

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Raymond, Walter: Files
Folder Title: [Unfoldered – Project Truth, Project
Democracy, Public Diplomacy & NED July-
December 1983]
Box: RAC Box 7

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 7/14/2011

File Folder [PROJECT TRUTH, PROJECT DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND NED JULY 1983-DECEMBER 1983]

FOIA

M430

Box Number 7

LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

69

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
115164	STUDY	US INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION POLICY <i>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #67</i>	33	ND	B1
115165	MEMO	STEINER TO MCFARLANE RE USIA AND THE NSC PROCESS <i>R 7/3/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #68</i>	1	7/9/1984	B1
115166	LETTER	DRAFT TO CHARLES WICK RE USIA AND THE NSC PROCESS (PARTIAL) <i>R 7/3/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #69</i>	1	ND	B1
115167	MEMO	KIMMITT TO EARLE RE USIA AND NSC PROCESS (PARTIAL PAGES 1, 3, ALL PAGE 2) <i>R 7/3/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #70</i>	3	7/10/1984	B1
115173	LETTER	WICK TO MCFARLANE RE USIA-NSC RELATIONS <i>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #71</i>	1	6/15/1984	B1
115175	MEMO	MALONE TO DIRECTOR, USIA RE NSDD 130 TASKING MEMO <i>R 11/2/2012 M430/2</i>	5	6/13/1984	B1 P5
115177	MEMO	RAYMOND TO SOVIET POLITICAL ACTION WORKING GROUP RE 12/15/MEETING <i>P 7/19/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #72</i>	2	12/30/1983	B1
115178	LIST	ATTENDEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS (PARTIAL)	1	12/15/1983	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 7/14/2011

File Folder [PROJECT TRUTH, PROJECT DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND NED JULY 1983-DECEMBER 1983]

FOIA

M430

Box Number 7

LAMB,
CHRISTOPHER

69

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
115179	LIST	ATTENDEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS (PARTIAL)	1	ND	B6
115180	LIST	ATTENDEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS (PARTIAL)	1	ND	B6
115181	LIST	ATTENDEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS (PARTIAL)	2	ND	B6
115182	LIST	ATTENDEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS (PARTIAL)	2	ND	B6
115183	LIST	ATTENDEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS (PARTIAL)	8	ND	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: RAYMOND, WALTER: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: [Project Truth, Project Democracy, Public
Diplomacy, and NED 7/83-12/83] OA 91162

Date: January 28, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. study	US International information policy (33) <i>rc 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 #67</i>	nd	P1
2. memo [90749]	Steven Steiner to Robert McFarlane, re USIA and the NSC Process (1) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #68</i>	7/9/84	P1
3. letter	draft, to Charles Wick, re USIA and NSC process (partial) (1) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #69</i>	nd	P1
4. memo [90749]	Robert Kimmitt to Robert Earle, re USIA and NSC process (partial pages 1, 3, all page 2) (3) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #70</i>	7/10/84	P1
5. letter [90749]	Charles Wick to McFarlane, re USIA NSC relations (1) <i>rc 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 #71</i>	6/15/84	P1
6. memo	Gifford Malone to the Director, re NSDD 130 tasking memo (5)	6/13/84	P1 <i>RY B1</i>
7. memo	Raymond to Soviet Political Action Working Group, re 12/15 meeting (2) <i>P 7/19/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #72</i>	12/30/83	P1 <i>B1</i>
8. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (1)	12/15/83	P6 <i>B6</i>
9. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (1)	nd	P6 <i>B6</i>
10. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (1)	nd	P6 <i>B6</i>
11. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (2)	nd	P6 <i>B6</i>
12. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (2)	nd	P6 <i>B6</i>
13. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (8)	nd	P6 <i>B6</i>

CCB 12/14/00

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: RAYMOND, WALTER: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: [Project Truth, Project Democracy, Public Diplomacy, and NED 7/83-12/83] OA 91162

Date: January 28, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. study	US International information policy (33) <i>RL 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 #67</i>	nd	P1
2. memo [90749]	Steven Steiner to Robert McFarlane, re USIA and the NSC Process (1) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #68</i>	7/9/84	P1
5. letter	draft, to Charles Wick, re USIA and NSC process (partial) (1) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #69</i>	nd	P1
4. memo [90749]	Robert Kimmitt to Robert Earle, re USIA and NSC process (partial pages 1,3, all page 2) (3) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #70</i>	7/10/84	P1
5. letter [90749]	Charles Wick to McFarlane, re USIA NSC relations (1) <i>RL 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 #71</i>	6/15/84	P1
6. memo	Gifford Malone to the Director, re NSDD 130 tasking memo (5)	6/13/84	P1 P5
7. memo	Raymond to Soviet Political Action Working Group, re 12/15 meeting (2) <i>P 7/19/00 NLSF 95-041/2 #72</i>	12/30/83	P1
8. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (1)	12/15/83	P6
9. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (1)	nd	P6
10. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (1)	nd	P6
11. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (2)	nd	P6
12. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (2)	nd	P6
13. list	attendees with Social Security numbers (partial) (8)	nd	P6

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

11/19

LENKOWSKI/MCMILLAN/USIA/STATE/WA - WICK

1. Develop a network of private sources
(foundations, corporations)
2. Bipartisan action is vital
Ideology raised to a strategic level
3. Funding window for "DP" now via State
4. Cost. Ask Govt to set up institute on free elects
= Inst. in AF, other?

Transcripts
Lancaster

5. Program expansion of ICAB - interrelated exchanges -
1.4M - (program 2.0M) - Michael
Harrington supports in DOL.

6. Open Area Institute (OAI) - met LeRoy Deane.

7. Productivity - impact, varied
Context

8. Get full package of free Electric Confusion papers
Provide context beyond world what part of world
Provide range of issues beyond US
Context of OSCE context (OC 83)
Brief NATO Adviser on this + get them to go it out

9. Conf on Education of Deane

Patricia Wides role - Mae contin

10. High visibility, low funding

11. - Under + util Recher though his leadership

decide it can make open discussion of
democracy is stalled a prestigious
issue - you will not see real movement

People are
hesitant -
make "learning"
no.

- What is problem? Go to Cz '46-'47 (for Kovacs)

No - military warfare was proven to be more
effective. A careless effort of our altruism
to hand away + discredit leadership. Bourgeoisie
don't like violence.

Restate: who began what, where, why?
Elements looked at Italy

San Kruger F

MacArthur
Pugh
Lobby
Olin

Exxon

Mell F. in 1957 (Pitt & Co)
David Packard
O'Donnell F.

Double-staked go to select of issues

- Timing '63
- Cutting-edge + large-scale program
- Foundation network

Cyr Eklund
Rob Kuby - Westphal
Ralph Dusk - Time Inc
Albert Kay - Amer. Air

- HX of need
- Water
- Regs on capital

→ Design a letter to "wealthy" list -

Small group → 500 letters

~~SECRET~~

~~Steiner~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

System II
90930
Add On/4

FO-
for
your
hold file
on NSSD/NSDD

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

December 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL JOHN H. STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. TERESA COLLINS
Chief, Secretariat Staff
Executive Secretariat
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: NSSD 2-83 on US International Information
Policy and Accompanying NSDD

Attached for final approval by the next SPG meeting are the
NSSD 2-83 study on US International Information Policy and the draft
NSDD based on the study. Comments and suggestions made by
your agencies have been incorporated in these texts.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachments

NSSD 2-83
NSDD

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

LOV
1/14/98

~~SECRET~~

I. Introduction

A. Authorities and Scope

This study, undertaken in response to National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 2-83, addresses the fundamental policy issues associated with US international information programs and activities in the context of US national security policy as it is broadly understood. Together with parallel studies in other areas, it is intended to lay the groundwork for a fully integrated national security strategy, as called for in NSSD 1-82 and the study resulting from it, "US National Security Strategy."

The assumptions made in this study regarding the international environment and US national security objectives and priorities are derived from Part I of the NSSD 1-82 study. This study also takes into account the study undertaken under National Security Council auspices in 1982, "US International Broadcasting Requirements," as well as the policy document deriving from it, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 45.

Organizational and management issues associated with US international information programs and activities are addressed in NSDD 77, which establishes an integrated, national-level public diplomacy program under the National Security Council.

The field of activity that has come to be described by the term "public diplomacy" includes three functionally distinct though interrelated areas: international information, international political action, and public affairs. "International information" denotes the overt conveyance of ideas or messages through programs and activities intended for a foreign audience, including radio broadcasting (which is governed by public law), television broadcasting, other print and audio-visual media, speaker programs, exhibits, and support of non-governmental efforts in these areas. "Public affairs" refers to similar programs and activities intended for a domestic audience. "International political action" denotes attributable overt support to foreign programs and activities of a primarily political nature by the US Government, and by non-governmental US and foreign organizations. A fourth element of public diplomacy, educational and cultural exchange, is not treated in this study.

B. International Information and National Security

Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy by being addressed primarily to peoples rather than governments. Its fundamental purpose is to affect the behavior of governments in ways favorable to US national interests by shaping the opinions and actions of the peoples they rule. Especially

where traditional diplomacy is unable to affect significantly the behavior of governments, and where other instruments of policy are insufficient or inappropriate, public diplomacy assumes major strategic importance. In other cases, public diplomacy can play a significant role in supporting and facilitating the employment of other strategic means.

The full effectiveness of public diplomacy is inevitably difficult to assess. Except in cases of crisis or severe political instability, the impact of public diplomacy is cumulative and long-term rather than immediate and dramatic. But it is the only instrument available to the US for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the globe over an extended period of time.

The need for a strong US effort in the information area in times of war has rarely been questioned. In peacetime, however, there has tended to be less vigorous pursuit of US information activities, and the utility or legitimacy of such activities has been questioned within as well as outside the US Government. There have also been shifts in the character and programmatic emphases of US information activities and the way their function is understood. There is the inherent danger that these activities may become simply reactive to events and routinized. To be effective, international information programs must be an integral and contributing part of US foreign and national security policy and maintain a sense of long-term and strategic purpose.

At the same time, the activities of the Soviet Union and other hostile states and movements in the general field of political action, propaganda and so-called active measures have steadily increased in scope and sophistication. They have contributed to the creation of a climate of opinion throughout the world which substantially constrains USG actions. These activities now pose a serious, if largely unrecognized, threat to fundamental US interests.

It must be acknowledged at the outset that the resources allocated for US international information efforts remain fundamentally inadequate. Even with currently projected budget increases, funding levels for the foreseeable future for the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) will probably not approach the levels of a decade ago, in real terms. In addition, these organizations are seeking to strengthen themselves in the areas of personnel, administration, morale, programming practices and procedures, and in regard to coordination with other elements of the US Government. In particular, it should be noted that a serious depletion in the number of career foreign service officers and foreign service information officers has occurred. This has led to a deterioration in the breadth and depth with which programmatic

activities can be implemented by US embassies and missions abroad.

The NSDD-77 Public Diplomacy structure has provided some impetus for greater attention to the information dimensions of foreign policy. There nonetheless continues to be insufficient appreciation of the importance of international information programs and activities. Other agencies with national security responsibilities have devoted few resources to this area, and at the national level there has been no permanent mechanism for planning or implementation of international information activities on a coordinated inter-agency basis. The resources of US diplomatic missions abroad have not been fully utilized for public diplomacy in support of US foreign policy as a whole. More attention should be given to the international impact of domestic public affairs activities relative to national security. Finally, the international information environment and foreign public opinion need to be taken into account adequately in the formulation of US foreign and national security policy.

Increased funding is a necessary precondition for improvement. But only sustained commitment over a considerable period of time will make it possible for the US to compete once again in this strategically vital area. Such a commitment presupposes, however, the development of a consensus within the Executive Branch (and, to the extent possible, with Congress and the public) as to the importance of international information, its legitimacy and the steps that need to be taken to improve the current US effort. This study is intended to contribute to the formation of that consensus.

II. The International Information Environment

US international information policy should be guided by the following assessment of the current international situation relative to information and communications, and of trends and prospective developments affecting the pursuit of US objectives in this area.

A. The Communications Revolution

The technological advances of recent years in the field of communications and data processing and their social and political impact are likely to affect increasingly the course of international affairs, creating both opportunities and dangers for the US and the West generally. This factor must be taken fully into account in any discussion of US international information strategy.

The widespread diffusion of modern means of mass communication -- notably, shortwave and transistor radios and (increasingly) tape cassettes, as well as television -- throughout

most of the Third World and the Communist World over the last several decades has exposed millions of persons around the globe to national and international political events for the first time in history. In most of the developed world, the exponential increase in the quantity of available information has tended to outpace the growth in data processing technologies and their assimilation in daily life. At the same time, the growing preference in the West for television over newspapers and magazines as the primary source of news about public affairs has served in many ways to restrict the flow of information as well as to alter its focus. The powerful images that are sought and projected by television tend to simplify and dramatize reality to a greater extent than other media. They tend to disrupt the context of politics by focusing on an instantaneous present, and encouraging emotional reactions to events rather than reflective consideration of them.

The implications of all these developments are not yet entirely clear, but some broad observations seem justified. Growing numbers of people are today almost instantly aware of events far beyond their immediate concerns. An isolated event which would once have had no more than local significance can quickly become an international cause celebre. The communications revolution has brought whole groups and classes, and in some cases whole populations, into the political process for the first time, thus introducing an unprecedented volatility into political life. Given these developments, it is not surprising that information can have a relatively immediate and dramatic effect on political events. In Iran, tape cassettes of speeches of the Ayatollah Khomeini are widely credited with a central role in the disturbances leading to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. In Poland, the immediacy and depth of coverage of the events of August 1980 by Western radio stations certainly contributed significantly to the rapid formation of a nationwide Solidarity movement.

The availability of satellites capable of relaying television transmissions throughout the world is an important new factor in the global communications situation. This development has encouraged an internationalization of television which has fundamental implications for the relationship of the US to other developed countries and to the Third World. The development of true direct broadcast satellites (that is, broadcasting to non-cooperative receivers), whether for radio or television, would create unprecedented opportunities for addressing the populations of Communist nations.

The unsettling effects of the communications revolution have been seen as a serious threat by governing elites in the Third World and the Communist world alike. Even in the West, enthusiasm for a policy of unrestricted freedom of information has been muted at best. Commercial and national security

considerations have placed limitations on the extent to which even the US has been able to uphold this principle in international fora. The "New World Information Order" promoted at UNESCO and elsewhere by an alliance of Communist and Third World nations represents an attempt to impose political restrictions on the worldwide expansion of Western information technologies and services. Though unsuccessful so far in reversing current trends, such efforts can be expected to continue. International regimes regulating orbital slots for broadcast satellites and radio frequency allocations may come increasingly under threat as Third World nations seek to expand their own information efforts and gain greater control over the information reaching their populations. In the case of the Soviet Union and its allies, governing elites will face a difficult choice between maintaining strict and centralized control over information and seeking the economic benefits deriving from new communications and information technologies. There can be little doubt, however, that they will continue to commit very substantial resources to countering Western efforts to communicate with their populations.

B. Communist Propaganda and Active Measures

In analyzing the information activities of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, it is helpful to adopt the Soviet distinction between overt propaganda and covert or semi-covert "active measures" designed primarily to influence foreign opinion.

1. Propaganda

The efforts of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries in the area of overt propaganda continue to be impressive. In the critical area of international radio broadcasting, the Communist world retains a significant edge over the West in terms of languages, signal quality, and hours broadcast, though the blatantly propagandistic nature of much Communist broadcasting almost certainly continues to limit its effectiveness, at least with some audiences. In 1981, international broadcasting by Communist countries increased to over 7500 hours per week, representing a continuing trend that has amounted to a 9 percent increase over the preceding five years. (The greatest increase was in broadcasting to Europe.) The USSR led with some 2100 hours a week in 81 languages; the People's Republic of China broadcast some 1300 hours in 43 languages, North Korea some 580 hours in 8 languages, and Cuba some 460 hours in 8 languages. There has been a marked increase in the last several years in broadcasting by East European countries, particularly Bulgaria and East Germany.

The Soviet Union supplements its broadcasting efforts with a variety of informational and cultural programs targeted on

specific countries. These include overt media placements; distribution of books, periodicals and pamphlets; films; exhibits; and cultural events of various sorts.

Overt Soviet informational activities are most intense and diverse in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia; Western Europe is an area of increasing activity; of least interest have been Latin America and East Asia. Among the countries where the USSR is currently most active are: India; Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru; Algeria, Jordan and Syria; Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain; Japan and the Philippines. The patterns of Soviet activity appear to be affected by a number of factors apart from the strategic importance of a particular country or region, including the political orientation of the governments and publics involved and, in a few countries, undeveloped media and cultural infrastructures.

2. Active Measures

The Soviets use the term "active measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to refer to a range of covert or semi-covert operations that are intended to have an effect on foreign opinion or on the policies of foreign governments, as distinct from espionage or counterintelligence. These include: written or oral disinformation; efforts to influence or control foreign media; use of foreign Communist parties and front organizations; clandestine radio broadcasting; blackmail and economic coercion; and political influence operations, particularly among intellectual, cultural and political elites.

The Soviet regime devotes considerable financial, technical and personnel resources to active measures. Active measures campaigns are approved at the highest levels of the Soviet government, and are well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy initiatives. Actual operations abroad are executed by both official and quasi-official Soviet representatives, including scholars, students and journalists whose links with official Soviet organizations are not always apparent. The highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and its system of control over all elements of society give the Soviet leadership an impressive capability to draw on all segments of party, government and private citizens in orchestrating active measures.

The open societies of the developed West, and of many developing nations, give easy access to the Soviets for active measures operations, and the increasing sophistication of the Soviets in making their policies appear to be compatible or parallel with the interests of peace, environmental and other movements in Western and developing countries has made them increasingly effective. The classic Soviet campaign against the "neutron bomb" in Europe (which a KGB defector has described as the most successful active measures operation of

the post-war period) demonstrates the particular vulnerability of Western societies in this regard. While Soviet active measures, strategies, and techniques are inadequately understood and their effectiveness cannot be fully assessed at the present time, it would appear that the Soviets have made a quantum advance over the last decade in their ability to manipulate Western media and Western elite opinion generally. This development, together with the growing sophistication of overt Soviet propaganda and information efforts, poses a serious threat to US national interests, and to the West generally.

C. Regional Environments

There are fundamental differences between the information environments of the West, the Communist World and the Third World that must be taken into account in formulating and implementing the objectives of US international information policy.

1. The West

Because the nations of Western Europe (together with Japan) have fully developed media and communications infrastructures and share with us a fundamental commitment to democracy as well as a common cultural heritage, US policy makers have in the past tended to take for granted a basic unity of outlook. It has become clear in recent years, however, that public opinion in allied countries can no longer be assumed to be fundamentally supportive of American views and purposes. A younger generation has grown up in Europe lacking positive memories of the US role in World War II and the early post-war period; and anti-American, neutralist and pacifist views have gained increasing influence in a number of NATO countries. As for Japan, in spite of an apparent stability in domestic public opinion and general acceptance of Japan's security arrangements with the US, difficulties of language and the insularity of Japanese culture and society have considerably limited understanding of the US in that country. The successes scored in recent years by the Soviets in influencing opinion both in Western Europe and in Japan are also a factor to consider.

The last fifteen years have witnessed a sharp shift to the left on the part of European political and intellectual elites, particularly the younger generation, involving in some countries a heavy influence by the left over the universities, the media and cultural life. Characteristic of this shift has been an increasing hostility to free enterprise, the growing influence of Marxist and neo-Marxist thinking among mainstream social democratic elites, and the consequent loss of respectability of anti-communist views. With the notable exception of France, where anti-Communism has

become intellectually acceptable for the first time since World War II, this has led to a movement away from the Atlantic Alliance and, on the part of some, to a tendency to accommodate to Soviet positions and to accept the Soviet characterization of international issues. Given leftist domination of significant vehicles of the popular media, these elite attitudes have played an important role in shaping the terms of public debate and in forming the political opinions of the younger generation.

It is clearly difficult for the US Government to involve itself directly in information efforts within Western European nations. Despite this, European receptiveness to US initiatives in radio, television and the print media, as well as the popular appeal of American commercial media techniques, are strong.

2. The Communist World

If one distinguishes societies from regimes, the Communist world continues to offer in a sense the most hospitable environment for US international information programs, and for a number of reasons will afford increasing opportunities to the US in the coming years. Throughout the Communist world, shortwave radio remains the favored information medium of the general population, and ownership of radios tuning shortwave frequencies is now so widespread as to be virtually universal in the Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe (and, to a lesser extent, in China). In addition, the growing availability of tape recorders creates new possibilities for the diffusion of tape cassettes. In a very few parts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, foreign television is currently received, and the use of this medium for specially targeted programming by the US or other Western broadcasters is another possibility meriting consideration.

Historically, externally originated communication with the Soviet Union has been extremely constricted. The regime has jammed Western broadcasts, prevented the sale and distribution of printed materials, limited the number of foreign experts (especially in the social sciences) to a mere handful, kept tourists away from Soviet citizens and severely controlled the foreign travel opportunities of Soviet citizens.

Although Soviet contacts with external institutions -- especially in the physical sciences, but also in other areas -- has gradually increased, the communications flow has been severely cut back in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and events in Poland. US exhibitions -- an important vehicle for bringing our values and achievements to millions of Soviets throughout that nation -- have been stopped. With resumed jamming of VOA and other Western radios, means of communicating with large numbers of Soviets are severely restricted. A number of private initiatives are designed to supplement official exchange programs by

publishing materials in Slavic languages in the West and by seeking to mail or carry these publications into the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However, official restrictions in these countries severely impede this effort.

The extent and nature of control and the degree of diversity and day-to-day freedom among media and educational institutions, varies among the Communist countries. Each country deserves distinct analysis, in order to shape strategic informational approaches.

Western broadcasts continue to find an enthusiastic listenership among Communist elites as well as among the population at large. English language broadcasts (including special instructional programs) have grown in popularity as the teaching of English has become more widespread; this appears to be particularly the case in China. The jamming of US as well as other Western broadcasters remains a problem, and has intensified since 1980 in apparent response to the crisis in Poland. The Soviets jam most Russian and Soviet minority language broadcasts, as well as Polish language broadcasts to Poland, and Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia both jam extensively. However, VOA English language broadcasts have never been jammed, and Hungary, Romania and China have not jammed Western broadcasts for some years. In any event, because of the technical characteristics of HF propagation, jamming can never be fully effective, and reception of jammed services, particularly outside the major cities, is sometimes surprisingly good. There is reason to believe that reception can be significantly improved by a variety of technical strategies which are currently under study.

For political and cultural as well as technical reasons, the audience for US international broadcasts has been considerably smaller in the Soviet Union than in Eastern Europe. General improvement in the quality of Radio Liberty programming, together with improvements in signal quality, may permit significant expansion of the audiences for specifically targeted US broadcasting to the Soviet Union over the next five to ten years. The continuing decline in the strength of Communist ideology in the Soviet Union, the widespread religious revival, and the growth of ethnic and national identities, particularly in Soviet Central Asia, offer major opportunities for expanding the effectiveness of the US broadcasting effort with its most strategically important audience. The limited opening to the West encouraged by the current Chinese leadership should also favor an increase in the popularity and influence of US broadcasting as well as of other US information programs.

C. The Third World

In the Third World, the United States confronts hostility, distrust and confusion as well as admiration. Governments and influential groups are, at best, ambivalent toward this nation and our policies. At worst, we encounter hostility reflecting frustration and internal tensions over economic development and the political, social and cultural discontinuities in so many developing countries. Furthermore, divergent views of global issues and US policies are exacerbated by Soviet exploitation of often volatile situations and vulnerable groups.

Although conditions vary very widely in the different regions and countries of the developing world, a few generalizations seem possible. Many developing countries lack both the technical infrastructure to support a truly national domestic communications and information system, and the traditions of a free and independent press. Accordingly, they are uniquely dependent on foreign sources for both programming and technical support, and they are highly vulnerable to manipulation and subversion due to the venality and lack of professionalism of many journalists and media organizations. For all of these reasons, they tend to be suspicious of and hostile to external information sources while remaining dependent on them. They are more vulnerable than developed countries to Soviet propaganda, due to generally low educational and cultural levels. And they are vulnerable to the range of Soviet active measures. At the same time, the products of the commercial media of the West, and of the US in particular, have wide popular appeal.

For the past two decades, the Third World agenda and public discourse have been shaped by elites that were mostly formed during the period of struggle against European colonialism. Though some are pro-Western, many remain ideologically hostile to the West and attracted to Marxism or to some version of socialism as the appropriate model for nation-building in the underdeveloped world. The bias against free enterprise in many areas is supported by bureaucratic and cultural, as well as ideological, factors. At the same time, the specific attraction of the Soviet model has diminished to the point that the USSR is no longer considered a desirable alternative either as an economic or as a political system.

The widespread disenchantment with communist ideology throughout the Third World appears to have stimulated a general rethinking of Third World "non-alignment" and of the feasibility of an ideological "third way." This rethinking is most evident in the Islamic world, where the current religious revival of Islam is closely coupled with attempts at a fundamental restructuring of economic, legal and political institutions. A common characteristic of such efforts is the desire to avoid what are seen as the errors of both Western (and in particular American) "individualism" and Soviet

totalitarianism in favor of more traditionally based ideas of "community."

III. Objectives and Priorities of US International Information

A. Global Objectives

The broad global objectives of US international information programs and activities correspond closely to the overall objectives of US national security policy. They may be enumerated as follows:

-- To contribute to deterrence of military attack against the US, its allies and other countries important to US interests, and to the countering of efforts to intimidate or coerce the US or others through military power.

-- To broaden international recognition of US efforts to achieve peaceful solutions to international problems, e.g., in the Middle East.

-- To strengthen international support for US arms control policy, including our efforts to achieve effective verification, and to place arms control policy in the context of our overall national security policy.

-- To strengthen the political influence of the US throughout the world by contributing to the strengthening of existing alliances and the improvement of relations with other nations and movements that have potential strategic importance and by advocacy of US foreign policy positions.

-- To maintain a positive image of the US and its political system and way of life.

-- To foster on a long-term basis the institutions, principles and ideals of democracy.

-- To foster strategies for economic development and international economic relations supportive of long-term US interests.

-- To encourage the free communication of ideas and information, and the growth of a free and open global communications network.

-- To counter the efforts of the USSR -- particularly through the instruments of political action, propaganda and active measures -- to expand its political influence.

-- To foster internal constraints on the political and military behavior of the USSR and its allies by creating an informed public opinion sympathetic to the West, encouraging

long-term liberalizing tendencies, and supporting the right of subjugated nations to regain their independence and dignity.

B. Regional/Country Objectives

In addition to the foregoing, US international information policy will be guided by the following operational objectives in specific regions:

-- In Europe, to strengthen the NATO Alliance by improving Western European understanding of US and Alliance security policies and actions; to strengthen cultural and political ties with Western European publics and with key elites and movements potentially supportive of US policies; to improve Western European understanding of US economic policies and thinking, and of the economic component of security issues; to encourage liberalizing tendencies in Eastern Europe, and to increase the costs of continued Soviet repression there.

-- In Latin America, to strengthen understanding of, and a climate conducive to, the growth of democratic institutions; to counter the efforts of the USSR to expand its political influence, to impose internal constraints on the political and military behavior of its Cuban and Nicaraguan proxies.

-- In East Asia and the Pacific, to strengthen existing alliances, particularly with Japan; to strengthen awareness of and commitment to a Pacific Basin identity in the political, economic and security areas; to strive to reduce Soviet influence and foster regional efforts to counter the domination of neighboring states by the Vietnamese; and to strengthen cultural and political ties with the Peoples Republic of China.

-- In the Near East and South Asia, to support the effort by the United States to gain an enduring peace and stability in the Middle East; to contribute to US efforts to strengthen the moderate nations of the region, and to expose and counter the activities of the USSR and its proxies or allies; to strengthen cultural and political ties with key elites and movements potentially supportive of US policies, in order to bridge the wide cultural gulf separating the US from the nations of the region, improve understanding and create a better climate for cooperation.

-- In Africa, to strengthen understanding of, and a climate conducive to, the growth of democratic institutions; to counter the efforts of the USSR to expand its presence and influence; and to expose and counter the activities of Cuba and Libya.

C. Priorities

While necessarily general and subject to exceptions, the following order of audience priorities should help to guide the structuring and funding of US international information activities and programs:

-- Political, cultural and intellectual elites in West Europe, Japan, the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China.

-- The population of the Soviet Union, particularly key sectors and national minority groups.

-- Political, cultural and intellectual elites in the Third World.

-- Key sectors of the population of Western Europe.

-- Key sectors of the population of Soviet allied and proxy states, particularly the Warsaw Pact states and Cuba.

-- Key sectors of the population of Third World states.

In addition, efforts to address a youth audience should have high priority generally, with a focus on fundamental political and cultural values. In thematic terms, though generalization is still more difficult, highest priority should be given to political and economic programming. Greater attention should be given to military and arms control issues than has been customary in the past. (A more detailed discussion of themes and strategies is provided in Part V.)

IV. International Information Policy

A. General Guidelines

The proper character and role of international information as an instrument of US national policy continues to be a matter of some controversy. US international information programs are frequently labelled by the term "propaganda," explicitly or implicitly equated with the propaganda and disinformation activities of totalitarian states, and thereby denied moral legitimacy. Some believe that, if such comparisons are to be avoided, US information programs must be apolitical or politically noncontroversial, or modelled on the practices and policies of the US commercial mass media. Such a view is usually defended on the grounds that information programs that are seen to serve a larger purpose necessarily damage their own credibility and therefore their effectiveness with their audiences.

US information programs should -- and do -- distinguish themselves from Soviet propaganda efforts by accurate reporting of facts and by a respect for and striving after truth. At the same time, the fundamental purpose of US information programs is to affect foreign audiences in ways favorable to

US national interests. Such programs must persuade as well as inform. Providing factually correct information and analysis supports this larger purpose, given the ignorance and misinformation concerning the US and the international scene that is common throughout much of the world. As the habits, interests, expectations and level of understanding of foreign audiences may differ significantly from those of Americans, however, different approaches and emphases in the selection and presentation of information are required.

At least as important as providing accurate and timely information, then, is providing information that is relevant to the concerns of its audience, and a context in which information can be properly assimilated and understood. Information should be differentiated according to the characteristics of specific target audiences. With regard to the representation of opinion, care should be taken to present the clearest and most readily understandable statement of views held by those within the mainstream of current domestic political opinion.

Just as US international information programs must be responsive to the sensitivities of foreign peoples, so must they be responsive to some degree to the sensitivities of foreign governments. It must be remembered, however, that our information activities are a strategic instrument of US national policy, not a tactical instrument of US diplomacy. Material critical of foreign governments may normally be communicated even at the risk of complication of diplomatic relations with those governments if more fundamental US interests are thereby served. The content of US programs is not to be considered an object of diplomatic bargaining.

B. Psychological Operations

Currently, the responsibilities of the Department of Defense in the area of psychological operations (PSYOP) in times of peace are unclear. Partly as a result, there has been a sharp decline in recent years in the human and material resources devoted by the Armed Forces to the PSYOP mission or to international information activities generally. There is no national policy for the conduct of overt PSYOP in peacetime or during crises or contingencies within which the DOD can execute its responsibilities. In view of the importance of psychological factors in maintaining the confidence of allied governments and in deterring military action against US national interests and assets by adversaries, and in order to be prepared for the immediate and effective use of psychological operations in crisis and wartime, it is vital that the armed forces maintain a strong and active international information capability in peacetime.

Revitalization of its PSYOPs capability, and full integration of PSYOP in military operations and planning, should be a high priority of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense should be directed, with guidance and supervision provided by the SPG and in accordance with the foregoing general guidelines, to participate in overt PSYOP programs in peacetime in support of US national security policy. In order to employ PSYOP most effectively and economically, in consonance with policy and in coordination with other instruments, a set of national guidelines, a directing organization and a funded program are required, and the roles and relationships of the agencies that are involved in relevant national programs must be defined. When direction is provided, DOD and other agencies should develop a coordinated plan for conducting international information in support of national security objectives.

C. Crisis and Wartime Considerations

Crisis and wartime conditions impose special requirements on US international information activities.

Because of the difficulty of defining crisis conditions with precision, the problem of managing information in a crisis has tended to be neglected. Yet, given the rapidity of many modern military operations or politico-military conflict, it is obvious that the impact of information activities or psychological operations undertaken in a pre-war crisis period can be of decisive importance. For the purposes of this discussion, a crisis may be defined as a period of acute tension involving a threat to the lives of American citizens, or the imminence of war between the US and other nations.

Under crisis circumstances, particular attention must be paid to speed of operations, policy consistency and rapid and reliable feedback.

US information operations should be ready to initiate special procedures to ensure compatibility with evolving US policy. Attention should also be given to accelerating the interaction between information and policy elements so as to ensure timely response and rapid feedback from the intended audience.

V. International Information Themes and Strategies

While it would be neither possible nor desirable to set forth a complete and authoritative analysis of international information themes and strategies for the purpose of this study, an attempt will be made to outline the most fundamental themes and the grand strategy that should underlie all US international information programs and activities in the areas critical for US national security.

The key requirement of all US information efforts is to understand and adapt to the interests, the preconceptions and the cultural and intellectual level of a variety of audiences. Essential to a successful global information strategy is recognition of the considerable diversity of the different audiences the US desires to reach. Beyond the obvious differences between Western, Third World and Communist country publics, there are significant cultural and ideological differences between and within countries and regions. Moreover, there are significant differences -- particularly in the Third World and Communist countries -- between the intellectual level and outlook of influential elites and that of the general population. In particular, a much more systematic effort must be made to address issues in relation to the ideologically-derived terminology and approach that so often dominates discussion of public policy questions elsewhere in the world.

As regards the problem of semantics, special attention should be paid to combatting the appropriation of Western political terminology by Communist propaganda.

Also, a greater effort must be made to address elite audiences at the level of sophistication (ideological or cultural) to which they are generally accustomed. The critical importance of elites in the formation of public opinion generally needs to be more clearly acknowledged than has been the case in the past. Over the long term, the best way for the US to affect public opinion in a given country is to affect the outlook of its key political and intellectual elites. This should be a fundamental premise of US information strategy. At the same time, intensified efforts must be made to address key sectors of the general population in areas where government control of elite communications is strict, particularly in the Communist world.

Specific information themes and strategies will be outlined for the political, the economic/social, the military/arms control, the scientific/technical, the cultural, and the human rights areas.

A. Political

In the political area, the overarching strategy should be to stress the fundamental strengths of the political system characteristic of the US and the advanced societies of the West, while at the same time emphasizing those features of Western democracy which can most readily serve as models for democratic or constitutional regimes in the Third World. The US must defend the institutions of Western democracy as morally and politically superior to Communist systems, but at the same time must avoid the appearance of wishing to impose an alien political system on the nations of the Third World.

We recognize the fact that many Third World regimes friendly to the US are, and will likely remain, authoritarian in greater or lesser degree. The US posture should be to maintain cooperative security or economic relations, while pursuing the long-term goal of strengthening democracy. Special care must be taken not to deny all legitimacy to such regimes provided they reflect a certain domestic political consensus and observe basic human rights. While the distinction between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes is too abstract to be compelling for many audiences, we should not shy away from the argument that traditional authoritarian regimes in some measure respect the autonomy of religion and the private sector and offer possibilities for internal evolution, while most Communist regimes do neither of these things, fail to secure political justice or economic efficiency and constitute a greater threat to the independence and security of their neighbors.

In the light of this analysis, particular emphasis should be given to features of Western governments such as constitutionalism, the rule of law, human rights, and political participation in a broad sense. Key themes in this connection: the role of an independent judiciary and of constitutional checks and balances generally; the genuinely democratic or popular character of Western (and in particular American) politics in contrast with the dominance of a narrow, privileged oligarchy in Communist regimes. Emphasis should also be placed on the importance of local politics and of intermediate political and social associations of all kinds as a practical expression of the freedom enjoyed in Western democracies, in place of the celebration of Western "individualism" -- a notion which is thoroughly alien to the political culture of much of the Third World. To the extent possible, the idea of democracy should be assimilated to traditional participatory practices of less developed societies such as tribal or village councils and the like.

B. Economic/Social

In the economic/social area, the overall strategy should be to defend free enterprise and private ownership as superior both in economic and political terms to Communism or to the various forms of state socialism prevalent in the Third World. Such a strategy does not require a defense of classic "capitalism" (a term which ought to be avoided in favor of "free enterprise") or a rejection of the welfare state or of political intervention in the marketplace; it does require a defense of the efficiency and justice of market economies in the broad sense. In addition, it requires particular emphasis on the theme that economic freedom and private ownership are inextricably and reciprocally related to political freedom.

It is particularly important that US information efforts remain sensitive to the social and political implications of

economic ideas. Welcome as it may be from an economic point of view, development also tends to be disruptive of existing social and political relationships and hence is often viewed in the Third World as threatening. While it may be advantageous in some contexts to stress the revolutionary potential of free enterprise economics, care must be taken to minimize the element of perceived threat in that potential. Free enterprise economics should be presented as at once a more efficient engine of development and more conducive in the long run to social and political stability than state control of the economy, with the oppression and corruption it necessarily entails.

The notion of private ownership is a particularly important theme. Emphasis should be given to the human satisfactions associated with ownership, and to the broad opportunities for ownership possible under contemporary capitalism. At the same time, a certain critical distance from current practices should be maintained. Expanded capital ownership should be treated as an innovative idea which is making headway in the developed world and holds considerable promise for alleviating the economic and social problems of the developing world. Emphasis should be placed on the dignity of labor, and the respect accorded labor and labor unions in democratic as distinct from Communist societies. Again, special attention should be given to the element of cooperation and association in the economic and social life of Western societies, as a counter to the stereotype of harsh individualism which is widely held to be an essential feature of capitalism.

C. Defense/Arms Control

In the defense and arms control areas, the overarching strategy should be to maintain and reinforce the deterrent effect of US and allied military power, while at the same time calling attention to the imbalance between Western and Soviet military forces and the need to constrain the latter through a combination of enhanced defense efforts by the US and its allies and arms control measures which genuinely inhibit Soviet capabilities and contribute to a stable military balance. There is a certain tension between the main elements of this strategy; attention must be given to developing themes which reconcile them. It should be stressed that the military potential of the West as a whole remains far stronger than that of the Soviet Union and its allies; that the Soviet Union is a "superpower" only in virtue of its deployed military forces, its arms transfers and its military involvement in other countries. We should stress that the US retains considerable advantages in military technology and in the strength and reliability of its allies. In explaining the current military imbalance, emphasis should be placed on the past voluntary self-restraint of the West induced partly by the doctrinal assumptions of the 1960s and partly by the political and arms control agreements of the 1970s.

Discussions of the future should lay stress on the potential of innovations in military organization, doctrine and strategy for strengthening Western defense, as much as on the potential of new technologies.

The anti-nuclear and "peace" movements of the West can be expected to remain a highly vocal political force. Priority should be given to combatting both the arguments of these movements and the underlying assumptions and attitudes which have given rise to them. Efforts must be made to avoid allowing the Soviets to monopolize such terms as peace, arms control and disarmament. The US should avoid the appearance of viewing war, particularly nuclear war, as natural or likely. At the same time, an effort should be made to avoid fueling anti-nuclear sentiments by endorsement of apocalyptic views concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear war. The activities of the Soviets and their allies in the area of chemical and biological warfare and the destruction caused by conventional weapons should be used to make the point that all weapons can cause great damage and suffering and thus our goal is to prevent any war. Focusing on conventional capabilities should help to make the case that the Soviet military buildup and aggressive actions in many parts of the globe -- particularly their intervention or support of regional conflicts -- pose a serious challenge to peace.

With respect to arms control, a balance must be struck between citing the inadequacy of the arms control process alone as a method of limiting the growth of nuclear and conventional arsenals and uncritical acceptance and promotion of it. It should be acknowledged that the arms control efforts of the 1970s failed to fulfill many of the expectations they generated, and did not produce a more stable and secure international environment. It should be made clear that the Soviets bear a large part of the responsibility for this. However, we should emphasize the merits of our current approach, drawing on the experience and the lessons learned during the past decade. The close integration of foreign, defense and arms control policies in overall national security strategy should be pointed out, as well as our commitment to sound arms control agreements based on the principles of real reductions, US-Soviet equality, and verifiability. Finally, the far-reaching arms control proposals and initiatives undertaken by the US should be highlighted. Critical problems and limitations in arms control, such as verification, should be acknowledged and elucidated where appropriate. It should be emphasized that the US remains ready to do business with the Soviet Union in any area which affords the possibility of arms control that is equitable, verifiable, and truly constraining of Soviet military power. At the same time, we should emphasize that other Soviet actions inevitably affect the political climate in which such interaction takes place.

D. Scientific/Technical

The enormous prestige that the US enjoys in scientific and technical matters needs to be exploited more systematically in US international information programs. The overall strategy should be to present American scientific and technical accomplishments as an outgrowth of the American political and economic system, and as the underpinning of our military strength. Contrasts should be drawn between US and Soviet performance in this area, with emphasis on the diversion of Soviet scientific resources to the military sector, Soviet illicit acquisition of Western technology, and the like. US space programs, including US/European/Canadian/Japanese technological cooperation in the Shuttle missions, should receive priority attention. Communications and information technologies should also be given systematic and extensive treatment.

It must be recognized that Western scientific and technical achievements, like Western economic achievements, are sometimes regarded in the Third World (and indeed in the West itself) as profoundly ambiguous in their implications. Western science is seen both as a revolutionary force which threatens traditional beliefs and ways of life and as a menace to man's natural environment. The increasing political salience of environmental issues in the West, and the linkage between the environmental and anti-nuclear movements, need to be taken into account in devising effective information programs in this area. Emphasis should be placed on the potential of science and technology for remedying the environmental disruptions of modern industrial society, and for supporting and improving natural processes in areas such as agricultural technology. The considerable successes of the USG and American industry in environmental protection should be contrasted with the sorry record of the Soviet Union.

With respect to the Third World, US information efforts must be sensitive to the potentially disruptive impact of modern science and technology on traditional societies. In particular, care should be taken to avoid suggesting that there is a fundamental incompatibility between scientific/technical thinking and traditional religious belief.

E. Cultural

US information efforts in the cultural area should rest on a strategic understanding of the importance of the cultural factor in international politics. Intellectual and cultural elites throughout the world tend to be both more politicized and more politically influential than is the case in the US; as the example of Alexander Solzhenitsyn is sufficient to show, a literary figure can become the symbol of a movement of political opposition. At the same time, the worldwide revival of religion as a cultural-political force has far-reaching implications for US communications strategies.

US cultural programs need not and should not directly reflect current policy concerns, but they should be guided by an overall strategy. US strategy in the cultural area should be to improve understanding of the United States in particular, and of Western liberal democracy in general, in elite cultural circles throughout the world (including Western Europe), and to establish and maintain ties with sympathetic cultural and religious movements abroad. The fundamental objective of US cultural information programs should be to advance long-term US interests by presenting a coherent and constructive picture of American life and thought, and more generally of the fundamental ideals of the West. Emphasis should be given to American history and to the classic documents of American culture, including those political documents (such as the Federalist Papers) which best embody the spirit of the American political system and way of life. Particular emphasis should be given to the role of religion in the United States, and to the creative spirit in American arts, humanities and education. The role of voluntary private associations generally should also be given expanded and systematic treatment, as an antidote to the stereotype of American "individualism." With respect to religion, special efforts should be made to explore areas of ideological affinity and common interest with major world religions or religious movements as appropriate.

F. Human Rights

Human rights constitute a key element in US international information strategy. While closely linked with US political information efforts, human rights also involve an important moral and legal dimension which to some degree sets them in a category apart. For purposes of policy, human rights are distinguished in two basic categories: rights of the person (such as freedom from torture), and civil and political rights. ("Economic and social rights" are considered policy objectives or ideals of a less fundamental order.) Overall US information strategy with regard to human rights should be to support human rights policy by publicizing human rights violations by authoritarian regions in instances where publicity is likely to be an effective weapon for change, and to underline the systemic failure of Soviet Communism and some of its allied regimes to guarantee political participation, the rule of law or even basic human decency. The US should be identified as one of the major forces for protection of human rights in the world.

In treating human rights themes, it is essential that the US remain sensitive to the diversity of political institutions and cultures of the Third World. We must avoid giving the impression that human rights are merely the expression of a liberal democratic Western ideology rather than universally recognized human values. The appeal of US human rights policy throughout the world has much to do with its embrace of

standards of morality or justice which exist in some form in a variety of cultures and ideologies, and it is important that human rights themes be treated in this broader context. At the same time, it should be made clear that the best guarantee of human rights in the final analysis is a democratic political system, and US support for long-term democratic development should be presented as an important element of our overall human rights policy.

VI. Information Instruments: Roles, Priorities, Policy

The instruments of US international information programs and activities are very diverse, and to some degree serve different functions and audiences. The following discussion reviews the roles and relative priorities of these instruments, and attempts to identify problems and opportunities associated with them. A number of recommendations are made that have significant implications for US policy. Owing to its special character, US international radio broadcasting will be discussed separately (Section VII).

A. Television

The worldwide growth of TV broadcasting offers great opportunities for expansion of US international information efforts in this medium; this is an area that should have a very high priority. USIA has broken new ground in the last several years in establishing a TV satellite news feed to the European Broadcasting Union, and in the use of two-way audio/one-way video links for international press conferences and "electronic dialogues." While the possibilities for placement of US film and TV productions on foreign stations seem limited at present, active facilitation of foreign TV networks can also be advantageous in encouraging the production of serious programs on US policies and American life. Formal co-production or information cooperation can be provided as appropriate.

Much more systematic thought needs to be given to the opportunities offered by international TV broadcasting, as an instrument both of long-range information strategies and of day-to-day international public affairs. Key speeches by US officials, for example, should be prepared in timing, substance and format with a view to international TV, and more attention should be given to the visual elements (clips, stills, charts) of policy presentation.

Given the enormous promise of TV and the relatively little attention it has received to date at policy levels, it would be very useful if a conceptual study could be produced examining technical and political options for US international television broadcasting over the next several decades. Special attention should be given to the potential of direct

satellite TV broadcasting as well as ground-based TV broadcasting to the USSR and Communist states generally.

B. Publications

The scope for publications abroad is wide. There are many areas where USG and/or privately produced publications could serve useful international information purposes. Unfortunately, however, long-term budget cuts have reduced both the number and circulation of such publications tailored for specific foreign audiences. Single-country publications -- the most effective because they are specially targeted and published in the host country language -- would be valuable in a number of nations if funds were available. Recently, arrangements have been made to translate the USIA monthly journal, Problems of Communism, into a number of key foreign languages. This should be done with other publications to the extent feasible. Additional efforts should be made as well to target critical elites in particular regional or functional areas, such as military elites. (The DOD publication, Asia and Pacific Defense Forum, is an example of what can be done in this field.)

In the area of book publishing, it is well to recall that in the past 35 years more than 75 million volumes have been translated into foreign languages or published in English abroad under USG auspices or with USG assistance. In a partnership with American and foreign publishers and book dealers, USIA has made it possible for millions of people to read serious works on American institutions, history and values. At present, however, the program has dwindled to a trickle. Private commercial sources have not traditionally seen the international market as lucrative one, and are not seeking out foreign markets for many serious books. American texts are far too expensive for most foreign students, and difficult to obtain in sufficient numbers to be assigned in universities. The obstacles to publishing and distributing books abroad are numerous.

A working partnership between government, publishers, educators and marketing specialists here and overseas, with financial and facilitative assistance, is needed if important books about this nation are to be made available in any quantity abroad. Steps should be undertaken to reconstitute this partnership. Publications programs of all kinds should be regarded as important investments in a long-term effort to educate and affect elite opinion throughout the world, and should be accorded higher priority than they currently enjoy. All agencies should be required to review their publications efforts in the light of the broad findings of this study.

C. Films

Film is a potentially important instrument of US influence around the world. Although USIA uses feature films in its program, by far the vast majority of films are conveyed abroad commercially and for commercial purposes. Additional analysis of this medium and its potential is merited.

D. Speakers

Speakers -- official and non-official -- are the mainstay of interpersonal communication with key groups abroad. Americans from various walks of life travel abroad and take part in officially arranged meetings in increasing numbers, and have proven on the whole to be highly effective representatives of this nation. This dimension of US international information activities merits expansion. Regarding key policy issues, there remains an urgent need for more senior officials to participate in overseas programs. If possible, this participation should be direct. If not, the participation can come in the form of briefings for the foreign press here in the US, or in USIA-arranged teleconferences. Efforts must also be made to increase the number and caliber of non-official speakers.

E. Exhibits

The exhibit medium suffered its most radical cutback as a result of the decision of the USG to terminate the US-USSR official exchange program after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The cuts in exhibitions to the Soviet Union reduced the entire Special International Exhibition program, and are depriving the United States of one of only three major vehicles for effective communication with millions of Soviet and (to a lesser extent) Eastern European citizens. These cuts probably outweigh the gains resulting from US sanctions, and should be reconsidered at an appropriate juncture in the context of US-Soviet relations generally.

F. Other

In addition to the traditional instruments of international information discussed above, new technologies have created new instruments whose potential can and should be exploited by the US. Foremost among these are audio and video tape cassettes. The popularity and increasing diffusion of cheap cassette players in the developing world offer significant opportunities, as the case of Iran particularly demonstrates. These and other new technologies merit careful and continuing analysis.

It is important to recognize that, for a number of reasons, the credibility of information emanating directly from the USG is likely to be weaker with many international audiences than of that disseminated by private and commercial organizations. A major component of US international information activities,

then, should be liaison and cooperation with, and support of, non-governmental information channels that further US national interests.

Certainly the most important such channel is the commercial domestic media and wire services, which profoundly affect the selection and interpretation of news, particularly news concerning the United States, throughout the non-Communist world. This argues for the closest possible coordination between US international information efforts and public affairs activities directed primarily to domestic audiences. A much more sustained effort is needed to incorporate the international factor in domestic public affairs planning, particularly in matters such as Presidential and Cabinet-level speeches and appearances on national security subjects.

Of equal and probably greater importance are the print and electronic media of other nations. These are generally the most credible source of news and opinion in their respective societies, and it is essential that the US make a maximum effort to influence their coverage of US and world events of strategic importance to this country. Of particular interest in this connection is the foreign press corps in Washington. A systematic effort needs to be made to ensure that foreign press representatives receive the fullest possible exposure to available information on national security related matters and to US officials knowledgeable about such matters.

VII. US International Radio Broadcasting

A key vehicle of US international information is international radio broadcasting, which alone among the direct instruments of US public diplomacy is capable of reaching a truly mass audience. At the same time, broadcasting provides vital access (among others) to the political and intellectual elites of other nations and can shape news events as they happen. Thus, both in the short and in the long term, the effect of international radio broadcasting is potentially a very considerable one. Improvement in the US international broadcasting effort, then, must continue to enjoy the highest priority, and major financial augmentation is needed.

A. Charters and Guidelines

US radio broadcasting is characterized by accurate reporting of facts and by respect for truth. At the same time, it has unique characteristics that distinguish it from commercial journalism as practiced in the United States. In particular, because the habits, interests, expectations and level of understanding of foreign peoples may differ from those of Americans, different approaches and emphases in the presentation of information are required. With respect to the Voice of America, the historical and political context of information about the United States should be provided

wherever possible, in accordance with sound journalistic practice and existing policy. And while the standard used in selecting information must conform to the VOA Charter, care should be taken to consider the expectations of particular foreign audiences as shaped both by their own political culture and other media sources available to them.

The statutory charter of the Voice of America (22 U.S.C. 1463, Sec. 503) establishes the following requirements:

-- VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

-- VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

-- VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.

Under the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, RFE-RL are established as "independent broadcast media, operating in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of the United States, and in accordance with high professional standards," intended to further the communication of information and ideas to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Program policy guidelines for RFE-RL have been drawn up by the Board for International Broadcasting, which has been given the statutory responsibility to "review and evaluate the mission and operation of RFE-RL, and to assess the quality, effectiveness, and professional integrity of their broadcasting."

The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983 establishes a special service within the Voice of America ("Radio Marti") for the communication of information and ideas to Cuba. This legislation requires that Radio Marti "shall serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news," and that it shall be "in accordance with all Voice of America standards to ensure the broadcast of programs which are objective, accurate, balanced, and which present a variety of views." At the same time, the Act recognizes that Radio Marti will fulfill "a need for broadcasts to Cuba which provide news commentary and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba."

The term "objective" in the VOA Charter should not be taken to require that programming overlook the characteristics of specific audiences or the national policy requirement to communicate effectively with those audiences; nor should the

term "comprehensive" be understood to equate necessarily the standard of international news reporting with that employed by the domestic media. The "objectivity" of VOA news is properly understood to require, under normal circumstances, the autonomy of VOA news broadcasting.

The essential difference between VOA and RFE-RL is that the latter are intended to function as "surrogate" domestic radio services for peoples whose governments seek to maintain total control over access to information. In order to perform the surrogate function effectively, these radios should not be perceived as a direct instrument of the US Government; preservation of their autonomy is therefore a prime requirement of US policy.

As regards Radio Marti, the language of the Act and associated legislative history clearly authorizes a surrogate broadcasting service for Cuba which will supplement regular VOA Spanish-language broadcasting to Cuba and Latin America generally. For Radio Marti to perform this function most effectively, it should be established and operated in such a way as to preserve a maximum of organizational and operational autonomy.

B. National Security Decision Directive 45

Problems and policy associated with US international broadcasting were reviewed in the NSC study, "US International Broadcasting Requirements," of June 1982.

NSDD 45, which resulted from that study, affirmed the essentials of existing US policy relative to US international broadcasting organizations, and authorized a major, long-term program of modernization and expansion of VOA and RFE/RL, involving the acquisition of new transmitting sites and facilities. In addition, it established a requirement for technical cooperation and joint planning between US broadcasters; approved revised guidance for determining languages and broadcast hours; called for a major effort to overcome jamming of US international broadcasts and ameliorate its effects; directed continuing study of the technical possibilities of direct broadcasting by satellite; and directed further study on a priority basis of the role of US international broadcasting facilities and operations in periods of crisis and war, calling for closer integration of international broadcasting into political and military contingency planning.

While some progress has been made in all of these areas, it is clear that much remains to be done.

For instance, for political and cultural as well as technical reasons, the audience for US international broadcasts has been considerably smaller in the Soviet Union than in Eastern

Europe. General improvement in the quality of Radio Liberty programming, together with improvements in signal quality, may permit significant expansion of the audiences for specifically targeted US broadcasting to the Soviet Union over the next five to ten years.

It would seem desirable at this juncture to undertake a review of implementation of NSDD 45. Such a review should include a revision of current language guidance, to include recommendations concerning the possible initiation of new language services. It should also incorporate reports on programming policy and objectives relative to international audiences of the Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS) and Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS).

VIII. Information and Communications Assistance

In the same way that security assistance can make a major contribution to US national security by providing allied or friendly governments with the wherewithal to improve their own defense capabilities, information and communications assistance can, if strategically targeted, contribute significantly to achieving US objectives in the information area for particular countries and audiences. The assistance mission should henceforth be recognized as an integral part of US international information activities.

Information and communications assistance has two relatively distinct aspects: technical assistance designed to improve the communications infrastructure in a particular country, and assistance in the improvement of programming. Programming assistance is likely to be of particular importance in situations of counterinsurgency warfare. Also of importance, however, is assistance designed to foster political stability and democratic evolution by facilitating the communication of governments with elements of their populations whose ties to the government may be weak, and encouraging the growth of free and open communications infrastructures. An interagency study should be undertaken to define the role and contributions of the various agencies involved and to develop a long-term strategy in this area.

Central America and the Caribbean should have first priority in the provision of assistance of both sorts.

IX. International Information: Functional Requirements

A. Research/Analysis

Research on public opinion, media reaction, internal political dynamics and cultural factors has been conducted over the years by a number of USG agencies, notably the Department of State, CIA (including FBIS analyses), USIA, and to a lesser extent DOD through DIA and private contract studies. USIA has been the primary agent for survey research and studies of communications and media. For a number of years, USIA also collected data and analyzed Soviet information and cultural activities and Soviet propaganda. This research was gradually eliminated in the mid-1970s, but it is in the process of being restored in part.

There is a need to close a gap between traditional political/economic/military reporting and assessment and analysis of the actions and attitudes of groups on the periphery of decisions, or larger publics. More reporting by USIA posts abroad would be valuable, but the Agency at present faces severe staff limitations. USIA field posts have traditionally been reluctant to appear to be gathering intelligence or doing political reporting that might endanger the vital trust of foreign contacts. USIA contacts, often with sensitive "out" groups as well as those in power, are invaluable and should not be compromised. It is essential, however, that information available to USIA be fully integrated into the data base and analyses of all relevant agencies. State and USIA should jointly review reporting policy and practices in this area.

Useful government research into public opinion abroad has been hobbled by the sensitivity of other governments to survey research, particularly that undertaken by foreign governments; the lack or absence of survey research capacities in many countries; and an inadequate funding base. In many countries, and with regard to many ongoing issues, the US lacks a base-line from which to conduct periodic studies and therefore form valid generalizations about the trends and importance of public attitudes.

USIA opinion research is more flexible, more relevant to policy concerns and more forcefully and clearly prepared than it has ever been, but has reached a plateau. With current resources, USIA research can focus adequately on only one major issue at a time.

Private, largely academic, institutions have conducted most of the studies of the political systems and the political cultures of other countries. Although the USG need not duplicate these, it is important to relate the findings to the more current, issue-oriented research interests of the government.

There is an urgent need to improve the research and analysis capabilities of the USG generally relative to foreign opinions and attitudes as well as communications and information developments. USIA and NSC Staff have recently developed a proposal for a coordinated interagency effort in this area,

the Foreign Opinion Research Advisory Group (FORA). This proposal has considerable merit, and should receive strong support from all involved agencies.

B. Role in the Policy Process

While there has been a substantial increase in calls for survey research, foreign media reaction and public affairs counsel on foreign public opinion, the likely impact of foreign public factors or reaction to policy options is not yet fully considered in the policy formulation process. Information should be an essential component of the determination and the conduct of political and economic action and the projection and use of military force. The other elements rely on the informational component for an accurate assessment of the response of significant groups to given options. Any substantive action must be communicated effectively to disparate groups throughout the world. Without forceful communication even the most logical and carefully worked out policy can fail.

Increasingly the exercise of power relies on projection as much as actual use; i.e., maintaining perceptions among other nations that the United States has the capacity and the will and national consensus to achieve its objectives.

Conversely, perceptions rely on the precedent set by action. Information activities can magnify and reiterate the meaning of actions, and to some extent mitigate negative outcomes, but cannot essentially reverse an unwise decision or unsuccessful action. No actions with regard to national security should be taken without careful analysis of public factors.

Occasionally the national interest will require actions that are intensely criticized overseas. International information would then help shape a public posture and policy support that would seek to mitigate opposition.

Not all SIG and IG decision documents examine issues and options from the standpoint of the public climate in the relevant countries. There remains the need for a simple mechanism for incorporating analysis of public factors, public opinion and the actions and reactions of key public groups and the public posture of key actors abroad. Wherever appropriate, major national security policy studies and decision documents should include an assessment of the impact of policy options or decisions on foreign opinion and on the international information environment generally.

The creation of the NSDD 77 structure offers promise of fuller consideration of international public factors in policy formulation. The performance of the NSDD 77 committees in this respect should be monitored and assessed in the near term.

C. Education/Training and Career Development

The current state of education and training by the USG in the general area of international communications and information is marginal to non-existent. In addition, existing career patterns tend to discourage the development of expertise in these areas.

There is an urgent requirement for more extensive and sophisticated training of USG personnel in USIA, State, DOD and the Intelligence Community (and of personnel of RFE-RL) in communications technologies relevant to US international information activities, in the international information environment, and in substantive and technical requirements of effective international and intercultural communications. With respect to education, it is hoped that a degree-granting program in international communications and information will be established soon at a university in the Washington area. This could eventually contribute importantly to the creation of a pool of qualified personnel for recruitment by the relevant agencies of the USG. More needs to be done, however, to introduce courses in international communications and information in the curricula of the senior service colleges and the Foreign Service Institute.

With respect to training, the relevant agencies of the USG, particularly USIA, should review their existing training programs and augment them as necessary, to ensure adequate levels of operational expertise in every field of international information.

In the area of career development, a special effort should be made by all agencies to develop career tracks which encourage qualified individuals to remain in the field of international information. Agencies should also cooperate among themselves to facilitate detailing of individuals with relevant expertise. In particular, an effort should be made to encourage continuous contacts and interchange between psychological operations officers and their civilian counterparts.

D. Resources

The erratic support for US international information programs and activities over the last several decades by the Congress, and the decline in resources committed to this area by the Executive Branch, will require correction if the US is once again to compete in this arena. It is critical, to begin with, that all Executive departments with significant activities in the international or national security areas comprehensively review their participation in US international information activities with a view to increasing their involvement, both directly and on an interagency basis. Such a review would be helpful as preparation for the study of

organizational and management issues relative to public diplomacy that will be undertaken in the near future.

Secondly, it is vital that the importance and priority attached to international information by the Executive Branch be communicated in a clear, consistent and continuous manner to the Congress. To this end, the existence of this study, its general argument and its chief recommendations should be disseminated to all persons in the Executive Branch who have a need to know for purposes of communicating with the Congress. In addition, Congressional and public affairs strategies to support resource allocations to the information area should be developed and pursued on a coordinated interagency basis.

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90749

WR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(MEDU)

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

F - NSDD 130

ACTION

July 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER *Steve*

SUBJECT: USIA and the NSC Process

Charlie Wick has sent you a brief letter covering an internal USIA memorandum dealing with that agency's role in the NSC process (Tab II). The internal memorandum notes the strengths and what USIA sees as the gaps in their involvement in the process and in our implementation of NSDD 130 (Tab III).

I believe the best way to respond is a brief letter from you to Charlie covering a Kimmitt-Earle memorandum giving a more detailed presentation of our views (Tab I). This would be consistent with USIA's informal approach to the issue. I have discussed this with two senior USIA officers, who indicated that they were simply putting their thoughts on paper and would welcome our own informal response.

I have already given USIA officers the gist of our likely response. The professionals know that the USIA role will remain selective and are resigned to that. I think the two steps that we can take for our part are: first, to do our best to help USIA play its carefully defined role in the NSC process; and second, to continue to strengthen our good working relationship on "hot" issues where we want a major public diplomacy component.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Wick and approve the Kimmitt-Earle memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

WR
Walt Raymond concurs.

Attachments

- Tab I Ltr to Wick
- Tab A Kimmitt to Earle Memo
- Tab II Wick Ltr, June 15, 1984
- Tab III NSDD 130

~~CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-041/2 #68

~~SECRET~~

BY smf NARA, DATE 7/3/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Charlie,

Thank you for your letter of June 15 covering the USIA internal memorandum of June 13 discussing in considerable detail the USIA role in the NSC process. (U)

We certainly agree that the close USIA relationship with State and ourselves has resulted in many instances in excellent public diplomacy results. As you know, we are strongly committed to improving the USG public diplomacy effort and to implementing effectively NSDD 130 and other public diplomacy directives. Obviously, there are still weaknesses in the process, as your internal memorandum points out. We want to work with you to iron these out. *let*

My staff members have already begun to discuss informally with USIA officers some of the questions raised in the USIA memorandum. We have also put our thoughts on paper in response to the specific points in the USIA memorandum. Our own memorandum, from Bob Kimmitt to Bob Earle, is attached. *let*

Thanks once again for conveying your thoughts. I feel this exchange will reinforce the excellent NSC-USIA working relationship and help to overcome remaining deficiencies in the process. (U)

Sincerely,

Attachment

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
301 4th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-04112 #69

BY amf, NARA, DATE 7/3/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90749

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT L. EARLE
Executive Assistant to the Director
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: USIA Role in the NSC Process (U)

We appreciate your internal memorandum on the USIA role in the NSC process, forwarded under cover of the Director's June 15, 1984 letter to Mr. McFarlane. This provides an excellent opportunity to strengthen our dialogue on the implementation of NSDD 130 and other pertinent directives. ~~(S)~~

The following are our informal responses to the specific points in the USIA memorandum:

-- We naturally see USIA playing a major role in shaping our public diplomacy and in implementing NSDD 130. We have put into effect an "alert" system to advise you concerning issues coming up at the NSC level where public diplomacy is a major component. We will do what we can to provide greater advance notice. ~~(S)~~

-- USIA similarly has a major role to play in our inter-agency public diplomacy mechanism, including the SPG process. In addition, one of the major public diplomacy bodies -- the IIC -- is under USIA leadership. Unfortunately, due to leadership changes, USIA has not been able in recent months to energize the IIC process. ~~(S)~~

-- We recognize and appreciate the accomplishments cited in your internal memorandum, particularly the very significant roles in the President's European and Asian trips played by Jim Rentschler, Rob Nevitt and other USIA officers who have worked so closely with us here. Also, with the establishment of FORA you have greatly strengthened the role of research in the foreign policy process. We are very impressed with the quality of USIA work in this area. ~~(S)~~

-- To address the gaps which you feel have occurred:

o NSDDs have been distributed to USIA in every case where public diplomacy plays a major role. In other cases, the limited references to public diplomacy in NSDDs which otherwise do not get into this sphere have been provided to USIA. In some cases, NSDDs have had extremely limited distribution, even within the NSC Staff. ~~(S)~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-041/2 #70

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

o In regard to the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance on Arms Control, we did -- as you know -- arrange a special briefing for the Director. It is our recollection that, in part, the delay was due to scheduling problems on the USIA side. (I believe the Director was away for part of this period.) (e)

o In the CW case, there was no formal mechanism set up to carry out the public handling of our arms control initiative. What occurred was formation of a very informal ad hoc group made up largely of the substantive players from State, ACDA, DOD and the NSC Staff. There was no conscious effort to exclude USIA, and we will indeed try to ensure in the future that USIA is included when such discussions occur. Even in this case, however, we provided substantial materials to USIA, including a detailed CW Press Book. Part of this was used in your Wireless transmission on the same day that we tabled our initiative in Geneva. (e)

o On MBFR, NSC participation was limited until somewhat late in the game. But the fact that we did little publicly prior to tabling the Western initiative was due to Allied sensitivities. We since have taken some steps to try to strengthen the public diplomacy process regarding MBFR. (e)

o We could not agree more with your comment that there is often a gap between our "substantive" officials and the public affairs and public diplomacy communities. We wish to work with you and others in trying to overcome this. (e)

o Finally, I wish to stress that in virtually all cases where we have had "hot" issues calling for an active public diplomacy effort, we have had a good arrangement between our staffs. The NSC Staff has given USIA advance notice of major initiatives and has provided draft documents which permit USIA to start planning for the issues. Whenever possible, we have also provided advance texts to be sent out overseas -- for example, the President's January 16 speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. And in the past two weeks, we again worked closely at the staff level concerning our newest initiatives on U.S.-Soviet relations. (e)

-- Looking at your two specific suggestions, it simply is not possible to have an automatic system of including USIA (or most other agencies for that matter) in each NSC meeting or in each NSDD process, even when there may be a brief reference to public diplomacy. But, as indicated above, we will try to strengthen the alert system which we have established. We will also try to get briefing materials for NSC meetings in which your Director is taking part to him with as much advance notice as possible. (e)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~₃

In regard to your suggestion about USIA participation in State-chaired meetings, we suggest that you work this out directly with State. If you would then let us know the results of your discussions with State, we will see if there are ways in which we could be helpful. We have noted, however, that even in some cases of meetings devoted exclusively to public diplomacy, on occasion there has been no USIA representation. We suggest that you strengthen your own internal process and your ties to State in this regard. ~~let~~

We hope these thoughts are helpful to you in your evaluation of the NSDD 130 process. We look forward to continued close cooperation with USIA in these areas. (U)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



SYSTEM II
90749

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 JUN 15 P 5: 34

June 15, 1984

Dear Bud:

The attached paper was prepared for me in order to assess recent progress and remaining gaps in USIA's participation in US national security policy matters. It seems to me a fair statement, and offers constructive remedies for specific needs.


On the one hand, as we look back at the President's trip to Ireland, London and Normandy Beach, we can all feel proud of the very close working relations and the very productive public diplomacy results that came from a USIA-White House/NSC-State Department partnership. On the other hand, the absence of USIA from consideration of US policy initiatives, as the attached memo points out, did not serve US interests.

Since USIA in the past years has not been fully engaged in policy matters, it will, understandably, take time for the foreign affairs community to see the Agency as an active participant, and continually to seek our counsel and policy support. However, our conversation last November, and your guidance to the December and March SPG meetings made it clear that this Administration considers public diplomacy to be a vital asset. In that spirit, we take our responsibilities seriously and want to do the best job possible for the President and the nation.

At your convenience, we should review the recommendations and discuss further ways to engage USIA in the NSC and inter-Agency policy process.

My best regards.

Sincerely,



Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 95-0412 #71
BY d NARA, DATE 8/27/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Charles Z. Wick, Director
OADR

TT

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

115175

NLRR M430/2⁴ 115175

BY KML NARA DATE 11/2/12

June 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM: P - Gifford D. Malone
SUBJECT: USIA and the NSC: Status Report
REFERENCE: NSDD 130 Tasking Memorandum, April 4, 1984

Summary:

NSDD 130 directs the NSC staff to report on progress in introducing international information factors and advice into US policy making and conduct. The Bureau of Programs was responsible for assessing the situation from the USIA viewpoint. Although it is still early to judge, the NSDD 130 prescriptions concerning USIA involvement in policy matters are not being fulfilled adequately. The problem is serious enough to warrant approaches to senior US officials. Below are described improvements and several remaining problems, and recommend next steps.

Background

In the drafting phase of NSDD 130 on US International Information Policy, the Agency requested that the NSDD make provisions for you to participate in NSC meetings in fulfillment of your statutory responsibilities to advise on international public opinion and related matters. The Agency also sought specific statements that all NSSDs, NSDDs and other major inter-agency policy deliberations include advice on relevant overseas public affairs factors, and public diplomacy strategies and action plans to support policy decisions.

Your November 28 discussion with National Security Affairs Adviser McFarlane resulted in an agreement that steps would be taken to assure your participation in NSC meetings. Subsequently in December, NSC Staff Director Bob Kimmitt and Deputy Director Bill Martin met with Bob Earle and Mike Schneider to work out ways to increase USIA access to appropriate documents, and improve Agency participation in inter-agency policy deliberations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by P - Gifford D. Malone
OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Recent Agency Involvement and Contributions to US Foreign Policy

In several ways the Agency has participated actively in NSC processes and contributed to US foreign policy in recent months:

You have participated in several meetings of the NSC since January dealing with such subjects as Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, US - PRC relations, and the visit of French President Mitterand. You also participated in two meetings of the Special Planning Group (SPG).

Agency participation in NSC matters has been greatest regarding the Presidential trips to Europe in 1982 and this month and to China this spring. Based in the White House, senior officers have coordinated USG public diplomacy. The Agency has enjoyed the necessary access to make an effective contribution to US goals, and has carried out major responsibilities quite impressively.

USIA has also participated actively in formulating USG public diplomacy regarding chemical weapons. A USIA-chaired working group of the Arms Control Coordinating Committee (ACCC) on chemical weapons has drafted several strategies and action plans in the past year that have guided USG public affairs activities.

The Agency has worked closely with other agencies involved in a special study of Soviet nationalities.

The Agency has chaired the International Information Committee (IIC) and taken part in the International Broadcasting Committee (IBC), as well as participated actively in the International Political Committee (IPC), especially its Subcommittee on US Public Diplomacy Regarding the USSR. In addition, USIA has contributed to coordinating groups on START and INF chaired by the Department of State.

The Agency worked closely with NSC staff, especially Walt Raymond in helping shape NSSD 2-83, and the resulting NSDD - 130.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

USIA has made a singular contribution to US public diplomacy on outer space arms control. We forcefully argued that the USG needed a public position months before the issues became public concerns. Through our persistence, public affairs positions were formulated, albeit belatedly.

USIA has also taken the lead in the establishment by the NSC of the Foreign Opinion Research Advisory (FORA), allocating \$250,000 to research projects that would be conducted in collaboration with other NSC agencies. FORA is designed to generate and coordinate research in the foreign affairs community.

Gaps and Problems

A number of gaps in coordinating policy decisions and public diplomacy remain. Several broader problems are also evident:

Several NSDDs have not been sent to the Agency, although in at least two instances public diplomacy figured heavily in the actions directed by the President. Even the NSDD on Soviet non-compliance following the NSC meeting in which you participated was not sent to the Agency.

This oversight had the effect of making it difficult for the Agency for several weeks to learn of the actual decision by the President regarding public handling of the report on Soviet non-compliance to the Congress, and seriously complicated our efforts to support the Administration's policy. Our policy staff was forced to seek second-hand guidance from other staffs at State and ACDA. The briefing presented to you came several weeks too late to remedy the lapse.

The Agency was not able to participate in inter-agency deliberations regarding US chemical weapons policy and public diplomacy meetings in preparation for the draft treaty proposed by Vice President Bush. We learned of the substance of the presentation quite late in the process but were not asked and could not join the public affairs discussions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

We were able to obtain a final draft of the presentation, but were directed by the Vice President's staff, calling from Geneva, not to transmit the text before it was presented. We often transmit speech texts before delivery but embargoed from use so that the posts can advance and support major US actions properly. Moreover, important background information, talking points and Qs-and-As were also not available soon enough.

Despite our requests, the Agency was not asked to participate in an inter-agency public affairs group on the Allies' proposal at the MBFR negotiations. The group produced a guidance to the field two days after the proposals were made, in a classified cable that made it difficult for our posts to use for public purposes.

After the recent Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, it was agreed by State, NSC and USIA representatives that State and USIA would quickly draft a joint message to the posts giving public affairs guidance with appropriate themes and talking points. The cable was sent by the Department several days later without Agency participation or clearance, classified, to only a handful of posts. Agency officers belatedly had to duplicate and expand upon the effort.

These are examples, not a complete list. It is not appropriate to belabor the details with the foreign affairs community. However, public diplomacy regarding each of the several instances could have been more effective, and the Agency might have made a greater contribution with more advance notice and greater participation.

The problem is not merely one of inadequate consultation within the public diplomacy community; several of the instances involve weak connections between the "substantive" officials and those responsible for public diplomacy.

Recommendations

Several steps are recommended looking toward future improvements. These suggestions are not new, nor in our opinion unusual.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

1. The NSC should automatically make USIA an "Action" or "Information" addressee on NSSDs and NSDDs whenever any document refers to public diplomacy or public affairs matters.

- If there is any question about sending an NSC document to the Agency, the NSC should consult with a senior officer (designated by USIA) who can serve as liaison, and, in confidence, advise the NSC about the need for USIA participation in any NSC matter. (A "rule-of-thumb" guide is that any issue for which there is concern about Congressional reaction should be considered one with potential public affairs significance abroad.)

2. Requests for your participation in NSC meetings should be made earlier, and through the same formal written memoranda as others receive. In at least two instances your office was informed of NSC meetings by phone, with little time for Agency staff to prepare adequate briefing materials. Many NSC meetings have written agendas which should be sent to the Agency on time.

We should also stress with our State Department contacts the importance of USIA participation in substantive inter-Agency policy groups chaired by the Department. Frequently these groups become involved in public diplomacy matters. In most instances our participation would make a contribution to the group's work and in turn give the Agency the background, working contacts and knowledge that are necessary for effective policy support.

- The simplest mechanism to accomplish this request is for the Department's Secretariat (S/S) to draw up a list of current inter-agency Senior Interdepartmental and Interdepartmental groups (SIGs and IGs) for possible Agency participation, and for S/S to request appropriate State coordinators of inter-Agency working groups include USIA representatives in future meetings.

- NSC endorsement of this proposal might be helpful.

While gaps will remain inevitable, we believe these steps -- and perhaps others that the NSC and State could suggest -- will help make Agency participation in the inter-agency process more consistent.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90930

F. N. SDD
(130)

March 8, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

- THE SECRETARY OF STATE
- THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
- COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
- THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
- THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
- UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
- CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
- CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: US International Information Policy (U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on US International Information Policy.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment
NSDD 130

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

111

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90930

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1984

~~SECRET~~

11/14/98
16/02/01 (12/20/01)
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
BY ADV
Stiller, Nsc (R87-1035)
NVA, DDM

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 130

US International Information Policy (U)

International information is an integral and vital part of US national security policy and strategy in the broad sense. Together with the other components of public diplomacy, it is a key strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the globe on a long-term basis and ultimately affecting the behavior of governments. (U)

While improvements have been made in US international information programs and activities over the last several years, there is a need for sustained commitment over time to improving the quality and effectiveness of US international information efforts, the level of resources devoted to them, and their coordination with other elements of US national security policy and strategy. The role of international information considerations in policy formulation needs to be enhanced, and wider understanding of the role of international information should be sought within the Executive Branch as well as with the Congress and the public. (U)

The fundamental purpose of US international information programs is to affect foreign audiences in ways favorable to US national interests. Such programs can only be credible and effective by respecting accuracy and objectivity. At the same time, the habits, interests, expectations and level of understanding of foreign audiences may differ significantly from those of the domestic American audience, and require different approaches and emphases in the selection and presentation of information. While US international information activities must be sensitive to the concerns of foreign governments, our information programs should be understood to be a strategic instrument of US national policy, not a tactical instrument of US diplomacy. We cannot accept foreign control over program content. (U)

International Information Strategy

Essential to a successful global information strategy is recognition of the diversity of the audiences the US seeks to address. Beyond the obvious differences among Western,

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR.

~~SECRET~~

COPIES 1 OF 13 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

Communist country and Third World audiences, there are significant ideological and cultural differences within countries and regions and between elites, key opinion sectors, and the general population. Programming must be more effectively differentiated to reach these audiences. The critical importance of elites in the formation of public opinion must be recognized. At the same time, intensified efforts must be made to address the general population in areas where government control of elite communications is strict. Specific information themes and strategies outlined in the study accompanying this directive should serve as the general basis for US international information programming. (S)

International Radio Broadcasting

International radio broadcasting is the US Government's most effective means of communicating the truth directly to the peoples of the world. Improvement in the US international broadcasting effort must continue to enjoy the highest priority. National Security Decision Directive 45 affirmed the essentials of existing US policy relative to US international broadcasting and, among other things, authorized a major, long-term program of modernization and expansion, approved revised guidance for determining languages and broadcast hours, and called for a major effort to overcome jamming of US broadcasts and ameliorate its effects. A review of implementation of NSDD 45 should be undertaken by the Senior Planning Group. Such a review should include a revision of current language guidance, to include recommendations concerning the possible initiation of new language services. It should also incorporate reports on programming policy and objectives relating to international audiences of the Radio in the American Sector of Berlin and our Armed Forces Radio and Television Service. (S)

Other International Information Instruments

Several other instruments of international information merit special attention and long-term planning and development. (U)

More systematic thought needs to be given to the opportunities offered by international television broadcasting. A conceptual study should be undertaken of technical and political options for US international television broadcasting over the next several decades. (U)

In the area of publications, steps should be taken to reconstitute as a major ongoing program support for publishing and disseminating abroad books and other publications. This includes strengthening a working partnership between the USG and the private sector to make available broad serious works on American or Western institutions and principles. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

In addition to the traditional instruments of international information, new technologies (particularly in the area of audio and video tape cassettes) have created new instruments whose potential should be explored. (U)

It is important to recognize that information disseminated by private and commercial organizations is likely to have special credibility with many audiences. A high priority should be placed on improving liaison and cooperation with, and support of, appropriate private sector information efforts. (U)

An interagency study in support of US objectives relative to the free flow of information and the potential of new communications technologies should be carried out under the auspices of the Senior Planning Group. Special attention shall be given as to how to overcome barriers to information flow and how to utilize communications technologies to penetrate closed societies. (U)

Information and Communications Assistance

Strategically targeted information and communications assistance to other nations can contribute significantly to achieving US objectives. It should be recognized as an integral part of US international information activities. A study should be undertaken by the Senior Interagency Group on International Communications and Information Policy to define the role and contributions of the various agencies involved and to develop a long-term strategy in this area. (S)

International Information Policy in Peace and War

In view of the importance of psychological factors in maintaining the confidence of allied governments and in deterring military action against US national interests, and in order to be prepared for the immediate and effective use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in crisis and wartime, it is vital that the Armed Forces maintain a strong and active international information capability. Revitalization and full integration of PSYOP in military operations and planning should be a high priority of the Department of Defense. In order to employ PSYOP effectively and economically, a set of national guidelines and a funded program will be established and roles and relationships of the agencies that are involved will be defined. The Department of Defense is directed, with appropriate interagency coordination and in accordance with national law and policy, to participate in overt PSYOP programs in peacetime. The SPG should take the lead in developing coordinated interagency plans, including the utilization of DOD capabilities, for international information activities in support of national security objectives. (S)

Crisis and wartime conditions impose special requirements on US international information activities. In wartime or during crises (which may be defined as periods of acute tension involving a threat to the lives of American citizens, or the imminence of war between the US and other nations), US international information elements should be ready to initiate special procedures to ensure policy consistency, timely response and rapid feedback from the intended audience. Appropriate agencies should review and, as necessary, develop procedures for their operations during crises. (S)

International Information: Functional Requirements

Research on public opinion, media reaction, and cultural factors needs to be substantially improved and more fully coordinated and applied to US information activities. The proposed Foreign Opinion Research Advisory Group (FORA) is hereby approved, and agencies should seek funding for it as required. (U)

There is an urgent requirement for more extensive and sophisticated training of USG personnel in the international information environment, and in substantive and technical requirements of effective international and intercultural communication. Agencies should review their existing training programs and augment them as necessary. In the area of career development, a special effort should be made by all agencies to develop career tracks which encourage qualified individuals to remain in the field of international information. (U)

The lack of adequate resources devoted to international information remains a problem of fundamental importance. All Executive departments with significant activities in the international or national security areas should comprehensively review their participation in and support of US international information activities, with a view both to increasing resources devoted to this area within current allocations and establishing clear requirements for future budgetary submissions. (U)

There is a need to enhance the role of international information considerations in the national security policy process. Wherever appropriate, major national security policy studies and decision documents should include an assessment of the impact of policy options or decisions on foreign opinion and on the international information environment generally. (U)

In order to generate the public consensus that is essential to support of a vigorous international information effort, agencies will review current mission statements and other existing policy declarations and revise them as necessary to reflect the guidance provided by this directive and the accompanying study. Other activities in support of this

~~SECRET~~
objective should be pursued by the involved agencies on a coordinated basis. (U)

Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY 1 OF 13 COPIES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS SOVIET POLITICAL ACTION WORKING GROUP

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.
National Security Council *WR*

SUBJECT: Soviet Political Action Working Group:
December 15 Meeting

The group met for an hour to discuss political activities that should be taken consistent with the recently approved action plan for public diplomacy on US Soviet relations. The principal objective was designed to have a meaningful exchange of views and to set some parameters for subsequent committee activities.

The policy objectives were briefly stated:

- To contain and counter Soviet political initiatives around the world.
- To promote the process of change within the Soviet Union.

Discussion ranged between strategic concepts and practical programs. It was agreed that we should identify key foreign policy areas where we should put pressure on the Soviets. This could be best done by probing for Soviet weaknesses and then developing political programs and psychological themes to exploit these weaknesses.

-- The Department of State should prepare a list of those areas where the Soviets have extended themselves internationally and identify vulnerabilities therein. They should also develop a series of vulnerabilities affecting the Soviet East European Bloc.

-- Themes should be developed by the working group on "moral equivalents" which we would recommend be given a broader mandate.

A number of practical areas were discussed for programmatic exploitation.

-- In areas such as active measures/disinformation, there was a belief that one should turn Soviet active measures back onto the Soviets--take the offensive--and make them pay the price for these initiatives. An action paper should be developed on this subject by State/USIA with consultation with Stan Levchenko.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F95-0412 #72
By Amf, NARA, Date 7/19/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- The international peace movement affords an excellent field for programmatic development. One possibility would be to develop action involving Batovrin, seeking to stimulate an internal Soviet/East European peace movement.

-- The question of the Soviet army in Afghanistan and the related issue of the anti-Islamic character of the Soviet invasion should be exploited. Discussion separate from this group is in train concerning the exploitation of Soviet POWs. (Defense, NSC, State and CIA should pursue this issue.) A much more concerted effort on the Soviet anti-Islamic posture should be developed. Several ideas were noted for consideration:

- o Exploitation of the State/Nebraska conference on Afghanistan. A careful examination of the recommendations emerging from that conference should be undertaken. (State Department lead.)

- o Consideration should be given to stimulating an Islamic conference on the Soviet Union. Possibly the Saudis could take the lead. (State lead with consultation with USIA and CIA.)

- o Soviet human rights violations should be given higher international attention. Each USG department and agency has a role to play. Each department and agency should be prepared to discuss their capabilities and plans for expanded activities in this field.

- o Consideration should also be given to those elements in the private sector with whom we should collaborate. ^{Such} consideration should also include the identification of possible funding needs from either public or private sources.

- o Review should be undertaken to determine support needed by Helsinki Watch and Resistance International. (State lead.)

This summary memorandum goes somewhat beyond the actual flow of the meeting but, as I promised it is designed to provide structure and direction to our thinking on this subject. It represents an action agenda for use at a meeting to be called shortly after 1 January.

Attendees: Steve Steiner, John Lenczowski, Walt Raymond (NSC); Jim Jatras, Steve Mann, Tony Salvia (State); Bob Kiernan, Scott Thompson, Herb Romerstein (USIA); [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

wk

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH TOMLINSON
Director, Voice of America

SUBJECT: Broadcasting to the Soviet Bloc

How much use is made of Samizdat to the USSR and East Europe?
This is a particularly rich grain of literary ore. Is it
mined? Let's discuss!

Walt

Walter Raymond, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
President

RL 427/83

November 11, 1983

UKRAINIAN DISSIDENT COMMENTS ON EVENTS IN POLAND

Bohdan Nahaylo

A leading Ukrainian dissident has expressed his views on recent developments in Poland in a document written in a Soviet labor camp that has found its way to the West.¹ Vasyl Stus, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki monitoring group, praises the struggle of the Poles for a better and freer life and draws lessons from their strivings for his Ukrainian compatriots. Stus's statement is a further indication of the impact of events in Poland on Soviet society² and represents the most detailed commentary on this question to have emerged from Ukrainian dissident circles. Moreover, it contains a candid critique of the self-imposed limits that Soviet dissent has up to now set for itself.

Vasyl Stus is a highly respected figure in Ukrainian national dissent. An uncompromising campaigner for human and national rights, he is also an outstanding poet who has been elected an honorary member of the English and American PEN Centers. During the 1960s, he was one of the shestydesyatnyky (literally, the generation of the sixties), a group of young, mainly literary intellectuals who spearheaded a revival in Ukrainian cultural and public life that was abruptly terminated by the extensive political and cultural purge carried out in the Ukraine in 1972-73. Stus became one of the numerous victims of this crackdown on resurgent Ukrainian national assertiveness, and in September, 1972, he was sentenced to a total of eight years of imprisonment and internal exile, ostensibly for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." On completing his sentence and returning to Kiev, Stus joined the beleaguered Ukrainian

1. The document will be published in the issue of the Ukrainian-language monthly Suchasnist for November, 1983. For a Russian translation of the document, see AS 5062.

2. On this subject, see RL 319/83, "A Samizdat Work on the Events in Poland," August 24, 1983; V. Stanley Vardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic," Problems of Communism, July-August, 1983, pp. 21-34; RL 474/82, "Workers' Protests in the Soviet Union," November 29, 1982; and RL 291/81, "Russian Group Issues Proclamation of Support for Polish Workers," July 24, 1981.

Helsinki monitoring group and within months was arrested again. He was tried in October, 1980, and sentenced to ten years in a special-regime camp and five years of internal exile, once again for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."³

Recently, a collection of notes written by Stus not later than the summer of 1982 in Perm corrective labor colony No. 389/36-1 reached the West through samizdat channels. Much of the material consists of descriptions of the harsh conditions in places of imprisonment and internal exile and the plight of Stus's fellow prisoners. Among other items, though, is a section devoted to developments in Poland.

Stus reveals that he has followed events in Poland with great interest ever since he returned to the Ukraine from internal exile in the remote Magadan Oblast in the fall of 1979. He is full of unreserved admiration for the emancipatory efforts of the Poles:

Long live the volunteers on behalf of freedom!
Their defiance of Soviet despotism is exhilarating. Their all-embracing popular upheavals impress: the workers, the intelligentsia, the students--everyone is involved, except the army and the police. If events continue to take this course, tomorrow the flames will also envelop the army. What will the Brezhnevs and the Jaruzelskis do then?

Stus avers that "in the totalitarian world" there is no other nation that defends its human and national rights as resolutely as the Poles. He says:

Throughout the nineteenth century Poland set fire to Russia and today is continuing to do the same. Poland is creating a new epoch in the totalitarian world and paving the way for its collapse.

Excited by the actions of "the Polish victors of the spirit," Stus declares: "I regret I am not a Pole."

But will the Ukrainians follow the Polish example? Stus emphasizes that psychologically the Ukrainians are probably closer than any other of the Soviet peoples to the Poles. Yet his honesty forces him to admit that his compatriots lack the

3. See Marco Carynnyk, "Vasyl Stus," Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies, No 1 (Fall), 1976; and RL 380/80, "Trial of Ukrainian Helsinki Group Member Vasyl Stus," October 15, 1980.

most important element that consolidates the Poles--that is, "ardent patriotism." For this reason, he argues, the Ukraine is "regrettably" not ready "to take lessons from its Polish teacher."

Stus goes on to consider what the Ukrainian and other peoples of the USSR can learn from the achievements of the independent trade-union movement "Solidarity," mentioning Vladimir Khlebanov⁴ and drawing the conclusion:

The trade-union way to liberation would also be exceptionally effective in the USSR. If the initiatives made by the engineer Klebanov were supported throughout the country, the government of the USSR would be faced with probably the most up-to-date antagonist. The Helsinki movement, after all, is above the heads of most of the population of this country, as are perhaps even the national-patriotic movements. But a movement for a roof over one's head and bread, a movement for a normal wage for workers, is something that is generally understood.

The Polish experience, Stus elaborates, has highlighted the weaknesses of the Helsinki movement in the Soviet Union. He adds:

Had it been a mass movement of popular initiative with a broad program of social and political demands and had it aimed eventually to have taken power, then it would have had some prospect of success.

Instead, the now disillusioned imprisoned Helsinki monitor asserts, it was a "timid" and "respectable" phenomenon resembling "an infant who wants to speak with a bass voice." Understandably, a movement of this kind, which in its "mournful intonations" foresaw its own destruction, had to end up crushed. For the time being, he contends, the pessimism of the Soviet dissident movement is thoroughly justified.

Stus condemns the imposition of martial law in Poland as yet another expression of the despotic nature of the regimes of the USSR and Poland. He is convinced that "after Poland, only

4. In 1977-78, Vladimir Khlebanov, a coal-mining engineer from the Donets Basin of the Ukraine, founded the Free Trade Union of Workers in the USSR. In February, 1978, he was arrested, pronounced mentally ill, and confined indefinitely in a special category psychiatric hospital.

November 11, 1983

a complete fool and utter scoundrel can still believe in Moscow's ideals." The Ukrainian poet also expresses his full-hearted support for the Poles during this difficult period:

I wish the Polish insurgents the best of luck and hope that the police regime of December 13 will not extinguish the sacred flame of freedom I hope that in the subjugated countries there will emerge forces that will support the liberative mission of the Polish volunteers for freedom.

Stus is not the first Ukrainian to advocate the broadening of the social base of dissent in the Ukraine and the creation of independent trade unions. Shortly before the birth of "Solidarity," a Ukrainian dissident group calling itself the Ukrainian Patriotic Group issued an appeal on behalf of Vladimir Khlebanov and called on Ukrainian workers to set up free trade unions at their places of work.⁵ Yuriy Lytvyn, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki monitoring group, is known to have been particularly interested in the question of forging an alliance between Ukrainian dissidents and workers, and shortly before his fourth arrest in August, 1979, his unfinished manuscript of a study entitled "The Soviet State and the Soviet Working Class" was confiscated during a search of his home.⁶ Interestingly enough, in November, 1980, Mykola Pohyba, a previously unknown Ukrainian worker who was for a time imprisoned in the same labor camp in the Kiev Oblast as Lytvyn, wrote an open letter:

Recent events in Poland have clearly shown that the working class is capable of waging a struggle for its rights and freedoms, for a real improvement of its well-being, and that the efficacy of this struggle depends on the degree of solidarity of the working class and on its level of self-organization.⁷

5. The appeal is contained in the booklet Documents of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement 1980, which was published as a supplement to The Herald of Repression in the Ukraine in New York in 1980 by the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (see p. 18).

6. See the booklet Yuriy Lytvyn (Protrety suchasnykiv) by Nadia Svitlychna published in New York in 1980 by the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

7. AS 4321, p. 4.

During the rise of "Solidarity," several strikes are reported to have taken place in a number of Ukrainian cities and towns.⁸ In the absence of sufficient information, however, it is not possible to establish that they were necessarily connected with events in Poland. Undoubtedly though, the Ukrainian population has not remained totally oblivious to what has been happening on their western frontier. Throughout the Polish crisis, the Ukrainian authorities displayed anxiety about the possible spillover effect and tightened up controls.⁹ Apparently, this has not prevented some spontaneous manifestations of support for the Poles. In February and March, 1983, for instance, leaflets in support of "Solidarity" and urging workers to strike were reportedly circulated in the Western Ukraine.¹⁰

Vasyl Stus's reflections on the lessons of "Solidarity" for the Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups is evidence of the growing sense of disillusionment in some quarters with traditional forms of open and legalistic dissent in the USSR. The major offensive against all forms of dissent launched in the latter part of 1979 has made this type of activity appear to be increasingly futile and inappropriate. Already several anonymous appeals have been made for a new strain of clandestine, more militant, and broader-based resistance to the regime.¹¹ Stus is the first of the well-known dissidents in the Soviet Union to openly admit that the restrained, apolitical phase of Soviet dissidence, as exemplified by the Helsinki monitoring groups, has had its day.

8. See, for example, RL 267/81, "Samizdat report on Strikes in Kiev," July 6, 1981.

9. See, for example, RL 70/81, "Ukrainian Party Journal Raises the Specter of Poland," February 17, 1983; see also RL 422/81, "Ukrainian KGB Chief Warns of Ideological Sabotage," October 22, 1981.

10. Vesti iz SSSR/USSR News Brief, No. 7, April 15, 1983, pp. 7-49.

11. See, for example, the statements issued by the "Democratic National Front of the Soviet Union," AS 4503, and the "Initiative Group for a People's Democracy," AS 4464; also the call for an illegal organization to work among the masses, AS 4547, and the samizdat work "The Polish Revolution," AS 4904.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 15, 1983

(F) front row

TO: BRENDA

FROM: LYNN SKOINICK

(S) 2nd row

The following Congressional staff should be added to the 17th Street gate list for tomorrow's NED event in room 450:

- o Richard Spees
DOB: 6/1/54
SSN: [REDACTED]
- o David Keany
DOB: 12/31/44
SSN: [REDACTED]
- o Cran Montgomery
DOB: 8/24/44
SSN: [REDACTED]
- o Scott Cohen
DOB: [REDACTED] regret
SSN: [REDACTED]
- o John Brady
DOB: 8/17/23
SSN: [REDACTED]
- o Virginia Schlundt
DOB: 11/26/49
SSN: [REDACTED]
- o Susan McCartan Andross
DOB: 7/17/52
SSN: [REDACTED]
- o Thomas Bruce
DOB: 6/24/56
SSN: [REDACTED]

Thanks.

Walt Raymond
Front Row - far left

Paul Dietrich

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 4-30-49

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 6-1-34

Willard Lee Edwards

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 12-1-32

Ernest Warren Lefever

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 11-12-19

Jacquelyn K. Davis

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 12-14-51

~~Roy S. Godson~~

~~SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 10-17-42~~

Emil Zseleczky

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 11-14-31

Anita Bedelis

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 8-29-59

Gregory Humphrey

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 6-12-46

Alan Choate

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 5-9-40

Eddie Fraser

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 1-29-43

Amy Moritz

SS#: [REDACTED]
DOB: 11-9-59

NAME	ORGANIZATION	DOB	POB	SSN
Otto Reich	State	10/16/45		
Gilbert Robinson	State	5/25/28	NY	
Melvin Lasky		1/15/20	NY	REDACTED
David Lowenfelt	State	7/20/55	NY	
T. Allen Overton, Jr.	Pres. Am Mining Congress	4/17/21	WVa	
Donald D. Brotzman	Pres. Rubber Mfg Assoc	6/28/22	Col	
- Leonard Marks	Chairman, Foreign Policy Assoc	3/5/16	Pa	REDACTED
Angier Biddle Duke	US/Japan Foundation	11/30/15	NY	REDACTED
- Carl Gershman	USJN	7/20/43	NY	
Thomas Hughes	Carnegie	12/11/25	Minr	
<i>Stage</i> Lane Kirkland	AFL-CIO	12/12/22	SC	
- Max Kampelman		11/7/20	NY	REDACTED
<i>Owen</i> Own Frisby	VP, Chase Manhattan	4/3/33	Ill	
Don Gregg	VP's Office	--	--	REDACTED
Robert Brand	State	11/5/20	Conn	
Judy Baar Topinka	State Rep, Ill	1/16/44	Ill	
James Billington	Wilson Center	6/1/29	Pa	
Anne Clifford Knipper	APF	8/24/52	WVa	REDACTED
Ted Johnson, Jr.		12/27/39	DC	
Robert Rose		2/27/51	Ill	REDACTED
Clancy Standridge	VP, GTE Corp	10/17/27	Conn	
Tibor Kovalovsky		9/27/21	Czech	
Catherine Fitzpatrick		6/2/56	NY	
Ben Wattenberg	AEI	8/26/33	NY	
- J. Wm. Middendorf III	State	9/22/24	Md	REDACTED
Leonard S. Matthews	Pres, Amer Assoc of Advertising Agencies	1/6/22	Ill	REDACTED

Embassies

— Israel - Ambassador Meir Rosemme

— India - Ambassador KR Narayanan

Barbados - Clifton Maynard
Minister Counselor
Diplomatic ID#
DOB 3-28-30
SOB Barbados

— Costa Rica - Ambassador Luis Guardia

Spain - Alonso Alvarez De Toledo (Minister)

Joseph Verde (Spanish Parliament)

— Italy - Ambassador Ranieri Tallarigo

Argentina - Advando Airaldi *Chape D' Affaires*

Dupl ~~Nigeria - Abudu Uesufu EKE *Ambassador*~~

Dupl ~~Jamaica - Allan Weston (Minister/Counselor
DOB 4-4-36)~~

George E. Agree
Director of International Develop
Association of Former Members of Congress

SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 6-25-21
SOB New York

Frederick
~~Fredrick~~ Biebel
White House Liaison
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 4-5-26
SOB Conn.

Thomas Donohue
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 8-12-38
SOB New York

Martha Escutia
Legislative Director
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 1-16-57

F
Sally Shelton
Vice President- International Business
Government Counselors, Inc.
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 8-29-44
SOB Texas

Stange
Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Chairman of Republican National Committee
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 8-28-39
SOB New York

William Phillips,
Chief of Staff, (RNC)
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 6-8-44
SOB Texas

Keith Schuette
Deputy, White House Liaison (RNC)
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 4-6-55
SOB Ohio

Mr. Roger Kaplan

SSN: [REDACTED]

DPOB: 10/26/46 France

John D. Sullivan
National Chamber Foundation
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 1-13-48
SOB AZ

Casimira S. Lenard
Executive Director of Polish American
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 5-23-24
SOB Poland

Patrick J. O'Farrell
Executive Director African American Labor Center
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 7-30-31
SOB Ohio

Morris Paladino
Executive Director for ASIAN American Free Labor
Institute
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 1-21-20
SOB New York

2nd row - Irving Brown
Director of International Affairs AFL-CIO
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 11-20-11
SOB New York

Sarah Weddington
Director Office - State of Texas
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 2-5-45

Juhan Simonson
President, Estonian-American National Council
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 6-1-33
SOB Estonia

George Packard
Dean, Advance International Studies John Hopkin
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 5-27-32

Anthony S. Harrington
General Council for Democratic Party
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 3-9-41
SOB North Carolina

Gene E. Bradley
Chairman International Manager & Development Institute
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 3-8-21
SOB Nebraska

2nd row

Melvin R. Laird
Former Secretary of Defense
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 9-1-22
SOB Nebraska

Leo Cherne
Honoree Chairman Freedom House
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 9-8-12
SOB New York

William A. Douglas
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 3-12-34
SOB Washington

Jack Anderson Marshall
Vice President National Chamber Foundation
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 9-1-50
SOB Mass.

Billy Ray Phillips
Chief of Staff for Public International Committee
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB -- --
SOB -- --

~~Steven Moses
Chairman of Board, National Investment Development, Inc.
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 11-24-34
SOB NXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Benjamin Wright Cotten
Lawyer Cotten, Day & Doyle
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 1-17-37
SOB Fla.

Luther H. Hodges, Jr.
Chairman of Board National Bank of Washington
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 11-19-36
SOB North Carolina

Mr. Jay Morris
Agency for International Development

SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 2/21/41 Hawaii

Mr. Stephen David Moses
Chairman of the Board
National Investment Development Corporation

SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 11/24/34 Pennsylvania

Mr. William McSweeny
Occidental International Corporation

SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 3/31/29 Massachusetts

Mr. John McGoff
President, Global Communications

SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 6/29/24 Pennsylvania

Ms. Denise O'Leary
Democratic National Committee

SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 10/4/57 California

~~Mr. Billy Phillips
Republican National Committee~~

~~SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 6/8/44 Texas~~

Mr. Wolfgang Pordzik
Adenauer Foundation
PPT#: [REDACTED]
Federal Republic of Germany

James R. Huntley
President Atlantic Council of United States
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 7-27-23
SOB Washington

David F. Norcross
Deputy General Counselor (RNC)
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 3-30-37
SOB New Jersey

Nelda Barton
National Committee Woman of Kentucky
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 5-12-29
SOB Kentucky

Kenneth Sheffer
Richard V. Allen Company
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 12-25-58
SOB New York

Dr. Peter Corterier
Sriedrich Ebert Foundation
Diplomatic ID Number - [REDACTED]
DOB 6-6-36
SOB Karlsruhe, Germany

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
President of Heritage Foundation
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 8-12-41
SOB Illinois

Roy Godson
Prof. of Government- Georgetown University
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 10-17-42
SOB New York

Hon. Polly Baca Barragan
Colorado State Senator
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 2/13/41 Colorado

Mr. John D. Sullivan
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 1/13/48 Arizona

Mrs. Violet Raymond (Mrs. Walter Raymond)
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 3/3/30 California

Mr. William C. Doherty
American Institute for Free Labor Development
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 12/26/26 Kentucky

Mr. Leslie Lenkowsky
Deputy Director, USIA
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 3/30/46 New York

Mr. Richard A. Durham
Acting Assistant Administrator, AID
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 5/24/40 Washington

Lane Kirkland
AFL-CIO
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 12-12-22
State of Birth: South Carolina

Frank Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Chairman of Republican National Committee
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 8-28-39
State of Birth: New York

Stage
Charles Manatt
Chairman Democratic National Committee
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 6-9-36
State of Birth: Illinois

2nd row
Katherine K. Manatt
Wife of Charles Manatt
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 1-15-36
State of Birth: Iowa

2nd row
Michelle Ann Manatt
Daughter of Charles Manatt - Democratic National Committee
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 11-24-61
State of Birth: Washington, D.C.

Stage
Michael A. Samuels
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 4-4-39
State of Birth: Ohio

~~Honorable Michael A. Samuels
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 4/4/39 Ohio~~

Honorable William Tip Hall, Jr.
Texas State Representative
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 8/5/22 Texas

Mr. Michael A. DeMita
Philip Morris, Inc.
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 1/18/33 New York

Mrs. Mary Ann D. Fitzgerald
Editor, Ethnic Report
Republican National Committee
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 2/19/57 New York

Mrs. Motria Sloniewsky
Wash. Rep.
Ukrainian National Women's League of America
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB 11/7/43 Ukraine

Ms. Gloria E. Rojas
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 8/18/45

Prof. Edward Lozansky
Sakharov International Committee, Inc.
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 2/10/41 USSR

Mr. Leonard Sussman
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 11/26/20 New York

F
Honorable Charles Wick
Director, USIA
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 10/12/17 Ohio

Dr. Scott Thompson
USIA
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 1/1/42 Maine

Mr. Donald G. Brotzman
President, Rubber Manufacturers Association
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 6/28/22 Colorado

Mr. Robert T. Thompson
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 1/25/30 Illinois

2nd row
His Excellency
Chief Abudu Yesufu Eke
Ambassador of Nigeria

Honorable Allan Weston
Minister/Counselor
Embassy of Jamaica
DOB: 4/4/36

Mr. Tom Kahn
AFL-CIO
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 9/15/38 New York

Ms. Lynn Cutler
Vice Chairman
Democratic National Committee
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 10/15/38 Illinois

~~Ms. Nelda Barton
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 5/12/29 Kentucky~~

Mr. Michael Farren
Republican National Committee
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 11/21/52 Connecticut

~~Honorable Sally Shelton
International Business Counsellors
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 8/28/44 Texas~~

F
Mr. John Richardson
Youth for Understanding
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 2/4/21 Massachusetts

Mr. Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Republican National Committee
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 8/28/39 New York

F
Mr. Charles T. Smith, Jr.
Chairman of the Board, SIFCO
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 7/28/20 Ohio

Mr. Robert S. Carter
Gnau, Carter & Jacobson
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 9/7/25 New York

~~Ms. Anne Knipper
American Political Foundation
SSN: [REDACTED]
DPOB: 8/24/52 West Virginia~~

Robert L. Healy
Director Federal Government Relations
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 2-25-45
SOB New York

Robert Neal Rose
Senior Vice President REFCO
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 2-27-51
SOB Illinois

Dr. Z. Michael Szaz
Doctor
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 1-3-30
SOB Budapest

Amelia R. Metro
Executive Assistant
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 1-29-33
SOB California

Rafael
~~Rafael~~ L. Franchi
Chairman of the Republican National Hispanic
of Virginia
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 2-14-27
SOB Cuba

Mercedes L. Franchi
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 10-31-32
SOB Cuba

Marilyn A. Zak
Human Rights Coordinator
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 9-8-42
SOB Ohio

Robert R. McMillan
Vice President Public Affairs Avon Products, Inc.
SS# [REDACTED]
DOB 5-21-32
SOB New York