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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

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**File Folder** [PROJECT TRUTH, PROJECT DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND NED NOVEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 1986]

**FOIA**

M430

**Box Number** 7

LAMB,  
CHRISTOPHER

76

ID	Doc Title	Document Description	No. of Pages	Date	Restrictions
115277	SPECIAL ANALYSIS	PAGES 12-13 RE EASTERN EUROPE  <b>P 7/3/2000 F95-041/2 #108; M430/2 PAR #115277</b>	2	12/16/1986	B1 B3
115278	MEMO	RE NEXT MEETING ON ACTIVE MEASURES (PARTIAL)  <b>R 7/19/200 NLSF95-041/2 #109</b>	1	11/28/1986	B1
115281	CABLE	1016042 DEC 86  <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #110</b>	4	12/10/1986	B1
115282	SPECIAL ANALYSIS	PAGE 3 RE USSR-INDIA  <b>P 7/3/2000 F95-041/2 #111; UPHELD M430/2 #115282</b>	1	12/5/1986	B1 B3
115310	MEMO	RE NEXT MEETING ON ACTIVE MEASURES (PARTIAL)  <b>P 9/26/2000 F95-041/2 #112; R M430/2 #115310</b>	1	11/28/1986	B3
115312	SPECIAL ANALYSIS	PAGES 13-14 PLUS INSERT RE USSR: GORBACHEV ENCOURAGES REFORM DEBATE  <b>R 7/3/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #113</b>	3	11/21/1986	B1 B3
115313	CABLE	021742Z DEC 86  <b>R 7/3/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #114</b>	3	12/2/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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**Collection Name** RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

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ID	Description	No. of Pages	Date	Restrictions
115314	SPECIAL ANALYSIS USSR: INCREASING DISINFORMATION ABOUT AIDS (PAGE12) <i>P 7/3/2000</i> <i>F95-041/2 #115; UPHELD</i> <i>M430/2 #115314</i>	1	11/24/1986	B1 B3
115317	SPECIAL ANALYSIS PAGES 11-12 USSR: IMPLICATION OF FREEING SAKHAROV <i>PAR 7/3/2000</i> <i>F95-041/2 #116; UPHELD</i> <i>M430/2 #115317</i>	2	1/7/1987	B1

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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Diplomacy, and NED 11/86-12/86] OA 91162

Date: January 27, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. special analysis	pages 12-13, re Eastern Europe (2) P 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #108	12/16/86 04/12 #108	P1/F3
<del>2. cable</del>	<del>101604Z DEC 86 (4) R 2/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 #110</del>	<del>12/10/86</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>3. mcmo</del>	<del>re next meeting on active measures (partial) (1) R 7/19/00 NLSF95-041/2 #109</del>	<del>11/28/86</del>	<del>P1</del>
4. special analysis	page 3, re USSR-India (1) P 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #111	12/5/86	P1/F3
5. memo	re next meeting on active measures (partial) (1) P F95-041/2 #112 9/26/00	11/28/86	PX F3
<del>6. special analysis</del>	<del>pages 13-14 plus insert, re USSR: Gorbachev Encourages Reform Debate (3) R 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #113</del>	<del>11/21/86</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>7. cable</del>	<del>021742Z DEC 86 (3) R 2/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 #114</del>	<del>12/2/86</del>	<del>P1</del>
8. special analysis	USSR: Increasing Disinformation about AIDS (page 12) (1) P 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #115	11/24/86	P1/F3
<del>9. special analysis</del>	<del>pages 11-12, USSR: Implication of Freeing Sakharov (2) R 7/3/00 NLSF95-041/2 #116</del>	<del>1/7/87</del>	<del>P1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 b(1)  
-3.5C

~~Top Secret~~

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115277

### Special Analysis

#### **EASTERN EUROPE: New Directions for Opposition**

***Dissident groups in Eastern Europe are adopting new tactics and taking up new issues to win popular support and increase their influence on regime policies. Several governments have taken over issues raised by the dissidents, especially environmental problems; all have taken or threatened to take tough actions to prevent the spread of opposition activity. Nonetheless, opposition ideas may gain greater prominence in the future as a new generation comes of political age.***

In Poland, Solidarity is trying to create a network of overt councils that would provide a more effective platform from which to bring pressure on the regime. A new and relatively small organization, Freedom and Peace, is winning youthful support for its opposition to military service, which is worrying the authorities.

In East Germany, some of the prime movers behind the peace movement of the early 1980s have turned their attention to human rights issues. The Honecker regime is increasingly concerned about the dissidents' focus on domestic problems, circulation of petitions, and unwillingness to leave East Germany. The authorities have put an unusual amount of pressure on the Lutheran Church to distance itself from the dissidents.

Environmental issues, especially after the Chernobyl' accident, provide fertile ground for dissident activity. East German authorities took the unprecedented step of reassuring the public after getting a petition complaining about the use of nuclear power. The Polish parliament also formally responded to a citizens' petition that expressed concern about nuclear power, but it reaffirmed the official line that Poland must proceed with its development program.

In Hungary, opposition to the building of a dam along the border with Czechoslovakia resulted in petitions and street protests and forced the regime to step in with stiff warnings and police measures earlier this year. Some party members are sympathetic to the public's concern about the dam. The authorities in Budapest have also responded to members of the opposition who have expressed dismay at the fate of ethnic Hungarians in Romania.

*continued*

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NLRR M430/2 # 115277

BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

~~Top Secret~~

### Increased Outside Contacts

The dissident organizations are trying to expand their contacts with each other. The most dramatic example occurred this fall when 122 dissidents from Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia signed the Budapest Appeal commemorating the 1956 Hungarian revolution. The US Embassy reports that all major Hungarian dissident groups were scheduled to meet secretly last week to discuss the revolution, only the second time the divergent strands of the Hungarian opposition have met to discuss a common agenda.

Dissidents are also increasing their contacts with Western groups, such as the West German Green Party, from which the East Europeans derive encouragement, advice, and some material help. Concern about these contacts has caused the authorities to lift passports and increase surveillance.

### Outlook

With the exception of Solidarity in Poland, most of the opposition groups remain small, divided, and isolated, but party leaders may have to pay more attention to their grievances than in the past. These groups do offer alternative solutions to a growing number of economic, social, and environmental problems; as the societies become increasingly alienated from their rulers, they may be quicker to seize on issues that could be embarrassing to the regimes; and new groups seem to arise quickly in the region during periods of change.

There is little chance any of these groups will get a direct say in politics or that the ruling parties will move toward Western-style pluralism. But younger party leaders may soon develop a better understanding of the grievances expressed by the opposition, and these issues may prove divisive within the regimes as the next generation comes to power.

~~Top Secret~~

16 December 1986

# Soviet East European Report

Vol. IV, No. 6, Dec. 1, 1986

## Restructuring Plan Implies Big Changes In Various Sectors Of Soviet Society

A resolution of the Soviet Politburo (Pravda, Aug. 29) has set in motion a restructuring of the system of wages and bonuses paid to Soviet workers that will affect the vital interests of more than 75 million people. This is only the first step, however, in a series of promised social and economic reforms that if implemented will change some of the fundamental principles on which Soviet society is based. Furthermore, each one of these closely connected reforms will be accompanied by countless consequences, many of which are not foreseeable.

The process of reforming the system of wages, bonuses and fringe benefits, for example, will involve not only a redistribution of income, but also a reordering of the rigid social structure of the Soviet Union. This will include changes in the roles, functions and status of social and professional groups, a reassessment of the status of various non-professional occupations, changes in patterns of consumption, and to some extent a shift in certain basic attitudes of society.

The consequences of restructuring the pricing system are even less predictable. This reform could result in repudiation of the Socialist goal of maintaining low prices at any cost. If that goal were to be set aside, it would mean the abolition of state subsidies that currently guarantee low rents and low prices for basic foods such as bread, meat and dairy products. If recommendations for a differentiation of prices for goods and services based on quality are followed, this alone could result in a re-stratification of society and the possible impoverishment of certain groups. The debate on pricing policy has raised concerns that savings might be depreciated and as a result currency reform has been discussed (Kommunist, No. 14).

In the area of pension reform, measures are being taken to prevent the Soviet Union's large population of pensioners from sliding into poverty as a result of wage and price restructuring. The reform of the pension system, which will begin in 18 months to two years, will affect the lives of about 55 million people, and according to official statements, will

bring about a significant increase in the size of pensions (Sovetskaya Rossiya, Oct. 22). However, the practice of allowing working pensioners to receive both a wage and a full or partial pension may be abolished because of the view held by some theorists that double remuneration not only contradicts the principle of social justice, but also encourages the development of a "mood of dependence" among children in families in which there is a working pensioner (Kommunist, No. 2).

A key motive underlying the impending social and economic reforms is to help overcome the lack of economic enterprise of most Soviet citizens. The discouragement of initiative typical of collectivist societies now threatens to paralyze any measures the leadership may take to accelerate reforms in the management of the national economy. To judge from statements made in discussions of the problems involved in the impending reforms, the main hope for overcoming the passivity of the population lies in the creation of a system of incentives designed to stimulate people into showing initiative in the social, scientific and economic spheres. The importance given to this objective is reflected in the words of Stanislav Shatalin, a specialist on social and economic reform who is a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Socialism has reached the point of having to resolve a fundamental global historical problem—namely the creation of a powerful motivational mechanism for the economically effective use of production resources; a mechanism stronger than the capitalist West has been able to create in the hundreds of years of its existence. Only on this basis can socialism realize its chief ultimate goal—the creation of the highest level of wellbeing for its people in the world, and the provision of the most attractive socialist model as the goal of worldwide social, economic, moral, and ethical progress" (Kommunist, No. 14).

One likely result of the current reforms is a move away from another fundamental socialist economic value—full employment. Enterprises will be required to finance higher wage rates from earnings and therefore they will be forced to get rid of superfluous workers. This could lead to a significant number of unemployed persons, a situation that already exists in some of the southern republics. As a palliative, Shatalin proposed the organization of a state program to retrain displaced workers (Ibid.).

(Based on RL 430/86 by Sergei Voronitsyn)

# Soviet Intellectuals Promote Christianity Under Glasnost, but State Responds Coldly

In the course of the campaign for openness in Soviet society the Soviet press has begun an extensive discussion of problems relating to what is being called moral degeneration. In this context, some Soviet intellectuals have decided to promote their views on the importance of Christianity as a basis for general morality. The relaxation of cultural policy under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has prompted the appearance of literary works that demonstrate the leanings of their authors toward Christianity. These expressions of support for religion, however, have drawn a sharp response from representatives of the official line.

In several recent novels and also in articles and interviews carried by the Soviet media, a number of writers have suggested that the root of what they view as a moral decline in Soviet society lies in the destruction of religion and that a religious revival is the only way moral rectitude can be re-established. In the May issue of the literary journal *Nash Sovremennik*, which is known for publishing writers with Russian nationalist views, an article by Viktor Astaf'ev with clear religious implications asks:

"What happened to us? Who extinguished the light of goodness in our soul? Who blew out the lamp of our conscience, threw it into the dark, deep pit in which we are groping, trying to find the bottom, a support, and some kind of guiding light to the future? What uses have we for the light that leads to the fires of hell?"

The main character in Kirgiz novelist Chingiz Aitma-

tov's novel "The Executioner's Block" is a man who has been expelled from an Orthodox theological seminary. In the first two chapters of the novel he tries to preach morality to drug dealers and poachers (*Novy Mir*, Nos. 6, 8, and 9). And the Belorussian writer Vasyl Bykov said in an interview with *Knizhnoe Obozrenie* (No. 25) that today's morality for the average person is still based on the Old and New Testaments. He also wrote that during the struggle against religion in the Soviet Union, some "zealous persons tried to eliminate everything without thinking." The Soviet press has also published a selection of letters emphasizing the need for religion in combatting the moral shortcomings of contemporary Soviet society.

In response to these views in favor of religion, *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* published on July 30 a blunt attack on Astaf'ev, Aitmatov and Bykov by Ivan Kryvelev, a specialist on atheism. He accused them in Lenin's words of "flirting with God" and assured readers that under no circumstances would atheism based on scientific materialist thinking be renounced in the Soviet Union. And in a major speech at a conference of social scientists, the Soviet Union's chief ideologist, Egor Ligachev, spoke at length on the need to improve atheistic education (*Izvestia*, Oct. 2). Although the party's position is clear on this matter, the debate continues in the Soviet press.

(Based on RL 418/86 by Vera Tolz)

## Military Training Begins at 11 for Romanians

The paramilitary training of young persons in Romania is continuing to expand, even at a time when Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu is preparing to reduce military expenditures. Military training begins for both male and female students in the fifth grade, or age 11. It continues in school and at work until the end of the citizen's 20th year. Training is organized into four age groups and is led by reserve military personnel. The four groups include about 3.5 million Romanians. Information about the amount of time spent training was not available for this article. These mass-based defense measures were introduced in 1968 in the wake of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which Romania did not participate.

The military preparation is carried out in part in training camps around the country. Last year, according to *Scinteia Tineretului* (July 8, 1985), a significant number of young persons spent part of their vacations in 204 military training camps; 2,500 students attended 41 aviation camps, and an additional 2,000 students attended 15 camps specializing in

naval skills, radiotelegraphy, frontier protection, gliding and parachuting. According to *Scinteia Tineretului* of July 12, 1986, the number of training camps increased this year. At all of the camps the trainees wear the blue uniforms of the Patriotic Guard.

At a youth forum in Bucharest last year special attention was paid to the training of girls for military service. The former Minister of National Defense, Constantin Olteanu, insisted on the necessity of paramilitary activities, "especially among female students" (*Scinteia Tineretului*, May 20, 1985). This summer many female students undertook their military training in Bucharest, but no precise estimate of their numbers is available. They were accommodated in 30 student hostels (*Viata Studentesca*, Sept. 3).

Children who live in border regions are trained to assist border guards. Games are organized to help them develop their skills and competitions are held between the different units. There is even a national competition.

(Based on Romanian SR/12 by Carmen Pompey)



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

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NARA, DATE 8/27/99

PAGE 01 OF 04

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<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI> RUEHMO<DTG> 101604Z DEC 86 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4003 INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 7047

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ZAGLADIN LECTURE ON CPSU RELATIONS WITH THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 20853

LIMDIS/NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ZAGLADIN LECTURE ON CPSU RELATIONS WITH THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

>BEGIN SUMMARY<  
SUMMARY

2. IN A RECENT LECTURE RESTRICTED TO PARTY PROPAGANDISTS, VADIM ZAGLADIN (DOBRYNIN'S FIRST DEPUTY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT) PRESENTED A CONCISE AND UNUSUALLY STRAIGHTFORWARD CPSU VIEW OF THE "NEW SITUATION" FACING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. ZAGLADIN DECLARED THAT DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE THE KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FUTURE, AND WARNED OF POSSIBLE SUDDEN ECONOMIC DISLOCATION IN THE U.S. HE CALLED ON COMMUNIST PARTIES TO UNITE BEHIND THE CENTRAL STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SEEK

ALLIANCES WITH NEWLY MOBILIZED ANTI-WAR GROUPS IN THE NON-SOCIALIST WORLD EVEN BROADER THAN THE POPULAR FRONT OF THE 1930'S. THE CPSU SHOULD REACH OUT TO ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES, MINIMIZING AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND ACCEPT DIVERSITY SO AS NOT TO CREATE OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION ON PEACE. CITING UNPUBLISHED DECLINING CP MEMBERSHIP FIGURES, ZAGLADIN SAID THE CPSU IN THE FUTURE SHOULD DEVELOP STRENGTH FROM DIVERSITY, RECOGNIZING THAT NATIONAL SITUATIONS VARY WIDELY AND LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHERS. THE NEW DEFINITION OF "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" INCLUDED "COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE." GREATER OPENNESS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTIES AND MEETINGS WITHOUT AGREED COMMUNIQUE MIGHT LEAD AT SOME STAGE TO A WORLD COMMUNIST PARTY MEETING.

3. THIS AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT DEPICTS HIGHLY MODIFIED SOVIET EXPECTATIONS FOR SOLIDARITY AMONG COMMUNIST PARTIES. ZAGLADIN'S THESIS (AND SOME Q'S AND A'S) PORTEND GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF DIVERSITY IN RELATIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES AND MORE OPENNESS IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. A SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES BALKAN EXPERT WHO ATTENDED THE LECTURE WAS STRUCK BY ZAGLADIN'S STRAIGHTFORWARD APPEAL TO JOIN FORCES WITH NON-COMMUNIST GROUPS IN THE WEST, LIKENING IT TO A BROADER VERSION OF THE COMMON FRONT POLICIES OF THE PAST.

END SUMMARY  
>END SUMMARY<

4. EMBOFF MANAGED TO ATTEND A RESTRICTED LECTURE AT THE ZNANIYE SOCIETY GIVEN BY VADIM ZAGLADIN, FIRST DEPUTY HEAD OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL

DEPARTMENT. TITLED "THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' MOVEMENT AT THE PRESENT STAGE," THE LECTURE WAS PART OF A THREE-DAY SEMINAR IN MOSCOW FOR PARTY LECTURERS AND OBSERVERS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FROM ALL OVER THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET SOCIALISM AND U.S. CAPITALISM IN THE "NEW STAGE"

5. ZAGLADIN PRESENTED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE CPSU VIEW OF THE "NEW" HISTORICAL SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. HE NOTED THAT THE LATE 1970'S AND EARLY 1980'S HAD PRODUCED CONTRADICTORY TRENDS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST. IN THE USSR, THE "GREAT ACHIEVEMENT" OF ATTAINING MILITARY PARITY WITH THE U.S. HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY SERIOUS DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. GROWTH RATES HAD DECLINED AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS INCREASED NOT JUST IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THROUGHOUT CEMA. THE CAPITALIST ENEMY HAD QUICKLY RECOGNIZED THESE TRENDS AND HAD ATTEMPTED TO EXPLOIT SOVIET DOMESTIC PROBLEMS TO REGAIN THE OFFENSIVE. THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE DANGERS OF THIS SITUATION AND HAD LAUNCHED A LONG-TERM AND IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS OF RESTRUCTURING AND GROWTH. SOVIET DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT CONSTITUTED THE KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FUTURE.

6. WHILE THE USSR HAD RECOGNIZED ITS WEAK POINTS AND HAD SET OUT TO CORRECT THEM, ZAGLADIN CONTINUED, THE WEST HAD FAILED TO ASSESS POTENTIAL DANGERS INHERENT IN ITS OWN EARLY 1980'S ECONOMIC GROWTH. BENEATH THE VENEER OF AN "ALMOST RELIGIOUS" AMERICAN FAITH IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY, THE U.S. ECONOMY FACED GRDWING PROBLEMS WITH STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND A STAGGERING DEBT. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD THUS BE PREPARED FOR "SUDDEN SHIFTS" STEMMING FROM POSSIBLE U.S. ECONOMIC AND

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 20853

LIMDIS/NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ZAGLADIN LECTURE ON CPSU RELATIONS WITH

SOCIAL SHOCKS IN COMING YEARS. NEW POSSIBILITIES

7. ZAGLADIN ARGUED THAT, IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLY 1980'S, THE SOVIET POSITION TODAY HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED BY (A) NEW POLICIES AT HOME, AND (B) THE FACT THAT, UNLIKE THE U.S., THE USSR HAD CORRECTLY PERCEIVED THAT "INTERDEPENDENCE" HAD BECOME THE SALIENT HISTORICAL TREND ON THE BASIS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND A COMMON THREAT OF WAR THAT CONFRONTED ALL COUNTRIES EQUALLY. A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THIS INTERDEPENDENCE WOULD CREATE NEW POSSIBILITIES NOT JUST FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, BUT FOR THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE.

8. ZAGLADIN STRESSED THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE WEST HAD CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY IN RECENT YEARS. LARGE NEW GROUPS HAD BEEN ACTIVATED AND, IN A "UNIQUE"

HISTORICAL SITUATION, THE MAJORITY IN MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES OPPOSED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES. DUE TO A MISUNDERSTANDING OF MARXIST THEORY, WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAD BEEN SLOW TO RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW GROUPS MOBILIZED BY ANTI-WAR SENTIMENT. ZAGLADIN DECLARED THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR COMMUNIST PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE IN A BROAD COALITION OF FORCES IN THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. THIS STRATEGY SHOULD BE EVEN BROADER THAN THE POPULAR FRONT POLICIES OF THE 1930'S, WHICH HAD BEEN BASED ON MORE NARROW ECONOMIC INTERESTS. THE GOAL NOW WAS TO LINK ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE -- THE COMMON CAUSE TO SAVE HUMANITY WHICH HAD MOBILIZED LARGE SOCIAL GROUPS -- WITH THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS.

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AN001820

9. IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTATIVES FROM MANY COUNTRIES, ZAGLADIN CONTINUED, THE CPSU HAD BEGUN THE IMPORTANT WORK OF PRESENTING A CLEAR IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS APPROACH. MARX AND ENGELS NOTED THAT THE PROLETARIAT COULD NOT FREE ITSELF WITHOUT FREEING THE ENTIRE SOCIETY, AND LENIN HELD THAT THE INTERESTS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS TRANSCEND THOSE OF THE WORKING CLASS. FOR MARX AND ENGELS, COMMUNISM SHOULD BE ABOVE HATRED FOR CAPITALISTS, AND "SOCIETY" WAS A HIGHER VALUE THAN "CLASS." AT FIRST, FEW UNDERSTOOD THIS, FOR THE SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS IN CAPITALISM WERE DEEP. BUT AFTER THE 1917 GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION, THE WORKING CLASS BEGAN TO SEE THE NEED TO FREE ALL HUMANITY. ON MANY OCCASIONS AFTER 1917, SOVIET POLITICIANS AND THEORETICIANS HAD FORGOTTEN THIS CORRECT VIEW OF MARXISM, BUT IN AN AGE OF INTERDEPENDENCE, THE CPSU WOULD NO LONGER MAKE THIS MISTAKE.

THE SITUATION OF NON-GOVERNING COMMUNIST PARTIES

10. CITING STATISTICS WHICH HE ASKED HIS AUDIENCE NOT TO USE PUBLICLY, ZAGLADIN DECLARED THAT THE FAILURE OF MANY COMMUNIST PARTIES TO ADAPT TO THE SITUATION HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED HAD CAUSED THEM TO LOSE STRENGTH IN RECENT YEARS. ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP HAD FALLEN FROM 1,800,000 TO 1,550,000; THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY FROM 700,000 TO 600,000; WHILE THE U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY STOOD AT A PALTRY 12,000. OVERALL, NON-GOVERNING COMMUNIST PARTIES HAD LOST BETWEEN 7 AND 9 MILLION MEMBERS.

11. THE REASONS FOR THIS DROP IN SUPPORT WERE MANY, ACCORDING TO ZAGLADIN: THE CONSERVATIVE WAVE OF THE EARLY 1980'S, INADEQUATE REACTION TO NEW SOCIAL FORCES, A WHITE COLLAR TREND WHICH LESSENER COLLECTIVE SPIRIT AND CAMOUFLAGED EXPLOITATION, NEW MASS MEDIA TECHNIQUES WHICH BROUGHT THE CAPITALIST MESSAGE INTO THE HOME AND AFFECTED THE "SOCIAL PSYCHE" OF THE WORKING CLASS. IN ADDITION, JUST WHEN INCREASED COOPERATION WAS NEEDED, WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAD CUT BACK THEIR INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS, FLAUNTED THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE CPSU AND REFUSED JOINT ACTIONS.

12. FOR ITS PART, ZAGLADIN SAID, THE CPSU HAD BEEN SLOW TO REACT TO NEW DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES, AND THIS HAD FURTHER COMPLICATED MATTERS FOR OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES. DISAPPOINTING CEMA

ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION,  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 MOSCOW 20853  
LIMDIS/NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ZAGLADIN LECTURE ON CPSU RELATIONS WITH EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND AND A GROWING TENDENCY IN WESTERN EUROPE TO ASSIGN THE U.S. AND USSR EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS ALL CONTRIBUTED TO A WEAKENING OF COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN WESTERN EUROPE, ALLOWING SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES TO GAIN THE UPPER HAND IN THE WORKING CLASS. THE CPSU HAD BY NOW FULLY REALIZED THIS FACT AND KNEW IT HAD TO SET A POSITIVE EXAMPLE AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM. A NEW PROCESS BEGUN AT THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO PRODUCE RESULTS THAT CREATED NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR COMMUNIST PARTIES ELSEWHERE: THE ANTI-WAR STRUGGLE HAD BEEN FURTHER ACTIVATED ON THE BASIS OF EVER-INCREASING SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES, AND THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TENSION WAS SHIFTING TO THE U.S. IN ADDITION, ALONG WITH SOVIET DOMESTIC ECONOMIC GROWTH, CLOSER CEMA INTEGRATION WOULD INCREASE THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIALISM AND PROMOTE

CLOSER TIES AMONG SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE RECENT MOSCOW CEMA SUMMIT, ZAGLADIN STATED, INCLUDING WAYS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND ALBANIA.

13. ANOTHER FACTOR IN COMMUNIST PARTY DECLINE, ZAGLADIN DECLARED, INVOLVED A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP CADRES. THE NEW GENERATION OF COMMUNIST OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN EUROPE, HAD NOT EXPERIENCED THE "OLD STRUGGLE" AND WAS OFTEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MASS MEDIA. AS THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP SAGGED, COMMUNIST PARTIES HAD OFTEN LOST TOUCH WITH REALITY. MANY OF THESE PARTIES CLEARLY NEEDED "RESTRUCTURING" AND "NEW THINKING." THE CPSU COULD NOT DECIDE FOR OTHER PARTIES IN SUCH MATTERS, BUT WOULD USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT HAD IN FAVOR OF POLICIES THAT RECOGNIZED INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE CRUCIAL LINK BETWEEN PEACE ISSUES AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

PRINCIPLES FOR CPSU RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST

MOVEMENT

14. ZAGLADIN NOTED THAT THE CPSU NOW PLACED HIGHEST PRIORITY ON REACHING OUT TO THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

(A) DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH ALL COMMUNIST PARTIES BY SEEKING AREAS OF AGREEMENT, HOWEVER SMALL, AND ALWAYS AVOIDING A BREAK IN PARTY RELATIONS;  
(B) DO NOT DRAMATIZE DIFFERENCES WHERE THEY MAY EXIST; ACCEPT DIVERSITY IN THE NAME OF CREATING NO IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION ON THE KEY ISSUE OF WAR AND PEACE;  
(C) STRESS THAT COOPERATION AND UNITY DO NOT ENTAIL INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER PARTY: THE CPSU ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS NO MONOPOLY ON TRUTH AND ADMITS THAT ON OCCASION IT IGNORED THAT IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE IN THE PAST; IN THIS REGARD, THE NEW DEFINITION OF "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" IS REVOLUTIONARY SOLIDARITY PLUS COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE

AND EQUALITY;

(D) RESPECT AND LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES; THE CPSU PROPOSES TO DISCUSS AND CONSULT WITH ALL PARTIES RECOGNIZING THAT NATIONAL SITUATIONS DIFFER; SOVIET MEDIA WILL BRING MORE DETAILED AND STRAIGHTFORWARD COVERAGE OF POLICIES ADOPTED BY OTHER PARTIES.

15. ZAGLADIN CLAIMED THAT THE CPSU'S NEW STYLE IN DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT HAD ALREADY PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS. RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED WITH THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ITALY, JAPAN AND SPAIN. IN RAPIDLY INCREASING ITS CONTACTS WITH OTHER PARTIES, THE CPSU SOUGHT TO FOCUS ON CPSU THEORY REGARDING INTERDEPENDENCE AND PEACE. THE CPSU HOPED TO SCHEDULE INFORMAL MEETINGS IN THE FUTURE TO ALLOW MORE CONTACT AMONG INTERESTED COMMUNIST PARTIES AND OTHER PARTIES AND SOCIAL GROUPS. FOR EXAMPLE, AN INFORMAL SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL MEETING, THE FIRST OF ITS KIND, HAD BEEN HELD IN MOSCOW RECENTLY TO DISCUSS "SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND THE MODERN WORLD." THE CONFERENCE HAD BROUGHT TOGETHER REPRESENTATIVES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 MOSCOW 20853  
LIMDIS/NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ZAGLADIN LECTURE ON CPSU RELATIONS WITH FROM LABOR UNIONS AND COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES FROM 81 COUNTRIES. THE CONFERENCE HAD ENTAILED NO SPEECHES, NO CONCLUSIONS, NO FINAL DOCUMENT, JUST FREE DISCUSSION. ON THE BASIS OF THIS POSITIVE EXPERIENCE, THE CPSU FAVORED ORGANIZING MORE SUCH SINGLE-ISSUE CONFERENCES USING THE SAME GROUND

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RULES.

PROSPECTS FOR A WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING

16. ZAGLADIN OBSERVED THAT GIVEN THE NEED FOR INCREASED CONSULTATION AMONG COMMUNIST PARTIES, THE QUESTION NATURALLY AROSE WHETHER A MEETING OF WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES SHOULD BE CONVENED. WHILE THE CPSU COULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A WORLD MEETING THAT WAS INFORMAL, PRODUCED NO FINAL DOCUMENT, AND ALLOWED AN EQUAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, THIS IDEA WAS NOT YET ACCEPTABLE TO A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT COMMUNIST PARTIES, SUCH AS YUGOSLAVIA, ITALY, FRANCE AND JAPAN, AMONG OTHERS. MANY PARTIES EXPRESSED SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR HOLDING A MEETING, BUT NOT AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE CPSU RECOGNIZED THE DANGER THAT SUCH A MEETING COULD HAVE THE CONTRADICTORY EFFECT OF CREATING DOMESTIC OBSTACLES FOR COMMUNIST PARTIES SEEKING TO COOPERATE WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND SOCIAL GROUPS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE. FOR THE TIME BEING, THE CPSU WOULD SEEK TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE IN THE MOVEMENT THROUGH MORE ACTIVE PARTY-TO-PARTY CONTACTS. THIS COULD WITH TIME LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING IN THE UNDETERMINED FUTURE.

17. ZAGLADIN SAID HE WAS OFTEN ASKED BY SOVIET CITIZENS WHY THERE WAS NO LONGER A CENTER OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. IN FACT, THE FORM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST COOPERATION DEPENDED ON THE HISTORICAL SITUATION. WHEREAS THE COMINFORM HAD DONE MUCH TO REESTABLISH

STRONG COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II, THE LONGSTANDING TREND TOWARD INDEPENDENT COMMUNIST PARTIES HAD RENDERED CENTRALIZATION UNWORKABLE. EACH COMMUNIST PARTY FORMED ITS GOALS ON THE BASIS OF ITS UNIQUE NATIONAL SITUATION AND GAINED STRENGTH FROM IDENTIFYING WITH NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS. INTERFERENCE FROM THE CENTER DURING THE LATE COMINFORM PERIOD HAD HURT THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. THE CPSU WOULD NOT AGAIN RAISE THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A CENTER. QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR

18. FOLLOWING HIS PRESENTATION, ZAGLADIN WAS BESIEGED WITH QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE. AMONG THE MORE INTERESTING WERE:

Q: WHERE IS THE "ZAKONHERNOST" (MARXIST HISTORICAL NECESSITY) IN WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD US?

A: IT IS THERE: UNDER MARXISM, DEVELOPMENT COMES THROUGH CONTRADICTIONS. WITHOUT THIS, HISTORICAL GROWTH WOULD STOP.

Q: WHAT ABOUT RELATIONS WITH CHINA? (THIS WAS BY FAR THE MOST FREQUENT QUESTION.)

A: THE LONGEST PATH STARTS WITH SMALL STEPS. WE ARE IN A TRANSITION STAGE MARKED BY CLOSER CHINESE CONTACTS -- INCLUDING PARTY CONTACTS -- WITH OUR EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES. THIS PROCESS FAVORS OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA, WHICH HAVE A HIGH PRIORITY.

Q: WITH HOW MANY COMMUNIST PARTIES DOES THE CPSU HAVE RELATIONS:

A: 103. (MORE THAN ONE PARTY FROM SEVERAL COUNTRIES)

Q: WHY DON'T WE NORMALIZE WITH ALBANIA?

A: WE HAVE NO PARTY RELATIONS WITH TIRANA AND ARE TRYING TO SIGNAL OUR INTEREST IN A RAPID RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PARTY TIES BY PROVIDING MORE INFORMATION ON ALBANIA IN OUR MEDIA. THIS MAY TAKE TIME, HOWEVER.

Q: SHOULD COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE CONTACTS WITH RELIGIOUS GROUPS FOR PEACE, AND SHOULD RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 MOSCOW 20853

LINDIS/NOFORM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ZAGLADIN LECTURE ON CPSU RELATIONS WITH BE ALLOWED INTO THE PARTY?

A: YES. CHRISTIANS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN MANY COUNTRIES. FOR EXAMPLE, FRANCE AND ITALY. RELIGIOUS GROUPS ARE A KEY TO THE PEACE MOVEMENT. THE

OVERALL CPSU APPROACH TO RELIGION SHOULD NOT CREATE OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION WITH SUCH GROUPS.

Q: WHAT EFFECT DID OUR 1930'S CULT OF PERSONALITY HAVE ON THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT?

A: IT DROVE SOME AWAY, BUT IN FACT IT DID NOT WEAKEN OUR POSITION AT THE TIME. NOW, HOWEVER, WE MUST SPEAK OPENLY OF ALL SIDES OF SOVIET HISTORY, GOOD AND BAD.

Q: SINCE, JDER GLASNOST', WE ALL NEED AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE TO INSTRUCT THE LOCAL POPULATIONS OF OUR HOME REPUBLICS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, WHY DOESN'T SOVIET MEDIA CARRY FULL TEXTS OF IMPORTANT STATEMENTS BY WESTERN LEADERS?

A: THEY ARE NOT ALWAYS THAT ENLIGHTENING, AND I OFTEN FEEL I AM READING THEM ONLY BECAUSE I HAVE TO. WE CAN CONSIDER THIS, HOWEVER.

Q: WHY DON'T WE JUST INSIST THAT A WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING BE CONVENED?

A: BECAUSE THIS APPROACH WOULD BE AN OBSTACLE TO FINDING A COMMON AGENDA ON PEACE.

Q: IS PCF LEADER MARCHAIS RESPONSIBLE FOR FRENCH COMMUNIST DECLINE?

A: PERSONALITY PLAYS SOME ROLE IN THIS CASE. THE PCF HAS MADE TACTICAL MISTAKES, AND THEY ARE CURRENTLY STUDYING THIS. THE PCF HARBORED ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN TO THE PCF RANK-AND-FILE THE ZIG-ZAGS OF COOPERATING WITH THE PS UNDER THE COMMON PROGRAM IN THE 1970'S, BREAKING WITH THEM, THEN JOINING THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT ONLY TO BREAK WITH THE SOCIALISTS AGAIN. IN ADDITION, THE PARTY HAS BEEN THE VICTIM OF AN ANTI-PCF CAMPAIGN IN THE FRENCH MEDIA.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SPLIT IN THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY?

A: THIS WAS AN UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT. IT IS COMPLICATED BECAUSE PERSONALITY CONFLICTS ARE INVOLVED.

Q: HOW ARE THINGS GOING WITH THE ROMANIANS?

A: WE KEEP TRYING TO FIND A COMMON BASE WITH THEM IN SPITE OF THEIR "PECULIARITIES." (OCOBENOSTI)

Q: WHY LOOK TO THE PEACE MOVEMENT NOW WHEN IT WAS UNABLE TO PREVENT INF DEPLOYMENT?

A: THE PEACE MOVEMENT CAN SOLVE ONLY POLITICAL PROBLEMS. INF INCREASED THE LONG-TERM STRENGTH OF THE MOVEMENT, AND RECENT SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES HELP THEM EVEN MORE NOW. HOWEVER, WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS INF EXPERIENCE THAT IT IS A MISTAKE TO GIVE THE PEACE MOVEMENT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT IT CANNOT SOLVE.

Q: ARE WE CONTROLLING THE PEACE MOVEMENT?

A: NO. ITS STRENGTH DERIVES FROM THE FACT THAT IT IS SPONTANEOUS.

Q: HOW ARE RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA?

A: OUR RELATIONS ARE GOOD AND GETTING BETTER. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE SOME INTERNAL PROBLEMS, BUT IN REPORTING ON THEM WE CARRY ONLY WHAT THE YUGOSLAVS ARE SAYING ABOUT THEMSELVES. THERE MAY BE SOME DECLINE IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY ROLE IN YUGOSLAVIA AND WE HAVE HAD AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WITH THEM ON THAT.

Q: IF WE REALLY WANT TO INCREASE OUR INFLUENCE, SHOULDN'T WE JUST RETURN TO MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 MOSCOW 20853

LINDIS/NOFORM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: ZAGLADIN LECTURE ON CPSU RELATIONS WITH

A: AS I TRIED TO EXPLAIN, WE ARE ON A MARXIST-LENINIST

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PATH.

Q: YOU SAY THERE COULD BE "SUDDEN SHIFTS" IN THE  
CAPITALIST WORLD: IF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS DOES DEVELOP  
THERE, ARE WE LIKELY TO FACE A FASCIST DANGER AGAIN?

A: THE CHANCES OF THIS ARE LOWER THAN IN THE 1930'S  
BECAUSE EDUCATIONAL LEVELS ARE UP.

Q: IS THERE STILL A HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF JEWS IN THE  
COMMUNIST MOVEMENT THAN IN THE POPULATION AT LARGE?

A: THE JEWS HAVE THE SAME RELATIVE REPRESENTATION  
AS OTHER GROUPS.

HARTMAN

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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 06<SSN> 0853<TOR> 861212101551 MSG000156075351

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<SECT>SECTION: 06 OF 06<SSN> 0853<TOR> 861212102358 MSG000156075838

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 28, 1986

TO: FRED HUTCHINSON  
NIO/FDIA  
CIA

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND *WR*  
Senior Director  
International Communications  
and Information  
National Security Council

Just a note to remind you that at the next non-group meeting at 3:30 p.m., December 4, we would like you to report on your Agency's 1987 plan for countering (and anticipating) Soviet active measures.

DECLASSIFIED / Released  
NLS F95-0412 #109  
BY *Amf*, NARA, DATE 7/19/00

JNB

USSR-INDIA:

**Soviets Trumpet Gorbachev Visit**

**Moscow launched an all-out public relations campaign for General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to New Delhi last week by using its extensive connections in the Indian press—tolerated by the Indian Government—to generate highly favorable media coverage. (S-NF)**

Moscow sent a public relations specialist to New Delhi in September to coordinate propaganda activities for the visit.

the Soviets paid \$200,000 to eight major New Delhi newspapers for advertising supplements highlighting the visit and also paid and entertained at least a dozen journalists. One Soviet official toured four northern Indian states and urged editors to print articles on Indo-Soviet cooperation. ~~(S-NF-NO-OO)~~

During the visit, the Soviets virtually took over the Indian national television network. They wrote programs, vetted Indian scripts, and chose film footage to be transmitted on all news and special programming for the four-day visit. The Soviets also helped the Indian Press Information Bureau select journalists to attend Gorbachev's press conferences and used Indian employees of the Soviet Embassy to persuade these journalists not to ask embarrassing questions. ~~(S-NF-NO-OO)~~

**Comment:** Prime Minister Gandhi appears to have given Moscow a free propaganda hand. Gorbachev's well-received speech to a joint session of the Indian parliament, the joint communique on principles for a nuclear-weapons-free world, and Gandhi's glowing endorsement of Gorbachev as a "crusader for peace" put India firmly on the public record in support of Soviet foreign policy positions on arms control, SDI, and the UN. The Soviets will use the extensive publicity surrounding the visit as part of their propaganda on arms control and other foreign policy issues, especially in the Third World. ~~(S-NF)~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-041/2 #111

By smf /KSA, Date 7/3/00

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

wr

115310

November 28, 1986

TO: JOE DETRANI  
CHIEF, PPS  
CIA

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND *WR*  
Senior Director  
International Communications  
and Information  
National Security Council

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bcc Vince *Connistraro*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *M43D/2* #11531D

BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/31/15*

SWB

VTB: Lawyers network - (see 11/27)

if "series" - funds + moral support

Sanity -

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RFE/RL 4870 EG 3658 26 NOVEMBER 1986

TO BUELL INFO BODIN LODEESEN MARCHETTI MILLER MURPHY RAND - WASH  
 KRATCH REYMAN PUDDINGTON - NEW YORK  
 INFO PARTA OVADIA MIRSKY - PARIS  
 FM MARSH INFO PELL GILDNER BLOCKER BUSH CARLSON EDWARDS  
 ERIKSEN GEORGESCU GALSKOY KAMINSKY KUSIN LYON NAJDER PANOFF  
 PENNAR REED RIBANSZKY SEDIVY VASLEF WIERZYNSKI WILLCOX - MUNICH

RFED/RLD DAILY REPORT NO. 224 FOR 26 NOVEMBER 1986

## 1. EASTERN EUROPE

EASTERN EUROPE. THE EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA HAVE HAD NO COMMENTARIES AND MADE ONLY BRIEF MENTION OF THE ROMANIAN REFERENDUM ON SUNDAY TO APPROVE CUTS IN DEFENSE SPENDING. THIS MAY IMPLY EITHER DISAPPROVAL OF THE MEASURE OR SIMPLE DISREGARD FOR THE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE. INDEED, ONE HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GESTURE MIGHT HAVE BEEN CALCULATED FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES AND/OR PUBLICITY IN THE WEST RATHER THAN IN THE HOPE OF GETTING OTHER EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE SIMILAR CUTS IN THEIR OWN MILITARY SPENDING.

POLAND. THE OFFICIAL LABOR ORGANIZATION OPENED ITS NATIONAL CONGRESS IN WARSAW TODAY. THE ORGANIZATION CLAIMS A MEMBERSHIP OF ABOUT 6,500,000 (800,000 OF WHOM ARE PENSIONERS), ASSOCIATED IN 131 FEDERATIONS AND ABOUT 27,000 LOCAL FACTORY UNITS; POLAND'S ENTIRE LABOR FORCE IS ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 14,000,000. TODAY'S SESSION IS CLOSED TO OBSERVERS. THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE CONGRESS IS TO BE STAGED TOMORROW AND WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED BY A WELCOMING ADDRESS BY WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI. THE CONGRESS HAS BEEN BILLED AS AN EVENT LEGITIMIZING THE OFFICIAL UNIONS AS A PERMANENT POLISH INSTITUTION.

## 2. U.S.S.R.

WE HAVE STILL NOT BEEN VOUCHSAFED ANY DETAILS OF THE "LENGTHY SPEECH" THAT GORBACHEV IS SAID TO HAVE DELIVERED TO THE LEADERSHIP OF UZBEKISTAN DURING A STOPOVER ON HIS WAY TO INDIA ON MONDAY. IT WAS GORBACHEV'S FIRST VISIT TO A CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLIC, AT LEAST SINCE HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY, AND IT SEEMS MORE THAN LIKELY THAT HE WILL HAVE HAD SOME PRETTY TRENCANT THINGS TO SAY ABOUT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN UZBEKISTAN--PERHAPS TOO TRENCANT FOR PUBLICATION EVEN IN THESE DAYS OF GLASNOST?

THE SOVIET AGITPROP BROADSHEET, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY PUBLISHED IN ITS ISSUE NO. 43 AN ARTICLE DESCRIBING THE SUFFERING OF SOVIET EMIGRES AND OTHER PEOPLE OF RUSSIAN ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES. TO THE USUAL HELPFUL COMMENTS ABOUT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FORMER SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE US JOB MARKET, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY ADDED SOME NEW AND QUITE UNEXPECTED DETAILS. THE PERIODICAL SUGGESTED THAT THE FBI REGARDS ALL PEOPLE WITH NATIVE RUSSIAN LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES AS "SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS." APPARENTLY, IN AN ATTEMPT TO WARN SOVIET CITIZENS AGAINST EMIGRATION, THE ARTICLE ALSO SAID THAT A SPECIAL NETWORK OF LABOR CAMPS IS NOW BEING BUILT IN AMERICA FOR THESE "SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS." REFERRING TO THE NEWSPAPER SAINT PETERSBURG TIMES (AS USUAL WITHOUT CITING A DATE), ARGUMENTY I FAKTY ALLEGED THAT SOME RUSSIANS IN AMERICA ARE AFRAID OF BEING PUT IN SUCH LABOR CAMPS WITHOUT A TRIAL. THE ARTICLE IN ARGUMENTY I FAKTY IS ALSO NOTEWORTHY FOR ITS AN-TI-SEMITIC IMPLICATIONS. IT SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE IN FACT SOME SO-CALLED "RUSSIANS" IN AMERICA WHO HAD BECOME CRIMINALS AND FORMED "THE NEW YORK RUSSIAN MAFIA." HOWEVER, THE PERIODICAL SAID, THE MAJORITY OF THOSE WHO ARE CALLED RUSSIANS IN AMERICA ARE IN FACT NOT RUSSIAN ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONALITY. (SUCH A STATEMENT IS AN OBVIOUS HINT AT THE JEWISH ORIGIN OF THE MAJORITY OF RECENT SOVIET EMIGRES.)

AT THE TIME OF WRITING, TODAY'S LOS ANGELES TIMES SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY NEWSPAPER TO REPORT THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE OFFERED TO RELEASE ANATOLII MARCHENKO FROM PRISON AND TO ISSUE HIM AND HIS FAMILY EXIT VISAS FOR ISRAEL. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, HEARD THE SAME NEWS FROM OTHER SOURCES. TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND MATERIAL, RL 345/81, "THE SIXTH TRIAL OF ANATOLII MARCHENKO," HAS BEEN REISSUED.

SHORT BUDGET ITEMS ON THE NEW USSR MINISTER OF MEDIUM MACHINERY-BUILDING, AND ON THE CURIOUS ABSENCE FROM PUBLIC VIEW OF ALEKSANDR YAKOVLEV, HAVE BEEN FORWARDED BY ELECTRONIC MAIL.

END MSG/S  
 18:42:11

# AFGHAN NEWS

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**A FORTNIGHTLY BULLETIN OF JAMI'AT ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN**  
Post Office Box No. 264, Peshawar - Pakistan.  
Vol. II, No. 22, 15/11/1986.

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## SOVIET INCURSION IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

The United Arab Emirates have agreed to the opening of a Soviet Embassy in Abu Dhabi. It is indeed sad news to see that the killers of the people of Afghanistan are gaining a foothold in a strategic area in the Muslim world.

The Soviet Empire is based on Marxist-Leninist ideology which denies the existence of God and considers all religious people reactionary. They hate all religions and try hard to destroy them but their enmity towards Islam is greater than to others.

What the Soviets did to the Muslims of Central Asia, the North of Iran and Turkey is a black page in history. Their language, culture, places of worship, in short, every side of their material and spiritual life were colonized and Sovietized. The great centers of Islamic knowledge were destroyed for ever.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is another example of their enmity towards Islam and Muslims. So far they have killed half a million innocent Muslims and have driven five million from their country and have destroyed 75% of all villages and towns.

They do all this to pave their way for the expansion of their empire and the control of the world. The double game that the Soviets have played in the Middle East has made it possible for Zionists to enjoy the occupation of Islamic Palestine.

The opening of Soviet embassies in the Islamic world does not serve any useful purpose. These embassies turn into the centers of conspiracies against the governments, and places for recruiting agents and creating puppet parties.

Cultural ties with the Soviets is a way of taking young people to the Soviet Union to brain-wash them.

Opening the door of an Islamic country to an invader and expansionist who dreams of world hegemony, is giving hope to the invaders to continue their present policies. Once the leaders of the Resistance in Bukhara were saying "Today Bukhara Tomorrow Afghanistan" but Afghan leaders of the time did not pay attention and we see the consequences of that indifference. Today the people of Afghanistan are saying "Today Afghanistan tomorrow the Gulf". If the leaders of the Islamic countries do not care, and remain indifferent the day which they will regret will not be too far away.

## A NEW TYPE OF BOMB

Soviet criminals are using Afghanistan as a testing ground for their weapons. They have used different types of their weapons in Afghanistan to improve their performance. Recently they have started to use a new type of bomb in Ferkhar and Panjshir. The bomb explodes in the middle of the air and creates a lot of fragments which are pushed towards the ground. The fragments are similar to the fragments created by the explosion of a D-30 artillery shell. The bomb is very strong and its fragments can penetrate the ground up to 30 cm.

## **A TRAITOR CAPTURED**

In an occupied country a few people can be found who offer their services to the enemy and spy against their own people. In Afghanistan we also have these people who sell their honor and dignity to the enemies of their religion.

One such traitor was Qazi Sekander from Andarab in Baghlan province. He was captured by our valiant Mujahideen in Andarab and was submitted to the judicial authorities to be tried. He was the person who led a delegation to Kabul to meet the puppet Babrak. He had appeared on enemy television and supported the occupation of Afghanistan. He had offered a home-made clock (Chapan) to Babrak, (the greatest traitor), a symbolic gesture to honor him.

He has now been captured and is facing trial. Every body knows the penalty for such actions and he and other traitors will not escape unpunished.

## **NEWS FROM THE BATTLE FIELDS**



### **PANJSHIR**

29/10/1986. Mujahideen attacked a Soviet supply convoy in the lower part of the Panjshir valley. One tank, two APCs and 20 trucks full of ammunition were set on fire. The enemy casualties were not immediately known.

17/10/1986. Mujahideen of Bazarak shot down an Mi-8 helicopter with DShK.

1/11/1986. One tank was blown up by land mine in Paarakh, 30 Km. inside the valley. All the occupants of the mentioned tank were killed.

11/10/1986. Mujahideen of Chemalwarda ( a side valley in Rukha) attacked an enemy post on the top of a mountain. The post was destroyed and the Soviets were forced to abandon the mentioned post. Mujahideen suffered no casualties and the casualties of the enemy was not immediately known.

12/10/1986. Mujahideen of Tulkha ( a side valley of Bazarak 35 Km. inside the main valley) attacked the enemy positions in Rahman Kahail with heavy weapons. Two houses occupied by enemy soldiers were destroyed. On the same day, two tanks were blown up by land mines planted by Mujahideen from the same area. No figure is given for enemy casualties for the two incidents.

15/10/1986. Mujahideen of Gulbahar ( a town in the mouth of the Panjshir valley) attacked the enemy post at Rah-i-Tang. Three puppet soldiers were captured and one officer killed. The Mujahideen siezed two PK machineguns and five AK-47s. The Mujahideen suffered no casualties.

16/10/1986. A Soviet convoy was ambushed by the Mujahideen from Shotol( a small narrow valley situated between the Salang and Panjshir vallieys) on the Salang Highway inside the Salang valley. As a result of a 6 hour battle 50 vehicles carrying ammunition and 3 APCs were destroyed. About 100 Soviet soldiers were either killed or wounded. The attack started at 2:00 PM. and continued till 8:00 PM.

Salang is a narrow valley through which the Salang highway passes. This highway connects the Soviet border to Kabul. It is the most important transportation route which the Soviets use. The Mujahideen are quite well organized in the valleys around this highway and regularly attack this enemy life-line.

The Mujahideen of Shotol are commanded by Commander Saeed a pious and dedicated Jami'at figure in the area.

### ***JAWZJAN PROVINCE***

14/8/1986. According to a late report from Sancharak district, Mujahideen from Jami'at attacked a resupply convoy of the enemy. Fighting continued for ten long days. 4 tanks and 4 trucks were destroyed by land mines or rocket fire from the Mujahideen. 15 puppet troops joined Mujahideen and brought their weapons with them. Enemy casualties were believed to be high but no precise figure is available. 4 Mujahideen and 10 civilians were martyred while 21 Mujahideen and 19 civilians were wounded. The enemy used jets and helicopters against the Mujahideen. Two heavy weapons of the Mujahideen were destroyed by the enemy fire.

### ***TAKHAR PROVINCE***

According to a report which was sent by the Council of the North, the enemy launched an offensive against Ferkhar district on 3/11/1986. After suffering heavy casualties the enemy reached close to the city of Ferkhar. The purpose of the attack seems to be to re-establish the garrison which they lost some time ago. Fighting is continuing.

### ***HERAT PROVINCE***

Afghan News recieved a letter from Esmaeel Khan the chief commander of Herat. The letter was written on 5/10/1986. Here are some important points from the letter:

- 1- The siege of Herat which started on 19/7/1986 is still continuing.
- 2- The enemy is putting great pressure on the Mujahideen by the extensive use of the airforce and long-range artillery.
- 3- The enemy is planning to continue this situation by bringing in more troops.
- 4- Our problems are:
  - a) Shortage of arms and ammunition
  - b) Shortage of food for the Mujahideen and the people
  - c) Shortage of medicine and clothes
- 5- Enemy casualties are high. According to our sources inside the enemy their casualties so far have reached up to 450 dead and wounded.
- 6- We have captured 200 enemy troops (puppets) and 180 guns of different types.

7- So far 80 civilians have been killed.

8- As a result of continuous fighting more people are becoming refugees.

9- Thanks Allah the morale of the Mujahideen is high.

### ***BADAKHSHAN PROVINCE***

19/8/1986. Puppet troops attacked Mujahideen positions in Jurm district. They were supported by the airforce and long range artillery. After losing 18 men in 12 hours of battle the enemy retreated. Mujahideen casualties are not mentioned in the report.

9/8/1986. Mujahideen attacked the enemy post in Qala-i-Gonbad in Jurm with RPG-2s and 7s. Twelve puppets were killed and seven others wounded.

4/10/1986. Mujahideen attacked a KHAD post in Jurm. 21 communists were killed and 9 others wounded. 25 Ak-47s and some ammunition were seized from the enemy.

9/10/1986. The enemy airforce heavily bombed some villages in Jurm district as a result of which a large number of houses were destroyed, harvests set on fire and cattle killed.

10/10/1986. In an ambush set by the Mujahideen, 2 puppet soldiers were killed and 4 others captured.

After these clashes, attacks on the enemy continued and in period of one month the casualties (dead and injured) of the enemy mounted to 84.

The report which was written by Haji Zabet the commander of the area gives no figure for the casualties of the Mujahideen and the local civilians. It should be mentioned that receiving news from this area is very difficult. This is due to the distance and road blocks because of the long winter.

### ***KUNAR PROVINCE***

14/10/1986. Mujahideen from Jami'at attacked the provincial capital of Kunar with 107 mm. rockets. Mujahideen fired 200 rounds in five days. According to the report most of the rounds hit the targets and caused damage to the enemy. However there are no details of the enemy casualties. The enemy retaliated by bombing the area. The operation was launched under the command of Khan Jan the commander of Jami'at in Marawar valley.

### **ALMIGHTY ALLAH SAVED RABBANI**

An attempt to destroy the residence of Rabbani was foiled by the Peshawar police on October 28th. Three KHAD agents who were trying to plant a strong bomb in the residence of Prof. B.Rabbani, the leader of Jami'at Islami Afghanistan, were captured approaching the house. It was reported that the bomb was six Kg. in weight and was equipped with remote control system. The terrorist gang was composed of two engineers and one medical doctor who were all arrested by the security forces.

These types of terrorist actions which are engineered by the Soviets to eliminate the Resistance leaders, have continued since the beginning of the war. What is new is the intensity of these types of missions. The new situation requires tight security measures by the Mujahideen parties and their close co-operation with the security forces of Pakistan to identify and capture the enemy agents.

## **THE SITUATION IN DARWAZ**

Darwaz is a district of Badakhshan province situated along the border with the Soviet Union. The people of Darwaz have been resisting the Soviet invaders and their puppets since 1979. This is a remote area with little connection with the outside world. The reporter of Afghan News talked to Abdul Karim a young Mujahid from Darwaz who has recently come from the area. Here are some extracts from his conversation:

It takes one month to come from Darwaz to Pakistan. The route is difficult and one has to climb more than eight passes each about 16,000 feet high. Darwaz is eight days walk from Faizabad the provincial capital of Badakhshan. There is no road passable by car from Faizabad to Darwaz.

The Mujahideen of Darwaz are organized in 4 base areas namely, Koof, Sheki, Shoryan and Mymay. The chief commander of Darwaz is Ameer Mohammad Fedaii. All the Mujahideen of Darwaz are members of Jamiat and no other party has a presence there.

The Mujahideen have a civilian organization beside the military organization in the area. They have financial, military, cultural and judicial committees. The Chief Justice of Darwaz is Mawlawi Shair Ahmad. Shariat Law is applied in the area and Mujahideen collect taxes to meet their needs.

The medical situation in the area is bad. There is no doctor. There are only two paramedics who have studied short term courses in Peshawar. The people are deprived of the merits of modern medicine.

Mujahideen do not have any publication but they are running ten schools. The teachers are chosen from amongst the educated people and the religious scholars.

**WE THANK ALL THOSE 122  
COUNTRIES WHO VOTED  
FOR THE UN RESOLUTION  
ASKING FOR THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF THE  
FOREIGN(SOVIET) TROOPS  
FROM AFGHANISTAN.**

The food situation is very serious. The area is very mountainous and does not have a lot of land which could be cultivated. The available land does not yield enough because of the absence of good seed and the lack of enough cattle. The Soviets burn the crops when they attack. People bring food from Ragh area which takes eight days for a two way journey. Last spring both Mujahideen and the local people were facing shortage of food. In order to be able to buy food they need cash. This is the only way to help the people and Mujahideen in this remote area.

In one village last year, the Soviets killed 60 cows and 30 donkeys and a large number of sheep and goats.

Militarily speaking, the Mujahideen in this area have logistic problems. Shortage of weapons and ammunition are always a problem.

Darwaz is located on the border and the Amu river separates the area from the Soviet Tajikistan province. The villages are so close that one can see a man standing in a Soviet village from an Afghan village. In all the military operations the Soviets bring

their troops from the other side of the the river. They have established posts inside the the Soviet territory opposite each Afghan village . They have stationed tanks and other heavy weapons in these posts. When they want they pound Afghan villages from these posts.

Almost all the military operations launched by the enemy in the area are in the form of commando actions. Planes fly from the Soviet territory and even the heavy weapons fire from the Soviet Union.

Last year (1985), Soviets massacred 60 civilians in 'Walfath' village using hand grenades. Among those who were killed were women and children. In this village and a neighboring village 100 houses were razed to the ground by enemy planes.

The Soviets are being helped by about 700 militiamen from Darwaz. These people are affiliated with a communist party called Setam-i-Milli(National Depression Party), a faction of the Khalq party which seperated from it some years back. No Khalqi or Perchami is present in the area.

Mujahideen have been very active ( taking into account their limited resources) in the area. Some times they have carried out cross border operations. Last year , Samiullah a commander of the Mujahideen crossed the river at night with his friends and attacked a Soviet post, killed some soldiers and returned back safely. Mujahideen have also mined roads inside the Soviet Union which has destroyed some vehicles.

A big explosion took place in Qala-i-Khan air base inside the Soviet Union. Ammunition dumps burned for one weak and a number of helicopters and antonov planes were destroyed. Mujahideen of the area claim responsibility for this action and say that it was their sabotage work.

The Soviets are making use of pressure anti-personnel mines in Darwaz. These are plastic mines which can not be detected by metal detectors.

The Soviets try to terrorize the civilian popultion of the area to stop them from helping the Mujahideen. One day they killed 8 people with axes in broad daylight. They were suspected of helping Mujahideen.

Despite all the difficulties and enemy pressure the morale of the Mujahideen is high and they believe in their final victory. They are united and relatively organized. They badly need weapons , ammuntion and cash to buy their needs and the needs of the people in the area.

### **PUPPETS ADMIT**

Najibullah, the leader of the puppet regime has admitted that some students publicly express their anti-Soviet sentiments in educational institutions run by the puppet regime. He warned that such oppositions would be crushed by strong measures.

Most of the people living in the Soviet controlled areas support the resistance. So far all the harsh measures to curb such anti- Soviet activities has failed and Najib's remarks is a sign the of frustration of the puppets.

### **WISHFUL THINKING**

The Soviet puppets in Afghanistan have made many false promises to their their latest is the most extreme.

Najib has promised the party members that Kabul province will be cleared of the presence of Mujahideen in a period of three months. Najib has resorted to the slogans of 1978. In those days they were boasting about their victories and were thinking that they had succeeded in imposing the Soviet system on the Afghan people. They were

defeated by the people and finally came back to the country with 100,000 foreign troops.

Now that seven long years have passed the Red Army has not been able to take even few steps towards what they came for. Najib and his colleagues should have learned their lessons by now and should abstain from making such slogans.

Three months is a short period for a guerilla war. It will come to an end soon and the Mujahideen will be more active not only in Kabul province but in and around the city itself.

Najib is preaching such victories for two purposes. Inside the country he wants to give hope for a demoralized army and outside he wants to show the world that he is gaining ground in the war against the Mujahideen. But wishful thinking and false promises only frustrate them more.

### **WPC DENOUNCED SOVIET INVASION**

The World Peace Council which is considered a Soviet backed organization held its congress last month in Copenhagen.

The chairman of the Radical Party of Denmark denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 50 demonstrators entered the hall where the congress was in session and raised slogans against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The leader of the largest labour union in Denmark criticized the situation in Soviet block countries where trade unions do not have the liberty to criticize the military stand of their governments.

It is a good sign that justice is defended in such a congress which has been a traditional supporter of the Soviet policies. The Soviets usually hide behind the words and manipulate some organizations to give them a peaceful image. But everything has a limit. The Soviets have invaded a small neighbouring country and have been busy killing its people since seven years. It has also helped Vietnam to invade Cambodia. With all this how can they claim to support peace.

We appreciate the Danish organizations stand to raise their voices against aggression committed by a super power. The incident embarrassed the Soviet delegation and this is the price they have to pay for the unjust war they have unleashed against the people of Afghanistan.

### **CAN WE TRUST THE SOVIETS**

The Soviet leader has sent a message to Robert Mogabe the current chairman of the NAM. In his message the Soviet leader has assured him of Soviet co-operation with NAM.

The Soviets try to give the impression that they are supporters of the NAM. In some cases they call themselves the natural allies of the non-aligned countries. In the past there were some people who believed that, but the events in the past ten years have shown that the Soviets do not respect the NAM principles and ignore its requests.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan which was a member of the NAM. Several resolutions asking for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops have been passed by the NAM all of which have been rejected by the Soviets. They also have helped the Vietnamese to occupy Cambodia and war continues there too. With all these blatant violation of international law and creating the greatest human tragedies of the time, how can they claim that they have any concern for peace and the well being of the poor nations.

The NAM which the Soviets want and support, is the one which supports her policies and only criticize the other super power. In the eyes of the Soviets, Cuba and India who



support aggression are the best examples of non-aligned countries. We believe that the time has passed when the Soviets could pose as champions of peace. Now they have to show their good intentions by respecting the resolutions passed by the NAM and withdrawing their forces from Afghanistan and letting the the people of that country decide their future themselves.

### **MAINTAINING PRESSURE**

Talking to Afghan Refugees in Peshawar, former U.S president Jimmy Carter said that it is necessary to maintain economic and political pressure to force the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The economic sanctions which were imposed by some countries on the Soviets after the invasion of Afghanistan were gradually lifted. The wheat embargo imposed by the Carter administration was lifted by Reagan and now they have decided to sell the wheat at subsidized prices. In short, the western countries are competing each other for trade with the Soviets.



**" RETURNING BACK FROM AFGHANISTAN"**

What the world is doing with the puppet regime is deplorable. Muslim countries (except Saudi Arabia) the NAM and Western countries have diplomatic ties and normal trade relationships with the puppet regime in Afghanistan. Trade between the regime and the U.S and other Western countries reaches hundreds of million dollars anually. A peaceful country like Switzerland provides electric generators for the besieged Kabul city to compensate for the shortage of electricity which the regime and the Soviet invaders are facing. Puppet goods pass through the neighboring countries on their way to Western Europe and far East.

Not only has the world not put enough political and economic pressure on the Soviet invaders but they have failed to boycott a puppet regime which is the product of the invasion.

In the absence of economic pressure, if the political pressure is limited to polite rejection of the invasion and passing soft resolutions it will not be enough to force the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan.

### **WAR WOUNDED MUJAHIDEEN TREATMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA**

According to the informed sources of Mujahideen the Saudi King has accepted a request by the Mujahideen that war wounded Mujahideen who can not be treated in Pakistan should be treated in Saudi hospital at the expence of that government.

The request was made by M.Y.Qanuni the head of Panjshir Office in Peshawar but treatment would be applied equally to all the Mujahideen. We fully appreciate the decision by the Saudi Government and consider it a great help to the cause of Jihad.

w/c

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 28, 1986

TO:

~~EDACTED~~

FROM:

WALTER RAYMOND *WR*  
Senior Director  
International Communications  
and Information  
National Security Council

Just a note to remind you that at the next non-group meeting at 3:30 p.m., December 4, we would like you to report on your Agency's 1987 plan for countering (and anticipating) Soviet active measures.

See Vince [unclear]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 28, 1986

TO:           HERB ROMERSTEIN  
              Soviet Active Measures  
              Coordinator  
              USIA

FROM:          WALTER RAYMOND    W  
              Senior Director  
              International Communications  
              and Information  
              National Security Council

Just a note to remind you that at the next non-group meeting at 3:30 p.m., December 4, we would like you to report on your Agency's 1987 plan for countering (and anticipating) Soviet active measures.

F-5NG

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~~RUFF UMBRA~~

## Special Analysis

USSR:

### Gorbachev Encourages Reform Debate

***Mikhail Gorbachev has significantly expanded the boundaries of legitimate debate over economic reform in the USSR by inviting discussion of controversial ideas and placing reformers in key positions. A broader debate will give the General Secretary greater room for maneuver in addressing the economy's problems, but it involves risks as well. Gorbachev will have to overcome resistance from entrenched party conservatives who are convinced that the reformers' proposals violate Soviet traditions and from government bureaucrats who are concerned that a move away from management-by-decree will undermine their traditional privileges and status. (C-NF)***

The measures adopted by the Gorbachev regime have not changed the basic features of the economy, but the party chief's moves to broaden the debate may ultimately lead to more far-reaching steps. By restaffing major newspapers and journals, fostering openness (*glasnost*) in the media, and publicly berating officials whose ideological rigidity blocks change, Gorbachev has enabled reformers to air their views more widely and to discuss issues that were out of bounds under previous regimes. (C-NF)

These steps have moved the reform debate from obscure specialized journals to leading party publications. The change at the authoritative party journal *Kommunist* has been particularly striking. Since Gorbachev named veteran reformer Ivan Frolov last March to replace conservative Richard Kosolapov as chief editor, the journal has been transformed into a leading forum for reform. It has published articles by economists such as Tatyana Zaslavskaya, whose views as recently as 1983 were judged too controversial for public discussion. (C-NF)

### Gorbachev's Goal

Although he may not welcome every proposal the reformers offer, Gorbachev stands to profit in several ways from a broader debate. His public statements indicate he believes discussion and debate will assist him in changing the psychological climate in the country and, therefore, in winning the battle against inertia and conservatism. The debate will allow Gorbachev to test both public and official reaction to potentially controversial proposals. It will also provide him with new ideas for his economic strategy, which he publicly admits he has not yet worked out in detail. (C-NF)

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## What the Reformers Propose

Reformers already have set forth several ideas that would constitute major departures from traditional Soviet practices:

- **Expanding opportunities for self-employment** . . . By expanding cooperatives— independent, self-governed associations of large and small groups of workers—it is possible to resolve the problems in personal services, retail trade, and auto repair. The chief objection is the view that this is a step backward as compared with state stores, dining rooms, and shops. But who has proved that? How can one speak of a “step backward” if workers are better provided with food, clothing, and services?

— *Fedor Burlatskiy, political commentator, Literaturnaya Gazeta, 16 April 1986*

- **Raising the specter of unemployment** . . . The principles of socialism are not the principles of charity, which automatically guarantee a job for everyone, regardless of ability. A person must strive every day to keep a job suitable for him.

— *Stanislav Shatalin, Deputy Director, Systems Research Institute, Kommunist, September 1986*

- **Introducing Chapter 11, Soviet style** . . . Quite a few enterprises have exhausted their circulating capital. Some are chronic debtors. Why not shut down enterprises that have become insolvent until order is restored there?

— *Ruslan Lynev, Economics Department Editor, Izvestiya, 23 August 1986*

- **Lowering the social safety net** . . . Some goods are sold for money, while others (housing, educational and health services, and so on) are distributed free of charge or at very subsidized prices. This practice has very serious shortcomings. It artificially limits the range of goods that the population can acquire with earned money and consequently reduces the interest in intense and effective work.

— *Tatyana Zaslavskaya, economist, Kommunist, September 1986*

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~~Confidential~~  
~~NOFORN~~

If Gorbachev wants bold ideas, the debate is providing them. Although no one is likely to propose abandoning central planning and state ownership, reformers are suggesting changes in economic management they believe will introduce a strong dose of Western-style economic competition into the Soviet system. Reformers advocate lowering the safety net that has traditionally protected poor workers, incompetent managers, and unprofitable enterprises; they would introduce harsher penalties—unemployment and bankruptcy—for poor performance. They also favor measures that would drastically change management practices, forcing central authorities to use economic levers—such as finance and credit policy—in place of administrative orders to influence the direction of the economy. (C-NF)

Some reformers have proposed a larger role for individual and family businesses, especially in the troubled consumer sector. New legislation on "individual labor activity" passed this week by the Supreme Soviet makes it clear the regime is already moving in this direction. More flexible prices and a decentralized supply system—which many Soviet and Western economists argue are essential to successful economic reform—also are reportedly under discussion behind the scenes, although they have just begun to emerge in the public debate. (C-NF)

### Looking Ahead

Whether the reforms get a serious trial will depend on economic as well as political developments in Moscow. Pressures to adopt the proposals might increase if, as is likely, the sharp turnaround in economic performance that the leadership is seeking does not occur. Even so, reform proposals would continue to face resistance from bureaucrats who want to protect traditional perquisites and who would be unqualified in a more competitive environment. Some party leaders—even if they share the reformers' disdain for the bureaucratic apparatus—may see the proposals as a retreat from Communist principles and a threat to central control. (C-NF)

Broadening criticism of the existing system may create pressure for change greater than the regime is prepared to accept. Gorbachev may ultimately be forced to choose between clamping a lid on the debate—as did Khrushchev and Brezhnev before him—or taking a more aggressive stance on reform. Choosing the latter would increase the chances that his more cautious colleagues would move to place greater restraints on his power. (C-NF) CIA, DIA, NSA-

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<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET DEMARCHE ON AFGHANISTAN

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, AF

SUBJECT: SOVIET DEMARCHE ON AFGHANISTAN

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ MET WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST ON DECEMBER 1, AT DUBININ'S REQUEST, TO MAKE A DEMARCHE ON SOVIET SOLDIERS ALLEGEDLY BEING HELD CAPTIVE BY RESISTANCE FORCES IN CAMPS IN PAKISTAN. DUBININ READ THE FOLLOWING NONPAPER:  
BEGIN TEXT. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE, A GROUP OF SOVIET MILITARY MEN IS BEING FORCIBLY DETAINED IN THE CAMP (SIC) OF THE AFGHAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUPINGS HEKMATYAR AND SAYYAF IN THE VARSAK SETTLEMENT ON PAKISTANI TERRITORY. THOSE SOVIET CITIZENS ARE BEING PUT INTO SHACKLES, SUBJECTED TO SAVAGE TORTURES AND SYSTEMATIC BEATINGS. THEY ARE DEPRIVED OF ELEMENTARY HYGIENIC CONDITIONS (AND) SUFFER FROM GASTRIC AND SKIN DISEASES. THEY ARE IN GENERAL TREATED IN A BARBARIC, MEDIEVAL MANNER. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT IS FULLY BORNE BY THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, TOO. WE KNOW THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN SPECIAL SERVICES PRESENT IN THE VARSAK AND OTHER CAMPS OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION ON THE TERRITORY OF PAKISTAN ENCOURAGE THE OUTRAGES THE SOVIET CITIZENS ARE SUBJECTED TO AND TRY TO INDUCE THE SOVIET MILITARY MEN TO BETRAY THEIR COUNTRY. SUCH ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAVE IN FACT ASSUMED THE FUNCTIONS OF EXECUTIONERS AND JAILERS ARE SIMPLY BEYOND THE COMPREHENSION OF THE HUMAN MIND; THEY ARE CONTRARY TO THE MOST BASIC NORMS OF MORALITY.

IT IS IN VAIN THAT THOSE WHO TAKE PART IN THESE SHAMEFUL ACTS HOPE THAT THEIR NAMES WILL REMAIN UNKNOWN. SOONER OR LATER THEY WILL HAVE TO ANSWER.  
WE DECLARE A RESOLUTE PROTEST AGAINST THE UNLAWFUL ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES, DEMAND THAT THEY BE CEASED IMMEDIATELY, THAT THOSE GUILTY OF THEM BE PUNISHED AND THAT SUCH ACTIONS NOT BE PERMITTED IN THE FUTURE. WE ALSO EXPECT THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE RETURN OF THE SOVIET MILITARY MEN WHO HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES IN THE HANDS OF THE BANDITS, TO THEIR COUNTRY.  
END TEXT OF NONPAPER.

DUBININ ADDED THAT HE WAS ASKING THE U. S. FOR HELP IN THIS CASE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.

3. IN RESPONSE, ARMACOST STATED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO

*WR*

*Outrages*

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CONTAIN HIS ASTONISHMENT AT THE SOVIET DEMARCHE AND FORMULATE A DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE. THE USSR HAD "CAST-IRON GALL" TO PRESENT THIS PROTEST TO THE U. S. THE SOVIET UNION HAD INVADDED A COUNTRY AND HAD CONTINUED ITS WAR FOR SEVEN YEARS, IN DEFIANCE OF REPEATED U. N. RESOLUTIONS. THE USSR HAD ENGAGED IN CARPET BOMBING OF CIVILIANS, DEPRIVED THE AFGHANS OF FOOD, ENGAGED IN MASSIVE DESTRUCTION, PLACED AS A MATTER OF POLICY BOMBS AND LAND MINES FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAIMING INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING CHILDREN, AND NOW HAD THE TEMERITY TO COMPLAIN OF THE TREATMENT OF ITS SOLDIERS BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. ARMACOST SAID THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD NOT COME TO THE U. S. WITH SUCH A COMPLAINT. THE U. S. KNEW NOTHING OF THIS MATTER AND DID NOT INTEND TO INVESTIGATE IT. ARMACOST STATED THAT THE USSR SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED BY THE TREATMENT ITS INVADING SOLDIERS RECEIVED AT THE HANDS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. EVEN MORE ASTONISHING, CONTINUED ARMACOST, WAS THAT THE PROTEST CONCERNED SOVIET SOLDIERS ON THE TERRITORY OF A THIRD COUNTRY. ARMACOST NOTED THAT HE HAD VISITED HOSPITALS IN PESHAWAR AND HAD OBSERVED SCENES OF INDESCRIBABLE HORROR COMMITTED BY THE SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN. MINES INDISCRIMINATELY PLANTED HAD MAIMED CHILDREN, TAKING OFF LIMBS AND EARS. ARMACOST SAID THAT DUBININ SHOULD SEE THESE SCENES FOR HIMSELF AND CONSIDER THEM BEFORE COMING TO THE U. S. WITH SUCH A DEMARCHE.

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4. DUBININ RESPONDED THAT HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO DISCUSS THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION; HE HAD COVERED THIS GROUND WITH ARMACOST BEFORE AND ARMACOST HAD DISCUSSED AFGHANISTAN IN DEPTH WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN LAST SUMMER. DUBININ NOTED THAT THE DRA HAD MOUNTED ITS OWN EXHIBITION OF MINES THAT HAD MAIMED AFGHAN CHILDREN. DUBININ SAID HE DID NOT HAVE TO NAME THE PLACE OF MANUFACTURE OF THESE MINES BUT WOULD JUST STATE THAT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY HAD PRODUCED MINES OF FANTASTIC CRUELTY; THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT USE SUCH MINES IN AFGHANISTAN. DUBININ CONTINUED THAT THE SUBJECT OF THIS DEMARCHE, WHICH HE HAD MADE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, WAS A SPECIFIC CASE AND HE WISHED TO RETURN TO IT.

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5. ARMACOST STATED THAT THE USSR SHOULD APPROACH THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT AS THE ALLEGED INCIDENT WAS OCCURRING ON ITS TERRITORY. DUBININ REJOINED THAT THE U. S. WAS BEING APPROACHED BECAUSE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN "SPECIAL SERVICES."

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6. ARMACOST OBSERVED THAT THE U. S. AND USSR SHOULD DISCUSS THE REAL QUESTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, NOT CASES SUCH AS THE ONE DUBININ HAD RAISED. ARMACOST SAID HE HAD HELD WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN WITH SOVIET DEPUTY FONMIN ADAMISHIN. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INTER ALIA URGED THE U. S. TO TAKE AS A SERIOUS GESTURE GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SIX-REGIMENT WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE U. S. HAD OBSERVED THE WITHDRAWAL CLOSELY, THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS' AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS A CRUDE FRAUD. OF THE SIX REGIMENTS' THREE WERE AIR DEFENSE REGIMENTS OF NO MILITARY CONSEQUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE OTHER UNITS "WITHDRAWN" WERE ACTUALLY INTRODUCED INTO THE COUNTRY FOR THAT PURPOSE. FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO TERM THIS A "GESTURE" TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY MADE A MOCKERY OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS ABOUT A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. 7. DUBININ REPLIED THAT THE WESTERN PRESS HAD MADE MANY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SOVIET STEP. SOME HAD SAID THAT THE WITHDRAWAL HAD NEVER TAKEN PLACE; OTHERS, THAT THE USSR WITHDREW LESS THAN IT HAD INTRODUCED. BUT IN FACT, THE SOVIET UNION HAD WITHDRAWN EXACTLY THOSE UNITS IT HAD IDENTIFIED AS SUBJECT TO THE WITHDRAWAL. THIS WAS A MAJOR STEP UNDERTAKEN TO STRENGTHEN SOVIET DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE AFGHANISTAN



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PROBLEM. DUBININ URGED ARMACOST TO NOTE GORBACHEV'S RECENT STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS TRIP TO INDIA WHICH EXPRESSED THE SOVIET HOPE THAT A SOLUTION TO THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM WOULD BE FOUND SOON.

8. DUBININ TURNED BRIEFLY TO THE INDO-SOVIET JOINT DECLARATION, CHARACTERIZING IT AS A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL DOCUMENT. THE JOINT DECLARATION'S EMPHASIS ON A NUCLEAR-FREE AND VIOLENCE-FREE WORLD WERE CONNECTED TO THE U. S. -SOVIET REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS AND DUBININ URGED THE U. S. STUDY THE DOCUMENT CLOSELY.

9. FOR ISLAMABAD. EMBASSY SHOULD SHARE SOVIET DEMARCHE AND U. S. RESPONSE WITH GOP.

10. KABUL AND MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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# INSTITUUT VOOR PUBLIEKE INTERESSEN

## Proposal for an International Helsinki Monitoring Group

### Aims:

- to watch continually the Helsinki process;
- to evaluate whether and how the Helsinki process weakens the (negotiating) position of the West in relation to the Soviet Union;
- to arrange through the proper channels that these evaluations are disseminated among public policy makers and the public;
- to further the growth of critical assessments in the West of the Helsinki Agreement as an instrument of the international political order.

### Members of the monitoring group:

- European and American private citizens who agree with the above stated aims and who qualify by one or more of the following criteria:
  1. a good grasp of the Helsinki process and its inherent problems;
  2. able to participate as a private citizen in the meetings of the group;
  3. access to the channels i.e. public policy organisations and the media which can organise conferences and/or give publicity about the monitoring groups' evaluations;
  4. access to funding to promote conferences or publications.

### Method of operation of the monitoring group:

- the group, to consist of 20 to 30 persons, to meet in a European city 3 or 4 times a year;
- the meetings to be organised and prepared by a small secretariat. This task could possibly be undertaken by an existing European public policy organisation against payment of a fee;
- the task of the secretariat is to obtain information and documents about what is happening under the Helsinki process and to prepare working papers for the periodical meetings of the International monitoring group;
- the secretariat is also to draw up the reports of the monitoring group's periodical evaluations and its conclusions about specific actions to be set into motion;
- the monitoring group to decide after each meeting which of the individual members will initiate the actions to be set into motion.

### Funding:

- the cost of the secretariat should not present a major funding problem. It is basically a task for one man in an existing organisation. A yearly budget of \$150.000 - with a commitment for at least 3 years - would probably be sufficient;
- the funding for such actions as may be considered necessary from time to time once the monitoring group has started to function should come mostly from foundations and public policy organisations as a normal part of their functional activities.

## THE HELSINKI PROCESS

The Helsinki Agreement - now in its eleventh year - has not produced the results the West had hoped for. Inevitably, this has caused controversy in the West. It is argued that in spite of the disappointing results, the Helsinki Process supplies an important means of dialogue between East and West and that there have been some tangible results for the West. Others argue that the Helsinki Process has become an exercise in delusion and self-deception, which, if it is allowed to continue in the same way, will erode Western security.

The third CSCE follow-up meeting will start in Vienna on November 4th, 1986.

The Institute for the Public Interest is seeking to organise and to promote a series of international meetings to evaluate whether the Helsinki Process contributes towards dialogue or towards delusion and self-deception.

The one day meeting planned by IPI will be held in The Hague late January or early February 1987. Two well-known speakers, who have first hand experience with the Helsinki Process will address the subjects. After the presentations there will be a debate with a panel and the participants. Approximately 100 participants will be invited on the basis of their involvement (politicians etc.) or interest (media) in the subject.

The first subject, to be addressed by a German speaker, will be:

The role and the influence of the German Ost-politik on the Helsinki Process.

The second subject, to be addressed by an American speaker, will be:

Dialogue or delusion: an interim appraisal of the proceedings of the third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.

*Nowak, Catherine*  
*7-9 Feb.*

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*Do Raymond  
B. Stearns*

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TAGS: PREL, SY

SUBJECT: MORE SOVIET DISINFORMATION

1. ENGLISH LANGUAGE SYRIAN TIMES AND SYRIAN MEDIA OF NOVEMBER 26 QUOTE AN ARTICLE OF THE PREVIOUS DAY FROM SOVIET NEWSPAPER "RED STAR" AS SAYING THE FOLLOWING: AMERICA ITSELF IS INVOLVED IN PREPARING A MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REGION. THEREFORE THE AMERICAN SIXTH FLEET IS STAGING MANEUVERS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WHILE AMERICAN FORCES ARE LANDING ON BRITISH BASES IN CYPRUS."
2. COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO BE ANOTHER INSTANCE OF THE SOVIET DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN WHICH HAS BEEN APPEARING CONSISTENTLY IN THE PRESS HERE.
3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. RANSOM

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### Special Analysis

USSR: **Increasing Disinformation About AIDS**

***Moscow's yearlong campaign charging that US biological weapons research is responsible for AIDS has gained momentum in recent months. The rapid spread of these allegations on a worldwide scale, even in the conservative Western press, demonstrates the USSR's ability to manipulate foreign media. Growing attention to the spread of AIDS will present Moscow with additional exploitable opportunities for the foreseeable future. (S-NF)***

Since October 1985, charges that US biological weapons experiments created the AIDS virus have appeared in more than 40 countries in media of all political viewpoints—including the London *Sunday Express*, several international wire services, as well as Soviet Bloc radiobroadcasts in more than 20 languages. Originally designed to blame the West for the occurrence of AIDS in the USSR and to sow fears that the disease may be spread by US military personnel overseas, Moscow's campaign has added racial themes by alleging that the West is trying to shift responsibility for AIDS to African countries. (S-NF)

Moscow used the occasion of the recent Nonaligned Summit in Harare to further its campaign. According to the US Embassy there, a Soviet-inspired report alleging US culpability for AIDS was distributed to those in attendance. This paper, prepared by East Germans misidentified as French scholars, claimed that the disease resulted from gene-mutation experiments at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Variations of this allegation have appeared in the media of about 20 countries since the summit. (S-NF)

Other countries have initiated similar efforts to manipulate fears about AIDS. For months North Korea has broadcast warnings of an AIDS epidemic of US origin in South Korea; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] North Korean embassies have been directed to use this allegation to disrupt planning for the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. South Africa may use AIDS as grounds for expelling foreign mineworkers. Demands that US military bases in the Philippines be closed to prevent the spread of AIDS there have already appeared in the local press. (S-NF-NC-OC)

The Soviet propaganda campaign will probably increase because of growing attention to the widespread incidence of AIDS in the Third World, particularly in Africa. Success in alleging that US military personnel are AIDS carriers could lead Moscow to broaden its claims to include other Americans overseas such as students, tourists, and Peace Corps volunteers. (S-NF) [REDACTED]

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By amf, NARA, Date 7/3/00

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- YOUTH SEMINAR  
THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI) YOUTH MOVEMENT HAS ANNOUNCED  
TO THE PRESS THAT SOVIET PHYSICIST ANDREI SAKHAROV

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SUBJECT: SAKHAROV ACCEPTS INVITATION TO ATTEND PSI  
- YOUTH SEMINAR

THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI) YOUTH MOVEMENT HAS ANNOUNCED  
TO THE PRESS THAT SOVIET PHYSICIST ANDREI SAKHAROV  
HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO COME TO ITALY IN MAY  
1987 TO SPEAK AT A SEMINAR ON THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR  
POWER GENERATION. THE PSI YOUTH NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT  
SAKHAROV CONDITIONED HIS ACCEPTANCE ON THE WILLINGNESS  
OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO GRANT HIM THE NECESSARY EXIT  
VISA. SAKHAROV, ACCORDING TO THE PSI YOUTH MOVEMENT  
SPOKESMAN, HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO PSI LEADER, PRIME  
MINISTER CRAXI, THANKING HIM FOR THE INVITATION AND  
EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE TWO COULD MEET, SHOULD  
SAKHAROV OBTAIN PERMISSION TO TRAVEL. RABB

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**Special Analysis**

**USSR:**

**Implications of Freeing Sakharov**

*General Secretary Gorbachev's willingness to allow Andrey Sakharov to speak freely is a bold stroke designed to persuade foreign audiences that the Soviet leader is serious about democratizing the Soviet system and to strengthen his support among reform-minded officials and the intelligentsia. (S-NF)*

The regime's efforts to facilitate publicity for Sakharov's views since his return to Moscow are unprecedented. The state organization that controls radio and television broadcasting allowed US television networks to interview Sakharov in its studios. Sakharov said Saturday that the Soviet weekly *Literary Gazette* had interviewed him and might publish the interview today, according to Western press reporting. (S-NF)

**External Purposes**

Foreign policy calculations have played a role in the regime's about-face on Sakharov. It deflects Western criticism of the death in prison of longtime human rights activist Anatoliy Marchenko and enhances Gorbachev's efforts to develop his image abroad. (S-NF)

The move was probably designed in part to facilitate progress on arms control and to smooth the way for expanded trade with Western Europe. In the CSCE forum, it removes one of several impediments to Western participation in the humanitarian affairs conference that the Soviets have proposed to be held in Moscow. The desire to remove the Sakharov case as a roadblock to broadening scientific exchanges with the West may also have been a factor, as Sakharov himself has suggested. (S-NF)

**Anticipated Domestic Benefits**

The decision to arrange for Sakharov to be interviewed by domestic and foreign media was also prompted by Gorbachev's need to generate new momentum for his effort to revitalize Soviet society. Many disgruntled officials and intellectuals see the handling of Sakharov as a key barometer of the regime's commitment to reform. (S-NF)

Many Soviet cultural, scientific, and intellectual figures and low-level officials admire Sakharov, according to interviews by USIA of Westerners who have had contact with them. A KGB defector has reported widespread sympathy for Sakharov among intellectuals, who

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By smf Date 7/3/00



sometimes compared his confinement to Gorky with Lenin in exile. Among Soviet scientists, on whose support Gorbachev relies for his economic modernization program, concern for Sakharov's welfare has been widespread; his membership in the Academy of Sciences was maintained throughout his period of internal exile, and he received a warm welcome on his return to the Institute of Physics last week. (S NF NC OO)

Gorbachev probably expects that Sakharov's freedom to speak will further his efforts to lure back prominent Russian cultural figures who have emigrated or defected to the West. The regime has recently used intermediaries to make overtures about the return of theater director Yuriy Lyubimov, who apparently will go back, and several others, according to Western press reports and US Embassy contacts. Last week, in an unusual, laudatory obituary of film director Andrey Tarkovskiy, who had defected in Western Europe several years ago, TASS lamented the continued foreign exile of Russian cultural figures. (S NF)

Gorbachev may calculate that Sakharov will support many of his policies. Although Sakharov has been outspoken since his return to Moscow about the regime's abuses of human rights and has publicly acknowledged that President Reagan's attention to these abuses has helped Soviet dissidents, he has also conveyed a belief that Gorbachev is moving in the right direction domestically. Sakharov has unequivocally endorsed Gorbachev's policy of cultural openness. Moreover, Soviet propagandists can exploit Sakharov's expressions of skepticism about SDI, even though Sakharov has also urged that the USSR not make other arms control agreements contingent on a restriction of SDI. (S NF)

### Political Implications

No Soviet leader has gone to such lengths to court Soviet intellectuals since the cultural thaw under Khrushchev. Gorbachev's doing so suggests that he is willing, and possibly even compelled, to seek support wherever he can find it. (S NF)

Gorbachev's difficulty in forging a consensus in the Politburo for his domestic programs might have been at least partly responsible for his decision to release Sakharov. By increasing his personal popularity among those intellectuals and lower-level officials pushing for a broad program of reform, Gorbachev may intend to increase pressure on other Politburo members to go along with his program for domestic revitalization. Combined with other moves to broaden the arena and scope of policy discussion, Gorbachev's encouragement of Sakharov to air his views publicly risks provoking a backlash among conservatives wary of carrying openness too far and opposed to various other elements of Gorbachev's domestic strategy. (S NF)

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