

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual  
collections.

---

Collection: Meese, Edwin III: Files  
Folder Title: Assassination Report [4 of 4]  
Box: CFOA 28

---

To see more digitized collections visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
inventories visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at:  
[reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>



memorandum

File: 610.0

X 110.1  
X 130.3

DATE: April 23, 1979  
 TO: Deputy Director  
 SUBJECT: Secret Service/FBI Procedures Following an Attempted Assassination of a Protectee  
 TO: See Distribution Below

I. INTRODUCTION

The Secret Service has entered into an agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigations regarding joint agency procedures following an attempted assassination of a protectee of this Service. The agreement (attached) outlines the responsibilities of the respective agencies during all phases of the subsequent investigation.

It will be the responsibility of the Secret Service to assume initial control of a post attack situation and exercise "Interim Federal Presence" until such time as a logical and coordinated transition of responsibilities can be made to the FBI in those instances where they have jurisdiction. (Title 18, Sections 1751, 245, 112, USC)

All personnel should be aware that in the event of an attack on a protectee, that the FBI should be given immediate access to all parts of the investigation under our control to provide for a coordinated effort leading to the transition of control.

II. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

- A. Office of Investigations, - The Director has delegated overall responsibility for the Secret Service's role in any investigation following an attack on a protectee to the Assistant Director (Office of Investigations). The Assistant Director will establish liaison with appropriate FBI headquarters personnel in order to reach an agreement as to when the Secret Service should turn its control of the investigation over to the FBI. The Assistant Director will send a representative to the scene of the attack who will have the overall responsibility for this Service's participation in any subsequent

16



investigation. The representative will coordinate this Service's investigative efforts with the FBI counterpart, who has a similar responsibility for that Agency.

- B. Office of Protective Research - The Assistant Director (Protective Research) has the responsibility to determine the nature of the attack and the potential for additional threats to protectees of this Service. The Assistant Director will send a representative to participate in a headquarters command post established by the FBI in accordance with their existing procedures.
- C. Intelligence Team - In the event of an attack on a principal, the first Intelligence Team present will:
  - 1. Effect immediate "Interim Federal Presence" at the site with the responsibility of conducting the preliminary interview of witnesses, the collection and preservation of evidence, the taking into custody of suspects, and doing those things which will insure a complete and successful investigation. The Intelligence Team will utilize available manpower in carrying out the above.
  - 2. Will cooperate fully with FBI and local law enforcement officials in order to establish a coordinated effort. Service personnel should appreciate that the Service has the responsibility for the Federal Government to control the investigation until it is assumed by the FBI at the direction of AD Investigations.
  - 3. Will maintain control of the situation until such time as the local SAIC or his designee can assume command.
- D. Field Office SAIC - Upon an attack on a protectee, the SAIC or his designee has the immediate responsibility to assist the protective detail leader in the safety and evacuation of the protectee. Once having relocated and provided necessary security for the protectee, the field office SAIC will:


1. Assume command of "Interim Federal Presence" from the Intelligence Team.
  2. Establish contact with appropriate local FBI officials and coordinate the investigative effort with all involved law enforcement agencies.
  3. Establish joint field command post with the FBI, giving consideration to the initial use of the protectee's command post. At such time as the FBI may establish its own command post, the SAIC will select a Secret Service representative to be in that command post.
  4. Provide constant information and notification to the Intelligence Division Duty Desk, who will in turn disseminate information to the appropriate headquarters offices.
  5. Will retain command of the investigation on behalf of the Federal Government until otherwise directed by the Assistant Director (Investigations) or his designee.
- E. Protective Detail Leader - Has the ultimate responsibility to evacuate and provide necessary security for the protectee. Based on needs of safety for the protectee, the Detail Leader should begin to make contingency plans as the situation warrants. In the event of an assassination, the Detail Leader should provide necessary security for the deceased and preserve any evidence under his immediate control.

### III. CONCLUSION:

The implementation of this policy follows the general Secret Service procedures regarding shooting incidents (Secret Service Manual Section 266.31) and jurisdictional authority during hostage and assault situations (Memorandum of Deputy Director dated July 27, 1978 under 610.0). These procedures should be reviewed.

Following an assassination or an assassination attempt, all personnel should work to provide for the safety of the protectee and for an orderly and systematic investigation. Each agent should take such action as necessary to insure a coordinated and complete effort at every level.

All employees should review this memorandum and a copy of this policy should be available in any command post being operated for a protectee of this Service.



Myron I. Weinstein  
Deputy Director

Distribution:

All Assistant Directors  
All Assistants to the Director  
All Protective SAIC's  
All Field Office and Headquarters SAIC's  
All RA's  
SATS Williams  
Legal Counsel

Attachment

AGREEMENT OF PROCEDURES

This agreement between the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation is to confirm our procedures to be followed in the event that a violation of law occurs involving a person or persons protected by the U.S. Secret Service pursuant to law and which falls within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.

I. In the event of the killing of a protectee of the U.S. Secret Service for which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction:

A. The U.S. Secret Service during the immediate period thereafter will exercise control as an interim Federal presence until such time as the Director of the Secret Service and the Director of the FBI, or their designees, agree to an orderly transfer of responsibilities. In most instances, this should occur before or no later than the time of the autopsy. It is understood that concurrent with the transfer of responsibilities the Secret Service will release custody and control of the deceased protectee to the FBI, but may maintain a presence as deemed necessary by the Secret Service. During

this period of time the FBI shall have presence in all situations to fully carry out their investigative responsibilities pursuant to law.

B. During the immediate period following the killing of a protectee, the U.S. Secret Service will maintain and preserve any suspects, witnesses, and evidence under its control until such time as the FBI assumes its investigative responsibilities.

C. The Secret Service and the FBI will coordinate all phases of the subsequent investigation or investigations into the killing of a protectee, and the Secret Service will have presence in all phases of the investigation, pursuant to the responsibilities of the Secret Service under law. This shall include mutual presence in any Command Post or Co-ordinating Center established by the FBI or Secret Service.

II. In the event of any other violation of law involving a protectee of the Secret Service for which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction:

A. The same procedures shall be followed



concerning control and presence as outlined above. The Directors of the Secret Service and the FBI, or their designees, shall agree to an orderly transfer of responsibilities.

B. The Secret Service during the immediate period following the violation will maintain and preserve any suspects, witnesses, and evidence under its control until such time as the FBI assumes its investigative responsibilities.

C. The FBI and the Secret Service will coordinate the subsequent investigation or investigations and the Secret Service will have presence in all phases of the investigations pursuant to its responsibilities under law.

### III. Internal Procedures

The FBI and the Secret Service will create internal directives to fully effect this agreement of procedures.

In order to provide for an orderly and systematic investigation of the above described violations of law involving a Secret Service protectee where the FBI has investigative jurisdiction, the FBI and the Secret Service will construe the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such

action as is necessary to insure a coordinated and complete Federal effort at every level.

This agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI and the Secret Service, or at such other times as the FBI or the Secret Service may request, to insure that the agreement is both practical and productive. Revisions may be made with the mutual concurrence of the Directors of the FBI and the Secret Service.

BY William W. Weber  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE Dec 11, 1978

BY H. Skuyt  
Director  
U.S. Secret Service

DATE Dec. 8, 1978



## DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

### I. BASES OF INVESTIGATION

- A. Domestic security investigations are conducted, when authorized under Section II(C), II(F), or II(I), to ascertain information on the activities of individuals, or the activities of groups, which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the violation of federal law, for the purpose of:
- (1) overthrowing the government of the United States or the government of a State;
  - (2) substantially interfering, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized representatives;
  - (3) substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. government policies or decisions:
    - (a) the functioning of the government of the United States;
    - (b) the functioning of the government of a State; or
    - (c) interstate commerce.
  - (4) depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

### II. INITIATION AND SCOPE OF INVESTIGATIONS

- A. Domestic security investigations are conducted at three levels -- preliminary investigations, limited investigations, and full investigations -- differing in scope and in investigative techniques which may be used.
- B. All investigations undertaken through these guidelines shall be designed and conducted so as not to limit the full exercise of rights protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

#### Preliminary Investigations

- C. Preliminary investigations may be undertaken on the basis of allegations or other information that an individual or a group may be engaged in activities which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the

- G. Techniques such as recruitment or placement of informants in groups, "mail covers," or electronic surveillance, may not be used as part of a preliminary or a limited investigation.
- H. All preliminary and limited investigations shall be closed within 90 days of the date upon which the preliminary investigation was initiated. However, FBI Headquarters may authorize in writing extension of a preliminary or limited investigation for periods of not more than 90 days when facts or information obtained in the original period justify such an extension. The authorization shall include a statement of the circumstances justifying the extension.

#### Full Investigation

- I. Full investigations must be authorized by FBI Headquarters. They may only be authorized on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities which involve the use of force or violence and which involve or will involve the violation of federal law for one or more of the purposes enumerated in IA(1)-IA(4). The following factors must be considered in determining whether a full investigation should be undertaken:
- (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm;
  - (2) the likelihood it will occur;
  - (3) the immediacy of the threat; and
  - (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by a full investigation.

#### Investigative Techniques

- J. Whenever use of the following investigative techniques are permitted by these guidelines, they shall be implemented as limited herein:
- (1) use of informants to gather information; when approved by FBI Headquarters, and subject to review at intervals not longer than 180 days; provided,
    - (a) when persons have been arrested or charged with a crime, and criminal proceedings are still pending, informants shall not be used to gather information concerning that crime from the person(s) charged; and

- (b) informants shall not be used to obtain privileged information; and where such information is obtained by an informant on his own initiative no record or use shall be made of the information.
- (2) "mail covers," pursuant to postal regulations, when approved by the Attorney General or his designee, initially or upon request for extension; and
- (3) electronic surveillance in accordance with the requirement of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

Provided that whenever it becomes known that person(s) under surveillance are engaged in privileged conversation (e.g., with attorney), interception equipment shall be immediately shut off and the Justice Department advised as soon as practicable. Where such a conversation is recorded it shall not be transcribed, and a Department attorney shall determine if such conversation is privileged.

NOTE: These techniques have been the subject of strong concern. The committee is not yet satisfied that all sensitive areas have been covered (e.g., inquiries made under "pretext;" "crash covers," photographic or other surveillance techniques.)

### III. TERMINATING INVESTIGATIONS

- A.. Preliminary, limited, and full investigations may be terminated at any time by the Attorney General, his designee, or FBI Headquarters.
- B. FBI Headquarters shall periodically review the results of full investigations, and at such time as it appears that the standard for a full investigation under II(I) can no longer be satisfied and all logical leads have been exhausted or are not likely to be productive, FBI Headquarters shall terminate the full investigation.
- C. The Department of Justice shall review the results of full domestic intelligence investigations at least annually, and shall determine in writing whether continued investigation is warranted. Full investigations shall not continue beyond one year without the written approval of the Department. However, in the absence of such notification the investigation may continue for an additional 30 day period pending response by the Department.

#### IV. REPORTING, DISSEMINATION, AND RETENTION

##### A. Reporting

1. Preliminary investigations which involve a 90-day extension under IIH and limited investigations under IIF, shall be reported periodically to the Department of Justice. Reports of preliminary and limited investigations shall include the identity of the subject of the investigation, the identity of the person interviewed or the person or place surveilled, and shall indicate which investigations involved a 90-day extension. FBI Headquarters shall maintain, and provide to the Department of Justice upon request, statistics on the number of preliminary investigations instituted by each field office, the number of limited investigations under IIF, the number of preliminary investigations that involved 90-day extensions under IIH, and the number of preliminary or limited investigations that resulted in the opening of a full investigation.
2. Upon opening a full domestic security investigation the FBI shall, within one week, advise the Attorney General or his designee thereof, setting forth the basis for undertaking the investigation.
3. The FBI shall report the progress of full domestic security investigations to the Department of Justice not later than 90 days after the initiation thereof, and the results at the end of each year the investigation continues.
4. Where the identity of the source of information is not disclosed in a domestic security report, an assessment of the reliability of the source shall be provided.

##### B. Dissemination

###### 1. Other Federal Authorities

The FBI may disseminate facts or information obtained during a domestic security investigation to other federal authorities when such information:

- (a) falls within their investigative jurisdiction;
- (b) may assist in preventing the use of force or violence; or

(c) may be required by statute, interagency agreement approved by the Attorney General, or Presidential directive. All such agreements and directives shall be published in the Federal Register.

2. State and Local Authorities

The FBI may disseminate facts or information relative to activities described in paragraph IB to state and local law enforcement authorities when such information:

- (a) falls within their investigative jurisdiction;
- (b) may assist in preventing the use of force or violence; or
- (c) may protect the integrity of a law enforcement agency.

3. When information relating to serious crimes not covered by paragraph IA is obtained during a domestic security investigation, the FBI shall promptly refer the information to the appropriate lawful authorities if it is within the jurisdiction of state and local agencies.

4. Nothing in these guidelines shall limit the authority of the FBI to inform any individual(s) whose safety or property is directly threatened by planned force or violence, so that they may take appropriate protective safeguards.

5. The FBI shall maintain records, as required by law, of all disseminations made outside the Department of Justice, of information obtained during domestic security investigations.

C. Retention

1. The FBI shall, in accordance with a Records Retention Plan approved by the National Archives and Records Service, within \_\_\_\_\_ years after closing domestic service investigations, destroy all information obtained during the investigation, as well as all index references thereto, or transfer all information and index references to the National Archives and Records Service.

NOTE: We are not yet certain whether empirical data exists to help define a period of retention for information gathered in preliminary or full investigations. Whatever period is



determined should take into account the retention period for other categories of information (e.g., general criminal, organized crime, and background checks); since we have not yet considered these areas we cannot fix a period for retention at this time.

**NOTE:** It may also be possible to establish a sealing procedure to preserve investigative records for an interim period prior to destruction. After being sealed, access would be permitted only under controlled conditions.

2. Information relating to activities not covered by paragraph 1A obtained during domestic security investigations, which may be maintained by the FBI under other parts of these guidelines, shall be retained in accordance with such other provisions.
3. The provisions of paragraphs one (1), and two (2) above apply to all domestic security investigations completed after the promulgation of these guidelines, and apply to investigations completed prior to promulgation of these guidelines when use of these files serves to identify them as subject to destruction or transfer to the National Archives and Records Service.
4. When an individual's request pursuant to law for access to FBI records identifies the records as being subject to destruction or transfer under paragraph one (1), the individual shall be furnished all information to which he is entitled prior to destruction or transfer.