels. He had not had the occasion before to lay out for the American people, and for specialists, for that matter, just exactly what we are proposing. And that's what he's going to try to do today in this area of improving the bilateral relationship.

MR. SIMS: I think we're going to have to give up the room. Maybe one question to end it, if someone would like --

Q Another political question. Some of the conservative columnists say that the politicians have taken over White House policy toward the Soviet Union with the election in view. What have you got to say about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I see absolutely no foundation for it. Certainly those of us who work in foreign affairs, I don't feel that anyone has taken over.

Q Can I just ask real quickly? The answer to his question, do we understand you that there's been no movement at all on arms control, getting them back to the talks, since they left?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There has been no movement on INF and START.

Q Right. Okay. That's --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, there certainly has been -- I can't say there's been no movement at all. We're not -- the subject today is not the arms control area --

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- but certainly there has been movement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have talks going on in Vienna on conventional forces and --

Q Right. I meant specifically on nuclear talks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Going back to the table with those two, there has been no movement.

Q Okay. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

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