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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder: Assassination Report (2) CFOA 28

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	Advance preparations for March 30, 1981 (partial, p44, 45).	n.d.	PT 87
2. report	same item as item 1. (partial, p48.)	n.d.	PT 87
3. report	same item as item 1. (partial, p50, 51)	n.d.	PT 87
4. report	same item as item 1. (partial, p69)	n.d.	PT 87
5. report	same item as item 1. (partial, p71)	n.d.	PT 87
			12/15/00

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
 F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
 F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
 F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR MARCH 30, 1981

Procedures for Trip Advances

Overview

Procedures for the conduct of security advances are first presented to prospective Special Agents in training courses, and are then restated and supplemented in procedures manuals prepared by each of the primary protective divisions. For the most part, these procedures are presented in checklist form, even though all of the items listed will not be applicable to every advance. The Service emphasizes to trainees that even those items applicable to a particular advance are to be interpreted with some flexibility, leaving room for the judgment of Special Agents on the scene who must respond to widely varying circumstances.

Thus, the procedures do not include such matters as how far from the President crowds should be kept, under what circumstances doors should or should not be locked or guarded, or even how many Special Agents should be assigned to a particular visit. The standards which Special Agents apply in individual cases seem to be the product of their experience in similar circumstances, modified by two other factors: the level of manpower available to the Service; and the need to reach a practical accommodation -- there being no written agreements -- with the occasionally conflicting demands of the White House advance staff for greater exposure of the President to the press and public.

Because of the unique character of each trip, and the fact that procedures are not specified in other than general terms, it is not possible to compare the execution of the Hilton trip in detail with a given and accepted set of standards.

Moreover, the circumstances of the President's trip to the Washington Hilton on March 30 did much to shape the way the Service adapted its procedures that day. The Hilton trip was uncomplicated; it was to begin and end in the White House, a highly secure facility; pass along routes with which the Service's Special Agents were well familiar; and involve a stop at a location which Presidents and other protected persons had visited many times.

In addition, the Metropolitan Police Department and the United States Park Police, which assist the Service on Presidential trips within the capital city, are familiar with the Service's procedures and are able to provide drivers, motorcycle escorts and crowd control with relatively little briefing or advance preparation.

Trips within the District of Columbia are also unusual in another respect: intelligence responsibilities are handled by the Washington field office rather than the Service's Intelligence Division. As discussed below, the procedures followed by the Washington field office for gathering intelligence information are different from those of the Intelligence Division.

Despite these exceptions, however, the broad outlines of Service procedures, applicable to all advances, are relatively clear.

The Advance Team

The advance is headed by a lead advance agent, who is ordinarily selected from the detail assigned to the protected person. Depending on the nature of the trip, the lead advance agent may be assisted by Service advance agents responsible for transportation, intelligence, technical security, and/or communications. The lead advance agent also coordinates preparations with Service Special Agents from field offices responsible for the districts to be visited by the protected person, with local law enforcement agencies, and with the protected person's staff.

On a Presidential trip, one or more Special Agents from PPD may be assigned to conduct the advance, depending upon the magnitude of the itinerary. One of the agents will be designated lead advance agent, and will coordinate all Service arrangements, as well as the support efforts of local police and security personnel. Where appropriate, a transportation agent may be designated from the Transportation Section of PPD.

Since the Hilton movement was to take place within the jurisdiction of the Washington field office, intelligence advance activities were to be performed by Special Agents from the Washington field office, rather than from the Intelligence Division. In such an instance, the lead advance agent is responsible for notifying the Intelligence Division, the operations desk of the Washington field office intelligence squad,

which then assigns a Protective Intelligence team (or teams) in support of the movement; and the Technical Security Division, which designates a team coordinator, responsible for all phases of the Technical Security Division mission.

When the lead advance agent contacts the Washington field office, he should, in addition to requesting Protective Intelligence assistance, also request the name of his Washington field office counterpart, and should ask that the Washington field office make initial contacts with the local police and fire departments that will be involved in the movement. The purpose of designating a Washington field office counterpart is to coordinate Washington field office participation in the advance, and to improve liaison and communications with local authorities.

The lead advance agent must also contact and work with other elements of government that have roles in any Presidential trip: the White House Communications Agency, the White House Physician's office, and the White House staff, particularly its advance personnel.

Execution of Procedures for Trip Advances
in Connection with March 30, 1981 Trip
to the Washington Hilton

Wednesday, March 25, and Thursday, March 26

Special Agent Ray Shaddick, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge of PPD, notified Special Agent William Green on Wednesday, March 25, that Green would be the lead advance agent for the President's March 30 visit to the Washington Hilton. The White House staff had already designated Rick Ahearn to conduct the staff advance, and had arranged a security meeting at the hotel for Friday morning. On either Wednesday or Thursday, Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon of the Transportation Section of PPD was notified by Special Agent [REDACTED] of her assignment as transportation agent for the March 30 visit.

Friday, March 27

Early Friday morning, Security Specialist [REDACTED] was informed that he would function as Technical Security Division Coordinator for the visit; Special Agent Thomas Lightsey was assigned to assist [REDACTED] in conducting the advance for training purposes. Both [REDACTED] and Lightsey

were instructed to attend the 10:30 a.m. security meeting at the Hilton.

The meeting at the Hilton was attended by ██████████ Lightsey, and Green of Secret Service; Rick Ahearn and Rocky Kounan from the White House staff; John Norton, Hilton Convention Sales Director, and Al Fury, Hilton Security Director; Victor Kamber, from the host committee sponsoring the event; and John Bixler, representing the White House Communications Agency. The participants at the meeting reviewed the itinerary proposed for the President. Green asked that the host committee provide a list of names of the union officials who would meet the President prior to his speech, and that the hotel update its employee list kept at the Washington field office. Following the meeting, those present conducted a "walk-through" of the President's itinerary.

Little or no consideration was given to the establishment of a designated press area outside the Hilton. Ahearn and Green agreed that a rope line would be placed in the vicinity of the follow-up car, as usual, but Green stated later that this was put in place primarily to control pedestrian traffic. Establishment of a designated press area would have required posting both a Secret Service Special Agent and a White House representative at the press area to control access; in addition, such a restricted press area would effectively shut down the main terrace entrance, which both Green and Ahearn felt was impractical.

Saturday, March 28

Early Saturday morning, Green prepared a list of names, to be checked by the Intelligence Division, composed of union members and those hotel employees who would be in the vicinity of the President. This function is ordinarily performed by the intelligence agents assigned to the visit. Since Green had not yet been given the names of the Washington field office agents assigned to the advance, he decided to submit the names himself, so that the results would be available as early as possible. He submitted the list that afternoon to the Intelligence Division.

Later, Green twice called the Washington field office to determine who had been assigned as his Washington field office advance counterpart. Green requested that the Special Agent on duty contact the Metropolitan Police Department, to inform them of the Hilton visit and to notify them that a security briefing

would be conducted at the hotel on Monday. The Special Agent was not successful in contacting the Metropolitan Police Department immediately; he decided not to take further action on Green's request, assuming that the Metropolitan Police Department would be notified of the visit by agents conducting the advance.

Gordon contacted the Washington field office to request that they provide one of the cars for the motorcade.

Sunday, March 29

On Sunday, Green spent the morning working on his preliminary survey report, and completed it except for the names of the Washington field office coordinator and the intelligence advance agent.

Gordon made two calls to Green during the course of the day; she obtained from Green the exact arrival and departure time for the Hilton trip, and the entrance to be used from the motorcade. Following the first of these calls, Gordon called the U.S. Park Police and the Special Operations Division of the Metropolitan Police Department to request their assistance in providing support for the motorcade. In addition, Gordon informed both departments that there would be a "run-through" of the motorcade routes the following morning.

During the afternoon, both Gordon and Green spoke with the Special Agent on duty at the Washington field office. Gordon called to ask that the Washington field office car be sent to the White House between 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. on Monday. Green called once again to obtain the name of his Washington field office counterpart, and given the name of Special Agent Paul Mobley. Green called Mobley that afternoon, and told him (1) that the Metropolitan Police Department had been contacted, (2) that name checks had been performed through the Intelligence Division, (3) which official vehicles would make up the emergency motorcade, and (4) that Mobley was to meet with Green the following morning at the Hilton.

Monday, March 30

Gordon called the U.S. Park Police that morning to determine whether any representatives of the Park Police would participate in the run-through of the motorcade routes, but was told that all available Park Police officers were needed to

assist with morning rush-hour traffic. The supervising Park Police officer stated later that it was unnecessary for his officers to run the routes with Gordon, since his officers were familiar with the designated routes and could be briefed regarding additional responsibilities at the White House. Gordon ran the routes as scheduled with a Metropolitan Police Department sergeant; after this, she called the D.C. Highways and Traffic Department, and determined that there would be no construction along the motorcade route.

Green completed the preliminary survey report between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. and turned it over to the Presidential Detail. He then called the Washington field office and was advised by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, the intelligence coordinator, that there was no intelligence information of significance to report in connection with this trip. McCarthy also provided Green with the composition of the intelligence teams. Shortly after Green spoke to McCarthy, however, illness caused the Washington field office to make reassignments which reduced the number of agents available for the intelligence teams. Green did not learn of this cancellation until the remaining intelligence team agents arrived at the Hilton for the noon security briefing.

A Special Agent from PPD gave Green the names of the Special Agents who would serve as the main security contingent at the Hilton, and promised that an additional Special Agent would be assigned later in the morning. Green determined that the name checks conducted by the Intelligence Division had revealed that none of the individuals who would obtain access to the President were "of record" with Secret Service. Before leaving for the Hilton, Green briefed shift leader Ray Shaddick on the Hilton visit.

Shortly before 11:00 a.m., Green met with Mobley at the Hilton; both men conducted a walk-through of the hotel. The security briefing began a few minutes after noon in the Adams Room of the hotel. Green met with McCarthy prior to the briefing, and was informed of the reassignment of some of the intelligence team agents. No representatives of the police or fire departments attended the briefing, contrary to usual procedure.

At the briefing, McCarthy reported that telephone calls to the Intelligence Division and the Metropolitan Police Department had revealed no adverse intelligence information. Green gave a standard security briefing, which covered the itinerary for the visit, the frequencies to be used for radio

communications, the location of the security room, the call signs to be used in connection with the visit, and the system of identification badges and pins to be used. At the conclusion of the briefing, the security contingent agents were stationed individually at their posts.

That morning, the ballroom was cleared and the Technical Security Division sweep of the ballroom began. The arrival area was swept by a canine unit, and nothing unusual was encountered. The Metropolitan Police Department detail arrived, headed by Sergeant Granger; Granger posted his own men around the VIP entrance and informed Green of the postings.

When the sweep of the ballroom was completed, Green returned inside and authorized the opening of the ballroom doors. The crowd entered through two checkpoints, manned by Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel were posted at each checkpoint to inspect briefcases and handbags; also assigned to each checkpoint was a representative of the host committee. Press personnel used a separate entrance to the ballroom; an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team was assigned to check cameras and other equipment. Green noticed some of the press people straying outside of the designated press area; he spoke to Ahearn, who had the situation corrected. Green then returned to the VIP entrance to await the arrival of the President.

At the White House, Gordon had supervised the coordination of the Presidential motorcade. A Park Police officer had been instructed to bring a portable Park Police radio for use in one of the leading motorcade cars, but had forgotten it; therefore, the motorcade had no radio communication with the U.S. Park Police motorcycle officers. Gordon briefed the motorcade participants, and distributed copies of the Transportation Survey.

The motorcade left the White House at 1:45 p.m.; the Metropolitan Police Department maintained intersection control along the route. On the way to the Hilton, Shaddick called Green for a situation report. Green noted about seven press people and about ten spectators at the rope line. He was aware of no difficulties, and advised the motorcade that the arrival area was clear.

A rope line blocking pedestrian traffic had been positioned approximately 35-40 feet from the VIP entrance. The spectators located behind it were not screened by Secret Service, since the area had not been designated a "press area".

Metropolitan Police Department officers controlled traffic on "T" Street. When the motorcade arrived at the Hilton, the Metropolitan Police Department detail assigned to the arrival were at their designated posts at the rope line and along the concrete island separating the driveway from "T" Street. The limousine moved to a point directly outside the VIP entrance; the President remained in the limousine until his Secret Service detail was in position; he then left the limousine, met Ahearn at the door, and was escorted inside the hotel. The arrival was uneventful.

After the President had entered the Hilton, Gordon instructed the motorcade drivers to reposition the limousine and the follow-up car, so that the limousine was parked at an angle to the curb, with the front pointed through the gap on the concrete island and facing directly onto the street. Placing the limousine in this position required the President to walk 25-30 feet from the VIP entrance, bringing him to within 15-20 feet of the assembled spectators. This repositioning was standard procedure for a Hilton visit. The follow-up car was parked a few feet behind the limousine, under the canopy that served the main Terrace entrance to the hotel. Four motorcade vehicles were parked behind the follow-up car, and the other cars and motorcycles were parked on "T" Street, ahead of the path to be taken by the limousine during its scheduled departure.

While the President spoke, Special Agents Unrue and Fabel sat in the follow-up car, while the military personnel driving the other motorcade vehicles gathered in another of the follow-up vehicles. Two Metropolitan Police Department officers moved the restraining rope a few feet farther away from the VIP entrance at the order of Sergeant Granger. While they were parked, some of the motorcade drivers noted the erratic behavior of one individual in the crowd. The Secret Service Special Agents were familiar with him, had interviewed him on several occasions, and had determined that he was not dangerous to the President. News accounts later suggested, incorrectly, that this individual was John W. Hinckley, the man later accused of the shooting. Special Agent Dennis McCarthy spoke with the individual and concluded that he was not a danger to the President.

At 2:20 p.m., Green radioed from inside the hotel that the President was finishing his speech and would be departing shortly. Following that transmission, the motorcade drivers returned to their vehicles. Special Agent Mobley left the ballroom and surveyed the departure area; he saw nothing out of

the ordinary. One security car prepared to leave, since its assignment was to precede the rest of the motorcade by a few minutes. The military drivers checked their assignments with each other and returned to their vehicles. The Metropolitan Police Department officers were stationed at their posts; Officers Swain and Delahanty were stationed along the rope line, and Sergeant Granger was between the two officers and the path to be taken by the President. The motorcade vehicles started their engines to prepare for departure; the advance security car moved away from the Hilton as the vanguard of the Presidential party began to exit through the VIP entrance. The counter- snipers were on duty, although perhaps not exactly in their usual positions. Gordon had moved to another of the advance vehicles and was preparing to get inside as the Presidential party began its departure. Up to this point, the visit had been almost entirely routine.

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Recommendations

1. The advance staff of the White House and the senior managers of the Secret Service should commit whatever time and resources are required to develop a single document, on which both groups can agree, in which they detail the balance that is to be struck among the security, scheduling, and public exposure requirements of the President. The document should be updated, at least annually, and should include specific information concerning such items as:

- a. The distances between the public and the President during his entrance and exit from areas with controlled access;
- b. The advisability of permitting unscreened members of the public to have advance notice of an opportunity for gaining proximity to the President;
- c. The circumstances in which the President will make himself available for questions from the press;
- d. The amount of information regarding Presidential visits to be released to the public;
- e. The advisability of locating the press in the area of motorcade vehicles;
- f. Procedures for screening, electronically or otherwise, members of the public who can get close enough to the President to threaten his security;
- g. The structure and placement of PPD formations around the President and arrangements with the

White House staff to avoid interference with those formations.

2. The Washington field office and the protective divisions of the Secret Service should commit whatever time and resources are required to develop detailed procedures for the conduct of advances in the Washington, D.C. area. The number of advances conducted in the Washington area, the routine and repetitive quality of these advances, and other distinguishing characteristics of Secret Service operations in the Washington, D.C., area should be taken into account in developing these procedures. These procedures should provide for the earliest possible notification to the Washington field office of proposed trips, preferably simultaneously with the notification given to the lead advance agent by the protective divisions, and a statement of the responsibilities of each member of the Washington field office advance team. In addition, the Washington field office should conduct a review of intelligence advance procedures in the Washington, D.C. area, assisted by the Intelligence Division; this review should address the categories of advance intelligence data to be collected by the Washington field office, as well as the procedures by which it is to be collected.

PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE DETAIL

Procedures

Presidential Protective Division Structure

The Presidential Protective Division is headed by a Special Agent in Charge, Jerry Parr, and a Deputy Special Agent in Charge, Robert DeProspero. The Division is organized into three major subdivisions, each headed by an Assistant Special Agent in Charge: (1) Support and Logistics; (2) Operations; and (3) Training and Special Projects. The Operations subdivision is further broken down into three separate details for protecting the President, the First Lady and immediate family members, and a transportation section.

The Presidential Detail is responsible for protecting the President at all times. The detail is composed of three shifts, each headed by a Shift Leader commonly known as an Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge. Normally when the President leaves the White House, he is accompanied by a working shift consisting of Special Agents assigned to his protective detail, an Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge of the Presidential Protective Division, and either the Special Agent in Charge or the Deputy Special Agent in Charge.

The Special Agents on the Presidential detail tend to be the more experienced, better qualified Special Agents. Typically, these Special Agents have had three to five years experience in the field, where each has had experience on various protective assignments (e.g., intelligence, post standing, and advance). The Special Agents usually remain in the Presidential Protective Division for three to four years.

Training

All Special Agents, when first employed, receive seven to eight weeks of basic law enforcement training at Treasury's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. After completing this basic training, each Special Agent completes specialized classroom training conducted by Secret Service's Office of Training in Washington, D.C.

In this basic classroom instruction the Special Agents are taught the Secret Service theory of perimeter protection, which has remained basically unchanged since the Kennedy assassination. The working shift moves with the President, entering and leaving a secure area established by Secret Service advance agents and local law enforcement officers. The Special Agents learn that during an entrance/exit situation between secure locations (e.g., the armored limousine to the holding room), the working shift Special Agents must leave their vehicle, move to predesignated positions around the President's limousine and quickly assess whether there is a danger to the President if he leaves the limousine. This, of course, is in addition to other security measures and observation being carried out by the Secret Service and local police.

If no danger is detected, the President leaves the car and the working shift Special Agents fall into protective formation around him. Circumstances such as crowd proximity and density dictate the formation that the working shift employs. Each formation has its own peculiar strengths and weaknesses. During this movement, other protective coverage is provided by Special Agents and law enforcement officers, who are not members of the working shift.

If shots are fired, Special Agents in the immediate area of the President are taught that they should remain in an upright position, each Special Agent making himself as large a target as possible.

Supplementing classroom instruction are training exercises conducted at the Secret Service's facility at Beltsville, Maryland. These exercises are designed to condition a Special Agent's response to an attack on the President. The Special Agents are also drilled on their reactions to medical emergencies such as a heart attack. The Special Agents' reactions are videotaped and later reviewed with instructors in a classroom setting.

Special Agents are taught in the classroom, in practical training, and on the job, that the safety of the protected person is the primary concern of any protective operation. Whenever shots are fired in the vicinity of a protected person, Special Agents are to interpose themselves between the protected person and the source of the shots, and are to see to his safety and evacuation before attempting to interdict the assailant or prevent the assailant's escape.

Execution on March 31, 1980, of Procedures
Established for Presidential Protective Detail

Trip to the Hilton

At 1:45 p.m. on March 30, 1981, President Reagan left the White House and went to the South Grounds where the Presidential limousine was waiting to take him to the Washington Hilton Hotel. Accompanying the President in his limousine were Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan and Special Agent in Charge Jerry Parr.

The Presidential motorcade departed the White House, proceeded north on 17th Street, veered left onto Connecticut Avenue, and proceeded directly to the Hilton where it arrived without incident at approximately 1:50 p.m. During the approximately four-minute ride, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Shaddick radioed lead advance agent Green at the hotel for a situation report. Green indicated that there appeared to be no problem. On arriving at the Hilton, the working shift Special Agents left their vehicles, and proceeded to their preassigned positions around the Presidential limousine, surveying the surrounding crowd for any signs of trouble. Parr moved to the right rear door where he awaited the President. They saw no sign of danger.

The President then got out of the limousine, which was parked directly opposite the VIP entrance -- a distance of ten to fifteen feet. He was accompanied on his short walk into the hotel by the working shift Special Agents. Inside the hotel, the President was accompanied to the holding room where he met briefly with ranking members of the Building and Construction Trades Union. After leaving the holding room, the President delivered a twenty-minute speech to the 4,000 members of the Union in the main ballroom. During the speech, the Special Agents of the Presidential detail were positioned in the ballroom, scanning the crowd for possible trouble.

Shooting Incident

At the conclusion of his speech, the President retraced his steps of half an hour earlier and headed outside to the motorcade for the return trip to the White House. Parr and Shaddick remained just behind the President as he stepped through the doors to leave the hotel. In front of the President were members of his staff and several Secret Service

Special Agents -- the lead advance agent, the transportation advance agent, the intelligence advance agents, and the Special Agents of the working shift.

Because there were a number of members of the press congregated between the Presidential limousine and the follow-up car, one Special Agent walked directly to this area and attempted to clear these persons from between the parked cars before moving to his preassigned position at the limousine. Other working shift agents moved to their preassigned positions around the limousine and scanned the crowds across "T" Street and at the hotel for possible trouble.

Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the right rear door of the limousine for the President. Having been repositioned for the departure, the limousine was now parked approximately 25 feet from the hotel entrance, facing the opening onto "T" Street at an angle toward Connecticut Avenue.

Parr and Shaddick stayed close to the President, although at one point Shaddick was forced to move around a White House staff member to maintain his position. The President, with Parr behind him and slightly to his right and Shaddick directly to the President's right and slightly in front of Parr, moved directly toward the waiting limousine. They were closely accompanied by Presidential aides Fischer and Deaver, Press Secretary Brady, and Military Aide Muratti.

Special Agent Green and Metropolitan Police Department Officers Delahanty, Swain and Sergeant Granger, all of whom were standing at the line, turned to see whether the President had gotten into the limousine.

At approximately 2:27 p.m., as someone in the crowd was shouting "Mr. President," six shots were fired in the direction of the President by an assailant in the crowd behind the rope line. All six shots took less than two seconds.

At the sound of the first shot, Parr pushed the President the remaining three feet into the limousine, dove in on top of him and ordered the driver, Special Agent Thomas Drew Unrue, to leave the scene. The President was hit by one of the six shots, the bullet apparently ricocheting off the side of the limousine, passing through the space between the door and the car body, and hitting him at a point under his left arm.

Special Agent Tim McCarthy turned in the direction of the shots, spread his arms and legs to protect the President and

was hit in the abdomen. Of the other four shots, one hit Officer Delahanty in the back of the neck, one struck Press Secretary Brady in the head, another hit the limousine, and another struck a building across the street.

Shaddick helped push the President and Parr into the limousine and slammed the door. He then jumped into the follow-up car and radioed the Presidential Protective Division's command post in the White House, advising that:

" . . . we've had shots fired, shots fired, there are some injuries"

No Secret Service Special Agent on the scene saw the assailant draw or otherwise display his weapon prior to the actual shots. Once the shots were fired, a number of Special Agents immediately drew their weapons, but seeing the subject surrounded, withheld fire. The films of the shooting show that as the President was being pushed into the limousine by Parr, the first law enforcement officer to reach the location of the shots was Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, who ran from his position near the curb behind the President's limousine and leaped onto the suspected assailant, grabbing him by the head and wrist.

McCarthy, with the assistance of other Secret Service Special Agents and Metropolitan Police Department officers, quickly subdued and handcuffed the suspect. A second Secret Service Special Agent raised his weapon, was unable to shoot safely, and ran to the scene from across the sidewalk; a third Special Agent ran to the suspect from a position near the left front fender of the follow-up car; a fourth Special Agent got to the suspect from a point near the rope line just behind D.V. McCarthy; and a fifth Special Agent moved to the suspect from the other side of the Presidential limousine.

Special Agent Wanko of the working shift looked in the direction of the gunfire, did not see the gun or the assailant, and started for the crowd behind the ropeline. He covered the limousine from the rear with an Uzi submachine gun as it departed. He then moved to the wall between the entrance and the rope line where he assumed a position facing the crowd. He tried to ascertain whether any other assailants were involved.

Other Special Agents helped safeguard the limousine's departure, neutralize the assailant, secure the incident scene, and get medical assistance. Although several weapons were drawn, no shots were fired by agents or police.

The Transportation agent, Mary Ann Gordon, retreated from her assigned car toward the President's limousine but got into another motorcade car when she saw that the President was already in the limousine. That car waited momentarily for the President's physician and then departed, pulling in behind the President's limousine.

Transportation of the President to
George Washington University Hospital

Within approximately ten seconds of the first shot the President's limousine pulled away from the curb and turned onto "T" Street. It passed another motorcade car (which had stalled going up the hill) and some of the motorcycles parked on "T" Street and turned left onto Connecticut Avenue. The follow-up car left the scene approximately thirteen seconds after the President's limousine. The remainder of the motorcade, delayed because of the crowd among the vehicles, followed.

Meanwhile, in the back seat of the President's limousine the President noticed a sharp pain in his chest and thought that he had broken a rib. Parr assisted the President to a seated position in the right rear seat. Parr asked the President whether he was all right, and the President replied that he was. Parr then quickly examined the President by running his hands inside the President's coat and found no sign of injury. He then examined the back of the President's coat and once again found no sign of injury. At this point, Parr ordered Unrue back to the White House. Parr advised the detail: "[The President] is o.k., follow-up. [The President] is o.k." Shaddick replied: "You want to go to the hospital or back to the White House?" Parr responded "We're going right, we're going to [the White House]." Shaddick acknowledged this transmission.

Approximately thirty seconds after Parr's initial examination, the President said that he was having trouble breathing. The President thought that he might have punctured a lung. Parr then noticed that the President had blood in his mouth, and ordered driver Unrue to go to George Washington University Hospital (the motorcade was then proceeding down Connecticut Avenue).

Unrue radioed Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon and told her: "We want to go to the emergency room of George Washington." After Gordon acknowledged this transmission, Unrue added: "Go to George Washington FAST." Parr followed this with a trans-

mission to Shaddick asking if Shaddick knew that they were going to George Washington. After Shaddick acknowledged this, Parr added: "Get an ambulance - I mean get - ah - stretcher out there." Parr indicated that he did not broadcast that the President was hurt because he did not want everyone who monitors that frequency to know of the President's injury.

Shaddick then asked the Service's White House Command Post if it had copied Parr's last transmission that the motorcade was going to George Washington University Hospital. The Command Post replied that it had and that the call to the hospital had already been made. The Command Post told the hospital that the President was enroute and that there were injuries, but did not say that the President was injured or that a stretcher should be available.

Special Agent Gordon attempted to notify the police vehicles that the motorcade was going to the hospital, but was unable to do so because of heavy radio traffic on the police frequency. Therefore, in order to keep a car in front of the President's limousine, Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon ordered the car in which she was riding to pass the President's limousine. When the motorcade turned onto Pennsylvania Avenue, the leading car and the four motorcycles failed to make the turn; the other advance cars then led the motorcade to the hospital.

Arrival at the Hospital

After the Command Post notification, the hospital emergency room announced over its loudspeaker that the President was enroute to the hospital. On hearing this announcement, various hospital medical, administrative and security personnel reported to the emergency room.

The President's limousine reached the hospital at approximately 2:30 p.m., about three minutes after the shots were fired. When the President's limousine pulled up at the hospital emergency room entrance, there were no stretchers or medical personnel present.

Secret Service Assistant Director for Administration, Fred White, who was in the emergency room on a personal matter, heard the announcement, went outside, directed that the emergency room doors be locked open and, when the motorcade arrived, directed where the limousine should park. The President got out of the car and started to walk into the emergency room. He was closely preceded by Special Agent McIntosh with Parr to

the President's right and Shaddick to his left. Inside the emergency room, the President's knees began to buckle, and he was carried by Parr, Shaddick, and two paramedics the remainder of the distance to Trauma Bay Number 5. At this point, the President appeared to be in the initial stages of shock.

In the trauma bay, medical personnel immediately started to administer standard emergency treatment. They removed the President's clothes, placed him on oxygen, started him on an intravenous solution, and took blood to determine the type. One of the medical staff asked Parr, who had remained with the President, what was the President's blood type. Parr responded correctly that it was O-positive.

It was after the President's clothes had been removed that the medical staff first realized that the President had been shot. Dr. Giordano, with the assistance of other medical personnel, inserted a tube into the President's chest and drained 1300 cc of blood. Within ten minutes of arrival the President was started on a transfusion of universal donor (O negative) blood. The President remained conscious during this time.

Dr. Giordano later stated that there was no medical history file on President Reagan (with blood types, etc.) available in the emergency room. While he did not deem this absence to be critical to the treatment of the President, he nevertheless believes that the President's medical file should be available in the emergency room, and that the emergency room staff should be familiar with it. Dr. Giordano further stated that because the President received prompt medical treatment in a fully equipped trauma center the chances that the President's injuries were life threatening were substantially minimized. Even so, the President's condition was much more serious than initially reported.

The President's personal physician, as well as Dr. Giordano and various Secret Service officials, believe that the chances of the President surviving a medical emergency can be enhanced by the presence of a highly skilled, paramedic team that moves with the protective motorcade. The doctors supported the paramedic team concept even though they believe that, in the March 30 shooting incident, paramedics would probably not have found time to contribute to the President's survival. His quick evacuation to a fully equipped and staffed trauma unit was the key element.

At some time after 3:00 p.m., the President was moved from the emergency room to the operating room where Dr. Giordano

initially performed a "peritoneal lavage" to determine whether there was any internal bleeding in the abdomen. The results were negative.

Dr. Benjamin Aaron headed the surgical team which treated the President's chest wound and, after considerable exploration, removed a bullet lodged in the President's left lung. The bullet was removed at approximately 5:45 p.m. Surgery was completed and the President moved to the recovery room at approximately 6:45 p.m.

At approximately 7:00 p.m., after the President was out of surgery, Secret Service Special Agents at the hospital received information that Hinckley had purchased explosive .22 caliber ammunition, with the brand-name "Devastator", at the same time he had purchased the weapon allegedly used in the assault on the President. This information was not given to the physicians treating the President, Special Agent McCarthy or Press Secretary Brady, who was still in surgery, or to the physicians treating Officer Delahanty at Washington Hospital Center.

The President remained in the recovery room the rest of the night. He was moved from there to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) early the next morning.

Conclusions

1. The Secret Service procedures in place on March 30, 1981, for the movement of the President from the hotel to the Presidential limousine by the Presidential Protective Detail were followed by the Detail's Special Agents.
2. Once shots were fired, the Special Agents on the scene reacted, as trained, to cover and evacuate the President, neutralize the assailant, and determine whether multiple assailants were involved. Four of the Special Agents performed in an exemplary manner: Special Agent in Charge Jerry Parr in reacting precisely as trained to cover and evacuate the President by pushing him into the limousine; Assistant to the Special Agent Charge Ray Shaddick in pushing both Parr and the President into the limousine; Special Agent Timothy McCarthy in placing himself between the assailant and the President; and Special Agent D.V. McCarthy in quickly jumping onto the assailant and, with the help of others, subduing him.
3. During the evacuation of the President to the hospital there were a number of minor incidents such as the initial con-

fusion with motorcade vehicles leaving the hotel, and the failure to notify the hospital emergency room that the President was injured. These incidents did not affect the evacuation of the President in this case but could have presented serious problems in less fortuitous circumstances.

4. The chances of the President surviving a medical emergency would be enhanced by the presence of a highly skilled, paramedic team that moves with the protective motorcade.

Recommendations

1. Based on their exemplary performance immediately following the shots at the hotel, Special Agents Jerry Parr, Ray Shaddick, Tim McCarthy and D.V. McCarthy should receive special recognition and an appropriate monetary award.

2. A fully trained paramedic team should be regularly included in the Presidential motorcade.

SECURITY AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

Procedures

The Secret Service Manual provides that the detail leader is responsible for the protection of the President during an emergency. It is the practice of the Secret Service, however, that in the event of an emergency the senior member of the working shift remains with the President, and the responsibility for establishing contingency plans is delegated to the next most senior member of the shift on the scene. This Special Agent must assess the situation, establish security perimeters, request extra Special Agents (if needed), plan for any movement of the President, and establish lines of communication.

There were no contingency plans for security at George Washington University Hospital. In July 1980 the Secret Service's Washington field office had surveyed George Washington University Hospital's emergency room and surgical capabilities, but security arrangements, such as the number of Special Agents needed to provide security in the event of an emergency, the placement of post standers, or the location of a command post, were not covered because Secret Service hospital survey procedures do not call for such information. Basic security arrangements for the President at the hospital commenced with his arrival. The hospital did maintain its own "hospital disaster plan" which was activated by the Hospital Administrator; the plan provided for increased hospital security through limiting access.

Execution of Procedures

Manpower

When the President arrived at the hospital, he was being protected by the Special Agents who had accompanied him from the Hilton. The senior agent, Special Agent in Charge Parr, followed the President into the trauma bay of the emergency room. Under Secret Service procedures, authority for establishing security for the President was transferred without formal delegation at this point from Parr to Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Shaddick. The remaining agents attempted to secure the emergency room. On arrival at the hos-

pital, Shaddick had instructed the follow-up driver, -Special Agent Dennis Fabel, to radio the White House Command Post for more manpower. Fabel had radioed and asked: "Would you contact Washington field office or some other division and get some additional people sent to this location [hospital]?"

With the assistance of members of the hospital administration, the Special Agents present then began to establish check points at the entrance to the emergency room, excluding all persons except those identified as necessary medical personnel.

Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon had arrived with the motorcade and remained outside the emergency room entrance attempting to set up security around the hospital. As the press and public began to gather, she asked for the assistance of the Metropolitan Police Department and Park Police officers on the scene to establish crowd control and keep people clear of the area.

Shortly after the President entered the emergency room, Special Agents from the Presidential Detail's 4:00 p.m.-to-midnight working shift arrived at the hospital. They had been driving to work at the time of the shooting and were ordered to report to the hospital by the White House Command Post. They arrived approximately five to ten minutes after the President and were assigned by Shaddick to assist in securing the emergency room, locating a command post, establishing communications, and preparing for the President's expected move to the operating room and his later move to the Intensive Care Unit.

Within half an hour after the shooting a Special Agent from the Technical Security Division arrived at the hospital and conducted a technical security check of the operating room. He remained throughout the evening and conducted other checks of the recovery room and Intensive Care Unit. There were no technical security checks of the emergency room.

While Shaddick was coordinating the security in the immediate proximity of the President, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Pat Miller arrived from the Washington field office. Without being assigned the task, Miller assumed responsibility for coordinating the security arrangements in the emergency room and the operating room. At about 5:00 p.m., Miller concluded that considerably more Special Agents would be needed to stand post during the President's movements after he left surgery. Miller attempted to telephone the Washington field office but was unable to get through. He then called

Secret Service headquarters instead and asked for additional Special Agents, who reported to the hospital between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m..

Two officers from the Service's Uniformed Division, who arrived at the hospital at approximately 3:00 p.m., were the first people from that Division on the scene. After evaluating the situation, they requested additional personnel, and by about 3:30 p.m., several other officers had arrived at the hospital. In the following hour, Uniformed Division strength was increased and the officers who arrived relieved Metropolitan Police Department officers at posts inside the hospital; the Metropolitan Police Department officers then moved to points outside the hospital. Later that evening, canine and counter-sniper teams also reported to the hospital. The Uniformed Division continued to maintain a sizeable contingent of officers at the hospital throughout the remainder of the President's stay.

When Deputy Special Agent in Charge DeProspero and Assistant Director (Protective Operations) Simpson arrived around 3:30 p.m., there were Special Agents posted at the door to the operating room, Special Agents guarding the hall to the operating room and Special Agents in the operating room with the President. In addition, checkpoints had been established at the entrances into the hospital, and at the entrances into the operating room area. Simpson and DeProspero spoke with Miller and concluded that security arrangements at the hospital were sufficient.

After surgery on the President was completed, he was moved to the recovery room. At this point there were security posts both inside and outside the President's room, and the requisite security perimeters were in place at the hospital. A technical search of the recovery room had been conducted and preparations initiated for the President's anticipated move to the Intensive Care Unit. This level of security was continued throughout the President's stay at the hospital.

Communications

George Washington University Hospital, even though it was the primary emergency hospital for trips by the President in the downtown Washington area, was not considered by the White House Communications Agency to be the primary hospital for medical treatment of the President in the Washington area. A military hospital in the area served this role, and as a

result there were only limited communication capabilities in place at George Washington for immediate use by the White House Communications Agency and the Secret Service.

Within five minutes of the President's arrival the White House Communications Agency began to set up communications. Shortly thereafter, White House Communications Agency portable communications equipment arrived. The room in which the equipment was installed, Room 2500, became the Secret Service Command Post, from which drop lines were installed and open lines were established with the Intelligence Squad duty desk at the Washington field office. Within an hour to an hour and one-half after the President's arrival, the Command Post was fully operational. It served as a communications and security coordination center at the hospital for the duration of the President's stay.

Conclusions

1. The Secret Service has procedures in place for conducting surveys of the adequacy and accessibility of medical care for the President at local hospitals in the event of an emergency. Those procedures appear to have been properly followed, and a Hospital Protective Survey Check List had been prepared for George Washington University Hospital.

2. The Special Agents arriving at the hospital with the President had no overall assessment of the protective manpower needs at the hospital. Such an assessment was not included in the hospital survey, which in any event did not arrive at the hospital until after the initial crisis had passed.

3. While with the benefit of hindsight it is clear that security at the hospital was adequate, there is some question whether the Service should have procedures to assure that an adequate level of personnel is available to protect the President in the immediate aftermath of an attempted assassination -- at least until it is known whether that attempt was part of a larger threat.

4. Hospital personnel have concluded that, although it was not critical to the treatment of the President in this case, it would be helpful in the future if the President's medical file were to be available in the hospital emergency room.

Recommendations

1. Hospital protective surveys should include a segment assessing the security needs at any hospital for which emergency use is contemplated, including manpower, posts, a room designated as a command post and all access routes to the emergency room, operating room, recovery room and intensive care unit; this survey should be placed in the President's limousine.

2. A copy of the President's medical history (including blood type) should be carried with the hospital survey in the President's limousine, so that it can be made promptly available to hospital emergency room staffs.

HILTON HOTEL AFTERMATH

Procedures

Secret Service Special Agents are instructed that they should not assist individuals injured during an assault on a protected person until the protected person has been evacuated from the scene or the scene has been secured. In addition, they learn that the scene of the assault should be secured as soon as possible by agents not directly involved in the physical safeguarding of the protected person.

The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over assassination attempts (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1751). The Secret Service and the FBI have entered into an agreement delineating the responsibilities of each agency in the event of an assassination of, or an assassination attempt on, a protected person, including the President. The agreement provides that it is the responsibility of the Secret Service to assume and maintain control of the situation (exercise an "interim federal presence") until the Director of the Secret Service and the Director of the FBI or their respective designees have arranged a logical and coordinated transition of control of an investigation. The agreement further provides that the FBI should be given immediate access to all parts of the investigation by the Secret Service. Responsibility for working with the FBI, to determine when to transfer control of an investigation to the FBI, is assigned to the Assistant Director, Office of Investigations.

In addition to the agreement with the FBI, each Secret Service Special Agent has received basic law-enforcement training and has normally had on-the-job experience with the procedures for preserving a crime scene and evidence and for establishing the chain of custody of the evidence.

Execution of Procedures

From the shooting, the evacuation of the President took less than ten seconds. Thereafter, attention turned to crowd control and dealing with the assailant.

As the suspect was being subdued by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, Special Agent Wanko, a member of the Presidential detail who had remained on the scene, readied his submachine

gun and surveyed the crowd for other possible assailants. He ultimately moved to a position against the wall of the hotel where he continued to survey the area. He also directed the crowd to move back.

At this point, members of the public trained in emergency medical treatment and other Special Agents in the vicinity moved to render assistance to Press Secretary Brady, Special Agent Tim McCarthy and Metropolitan Police Department Officer Thomas Delahanty.

Special Agent William Green, the lead advance agent, was near Officer Delahanty at the rope line when he heard the shots. He moved away from the rope line and toward the departing Presidential limousine, radioing that there had been an attack on the President. After the limousine left, he attempted to radio the emergency ambulance which was pre-positioned on Connecticut Avenue above the hotel. The ambulance did not respond, so Green moved up the hill and motioned for the ambulance to come to the area of the shooting.

The Special Agents and police officers in the area of the wounded effectively kept the crowd back. Within a few minutes of the shooting, Special Agent Tim McCarthy and Press Secretary Brady were loaded into the first two ambulances in the scene and Officer Delahanty was loaded into the third. Secret Service Special Agents got into the ambulances with Special Agent McCarthy and Press Secretary Brady. They accompanied them to the George Washington University Hospital and there assisted with hospital security.

A number of Special Agents and police officers tried to control the crowd and preserve the crime scene until the FBI arrived. Special Agent Tom Lightsey picked up the .22 caliber weapon used by the assailant with his handcuffs, was later advised of the FBI's assumption of jurisdiction by the Assistant Director for Investigations, and turned the weapon over to the FBI. Eight officers from the Uniformed Division, responding to a radio transmission requesting assistance, arrived within seven minutes of the request and assisted in preserving the integrity of the crime scene.

In the Security Room monitoring the radios was Special Agent [REDACTED]. After hearing that the crime scene was under control, [REDACTED] ordered the post standers to report to the Hilton briefing room for interviews with the FBI. [REDACTED] also called the Washington field office and asked for case agents, required whenever there is a shooting incident, to

report to the scene. Shortly after 2:30 p.m., two Special Agents from the Washington field office were dispatched to the hotel to work with the FBI.

By 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., the FBI had interviewed most of the post standers, who were then told that they could return to their respective offices. Most returned to the Washington field office and remained there working the telephones or were ordered home with instructions to rest and return with a later shift.

Movement of the Suspect

Procedures

Secret Service Special Agents are instructed that steps should be taken to protect those in custody from physical harm and from overexposure to news reporters and photographers. Any suspects taken into custody are to be informed immediately of their rights as outlined in the Miranda decision of the Supreme Court.

Execution

After being subdued by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, the suspect, later identified as John Warnock Hinckley, Jr., was transported to the Metropolitan Police Department Central Cell Block. After the ride, Hinckley was searched for weapons. On arrival, McCarthy covered the subject as he entered the cell block; another Special Agent, Carlton Spriggs, searched Hinckley, and McCarthy informed him of his rights. Hinckley was placed in a cell, and McCarthy stayed at the entrance.

Spriggs took Hinckley's belongings and called the Washington field office to inform the Secret Service of their contents. The Washington field office then assigned a response team of two Special Agents from the Protective Intelligence Squad and they, plus a Special Agent from the Command Post, went to the Central Cell Block. Secret Service Special Agents who were present during questioning of the subject by Metropolitan Police Department homicide detectives reported pertinent information (name, date of birth, etc.) back to the Washington field office.

Hinckley was transferred to the FBI Washington field

office at Buzzard's Point by Secret Service armored car. On arrival at the FBI Washington field office, Hinckley was interviewed by FBI agents with Secret Service Special Agents present. Information from the interview was forwarded to the Secret Service Washington field office and from there to the Intelligence Division.

Intelligence information was also coming from a variety of other sources. The State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of Special Investigations (Department of Defense), the CIA and the Capitol Police, all reported that they had no record of Hinckley. ATF called to offer its services and provided information on the weapon used within one-half hour after receiving the correct serial numbers, as is further explained below.

At about 5:00 p.m., Special Agent [REDACTED], the Secret Service liaison to the FBI, advised the Intelligence Division's Command/Control Center that the FBI had a record of Hinckley's arrest at the Nashville Airport on October 9, 1980. Later, at about 9:00 p.m., the FBI confirmed this information.

Secret Service personnel transported Hinckley during the evening of March 30 from the FBI Washington field office to the Federal Courthouse using an armored car. Later that night he was again moved with the aid of Secret Service personnel to the Quantico Marine base.

Search of the Park Central Hotel

Special Agent Spriggs determined from Hinckley's belongings that he was registered in Room 312 at the Park Central Hotel. Spriggs relayed this information to the Washington field office, and two Special Agents were assigned there. At about 5:45 p.m., a search warrant was requested by FBI agents, and was signed by a Magistrate at 9:45 p.m. Approximately ten minutes thereafter, the search of Room 312 began. The luggage was screened for explosives, and the room was dusted for fingerprints. Among the items of interest in the room was the newspaper listing of the President's schedule (time and location) for Monday, March 30, 1981. At approximately 4:15 a.m. the next morning the search was completed.

Conclusions

1. The Service's agreement with the FBI for the preservation of an "interim federal presence" at the Hilton Hotel did not require that the post standers remain at the hotel for interviews with FBI agents. What the agreement did require was the presence of a Secret Service intelligence team, who were in turn authorized to use available personnel. The decision to keep the post standers at the hotel was questionable under circumstances in which the dimensions of the danger to the President -- who was then in the hospital -- were still largely unknown. A determination should have been made at headquarters to transfer these Special Agents to the hospital.

2. The control, protection and transportation of the suspected assailant to the Metropolitan Police Department proceeded in accordance with Secret Service procedures.

3. Available information suggests that the accused in this case was materially aided in his attempt on the life of the President by a newspaper publication of the daily itinerary of the President.

Recommendations

1. The agent coordinating communications at the scene of any assassination attempt should be responsible for obtaining instructions from Secret Service headquarters as to the subsequent assignment of the agents remaining at the site. These agents should be made available to protect the President at another location, if advisable, before they are assigned to any other duties.

2. Consideration should be given to withholding from publication information concerning the times and locations of the President's public activities outside the White House.

PROTECTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Procedures for Protection of the Vice President

There were apparently no written procedures in place for automatically increasing the protection of the Vice President in the event of an assassination attempt on the President.

Secret Service Protection of the Vice President On March 30, 1981

The Vice President was enroute to Austin, Texas, by airplane when he learned that the President had been shot. Although it is unclear whether other landing sites were considered, the Vice President decided to land in Austin for refueling, and did so for refueling at 2:25 p.m., C.S.T. It is unclear whether the Service made a special check to determine whether trouble might be anticipated at this stop, which had been scheduled well in advance. In any event, there is some question as to the security of the communications facilities on the Vice President's plane; any transmission of the decision to land in Austin could have been overheard by members of the public.

In Austin, the Vice President did not leave the plane. Special Agents remained on the aircraft with the Vice President, guarding the door with automatic weapons. Other Special Agents were posted outside the plane. The plane departed Austin at 3:10 p.m., C.S.T.

The Washington field office ordered protective intelligence agents who were at Andrews Air Force Base for the arrival of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands to remain there pending the arrival of the Vice President. In addition, several other Special Agents were assigned by the Washington field office to assist in security arrangements at Andrews Air Force Base.

The Vice President landed at Andrews at 6:25 p.m., E.S.T., and the plane taxied directly into a hangar adjacent to that housing Air Force One. The Vice President was then flown by helicopter to the Naval Observatory grounds where he landed at 6:41 p.m. At the Naval Observatory, he was transferred to an armored limousine and escorted by an augmented motorcade to the

White House (after the attempt on President Reagan's life, the Vice President received additional Secret Service protection).

Upon arrival at the White House, the Vice President went directly to the Situation Room. He later went to the Press Room and made a short statement. About 9:50 p.m., the Vice President returned from the White House to his residence at the Naval Observatory grounds.

Conclusion

The protective detail with the Vice President at the time of the shooting responded with good judgment to his protective needs. Nevertheless, the written procedures for responding to an assassination attempt on the President do not provide a very specific system for upgrading protection for the Vice President or other successors to the Presidency. Although the President already has the authority to order such protection, given the circumstances in which a decision may be required, statutory authority for the Secretary of the Treasury may be appropriate.

Recommendations

1. The Secret Service should review and formalize its unwritten procedures for an immediate increase in protection for the Vice President and other successors to the Presidency in the event of an attempted assassination of the President.
2. The security of communications with the Vice President's traveling party should be enhanced.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING THE SECRET SERVICE

General Conclusions

1. As a whole, the United States Secret Service performs its protection role with great effectiveness and professionalism. Moreover, from the Director down through each of the agents interviewed, the Service was entirely cooperative and forthcoming with what was in effect the most searching management review it has undergone since the Warren Commission.

2. Over the last few years there has been an increase in the number of individuals the Secret Service is charged by law with protecting, and a decrease in the number of Special Agent and Uniformed Division personnel the Service has to discharge those responsibilities. Even after offsetting the decreases against an increase in support personnel, the Secret Service still puts its effective loss in strength since 1977 at 280 positions, with about a 15 percent overall decline in the Special Agent and Uniformed Division categories.

General Recommendations

1. In its 1964 report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the Warren Commission recommended improvements in the Treasury Department's daily supervision of the operations of the Secret Service and that "the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Service." Continuous outside management supervision can improve the responsiveness and flexibility of government agencies, especially those -- such as the Service -- which are headed by career officials. Consideration should be given to increasing the reporting responsibilities of the Secret Service to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations, and the supervisory authority which this officer can exercise over the Service's activities.

2. If the Secret Service is to continue to provide the level of protection equivalent to that which it has historically achieved, the manpower and financial resources available to the Service for the performance of this function must be significantly increased.

B. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

LEGAL AUTHORITY

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is responsible for enforcing and administering the firearms and explosives laws of the United States. Much of ATF's authority derives from the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 921, et seq.), which imposes a number of record-keeping requirements on importers, manufacturers, and dealers who are licensed to engage in the firearms business by the Act.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 923(g), licensees must maintain records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition of firearms and ammunition "at such place, for such period, and in such form as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may by regulations prescribe."

In addition, licensees must make their records available for inspection at all reasonable times and must submit to the Secretary such reports and information with respect to the records as the Secretary may by regulations require. And finally, licensees must allow the inspection, during business hours and on their premises, of any records required by regulation to be kept as well as the inspection of any firearms or ammunition stored on the premises.

When a firearm is sold or otherwise disposed of by a licensee to an unlicensed person, the transaction must be recorded on a firearms transaction record (Form 4473). Each licensee must retain as a part of his permanent files each Form 4473 and must file the forms in one of three ways: alphabetically (by name of purchaser), chronologically (by date of disposition), or numerically (by transaction serial number).

In an over-the-counter sale of a firearm to a non-licensee who is a resident of the state in which the licensee maintains his business, the Form 4473 will contain the purchaser's name, address, date and place of birth, height, weight and race, as well as a certification by the purchaser that he is not prohibited by law from receiving a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce. It will also contain the name of the manufacturer of the firearm, the name of the importer (if any), the type, model, caliber or gauge, and the serial number.

Forms 4473 are not forwarded to ATF, but are maintained by the licensees. However, if two or more pistols or revolvers are sold to a single person within a five-day period, the licensee must file with ATF a Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Pistols and Revolvers.

In the Federal Register of March 21, 1978, ATF published a notice containing several proposals concerning recordkeeping and reporting requirements under the firearms regulations. Specifically, the notice proposed that (1) licensed manufacturers and licensed importers put a unique serial number on each firearm imported into or manufactured in the United States; (2) each Federal firearms licensee report to ATF any theft, loss, or recovery of a firearm; (3) each licensed manufacturer submit to ATF a quarterly report of firearms manufactured; and (4) each licensed manufacturer, licensed importer, and licensed dealer submit to ATF a quarterly report of firearm dispositions.

Congress halted any action on the proposals by providing, in the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-74), that no funds appropriated for the salaries and expenses of ATF:

"shall be available for administrative expenses in connection with consolidating or centralizing within the Department of the Treasury the records of receipt and disposition of firearms maintained by Federal firearms licensees or for issuing or carrying out any provisions of the proposed rules of the Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, on Firearms Regulations, as published in the Federal Register, volume 43, number 55, of March 21, 1978."

COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The National Firearms Tracing Center at ATF Headquarters traces firearms for federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, conducting approximately 3,000 to 4,000 traces per month. Law enforcement agencies may call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and request a gun trace. The trace request call is recorded and the trace is done when the personnel of the are at work -- usually from around 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

When the Center receives a request for a trace, the name of the requester, a description of the firearm (including the

serial number, manufacturer, etc.) and other available information is recorded. Center personnel call the manufacturer and obtain the first disposition of the weapon; the manufacturers usually sell to wholesalers. The wholesaler receiving the weapon is then called, and the next disposition of the weapon is identified. The entire transfer history of the weapon is obtained in this manner and provided to the requester.

EMERGENCY PERFORMANCE

Procedures

While ATF has no written plans or procedures to be put into effect in case of an assassination or attempted assassination of the President, such an event would be treated in a fashion similar to other more common emergency situations (bombings, bomb threats, etc.).

Because information on firearms ownership is maintained by manufacturers, wholesalers and dealers, and not by ATF, there is only limited tracing capability after business hours. If an emergency gun trace is requested after the National Firearms Tracing Center has closed for the day, the ATF Communications Center (which is open 24 hours a day) will call the Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center at his residence. He has the names and the home telephone numbers of all the major manufacturers' representatives who could be called and asked to initiate a trace. If the firearm was not manufactured by one of the major firms, it is likely that no trace can be effected after business hours. Moreover, reaching the ultimate dealer (who actually sold the firearm and has the Form 4473 indicating the name of the individual purchaser) after business hours is likely to be difficult in any case.

Execution on March 30, 1981

At approximately 2:40 p.m. on March 30, 1981, the ATF Liaison Branch, upon the instruction of the Acting Assistant Director (Criminal Enforcement), contacted the U.S. Secret Service Liaison Office and offered to provide assistance, including the ATF gun tracing capability. At about the same time, the National Firearms Tracing Center was ordered to stand by for an urgent trace. At approximately 3:20 p.m., a liaison agent from the Secret Service contacted the ATF Liaison Branch and provided a description and the serial number of the firearm

recovered from the scene of the attempted assassination.

The ATF Liaison Branch immediately passed the information along to the Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center for an urgent gun trace. The Chief of the Tracing Center called the ATF Liaison Branch a few minutes later and advised that the serial number given was missing one digit (the number of digits in a serial number varies according to the manufacturer so it would not be immediately apparent that a digit had been dropped). Contact was again initiated with the Secret Service and at about 4:00 p.m. the correct serial number was furnished and the trace was begun.

The Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center telephoned the manufacturer, RG Industries, in Miami, Florida, and gave them a description of the weapon and the serial number. In a few minutes RG Industries advised that the weapon had been shipped on July 27, 1979, to Scott Wholesale, Indian Trail, North Carolina. The Chief then called Scott Wholesale and they advised him that the weapon had been shipped to Rocky's Pawn Shop, 2018 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas, on October 11, 1979.

Finally, the Chief called Rocky's Pawn Shop, and was told that the weapon had been purchased on October 13, 1980, by an individual identifying himself as John Warnock Hinckley, Jr. Hinckley provided the dealer with his Texas driver's license number, his date of birth, and his Lubbock, Texas address. Rocky's Pawn Shop also advised that Hinckley had purchased a second identical firearm on the same day.

At about 4:30 p.m., the Acting Assistant Director of ATF's Office of Criminal Enforcement telephoned the Office of the Director of the Secret Service and spoke with the Deputy Director. The trace information was passed along to the Deputy Director, including the information that Hinckley had purchased a second identical firearm. The Deputy Director of the Secret Service asked that ATF notify the ATF Dallas office that the weapon had been traced to Rocky's and that the ATF Dallas office inform the Secret Service Dallas office of the trace information. This was done and at about 4:55 p.m. agents from ATF, the FBI and the Secret Service went to Rocky's and obtained the original Forms 4473 that Hinckley had signed when purchasing the two RG Industries .22 caliber revolvers.

While ATF headquarters was conducting the gun trace on the weapon recovered from the scene of the attempted assassination, the Lubbock field office, after learning from television reports that the suspect John Hinckley was from the Lubbock area,

began calling dealers in Lubbock and asking them to review their records for purchases by Hinckley.

The office also began checking its files of multiple sale forms (described above), and found one indicating that the two handguns described above had been purchased by Hinckley at Rocky's Pawn Shop in Dallas. The Lubbock office passed this information along to the ATF Dallas District Office shortly before Dallas was advised by ATF Headquarters of the successful trace of the weapon by the National Firearms Tracing Center.

Subsequently, the Lubbock investigation revealed that Hinckley had made several other purchases of firearms and ammunition in the Lubbock area. The ammunition purchased included one box of "Devastator" ammunition. In explosive bullets, such as the "Devastator" brand, an explosive is inserted into each bullet in order that the bullet will fragment upon impact with a target. The Lubbock information, which included the purchase of the Devastator ammunition, was passed to the Dallas District Office and on to ATF headquarters at about 5:30 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. The information concerning the Devastator ammunition was given to the Chief of ATF's Firearms Technology Branch and he began a search of his files for information concerning the Devastator ammunition.

Shortly thereafter, at about 6:30 p.m., the FBI requested (through the ATF Nashville field office) a gun trace on three firearms which had been seized from Hinckley when he was arrested at the Nashville Airport on October 9, 1980. ATF had not previously been notified of this arrest and seizure. The three seized weapons turned out to be the revolvers purchased in Lubbock, and ATF Headquarters was able immediately to advise the FBI of the purchase information on the weapons.

The fact that Hinckley had purchased Devastator ammunition, the full significance of which was not then apparent, was provided to Main Treasury and to the Liaison Office of the Secret Service by ATF Headquarters at about 7:00 p.m. on the evening of March 30. Later, at approximately 9:00 p.m., after the Chief of the Firearms Technology Branch had found a descriptive advertisement for Devastator ammunition in his files, ATF Headquarters again called the Liaison Office of the Secret Service and provided further information on the nature of the ammunition.

Conclusions

1. ATF was able to conduct the gun trace on the weapon recovered from the scene of the assassination attempt in less than half an hour. Such a rapid trace could, of course, be of crucial importance in identifying a suspect in circumstances where the weapon is recovered, but the suspect escapes or a second person is involved. ATF also swiftly gathered information on other weapons and ammunition purchased by Hinckley and provided that information to the appropriate authorities. Through its own investigation, and prior to a request from the FBI, ATF obtained the purchase information on the three weapons seized from Hinckley in Nashville.

2. It is noteworthy that the gun trace of the suspect's weapon and the other investigative activities carried out by ATF were initiated during the normal working day. It would be difficult to conduct such an emergency gun trace if the weapon were not made by one of the major manufacturers, and it is likely to be difficult in any case to reach the ultimate dealer (who actually sold the weapon and has the name of the retail purchaser) during non-business hours.

Recommendation

Consideration should be given to methods or mechanisms, acceptable to the Congress, by which ATF would be enabled to effect gun sales traces during non-business hours.