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Need. Freeze  
1

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

18 Oct 85  
B

Dr. Keyworth

J

Attached is a report on what the Freeze groups are up to. If you are interested in this type of information, I'll continue to send you such reports.

Bob McMains

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To Sid Singer  
Bob McMains

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From J

Memorandum for: Our Clients  
Date: October 15, 1985

UPDATE:

ANTI-MX & NUCLEAR FREEZE CAMPAIGNS

~~ANTI-SDI~~

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"The peace movement has always had the most success in cutting nuclear programs during the autumn appropriations process. Hopefully, the upcoming Geneva summit will help focus attention on the military budget and the run-away arms race. We will be working to dispel the notion that support of disarmament measures by Members of Congress might 'undercut the President' shortly before a meeting with Gorbachev."

--Laurie Duker  
SANE Political Director  
SANE "Action Alert" (Fall '85)

MX DIMINISHING AS A "LIGHTNING ROD"

If there is any clear consensus among activists in the oft-fragmented nuclear freeze movement, it is in their belief that the recent decision by Congress to limit MX missile production to a total of 50 (for deployment in existing Minuteman silos) constitutes a "victory" for the movement. Given the fact that the freeze movement has essentially failed to halt continued production

and deployment of MX on countless other Congressional votes over the years, this attempt to put the most positive interpretation or "spin" on the most recent votes must be viewed as part of freeze leaders' strategy for energizing their membership -- both to maintain interest and to prepare for other "battles" ahead. Their declarations bring to mind the oft-quoted statement by the late U.S. Senator George Aiken (R-VT) concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War: "Let's declare victory and go home."

Leading the "victory" chorus is Common Cause President Fred Wertheimer, who continues to argue strenuously that the 50 missile limitation on MX constitutes a "victory" because: "There will no longer be enough MX missiles deployed for it to serve as the 'first-strike' nuclear weapon that the administration has been seeking..."

This interpretation is also put forth by Christopher Paine in an article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Paine proudly notes that "a broad coalition of nongovernmental organizations has forced a drastic curtailment of the program...This seven-year legislative battle has set new standards of tenacity and political sophistication for the U.S. peace movement, which in the past was rarely able to mount concentrated and effective political pressure on the Congress."

Despite claims of victory, however, we believe that MX opponents will not follow all of Senator Aiken's dictum -- the freeze movement is unlikely to "go



home" or simply "roll over" during the current Congressional appropriations process or other decision-making cycles throughout the 1986 elections. Indeed there is growing evidence that freeze leaders and the movement's paid lobbyists believe their own propaganda and believe that achieving "final" victory on MX and other related issues may be near. This is evidenced by comments from leaders like SANE's Laurie Duker, who is quoted at the beginning of this report.

SDI FOCUS CONTINUES TO INCREASE AS MX DECREASES

As we have noted in recent "Updates," SDI has increasingly become the movement's primary "target," drawing more and more of the movement's attention, resources, and energies (following the similarly increased attention of the news media). This trend away from focusing on MX and towards SDI instead has accelerated in recent months and should continue for some time to come.

For the first time since the beginning of organized opposition to the MX, movement leaders have publicly admitted that they are not likely to mount a major anti-MX, grassroots effort during the FY 1986 appropriations process. The highly-respected Congressional Quarterly reports: "Lobbyists from Common Cause and SANE, who have led the three-year-long battle against MX, said they would not mount a major grassroots campaign for further restrictions on MX deployment in the companion defense appropriations bill ... In particular, they vowed not to let further work on MX get in the way of efforts to cut back Reagan's plan to develop space-based anti-missile defenses ... 'Nobody's going

to invest institutional energy at the grassroots level,' Mawby insisted." (Mawby is Executive Director of SANE).

This shift in emphasis is demonstrated by the fact that the nationwide lobbying efforts on SDI are heating up on both sides. In addition to a strong defense of SDI offered by President Reagan, Secretary Weinberger, and other presidential aides, private organizations -- pro and con -- are seeking to sway public opinion to their side. For example, a recent full-page ad in the Washington Times (attached) "thanks" the President for holding fast on SDI. The ad is sponsored by the Coalition for SDI, whose chairman is General Daniel Graham (Ret.) and co-chairmen are Senators Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) and Malcolm Wallop (R-WY). On the other side of the issue, the Union of Concerned Scientists has announced plans for a nationwide "video conference" on nuclear arms control ("From Trinity to Star Wars") and Common Cause has printed up an extraordinarily slick question-and-answer pamphlet called "Star Wars: Questions and Answers on the Space Weapons Debate."

Has the freeze movement withdrawn from the fight on MX? Absolutely not. Have they continued to move it downward on their list of priorities and give it decreasing attention from freeze movement lobbyists, grassroots organizers, and movement spokespersons? The answer is yes. According to Congressional Quarterly, this is a result of internal problems as well as political strategy: "In part, this judgment reflected the long-standing complaint of the



space-oriented lobby groups that their priorities had for too long been taking a back seat to the anti-MX campaign," they reported.

SMALL MISSILE: GETTING READY TO FIGHT

As also reported in our last "Update," anti-nuclear activists are hard at work laying the foundation for waging a campaign against deployment of small ICBMs. Efforts are underway to gather and utilize information about potential small missile sites, with emphasis on technical, cost and environmental impact data, as well as budget requirements. The movement has been poised to begin a larger-scale effort in opposition to small missile for several months now -- but they have not yet launched any formal effort.

Indeed, current freeze movement literature does not, for the most part, even mention small missile. In addition, most of the speeches and media interviews by freeze activists concentrate on SDI and the overall defense spending issue. We believe that there is still some hesitation within the movement itself, particularly at the national level, to get into a major small missile campaign -- but only for the present time. After all, some of the most prominent Democrats in the country have endorsed the small ICBM program as their rebuttal to charges that Democrats are "soft on defense." Consequently, the anti-nuclear movement faces a serious dilemma and potential conflicts with allies in deciding how hard to push on small missile, particularly among "moderate" Democrats who have helped them on key votes in the past.

This interpretation is reflected in the recent article written by Christopher Paine (the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) which is attached. Paine criticizes the movement for losing a "window of opportunity" during Congressional consideration of MX, by "failing to clarify the nuclear debate and failing to address the fundamental strategic and psychological premises of U.S. nuclear policy." Paine goes on to sharply criticize those who argued that MX should be cancelled -- but replaced by a so-called "better weapon," the small ICBM.

Until further decisions about the small missile program -- size, basing modes and sites, etc. -- are made and gain public visibility, we expect that opposition will continue to be "low key" in anti-small missile activities, particularly at the national level, where most groups will continue to concentrate on SDI and MX. However, we are convinced that small missile's proposed deployment will eventually become a major rallying point by which freeze groups can mobilize local citizenry within potential deployment areas -- and thus build membership, national (and much-needed) publicity, and generate grassroots pressure on small ICBM "friends" among Democrats in Congress. As one small missile proponent told us: "The lack of original opposition is due to the lack of definitive data (on the system). They will come out in opposition; wait 'till next year when the system is defined and baselined."

#### THE FREEZE MOVEMENT AND THE SUMMIT

Historically, anti-defense, anti-arms, and nuclear freeze leaders have been on the "defensive" during U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Much of the relative decline



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in media attention and grassroots activity concerning the freeze movement is a direct result of the renewal of arms reduction talks in Geneva. Members of Congress are more likely to offer "bipartisan support" for the President than is normally expected (as evidenced by the March, 1985 vote in favor of MX at the start of the Geneva talks). Significantly, however, movement leaders are making a clever attempt to remove themselves from a defensive posture and, concurrently, to frame the arms debates and the summit itself in a manner most favorable to their message strategy.

Common Cause, one of the most media-wise members of the nuclear freeze leadership coalition, demonstrated this new strategy at its September 13th press conference, where a "distinguished" group of national security "opinion-leaders" (Paul Warnke, Gerard Smith, Theodore Hesburgh, Stanley Resor, Cyrus Vance, et. al) urged the President to seek a major breakthrough on arms control in negotiating with the Soviets (see attached Washington Post article).

Leading freeze groups like Common Cause clearly recognize that the summit will stimulate intense public interest in -- and media scrutiny of -- arms control and other strategic and military issues. Consequently, they are moving forward now with a campaign designed to put the "blame" on President Reagan and his defense buildup if the Geneva talks fail to produce an acceptable agreement. According to the Post: "The conference was arranged by the public interest group Common Cause at what was described by its president, Fred M. Wertheimer, as the start of a national campaign to pressure the White House to

seek substantive accords at the November 19-20 summit meeting in Geneva"  
(emphasis added).

Hence, instead of being placed in its historical defensive posture at the time of the summit, the freeze movement is attempting to put the Reagan Administration on the defensive at the outset. This clearly is reinforced by -- and reinforces -- Soviet leader Gorbachev's propaganda campaign to do the very same thing.

#### MOVEMENT TRENDS AND LONG-TERM STRATEGIES

At present, there are two clear priorities for the nuclear freeze movement's leadership. The top priority remains generating opposition to SDI (pro-freeze activists already are taking credit for the FY 1986 budget cuts in SDI funding) and influencing worldwide media coverage on the summit and interpretations of its outcome. As the Wall Street Journal recently reported on the anti-SDI campaigns: "Peace groups in Europe are campaigning against the program, and domestic opponents, led by Common Cause, are gearing up for a fight against it similar to the one mounted against the MX missile."

The second priority is to achieve a far better "victory record" in the 1986 elections than they did in 1984. Most groups appear to be avoiding a repeat of the mistake they made in 1984 in targeting races too early (announcing their priorities up to a full year in advance of the elections). Thus far, there have been no widely circulated lists of 1986 elections "targets" or "priority races" as we reported at this stage in 1983. Nonetheless, the



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freeze movement is committed to a major election effort, looking to 1986 as the year in which the disastrous public relations and morale problems that plagued it during the 1984 elections are resolved and forgotten. These problems are receding as the media covers new activities (such as the movement's Hiroshima anniversary activities and the recent "victory" on the MX deployment cap). But the movement's problems are far from being resolved, however. The outcome of the summit and arms reductions talks -- as well as the issue focus of the 1986 election year -- will have a great deal to do with whether they can remain a truly national, grassroots movement to the extent they have been in recent years.

In addition, the awarding of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War will clearly have a positive and rejuvenating effect on the entire nuclear freeze movement. The respectability and credibility bestowed by the awarding of the prestigious Nobel Prize are incalculable but, at the minimum, the award will lead to increased membership, larger budgets, and greater media attention.

Attachments



# An Historic Turning Point For The MX

By Fred Wertheimer

"ASPIN SAYS MX MISSILE PROGRAM IS DEAD." That was the headline in the July 27 edition of *The Boston Globe*. It quoted Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who had been one of President Reagan's

those citizens and Members of Congress who have been fighting for years to halt the MX missile system. While Common Cause and the many other national organizations involved in this fight obviously wanted to prevent the production of *any* MX missiles, winning the permanent statutory cap of 50 is a major achievement in the nuclear arms struggle.

At 50 missiles—one-fourth of the number originally proposed—there will no longer be enough MX missiles deployed for it to serve as the "first-strike" nuclear weapon that the administration has been seeking, according to the Air Force's

attractive potential target, particularly in a crisis, because if it can be destroyed by an enemy, its dangerous "first-strike" capability can be eliminated.

The impact of all this is an increase in nuclear tensions and an escalation of the nuclear arms race without enhancing our national security. And it is this result that has been blocked. Capping the MX at 50 deployed missiles means the MX is no longer a vulnerable "first-strike" weapon.

The consequences of this victory are profound and in some ways historic for the following reasons:

1) As noted earlier, this is the first time any administration has ever been stopped from obtaining a nuclear weapons system it sought.

2) The long accepted notion that once a military weapons program has been started it cannot be stopped has been successfully challenged. So has the notion that the Pentagon can get any program it really wants, regardless of the merits.

3) While key Members of Congress provided critically important leadership, in the end this battle was won through sustained, organized and persistent citizen action throughout the country.

4) As a result of the long campaign against the MX, dozens of national groups and hundreds of thousands

of individuals have come together, creating a far stronger and better organized lobbying force on other nuclear arms issues than existed before this battle began.

5) It has been made clear that the nuclear arms establishment no longer has a monopoly on making decisions about nuclear arms issues—citizens are going to be a key part of the decision-making process on future nuclear arms questions.

We know that despite our MX victory, we will need to be ever vigilant in protecting against efforts to overturn it. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has already begun talking about reviving this fight and pushing for deployment of an additional 50 missiles.

But we also know Congress is now with us. If we stay on top of this issue and hold firm, we can continue to prevail.

The MX battle reminds us just how hard and long a struggle the nuclear arms control fight really is. But it also says something else to us. It sends a bottom line message that we *can* win these battles. We *can* help to reverse the nuclear arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear conflict.

The fight goes on. ●

*"This agreement represents a precedent-setting victory for those who have been fighting for years to halt the MX missile."*



Fred Wertheimer

chief congressional allies in the administration's long running effort to build this "first-strike" nuclear weapons system.

"In my view," Aspin said, "there is no way we are ever going to build more than 50 missiles. The issue is over."

Aspin's comments came after House and Senate Members ironed out differences on the defense authorization bill and agreed to enact a statutory restriction permanently "capping" deployment of the MX system at no more than 50 missiles.


This agreement—passed in July by the Senate and virtually certain to be enacted into law—represents a precedent-setting victory for

own calculations.

In seeking the MX as a "first-strike" weapon to be deployed in Minuteman silos, the administration has been advocating a vulnerable, costly, destabilizing and dangerous weapons system.

A "first-strike" weapon is one that potentially can be fired against an adversary in a nuclear attack, and can destroy the adversary's ability to retaliate. This capability obviously would increase an adversary's fear that it might be subject to attack. Moreover, it assures that the other side will escalate its nuclear arms buildup to overcome this potential "first-strike" threat. And when a "first-strike" weapon is itself vulnerable to attack—as the MX is in Minuteman silos—it further raises the nuclear stakes. The weapon becomes a very

*Fred Wertheimer is president of Common Cause.*



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# SANE ACTION

## SUPPORT THE SUMMIT

When President Reagan meets Soviet leader Gorbachev this November he intends to broadcast a clear message to the American public: that he is a man of peace, a strong representative of the U.S. and a wise world leader. But early signs indicate the administration is trying to lower expectations for concrete results from the meeting.

Just as strong public opinion pushed candidate Reagan to take pro-peace positions during his reelection campaign, visible and widespread support for a ban on nuclear testing may push the President in the right direction.

Across the country, SANE chapters will be organizing activities supporting the summit process and focusing public expectations on a nuclear test ban. You can get involved in this important campaign in a variety of ways.

- Collect signatures as part of a nationwide petition drive calling on leaders to stop testing and reverse the arms race. The SANE and Freeze canvass staffs have already gathered over 200,000 names. By the time these petitions are sent to Geneva from the Freeze conference in Chicago on November 17, organizers expect to have over a million signatures.
- Organize and participate in candlelight vigils on the evening of November 19 expressing the strong desire of the American public to end the arms race. Gatherings will be held in town squares and community centers and will feature local civic and religious leaders speaking out for peace. Ecumenical in nature, the vigils will display art from local schools, segments of the Ribbon, and audio-taped messages to the two world leaders from local children.
- Sponsor a resolution for passage in your city council, ecumenical council, or student government that calls for a summit agreement on a nuclear test ban. Publicize passage in the local media and use the opportunity for civic, religious, and academic leaders to speak out.

## STOP STAR WARS

During consideration of the FY '85 Defense Authorization Bill in June, the House and Senate refused to cut funding for Star Wars below the levels recommended by their Armed Services Committees. The final authorization level approved was \$2.75 billion—a billion dollars lower than President Reagan's request—but still a major increase in the program's funding over last year.

SANE activists have another opportunity to cut Star Wars this fall in votes on the Appropriations bill debated in late September or early October. *Please write or call your Representatives today and urge them to eliminate funding for Star Wars.*

Tell them:

- Star Wars will be the most expensive military project ever undertaken, reaching a trillion dollars for a fully deployed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, according to former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
- Star Wars guarantees the worst situation for U.S. national security, a defensive as well as an offensive arms race.
- Star Wars threatens to destroy the 1972 ABM Treaty, the most important arms control agreement ever reached by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

### Swing List

The following Representatives are key votes on Star Wars. They have all either voted for some limitations on Star Wars funding or potentially could vote for limitations (based on past voting records). None of these Representatives have yet voted for a freeze or elimination of those funds.

AR-01 Alexander	KY-02 Natcher	NB-03 Smith	SC-03 Derrick
CA-12 Zechin	KY-03 Mazzoli	NJ-02 Hughes	SC-05 Spratt
CT-06 Johnson	LA-02 Boggs	NJ-05 Roukema	SC-06 Tallon
DE-AL Carper	LA-08 Long	NJ-08 Roe	TN-05 Borer
FL-03 Bennett	ME-01 McKernan	NM-03 Richardson	TN-06 Gordon
FL-19 Fasnell	ME-02 Snowe	NY-15 Green	TX-05 Bryant
GA-05 Fowler	MD-05 Hoyer	NY-19 Biaggi	TX-12 Wright
HI-01 Heftal	MD-06 Byron	NY-21 Fish	TX-16 Coleman
ID-02 Stallings	MA-02 Boland	NC-05 Neal	TX-23 Bustamante
IL-10 Porter	MA-11 Donnelly	NC-08 Helner	TX-24 Frost
IL-21 Price	MI-02 Parsell	OK-01 Jones	TX-25 Andrews
IN-01 Vucelja	MN-03 Frenzel	OK-04 McCurdy	TX-27 Ortiz
IN-02 Sharp	MS-01 Whitten	PA-11 Kanjorski	VA-06 Otis
IN-09 Hamilton	MS-04 Dowdy	PA-13 Coughlin	WA-06 Dicks
IA-02 Tauke	MO-03 Gephardt	PA-21 Ridge	WI-01 Aspin
KS-02 Slattery	MO-04 Skelton		

### Hotlines —

To keep abreast of late-breaking events on peace and arms control issues, call the following regularly-updated taped messages:

**Nuclear Arms Control Hotline**  
(Council for a Livable World)  
202-543-0008  
**Central America Legislative Hotline**  
(Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy)  
202-483-3391  
**Witness for Peace Hotline**  
(religious activists in Nicaragua)  
202-332-8230

### Let Them Know You're There!

**Write:**  
Your Representative  
U.S. House of  
Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515



Your Senator  
U.S. Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

**Call:**  
202-224-3121  
(Capitol Hill switchboard)

**Send Telegrams:**  
Call your local Western  
Union office and ask to  
send a 20-word Public  
Opinion Message (\$4.45)

**SANE**


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Randall Enos, United States

## Lobbying for arms control

*To build upon its considerable success in influencing public opinion, the U.S. antinuclear movement must unify and clarify both its ideology and its political strategy.*

*by Christopher E. Paine*

**O**RGANIZED POPULAR resistance to the nuclear arms race in the United States is fragmented among a wide array of religious, scientific, professional, environmental, government reform, and grass-roots peace activist organizations. Despite their varying orientations, these groups have managed to form national coalitions to achieve specific legislative objectives, as well as local coalitions to conduct educational events and organize demonstrations.

The unprecedented intensity of the movement, along with its modest achievements, give cause for hope, if not for optimism. The following developments have been particularly encouraging:

*Christopher E. Paine, former senior policy analyst for Physicians for Social Responsibility, is a staff consultant with the House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power.*

- A broad coalition of nongovernmental organizations opposing the new MX intercontinental ballistic missile has forced a drastic curtailment of the program. The Carter Administration's original proposal was to spread 200 semi-mobile missiles over thousands of square miles of the American West. Today, the program has been reduced to probably no more than 50 missiles, based in existing Minuteman silos. This seven-year legislative battle has set new standards of tenacity and political sophistication for the U.S. peace movement, which in the past was rarely able to mount concentrated and effective political pressure on the Congress. Unfortunately, however, the prolonged struggle over a single weapons system has also entailed an "opportunity cost" that the U.S. peace movement can no longer afford to ignore.

- The new "arms control lobby" has repeatedly turned back Reagan's requests to begin binary nerve gas production, and in 1984 it prompted the House of Representatives



to respond to a Soviet unilateral moratorium on antisatellite (ASAT) testing by sidestepping the president and legislating a reciprocal ban. The House action charts an obvious path for further citizen action to slow down the arms race bilaterally, even in the face of concerted Administration attempts to prolong negotiations and open new areas of military competition.

- In November 1982, millions of Americans—in eight out of nine states and in 28 cities and counties—supported the passage of ballot initiatives calling on the president to negotiate a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze with the Soviet Union. Six months later, after the longest debate in the history of the House, the freeze concept was endorsed by a vote of 278 to 149. However, this resolution, festooned with qualifying amendments, supported the freeze solely as an “immediate objective” of arms-control negotiations which legislators knew to be under the control of an Administration hostile to arms control.

- For the first time in the nuclear age, the public's desire to end the nuclear arms race has become a major motivating factor for citizen involvement in grass-roots electoral activity. During 1984, the national Freeze Voter political action committee (PAC), along with Freeze Voter PACs in 38 states, raised a total of \$3.4 million to finance some 260 grass-roots organizers working in 244 House and 20 Senate races, coordinating the efforts of some 25,000 volunteers. Political action affiliates of the four other peace organizations doing electoral work raised an additional \$2.2 million.

While these figures far exceed sums raised in the past, they barely offset the \$3.6 million contributed directly to reelection campaigns by PACs affiliated with the nation's top 20 defense contractors, and do not begin to match the more than \$14 million raised by the National Conservative Political Action Committee and Senator Jesse Helms's National Congressional Club. The result of these fledgling electoral efforts, however, was that despite Reagan's nationwide win, five of the seven new senators elected in 1984 promised voters they would support a nuclear freeze, and most of the representatives who had led the opposition to the Reagan Administration's nuclear buildup were returned to office.

- During Reagan's first term the educational efforts of Physicians for Social Responsibility and other local and national organizations, augmented by extensive media coverage, gave millions of Americans a refresher course in the destructive effects of a single nuclear bomb, and in the grotesque accumulation of destructive power in the superpowers' arsenals. Religious leaders and groups, most prominently the Catholic bishops, by questioning the moral underpinnings of the nuclear arms race and deterrence theory based on the threat of deliberate escalation, have also contributed significantly to public awareness.

- A recent survey by the Public Agenda Foundation suggests that public discussion of the nuclear issue has convinced a significant segment of the American people that a nuclear war could not be limited, survived, or won, and that new nuclear weaponry will not make them more secure.

But this reassertion of common sense coexists with—and is often submerged by—longstanding public perceptions about the importance of “bargaining with the Soviets from a position of strength.” These contradictory impulses apparently leave a majority of citizens without a clear sense of the specific policy initiatives they should support to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

**THE RECENT UPSURGE** of antinuclear activism in the United States and around the globe suggests both a fundamental change in public attitudes toward the nuclear arms race and a quantum leap in individual and organizational commitments to oppose it. But the American antinuclear movement is still a long way from developing the combination of political strategy, skilled leadership, and awareness of historic responsibility that characterized earlier struggles to end such deeply ingrained abuses as slavery and colonialism.

Unlike the European situation, where both ideology and party discipline limit the individual legislator's room for maneuver, the comparatively nonideological and issue-oriented nature of the U.S. political system encourages and occasionally rewards a short-term pragmatic approach. But the same factors impede the development of a broad-based, long-term strategy for changing the overall direction of U.S. nuclear policy.

American legislative politics has often been compared to a floating crap game, with all the attributes of easy access and ephemeral activity this analogy implies. Thus, while the American peace movement has experienced occasional success in controlling specific outputs and activities of the military-industrial complex, it has not even attempted to mount a sustained attack on the ideological hegemony and institutional prerogatives of the complex itself. The much strengthened arms control lobby which has grown up under the Reagan presidency relies on a kind of political and analytical eclecticism which is both the key to its present success, and a major barrier to future progress.

The movement's efforts to organize support around a coherent set of policy alternatives to the status quo are made more difficult by the endemic “faddism” of U.S. political life. In the news media the set of serious interlocking arms control proposals known as “the freeze” was treated like the political equivalent of the hula hoop: the sudden feast of coverage was matched only by the instant famine when the media-pack moved on, leaving behind the partially digested remains of an issue and a movement struggling to recover from a drastically “oversold” condition.

An avalanche of news coverage can be disorienting to activists, leading them to mistake their own reflections in the media for a mass of converts. Inevitably this tacit media-activist collaboration arouses expectations which it cannot possibly fulfill. When the balloon pops, pundits left and right declare the issue “dead,” when in fact it may still be gaining political strength, as measured by real indices that have been corrected for journalistic hyperinflation. The freeze movement, for example, reached its peak of organization, expen-



diture, and political influence during the 1984 election, long after the media had lost interest in it.

The lesson here is that the American peace movement should not, and need not, be completely vulnerable to the media's capricious "hot issue" syndrome. Fluctuations in coverage are inevitable, but the movement must develop a conscious long-term strategy for shaping its message in the press.

**T**HE ABSENCE of a consistent, principled foundation for public opposition to the nuclear arms race has been felt in the protracted campaigns against the MX and the B-1 bomber, as well as in the debates over "no-first-use" and the role of past and present bilateral superpower negotiations.

While the current legislative deadlock over the MX must be counted as a historic success, it has been achieved primarily by manipulating contradictions within the established doctrinal framework. The arms control lobbying coalition has relied on the argument that the MX is a dangerous, wasteful, destabilizing weapon because it will be a highly accurate MIRVed missile deployed in fixed silos vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. But this argument implicitly leaves the door open to a whole host of weapons that do not fit this narrow criterion: "Midgetman" missiles are not MIRVed and need not be "fixed"; Trident II missiles deployed aboard submarines will be accurate and MIRVed,

but invulnerable. Some leading legislative opponents of the MX are, in fact, enthusiastic proponents of Trident II.

The weaknesses of the current "target of opportunity" approach pursued by the Washington arms control lobby coalition is epitomized by its flip-flop on the ICBM "vulnerability" problem. When the MX opponents were focusing on defeating the Carter Administration's solution—turning the Western Great Basin region into an environmental catastrophe of MX "racetracks" and concrete "garages"—they drove home all the sound reasons why the Soviet first-strike scenario was really just another instance of worst-case planning run amok. This is precisely the kind of self-serving paranoid fantasy unleashed routinely by the Pentagon at critical junctures in the weapons acquisition process.

These same objections to ICBM vulnerability were sufficiently persuasive to be appropriated in subsequent testimony by members and counselors of the Reagan-appointed "blue-ribbon" Scowcroft Commission. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, for example, has explained to Congress on several recent occasions why the coordination problems and operational uncertainties of a first strike on U.S. missile silos are so severe that the "window of vulnerability" was never really open after all. These same arguments were now being used to bolster the case for deployment of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos, but MX opponents failed to use the opportunity for a coherent debate,



*Randall Enos, United States*



tion, they argue, because such off-setting capacities for intervention could become the main agents of a superpower confrontation leading to nuclear war.

The NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation is truly the primal case of conventional power projection from which much of the current arms race has grown. Much greater trans-Atlantic contact will surely be necessary if the U.S. movement, and its allies in Congress, are to make a positive contribution to European security. In particular, the arms control lobbying coalition, by working more closely with its European counterparts, must find a way to short-circuit the Pentagon's practice of wrapping its nuclear weapons programs in the endorsements of allied governments to protect them from congressional opposition.

In the usual discourse of intra-alliance politics, NATO governments respond to critical inquiries about new nuclear weapons programs by saying, in essence, "Nothing has been decided," while in Washington these same programs are presented as the "requests" of beleaguered U.S. allies. Alleged NATO "resolve" to deploy new tactical and intermediate-range weapons is then used to coerce wavering U.S. legislators into demonstrating comparable U.S. "will" by deploying new *strategic* nuclear weapons. Increased international cooperation between peace movements and parliamentary partisans of nuclear arms control can do much to penetrate this trans-Atlantic fog.

**P**ERHAPS THE MOST vital task facing current peace movement strategy is that of overcoming the inevitable tension between the *political* role of arms control agreements as symbols of mutual superpower accommodation, and their *substantive* role in controlling and possibly ending the nuclear arms competition. Since substance is routinely sacrificed for symbolism in superpower negotiations, the peace movement is caught in a dilemma. It must choose between a *de facto* alliance with the right to denounce the agreement and grudging support for ratification of a superpower compact to continue the arms race.

Ironically, arms control talks provide a useful adversarial context for a process which, absent Geneva, is increasingly seen by the public as a dead end of mutual vulnerability, overkill, and diminishing returns. It is no accident that the U.S. peace movement made its greatest gains in 1984, the year the Soviet Union stayed away from the bargaining table.

But critics must tread carefully here. The political importance of arms control negotiations for both sides, and the public's feeling of reassurance when Soviet and U.S. leaders hold a summit meeting, means that little political gain for genuine arms control can come from angry denunciations of the "SALT process." That task is better left to the radical right.

Still, governments must not be allowed to use the Geneva talks as a means to disarm the peace movement. To the contrary, the peace movement must learn how to use the Geneva talks as a means to disarm the governments: by constantly raising expectations about what could be accomplished with a modicum of competence and good will; by defin-

ing arms control opportunities more clearly in the public and congressional consciousness; and by using the legislative process to precipitate areas of mutual nuclear restraint, which can then be codified in lasting agreements.

The overall policy which the antinuclear movement seeks to change is both formulated and implemented, however, by vast and only marginally accountable bureaucracies in the executive branch. The same goes for negotiation of the international agreements that will be necessary to bring the nuclear arms race to an end.

A further obstacle to arms control progress resides in the constitutional requirement for Senate consent to treaty ratification by a two-thirds majority. This has given the political right and its military-industrial allies what amounts to a "minority veto" over nuclear arms control agreements. The president's historical willingness to placate this conservative minority in advance so as to assure Senate ratification virtually guarantees that the treaty will impinge as little as possible on U.S.—and hence Soviet—nuclear force modernization. On the other hand, battles to force *unilateral* cancellation of particular nuclear weapons programs can plant the seeds of a political right-wing "boomerang effect" as Soviet programs proceed apace.

Overcoming these obstacles would seem to require nothing less than an expansion of the historically—but not legally—determined boundaries of congressional action in foreign affairs. There is nothing in the Constitution to bar Congress from taking direct account of the prospect for Soviet reciprocal restraint when that body exercises its right to authorize and appropriate funds for the nation's defense. Congress could undertake a simple, verifiable arms control initiative—such as a moratorium on MIRVed ballistic-missile flight testing, or on underground nuclear explosive testing above the long-range detection threshold—with the explicit provision that its continuation after a certain period would be contingent on reciprocal Soviet restraint.

Finally, the diverse grouping of nuclear arms control organizations must come to the collective realization that no irreversible progress is likely without major institutional reforms to loosen the grip of the military-industrial complex on U.S. security policy. New laws are needed: to increase congressional control over the military budget; to drastically curb official secrecy; to limit contractor campaign contributions; to lock the revolving door between the Pentagon and its contractors; and to withdraw from the defense industry the task of evaluating potential new weapons systems. Such legislation is essential to any long-run strategy to end the nuclear arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The nuclear arms race will not succumb to a movement bogged down in contradictions over short-term objectives and tactics. To build upon its considerable success in changing public opinion and attitudes, the U.S. antinuclear movement must now develop both the inclination and the institutional mechanisms for advancing a broadly shared political strategy which can move national policy steadily in the direction of ending the nuclear arms race. □



based on a common set of facts. Instead, they replayed the old tune about silo vulnerability to a Soviet "first strike."

Thus, an opportunity was lost to clarify the nuclear debate and address the fundamental strategic and psychological premises of U.S. nuclear policy. The real case for the MX, and strategic "force modernization" in general, was laid out in some detail in the April 1983 Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces; it remained, for the most part, unacknowledged and unopposed by the anti-MX coalition.

The Scowcroft Report's authors argue that the relative balance of U.S.-Soviet nuclear weaponry cannot be "set apart from all other calculations about relations between nations"—a premise of the nuclear freeze—because trends in the nuclear balance purportedly "heavily influence the vigor with which they [Soviet leaders] exercise their power." We are told that the United States cannot afford the "delusion" that Soviet leaders are going to be deterred by the normal human concerns that dissuade American leaders from undertaking aggressive, risky ventures overseas.

U.S. strategy must, in this view, focus on persuading Soviet leaders that the United States has both the will and the capability to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against those targets "which the Soviet leaders . . . value most"—a list which the report says includes "military command bunkers" and "missile silos" but not Moscow or Leningrad. "A credible capability for controlled, prompt, limited [nuclear] attack on hard targets" would "cast a shadow over

the calculus of Soviet risk-taking at any level of confrontation with the West." And in the short term, the report stated, this capability for nuclear intimidation could be provided only by the MX.

Such is the justification not only for the MX, but for Pershing II, Trident II, and the whole gamut of new nuclear weapons systems. It represents the archetypal but seldom articulated "psycho-military" case for continuing the nuclear arms race, yet the U.S. peace movement has failed for the most part to mount a sustained public campaign to discredit this orthodoxy.

Many Americans—perhaps a majority—seem to support, at least passively, the Scowcroft Report's recommended strategy of threatening nuclear war in order to deter conventional conflict with the Soviet Union on U.S. terms. That is, they support the utility of the nuclear bluff. But what little public opinion polling that has been done on the question suggests a public belief that the president should never be the first actually to use nuclear weapons.

Without a much clearer public debate over the role of nuclear threats in U.S. military strategy, it appears that majority opinion will tolerate a president who brandishes threats of nuclear escalation at the battlefield and of a stepped-up arms race at the bargaining table. But widespread public opposition to nuclear civil defense planning, and general disbelief in the prospect that a nuclear war would remain limited, indicate that the public does not subscribe to the "nuclear-warfighting" dimension of current

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strategy. As might be expected, the public wants to enjoy the purported benefits of a fierce nuclear posture while rejecting its attendant risks. The freeze movement, unfortunately, was unable to bridge this dichotomy in public consciousness.

**T**HE HISTORY of the B-1 strategic bomber is a painful reminder of another persistent weakness in U.S. peace movement strategy: the confusion between "cost-effectiveness" and arms control. Politicians from all parts of the political spectrum have a tendency to delude themselves and their constituents with the notion that they are helping to achieve the latter by insisting on the former. Regrettably, "more bang for the buck" rarely translates into "less bucks for the bang."

In the mid-1970s antinuclear and human-needs groups formed a tacit alliance with a coterie of defense-minded systems analysts in the Carter Administration to turn back production of the B-1 in favor of converting the existing B-52 bomber force to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Today, almost everyone recognizes that from the perspective of limiting the arms race, this was a temporary victory for "cost-effectiveness" but a political blunder for arms control. General Dynamics, which lost in the competition to build the ALCM, was awarded contracts to build ground- and sea-launched variants, creating a new SALT limitation and verification problem, and a new dimension for superpower military competition.

Cancellation of the B-1 added fuel to the fires of conservative opposition to SALT II and created an irredentist cause for the military-industrial complex which Reagan was able to tap effectively during the 1980 election. Not only was the B-1 revived and put into production (as the B-1B), but the steady attacks on its "cost-effectiveness" against "anticipated growth in the Soviet air-defense threat" paved the way for development of an entirely new radar-evading "stealth" bomber which is likely to cost even more than the B-1. In the meantime, cruise missiles are moving into their "second generation," and there is even talk of a B-1C.

When divorced from broader political objectives, debates about cost-effectiveness can do little to help arms control, but they seem to have some potential to subvert it. A similar confusion is pervading the MX debate, with the "better weapon" role of the cruise missile now being played by the "Midgetman" single-warhead ICBM.

The various organizations which comprise the active U.S. constituency for arms control and disarmament measures support different combinations of goals and pursue disparate and sometimes politically contradictory strategies for achieving them. Current efforts range from Harvard University's modest proposal to avoid nuclear war through better management of crises and more rational procurement of "stabilizing" nuclear weapons to the visionary efforts of activist religious organizations to abolish all types of warfare and establish economic justice and universal human rights.

A clear premise of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign over the past four years has been that a halt to the nuclear

arms race can be pursued, and possibly achieved, with only a tangential connection to the success or failure of more far-reaching efforts to transform the international system.

This is certainly true at the level of dispassionate analysis. But some progress toward other goals—particularly a reduced reliance on the threat of conventional war—is probably indispensable for establishing the political and psychological preconditions for acceptance of the "general nuclear settlement" envisioned by the freeze movement. In other words, the freeze could be the logical outcome to a classical arms control process of "agreements between adversaries," but the extent to which the Soviet Union and the United States actually remain adversaries will probably determine the fate of the freeze.

Implicit differences in fundamental goals, or a lack of clarity about what ultimate goals their policies are designed to support, can lead organizations to radically different prescriptions for policy even though they share the same short-term objectives. For example, most groups working on nuclear arms control issues favor a "no-first-use" policy for the United States. Some organizations, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, have suggested that this transition be facilitated by augmentation and improvement of conventional forces, permitting them to shoulder the deterrent burden now being carried by tactical nuclear forces. Other organizations—such as SANE, Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, and Mobilization for Survival—whose primary concerns include foreign intervention and the military budget, argue that the suggested improvements in the mobility and firepower of U.S. conventional forces will merely elicit similar Soviet improvements and make both superpowers even more combative and intervention-prone. An enhanced capacity in conventional forces must not be accepted as the price for gradual denucleariza-

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# Reagan Urged to Seek Arms Breakthrough

## SALT Negotiators List Approaches for Summit Meeting With Gorbachev

By David B. Ottaway  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The two chief U.S. negotiators of the SALT I and II arms-control agreements yesterday urged President Reagan to use the forthcoming summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to achieve a "major breakthrough" like that achieved by then-President Gerald R. Ford and Leonid Brezhnev in 1974.

At a news conference, Gerard Smith and Paul Warnke presented a statement signed by 22 other national security experts and 12 national organizations calling upon the president "to break the deadlock" in arms-control talks at Geneva, which resume next week, and ease tensions between the two superpowers.

The conference was arranged by the public interest group Common Cause at what was described by its president, Fred M. Wertheimer, as the start of a national campaign to pressure the White House to seek substantive accords at the Nov. 19-20 summit meeting in Geneva.

The statement listed seven steps the two leaders might take and said agreement on one or more would make "an important contribution" toward lessening risk of nuclear war and reducing tensions.

Warnke, chief negotiator of the unratified 1979 SALT II accords, said he was concerned about White House suggestions that little of substance should be expected from the summit, an attitude he called "basically a triumph of low expectations."

"Our feeling is that the president can do better, that he should do better," he said. "This can be much more than just a get-acquainted session. Whether by luck, inadvertence or crafty design, there is now an opportunity, we feel, for a major breakthrough."

Warnke argued that the precedent Reagan should consider is the summit in Vladivostok, where Ford and Brezhnev broke a two-year deadlock in negotiations by agreeing to the basic principles of nuclear parity and arms ceilings that provided the foundation for the SALT II agreement reached five years later. Although never ratified by the Senate, the treaty has been observed by both superpowers.

In a related event, Reagan, meeting with his negotiators before their return to the Geneva arms talks, called upon the Soviets to offer concrete proposals to "get the talks moving." Reagan said arms control would be "one of the important parts" of the agenda for the summit with Gorbachev.

Smith, chief negotiator of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, said the "most important priority" now is to preserve the progress the two superpowers had already made in past arms-control agreements. He emphasized the need for an agreement at the November summit



Paul Warnke, left, and Gerard Smith present statement asking Reagan to break arms control deadlock.

on at least the first two of the seven proposals he and Warnke presented.

Those proposals call for a reaffirmation of the present policy of not undercutting the 1979 SALT II accords, and a new commitment to uphold and strengthen the ABM Treaty. Other suggested steps include a moratorium on testing antisatellite weapons and a temporary halt of nuclear testing pending agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

Additional proposals are for a U.S.-Soviet agreement to bar countermeasures preventing the gathering of telemetry data on missile tests, another agreement to halt deployment of new

multiple-warhead, long-range missiles, and third agreement on an interim strategic arms accord.

Among those signing the statement were William L. Colby, former Central Intelligence Agency director; Cyrus R. Vance, former secretary of state; Theodore M. Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University; Donald M. Fraser, mayor of Minneapolis; John Kenneth Galbraith, former U.S. ambassador to India; Morton Halperin, former deputy assistant secretary of defense; Stanley Resor, former secretary of the army, and Raymond Garthoff and Lawrence Weiler, both members of the SALT I delegation.





## WHAT IS BENS?

Business Executives for National Security is a non-partisan trade association with over 2,500 members in almost every state and more than half of the Congressional districts. BENS members are business executives, entrepreneurs, and self-employed professionals who work to reduce the threat of nuclear war and promote a strong, effective, and affordable national defense. BENS represents not the 23,000 prime defense contractors, although some defense contractors are members, but rather the nation's other thirteen million businesses.

BENS sees our national security as resting upon the strength of our economy and the vitality of our institutions, as well as the size of our arsenals. Thus the foundations of our national security are threatened by the nuclear arms race and its attendant risk of nuclear war, as well as by wasteful and excessive spending on weapons that don't work or aren't needed. Our national security depends on integrating coherent defense strategies with a sound defense budget. BENS stresses the need for using sound business principles and avoiding the hazards of poor planning and budgeting.

BENS members come from a broad spectrum of American business, from small independent firms to Fortune 500 corporations. Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, they are diverse in their politics but united in their recognition that business insights can help make this country more secure.

With their authority, position, expertise, and power, BENS members are uniquely positioned to positively influence defense policy. And as members of a non-partisan national organization, they can effectively exercise this influence.

## BENS IS A NEW KIND OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION

### BENS IS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER TRADE ASSOCIATIONS.

Most trade associations help particular industries or support businesses of a certain size, in order to get them more business. BENS, on the other hand, works towards strengthening the entire economy by cutting wasteful defense spending and reducing the deficit. BENS works on defense issues from the point of view of the entire business community — not just defense contractors, but all of American business.

### BENS' BUSINESS SENSE CAN MAKE THIS COUNTRY SAFER AND STRONGER

BENS is applying business principles to increase our real national security. A business executive knows that a company can't survive without a coherent, rational strategy and a budget that makes sense. And a company can't afford to buy materials that are too expensive, or to market products that don't work. A business executive knows that competition between suppliers improves the quality and reduces the cost of doing business. This is the kind of business common sense that is urgently needed in defense policy. Without it, we have inflated prices, cost overruns, weapons that don't work, and the purchase of redundant and unnecessary nuclear weapons that increase the risk of nuclear war.

### BENS FOCUSES ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUES

#### BENS:

- o advocates freezing federal spending at current levels;
- o supported legislation to require warranties on Pentagon equipment purchases;
- o lobbied for legislation to promote competition in military procurement;
- o advocated setting up an office to independently test and evaluate weapons;
- o opposes the MX missile as unnecessary, costly, destabilizing, and vulnerable; and
- o supports a bilateral verifiable nuclear freeze as the first step towards stopping the arms race.

### BENS IS MAKING A DIFFERENCE

Last year, BENS led an effort to freeze the entire federal budget. This year, we will continue to lead this effort. BENS contributed to the lobbying effort that convinced Congress to halt further development of the MX, pending reconsideration in the spring of 1985. Congress has passed BENS-supported legislation to increase competition in Pentagon purchases, to independently test and evaluate Pentagon weapons purchases, and to require warranties on the equipment the Pentagon does buy. BENS has been praised by members of Congress for its knowledgeable work on these issues. BENS' story has been told in prominent national publications such as the Wall Street Journal, Inc. Magazine, and the Christian Science Monitor.



## BENS and the MX

As a trade association providing business insights on national security issues, BENS generally avoids lobbying for or against specific weapons systems. BENS does call attention to flaws in weapons systems when such flaws help to illustrate larger problems in national security decision-making, like unbusinesslike planning or the lack of independent testing of equipment.

The MX has been an exception to this.

Having examined the MX program carefully for almost 3 years, BENS concluded:

■ the program's "justifications" are contradictory — dangerously so for a nuclear weapon;

■ exceptional performance claims are being made for the MX without any operational testing; and  
■ at \$25-45 billion, the program is too redundant and too expensive to be produced at a time of massive federal deficits.

BENS previously has urged Congress to suspend or cancel the MX program. This year BENS again lobbied against it.

Early in March, a BENS Action Alert was sent to all 3,000 BENS members, urging them to personally contact their members of Congress and express opposition to continuation of the MX program.

continued on next page

Congress continued from page 1

In previous years, only the House of Representatives had felt the full force of the MX debate. But the Senate, long regarded as heavily pro-MX, astonished official Washington last year by casting a tie vote on a motion (that BENS helped craft) to suspend production of the MX. So this year the Senate became a center of the MX battle for the first time.

Under the terms of a previous agreement, the Senate was required to vote on the MX before the House this year.

By two votes, on March 19 and 20, the Senate agreed to release the \$1.5 billion for 21 more MX missiles. Both votes were 55-45. The House granted its approval on March 26 and 28 by votes of 219-213 and 217-210. The latter vote marked the seventh occasion the MX has survived by 10 votes or fewer; no weapons program in American history has so deeply divided Congress and the American people.

The principal contention of this year's MX backers, including the President himself, was that Congress should approve more MX missiles as a signal to the Soviets of American resolve in the recently-revived Geneva arms limitation talks. "Protecting the peace and working for a more secure and stable future" necessitated the MX, the President stated. Voting for it would represent "a commitment... to do everything possible to achieve significant arms reductions," he said. When vote projections on the eve of Congressional action showed the MX losing, arms reduction negotiator Max Kampelman was flown in to lobby for more MX missiles. By almost all accounts, the "Geneva argument" saved the weapon system.

The mood in Congress was scarcely one of enthusiasm for the MX, however. Reluctant MX supporter Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) summed up the feelings of many when he told reporters, "I'm OD'd

on the MX."

And Congress moved with unusual speed to finally clamp a lid on the program. Before the full House even voted on the MX in March, the House Appropriations Committee surprised many observers by recommending against MX funding in what was supposed to have been a *pro forma* vote in favor of the funding. The Committee's action contributed to the closeness of the subsequent House votes.

No sooner were the House votes tallied than 4 influential Senate Democrats who had supported the MX announced that they would move to halt MX deployment at 40 missiles. The Senators — Sam Nunn (GA), Robert Byrd (WV), David Boren (OK) and Albert Gore (TN) — indicated that they would oppose the proposed 1986 purchase of 48 additional missiles.

Within a week of the Congressional votes, the solidly pro-MX Senate Armed Services Committee voted to chop the remainder of the MX program in half. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-WI), leader of the MX supporters in the House, announced that he "expected" his Committee to slash the program even further. Key MX backer Rep. Norman Dicks (D-WA) said that he was giving serious consideration to "zeroing out" [eliminating] all of the remaining MX program, and his view was echoed even more strongly by members of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, which have control over any future MX funds.

It may be that the MX finally has exhausted its political support. Having begun with great fanfare as a huge deployment of hundreds of new land-based nuclear missiles, the program appears to be grinding to a bitter, rancorous halt at 40 to 42 new missiles — and a legacy of enormous political costs to many of its backers. (See accompanying story.)



Some of the points the Action Alert noted:

The notion of the MX as a "bargaining chip" ignores negotiating experience. The Soviets traditionally have "bargained" for weapons systems yet to be produced. True to form, when production of the MX began last year, references to it quickly disappeared from Soviet pronouncements on arms control.

The Defense Department was requesting \$1.5 billion in MX production funds at a time when only \$150 million of the previously approved \$3 billion in MX production money had been spent. Thus the program could have been run on prior year funds long enough to evaluate the "bargaining chip" claim.

The question of MX funding was due to come up within a few months anyway, as a part of the regular cycle of military appropriations. A decision then would have offered a better vantage point on the Geneva negotiations than one made just after the negotiations had begun.

Serious questions about the MX's purpose, cost, and military need still were unanswered. New evidence was tending to support claims that the missile was wasteful, overrated, unnecessary, and dangerous.

BENS members responded very strongly to the Action Alert. Hundreds of telephone calls were made and telegrams sent to Congress. Some BENS members went even further. BENS members in California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Washington met with Senators and Congressmen from those states to personally urge an end to the MX program.

A BENS delegation in Philadelphia met with Congressman Larry Coughlin (R-PA), a high-ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee. Coughlin, a Marine combat veteran, is respected by Committee members on military issues. He subsequently voted against the MX in the Appropriations Committee (a key factor in the missile's defeat there) and repeated his vote on the floor of the House.

BENS members in another major city met with a Republican Congressman who was wavering on the MX. He subsequently announced his opposition to the missile — and stood by his decision even after a private meeting with President Reagan on the issue.

BENS members participating in the pilot National Political Action Program were especially active in pressing the MX issue on their Representatives, changing or solidifying about 5 votes on the MX.

In Washington, BENS lobbyists met with more than 40 Senators, Representatives, and Congress-

sional staffs on the MX issue. These meetings helped encourage a number of undecided Senators and Congressmen to vote against the MX, and probably were decisive in some instances.

BENS would like to acknowledge those Senators and Congressmen who showed outstanding political courage in opposing the MX despite particularly intense political pressures to support it. It would be impossible to acknowledge every such member of Congress, since much of what went on involving the MX will never be known publicly. But the following list represents, by consensus among MX opponents, those members of Congress who deserve extra thanks for the special courage they showed:

#### Representatives

Bill Alexander (D-AR)  
Charles Bennett (D-FL)  
Doug Bereuter (R-NE)  
Lindy Boggs (D-LA)  
Ronald Coleman (D-TX)  
Larry Coughlin (R-PA)  
Thomas Daschle (D-SD)  
Joseph J. DioGuardi (R-NY)  
Cooper Evans (R-IA)  
Thomas Foley (D-WA)  
Joseph Gaydos (D-PA)  
William Gradison (R-OH)  
Paul Henry (R-MI)  
William Hughes (D-NJ)  
Ed Jenkins (D-GA)  
Nancy Johnson (R-CN)  
James Jones (D-OK)  
Paul Kanjorski (D-PA)  
Matthew Martinez (D-CA)  
Nicolas Mavroules (D-MA)  
John Miller (R-WA)  
Dan Mica (D-FL)  
James R. Olin (D-VA)  
Thomas Petri (R-WI)  
Thomas Ridge (R-PA)  
Pat Roberts (R-KS)  
Charles Rose (D-NC)  
Marge Roukema (R-NJ)  
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI)  
Norman Sisisky (D-VA)  
Christopher Smith (R-NJ)  
Virginia Smith (R-NE)  
John Spratt (D-SC)  
Richard Stallings (D-ID)  
Robin Tallon (D-SC)  
Thomas Tauke (R-IA)  
Ed Zschau (R-CA)

#### Senators

Mark Andrews (R-ND)  
Lawton Chiles (D-FL)  
David Durenberger (R-MN)  
J. James Exon (D-NE)  
Charles Grassley (R-IA)  
J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA)  
Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-KS)  
Larry Pressler (R-SD)

BENS hopes that these members of Congress will continue to oppose the MX and that their political integrity on the issue will serve as an example to Congress when other national security questions are decided.



## The MX Vote in Perspective: A Political Analysis

Congressional action in March extended the controversial MX missile program. But the MX go-ahead could prove much more politically costly than is now realized. Here's why:

### 1. Military Justifications

By framing the MX issue in diplomatic rather than military terms, MX supporters basically conceded to critics' long-standing arguments that the system is costly, unnecessary, and vulnerable. With veteran supporters of military spending programs like Rep. Samuel Stratton (D-NY) arguing that the U.S. could not "expect to achieve any effective arms agreement without the MX" and sidestepping questions about the MX's merits, undecided members of Congress deduced — in droves — that the MX lacked any military justification. This impression was augmented when influential Congressional defense spokesmen like Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) announced their support for the MX with the deepest reservations and ambivalence about its military value. "There are not 30 people out there [in the Senate] who think you ought to build MX," Senator Lawton Chiles (D-FL), an MX opponent, remarked. "A lot of them say, 'If anything happened at Geneva we'd be blamed.'"

Abandoning any major attempt to justify the MX militarily was probably a crucial error by MX backers. The "diplomatic timing" argument, so influential in this round of voting, is unlikely to present itself again. Encasing the MX in a diplomatic rationale traded a temporary tactical gain for a major strategic loss: frozen MX funds were released, but at the price of serious, probably irreparable, damage to any credible military justification for basing nuclear missiles at fixed sites. A related and more profound impact of the whole MX debate was that it forced Congress to spend months re-evaluating nuclear weapons policy at a time of deepening public doubt about such weapons.

Had the MX's backers sought a quiet compromise rather than a test of strength, its military limitations might never have gained wide Congressional awareness, especially in the Senate. As one long-time political observer put it, the legislative strategy on the MX "postponed, but made inevitable, a day of reckoning."

### 2. Domestic Bargaining Chips

**A wide swath of Congress and much of the public was exposed to the kind of disturbing "trades"**

**and "deals" on military spending that normally occur much more privately, and involve far fewer members of Congress. A New York Times report noted a widely-observed case:**

Congressman Harold Rogers, a Kentucky Republican ... wanted the Administration to show more concern about the tobacco subsidy program. He received the assurances he wanted at a White House meeting and voted for the MX.

Rep. Stephen Neal (D-NC), who had previously sought to suspend MX production, was concerned about plans by Republican campaign officials to spend heavily against him and 24 other House Democrats in the 1986 elections. He brought the matter up at a meeting with President Reagan on the MX, and received assurance from White House political operative Edward Rollins that the campaign spending plans would be called off. Neal voted for the MX. (Later, Republican Campaign Committee Chairman Guy Vander Jagt (R-MI) stated that the campaign against Neal and the other Democrats might go on anyway without official White House approval.)

Rep. Tommy Robinson (D-AR), a freshman member who has just gained a seat on the House Armed Services Committee, said that he favored the MX all along, but used the issue as "a bargaining chip with the White House" to have 1,100 Air Force civilian jobs transferred to a base in his district. "One has to look out for one's self and one's district," Robinson said. "That's just the way the game is played." Robinson voted for the MX.

Asked if the Administration was buying MX votes, House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-TX) replied, "No, just renting them."

Pentagon contractors lobbied much more visibly than usual, as well. Freshman Republican Representative Jim Kolbe of Arizona, who is not a member of any defense-related committee or subcommittee, probably would not have been approached by weapons contractors under normal circumstances. But Clinton E. Rouche, a consultant to MX contractor GTE, met with Kolbe to give him the complete "briefing package" prepared by a group of MX contractors, as well as a desk set of models of Soviet and U.S. intercontinental missiles. "Kolbe ran on a platform of generic support for the President," Rouche said. "So anyone who supports the MX wants to make sure he is briefed to the teeth." (Kolbe, who also voted for the MX, said that a meeting with arms negotiator Max Kampelman was "very persuasive" in his decision.)

continued on next page



Of the 20 House members who had received more than \$15,000 in campaign contributions from military contractors, 17 voted for the missile; so did 13 of the 14 Senators who received more than \$30,000 in such contributions. (The Senate exception — Louisiana Democrat J. Bennett Johnston.)

This atmosphere of blandishments by the White House and the contractors — for a weapons system supposedly crucial to U.S. national security — reinforced the image of the MX as both unnecessary and undesirable.

### 3. The Deficit-Cutting Consensus

The "hard sell" for the \$20 — 45 billion MX on non-military grounds has heightened Congress' cynicism about the whole military budget, and increased Congressional suspicions about the Administration's sincerity on deficit reductions. Conservative Congressman J. J. Pickle (D-TX) captured this spirit during the debate on the MX. "If the House is serious about cutting the massive budget deficit, then the House must reasonably restrain government spending," Pickle declared. "The first, most obvious step in this direction is to withhold MX funds." House Budget Committee Chairman William H. Gray (D-PA) was blunt about the MX's effect on the rest of President Reagan's military budget. "I think it's going to boomerang," Gray said. "I think winning here is going to hurt him. He used his bargaining chip here."

### 4. Geneva Expectations

The emphasis on the need for the MX to insure negotiating success at Geneva has raised public expectations about the negotiations to a much higher level. Should no "success" at Geneva occur, there is likely to be a major political reaction against the MX and much of the policy underlying it. As reluctant MX supporter Sen. John Chafee (R-RI) put it, "I am saying to the President and his negotiators, 'I don't want any excuses. I expect you to come back with an agreement. I don't want anybody saying you would have succeeded but for lack of the MX'" (emphasis added).

### 5. Increased Partisanship

The strenuous efforts to enforce Republican "party discipline" on the MX, which enjoyed moderate success, must be weighed against the unprecedented unity the issue triggered among Democrats. Despite the intense pressure, 24 House Republicans voted against the MX — virtually the

same number as last year. At the same time, polarizing the issue along party lines galvanized Democrats. The entire Democratic leadership of the House opposed the missile for the first time. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin (D-WI), the leading House Democrat to favor the missile, was loudly booed and hissed by his Democratic colleagues as he spoke — a highly unusual type of occurrence on the House floor. Half the House's Southern Democrats, traditionally strong and all-but-unanimous supporters of Pentagon requests, voted against the MX in March. And Senate Democrats who had grudgingly voted for the MX quickly distanced themselves from it. On March 28, Senate Democratic leader Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), ranking Senate Armed Services Committee Democrat Sam Nunn (D-GA), Sen. Albert Gore (D-TN), and Sen. David Boren (D-OK) jointly announced their support for a cap on MX deployment at 40 missiles — 2 fewer than the 42 Congress has authorized for production. Influential House MX supporter Norman Dicks (D-WA) said the program was "down to the end of the road." Many Democrats have begun calling opposition to the MX a "litmus test" for anyone seeking a leadership position in their party. Democrats have almost never shown this degree of party unity on defense questions, particularly on those involving nuclear weapons. This closing of ranks within the Democratic Party's leadership may well be of historic significance for future military and nuclear weapons issues. It will clearly have a major impact, even in the short run, should the Democrats regain control of the Senate in 1986, as is predicted by many.

### Outlook

Seen in this perspective, the MX's slender "victory" looks a great deal like a winning battle in a losing war. Congressman Vic Fazio (D-CA), an MX supporter who called the issue the most divisive in his political career, said, "We're like two tired fighters going through the motions in the late rounds." House Republican Leader Bob Michel (R-IL) virtually invited his colleagues to vent their frustrations on the remainder of the MX program as well as the whole defense budget: "If you want to take a shot at defense — and everyone seems to want to," Michel conceded, "do it in the right place." House Republican Whip Trent Lott (R-MS), an MX backer, summed it up this way: "The message from Congress is yes, we'll go forward this time. But I think we're going to be very cautious and hesitant to take any big step after this one."



# Activists begin vigil against arms race at base missile office

By ANDREW MANN

Sun Staff Writer

**SAN BERNARDINO** — With the roar of military aircraft landing in the background, anti-nuclear activists began a three-day vigil outside the Ballistic Missile Office at Norton Air Force Base to protest the continuing arms race.

The event is the conclusion of a two-week observance, coordinated by the Inland Peace Action Center of San Bernardino, commemorating the 40-year anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

Chris Brown, director of the center, said some 100 people were scheduled throughout the 72 hours to stand vigil outside the missile headquarters at Mill Street and Tippecanoe Avenue. The three days symbolizes the period between the bombing of Hiroshima and the atomic attack of Nagasaki three days later, he said.

About 25 people gathered at 5:30 p.m. for the vigil's beginning. They sang spiritual songs, including one with the appropriate line "ain't gonna study war no more."

The Ballistic Missile Office was targeted for the vigil because it is the headquarters for the Air Force's MX Peacekeeper missile program, as well as where the planned Midgetman missile is being researched.

"This office is the focus of all the missile development in the Air Force," Brown told those gathered. "The Midgetman is being developed here. The research on the MX was conducted here. Let's hope no other weapons are developed here."

As motorists passed by or were stopped at the intersection, activists passed out anti-nuclear literature, including a flyer comparing the three megatons of atomic arms used in World War II to the

20,000 megatons now stored in the world's nuclear arsenal.

Most motorists took notice of the demonstration — either honking in support as they drove by or heckling in disapproval.

Those gathered were of varying ages and backgrounds, but one common thread running through them was their commitment to ending the arms race.

One of those gathered was Bob Moore of Redlands, a U.S. History professor at Valley College, who said that "the greatest danger man faces is nuclear war."

Moore, 56, said he just arrived home Monday from a three-week trip of the Soviet Union, where he said he met with peace activists in that country.

"What we're doing now here on a grassroots level would not be permitted in the Soviet Union," he said. But he added that people there have a genuine fear of war because of heavy casualties during the World War II.

"These people have a hatred of war and a fear of war. I will not apologize for their leaders."

While Moore said he doesn't consider himself a "pacifist," he said he believes the danger of nuclear war is very strong, especially by "miscalculation or error."

"I do not believe in waiting for leaders," Moore added. "In studying American history you discover that many of the major changes in society started out at the grassroots level."

Theresa Bachman, 28, of San Bernardino said that, for her, the issue is a religious one, and that she became involved in the anti-nuclear movement through the John 23rd Newman Center, a local Catholic center for young adults.

"As a Christian, I'm called to love and bring peace among nations," she said. "We need to start

converting all this technology and resources to peaceful alternatives."

"It's definitely a religious and moral issue," Ethel Callahan, 74, of Redlands commented. "As long as we keep building these weapons, how are we going to feed the hungry and get justice in the world?"

Callahan said she's been involved with Churchwomen United, a group dedicated to "peace and justice issues." She said she toured with the group through

Central America three years ago and saw misery and hunger there.

Brown said throughout the vigil literature will be passed out to employees at the center. He said those in the vigil will provide statements on "why we are here" that will be printed and given to the workers "to let them know that we're human beings just like they are."

Major Barry Glickman, the missile office's spokesman, said the office had heard of the vigil through newspaper reports, but that there would be "normal busi-

ness as usual" throughout the three days. He said no problems were anticipated for the vigil as long as it is peaceful.

"It's kind of what we're here for, so people are free to do this," Glickman said Tuesday before the vigil began.

He said nearly 800 people are employed at the Ballistic Missile Office, including 482 military personnel and 300 civilians, most of whom are engineers involved in the research and development of the MX and Midgetman programs.

Glickman said the headquarters have been in San Bernardino since 1960, and that it has been at Mill and Tippecanoe since 1982. The office is just outside the gates of Norton Air Force Base.

Brown said many area residents are not even aware that most of the development of the Air Force's nuclear arms is taking place in their own backyard.

"I think what we're doing is going to wake people up. A lot of people don't realize that a lot of this stuff is done here. I don't think people realize how many millions dollars go through here."





Staff photo by David Schreyer

Protesting about nuclear arms at Norton Air Force Base's front gate are John Longville, left, and John Ragsdale.



On November 19, 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will meet in Geneva for their long-awaited summit. The most pressing issue on the agenda of the two world leaders will be reducing the risk of nuclear war. All of the world will be watching for any sign of progress on the most important issue of our time.

"From Trinity to Star Wars," just one week before this historic meeting, will provide a key opportunity for conference participants and viewers across the country to gain an understanding of the present situation between the US and USSR, the increasing risk of nuclear war, and the issues that will be under discussion in Geneva.

Panelists appearing on the program will address technological trends which undermine stability between the superpowers, factors that increase the chance of nuclear war during an escalating international crisis, and measures that could be taken to reduce the nuclear risk.

The program will be moderated by Hodding Carter. Panelists will include:

**Dr. Paul Bracken**, Associate Professor, Yale School of Management, author of *Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*

**Ambassador Jonathan Dean**, Head of the US Delegation to the NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Reduction Negotiations, 1978-1981

**The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.**, United States Senator, Tennessee

**Dr. Henry Kendall**, Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Chairman, Union of Concerned Scientists

The program will also feature a specially produced interview with **Robert McNamara**, in which the former Secretary of Defense will set forth his views on what the two superpowers should do to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

## Format of the Video Conference

The program will take place on November 12, 1985 from 8 to 10 pm, EST. It will be televised live from the studios of WETA in Washington, DC to six conference sites around the country: Amherst, MA, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. Each of these sites will be equipped with large video projection screens and direct voice connection to the WETA studios. During the program, local audiences will be able to formulate and address questions to the panelists in Washington.

"From Trinity to Star Wars" will also be broadcast via a variety of cable TV systems. This will allow individuals or community groups to view the program even if they are not able to attend any of the conference sites in the seven cities above. Information on how and where the program can be seen can be obtained by calling 1-800-CALL-800 after October 15, 1985. Operators will provide information on the availability of the program in all parts of the country.

## Union of Concerned Scientists' Action Network

This video conference, like its two predecessors, is run under the aegis of UCS's Action Network. Formed in 1982, the Action Network coordinates scientists nationwide in a variety of educational and legislative activities designed to support arms control.

## Registration

To register to attend one of the seven conference sites, please fill out the enclosed registration form. We encourage you to register for a specific site as soon as possible, as available space at each location is limited, and registration will be closed once available seating has been taken. There is a \$10 registration fee.

By returning the enclosed registration form and a check for \$10.00, you will receive confirmation of your registration, a ticket for entry to the site of your

choice, background information on the video conference, and a copy of the new UCS report: *Toward a New Security: Lessons of the Forty Years Since Trinity*.

We urge you to inform your colleagues of this important event and we hope you will participate.

Yes, I would like to attend a video conference site in my area. I have enclosed \_\_\_\_\_ (\$10.00 per reservation) for \_\_\_\_\_ reservations to the following site:

- Locations:**
- Amherst, Massachusetts, 8:00 - 10:00 pm  
Hampshire College
  - Atlanta, 8:00 - 10:00 pm  
site to be announced
  - Chicago, 7:00 - 9:00 pm  
site to be announced
  - Dallas, 7:00 - 9:00 pm  
Marriott - Market Center
  - Philadelphia, 8:00 - 10:00 pm  
Marriott - City Line
  - San Francisco, 5:00 - 7:00 pm  
Holiday Inn - Golden Gate
  - Washington, DC, 8:00 - 10:00 pm  
WETA Studios

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone: w \_\_\_\_\_ h \_\_\_\_\_

Please enclose this coupon and registration fee in the return envelope and return to the Union of Concerned Scientists by October 15.



# **THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, FOR HOLDING FAST ON YOUR HISTORIC STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, THE HIGH ROAD TO PEACE IN THE WORLD!**

● You have started us on a path that will ensure a peaceful and secure Free World in the future, and will ensure your place in history.

● You have seized the moral high ground from those who would have our children live perpetually in the dangerous world of Mutual Assured Destruction, aptly called MAD.

● You have resisted the blandishments and threats of the Soviet Union who wish us to remain undefended in the face of their massive nuclear buildup.

● You have preserved the opportunity to test promising technical options for defense against nuclear weapons, and with it, at least the possibility that you, and not some future president, will make the decision to deploy a space shield.

● You have preserved for us and the whole world the historic opportunity to create a non-nuclear protective system that will get us off the nuclear treadmill.

● You have opened the door for true arms control, a search for Mutual Assured Security instead of an unending race to maintain equal levels of destructive nuclear power under Mutual Assured Destruction.



We realize, Mr. President, that powerful forces remain at work to derail you from this high purpose; some because they are politically and historically wedded to the old strategy of MAD; some because they fear any course of action that annoys the Soviet Union; some because they see the tattered ABM Treaty often violated by the Soviets as a sort of "sacred" document; and some object simply because SDI is your initiative, not theirs.

But rest assured, Mr. President, that you have the strong support of this bi-partisan Coalition, formally representing millions of Americans and informally representing the overwhelming majority of Americans, who in poll after poll applaud the idea of space-borne defenses against nuclear missiles.



● You have given new hope to those who had been led to believe that our only options were accommodation with the Soviets or nuclear apocalypse.

● You have unleashed a surge of technological advance in the U.S. and in the rest of the Free World which will not only solve the technical problems of strategic defense, but will also open up space to tap its unlimited resources of material and energy and its unique manufacturing environment for the good of mankind.

● You have made it possible that in the year 1992, 500 years after Columbus opened up the frontiers of the New World, the U.S. and its Free World allies will open up the high frontier of space for our security and our prosperity as space-faring nations. Free enterprise investment in space systems demands long term security be provided, and SDI is an essential first step in this direction.

We urge you, Mr. President, to stay the course. No Soviet propaganda or promise of arms reductions should persuade us to forego the historic opportunity to once again defend ourselves. Nor should any scheme, such as prolongation of the ABM Treaty designed to deny you the opportunity to build our defenses as soon as technology permits, be part of any agreement with Mr. Gorbachev.

Get our children out from under the nuclear Sword of Damocles. Free men for centuries will never forget your role in delivering them from the nuclear balance of terror.

## COALITION FOR THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE



### Join and Support the Coalition

The bi-partisan Coalition for SDI was formed to combine the efforts of all international, national and state organizations that support the development of non-nuclear defenses for the U.S. and the Free World.

The Coalition for SDI addresses no other issue. Although recently formed, it consists of over 40 organizations and 70 U.S. Senators and Representatives and is growing rapidly.

We urge you and your organization to become part of this vital and historic effort. Please help us get this peaceful and hopeful message out to people everywhere. Use the coupon on this paper to join us.

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