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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
241	MEMO	RAYMOND TO WILLIAM CLARK RE WAR CRIMES GRAND JURY <i>R 1/3/2018 M443/1</i>	1	12/30/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

national security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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13924

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 30, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ^{WR} WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SIGNED

SUBJECT: War Crimes Grand Jury

Leo Cherne contacted me and asked if I could appeal to you for help one more time on this subject. As you recall, several months ago you sent a letter to Edward Bennett Williams encouraging him to help on this issue. He has agreed. Leo has asked for this letter to Peter O'Donnell as a preliminary to a meeting that Leo and Frank Barnett will have with him. Ed Williams' role will be largely in putting the program together and developing an international jury. Leo hopes to enlist Peter O'Donnell in raising the necessary private funds to underwrite a portion of this endeavor.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Peter O'Donnell underscoring your interest in a program to pressure the Soviets for their CBW violations.

Approve *WR*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Letter to Peter O'Donnell

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M443/1 #13924

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Raymond:
F14R

January 10, 1983

Dear Peter:

Attached is a very creative proposal for a "trial by jury" of the Soviet Union, whose use of chemical agents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan deserves the most careful international scrutiny and judgment. Our good friends Leo Cherne and Frank Barnett have developed this proposed "trial", in which the highest standards of international jurisprudence would be upheld. Obviously under today's circumstances of international law, we cannot expect the World Court or other international bodies to take up this case. Thus, we must rely on the private sector to bring the best judicial minds to bear on it, weighing the very considerable amount of evidence available today.

Edward Bennett Williams has also expressed his willingness to help in trying to bring the Soviet violation of international covenants into public scrutiny. I would hope that you could talk to Leo or Frank in the near future to discuss this project. I would be most appreciative of anything you could do to help us in this effort.

Thanking you in advance for your consideration, I am

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

Attachment

Proposal: The Yellow Rain Trial

cc: Leo Cherne

Mr. Peter O'Donnell, Jr.
4275 National Bank Building
Dallas, Texas 75202

The Yellow Rain Trial: A Proposal

Proposal

propose the establishment of a privately organized War Crimes Grand Jury whose purpose is to examine the evidence of and pass judgment on the alleged use of chemical agents by the Soviet Union and its proxies. In its first phase, the Jury would collect data and testimony on the Soviet use of chemicals. After sufficient evidence had been collected, the jury would announce its verdict and recommend suitable action by the UN, the International Court of Justice, and other relevant bodies.

Justifications

An independent Grand Jury is the best possible vehicle for addressing the accusations of chemical warfare by Soviet and Soviet supported forces. The UN investigation is constrained by its very nature; the influence of Soviet, Soviet bloc, and sympathetic Third World countries makes a truly impartial hearing impossible. The Grand Jury, if properly conducted, could focus world attention on the growing body of evidence of Soviet misconduct. The impact of such a tribunal on world opinion and Soviet behavior is potentially great.

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tribunal would be situated in a European capital; Paris is perhaps the ideal location. France is sufficiently independent from the United States to avoid the charge that it is simply acting as a client-state of the U.S.

Jury should consist of eminent retired statesmen, jurists, university presidents, authors, labor leaders, scientists et. al.

Jury must be truly international, so as to illustrate that the issue is of global concern. Leading personages from the Third World especially those regions directly affected by yellow rain, must be included, perhaps even comprising a majority.

International commissions tend to be identified with the name of their leader -- i.e. the Palmer Report, the Brandt Report, the Grand Russell Tribunal. The following are eminent Asian statesmen whose names are known internationally. One of them, or someone of equal stature, should chair the committee.

a. Thanat Khoman, ex-Foreign Secretary, now Deputy Prime Minister, of Thailand;

Goh Keng Swee, former Defense and Education Minister
Singapore;

Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Secretary of the Philippines;

Prime Minister Sirimavo R.D. Bandaranaike, leader of
Lanka Freedom Party.

Publicizing is of course a prerequisite to an effective tribunal.
Funds are solicited from existing groups with humanitarian
interests such as the International Rotary, CARE, International
Red Cross, and Amnesty International. Direct mail solicitation
has the dual purpose of raising money and publicizing the
work of individual citizens in its work. Preliminary
experience in the U.S. foundations indicate that securing minimally
adequate financing should not prove difficult.

The primary goal of the tribunal must be to "stop the killing."
The use of chemical weapons has horrified mankind for centuries,
and will not be tolerated by the international community.
The most valuable contribution the jury could make would be to
deter violent behavior away from further atrocities. Another
goal would be the awakening of world opinion to the realities of

Soviet aggression. Finally, "Peace" movements in Europe and United States would be forced to deal with the issues of armament in a more complex and even-handed manner, or forfeit dignity.

Recommendation

Assuming general consensus that the idea of a Grand Jury is to be pursued, the first step would be to organize an ad hoc committee to:

- a. nominate and recruit candidates to serve on the Grand Jury;
- b. help nominate and/or select the executive personnel;
- c. ensure that accurate data and credible witness are forthcoming.

Conclusion:

For such a program is to be successful there will be a need, quite separately from the Tribunal, to design a world media campaign to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet Union to stop the use of nuclear weapons. Several strategies suggest themselves.

testimony and evidence should be broadcast from Western sources to the USSR and Eastern Europe, as well as through conventional channels to the world at large. Following a verdict, environmental groups in Europe and the United States should be encouraged to publicize the issue further. Demonstrations could be organized in front of Soviet embassies throughout Europe, Japan, and the Third World. Peace and Disarmament Movements, which have hitherto focused their efforts on the United States, would be challenged to direct at least part of their energies against Soviet chemical aggression.

SPG

3/1/8
from Bill Br
h-524-8775

Walt,

Enclosed are a draft memorandum and attachments that outline a proposed OSD program for public diplomacy conferences. The program is still only draft because some of the contractors have not submitted final proposals and, more importantly, Stilwell, Perle, and Ikle have not yet had time to look at it. Some of the documents are only skeletal; they're included in that form in order to elicit suggestions.

Regarding the CV you requested, my latest is one I put together for OSD. Copies of it and my updated 171 for State are enclosed. They will give you some idea of my background. You'll find that my path to Washington was even more indirect than most.

The rest of this letter addresses political and philosophical issues of arms control relevant to how we should handle "yellow rain." I've been pondering these issues ever since I got into the arms control game eight years ago, but especially over the last two years, and I've been trying for several months to lay out my arguments systematically in what is becoming a very long paper. As I have not yet succeeded, you are getting a collection of observations rather than a fully developed line of argument. They will give you some sense of my thinking on this subject.

Some of my comments are critical of the Administration. They are meant to be constructive, not damaging, and I don't make them to persons who would use them against the Administration.

I took your comment on "yellow rain" broadly as raising the question of how to criticize the Soviet Union while engaging in arms control negotiations. Superficially, that's easy to handle with the observation that we're not negotiating with the Soviets because they're nice folks, but because they're dangerous and we're looking for ways to reduce the risk of conflict with them.

That simple answer may not be very helpful with a complicated political problem. It requires a supporting rationale. Maintaining public support for sound defense and foreign policies while negotiating with the Soviets is difficult and requires a well thought out strategy. I'm afraid that some of the Administration's politically expedient tactical decisions, such as to encourage optimism regarding the outcome of the Geneva negotiations, may have made development of such a strategy more difficult. Many of the small steps we've taken under duress, and often in the absence of careful consideration of long-term military and political consequences, have constrained our policy options. The decision last year to adopt the position of "freeze later" forfeited many of the best arguments against a freeze and made the Administration look cynical. Given the Administration's public statements and political commitments, the best we can do

now is to begin the slow process of improving the political climate in order to regain political maneuvering room.

I believe that the best way to do that is not always by taking arms control issues on directly, but by building public understanding of Soviet strategy--not in detail but broadly. My ideal would be for American citizens to be able to "smell" Soviet involvement in some activity the way they can "smell" Mafia involvement in a murder. No one had to await the verdict of a jury to know that Allen Dorfman had been killed by a mob; the style gave it away. No one should have to await the verdict of history to know that the Soviet Union is involved in El Salvador. If the public can't "smell" that, it's our fault, not theirs. No other group can put such matters in strategic perspective for the American public, except perhaps the KGB.

The fundamental reason for the size and nature of many of our national security programs is that we are threatened by the Soviet Union. The public must understand the scope of that threat, at least in general terms, if it is to support our programs. The freeze movement here and the anti-nuclear movement in Europe indicate that the message is not getting through to many citizens. Too many people believe that the United States Government or nuclear weapons (for the invention and improvement of which we are held responsible) are the problem, not the Soviet Union. Our task is not to argue the fine points of a nuclear freeze, but to inform the public why a freeze is a phony proposal that detracts from realistic consideration of serious matters. The real task is to rebuild a consensus that the Soviet Union is a threat to the West and to rally support for defense against that threat. That is more of a problem in Europe than here, where recent polls indicate that over 70% of our population recognize that the Soviet Union is "hostile to our interests." The domestic problem is to harness that common sense to specific policies, such as a firm stand on arms control.

I'm convinced that we can gain broad public support for the Administration's national security policies, but it will require a degree of coordination not yet exercised by this Administration, and that almost certainly requires expanding the White House staff--and getting the speechwriters under control.

Clearly, we must be careful in describing the Soviet threat not to cause panic or to portray the Administration as bellicose, but those problems are easy to avoid, if given a little thought. Unfortunately, the Administration chose one of the worst devices for bringing the Soviet threat to the public's attentions, the "window of vulnerability." It helped marshal public support for a defense buildup for awhile, but ultimately it worked against us by contributing to panic regarding imminent nuclear war. It also does not describe circumstances very fully or accurately, hence

is easily discredited and undermines the Administration's case for defense.

Given the Administration's poor start on nuclear issues, our best bet now is to begin to shift the emphasis from nuclear weapons toward non-nuclear threats, conventional and unconventional. The trick is to be able to present the Soviet threat convincingly while engaging in arms control negotiations.

One of the unfortunate side effects of arms control negotiations is that they tend to create a need to apologize for our "negotiating partners" in order to maintain our own credibility. The problem is even worse than simply being inhibited from criticizing the Soviet Union for violating arms control agreements; it extends to moderating our description of the danger the Soviet Union poses to the West. The arms control process alone is not responsible for this pressure; there are plenty of other factors, such as the inability of most westerners to understand Soviet attitudes and methods, an American inclination to give the other guy the benefit of the doubt, wishful thinking in order to avoid having to face tough decisions, etc.

The usual argument is that Europeans--and even the American public--will not accept harsh descriptions of the USSR, so it is counterproductive to state them, but the choice is not just between strident rhetoric and tacit approval. Clearly, unsupported accusations can be ineffective or harmful, but that is not an argument against building a solid case, then making accusations in a moderate tone.

The argument against criticizing the USSR is, in unintended effect, an argument against building our defenses, because it takes away our best case for those defenses. The public cannot conclude that we need the forces we propose (and the intelligence capabilities, and the security assistance, and public diplomacy, and...) unless it shares our basic beliefs regarding the nature of the Soviet threat. If we suppress our description of that threat, we forfeit our claim to public support. We fall back on asking the public to have faith in our policies. That can't work. The sacrifices are too great for people to make them on our say so alone. We must convince the public of the intentions of the Soviet leadership to do us harm. Otherwise, totting up the numbers of missiles and tanks is meaningless. What's a little overkill one way or the other?

The critical missing ingredient in our public presentation of the Soviet threat--even in much internal discussion--is the context of Soviet strategy. Americans are not told that the SS-18 is related to the T-72 tank and the Operational Maneuver Group and Cuba and El Salvador and elements of the peace

movement. Many of them can't fit those pieces into a coherent picture of the danger we face. Individually, those ingredients may not seem especially threatening.

It is the responsibility of the Administration to begin explaining Soviet strategy simply and clearly by using the examples of Soviet attitudes that the Soviets supply almost daily. Afghanistan is a grand example of Soviet attitudes and of Soviet strategy about which we complain but say little instructive. Poland is an example of Soviet insistence on hegemony-- and of the misery that Soviet domination imposes--to which Westerners can relate.

And "yellow rain" is another fine example. We should use it not just as an occasion to accuse the Soviets of being bastards, but to illustrate their attitude toward the extermination of inconvenient human life, toward treaties, toward the public opinion that is supposed to restrain them as it does us, toward Moslems, toward a multitude of associated matters. (Some of these points are better made by persons outside the Administration, but we at least should avoid contradicting them.)

Occasional references to "yellow rain" as an example of Soviet perfidy do us more harm than the Soviet Union, because they reinforce the image of the Administration as being "anti-Soviet" without making a persuasive case for why we are concerned. Drawing the moral that Soviet use of "yellow rain" means that arms control agreements should contain better provisions for verification is something like concluding that the central lesson of the Nazi reoccupation of the Rhineland was that the Treaty of Versailles was poorly drafted.

The emphasis of the Administration should be on the nation's security, with arms control a possible--but not certain--contributor to that security. Arms control should be presented as one of the diplomatic tools used to pursue that security, but not as the sole or most important tool, and certainly not as an end in itself. The goal is peace with freedom, and the necessary condition is a military balance--and defense policies--that allow political change to occur only through genuinely peaceful means. The goal certainly is not simply reduction of arms.

Blaming weapons themselves or a mindless arms race for the dangers we face diverts public attention from the real problem; Soviet intentions and increasing Soviet ability to achieve their objectives. Blaming nuclear weapons--which is implied in our policy of pursuing reductions in nuclear weapons as a means of reducing the risk of war--especially hurts us. After all, we invented them and used them and are generally considered to have

the most and the best. At the very best, it puts us on the same moral level as the USSR as a threat to humanity; at the worst, it puts us below them as the evil genius that created the whole ugly mess and refuses to take the lead in making it go away.

Unfortunately, most members of the Administration have not had the time to reflect at length on why we are negotiating on arms control with the Soviets. The most immediate reason, and the worst, is that we have been pressured into it by insistent senators and a vocal minority of the public. In fact, because we were pressured from the start, we never really developed a rationale. We had an interagency exercise that was supposed to develop sound policies from scratch. Instead, it developed half a dozen feeble principles intended to guide policy development and negotiating, but it did not start at the beginning and reason through to a conclusion. We began with the assumption that arms control negotiations are politically essential and developed tactics to limit the damage. Conceding that necessity at the outset crippled the effort intellectually. Staffing the study mainly with persons who had been involved in the arms control negotiations of recent years insured that it would not depart radically from past policies. Not that radical changes would have been desirable in all cases, but we should have tried to maintain the intellectual objectivity to maintain or reject policies on their merits. (To be fair, I think that most high officials believed that that freedom was being exercised.)

We never did question what it was that we hoped to get out of arms control negotiations, or exactly what was the mechanism by which we would get it, or what was the likelihood of success, considering Soviet attitudes and the lessons of recent experiences with the Soviets. There's a raft of assumptions in the logic of arms control that go far beyond the experience of ordinary diplomacy.

One of the fundamental problems is that arms control theory tends to be built on a game theory that treats the players as interchangeable players ("the two superpowers"). It assumes sharing of numerous values, such as maintenance of international stability, prosperity for citizens, abhorrence of violence. These assumptions encourage a strong American tendency to mirror image, which ensures a misunderstanding of Soviet policies.

The supreme shared value, which often is considered to outweigh all differences between us and the Soviet Union, is a desire to avoid nuclear war. While true in part, this shared value hides important differences between us and the Soviets on nuclear war, on war in general, and on conflict between our systems. (The unthinkability of nuclear war contributes to unthinking attitudes toward other aspects of conflict. The Soviets have exploited this skillfully.)

Most Americans think of a stable military balance as a way to reduce the risk of war, whereas Soviet leaders think of Soviet military superiority as the only sure way to prevent war while also safeguarding and extending socialist gains. Superiority is necessary, too, in case the United States takes desperate steps to fend off certain defeat. With these different purposes for military forces, logic alone (not to mention NTM) tells us that we must have different goals for arms control negotiations. Given this one difference in outlook, it will be difficult, to say the least, to arrive at satisfactory results in arms control negotiations. It would be useful for the public to have information that would enable it to reach the same conclusion.

Perversely, every time the Administration makes an optimistic statement about arms control negotiations, it implicitly misleads the public on this and other important matters.

The left often portrays the tension in U.S.-Soviet relations as a misunderstanding that can be smoothed over if we just sit down and talk. Official suspicion of Soviet intentions is treated as ill-tempered or petty and immature and an obstruction to healthy relations. Dramatic but undocumented statements by the Administration encourage this attitude. Recall the President's statement that some members of the freeze movement are inspired by the Soviet Union. That statement was made with no preparation and not documentation, and the Administration backed away from it immediately. Larry Speakes told the press he didn't know where the President had gotten it or why he had said it, which made the President foolish. That statement did, indeed, hurt, but that doesn't mean that no attempt should have been made to get the message across, perhaps through someone else. The President might have been able to say something like that, eventually, if the way had been prepared. Certainly, if the public cannot be educated in recognizing a communist propaganda line, even when repeated by well meaning Americans, we are in for a long, hard, and losing battle.

23 Feb 83

MEMORANDUM FOR DUSD/P

SUBJECT: STRATEGY AND CONTRACTS FOR OSD PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROGRAM

With the help of Phil Peterson, and under the guidance of John Merrill and Walt Jajko, I have put together the first proposals for the OSD portion of the public diplomacy campaign. The attached schedule would obligate about two-thirds of the FY83 funds. At this stage, you might wish to consider what projects to fund in addition to these or whether to reprogram some of the \$3M for USD/P travel in connection with public diplomacy. Other contractors could be approached, or projects could be added to these. Decisions on these proposals should be made soon in order to get conferences underway this spring and early summer. Additional proposals should be solicited and approved within the next month if they are to result in conferences in late summer or fall.

Proposals for FY84 contracts have not yet been solicited.

ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

Before addressing the public diplomacy program itself, this memorandum raises two administrative matters that influence planning of the program: travel and OSD representation at conferences.

--Travel

You almost certainly will have to request additional travel funds for public diplomacy. Most of the participants in overseas conferences will be funded through contracts, but some official representation will be necessary. USIA may pay for some of this travel, especially if we schedule it well in advance and consult regarding the amount, but I believe you will want the flexibility of having travel funds available for USD/P that are not controlled by USIA. This might be arranged either by earmarking some of the \$3M that has been set aside for public diplomacy but not yet transferred to policy research or by requesting that new funds be found. John Merrill suggests that, in either case, money not be added to the USD/P travel fund but, instead, placed in a fund specifically for support of public diplomacy. There is precedent for asking for such funds for projects undertaken at the direction of the President.

--OSD Representation

Regarding OSD representation, John Merrill, Walt Jajko, and I

originally had discussed keeping OSD sponsorship of these conferences as nearly invisible as possible, which implied no official representation, even at a low level. However, given recent press reports, I believe that the best approach is to acknowledge--though not to emphasize--our sponsorship. If the sense we convey is of consultation, not indoctrination, reception in Europe should not be hostile. The conference topics are legitimate, papers presented will be scholarly, and participants and discussants will be balanced, within reason, so they should not be seen as propagandistic. We should be able to make a virtue of our willingness to engage in open debate on issues of concern to NATO.

There are several sound reasons for sending American representatives to some of these conferences. A very few conferences should include high-level representation--say, SACEUR or ASD/ISP. Some or all of these might be held outside the public diplomacy project but coordinated with it. For example, SHAPE could stage a conference in Brussels on the implications for NATO of recent developments in the Soviet military, as suggested by Phil Petersen (see attached list of proposed conferences). Smaller conferences on the same or related subjects could be held before and after, and some of the participants could attend both types of conferences. In planning these conferences, it will be important that someone be aware of how well they work and what changes in personnel or approach might be necessary. Contractors can do some of this, but USD/P should be designated to follow specific topics and should attend some conferences. (The possible use of NSIC and Ray Cline's Global Strategy Council in this role is discussed under PROPOSED CONTRACTORS.) Phil Petersen could do this very well on military matters. Harold Rhode could cover the Third World. Someone from Steve Bryen's office could handle technology and economic issues.

--Office of Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy should be supported by an office of at least four professionals, two of whom might be assigned nominally to ISA and ISP as full-time liaison with the office. Phil Peterson will be available on loan from DIA through the end of the year, by which time it might be possible to find him a position within USD/P. If the program becomes what it should, the budget might double and the staff grow by one or two in FY84.

--Advisory Staff

The office will require advice independent of the main contractors on such matters as topics, participants, and organizations suitable to conferences in each country. A small group of consultants might be constituted to review the program periodically. Carl Bernard and Paul Henze, for example, would be

well qualified for this group.

STRUCTURE OF PROGRAM

--Rationale

The assumptions behind the proposed program are that 1) Europeans will be receptive to public diplomacy if it is managed in the spirit of consultation rather than of instruction, 2) overt public relations efforts must be supported by academically respectable information efforts, and 3) informed debate of security issues provides the basis for public support of sound NATO policies, even if specific policies are not addressed directly in the debate.

--Emphasis on Conferences

The bulk of the the proposed program would be conferences on the topics in the attached SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS; very little effort would go into original research. Rather, contractors would be encouraged to base papers for conferences on work done under other contracts, and other participants would be asked to present drafts that could be developed fully later. The main purpose of the conferences would be discussion, not presentation of papers. This approach was chosen for reasons of both economy and speed.

One exception would be the NSIC contract, which calls for a long-term study of the attitudes of selected European opinion leaders. In the course of surveying attitudes, NSIC staff could ensure that persons and organizations surveyed were aware of the conferences. In addition to helping to broaden attendance at the conferences, this would provide us some feedback on their effectiveness.

--Scope

Although the public diplomacy campaign is intended to be worldwide, our highest priority now obviously is Europe, and this is reflected in the attached proposals. Some conferences to be held in Europe concern circumstances outside Europe, and some include participants from other nations, particularly Japan. (The latter should be helpful in discussions of INF.) Military conferences chiefly concern non-nuclear aspects of the Soviet threat, on the theory that Europeans need not be encouraged in their obsession with nuclear weapons, particularly as that is an area in which we and the Soviets can be portrayed as equally threatening. Conferences directly addressing INF do so in the context of broad Soviet strategy.

--Types of Conferences

Proposed public conferences are of two basic types: broad, strategic discussions oriented to the region in which they are held, and narrowly focused discussions of specific security problems, generally regarding some aspect of the Soviet threat. A third type of conference, of the type proposed by NSIC and perhaps to be held under other contracts as preparation for later conferences, would be more restricted in attendance, probably excluding journalists.

The broad conferences would be overtly political; respected American analysts, most with experience in the government but not in office now, would meet in open discussions with distinguished foreign participants, including officials and politicians, where possible. The purpose of the American teams would be to present an American perspective, but also to listen to the regional perspective. The reputation of both American and foreign participants--and good advance work--should ensure wide journalistic coverage.

In the smaller conferences, the general rule followed is that most conferences should address discrete components of Soviet capabilities, doctrine, or ideology for military and political warfare, should attempt to put that threat in a strategic context, and should address possible countermeasures. The latter condition is intended to avoid adding to the current anxiety by encouraging portrayal of the Soviet Union as invincible, which would be the result of presenting problems without also suggesting possible solutions.

These conferences address relatively narrow issues, such as the Soviet conventional offensive in Europe and Soviet policy toward the Third World. These smaller conferences have the advantage of being suitable for communicating clear, simple, thoroughly documented messages, e.g., that the Soviet Union has integrated Afghanistan into Soviet air defenses and other military structures and, by implication, has no intention of pulling out. The detailed discussions in these conferences can provide both intellectual respectability for our positions and grist for the policy mills of the larger, politically oriented conferences. They also will have the effect of keeping before the public examples of Soviet policies and behavior that call into question professed Soviet peaceful intentions.

The specialists who will be featured in these conferences ordinarily talk to each other and to a few government officials. We intend to focus public attention on both the topics and the participants in order to establish continuing sources of information for use in public debate. If the right questions are posed and the right participants selected, these conferences will not be dry discussions among narrow specialists but lively,

informed debates of issues of great interest to the European public--and to our own.

Conferences will emphasize discussion, not delivery of papers. Authors will be urged to read only abbreviated versions of their papers and to be prepared to expand and defend them in discussion.

--Dissemination of Information

Because of the short preparation time for most of the FY83 conferences, many analysts will be unable to present fully documented papers suitable for publication. They can, however, be asked to supply abstracts in advance of the conference. These can be issued in packets with fact files, photographs, and maps. These packets will contribute to the understanding of the discussants and audience and provide a framework for notes that can be used immediately after the conference to aid in recalling material presented. Journalists and others who wish to disseminate information gained at the conferences will find these packets useful. Later packets containing summaries of the highlights of the proceedings also can be distributed to all participants.

The conferences should result in several useful books on such topics as Soviet grand strategy and the Soviet perspective on conventional war and the Third World, as well as pamphlets and articles.

PROPOSED CONTRACTORS:

--National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) \$500-700K

NSIC has submitted two proposals: one to establish a network of pro-American European politicians, government officials, businessmen, trade unionists, and journalists who can promote European support of American policies, the other to use an existing network of European reserve officers to disseminate information that supports American policies. The first would use opinion surveys as the vehicle for approaching Europeans; the second would conduct ten training seminars for reserve officers. Both propose hiring full-time European coordinators, three for the first and one for the second, in expectation of expanding operations within a year or two.

Attempts should be made to reach both groups of Europeans. Perhaps the two proposals could be combined, so that NSIC conducted opinion surveys of both groups. These opinion surveys would result in contract deliverables while also providing occasions for communicating regarding conferences and other aspects of the public diplomacy program. Rather than hire three

or more full-time coordinators in the first year, NSIC could hire one, plus the part-time services of Europeans. Fewer seminars (say, four) could be staged specially; the rest of the communication with reservists might be conducted through other channels, perhaps the mail or currently scheduled meetings.

Money could, however, be earmarked for the full ten conferences as a means of making available funds to support and influence already scheduled conferences and to take advantage of opportunities that might arise to organize conferences quickly. Paul Henze has suggested that many of the numerous conferences that take place in Europe year round are poorly funded and could be very receptive to suggestions that were backed by even small amounts money.

Much of the value of the proposal to approach reserve officers could be realized by initiating contacts with the International Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR), as proposed, then encouraging CIOR to find inexpensive ways of communicating with its members. If this approach proved inadequate, the number of seminars to be staged could be increased later.

The best function of NSIC at this time would be to open channels to political, military, business, labor, and other groups, as proposed, and to survey their attitudes, communicate American policies, and facilitate communication of the substance of other OSD-sponsored conferences, in large part by promoting attendance by opinion leaders.

--Global Strategy Council/Georgetown (GSC) \$600K

Ray Cline is mainly responsible for establishment of the GSC. It operates in the style of Georgetown but is new and has almost no overhead. (Office space and salaries are donated by a businessman.) It has the single task of articulating and presenting to the public a global American strategy, a task in which Ray has been engaged for two decades. Ray would draw on Georgetown staff in order to gain their individual expertise and the academic respectability of Georgetown.

Ray's proposed approach is to take a small group of articulate Americans knowledgeable about strategy to meet with politicians, journalist, businessmen, and other opinion leaders of other nations. One-and-a-half-day conferences would be held before audiences of perhaps 200 (selected and notified with the help of NSIC, among others).

The conference would open with presentations on broad strategy by 2 or 3 Americans for about an hour. Another hour would be devoted to American perception of the role in American policy of the country and region where the conference were held. The

remainder of the day would be devoted to an hour or two of presentations by citizens of the nation on their perceptions of the same topic, then an open discussion, including participation by the audience. The following half day would be used to summarize the previous day's discussion and to attempt to arrive at conclusions.

Ray anticipates having to field numerous hostile questions, which is why his panel would consist of seasoned analysts not holding official positions.

Ray works closely with Frank Barnett, which would facilitate NSIC's role of recruiting participants and audiences for OSD-sponsored conferences and surveying their attitudes. The capabilities and interests of GSC and NSIC are generally complementary, not duplicative.

--National Institute For Public Policy (NIPP) \$460K

NIPP will address arms control, deterrence, the military balance, Soviet military doctrine and capabilities, and Soviet activities in the Third World. Colin Gray is strong on the abstract issues, of course, as is Keith Payne. Keith also is competent on Soviet policy toward the Third World. Seffy Bodansky, who is joining NIPP, is knowledgeable regarding Soviet conventional and unconventional warfare and Soviet activities in the Third World. Colin can use these staff members and consultants to provide papers to serve as the basis of discussion. The unusual ability of NIPP staff to produce analysis comprehensible to the layman will be valuable in producing these papers and follow-on publications.

Aware of his reputation for relishing the prospect of nuclear war, Colin Gray has agreed that he will serve as the middleman for arranging conferences in the UK--which he is uncommonly well qualified to do--but will not be featured in them in order to avoid distracting public attention from the intended messages. Several NIPP staff members, however, lack Colin's notoriety and would be capable participants in conferences as well as useful back-room analysts for providing discussion papers, summaries, and articles.

--Hudson Institute \$300-500K

Hudson Institute can do a mixture of small and large conferences. Herman Kahn is a major attraction in Japan and could arrange useful conferences there and perhaps in Europe. Norman Friedman could arrange conferences on Soviet naval doctrine and capabilities and on the historical lessons of attempts at naval arms control in the '20's and '30's. Frank Armbruster and others could address conflict in Europe, the

Persian Gulf, or other areas of interest to NATO. Bill Brown--who attracted notice for having predicted accurately an oil glut when that position was unfashionable--and other Hudson staff could address economic and resource issues.

--Harold Rosenbaum Associates (HRA) \$200-400K

HRA has proposed staging conferences on economic and technology transfer issues in Germany and France. Peter Hughes would be responsible for Germany, while Carl Bernard would be hired as a consultant for France.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

1) Soviet Grand Strategy (London)

Topics: ideology; foreign policy; military strategy; historical continuity of Russian military thought

Comment: location in London would enable reaching entire defense and foreign affairs community.

Participants:

Peter Vigor (Sandhurst),

Chris Donnelly

Julian Lidder (Sweden)

Richard Pipes

Derek Leebaert (Harvard)

Robert Bathurst (Naval Postgraduate School)

John Erickson

Fritz Ermarth

Thomas Wolfe

Harriet Scott

2) Arms Control in Soviet Strategy (London)

Topics: military and political objectives; objectives in START and INF; arms control organization and personnel; relationship to propaganda; Soviet record on treaty compliance;

Comment: location in London would enable reaching entire defense and foreign affairs community.

Participants:

John Erickson

Malcom Mackintosh

Arnold Horelick

William Hyland

Richard Pipes

Edward Heath

Dennis Healey

David Owens

3) Soviet Policy toward Europe (Edinburgh or Glasgow)

Topics: Soviet political objectives in Europe; Soviet view of deterrence; attitude toward British and French nuclear forces; Andropov

Comment: location in Edinburgh or Glasgow would enable inclusion of scholars and opinion leaders in northern England and Scotland.

Participants

John Erickson

Alec Nove (Director of Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Glasgow)

Adam Ulam

R.W. Davis

Johan Holst (Director of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs)

4) Peace, Nuclear Disarmament, and the Military Balance in Europe (London)

Topics: trends in military balance in Europe; past experience with disarmament; relationship to peace; arms races and war; peace movements in historical perspective; means to restore military balance

Comment: location in London convenient for opinion leaders.

Participants:

Lawrence Whetten

Michael Howard

Lawrence Freedman

Stephen Haseler

Richard Ogorkiewicz

Field Marshall Lord Carver

5) East-West Relations and Arms Control (Lancaster or Manchester)

Topics: possible improvements in East-West relations; role of arms control; linkage; effect of Andropov succession

Participants:

Walter Lacquer

Hugh Seton-Watson

Ian Bellamy

Peter Nanlaw

6) Deterrence, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons in Europe: the Case of the Cruise Missile (Cambridge)

Topics: NATO strategy; threats to stability; deterrence; contributions of cruise missiles to deterrence; effect of unmatched SS-20

Comment: Would attract attention in eastern England, particularly in East Anglia cruise missile site.

Participants:

Gregory Treverton (Harvard)

Michael Mccgwire (Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia)

Catherine Kelleher (U. of Denver)

Scholars from Cambridge, Norwich, Essex, Nottingham, and Hull Universities

7) Understanding Soviet Policy: words, deeds, intentions (Canterbury, Guildford, Brighton)

Topics: public statements versus internal; NATO weapons of greatest concern to USSR; relationship between military doctrine and military capabilities

Comments: suggested locations are close to London but have strong local radio and newspaper resources, hence conference would be local event and easily covered by national media.

Participants:

Leopold Labedz (editor of SURVEY)

Hugh Seton-Watson

John Erickson

Peter Vigor

Robert Bathurst

Hans Adomeit (Columbia, author of "Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior")

B) Soviet Perspectives on Conventional War (Oxford or Cambridge)

Topics: current Soviet strategy versus NATO strategy; the shape of the non-nuclear battlefield; role of nuclear forces, especially SS-20;

Comment: location at major academic research center would attract many U.K. opinion leaders; subject suitable for publication.

Participants:

John Erickson

Peter Vigor

Phil Petersen

Richard Ogorkiewicz

General Sir John Hackett

General Andrew Goodpaster

Steven Canby

Yossef Bodansky

General Robert Close

9) Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Threat
(Birmingham)

Topics: Soviet strategy; problems in threat analysis; nuclear balance; political pressures on NATO

Comment: would involve opinion leaders from the Midlands and the North, Wales, and the West Country.

Participants:

Neville Brown

Hedley Bull (Oxford)

General Sir John Hackett

Johan Holst

Richard Lowenthal (Free University, Berlin)

Anthony Sutton

Jiri Valenta (Naval Postgraduate School)

10) War in the Third World, Covert and Conventional (London--2 days)

Topics: Soviet objectives in Third World; military, political, economic tools; national liberation and detente; recent developments in Soviet doctrine for local war; Turkey in a local war; lessons from Middle East, Horn of Africa, Angola, Afghanistan; power projection; forward basing and infrastructure,

Participants:

Cord Meyer

Michael Ledeen

Walter Lacquer

Paul Henze

Avigdor Haselkorn

Alvin Rubinstein

Laurence Whetten

John Erickson

Sir Robert Thompson

Amnon Sella

Yossef Bodansky

Roger Kanet

Steven Kime

HUDSON INSTITUTE

1) The Soviet Fleet in Transition (Oslo)

Topics: effects on NATO of increasing soviet blue-water naval capability; role of a prospective Soviet conventional (full-deck) carrier force;

Participants:

Norman Friedman

Michael MccGwire

Bradford Dismukes (CNA)

Norman Polmar

Antony Preston (future editor of Jane's)

John Moore (Jane's)

Jurgen Rohwer (editor of Marine Rundschau)

2) The Conventional Defense of Europe (Denmark)

Topics: Soviet perceptions concerning the possibility of conventional war; Soviet concept of non-nuclear battlefield; role of nuclear forces;

Comment:

Participants:

Frank Armbruster

Herman Kahn

General Robert Close

Chris Donnelly

General Sir John Hackett

Seymour Deitchman

General Berkhoff

3) Arms Control and the Arms Race; Lessons from the Naval Agreements (Netherlands)

Topics: influence of treaties on weapon design and acquisition; compliance and evasion; politics of verification

Participants:

Norman Friedman

Jurgen Rohwer

4) Japan and the Security of the Pacific Basin (Tokyo)

Topics: Soviet strategy for Asia and the Pacific Basin; role of Vietnam in Soviet strategy; Participants:

Herman Kahn

Frank Armbruster

Ray Cline

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER

Attitude surveys of opinion leaders, including reserve officers; 4-10 seminars on security issues.

GLOBAL STRATEGY COUNCIL/GEORGETOWN

At each of below locations, a conference on American strategy, with a large component dedicated to the role of that region.

Theater Nuclear Forces and the Intermediate Nuclear Force Negotiations (Rome-April)

(London-July)

(Bonn or Hamburg-September)

(Paris-October)

(Tokyo-November)

(Jamaica-December)

HAROLD ROSENBAUM ASSOCIATES (\$100K plus \$50K per conference)

Conferences in Germany, France, and the Netherlands on:

1) Soviet Military Adventures and Exercises: Lessons for the West

Topics: ZAPAD-81 and SCHIT-82; Afghanistan; INF; Soviet involvement in the peace movement

2) Technology Transfer with the West

Topics: Soviet exploitation of western technology; economic issues of technology transfer among Allies; American legislation

3) REDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN EUROPE

Topics: the "conventional initiative" ("smart" weapons and new tactics); TNF; co-production and other economic issues

NON-CONTRACTOR CONFERENCES

1) Soviet Strategy Against NATO (London--RUSI--5/11/83)

Topics: theater of military operations; strategic offensive; nuclear planning

Participants:

Phil Petersen

John Hines

Chris Donnelly

Peter Vigor

David Bolton

Kenneth Hunt

Fritz Ermarth

2) NATO's Response to Changing Soviet Strategy (London--RUSI--September)

Topics: recent changes in Soviet military strategy and

organization; weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Soviet operations; NATO countermeasures

Participants:

John Erickson

General Sir John Hackett

General Robert Close

General Berkhoff

Phil Petersen

John Hines

Chris Donnelly

Peter Vigor

David Bolton

Kenneth Hunt

3) The Reorganization of Soviet Forces: Impact on Soviet Military Capabilities and Implications for NATO (Brussels--September--2 days)

Topics: contemporary stage of Soviet development; vulnerabilities in Soviet operations; NATO countermeasures

Comment: conference sponsored by U.S. Delegate to Military Committee

Participants:

General Rogers

Phil Petersen

John Hines

NATO members

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONFERENCES BY COUNTRY

FRANCE

HRA

Soviet Exercises

Tech Transfer

Redressing the Conventional Imbalance

GSC

--

NSIC

GERMANY

HRA

Soviet Exercises

Tech Transfer

Redressing the Conventional Imbalance

GSC

--

ITALY

GSC

--

NSIC

(PANHEURISTICS)

--

JAPAN

GSC

--

Hudson

Japan and the Security of the Pacific Basin

LATIN AMERICA

GSC

--

NETHERLANDS

NIPP

The Nuclear Freeze and the Anti-Nuclear Movements

HRA

Soviet Exercises

Tech Transfer

Redressing the Conventional Imbalance

HUDSON

Arms Control and the Arms Race: Lessons from the Naval Agreements

(Dorfer)

--

(PANHEURISTICS)

SCANDINAVIA

HUDSON

The Conventional Defense of Europe (Denmark)

The Soviet Fleet in Transition (Norway)

SPAIN/PORTUGAL NSIC

SWITZERLAND

NIPP

Prospects for the Control of Chemical Weapons

UNITED KINGDOM

NIPP

The Soviet Approach to Arms Control

Peace, Nuclear Disarmament, and the Military Balance in Europe

Soviet Policy Toward Europe

East-West Relations and Arms Control

Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Threat

Deterrence, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons in Europe: the Case of the Cruise Missile

Understanding Soviet Policy: Words, Deeds, and Intentions

Soviet Perspectives on Conventional War

Soviet Attitudes toward the Third World

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PARTICIPANTS BY COUNTRY

FRANCE

GERMANY

ITALY

JAPAN

LATIN AMERICA

NETHERLANDS

SCANDINAVIA

SWITZERLAND

SPAIN/PORTUGAL

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED STATES



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 May 1983

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EXCOM

SUBJECT: FY83 OSD Public Diplomacy Program

This Administration has placed great emphasis on generating support for our national security objectives while fostering the growth of democracy throughout the world. We are now putting the finishing touches on a program that supports that effort while staying within the legal limits placed on the Department of Defense.

The purpose of our program is to obtain information on popular and elite perceptions of international defense issues, threats to our alliances, and U.S. defense policy and program initiatives designed to enhance the credibility of our common security forces. The findings of this research are intended to aid senior DoD officials in weighing the prospects for implementation of U.S. policy and program options.

Several contractors will assess European, Japanese, and Central American views at seminars and colloquia conducted in cooperation with various organizations from each country. In order to focus such discussions and generate an informed dialogue on defense issues, the contractors will prepare or commission to be prepared scholarly working papers on salient subjects. The papers will be adjusted as necessary to incorporate improvements suggested by conferees. They will then be translated and published in a series of books. Conference proposals for changes in U.S. defense policy will be forwarded for our review.

Contracts supporting this program are in various stages of completion, but we expect to have the last contract ready for approval by late June 1983. We solicit your support in this endeavor and attach a summary of the tentative FY83 program for your review.

RC5/10/83
Richard G. Stilwell
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy

SUMMARY
OF
FY 83 OSD PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROGRAM (TENTATIVE)

LOCAL INTERAGENCY PROGRAM:

- Public Diplomacy Office established under General Stilwell
 - Four full-time AOs with a full-time Secretary
 - AOs include Assistant for Public Diplomacy and three geographic specialists - one each for Soviet/Europe, Asia and Central America
 - Office is augmented by POCs in ISP, ISA, and PA, who are in turn supported by AOs appropriate to the task
- Duties of Public Diplomacy Office
 - Serves as focal point for Public Diplomacy communications going into and out of OSD
 - Insures that OSD is appropriately represented in all interagency committees and working groups
 - Provides preparatory material for senior-level attendees to the five major committees
 - Provides feedback from major committees to AOs responsible for those issues that were addressed
 - Insures appropriate follow-up action
 - Receives feedback from OSD attendees to working groups
 - Manages OSD's International Public Diplomacy program

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM:

- Objectives:
 - To communicate more effectively U.S. defense policy in order to reinforce the consensus on defense of democratic values
 - To identify changes in defense policy made necessary by various political, economic, and social forces present in the international arena
- Strategy: Through contractors:
 - Identify groups most likely to impact future and promote dialog
 - "Friends" - Military, reservists, retired military, specialists, media
 - Uncommitted moderates
 - Identify the effects of various political, economic, and social forces on our defense policy in selected countries of interest
 - Commission papers on key defense issues which will be discussed at highly structured conferences in selected countries
 - Resulting dialog insures a clear understanding of the issues and a better understanding on our part of the necessary changes in policy
 - Publish the papers and results of the dialog in English as well as the native language, if appropriate

- Implementation (tentative):
 - FY 83 program focuses on Europe, Japan, and Central America
 - About 30 conferences in 13 countries (including a conference for South Asia held in the US)
 - Results published in at least four books
 - 1. Soviet Political Strategy Against NATO
 - 2. Military Power in Soviet Strategy Against NATO
 - 3. Soviet Foreign Policy and Its Implications for Security in Asia
 - 4. Communist Intervention in Central America
 - Books 1 and 2 translated in German and French, Book 3 in Japanese, and Book 4 in Spanish
 - Europe
 - RUSI - Soviet Strategy Against NATO briefing given to attendees, with briefing published in RUSI Journal to kick off its fall campaign on Soviet Power and Prospects
 - Public opinion surveys through USIA to determine European attitudes on various INF issues
 - Market survey to identify and analyze political, economic, and social forces and determine how US Defense policy communicates
 - Ten conferences throughout Europe for reservists on Soviet Strategy
 - USDELMC - NATO defense planners with SACEUR
 - Eight conferences throughout Europe for moderates on Soviet political strategy/Soviet military power
 - Two conferences in UK for moderates, one on Soviet naval strategy and one on the history of arms control
 - One conference in France on resources
 - Japan
 - Four conferences for retired officers and businessmen on Soviet strategy
 - One conference for moderates on Soviet foreign policy
 - Central America
 - Two conferences on Soviet strategy/Communist intervention in Central America
 - US
 - One conference, perhaps co-sponsored with Ford or Rockefeller Foundation for South Asia

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 23, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR GEN RICHARD G. STILWELL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Possible Items for DOD
"Public Diplomacy" Funding

I am very pleased that DOD will be able to help underwrite the funding for the USIA poll and for the European reservists program. I hope that these are proceeding forward without any hitches.

I have three additional proposals to bring to your attention:


-- Forwarded is a memorandum from John Glad of the Wilson Center, affiliated with the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. This proposal is designed to focus on the study of the Soviet Union in the Third World. The suggestion is clearly made that the Soviets viewed such study programs as a means to advance their political objectives around the world. The suggestion is further made that the detailed study of the Soviet effort will bring this situation into sharp focus. Clearly, the result of a proficiently done study will provide the basis for significant new US programming in this vital area. I would strongly recommend that DOD consider undertaking a study in this area--possibly utilizing Glad's surveys--to launch the effort.

-- Afghanistan. I am attaching a Department of State summary of a proposed Afghan seminar, a seminar designed to look at the impact of Soviet cooperation and future prospects. I think such a seminar would conceivably fall within the range of DOD's interest and concerns. I also believe to get it launched we will need to use federal funds. USIA is not in a position to underwrite this seminar, therefore, I would strongly encourage you to give it serious consideration. Ambassador Helman in the Department of State can provide you new and updated data. The dates included in the attached memorandum are illustrative. No seminar has taken place to date.

-- My third and last proposal concerns the need for funding for continued research concerning Yellow Rain. I am aware that you

are in direct contact with Stuart Schwartzstein. If something comes of this fine. If not I would suggest that a program analogous to Schwartzstein's be developed. As I noted in a recent IIC meeting concerning this subject I am concerned about the lack of resources available for research on this issue in Bangkok. I believe this is a natural for expanded attention by DOD.

Please let me know if there is something further that I can do to help you. I would be most interested in your reactions to these two new proposals and DOD's current actions designed to break loose more resources for CBW/Schwartzstein, etc research.



Walter Raymond, Jr.

Attachments (3)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL RICHARD STILWELL
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Support to RAND-Stiftung Wissenschaft
and Politik (SWP) Conference

I do not know if this issue is still a matter of concern but I would ask that you raise it with the appropriate office in DOD. I believe that this effort is worth supporting although given the timing I suspect the matter is in hand.

Please let me know what you determine.

Walt Raymond

Walter Raymond, Jr.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Scott Thompson



May 2, 1983

Mr. Walter Raymond, Senior Staff Member
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Walt:

Many thanks for forwarding a copy of the Report of the North Atlantic Assembly on the Successor Generation. The paper was interesting and in some ways insightful, although generally unimaginative in terms of conclusions and policy recommendations. Urging "more cooperation among NATO countries on multilateral exchange programs" goes only so far. If there is a more prescriptive follow-on document, please do forward a copy. My book on the Successor Generation, incidentally, continues apace. Four publishers have expressed interest--Random House, Crane Russak, Ballenger, and Heath. The current plan is to get them the full manuscript by the Fall.

Subsequent to our recent meeting, Don Rice, Rand's President, called Fred Ikle to inquire about the possible use of DoD Public Diplomacy monies to support the planned Rand-Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) joint conference and book on "Managing the West's Relationship with the Soviet Union: Implications for U.S.-FRG Relations." Much of this money Ikle apparently has recently put at the disposal of C. Wick. A note from you to Wick expressing support for the Rand-SWP project as a useful effort in Public Diplomacy would likely be helpful and would be greatly appreciated. The non-Public Diplomacy staff at USIA already has a copy of our proposal.

I have just returned from three days of USIA speaking on arms control in Mexico City. You might appreciate hearing a few observations:

- There is a lot more interest in Mexico City in INF and START than might be expected. The crowds at my talks were relatively large.
- The tone of the questions and comments tended to be uninformed and generally anti-American. It is clear that the media is not representing the American approach to arms control and these talks in an even-handed way.
- The Soviets are making a perceptible effort to capitalize on this anti-American sentiment, lumping together in public speeches and through the media U.S. Central American policy and U.S. arms control policy. At my talk at Ibero-American University, the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico and one of his staff aides showed up. The Soviet Ambassador is to address the same group within the next week, giving "a Soviet perspective on the U.S. approach to arms control."

Mr. Walter Raymond

-2-

May 2, 1983

- The Mexicans with whom I came into contact, in general, had a rather benign view of the Soviet Union and its policies. Angola, Afghanistan, Poland--these seem hardly known to most Mexican audiences, even educated ones.
- USIA might usefully send two to three speakers to Mexico who can address East-West issues in general and Soviet foreign policy in particular. Soviet foreign policy specialists (like Arnold Horelick) could do some real good there.

Let's stay in touch and I appreciate in advance your help with USIA or whomever regarding the Rand-SWP project. It is a worthwhile effort, for which raising money from foundations has been going slowly.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely,



Alan Platt, Coordinator
European Security Studies

AP:zs

(Needs more funds)

✓ Call Allan Platt

- 1 -

November 18, 1982

MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-GERMAN RELATIONS

The purpose of this proposal is to secure financial support for The Rand Corporation's share of a joint study it plans to undertake with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).[1] The study will examine future issues in U.S.-German relations arising from the relationship of the Western Alliance with the USSR. It will culminate in a conference and will result in a book, to be jointly published by Rand and the SWP.

BACKGROUND TO RAND-SWP COOPERATION

Among the many roots to the current and enduring problems of U.S.-West European relations are problems of communication and understanding about how countries on the two sides of the Atlantic approach their security problems. These problems stem in part from differing national security perspectives on the part of the United States and European nations. The United States has global defense responsibilities and a multi-faceted military force to meet them, encompassing nuclear, ground, tactical air, naval, and mobility forces. These responsibilities help to shape the U.S. approach to national security problems. European nations naturally see their security problems through quite different lenses: European security is, of

[1] The SWP is a defense and foreign policy research institute located in Ebenhausen, West Germany. It is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, although its research is also sponsored by other sources.

course, paramount to them. They do not have many defense responsibilities beyond their territories. They often emphasize the political and economic characteristics of national security planning and, compared with the United States, seem to downplay the role of military force. When coupled with different historical experiences, economic growth patterns, views of the role of government in society, governmental structure, geographic position, and so forth, these differences are not often well understood or considered in the national security decisionmaking processes on the two sides of the Atlantic.

Another important set of differences arises from the American and European approaches to national security and defense policy decisionmaking. The United States has a long tradition of assessing defense policy issues through the techniques of systems analysis, using rigorous methodologies, quantitative calculations and technical assessments. Even if the results of analysis are not always central to the outcome of an otherwise politically based U.S. decision, the framework of the decision is typically "analytic." In addition, the large community of strategic policymakers and scholars in the United States is imbued with this analytic tradition. For this reason, policy debates in the United States over defense and arms control policy, and at times international economic and foreign policy, usually have a heavy technical and quantitative content.

Aside from the British, Europeans do not have this tradition. They approach security problems largely from a political perspective. Systems analysis plays little or no role in government decisions, including decisions on defense and arms control policy. The community of strategic thinkers in Europe is considerably smaller than that in the

United States, and most members are not entirely comfortable with the technical and analytic content of the U.S. debate.

These differences in approach often impede improved U.S.-European communication on security matters. There are, of course, related policy impediments: differences in national domestic political settings, in national security objectives, in economic and geostrategic circumstances, in assessment of the Soviet threat and in the effectiveness of various policy instruments for dealing with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the past, a conceptual lack of understanding on both sides of the Atlantic about the other's problems and assessments has contributed to disputes over policy, which might have been modulated by better understanding.

The Rand Corporation is well-suited to help bridge the analytic gap that can separate the United States from Europe on security issues. It has a staff whose interests and expertise cover the range of issues on the U.S.-European security agenda--defense, arms control, international economics, and foreign policy. It has recently strengthened its staff capabilities to assess European security debates, including the domestic dimension. Most important, Rand's approach to security problems is very much in the analytic tradition that has underlined America's thinking about security issues throughout most of the postwar period.

In the past year, Rand has begun to concentrate on the problem of improving transatlantic understanding of and cooperation on security issues with an increase in Rand's links with European research institutions. We have had discussions with several institutes, but efforts have mainly concentrated on strengthened cooperation with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Ebenhausen, FRG. This is a

logical beginning, because of all the European research institutes, the SWP is the most comparable to Rand in terms of size, research agenda, and relation to the federal government.

Rand has two broad goals in establishing this cooperation with the SWP: The first and more near-term goal is to increase understanding of the American and European approaches to security planning, to analyze likely areas of potential harmony and differences in the future, and to suggest means for managing these differences. The second and more long-term goal is to narrow these differences through such activities as training young European and American analysts, sharing information and analysis, and joint study efforts. Accordingly, strengthened cooperation between Rand and the SWP is emphasizing the following areas:

- o | Discussions among Rand and SWP research leaders about current research agendas and future plans in order to identify common interests.
- o | Exchanges of information, data, and draft reports when appropriate.
- o | Exchanges of researchers for lengthy periods to expose them to different national perspectives.
- o | Joint or cooperative research ventures, including jointly sponsored workshops and conferences.

In the context of strengthened cooperation, Rand and SWP management have stressed two points: (1) the need to involve younger analysts in the cooperative efforts in order to help train a new generation of

European security analysts on both sides of the Atlantic in similar ways, and (2) the need to insure that our cooperative efforts, including any joint conferences, facilitate new research at both institutes, rather than simply act as a showcase for old research.

As part of the first agreement between the two organizations, each is committed to secure funds for its own contribution to the cooperative effort--staff salaries, fringe, indirect costs, publications, travel, etc. On the Rand side, with some support from the Ford Foundation, cooperation is beginning in the first three areas. Visits and discussions between the Rand and SWP staff are increasing, information is flowing, and a Rand analyst is currently spending nine months at Ebenhausen to gain valuable insight into the German approach to defense problems. The SWP, using a grant from the Thyssen Foundation, is planning to send researchers to be in residence at Rand.

BOOK AND CONFERENCE ON 'THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-GERMAN RELATIONS'

As a first cooperative research effort, Rand and the SWP have recently agreed to pursue a joint study of the potential for U.S.-German difficulties arising from the management of the West's relationship with the USSR over the next decade.

The setting for the study will be Western efforts to fashion a strategy for dealing with the USSR by combining military, political, and economic measures. The goals of the study are to identify and assess the reasons for potential areas of agreement and disagreement between the United States and the FRG, and suggest ways in which the differences could be best managed. This topic was selected for the first joint

Rand-SWP effort because it is critically important, and both institutions already have substantial expertise in it. Military issues and defense analysis figure heavily, but they must be considered in the context of foreign and economic policy as well.

The study is expected to result in a book, which will report new research in the following areas:

- o The Determinants of U.S. Policy Toward the FRG.
- o The Determinants of German Policy Toward the United States.
- o Assessment of the USSR and the Options for Soviet Leaders in the Next Decade.
- o Strengthening Deterrence: The Military Dimension of Dealing With the USSR.
- o The Role of Economic Power in Dealing with the USSR.
- o Formulating an Overall Strategy: Integrating Foreign, Economic, Defense, and Arms Control Policy, with regard to the USSR.
- o Managing the U.S.-German Differences.

Rand and the SWP have agreed to the following procedure. Both institutes have nominated researchers for each of the above topics. In the course of the next two months, these researchers will prepare point papers describing their views of the issues to be contained in the chapters.[2] These papers will then be exchanged and subsequently

[2] Rand researchers include Abraham Becker, Paul Davis, Arnold Horelick, Alan Platt, James Thomson, and John van Oudenaren. The SWP team includes Uwe Nerlich, Peter Stratmann, Gebhard Schweigler, Reinhardt Rummel, Christoph Royen, Friedemann Muller, and Hannes Adomeit.

discussed at a joint Rand-SWP workshop currently scheduled for Santa Monica in late January 1983.

On the basis of the point papers and the discussion, chapter authors will prepare draft chapters. To take advantage of comparative strengths, the institutes have divided responsibility for the chapters between them--three to the SWP, three to Rand, and one done jointly. But each of the chapter authors will maintain contact with his vis-a-vis at the other institute.

The chapter drafts will form the basis of discussion at a jointly sponsored conference to be held in Ebenhausen in June 1983. For this conference, the institutes will invite a small number of Germans and Americans, including government officials. The chapters will be rewritten as necessary on the basis of conference discussions. The resulting book will include a summary of the workshop and conference proceedings.

FUNDING

Rand and the SWP are responsible for funding their respective contributions to the cooperative effort. Because Rand does not have any government contract work within which this new cooperative effort can be undertaken, we are seeking foundation support for our part of the effort, which includes:

- o Management of research effort (one Rand staff member @ 10 days).
- o Research time (three researchers @ 50 days; four researchers @ 10 days).
- o Cost of January workshop (including accommodations and expenses for 10 SWP staff members for three days--SWP is paying travel).
- o Travel costs for June conference for ten Rand staff (Santa Monica-Ebenhausen and return), and for eight other U.S. participants (Washington-Ebenhausen and return)--SWP is paying accommodations and expenses, as well as other conference costs.
- o Publications costs for Rand report and English and German version of book.

Total estimated cost: \$192,000.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 JUN 1983

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR WALTER RAYMOND, JR., ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Proposals for DoD Public Diplomacy Funding


We have completed an initial review of the three projects you recently proposed for inclusion in the DoD Public Diplomacy Program. Although our FY 83 program has already been approved, there is a possibility that two of the projects you proposed could be funded, at least in part, in early FY 84.

The first project, John Glad's proposal on Soviet Studies, is not within the legal bounds of the DoD mission and, therefore, cannot be funded from DoD Public Diplomacy funds.

We have received Mr. Schwartzstein's proposal for interviewing/examining victims of Yellow Rain and are presently reviewing it. We have asked him to provide more information on the funding required and will make a recommendation once we have collected the salient facts.

As you know, I support fully the conference on Afghanistan and am attempting to secure funding for it in the private sector. Depending upon the outcome of those discussions, DoD funding could be available for the portions of the conference that address the DoD mission.

We will continue to pursue the Yellow Rain and Afghanistan proposals and will keep you apprised of our progress.


Richard G. Stillwell
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

F
23 JUN 1983

Dear Mrs. Nicolosi:

Pursuant to our discussion of the proposed National Strategy Information Center project on "Rebuilding Transatlantic Consensus on Alliance and Security Affairs," I have discussed with our research staff the question of prior DoD review of papers and other contract deliverables.

I am informed that prior review is a routine obligatory feature of all contracts undertaken for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD/P). Standard clausal language to that effect is included in studies, analyses, and other research support agreements in compliance with implementing instructions of the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR).

It is not our purpose or intention to dictate findings or conclusions to independent defense analysts and observers. Rather, we are obliged to insure that documents produced under our sponsorship are factually correct and, when authorized for public release, include an accurate reflection or characterization of official policies of the DoD and the US government. It is for these reasons that we ask our public diplomacy contractors to submit their papers to us 30 days before they would be delivered at a conference.

I trust that this satisfactorily responds to your questions. If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me.

Johnnie L. Vaught
Assistant for Public Diplomacy



POLICY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

29 JUN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER RAYMOND, JR.
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Proposal for DoD Public Diplomacy Funding

A member of my staff called Dr. Alan Platt's office in response to your June 9, 1983 memorandum concerning a request from Dr. Platt for Public Diplomacy financial support of a RAND-Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik joint project. As Dr. Platt was already in Europe to attend the second of the two meetings that were to result in the final product, we assumed that RAND found financial support for the joint project elsewhere. We will let you know if we determine that is not the case.

Dick
Richard G. Stilwell
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy

W

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 8, 1983

TO: PAUL THOMPSON
FROM: WALT RAYMOND
SUBJ: Legalities of Proposed USIA Grant

I have had considerable discussion concerning the legality of a USIA grant which would, inter alia propose an activity associated with the Department of State.

State and I believe it is legal; USIA says it is not.

I will be going to a meeting on July 12 and I would appreciate your legal judgement as to whether this grant is legal. (See attached document.)

If you have any further questions I suggest you discuss this with Elie Maurer (State legal office).



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 DEC 1983

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER RAYMOND, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: DoD Public Diplomacy Conferences

During the meeting of the IPC Subcommittee on U.S.-Soviet Relations, you asked Ed Cooke to send you a copy of our conference schedule. The specific dates for the conferences are still being determined, but I am happy to provide you a tentative summary of the conferences that have been approved and funded. We expect most of them to occur between February 16 and the end of June.

By way of background, as part of its contribution of sustaining broad popular support for a strong Western defense, DoD is sponsoring a series of studies which, through the mechanism of conferences conducted in support of the studies, are intended to facilitate a better understanding of the Soviet challenge. By bringing together Soviet specialists and strategic thinkers, the level of understanding among defense specialists can hopefully be raised. Only if this objective is achieved can there be any hope of ultimately raising the level of popular discussion of defense issues.

As part of the overall plan for the studies, we hope to make available new materials through well-documented papers prepared by a small number of American participants in the conference programs. In addition to the various interpretations of the implications we expect to flow from the new materials, we will be looking for European perceptions of the strategic context in which these materials must be considered. Although the studies would ostensibly be prepared for the use of senior-level DoD policy-makers, we believe that they would also be of great value of the European and American publics in general.

These study/conference activities have been submitted to the Department of State for prior review under interagency procedures for clearance of research with potential foreign affairs implications. State Department clearance has been granted for most of them, though some problems remain to be resolved with others.

We are now working with USIA, State, appropriate country desk officers and contractors to refine the parameters for each of the studies and associated conferences. Areas of emphasis in that planning process include the importance of a low-key, responsible effort where the views of knowledgeable international experts on the Soviet Union and associated security issues

can be combined to produce new and inventive ideas on various defense-related topics. Also, to enhance the credibility of the overall effort, it is our intention to enlist prestigious institutions in each country to serve as co-hosts.


One of the key ingredients necessary to insure the success of the effort is close cooperation with the U.S. embassy in each country. Embassy assistance will be especially crucial for contractor/subcontractor representatives as they set up the program in each country. Support for any senior officials attending the conferences will also be important.

The papers to be presented at the conferences will be original research in primary sources. Both U.S. and host country researchers will be invited to present their analysis with prepared discussants. Also planned is a roundtable discussion on the Western response.

The response from respected private sector organizations in Europe has been very encouraging once we have explained what the program is and what it is not. They are particularly happy to hear that we are using highly respected international experts, that emphasis will be placed on a legitimate exchange of ideas rather than the U.S. force-feeding its own views, and that our contractors are not operating totally independently.

Although we are still refining the program, I believe it is sufficiently defined at this point that we could brief it in an interagency public diplomacy forum early in January. This would provide answers to a myriad of questions that have surfaced recently while offering us an opportunity to explain the interagency help we need to insure the program's success.

I appreciate your interest and will be glad to discuss our plans with you at any time.



Raymond A. Warren
Director
Public Diplomacy Staff

Attachment:
a/s

Summary
DoD Public Diplomacy Conference Program
22 December 1983

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>
FRG/IT/NETH	Conferences (3)	Soviet Political Strategy	Specialists, "Swing-Group" Moderates, and Media	Interaction S Inc. (Cline)
FRG/FR/ UK/DEN/NETH	Conferences (5)	Soviet Military Strategy	Specialists, "Swing-Group" Moderates, and Media	Harold Rosenb Associates
NATO	Conference (1)	Soviet Military Reorganization	Military leader- ship and Media	To Be Determini
FRG/IT/FR/ UK/BEL/NOR/ DEN/NETH	Conferences (10)	Soviet Strategy	NATO Reserve Officers	To Be Determini
UK/FR	Conferences (3)	Soviet Naval Strategy (UK) Arms Control (UK) Resources (FR)	Specialists, "Swing-Group" Moderates, and Media	Hudson Instit
JAPAN	Conferences (4)	Soviet Strategy	Retired Officers Media and Businessmen	Interaction Systems, Inc. (Ray Cline an Shinsaku Hoge
USA	Conference (1)	South Asian Security	Specialists, Retired South Asia Military Officers, and Media	University of Illinois (Stephen Cohe
Costa Rica/ Dominican Republic	Conference (2)	Communist Intervention	Military Officers, Police, Businessmen and Labor	University of (Jaime Suchli

Summary
DoD Public Diplomacy Conference Program
11 January 1983

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>
FRG/IT/NETH	Conferences (3)	Soviet Political Strategy	Specialists, "Swing-Group" Moderates, and Media	Interaction Inc. (Cline)
FRG/FR/ UK/DEN/NETH	Conferences (5)	Soviet Military Strategy	Specialists, "Swing-Group" Moderates, and Media	Harold Rosen Associates
NATO	Conference (1)	Soviet Military Reorganization	Military leader- ship and Media	To Be Determ
FRG/IT/FR/ UK/BEL/NOR/ DEN/NETH	Conferences (10)	Soviet Strategy	NATO Reserve Officers	To Be Determ
UK/FR	Conferences (3)	Soviet Naval Strategy (UK) Arms Control (UK) Resources (FR)	Specialists, "Swing-Group" Moderates, and Media	Hudson Insti
JAPAN	Conferences (4)	Soviet Strategy	Retired Officers Media and Businessmen	Interaction Systems, Inc (Ray Cline a Shinsaku Hog
USA	Conference (1)	South Asian Security	Specialists, Retired South Asia Military Officers, and Media	University o Illinois (Stephen Coh
Dominican Republic	Conference (2)	Communist Intervention	Military Officers, Police, Businessmen and Labor	University o (Jaime Suchl

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE
FOR
DOD PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RESEARCH CONFERENCES (AS OF 13 JAN 84)

<u>DATE*</u>	<u>TITLE/COUNTRY</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>CO-HOST</u>
Feb 12-14	Cuban/Soviet Strategy and Policies in Central America and the Caribbean (Costa Rica)	University of Miami	CIAPA/ La Nacion/ University of Costa Rica
Feb 16	Soviet Maritime Power (U.K.)	Hudson Institute	Royal United Service Institute
Mar	Soviet Strategy in Asia (Japan)	Interaction Systems, Inc.	Japan World Strategy Council
Apr	Soviet Military Strategy (U.K.)	Harold Rosenbaum Associates	IISS/Chatham House
	Soviet Military Strategy (France)	Harold Rosenbaum Associates	IISS/Foundation Pour les Etudes De Defense Nationale
	Soviet Political Strategy (Italy)	Interaction Systems, Inc.	?
	Cuban/Soviet Strategy and Policies in Central America and the Caribbean (Dominican Republic)	University of Miami	El Museo del Hombre?
May 7-8	South Asian Security (Champaign, Illinois)	University of Illinois	None
May	Soviet Military Strategy (FRG)	Harold Rosenbaum Associates	IISS/German Strategy Forum
	Soviet Military Strategy (Denmark)	Harold Rosenbaum Associates	IISS/?
	Soviet Strategy in Asia (Japan)	Interaction Systems, Inc.	Japan World Strategy Council
	Soviet Political Strategy (FRG)	Interaction Systems, Inc.	?
June	Soviet Military Strategy (Norway)	Harold Rosenbaum Associates	IISS/Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
	Resources (France)	Hudson Institute	Fondation Pour les Etudes De Defense Nationale

<u>DATE*</u>	<u>TITLE/COUNTRY</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>CO=HOST</u>
ine	Soviet Strategy in Asia (Japan)	Interaction Systems Inc.	Japan World Strategy Council
ine	Soviet Political Strategy (The Netherlands)	Interaction Systems, Inc.	?

Post-February dates and co-hosts are tentative; dates for the 10 conferences involving European reservists have not yet been determined.

FY-84 Funded Research Conferences

Revolutionary Network in the Third World (3 conferences)
Soviet Strategies in the Americas (3 conferences)
Disinformation in Soviet Strategy (1)
Technology Transfer (1)
Biological/Chemical Weapons Ban: Problems and Prospects (1)