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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** RAYMOND, WALTER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 7/14/2011

**File Folder** [PROJECT TRUTH, PROJECT DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND NED DECEMBER 1982]

**FOIA**

M430

**Box Number** 7

LAMB,  
CHRISTOPHER

67

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
115133	MEMO	REPORT ON 12/2 AND AGENDA FOR 12/9 <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #46</b>	2	12/7/1982	B1
115134	NOTE	ROY TO WALT RE LABOR	1	ND	P5
115135	TALKING POINTS	RE GERMAN FOUNDATION (FES) <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #47</b>	2	ND	B1
115136	TALKING POINTS	RE GERMAN FOUNDATION (FES) <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #48</b>	2	ND	B1
115137	MEMO	SEARLY TO RAYMOND RE IMPLEMENTATION OF RR'S SPEECH TO BRITISH PARLIAMENT ON PROMOTING DEMOCRACY <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #49</b>	6	ND	B1
115138	MEMO	RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/PROJECT DEMOCRACY <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #50</b>	2	12/8/1982	B1
115139	MEMO	RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/PROJECT DEMOCRACY <b>R 5/10/2013 M430/2</b>	3	12/3/1982	B1 P5

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
115140	SUMMARY	RESOURCES FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND POLITICAL ACTION <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #51</b>	2	ND	B1
115141	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO HELMAN, ET AL RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/PROJECT DEMOCRACY <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #52</b>	2	11/17/1982	B1
115142	MEMO	RAYMOND/SOMMER TO MCFARLANE RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/PROJECT DEMOCRACY <b>R 5/10/2013 M430/2</b>	2	11/15/1982	B1 P5
115143	CABLE	031935Z DEC 81 <b>D 7/3/2000 F95-041/2 #53; PAR M430/2 #115143</b>	3	12/3/1981	B1 B3
115144	CABLE	192014Z DEC 81 <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #54</b>	7	12/19/1981	B1
115145	MEMO	RAYMOND TO CLARK RE PROJECT DEMOCRACY <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #55</b>	1	12/9/1982	B1
115147	MEMO	SAME AS DOC 115139 <b>R 5/10/2013 M430/2</b>	3	12/3/1982	B1 P5
115148	MEMO	SAME AS ITEM #9 <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #56</b>	2	11/17/1982	B1

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115149	MEMO	SAME AS DOC 115142 <b>R 5/10/2013 M430/2</b>	2	11/15/1982	B1 P5
115150	SUMMARY	SAME AS ITEM #8 <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #57</b>	2	ND	B1
115151	CABLE	091831Z DEC 82 <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #58</b>	4	12/9/1982	B1
115152	SUMMARY	AFL/CIO LABOR INSTITUTES <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #59</b>	1	ND	B1
115153	SUMMARY	AALC <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #60</b>	2	ND	B1
115154	SUMMARY	AAFLI <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #61</b>	1	ND	B1
115155	SUMMARY	AIFLD <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #62</b>	1	ND	B1
115156	MEMO	RAYMOND TO HELMAN, ET AL RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND DEMOCRACY <b>R 8/27/1999 NLSF95-041/2 #63</b>	2	12/10/1982	B1
115157	MEMO	RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <b>R 7/3/2000 NLSF95-041/2 #64</b>	2	12/9/1982	B1

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Collection: RAYMOND, WALTER: Files

Archivist: lov

File Folder: [Project Truth, Project Democracy, Public Diplomacy, and NED 12/82] OA 91162

Date: January 27, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. memo</del>	<del>report on 12/2 and agenda for 12/9 (2) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 46</del>	<del>12/7/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
2. note	roy to Walt, re Labor (1p, partial)	nd	PS B6
<del>3. talking pts</del>	<del>re German Foundation (FES) (2) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 47</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>4. talking pts</del>	<del>re German Foundation (KAS) (2) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 48</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>5. memo</del>	<del>Robert Searly to Raymond, re implementation of RR's speech to the British Parliament on promoting Democracy (6) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 49</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>6. memo [8306]</del>	<del>Raymond to McFarlane, re Public Diplomacy/Project Democracy (2) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 50</del>	<del>12/8/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
7. memo [8306]	Raymond to McFarlane, re Public Diplomacy/Project Democracy package (3)	12/3/82	PS B1
<del>8. summary</del>	<del>resources for Public Diplomacy and Political Action (2) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 51</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>9. memo [7927]</del>	<del>McFarlane to Helman, Stilwell, Thompson, re Public Diplomacy--Project Democracy (2) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 52</del>	<del>11/17/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
10. memo [7927]	Raymond and Sommer to McFarlane, re Public Diplomacy --Project Democracy (2)	11/15/82	PS B1
11. cable	031935Z DEC 81 (3) D 7/3/00 <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 53	12/3/81	PS B1
<del>12. cable</del>	<del>192014Z DEC 81 (7) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 54</del>	<del>12/19/81</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>13. memo [8470]</del>	<del>Raymond to William Clark, re Project Democracy (1) <sup>R 8/27/99</sup> NLSF 95-041/2 # 55</del>	<del>12/9/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
14. memo [8306]	Same as item #7 (3)	12/3/82	PS B1

EB  
12/14/00

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<del>15. memo [7927]</del>	<del>Same as item #9 (2) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 56</i></del>	<del>11/17/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
16. memo [7927]	Same as item #10 (2)	11/15/82	<del>P1</del> <i>B1</i>
<del>17. summary</del>	<del>Same as item #8 (2) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 57</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>18. cable</del>	<del>091831Z DEC 82 (4) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 58</i></del>	<del>12/9/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>19. summary</del>	<del>AFL/CIO Labor institutes (1) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 59</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>20. summary</del>	<del>AALC (2) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 60</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>21. summary</del>	<del>AAFLI (1) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 61</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>22. summary</del>	<del>AIFLD (1) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 62</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>23. memo</del>	<del>Raymond to Helman, Stilwell, et al, re Public Diplomacy and Democracy (2) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 63</i></del>	<del>12/10/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>24. memo [8541]</del>	<del>Raymond to McFarlane, re Public Diplomacy (2) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 # 64</i></del>	<del>12/9/82</del>	<del>P1</del>

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11. cable	031935Z DEC 81 (3) <i>D 7/3/00 NLSF 95-0412 #53</i>	12/3/81	P1/F3
<del>12. cable</del>	<del>192014Z DEC 81 (7) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-0412 #54</i></del>	<del>12/19/81</del>	<del>P1</del>
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<del>23. memo</del>	<del>Raymond to Helman, Stilwell, et al, re Public Diplomacy and Democracy (2) <i>R 8/27/99 NLSF 95-041/2 # 63</i></del>	<del>12/10/82</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>24. memo [8541]</del>	<del>Raymond to McFarlane, re Public Diplomacy (2) <i>R 7/3/00 NLSF 95-041/2 # 64</i></del>	<del>12/9/82</del>	<del>P1</del>

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2

MEMORANDUM TO: W. Scott Thompson  
FROM: Robert Kiernan  
DATE: 28 December 1982  
SUBJECT: Private Sector Funding of Project Democracy

### Guidelines

Efforts to obtain commitments from the private sector for the funding of Project Democracy programs should be guided by three principles:

(1) economic efficiency: the private sector can be expected to evaluate programs presented to them just as they would a business proposition; a return on investment should be demonstrable.

(2) prohibition: any program that would be of statutorily or legally ambiguous if executed by the USG should, in the proper use of resources, be assigned to the private sector.

(3) anonymity: any connection between the USG and the ultimate project should be avoided for obvious credibility reasons.

### Administration

As early as possible, a meeting with senior officials in the executive office and potential funders should be planned. It is essential the the Presidential support of this project—as well as the trappings that surround a Presidential imprimatur—be fully exercised. The director has been asked to devote considerable time to the development of possible funders.

It is recommended that this meeting be scheduled before the Congress reconvenes in January.

### Projects

In order to obtain the \$4m desired in this effort, it is advisable to lay out a schedule of programs totaling slightly more than that to allow for selectivity among funders. To that end the following list of larger projects is suggested with the advice that consultations with intelligence sources identify other more specific projects.:

#### Post Soviet World Project

A series of conferences and a book to be published early 1984 discussing the demise of the Soviet Empire.

\$150,000.

#### Academic Programs in Democracy

Private endowments either to Universities in developing countries or to U.S. Universities for visiting chairs in donors name.

\$1,000,000.

Institute for Democracy In Central America  
Regional organ composed of U.S. and Latin  
American intellectuals, modeled after Amer-  
ican counterparts.

\$1,500,000.

International Election Commission  
An international, bi-partisan monitoring  
agency responsible for world-wide and  
standard election review.

\$1,500,000.

Private Institution Leadership Training  
Designed for military as well as civilian  
leaders and attached to private Institutes  
and Universities.

\$750,000.

Free Market Institutes  
Regional efforts modeled after  
AEI and adapted to the specific  
needs of the indigenous economies.

\$1,000,000.

This list is presented only as a tentative schedule. More thought and planning should go into a presentation that will cover the details and possible success rate of any such program.

I will meet with Dennis Blair at the NSC as soon as he is available and report to you as to agenda develops. In the mean time we should gather Dan Arnold's suggestions in this area and incorporate them into our program schedule.

**International  
Communication  
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547



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MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC - Walt Raymond

FROM: USIA - W. Scott Thompson

SUBJECT: NSDD on Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security:  
The International Information Committee (IIC)

**BACKGROUND**

Any credible determination of the operational responsibilities of the IIC perforce proceeds from the NSC's intent in establishing Project Truth - of which the IIC is a strengthened successor with a broadened mandate.

Project Truth addressed decades of neglect by the USG foreign policy community of the public affairs dimension of international relations. In establishing Project Truth, the NSC sought: to effect a tighter organization of the USG international public affairs effort through a coordinating body and integrate public affairs considerations into the policy process. Furthermore these priorities were underscored by designating the foreign affairs agency with primary responsibility for international public diplomacy as the lead agency in this coordinated effort. Finally, Project Truth was accorded an immediacy of access to the NSC unique to a non-SIG entity within the NSC foreign policy system.

**THE IIC: TERMS OF REFERENCE**

The NSDD mandate empowers the IIC "to make recommendations, and as appropriate, direct the concerned agencies, interagency groups, and working groups with respect to information strategies in key policy areas". Thus the IIC is able to move with initiatives such as "the Post-Soviet World" public affairs strategy confident that the activities of the other two NSDD committees will implement these plans in a sustained and focussed manner. Thus the formulation of the NSDD on Information Policy, as well as the "planning, coordination and implementation" of international information strategies for the full spectrum of priority policy objectives including INF, the Mid-East peace initiative, as well as the "Project Truth agenda" (Poland, Afghanistan, CEW, Central America, Active Measures, etc.) are directed by the IIC.

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THE IIC: RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NSDD COMMITTEES

The NSDD on Public Diplomacy which establishes the IIC as Project Truth's successor represents a further evolution of the considerations which motivated NSC attention to the role of public affairs planning in the foreign policy process. Information strategy will remain critical to the operation of all four committees, and the NSC understands that this must continue. This is clear from the IIC mandate which removes all such constraints from involvement in major U.S. peace initiatives as had inhibited Project Truth's lead role (i.e. the perception of a narrowly defined anti-disinformation or counter-propaganda mission for Project Truth).

It may be helpful, too, in defining the operational responsibilities of the three international committees to recall, for example, that the political democracy initiative (which is a prime activity of the International Political Committee) drew first breath as part of the public affairs strategy for President Reagan's European trip. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive any major undertaking of the International Political Committee absent the context of an international information strategy. Thus, the activities of the IPC concerning international labor, Central American democracies and other specific projects implementing the democracy initiative will proceed in harmony with the relevant information strategy developed by the IIC.

It is equally difficult to imagine that the International Broadcasting Committee (IBC), whose NSDD mandate indicates primarily technical responsibilities, could pursue its activities absent an information strategy.

The activities of these other committees, then, depend for meaningful policy context upon the long range plans for which the IIC is responsible.

Obviously, the success of the committee system created by this NSDD depends on harmonious relationship with the Public Affairs Committee, which is responsible for coordinating the domestic public affairs activities of top USG officials on foreign policy issues with the implementation of information strategies developed by the IIC.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 7, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Interagency Working Group on Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: Report on 12/2; Agenda for 12/9

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS # 95-04112 # 46

BY                      NARA DATE 8/27/99

Report on 12/2 Meeting

The entire meeting was devoted to discussion of how to carry out vis-a-vis Europe the President's Democracy Initiative. The urgency of reaching consensus was stressed, as USIA's first budget submission was due in less than a week.

Discussion covered the following:

- actions in regard to European parliamentarians and the Council of Europe; ✓
- putting new life into SAIS/Bologna, while encouraging them to expand some of their focus from American studies to more universal studies on democracy;
- putting more focus on how to expand democracy, including providing studies and training in building democratic infrastructure and in the democratic process and on how to make the transition from non-democratic to democratic institutions;
- placing more emphasis on programs related to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as on Western European countries where democracy still remains relatively new; also, Yugoslavia should be added to relevant programs designed for Western Europe;
- developing programs in labor area;
- whether to establish a center for democracy or for democratic studies, e.g., in Europe (Spain?); ✓
- programs for gaining greater understanding among the "Successor Generation" in Europe, including not only USG programs but also pressing private groups (e.g., Atlantic Associations) and other governments to put priority on such groups.

In regard to institutional exchanges with Europe, Jim Gadsden (EUR/RPE) reported that we have had no contact yet with the European Parliament in regard to the Democracy Initiative, but have some actions underway with the Council of Europe. The Council is hosting a Strasbourg Conference of Parliamentary Democrats next October and is particularly interested in OECD parliamentary participation. There are two preparatory events leading up to the Strasbourg Conference: a preparatory meeting in January (and another possibly in March) to prepare agenda and procedures; and a Colloquium on the Concept of Democracy to be held in March, which Council of Europe

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Areilza hopes will produce a paper for the larger meeting in October. Dick Hecklinger (P) reported that we will encourage the leaders of the bipartisan Democracy Project<sup>cc</sup> to take part in these meetings. (A further suggestion would be to brief Codel LANTOS, the US Delegation to the exchange with the European Parliament in January, on how they might be helpful in regard to the Democracy Initiative.) Finally, it was reported by USIA that Associate Director for Programs Thompson is working on a similar project; it was agreed that a member of his staff would brief the next meeting (12/9) of this group on the project.

There was also detailed discussion of establishing a "New Center for the Study of the USSR and Eastern Europe." It was emphasized that this should be open to Russian and other ethnic groups from the USSR and to Eastern Europeans and that a welcome mat should be out for motivated blue collar representatives (e.g., Polish Solidarity) as well as members of the intelligentsia.

In regard to programs for youth and for the "Successor Generation," USIA reported that it is attempting to bring these two areas together under the Democracy Initiative. This is being done through the "Full Cycle" program in which we will: encourage the formation of alumni groups of exchange programs such as Fulbright, organize meetings of these groups, ask their help in targeting younger persons from their countries who should be brought into these programs and work with these groups to establish ten leadership seminars in Europe patterned after the Georgetown Leadership Seminar. The AFL-CIO Youth Desk will also be brought into this program.

It was reported that a labor package is also being put together with a global focus, and that Walter Raymond of the NSC will be convening an interagency group to pursue this.

It was agreed that the near term schedule for pursuing the democracy initiative will be as follows:

- ① USIA is to revise the submissions examined by the group, incorporate new ideas on which agreement was reached and make their initial submission to OMB within a week.
2. Other agencies will have an opportunity to comment again before the package goes to Congress. Further, OMB has indicated to USIA that it will permit changes in the initial submission.
3. The program will be discussed further at the "Shaping" meeting this week, i.e., December 9, then in more detail at the same meeting on December 16.

Agenda for 12/9

1. Follow-up on Democracy Initiative.
2. Report on European public views on arms control (USIA-Shaffer)
3. Status report on NATO Force Comparison paper and Soviet "Whence the Threat to Peace." (EUR/RPM - Halgus)

Democracy Report

# INTERNATIONAL

## Look out, generals, the civilians are coming

Democracy seems to be returning to fashion, at least temporarily and in spots, in Latin America. The ruling generals, fighting recession and trying to pay off mountainous foreign debts, find themselves increasingly unpopular; so the barracks have suddenly become more attractive. It is a trend that President Reagan's administration can understand and welcome—provided the generals are replaced by safe civilian governments.

The new stage began three years ago, when the military rulers of Ecuador (1979), Peru (1980) and Honduras (1981) turned their governments over to elected civilians. In April this year it was the turn of El Salvador. In October, the generals in near-bankrupt Bolivia, unwilling to impose the austerity measures needed to obtain credits from the International Monetary Fund, handed over power to Mr Hernan Siles Zuazo, a left-wing civilian who had twice been deprived of the presidency by military coups.

A month later, Brazilians were allowed by their military rulers to elect state governors for the first time since the military coup in 1964. They voted 60-40 in favour of opposition candidates. The opposition also won a majority in the chamber of deputies. Thirteen days later, Uruguayans had their turn. Electing delegates to party congresses for the first time since the 1973 military coup, they gave a 60% majority to opposition candidates.

A one-day national strike in Argentina on December 6th against the military regime's way of dealing with recession, inflation and a giant foreign debt achieved almost everything it set out to do. Even the interior minister, General Llamil Reston, acknowledged that "everything stopped", and the Buenos Aires newspaper Clarin commented that General Reynaldo Bignone's government was "manifestly weak and in its twilight". The strike was organised by two rival factions of the officially banned trade union federation. Five recently legalised political parties are jointly planning a mass rally on December 16th.

The Brazilian, Uruguayan and Argentinians

generals are all promising a return to democracy. But when? The Brazilian opposition wants a direct election for the presidency in 1984, instead of election by a government-rigged electoral college. Uruguayans want their regime's promise of a presidential election in November, 1984, to be brought forward. The Argentines are likely to be the most insistent, sensing the weakness of their military rulers. General Bignone, who has promised a return to democracy by 1984, recently offered elections at the end of 1983 or earlier, if preparations could be made in time. He is under strong pressure: even before this week's strike, violent disorders erupted recently in a quiet Buenos Aires suburb over tax increases.

There are still exceptions to this encouraging trend. One odd man out in South America is General Augusto Pinochet, whose one-man rule of Chile has so far seemed impervious to the country's deepening economic woes. This may not last for ever. Chile's gross domestic product is expected to fall by 13% this year, industrial production by 20%, construction work by 50%. The peso has been devalued by 40%, and unemployment is over 20%. In August, when General

Pinochet faced a crisis over the peso, he asked followers of Mr Jorge Alessandri, a right-wing former president, to join his government. When they asked, in return, for an opening towards democracy, he turned them down.

President Reagan's Latin American tour from November 30th to December 4th was tailored to fit the changing scene. The countries which he visited either had elected governments (Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras) or were well on the road back to democracy (Brazil). The tour was blessed with some blunt talking. Soon after his return, the American treasury secretary, Mr Donald Regan, called for a new approach to the third world's debt crisis. His ear had been much bent on this issue. The Brazilians, long ignored by American policy-makers, felt that they had at last been properly treated. President Betancur of Colombia made sure he had an attentive audience, complaining about the isolation of Cuba and Nicaragua.

In central America, Mr Reagan moved on to more sensitive ground—abuses of human rights. In an address heard by President Alvaro Magaña of El Salvador, he echoed the stern warnings on this subject of his ambassador in El Salvador, Mr Deane Hinton. He was nevertheless quoted as saying that he would certify to congress in Washington that El Salvador had made enough progress in respecting human rights to warrant a continuation of American aid after January. Soon afterwards, an American official said he had

Argentines, angry about taxes and generals, take it out on the police



## INTERNATIONAL

not meant that at all.

The president was also on shaky ground when he met Guatemala's military ruler, General Efraim Rios Montt, who promised to announce plans next March for an election. Mr Reagan came away from his meeting enthusing about "a man of great personal integrity, committed to restoring democracy", who had been given a "bum rap". This contrasts with the view of Oxfam, a British charity working in Guatemala, which said this week that the country is "in a vice-like grip of fear with violence and repression . . . . Already this year at least 7,500 have been killed."

No changes in relations with Nicaragua are expected until its Sandinist rulers respond to the American peace proposals laid down at a recent conference in Costa Rica. Until then, pressure against the Sandinists, with reported American help, is likely to continue. Guerrilla bases on the Honduran frontier have been cleared; the "contras" who want to overthrow the Sandinists are now taking the fight deeper into Nicaragua.

## Egypt

### Fairground coda

FROM OUR CAIRO CORRESPONDENT

As a courtroom spectacular, it was a winner. The first day of the trial of Egypt's best-known Islamic revolutionaries started with a chorus of Islamic chanting from courtroom cages. It ended in an adjournment amid eloquent allegations of torture. In between, an allegedly brutal police brigadier, spotted by his victims, was hissed out of court, several distraught revolutionaries were carried away screaming, and defendants raised their shirts to compare torture scars.

Two hundred and eighty members of the *Jihad* (holy war) organisation are now on trial in Cairo's international fairground complex, newly fortified for the occasion. They are accused of plotting to set up an Iranian-style Islamic republic after Anwar Sadat's murder last year, and of initiating a post-assassination uprising in the upper Egyptian town of Assiut. Sixteen men are already serving long sentences for conspiring to assassinate Sadat.

The complexities of the case, the rhetoric-power of the defendants and the ponderous pace of Egyptian civil justice suggest that the trial will drag on for months. Almost certainly, most of the hearings will be held in camera, although at the opening proceedings everybody was given a free hand to record the unruly scenes in court. No matter: the more fanatical the screen appearance of



A chance for reunion and comparing scars

the plotters, the more hope President Mubarak has of driving a wedge between extremist and moderate Islamic sentiment. Unlike Sadat's assassins, there is little danger that these cagefuls of bearded young men will turn into popular heroes. Many Egyptians were glad to see Sadat dead; few beyond the committed extremists would welcome the full consequences of an Islamic republic.

Nevertheless, the lesson of these robbed revolutionaries has not been lost on Egypt's leaders. Recognising that it is some of the brightest and best of the young generation who are attracted by militant Islam—often young doctors and engineers—the extremist viewpoint has been treated seriously in learned articles in the press by top theologians. "Reformed" extremists have appeared on television to discuss how they were seduced by wrong tenets. Some small steps have been taken towards creating a more obviously God-fearing society. Alcohol prices have rocketed this year, belly-dancers no longer fill in between television programmes, and a new committee, including religious officials, is to be set up to monitor foreign films and exclude those "incompatible with our Islamic principles".

This sort of thing may serve to satisfy the moderate Moslem that his society is not being swamped under a mass of tradition-breaking western goods and ideas. It will not, of course, convert the extremists. Mr Mubarak is keeping that danger at bay by a heavy hand. As the father of one of the *Jihad* defendants told your correspondent outside the court this week, the extremists in Assiut have not changed their minds but are simply keeping quiet through fear. The cell-like Isla-

mic groups outlawed just before Sadat's death are probably still in existence, financed and armed from across the border in Libya. The president's security forces are vigilant.

## Israel

### Storm in a money bowl

FROM OUR ISRAEL CORRESPONDENT

As the Israeli government sees it, negotiations over Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon have to be disentangled from the negotiations over President Reagan's plan for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. It may be prepared to talk about getting out of Lebanon, subject to a formidable list of conditions, but it is not prepared to consider the American plans for the West Bank. The two American envoys, Mr Philip Habib and Mr Maurice Draper, who reported back empty-handed to Washington this week, will not get anywhere, say the Israelis, until they are issued with more modest guide-lines.

The Israelis claim that, after the end of the fighting in Lebanon last summer, both they and the Syrians were ready to agree to a staged and parallel retreat from Lebanon, but were stalled by the Reagan plan being thrust upon them on September 1st. From then on, the Americans have been trying to sell too much too quickly to too many people. The Israelis look back regretfully to Mr Henry Kissinger's salami method of Middle East peacemaking; now, they say, they are being offered an all-in-one casserole



PORTUGAL:

1. Funds for UGT Congress	\$ 15,000
2. Printing Press	70,000
3. Adequate Headquarters Space	75,000
4. Staff for UGT/AAPLI Program:	
Support staff - research, education, publications (6)	75,000
5. Additional vehicles (2)	30,000
6. Comprehensive Organizing campaign and organizers	100,000
	<hr/>
	\$365,000

Democracy Payer

PRELIMINARY BUDGET---MONTHLY: THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM

STAFF SALARIES (benefits paid only when indicated by an asterisk)

Allen Weinstein*	\$4,583.33	(Georgetown U. salary of \$55,000 yrly.-changes to \$60,000 on March 1, 1983)
Alexandra Glowacki	2,000.00	
Eugenia Kemble (½ time)*	2,566.77	
John P. Loiello*	4,333.00	(benefits to be arranged from this pay with APF)
Keith E. Schuette	3,000.00	
Maria Thomas (Admin.Secy.)	2,167.00	
Receptionist/Typist	<u>1,000.00</u>	
TOTAL MONTHLY:	\$19,650.10	(AID anticipated total:\$20,000)

OFFICE SPACE (Suite 818, 2100 Penna. Ave.)	3,047.41	
FURNITURE RENTAL (est.)	<u>952.59</u>	
TOTAL OFFICE & FURN.:	\$4,000.00	(AID budget: \$4,666.66)

EQUIPMENT RENTAL (est.)	1,000.00	(AID budget: \$833.33)
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COMMUNICATIONS (including telephone downpayment & installation fee-\$1,750)	1,000.00	(AID budget: \$833.33)
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SUPPLIES, PRINTING, etc.:	750.00	(AID budget: \$833.33)
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CONSULTANTS' FEES:	7,500.00	(AID budget: \$8,333.33)
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TRAVEL FOR STAFF, CONSULTANTS, & EXECUTIVE BOARD (including per diem for staff & consul.)	7,500.00	(AID budget: \$8,333.33)
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CONTINGENCY FUND:	<u>5,000.00</u>	
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TOTAL ANTICIPATED MONTHLY EXPENSES: \$46,400.10

DECEMBER BUDGET: EXPENSES NEEDED IMMEDIATELY (i.e., pre-Christmas)\*

1. Telephone Company Deposit:	\$1,750.00	(202-293-9072)
2. Rental Deposit-2100 Penna. Ave., Suite 818:	3,047.41	
3. Alexandra Glowacki, salary (Dec.):	2,000.00	
4. Stationery payment (est.)--including payment to designer:	1,500.00	
5. Secretarial help--temporary (est.)	600.00	
6. Postage, office supplies, contingencies (est.):	<u>1,000.00</u>	
	\$9,897.41	

PROPOSAL: "Christmas loan" from the Democratic and Republican National Committees of \$5,000 each to be used to open a checking account for The Democracy Program of the American Political Foundation. In the months ahead, both parties will agree to loan an additional \$5,000 each monthly---if needed to maintain the program---to a total of \$25,000 (the amount initially given to the APF for The Democracy Program by the AFL-CIO). It is the Project Director's hope that the Chamber of Commerce will provide either grant or loan funding comparable to the total of \$25,000 in some manner.

\*(NOTE: Since the Project Director's salary will continue to be paid by Georgetown University with reimbursement to come from Democracy Program funds when available, Georgetown will be asked to await reimbursement until the New Year to keep project expenses down this month. Ms. Glowacki's salary, however, will be paid--by prior arrangement--directly from project expenses and hence is needed this month.)

THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM: PROPOSED STAFF STRUCTURE (preliminary

PROGRAM DIRECTOR: Allen Weinstein

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT: Alexandra Glowacki

ASSISTANT DIRECTORS: Eugenia Kemble (AFL-CIO designee)

John P. Loeillo (DNC designee)

Keith B. Schuette (RNC designee)

SENIOR CONSULTANTS: William A. Douglas

Robert E. Hunter

(longer list to follow)

ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY: Maria Thomas

RECEPTIONIST/TYPIST: (to be hired)

INTERNES (unsalaried): Alan P. Capps; Harold H. Montgomery

*Walt Ragnor*

To: David Stockman

From: Charles Wick

Subject: Unanticipated Needs: Allocation of \$150,000 for a Study by the Bipartisan American Political Foundation to Determine how the United States can best Contribute as a Nation to the Global Campaign for Democracy

Pursuant to the provisions provided for meeting the unanticipated needs of the President, I propose an allocation of \$150,000 from the appropriation "unanticipated needs" to the U.S. Information Agency for the conduct of a study and the preparation of a report with recommendations by the American Political Foundation to determine how the United States can best contribute as a nation to the global campaign for democracy.

As you know, President Reagan in his June 8, 1982, address to the members of Parliament in London declared his support for this study and stated, "I look forward to receiving their recommendations and to working with these institutions and the Congress in the common task of strengthening democracy throughout the world" (see attachment).

It is important that this study get underway early in January, 1983, so that it may be completed and the President may receive recommendations in the Spring in time to lay matters before the Congress and have legislation and appropriations, as may be necessary, reported in time to meet deadlines in the Congressional Budget Act with respect to the fiscal year 1984 budget.

I propose that the funds be allocated to the U.S. Information Agency and that our Agency enter into arrangements with the bipartisan American Political Foundation for the necessary study and report work.

Attachment:

Pres. Reagan's June 8  
Speech

Budget + Study Plan

Walt,

I had a call from one of Irving Brown's assistants very perturbed about some of the specifics in the black book, particularly hostile to the proposal relating to the Department of Labor exchanges. They indicated the AFL-CIO would be reluctant to participate in Government exchanges that they opposed. I responded by stating that nothing was said in concrete, that priorities were being established and that I was sure that all things considered with State their priorities would want to take AFL-CIO view fully into account. Again I was warned not to lock organized labor into any specific US Government programs. The key person in charge in the absence of Irving Brown is Dale Good special assistant to Kirina. I have attached a draft overview statement as well as an example of a statement of principle about labor exchanges that I would propose that we go for now rather than try to specify which agencies and which organizations should get a specific sum. If thi pattern is agreeable to you I can try to apply this pattern to other labor related programs specifically information activities, support to national centers and support to the international labor movement. (I understand USIA did send someone over to see Dale Good on European labor information center.

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

## OVERVIEW

The U.S. and democracy throughout the world would benefit enormously from a strengthened international free labor movement. Free trade unions have proved to be strong supporters of democracy, which they regard as necessary for their existence. Free labor, usually has proven to be a bulwark against Soviet and communist attempts to control the domestic and international labor movements. Free trade unions also have been "schools for democracy" enabling millions of workers, farmers and peasants, to affect their lives and working conditions through democratic elections and collective bargaining. A strengthened national and international labor movement would bolster democracy both in countries where the Soviets are engaged in overt and covert political action programs in the labor sector to shift the political balance of power (e.g. Western Europe and Oceania) as well as those regions where the Soviets are supporting communist and radical insurgents in an effort to undermine stability and the democratic labor movement (e.g. Central America and southern Africa.)

To support democratic trade unions and undermine Soviet efforts to use labor to shift the "correlation of forces" against the U.S. it is necessary (1) to support free trade unions abroad, both on the national and international levels <sup>and</sup> ~~at~~ (2) to ensure that the foreign policy perspectives of American labor, reflected

for over 100 years in the AFofL and the AFL-CIO, becomes widely accepted in trade union circles throughout the world. American labor, more than any other trade union movement, has been steadfast in its support of democracy, virulently opposed all forms of dictatorship, and has a proven record of effective moral and material assistance to the ~~free trade union~~ <sup>international labor</sup> movement.

By bolstering American labor's efforts either directly through the AFL-CIO, or ~~to~~ <sup>through</sup> institutions which cooperate closely with it, the U.S. will be able to strengthen democratic elements throughout the world.

The following programs would accomplish these purposes:

- 1) Exchanges
- 2) Information Program
- 3) Assistance to national labor centers
- 4) Assistance to international labor bodies which support democratic trade unions.

They should be targetted at key U.S. strateg~~y~~ priorities and regions which include Western Europe, (particularly southern and central Europe) <sup>Central America (Mexico to Columbia) and</sup> southern Africa. In addition key countries such as Brazil, Nigeria, and regions such as Oceania should receive priority attention.



## TALKING POINTS ON GERMAN FOUNDATION

### Friedrick Ebert Stiftung (FES)

- FES, founded in 1925, is effective foreign policy tool of the SPD. While legally separate, it is intimately linked to SPD via interlocking Socialist personnel and funding.

#### Organization

- Managed by seven-man committee whose chairman is Alfred Nau. Chief executive officer is Groenwald. FES Association has about 70 members--including many top SPD and labor leaders.

- Has four sections -- international, research, domestic political education, academic studies promotion.

- 1978 Annual Report states 107 FES representatives abroad including 45 Black Africa, 18 Asia, 27 Latin America/ 8 Caribbean. Serve as SPD's "Foreign Service." Most are SPD members. Some are also trade unionists (DGB).

#### Funding

- No public record on financing.

- Receives annual subsidy from German Federal Govt -- about \$12,000,000 for 1980.

- Other sources are: contributions, SPD organizations such as Reconstruction Bank, German Federal Govt funds for specific education and development and projects, State and local level funding.

- One estimate (for 1975) was about \$36,000,000 total.

#### Program (Foreign and Related Domestic)

- Provides technical training and funding support to foreign political parties emphasizing member parties of Socialist International and "progressive parties." Examples: PLN (Costa Rica), PS (Senegal), AD (Venezuela), PAP (Singapore).

- Works with Socialist-oriented trade unions in developing countries.

- Maintains adult education centers in Costa Rica, Indonesia, Zambia, Sri Lanka, Sudan to promote socialist principles.

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BY d NARA DATE 2/27/99

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- Runs agricultural development programs, provides advisors for forming agricultural cooperatives.

- Trains third world journalists, TV/radio technicians and programmers.

- Foreign visitors program. In 1978 almost 100 foreigners visited Germany -- about one half politicians -- for meetings with German counterparts. Permits SPD members in German Govt to meet with legal and illegal foreign party reps on party-to-party basis.

- Runs some foreign assistance programs directly on behalf of FRG.

After 1974 Portuguese Revolution

- Provided over \$500,000 to Portuguese Socialist Party. Sponsored training of Portuguese political and labor cadres in both Portugal and Germany.

## TALKING POINTS ON GERMAN FOUNDATION

### Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS)

- KAS, founded in 1964, is effective foreign policy tool of CDU. Relationship with CDU and receipt of Govt funds parallels that of FES.

#### Organization

- Headed since 1968 by Dr. Bruno Heck, prominent CDU member, Has 40 member board, heavily CDU.

- A/o 1978, employs 360 in Germany and 48 German advisors abroad in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Europe.

- Has six subordinate institutes. One is institute for International Solidarity.

#### Funding

- 1978 Budget was about \$40,000,000 from Federal Govt and other sources.

#### Program in 1978:

about \$20,000,000 spent on political training and community rural development.

about \$8,000,000 spent on trade union projects.

Latin America ranks first in budget ratio (55), staffing (20 of the 48 German advisors) and number of projects. Most active in Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica with Christian Democratic parties and groups.

- Also works closely with Christian Democratic groups in such countries as Guatemala, Peru, Chile.

- Supports projects in following fields: mass media; public administration; social, youth and women's affairs; scientific cooperation.

- In 1978 sponsored visits of 28 foreign students to Germany, 19 from Latin America.

- Less effective in Latin America than FES, partly because Socialist International is stronger than Christian Democratic equivalent.

- More supportive of basic USG positions in Latin America than FES.

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NLS F95-0412

~~SECRET~~ BY d NARA, DATE 8/27/99

- Runs some foreign assistance programs directly on behalf FRG.

After 1974 Portuguese Revolution

- Contributed over \$1,000,000 to the Portuguese Social Democratic Center party. Sponsored the training of Portuguese political and labor cadres in both Portugal and Germany.

With the tasks defined, the question of who is to organize the programs arises: State, AID, USIA, or (as will often be the case) the private sector? The objective transcends bureaucratic lines and requires interdepartmental coordination.

America has been on the defensive. The reason is that the Soviet Union has used political action shrewdly to develop networks of support and to identify the United States with "reactionary" causes. Today the Soviet Union stands accused of an offensive military posture, of breaking solemn treaties of chemical warfare. Even more pertinent is the loss of internal legitimacy and self-confidence in the ruling circles of the Soviet Union. Centrifugal forces abound within that empire, and our broadcasting, the largest component of our agenda, is the key weapon in encouraging these forces. We must build a coherent world campaign to secure the future of democratic forces everywhere. Our own security depends on the health of these forces, and our belief in our cause obligates us to do no less.



NLSF95-041/2 #49  
DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By NARA                      ~~Date~~                     

8/27/99

MEMORANDUM FOR: WALTER RAYMOND  
National Security Council

FROM: ROBERT W. SEARBY  
Deputy Under Secretary  
International Affairs

SUBJECT: Implementation of the President's Speech to  
the British Parliament on Promoting Democracy

At the meeting Jim Taylor, you and I had on August 13, 1982, we discussed DOL's Free Labor Leader Program which will be considered at the NSC meeting on August 30. You invited us to *also* submit our ideas concerning the implementation of the President's London speech. I hope that what follows will be of interest to you and the NSC.

Background

In his Address to the British Parliament of June 8, 1982, President Reagan proposed to "foster the infrastructure of democracy--the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities--which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means." The President explained that the bipartisan American Political Foundation would study how the U.S. could best contribute to the global campaign for democracy. This paper discusses actions that can be taken in the interim and begun immediately.

In fostering democracy around the world, the NSC should be cognizant of the pivotal political role played by trade unions in many governments. By promoting free and independent trade unions, the U.S. can hope to weaken the anti-democratic, anti-American elements of important foreign trade unions and also help to combat Communist penetration of labor institutions.

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Objectives

1. To suggest interim actions that could be initiated immediately to promote and strengthen free and non-communist trade unions.
2. To discuss how these labor programs can be carried out and funded, to the extent possible, through existing appropriations.

Proposed NSC Actions

1. Improving Information

In order to design and implement better programs to support free trade unions, the U.S. needs to collect and analyze more foreign labor information. This could be accomplished by:

- a. An inventory of U.S. Government information on world labor developments with the goal of identifying the gaps in needed information and analysis.
- b. An assessment of the major problem areas of Communist penetration of trade unions.
- c. A plan for the better coordination of information from all relevant non-governmental sources including the AFL-CIO, the AFL-CIO Institutes, the international trade unions, and U.S. businesses. A plan for the better coordination of information from governmental sources such as DOL, State, AID, and other foreign affairs agencies. Responsibility for these plans should be assigned to DOL which has already begun this effort and is in a position to integrate effectively the governmental and private sources.
- d. The acceleration of DOL's publication of international trade union directories in unclassified form.

2. Improving the Targeting

Both because of U.S. budget constraints and because of anticipated dissimilar foreign responses to the campaign for democracy, the interim U.S. efforts in the labor area should be

*Mya Dunster  
differs w. SHL*

*Ocean*

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finely targeted to those countries having the potential for the most serious problems. DOL proposes the following:

a. Initiate programs in the Caribbean and Latin America first. We propose this priority because (1) the Administration has already identified this region as having great importance, (2) there are serious labor problems and Communist threats there, and (3) any pilot program should be launched regionally before going worldwide so as to monitor effectiveness more easily.

b. Develop specific country labor strategies for the following: Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Surinam, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the English-speaking Caribbean.

c. The country strategies would identify:

--the specific foreign leaders (or future leaders) most important to enlist in the democratic offensive;

--targeted projects for existing U.S. government programs (USICA, AID);

--specific ways in which U.S. multilateral resources (ILO, IDB, IBRD, UNDP, OAS, etc.) can be enlisted to strengthen democratic and anti-communist labor;

--specific ways in which the U.S. can help facilitate American labor's (AFL-CIO, American Institute for Free Labor Development [AIFLD], independent unions) exchanges with foreign trade unions;

--specific ways in which the U.S. can influence third country or national foundation programs in Latin America; and

--specific ways in which the U.S. business community can be urged to increase their cooperation with non-communist trade unions involved in their overseas operations.

d. Establishing Latin America and the Caribbean as a priority is not meant to deny the importance of promoting democracy in other trouble spots. This effort, however, will provide a basis for the development of analagous efforts in other highly sensitive areas, such as the Southwest Pacific.

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App/cio will  
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*maybe in  
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### 3. Utilizing the Labor Attaches

If the campaign to promote democratic labor institutions is to be successful, there must be a person within each Embassy to coordinate U.S. actions. This is a natural role for the U.S. labor attache. While most current labor attaches are well equipped for their labor reporting roles, some of them do not have the background necessary to serve as the operational spearheads for this kind of program. To ameliorate this deficiency, the following actions will be required:

a. In addition to specially qualified FSO's, assign to labor attache positions other personnel as needed who have extensive trade union knowledge or experience. The labor attache must be equipped to mix with and influence local trade unionists.

b. To implement the above policy, it will be necessary to recruit some new attaches (as FSRO's) and, where necessary, to redeploy existing attaches. These steps should be done as soon as possible. [DOL should have a strong role, in collaboration with S/IL, in the selection and assignment of the labor attaches.]

*May be present* ( c. Use the DOL-State conference of ARA Labor Attaches now scheduled for September 20-23 in Washington to discuss these new priorities for ARA labor activities. This could include detailed country-by-country strategy work sessions between the attaches and DOL, State, AID, and USICA.

d. After completion of the ARA Conference, DOL and State jointly will hold separate sessions with union and business leaders to seek their input on these matters and to maximize private sector involvement.

### 4. Fostering the Infrastructure of Democracy

While the American Political Foundation is studying how best to institutionalize U.S. support for democracy, there are several interim actions that can be taken to begin dealing with existing problems. Such actions could include:

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- 5 -

✓ a. Implement the Free Labor Leader Program (see the DOL proposal of April 29, 1982) with foreign labor leaders who can favorably counteract the Communist initiatives in Latin America.

✓ b. Expand the funding of AIFLD to strengthen free trade unions as authorized by Section 601 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

7  
1 c. Orient and seek the cooperation of international trade union organizations, the Socialist International, and other groups active in Latin American union affairs with the new U.S. campaign to promote democracy.

✓ d. Expand DOL cooperative programs with foreign labor ministries in the area of labor management relations. (Effective dispute settlement procedures are necessary for the economic success of a pluralist democratic country)

✓ e. Establish new programs within the U.S. to orient foreign students at the university level about the dangers of totalitarian systems versus the benefits of democratic, free market systems.

7 f. Encourage NSF, private sector, or foundation support of academic research into issues relating to the enhancement of democracy. Too much of the political science analysis focuses on "order" and "stability" as prerequisites rather than on democratic norms.

g. The above steps are offered as actions that can be undertaken now by the NSC. In the long-run, there is probably a need for an "off-government" foundation analagous to those that exist in several European countries. Such a foundation could promote the diffusion and understanding of democratic principles through national and international seminars, investigations and reports, publications of monographs, exchange visits, foreign study opportunities, and media presentations. DOL believes it important that such a foundation have a distinct labor component, and would welcome the opportunity to assist the NSC or the American Political Foundation in designing such a component.

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- 6 -

5. Funding These Actions

If the NSC deems the above programs to have sufficient priority, funds might be reallocated from the following appropriations:

- a. USICA- Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act
- b. AID- Bilateral Assistance
- c. State- Economic Support Fund
- d. Labor- Departmental Management

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p. 30 -

- Contract for a deliverable

- Example - contract

Result to give study

Open market etc. in

allow indicators

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End product -

# Addendum to Democracy + Public Diplomacy Projects

## Additional Unreviewed Projects.

- X 1. Elections Institutes (State)
- X 2. Central American Seminars (State)
- ~~3. Special Projects for East Europe (USIA)~~
- X 4. Fifteen projects proposed by State (HA)
5. AID projects
- ~~6. DOD proposals (not fully cleared)~~

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December 8, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: <sup>W</sup>WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy/Project Democracy

The following provides you background for the public diplomacy/democracy meeting which you will chair on December 9 from 10:11 a.m. in the situation room. I held a working group meeting on the issues raised in my December 3 memorandum to you in an effort to narrow the questions requiring decisions. Concerning the December 3 memorandum, there is full agreement that the \$100 million should go forward as a single problem with one "lead agency."

The issue of organizational sponsorship is not resolved. The Department of State will submit pro and con argumentation for the 3 options: State, USIA, "funds appropriated by the President." I hope to be able to show to you a State non-paper before the meeting otherwise it will be orally briefed.

Congressional strategy will directly relate to the decision "lead agency."

The budget review board will meet on Saturday, December 11, to discuss the appeal, which has been raised by both the Secretary of State and the Director, USIA. The appeal asked for OMB funding of this program at the \$100 million level. Currently OMB has penciled in \$35 million but has advised me that some additional funds can be directed to this activity. (OMB says that there is roughly \$100 million unallocated in the 150 account which could be made available to Lebanon and/or public diplomacy and democracy.) In discussing our strategy, we must bear in mind that the "lead agency" will also handle the BRB presentation. As USIA tentatively accepted that responsibility Wick has been invited to present the case to the BRB.

State is prepared to provide Larry Eagleburger as backup support to Wick. If Wick takes the charge, he wants a letter from either the Secretary of State or Judge Clark underscoring the importance of public diplomacy and democracy and asking him to take the lead in its defense. This, as you can see, will all fall in place after the overall strategy is selected. Talking points for this presentation will be circulated for review at the December 9 meeting.

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We will also cover the items identified in your memorandum of November 17. Specifically we will focus on the outlines of the FY 84 funding request. I have a book available to show you that summarizes these programs.

In the same context, we will need to identify FY 83 funds for reprogramming action. Your memorandum specifically addresses this action. On the basis of the response from the concerned agencies and departments we will then be able to judge the size of the FY 83 zero supplement required to get this program started in FY 83. We will need to send forward the supplement request at the same time that the FY 84 basic program request goes forward. USIA has indicated a willingness to make available to project democracy some of the funds which Senator Pell has indicated he wished to add to the USIA budget. OMB's position on this, according to USIA, is to turn down this offer from Pell. We might probe this point a little more during the meeting.

Attachments

- Tab I     Agenda
- Tab II    List of Attendees
- Tab III   Talking Points

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AGENDA

1. Organizational Yearly
  - USIA
  - State
  - Funds appropriated by the President
2. Congressional Strategy
3. FY 84 Funding
4. FY 83 Funding
  - Reprogramming
  - Supplement



REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on December 9, 19 82

for WALTER RAYMOND, Jr. of NSC  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

HELMAN, Gerald

MICHEL, James

FELDMAN, Roger

HECKLINGER, Richard

BOLTON, John

ZAK, Marilyn

JAJKO, Walter

THOMPSON, Scott

HENSGIN, Bernard

ANDERSON, Sarah

BARIE, James

SEARBY, Robert

SPEVACEK, David

MEETING LOCATION

Building WHWW

Requested by Carol Cleveland

Room No. Situation Room

Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Time of Meeting 1000

Date of request December 8, 1982

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

## Talking Points

### Democracy Initiative

1. The Democracy Project, a major presidential foreign policy initiative, was launched publicly by Mr. Reagan in a speech to the British Parliament last June 8. The President called for an ambitious U.S. effort to strengthen democratic forces and infrastructures abroad and for more effective U.S. participation in what he called the "competition of ideas and values" with the Soviet Union.

2. George Shultz, Cap Weinberger, Bill Casey, Bud McFarlane and I met last summer to discuss how to implement the President's initiative. We were unanimous in the belief that this is a critical national security concern and that the U.S. has devoted far too few resources to this effort. We settled on a figure of approximately \$100 million. Certainly the Soviets devote much more than that to these activities.

3. An interagency group led by the NSC has prepared a package of programs for FY 84 totaling about \$100 million and a much smaller package for FY 83. Since USIA has the broadest legislative authority and the lion's share of the programs, OMB recommended that the entire sum be put into our budget. I must point out that I am here representing not only my own agency, but State, Defense, CIA, and AID as well as the NSC.

4. The package of programs contains many clearly top notch items ready for immediate implementation. Others are still in the research and planning stage. The most important factor is not whether a particular program should be approved, but whether we are to commit a substantial amount of funds to the overall project. The specific programs will be revised after consultation with overseas posts, non-governmental organizations, and the Congress. We cannot take these steps, however, until we are certain the money will be there.

5. The U.S. has long recognized the need to offer economic and military assistance to our friends to further democracy. But we have not given significant support to the political, intellectual and social infrastructures that make democracies function. A coherent world campaign, sustained over years, in support of democratic development will be at this stage the most important additional investment we can make to enhance our national security over the long term. But for such a campaign to succeed, sufficient resources must be allocated to it.

Wang 1443G      December 8, 1982

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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December 3, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: <sup>WR</sup> WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy/Project Democracy Package

In seeking to implement your instructions, I have run into several concerns over the presentation of this package in the budget and to Congress. State for example, is reluctant to accept the role of "lead agency" in terms of the budget without further discussion. I believe a short interagency meeting is needed as soon as possible to insure we have a coordinated approach. It would be a logical follow-up to your memorandum, dated November 17, 1982, same subject. As you are aware the essential plan is to include \$100 million in the FY 84 budget request for this program. The overall direction of this program will be under the aegis of the Special Planning Group as spelled out in the projected NSDD on Public Diplomacy. The sequence of events are a bit out of phase in that ideally we would have the SPG in place, it would review and approve the program and then submit it to OMB. The imperative of the OMB deadline has necessitated that we share with them a preliminary cut of the program. We will, in the immediate future, submit the program to the concerned agencies for final approval (or to the SPG if it exists at that time).

Special management issues, however, have to be resolved now. These include:

-- Packaging: Does the \$100 million go forward as a single program with one "lead agency" carrying the ball?

-- There is majority support for this approach, although State Department lawyers believe the lead agency concept complicates the issue.

-- The arguments in favor are that it permits the program to be seen and discussed in totality. Allocations could be made subsequently by the "manager" to concerned agencies.

-- Whoever is designated as "lead agency" would provide the budget defense on the Hill, but this would be preceded by a policy presentation by the Secretary of State.

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BY KML NARA DATE 5/10/13

-- Organizational Sponsorship:

The argument for State.

-- The Secretary is the President's principal foreign policy advisor and is the best placed to articulate an interagency program.

-- Most convincing advocate on the Hill. In this regard we are talking both about "plausibility" as well as a willingness to make the time commitment and undertake the selling effort necessary.

-- Some (OMB, State) are concerned that State does not have sufficient authorization; our understanding is that the basic State authorization (Title 22, US Code) provides sufficient latitude.

-- State (Comptroller/M) is concerned about the impact on its budget if there is heavy pressure for resources. (This argument will be made by any organization.)

The argument for USIA.

-- The largest amount of the program is to be run by USIA and most of the program according to OMB falls under existing USIA authorization. OMB prefers this option as the most effective "package" for Hill presentation and defense.

-- It is the preferred option of State. AID is prepared to accept either State or USIA as the lead agency.

The argument for Presidential appropriation.

-- Both USIA and State have expressed enthusiasm for this as a compromise option. (Possibly their enthusiasm is that they see this as a way to keep their budgets intact.) State Department lawyers state that separate legislation, with funds appropriated by the President and the concurrent designation of the Secretary of State to execute the program, would be a sound way to respond to this specific Presidential initiative. If the Secretary were designated as manager, he would give funds to concerned agencies as appropriate (and on the basis of SPG deliberations).

-- A possible downside is the uncertainty of how this might be perceived on the Hill and whether this is the best way to guarantee the integrity of these funds. The President's "discretionary" funds can experience unexpected drawdowns if circumstances warrant and this could jeopardize program funding levels. Discussion of this is necessary. OMB strongly opposes including Project Democracy under Presidential appropriation.

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-- Congressional Strategy:

The key here is to identify the most "plausible" and most "effective" defender of the program. Frankly, I think State is better prepared and more credible. Nevertheless, this is related closely to whom will work hard. Helman worries about Secretary Shultz's availability. I should think Eagleberger's office could be counted on. Larry's request for 14 full-time officers for this area suggests a serious commitment. One concern: Dick Kennedy (M area) was not effective or committed to defending the Asia Foundation and this is analogous to the projected programs. "M" worries about the budgetary impact on State's other functions. Given the general parallelism of USIA's program to much of "Project Democracy", Helman believes USIA can and would give it a good shot.

Note 1: To put the \$100 million "in the budget" by the December 1 deadline, Gil Robinson wrote a letter to Stockman acknowledging the inclusion of the sum in the USIA budget. I am assured by OMB this can be shifted to State if we so choose.

Note 2: Bob Kimmitt and I believe the State option is viable, particularly if State is prepared to push the case aggressively on the Hill. We also believe that a brief meeting, chaired by you, will cut through the various concerns and establish a clear and coherent plan for the lead agency and a Hill strategy. Two earlier meetings (one in October and one in November) have set the stage.

Options:

- 1) Meet with the Ad Hoc Working Group at your earliest convenience in the week of December 6.
- 2) Let the Robinson memo stand with USIA as lead agency.
- 3) Call Eagleberger and sort it out telephonically.

Recommendation:

That you meet with the Ad Hoc Working Group.

APPROVE Bob

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Bob Kimmitt has concurred.

Tab I Background Material

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December 17, 1982

*Walt  
Raymond  
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I don't think  
biggest  
request  
Bud  
12-2-82*

Dear Bud:

You probably have heard that the Secretary has agreed to an NSDD which establishes an NSC-led inter-agency structure for public diplomacy and political action. I hope you can move the draft NSDD ahead promptly so that we have an interagency structure to supervise the array of democracy projects which are being drawn up for submission under the FY 84 budget. The Secretary has already rejected the OMB passback to reduce to \$35 million the \$100 million target for democracy projects. We also are objecting to OMB's denial of an increase in the Department's staff to handle public diplomacy and political action. Our concept for this staff is attached. I hope I can count on your support.\*

Sincerely,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

*\*We will need the  
positions if we are to  
Enclosure: make this*

*As stated. things work  
L*

The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane,  
Deputy Assistant to the President,  
The White House.

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Resources for Public Diplomacy and Political Action

President Reagan has developed, both conceptually and operationally, a broad new concept for the role of public diplomacy and political action in the US foreign policy. It constitutes one of the principle elements of our strategy with respect to the Soviet Union and third world countries. The democracy initiative, described to the British Parliament by the President in June 1982, is characteristic of the scope of the Administration's concept of political action. Currently, an NSDD is being developed to establish an inter-agency structure for public diplomacy and political action. A \$100 million program package is in the final stages of preparation for presentation to Congress. There must be a strong central staff which can tie all the strands of public diplomacy/political action together, both within the Department and between agencies under the proposed NSDD.

Presently, there are four officers attached to P doing public diplomacy/political action work. I believe we need a minimum of ten fulltime officers plus provision for four man-years of consultants who can provide more specialized skills.

The functions of this new staff will include:

- integrating public diplomacy into the regular conduct of our foreign policy;
- developing policy initiatives that will put the US on the political offensive;
- initiating and implementing political action projects such as the conferences on elections and the democratization of the communist world;
- assessing and devising actions to counter the overwhelming larger Soviet effort;
- implementing the President's democracy initiatives through private and public sector programs;
- providing liaison with other agencies;
- directing and serving as a catalyst for regional bureaus;
- covering issues not handled elsewhere, such as youth politics and international broadcasting;

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- serving as liaison with non-governmental organizations with international scope (e.g., religious groups, labor) and transnational movements (e.g., Socialist International);
- working with FSI on the development of training programs for the Foreign Service;
- working on public statements.

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United States  
Information  
Agency

December 1, 1982

Dear Dave:

Director Wick left for Morocco shortly after he signed the letter appealing OMB's proposed allowance on USIA's regular FY 1984 budget request. After he departed, members of your staff asked the Agency to address the issue of funding for Project Democracy.

We concur in the FY 1984 estimate of \$100 million for the Democracy projects as recommended by Secretary Shultz in his recent letter to you and repeated in the proposed memo to the President from Judge Clark presently being circulated for concurrence to Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger and Directors Wick and Casey.

We welcome the opportunity to play a significant role in the implementation of this initiative on behalf of the entire foreign affairs community. However, in asking that you establish the FY 1984 estimate for this effort at \$100 million, we must emphasize the fact that this initiative must complement, not replace, USIA's basic programs as manifested in yesterday's budget appeal letter. An enhanced level of those program activities is essential to the Agency's effectiveness in carrying out its own national security mandate.

Your staff has a draft of the individual programs contained in the Democracy project. These are currently under review by inter-agency committees and an updated version will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Gilbert A. Robinson  
Acting Director

The Honorable  
David A. Stockman  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget

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File - Public D. Policy.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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November 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR GERALD HELMAN  
Deputy to the Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs  
Department of State

GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
for Policy

MR. W. SCOTT THOMPSON  
Associate Director, Bureau of Programs  
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy -- Project Democracy (U)

As you are aware, the Ad Hoc Working Group's efforts to foster public diplomacy have most recently focused on finding FY 83 funds to initiate our efforts now. Following extensive discussions, I believe that we should focus our efforts on a full policy presentation to the 98th Congress shortly after it convenes in January 1983. (S)

Before formally seeking Congressional funding we need specific Presidential endorsement via the NSDD on Public Diplomacy. We are currently working toward obtaining Presidential signature. (C)

There is, however, considerable preparatory work that the concerned departments and agencies can begin now so we will be in a position to move out smartly early in the new Congress. We need to begin work on the following: (S)

1. Presidential approval of the NSDD on Public Diplomacy (Action: NSC).
2. A draft Presidential statement launching Project Democracy to be accompanied by a detailed policy paper for presentation to Congress (Action: State).

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3. Budget submissions for FY 84 should include funds for Public Diplomacy (Action: USIA in close association with State, AID, DoD, and perhaps Labor).


Working on the assumption that we will have Presidential concurrence and present our case to Congress early in 1983, we should further examine steps which we can take within existing authorization to augment our FY 84 request by taking certain steps involving FY 83 funding. These include: (S)

1. Identification of FY 83 funds already available that may be cited for presentational purposes as aimed toward implementing Project Democracy (Action: USIA, State, AID, Defense, and Labor. The NSC Staff will contact Labor separately).

2. Identification of FY 83 funds for reprogramming action (USIA, State, AID, Defense, and perhaps Labor). Reprogramming requests, which require Appropriations Committee concurrence, must be supported by a strong budget presentation.

3. Preparation of an FY 83 supplemental request. USIA should take the lead, but work closely with OMB and the NSC. Under current planning, we envisage that the supplemental funding will be obtained via a "re-appropriation" action. Coordination with the other concerned departments to include beefed-up budget supporting documentation is absolutely essential.

I suggest that we meet again on November 30. I hope by that time we will have the NSDD signed. I request that each department/agency come to the meeting equipped with the specifics for reviewing the steps outlined above. (C)



Robert C. McFarlane  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

cc Philip A. DuSault, OMB  
Robert Searby, Department of Labor  
John Bolton, AID

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number: 1941

Date: 17 NOV 1982

Subject: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY -- PROJECT DEMOCRACY (U)

Classification:  Top Secret  Secret  Confidential  Unclassified

ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ADDRESSES SHOULD INCLUDE ADDRESSES AND ROOM NUMBER TO INSURE PROMPT/APPROPRIATE DELIVERY:

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	# cys	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
AMB GERALD HELMAN DEPT OF STATE	1			
GENERAL RICHARD STILLWELL DEPT OF DEFENSE	1			
W SCOTT THOMPSON USIA	1			
PHILIP A. DUSAULT OMB	1			
ROBERT SEARBY DEPT OF LABOR	1			
JOHN BOLTON AID, DEPT OF STATE BLDG	1			

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO:  
BT MERCHANT  
SITUATION ROOM

Handwritten signature/initials

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7927

MW

115142

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. <sup>WR</sup>  
PETER R. SOMMER <sup>PJ</sup>

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy -- Project Democracy

In response to your note to Walt, we appreciate the need to get the NSDD on Public Diplomacy signed. The NSDD, as you noted, would provide the framework to boost "public diplomacy." This would give us an interagency organization which would permit us to marshal governmental resources for a more coherent and integrated approach to public diplomacy strategies, which includes information programs, political aid and the Democracy Project initiative. It would also give us the clout to drive an interagency approach to resource allocations for this activity. The President has already endorsed the "Democracy Project," but he is not personally on board with the broader aspects of "public diplomacy."

We do not want to get out in front of the process, but the budgetary/funding complexities are such that we need to lay the groundwork now to have any hope for early implementation of Project Democracy following Presidential approval of the NSDD.

To explore the way forward, we had two informal meetings last week with the Ad Hoc Working Group (Scott Thompson, Dick Stilwell, and Jerry Helman). The Working Group, supported by agency budget experts, concluded that it would be nearly impossible to obtain Congressional approval for enhanced funding in the field of public diplomacy -- even for initial funding via reprogramming -- during the lame-duck session. The Working Group was particularly concerned that a push for this activity during the lame-duck session could jeopardize other international broadcasting and foreign assistance requests.

Against this backdrop, the Working Group's consensus was that we should submit a comprehensive plan of action, with a full explanation of Administration plans to expand our work in the field of public diplomacy, very early in the 98th Congress. State would probably spearhead this presentation, which would be in the form of a consolidated budget request for FY 84. OMB has earmarked \$35 million for Public Diplomacy initiatives within

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the USIA budget for FY 84. We understand they have an additional \$100 million unallocated, but identified as available for Public Diplomacy and Lebanon.

If we are to have funding for Public Diplomacy programs before next summer, we need to task the line agencies (with help from OMB) to examine further the possibility of reprogramming some FY 83 funds and reappropriating some FY 83 funds from one agency to another (e.g. refugee money).

Given the complex funding situation associated with these initiatives we suggest that you send the memorandum at Tab I to the Ad Hoc Working Group. It underlines that we will not make a submission to Congress prior to Presidential approval of the NSDD, but asks their departments/agencies to do the necessary preparatory work so we will be ready to move out smartly, hopefully early in the new Congress. Walt could, of course, send the memo, but it would carry considerable more weight if you signed it.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum at Tab I to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Public Diplomacy.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Bob*

Bob Kimmitt has concurred in the above.

Attachment

Tab I      Memorandum to the Working Group on Public  
            Diplomacy for Signature

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dec 2

Bud:

Tentatively scheduled Walt Raymond  
to see you for 5 mins tomorrow 9:00 am  
re:


State-sponsored \$100M democracy project:  
When he returned from Langley, he had a  
proposed draft letter to Stockman from  
Robinson re \$100 M democ proj. He  
called State re your recommendation that  
they sponsor it and they gave him a  
very mixed signal which he needs to  
talk to you about.

Okay to schedule \_\_\_\_\_

Instead, put on call list \_\_\_\_\_

Walt-→ Please pose the proposition to  
someone in Eagleburger's office; then  
let me know what he thinks. If he's against  
State having it in their budget let's go  
ahead with USIA and move it.

Bud





**DRAFT**

*Pliny Deming*

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*11/3/98*

0073P

P:R HECKLINGER:TF  
12/29/82 EXT. 20721  
P:L S EAGLEBURGER

NSC - W RAYMOND  
USIA - S THOMPSON

AID - M ZAK  
*HA - H. Simon*

*bureau.*

PRIORITY ALLDP

FOR AMBASSADORS FROM UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

N/A

*Also for PAO's and PIO Directors*

LSE  
DH

DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE: BIPARTISAN

STUDY

REF: 1. CABLE REPORTING JUNE 8 SPEECH, 2. 82 STATE  
298999, 3. 82 STATE 325083

*F  
m  
keep  
date June 8 -*

1. I BELIEVE MOST OF YOU ARE ALREADY AWARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S ENDORSEMENT IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT OF A PROPOSAL BY THE CHAIRMEN OF THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES TO SPONSOR A STUDY ON HOW THE U.S.--PARTICULARLY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS--CAN CONTRIBUTE MORE EFFECTIVELY TO THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS ABROAD. THIS STUDY IS NOW UNDERWAY. IT IS BEING CONDUCTED THROUGH THE BIPARTISAN AMERICAN POLITICAL FOUNDATION AND INCLUDES, BESIDES THE TWO PARTIES, REPRESENTATIVES OF LABOR, BUSINESS, CONGRESS, AND OTHERS (TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AT PARA. 4 BELOW). ~~AS YOU CAN SEE,~~ THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE STUDY IS AN UNUSUALLY PRESTIGIOUS BODY WHICH REFLECTS A BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL OPINION.

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MOST IMPORTANTLY, THESE PEOPLE INTEND TO LEND FAR MORE THAN THEIR NAME TO THE PROGRAM; THEY CONSIDER THIS TO BE A VITALLY IMPORTANT EFFORT TO WHICH THEY WILL DEVOTE SUBSTANTIAL ATTENTION.

2. THIS STUDY IS ALSO OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND WE WANT TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE. THE STUDY DIRECTOR, PROFESSOR ALLEN WEINSTEIN, HAS WRITTEN TO ME TO REQUEST POSTS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORK OF THE STUDY (TEXT OF LETTER AT

PARA 5 BELOW}. I ASK YOU TO GIVE THIS YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION AND RESPOND AS FULLY AS TIME AND RESOURCES ALLOW.

3. REPLIES TO WEINSTEIN'S LETTER SHOULD BE CABLED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY JANUARY 21, 1983. ~~THESE CABLES SHOULD BE UNCLASSIFIED.~~ CABLES SHOULD BE UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE SLUG ALL CABLES FOR P. THIS SHOULD BE AN INTERAGENCY EFFORT. STATE, USIA, AID, AND DOD ARE COOPERATING CLOSELY IN SUPPORT OF THIS STUDY AND, ON A PARALLEL TRACK, IN DEVISING A USG PROGRAM <sup>ON Democracy and Public Diplomacy</sup> TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS FOR FY 84. Posts' contributions to this latter effort have been appreciated.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF NOVEMBER 19 ANNOUNCEMENT.  
NEW BIPARTISAN DEMOCRACY PROGRAM LAUNCHED.

A MAJOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL EFFORT SEEKING METHODS TO ASSIST DEMOCRATIC FORCES ABROAD BEGAN ITS WORK ONLY DAYS AFTER THE MIDTERM ELECTION UNDER THE AUSPICES OF BOTH NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE BIPARTISAN AMERICAN POLITICAL FOUNDATION. AMBASSADOR WILLIAM E. BROCK, CHAIRMAN OF THE FOUNDATION, WILL CHAIR "THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM" OF THE APF, WHOSE CO-CHAIRMEN ARE CHARLES T. MANATT, CHAIRMAN OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, AND RICHARD RICHARDS, CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE.

THE THREE CHAIRMEN ANNOUNCED JOINTLY THE APPOINTMENT OF AN EXECUTIVE BOARD TO SUPERVISE THE SIX-MONTH STUDY PROJECT, WHICH WAS FIRST PROPOSED IN A LETTER THEY SENT

TO PRESIDENT REAGAN LAST SPRING ON THE EVE OF REAGAN'S EUROPEAN TRIP. AT THAT TIME, THE THREE URGED THAT A THOROUGH BIPARTISAN STUDY BE UNDERTAKEN TO DETERMINE "HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN HELP BUILD DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS IN OTHER NATIONS," A PROPOSAL MENTIONED BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT.

OTHER MEMBERS OF "THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM'S" EXECUTIVE BOARD INCLUDE VICE CHAIRMEN ANTHONY LAKE, FORMER STATE DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING AND CURRENTLY A ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ 3

FIVE-COLLEGE PROFESSOR AT AMHERST COLLEGE, AND BEN WATTENBERG, SENIOR FELLOW OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND BOARD VICE CHAIRMAN OF RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY; FORMER REAGAN NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RICHARD V. ALLEN; SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD {D. - CONN.}; CONGRESSMAN DANTE B. FASCELL {D. - FLA.}; PETER G. KELLY, DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL FINANCE CHAIRMAN; PRESIDENT LANE KIRKLAND OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR - CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS; THOMAS REED OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; MICHAEL SAMUELS, INTERNATIONAL VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE; {EX-OFFICIO} GEORGE AGREE, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL FOUNDATION, AND PROJECT DIRECTOR, PROFESSOR ALLEN WEINSTEIN. CO-COUNSELS TO THE PROGRAM ARE SARAH WEDDINGTON AND EDWARD WEIDENFELD. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD ANNOUNCED AFTER ITS FIRST MEETING ON NOVEMBER 4 THAT WEINSTEIN, AN HISTORIAN WHO IS UNIVERSITY

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PROFESSOR AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY AND EXECUTIVE EDITOR OF THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY AT CSIS, WILL DIRECT THE RESEARCH PROJECT.

AN ADVISORY PANEL TO THE PROJECT REPRESENTING "MAJOR SECTORS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY--THE CONGRESS, PARTIES, LABOR, BUSINESS, JUDICIARY, MEDIA, EDUCATION, AND OTHERS" WILL BE APPOINTED IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. AMBASSADOR BROCK EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD WOULD PRESENT PRELIMINARY FINDINGS IN LATE JANUARY AND A FINAL REPORT EARLY NEXT SPRING. END TEXT.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER FROM ALLEN WEINSTEIN.

DEAR AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER:

AS YOU CAN SEE FROM THE ACCOMPANYING PRESS RELEASE, OUR BI-PARTISAN AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL "DEMOCRACY PROGRAM" HAS NOW BEEN LAUNCHED. THE EXECUTIVE BOARD, ADVISORY PANEL, STAFF, AND I PLAN AN INTENSIVE AND THOROUGH STUDY OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS AIMED AT PROVIDING ANSWERS TO THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN ASSIST -- THROUGH OPEN POLITICAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES -- THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

AND INSTITUTIONS ABROAD.

LET ME AGAIN STRESS THAT THE PROGRAM IS STRICTLY  
NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND BI-PARTISAN, FUNDED IN ITS RESEARCH  
COMPONENT BY A COMBINATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE  
CONTRIBUTIONS. AMONG OUR CENTRAL RESEARCH CONCERNS WILL  
BE AN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT APPEARS TO US TO BE THE  
APPROPRIATE FORM THAT ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR  
THIS PROGRAM MIGHT TAKE. IN OUR RESEARCH STAGE, HOWEVER,  
WE ARE EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE STRONG ADMINISTRATION  
SUPPORT, AND FOR THAT OF THE BI-PARTISAN LEADERSHIP OF  
CONGRESS.

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AT THIS EARLY STAGE WE CANNOT OUTLINE IN DETAIL THE EVENTUAL EVOLUTION OF THE STUDY OR ITS CONCLUSIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT OUR FINAL REPORT WILL CONTAIN -- AMONG OTHER THINGS -- A SERIES OF PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING BOTH THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF ANY NEW AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL EFFORT TO SUPPORT AND HELP FOSTER DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT ABROAD. CLEARLY THE DEPARTMENT AND ITS EMBASSIES CAN PLAY AN EXTREMELY HELPFUL ROLE IN THIS PROCESS BY PROVIDING US WITH INFORMATION RELATED TO THE GENERAL PURPOSES OF THE STUDY. YOUR PREVIOUS OFFER OF ASSISTANCE WAS GREATLY APPRECIATED, AND BEARING THIS IN MIND, I HAVE INCLUDED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH I ASK THAT YOU SEND TO YOUR POSTS ABROAD FOR APPROPRIATE REPLIES. THESE REPLIES WILL BE INVALUABLE IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF OUR WORK AS WE SEEK TO DEVELOP NOT ONLY A SENSE OF WHAT IS BEING DONE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY BUT ALSO A VARIETY OF VIEWPOINTS ON WHAT OPPORTUNITIES AND POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR NEW ACTIVITY IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA:

1. WHAT TYPES OF FOREIGN NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS NOW EXIST IN YOUR HOST COUNTRY WHICH SEEK TO FOSTER INDIGENOUS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

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DEVELOPMENT, WHETHER OR NOT TOWARD DEMOCRATIC ENDS {I.E., NOT ONLY AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN PROGRAMS, BUT THOSE OF THE SOVIETS AND OTHERS AS WELL}?

2. WHAT ARE THE GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF THESE PROGRAMS AND HOW DO THEY OPERATE {I.E., SOURCES AND LEVEL OF FUNDING, RELATIONSHIP WITH SPONSORING NATION'S EMBASSY, HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD, ET AL.}?

3. IF A BI-PARTISAN, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY IS FORMED IN THE UNITED STATES -- ONE THAT WOULD INVOLVE BOTH MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, LABOR, BUSINESS, AND OTHER SECTORS -- TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD, WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON HOW IT MIGHT OPERATE IN YOUR HOST COUNTRY? ANY IDEAS THAT YOU COULD PROVIDE ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS WOULD BE HELPFUL:

-- IN THE UNITED STATES, WHAT SHOULD BE THE RELATIONSHIP, IF ANY, BETWEEN SUCH AN ENTITY AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT?

-- IN COUNTRY, WHAT SHOULD THE RELATIONSHIP BE BETWEEN SUCH PROGRAMS AND THE AMERICAN EMBASSY?

-- WHAT, IF ANY, ARE THE SPECIFIC PROJECTS THAT SUCH AN



ORGANIZATION MIGHT CONSIDER IN YOUR HOST COUNTRY?

4. FINALLY, WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE GENERAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT ABROAD? CAN IT BE DONE SUCCESSFULLY, AND IF SO, HOW? WHAT ARE THE PITFALLS TO BE AVOIDED? WHAT HAS OUR POST-WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE IN THIS AREA TAUGHT US? DO YOU HAVE ANY THOUGHTS ON STRUCTURE, FUNDING, AND POSSIBLE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES? WHAT ARE THE LIKELY EFFECTS UPON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RECIPIENT NATION AND THE U.S.?

NOTE: ALTHOUGH OUR QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO ELICIT INFORMATION AND IDEAS FROM POSTS IN NATIONS WHERE SUCH PROGRAMS MIGHT BE USEFUL, WE ENCOURAGE ALL POSTS TO SUBMIT REPLIES ON THESE, AND ANY OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT ABROAD.

YOU MAY ASSURE POSTS THAT THEIR VIEWS WILL BE TREATED WITH THE UTMOST CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCRETION BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD AND STAFF OF THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM. AS OUR STUDY PROGRESSES, WE MAY BE RETURNING WITH REQUESTS FOR MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION. IN THIS INITIAL STAGE, HOWEVER, THE RESPONSES OF POSTS TO THE QUESTIONS ABOVE, ALONG WITH ANY ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS THEY WISH TO SHARE, WOULD BE INVALUABLE.

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER, AND LOOK  
FORWARD TO HEARING THE VIEWS AND COMMENTS OF OUR  
EMBASSIES AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. END TEXT. 44

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*Sum Proj.*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 21, 1982

Dear George,

Several of the staffers believe the ~~idea~~ idea proposed by Dr. Pechel is a good one. We suggest that Dr. Pechel see Richard Perle in OSD who has done research work on appeasement in the 30's and, of course, is deeply involved in the security and strategic considerations concerning East/West relations in the 80's.

*Walt*

Walter Raymond, Jr.


Mr. George E. Agree  
President  
American Political Foundation  
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 716  
Washington, D.C. 20037

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E.O. 12958  
Amended  
Sec. 3.3b(1)

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REF: USICA 55125 CONFIDENTIAL

1. WISH DIRECT ADDRES ATTENTION TO REF TELEGRAM FROM CHARLES NICK, DIRECTOR ICA, TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS DESCRIBING PROJECT TRUTH MANDATED BY THE PRESIDENT AND CONSISTING OF A VIGOROUS MULTI-FACETED INFORMATION CAMPAIGN TO PROJECT OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AN ACCURATE IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY. AS NOTED IN REF, CIA PARTICIPATES IN SPECIAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTING PROJECT TRUTH.

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NLRR M430/1 #415143

BY RW NARA DATE 3/31/15

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2. IMPORTANT PART OF CAMPAIGN WILL BE TO REVEAL AND REFUTE MISLEADING SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA. TO THIS END, MISSIONS WILL BE SHORTLY TASKED BY STATE DEPARTMENT TO SUBMIT AN INTEGRATED MONTHLY REPORT ON SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES.

3. STATED OBJECTIVES OF PROJECT TRUTH ARE TO PROVIDE ICA/STATE WITH MATERIAL FOR USE: A. ONCE SUITABLY SANITIZED IN OVERT ISSUANCES SUCH AS A PLANNED PERIODIC SOVIET PROPAGANDA ALERT AND A FAST RESPONSE ALERT SERVICE; AND B. AS GRIST FOR A MONTHLY ANALYSIS OF SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA.

4. SPECIAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE WILL ALSO PROVIDE FORUM FOR DEVELOPING INTEGRATED AND ORCHESTRATED POLITICAL/PSYCH GUIDANCES ON AREAS AND SUBJECTS CRITICAL TO US POLICY INTERESTS. AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, INF (EUROPE) AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (CBW) ARE CURRENT EXAMPLES. COMMITTEE'S THRUST IS DESIGNED TO BE STRATEGIC RATHER THAN TACTICAL ALTHOUGH IT FUNCTIONED IN LATTER CAPACITY DURING NATO/INF/WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN SEPT/OCTOBER 1981 PERIOD.

6. AS PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR IN IMPLEMENTING PROJECT TRUTH WE WILL ADVISE ADDEES EITHER COLLECTIVELY OR SELECTIVELY.

~~SECRET~~

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[REDACTED]

7. FILE: [REDACTED]

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ORIG: [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

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STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: CMASS-E ( ), DALA/MC, DALA/MC/CC-3,  
DALA/MC/R-2, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OGI/G/UE, OOE/WE, OSA/CS/CA,  
OSA/CS/CF, OSA/CS/EN, OSA/CS/EP, OSA/CS/SD, OSA/CS/X, OSA/PA, OSA/PA/D,  
OSA/PA/F, OSA/PA/S, OSA/SE, OSA/SE/M, PLANFAC-E ( ), FILE, RF, LA-3,  
SE-3, CI-3, D/FBIS-2, IAD/CAS-3, IAD/IC, IAD/PE, NICAG/II, NICAG/PM,  
NID/GPF, NID/LA, NID/PE, NID/USSR, OER-3, OIA/ERSS, OTS, PCS/INT,  
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NLS F95-0412 #54

BY d NARA, DATE 8/27/99

FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS  
BT

EZ1:  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 335811  
EZ2:

FOR CHIEF OF MISSION FROM UNDER SECRETARY STDESSEL  
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 (12/14/01) (KUX, DENNIS)

TAGS: PROP, UR

SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: COUNTERING SOVIET  
ACTIVE MEASURES

INFORM CONSULS

REF: STATE 28758

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: THIS TELEGRAM SPELLS OUT HOW THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSES TO IMPLEMENT THE DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF ITS PROGRAM OF COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES DISCUSSED IN EARLIER MESSAGES. END SUMMARY
3. AS ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE USG'S CAMPAIGN TO

2

- MAINTAIN THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE WANT TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO HEIGHTEN THE AWARENESS OF NATIONS AND PUBLICS REGARDING THE SOVIET UNION'S USE OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT TO UNDERMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE US AND ITS FRIENDS AND GENERALLY WEAKEN THE WESTERN SYSTEM.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THAT A VIGOROUS, CREDIBLE DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT, TO SPOTLIGHT SOVIET MISCONDUCT WHEN IT IS EXPOSED - AS IT OFTEN IS - WILL HELP TO REDUCE THE ADVANTAGE THE SOVIETS CAN GAIN FROM ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS.

5. - IN WASHINGTON, THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON ACTIVE MEASURES WITH PARTICIPATION BY STATE, CIA, THE FBI, USICA AND THE NSC HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING THE DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. EACH GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU IN STATE WILL BE ESTABLISHING A CONTACT POINT ON ACTIVE MEASURES. THE STRATEGY OUTLINED BELOW WAS DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL MONTHS EXPERIENCE OF THE WORKING GROUP - WHICH

- INCLUDED THE CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STUDY ON ACTIVE MEASURES RELEASED IN AUGUST, THE STATE DEPARTMENT OCTOBER UNCLASSIFIED SPECIAL REPORT, AND DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER - NOVEMBER AT NATO AND IN EIGHT WEST EUROPEAN CAPITALS BY AN INTERAGENCY ACTIVE MEASURES TEAM.

6. THE STRATEGY SEEKS TO ACCOMPLISH OUR GOALS AS FOLLOWS:  
A. RAPID AND COMPREHENSIVE FIELD REPORTING ON ACTIVE MEASURES INCIDENTS WHEN THEY SURFACE OR APPEAR TO SURFACE (THIS IS DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL BELOW).

B. FOLLOWING QUICK ANALYSIS OF FIELD REPORTS, A DECISION BY THE WORKING GROUP ON WHETHER TO EXPLOIT THE INCIDENT AS A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY. NORMALLY IN SUCH CASES, USICA WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING WIRELESS FILE, USINFO, OR OTHER PRESS MATERIAL, HOPEFULLY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE REPORTED ACTIVE MEASURES INCIDENTS. (RECENT EXAMPLES WOULD BE THE EARLY NOVEMBER EXPULSION OF A KGB OFFICER FROM DENMARK FOR UNACCEPTABLE COVERT ACTIVITIES AND THE SURFACING OF A FORGED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE KING OF SPAIN).

C. RE LONGER-TERM TRENDS, THE WORKING GROUP WILL



COORDINATE:

--PERIODIC CLASSIFIED TREND REVIEWS OF ACTIVE MEASURES DEVELOPMENTS TO BE PREPARED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THESE WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN NATO AND FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS IN DIPLOMATIC AND INTELLIGENCE LIAISON CHANNELS AS APPROPRIATE. (COMMENT: THE RECEPTION TO THE CLASSIFIED STUDY FINISHED IN SEPTEMBER WAS POSITIVE BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN NATO WHERE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE (INTERNAL SECURITY) IN ITS MID-NOVEMBER SESSION APPROVED THE REPORT WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS AND - AS THE US URGED - RECOMMENDED THAT THE NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE FURTHER CONSIDER THE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS RAMIFICATIONS.)

--PERIODIC UNCLASSIFIED USG REPORTS. THESE WILL EITHER REVIEW TRENDS IN ACTIVE MEASURES ACTIVITIES OR FOCUS ON SPECIFIC TOPICS IN GREATER DETAIL, I.E., FORGERIES, FRONT GROUPS, KGB EXPULSIONS, ETC.

D. FOLLOW-THROUGH WORK, PRIMARILY IN THE FIELD, WILL INVOLVE:

--AGGRESSIVE PLACEMENT WORK BY USIA OFFICERS OF WIRELESS

FILE, USINFO OR OTHER PRESS ORIENTED MATERIAL AND ANY SPECIAL STUDIES SUPPLIED BY STATE;

--BACKGROUNDING BY STATE OF THE US AND FOREIGN PRESS IN WASHINGTON WHEN NEWSWORTHY ITEMS APPEAR;

--PERIODIC CONSULTATION IN NATO, WITH FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO ENCOURAGE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO REACT MORE VIGOROUSLY IN PUBLICIZING SOVIET MISDEEDS, AND TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY MORE FIRMLY IN DIPLOMATIC DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS. (SEPARATE MESSAGE WILL DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION).

7. WE REALIZE THAT THIS STRATEGY IS ONE FOR THE LONGER TERM. WHILE DRAMATIC SPY STORIES ATTRACT HEADLINES, EXPOSING THE NITTY GRITTY OF ACTIVE MEASURES IS LESS EYE-CATCHING BUT STILL, IN OUR VIEW, NEWSWORTHY, PROVIDED WE FOLLOW A PERSISTENT, NON-POLEMIC APPROACH SUPPORTED BY CONTINUING FLOW OF FACTUAL MATERIAL ON WHAT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR PROXIES ARE UP TO. WE RECOGNIZE THAT NOT ALL MANIFESTATIONS OF UNHELPFUL ATTITUDES (I.E., THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN VARIOUS WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES) ARE

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SOVIET INSPIRED. MOSCOW NONETHELESS ATTEMPTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE SITUATIONS BY MANIPULATING AND AMPLIFYING ANTI-WESTERN ATTITUDES THROUGH VIGOROUS ACTIVE MEASURES EFFORTS.

8. AS EXPLAINED ABOVE, THE SUCCESS OF OUR STRATEGY WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON FIELD REPORTING. IN MANY CASES WE WILL NOT KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED UNLESS YOU TELL US - AND IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. SPOT REPORTING ON SPECIFIC ACTIVE MEASURES INCIDENTS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFORT. PERIODIC ANALYSIS OF HOW SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS ARE SUPPORTED BY ACTIVE MEASURES TECHNIQUES IS ALSO OF GREAT INTEREST.

9. ACTIVE MEASURES REPORTING SHOULD BECOME AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY TEAM RESPONSIBILITY WITH EACH MISSION UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE MECHANISM TO COORDINATE REPORTING AND TO ASSURE A DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG COUNTRY TEAM ELEMENTS. TO FACILITATE WASHINGTON DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTING ON ACTIVE MEASURES, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT MESSAGES ARE PROPERLY TAGGED (PROP, AND UR AT A MINIMUM) AND THAT THE SUBJECT LINE ON ALL

REPEAT ALL MESSAGES BEGIN: SOVIET (OR SOVIET PROXY) ACTIVE MEASURES: ... MESSAGES ON ACTIVE MEASURES WHETHER PREPARED BY USIA OR STATE OFFICERS SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED AS STATE TELEGRAMS WITH USIA AS AN INFO ADDRESSEE AND SLUGGED: ATTN PMG/G. THIS IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE FULL AND RAPID DISTRIBUTION IN WASHINGTON.

10. THE FOLLOWING TOPICS ILLUSTRATE WHAT TYPE OF REPORTING WE WOULD FIND USEFUL:

FORGERIES: FORGED DOCUMENTS ARE A STAPLE ELEMENT OF SOVIET DIRTY TRICKS. WE ARE AWARE OF AT LEAST 6 EFFORTS WHICH HAVE SURFACED IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS. SOME LIKE THE SO-CALLED HOLOCAUST DOCUMENT AND FIELD MANUAL 30-31B HAVE BEEN USED REPEATEDLY, AND WE PLAN TO PROVIDE BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING THESE RECURRENT FRAUDS. WHEN AN APPARENT NEW FORGERY SURFACES, WE NEED COMPLETE REPORTING INCLUDING ITS TEXT AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ITS SURFACING SO THAT WE CAN PROMPTLY PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORITY-ATEDENTIAL AND IN SOME CASES IDENTIFICATION OF ITS PROBABLE SOURCE. AFTER THE INITIAL CABLE REPORT,

THE FORGERY ITSELF OR A COPY TOGETHER WITH THE ENVELOPE OR RELATED MATERIALS SHOULD BE SENT TO WASHINGTON VIA PARS OR ADDRESSED TO INR/INC FOR TRANSMISSION TO PARS TO ASSURE PROPER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS.

DISINFORMATION: DISINFORMATION IS ANOTHER ACTIVE MEASURE STAPLE AND CAN TAKE MANY FORMS. A TYPICAL EXAMPLE WAS A REPORT ON RADIO MOSCOW OF "MASS PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS" ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF THE NAMIBIA CONTACT GROUP TO LUANDA, ANGOLA IN OCTOBER 1981. NO SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED. WE NEED PROMPT REPORTING WHEN INSTANCES OF POSSIBLE DISINFORMATION OCCUR. OF SPECIAL INTEREST ARE CASES WHEN THIS TYPE OF ACTIVE MEASURE FIRST SURFACES IN NOMINALLY NON-COMMUNIST MEDIA. THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH DISINFORMATION FIRST APPEARS AND ANY INDICATIONS OF ITS PROBABLE ORIGIN ARE OF SPECIAL INTEREST. RUMOR CAMPAIGNS AND MEDIA REFERENCES TO DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION ARE TYPICAL VARIANTS OF DISINFORMATION TECHNIQUES. REPORTING ON THE CREDIBILITY ACCORDED SPECIFIC DISINFORMATION EFFORTS IS ALSO IMPORTANT.

EXPULSIONS OF BLOC OFFICIALS: THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE EXPULSION OF SOVIET BLOC OFFICIALS OFTEN SHED SIGNIFICANT LIGHT ON ACTIVE MEASURE OPERATIONS. THE FREQUENCY OF THESE OCCURRENCES -- 161 PUBLICIZED EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS BETWEEN JANUARY 1980 AND SEPTEMBER 1981, FOR EXAMPLE -- IS A GRAPHIC MEASURE OF THE SCOPE OF SOVIET MISCONDUCT, MUCH OF IT IN THE ACTIVE MEASURE AREA. IF QUIET EXPULSIONS AND UNPUBLICIZED PREMATURE DEPARTURES ARE INCLUDED THE NUMBER WOULD BE MUCH LARGER. MOREOVER, THESE EVENTS AND FREQUENTLY RELATED ARREST OF LOCAL COLLABORATORS ARE A PRIME SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON "AGENT OF INFLUENCE" OPERATIONS, MEDIA MANIPULATIONS, FRONT OPERATIONS AND OTHER DIFFICULT TO TRACK TYPES OF ACTIVE MEASURES. AN EXAMPLE IS THE RECENT DANISH EXPULSION OF A SOVIET "DIPLOMAT" FOR TRYING TO SUBORN MEDIA AND FUND FRONT ORGANIZATIONS TO SPUR THE DANISH PEACE MOVEMENT.

MEDIA MANIPULATIONS: IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE MORE INFORMATION -- BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON EDITORS, FINANCES, ETC., -- ON OSTENSIBLY NON-COMMUNIST PUBLICA-

6  
TIONS THAT LEND THEMSELVES, WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY, TO PASSING SOVIET DISINFORMATION. WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK TOGETHER WITH FIELD MISSIONS TO DEVELOP BETTER METHODS TO PUBLICIZE THESE VEHICLES OF ACTIVE MEASURES OPERATIONS.

FRONT GROUPS: THE SOVIET UNION, AS A STANDARD PRACTICE, USE INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONS TO CARRY OUT ACTIVITIES ON ITS BEHALF. THE MEANS USED TO INFLUENCE THESE FRONTS RANGE FROM STRAIGHT-FORWARD, IF UNADMITTED, CONTROL TO SUBTLE MANIPULATION OF UNWITTING LEGITIMATE NON-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS. WE HAVE ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON MAJOR SOVIET-DOMINATED MASTER FRONTS SUCH AS THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF JOURNALISTS, AND WILL PROVIDE MORE BACKGROUND TO THE FIELD. WE LACK, HOWEVER, A FULL UNDERSTANDING IN MOST COUNTRIES OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE INDIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIET UNION OR ARE FREQUENTLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE. REPORTING THAT ILLUMINATES THE STRUCTURE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS, THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE

HOST COUNTRY, AND HOW THE SOVIETS MANIPULATE THEM IS NEEDED.

11. OUR ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVE MEASURE PHENOMENA SHOWS THAT CONTROL IS USUALLY BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRIMARY FOCUS IN OUR EFFORTS TO COUNTER THESE ACTIVITIES IS THEREFORE ON THE SOVIETS. NEVERTHELESS, EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CUBA PLAY A CLOSELY ORCHESTRATED ROLE IN MANY ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS. CUBA HAS A LEADING ROLE IN ACTIVE MEASURES DIRECTED AT THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND LATIN AMERICA. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE, THEREFORE, TO IGNORE THESE PROXY EFFORTS. ESPECIALLY IN LATIN AMERICA, REPORTING ON ACTIVE MEASURES SHOULD HIGHLIGHT THE CUBAN ROLE FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURES NOTED ABOVE.

12. ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THIS MESSAGE FOR COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES ARE COMPLEMENTARY TO THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON PROJECT TRUTH HEADED BY USICA. THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ALERT AND FAST RESPONSE ALERT SERVICE PROVIDED BY USICA WILL DEAL WITH PUBLIC ANTI-US CHARGES AND PROPAGANDA. THE

- ACTIVITIES COVERED IN THIS MESSAGE WILL DEAL WITH SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES WHICH ARE OFTEN COVERT IN CHARACTER. OUR PUBLIC RESPONSE TO SOME SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES MAY BE BY MEANS OF THE PROJECT TRUTH FAST RESPONSE ALERT SERVICE AS WELL AS THE MECHANISMS NOTED IN THIS CABLE. HAIG

NNDD

NNNN

Raymond

National Security Council  
The White House

460

Package # 8470

02 DEC 10 P 6: 44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	J	A
Bud McFarlane	2	m	A
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4		
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

I have talked to  
Mr. P. He promised  
to solve the problem  
tomorrow. Keep me  
informed. Bud

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 9, 19 82

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: <sup>WR</sup> WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: Project Democracy

We continue to get less than positive support on this activity from AID. AID has initiated various efforts to build itself more into the center of the activity on the tenuous basis of their seed grant of \$150 thousand. This was an issue when Allan Weinstein and I had lunch with Tom Reed on November 24. At that point Tom and I suggested dumping AID and turning to State to fund the study. When this view was known in State, they pushed AID to complete the contract work. AID offered the APF a contract with built in language over which various elements of the Executive Committee of the Democracy Project find unacceptable. There is no danger of the USG losing control of this activity with Bill Brock and Tom Reed involved. I strongly urge that one call to Peter McPherson be made to encourage him to accept the contract changes and get moving forward now. Allan Weinstein literally cannot hire staff, rent offices or proceed without some funds.

Recommendation:

That you call McPherson today and encourage him to accept the contract, as amended, and launch the study.

APPROVED                      ✓ DISAPPROVED                     

Attachment

Tab I Amended Contract with covering memorandum

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F95-041/2 #55  
BY A NARA, DATE 2/6/99

~~SECRET~~

**WASHINGTON  
QUARTERLY**CSIS  
1800 K Street NW  
Washington DC  
20006202 887 0200  
Cable Address:  
CENSTRAT  
TWX: 7108229583

December 8, 1982

Mr. Walt Raymond  
National Security Council  
Old EOB


Dear Walt:

I enclose the memo which I sent to my overlords on The Democracy Program along with a copy of the amended AID contract. Nothing has happened since Monday to persuade me that anything short of an insistent call by Judge Clark or Bud McFarlane --or Secretary Schultz---will compel AID to expedite processing of the amended contract. I do not want to rehash the "politics" involved, but believe it, it would resist settlement at the staff level which you and I inhabit.

Should the AID contract not be signed by week's end, I think my best recourse is to seek immediate funding from some other interested government agency--State, USIA, or whatever. The situation with AID cannot be allowed to drag on, one way or another, until the New Year. The project has to begin moving.

Thanks for your help.

Best wishes,



Allen Weinstein



CSIS  
1800 K Street NW  
Washington DC  
20006

202 887 0200  
Cable Address:  
CENSTRAT  
TWX: 7108229583

December 5, 1982

To: Bill Brock, Chuck Manatt, and Dick Richards  
From: Allen Weinstein *A-W*  
Subject: The Democracy Program: Issues to be Resolved

Last Friday, George Agree's secretary read to my assistant in a telephone call a list of changes George proposed to make in the AID contract (a copy of which--including penciled-in changes, I enclose). George submitted the revised contract to AID later that day. Earlier last week, I sent each of you a copy of AID's proposed contract, so that presumably George's changes incorporate and reflect your collective advice and suggestions. George did not consult me about the changes prior to submitting them.

As matters stand, even if the AID contract were renegotiated successfully this week, funds for staff and consultant hirings for The Democracy Project, office leasing (I had planned to lease a suite in the National Academy of Sciences building that is being prepared for our use), stationery and telephone and other program expenses will not be available until mid-to-late December at the earliest. For obvious reasons, therefore, I urge the three of you--as the key principals--to resolve the remaining difficulties with the AID contract as soon as possible. When doing so, I urge you also to address the problem of obtaining the additional funds which the project requires. You should know that my leave of absence from Georgetown began formally on December 1, though as you know, my assistant Alexandra Glowacki and I have been working full-time on the program for well over a month. Having fulfilled the conditions you established for my undertaking the project directorship in your letters of appointment, I hope it is correct to assume that the final draft of the AID and other contracts dealing with The Democracy Program will reflect fully your mandate to me in the appointment letters.

As you know from my November 22 progress report to the three of you, we have moved ahead significantly in The Democracy Program despite the total absence of either public or private funding. My expenses in organizing the work for the past six weeks---personal salary and that of my assistant, telephone, secretarial help, xeroxing, travel, and office supplies--have been paid either by me or by Georgetown. My meetings with foreign and domestic dignitaries has demonstrated widespread interest in and support for our efforts. In addition, I have met individually since the November 4 Executive Board meeting to discuss the program with the following Board members: Allen, Fascell, Kirkland, Lake, Reed, Samuels, and Wattenberg. In addition, I have spoken with Senator Dodd's staffers on the telephone several times and have had numerous talks with your respective representatives.

Later this week, I plan to mail to the full Executive Board membership a written status report on our progress thus far, something which a number of them have requested. Before doing so and before we meet again as a Board on December 17, I believe it essential that the four of us meet as a group to review the situation. I leave the scheduling in your hands and will rearrange my existing appointments to accommodate your schedules.

December 1, 1982

Mr. George E. Agree, President  
American Political Foundation  
~~P. O. Box 37034~~ 2100 PA. AVE.  
Washington, D. C. 20013

Subject: Grant No. OTR-0098-G-SS-3029-00

Dear Mr. Agree:

Pursuant to the authority contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, The Agency for International Development (hereinafter referred to as "A.I.D." or "Grantor" hereby grants to the American Political Foundation the sum of \$150,000 to provide support for a program entitled "Support for Democracy" as described in the Schedule of this grant and Attachment 2, entitled "Program Description".

This grant is effective and obligation is made as of the date of this letter and shall apply to commitments made by the Grantee in furtherance of program objectives during the period beginning with the effective date and ending June 30, 1983. *is this inconsistent with D.M.P. of grant?*

This grant is made to the Grantee, on condition that the funds will be administered in accordance with the terms and conditions as set forth in Attachment 1, the Schedule, Attachment 2, entitled "Program Description" and Attachment 3 entitled "Standard Provisions" which have been agreed to by your organization.

Please sign the original and seven (7) copies of this letter to acknowledge your receipt of the grant and return the original and six (6) copies to the Office of Contract Management.

Sincerely yours,

L. E. Stanfield  
Grant Officer  
OTR Branch  
Central Operations Division  
Office of Contract Management

Attachments:

1. Schedule
2. Program Description
3. Standard Provisions

ACKNOWLEDGED

AMERICAN POLITICAL FOUNDATION

BY: \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FISCAL DATA

Appropriation: 72- 113103.7

Allotment: 337-30-099-00-20-31

PIO/T No. (FESA-83-13010-KG-11  
930-0098-3033397

TOTAL OBLIGATED  
AMOUNT: \$150,000

IRS Employer  
Identification No.: \_\_\_\_\_

Funding Source: AID/W

SCHEDULE

**A. Purpose of Grant**

The purpose of this Grant is to provide support for a study to determine the feasibility of various programs and institutional arrangements to promote the development and strengthening of democratic forces overseas.

**B. Period of Grant**

The effective date of this Grant is December 1, 1982. The expiration date of this Grant is June 30, 1983.

**C. Amount of Grant and Payment**

1. AID hereby obligates the amount of \$150,000 for purposes of this Grant.

2. Payment shall be made to the Grantee in accordance with procedures set forth in Attachment 3 - Standard Provision 7B. PAYMENT- PERIODIC ADVANCES

**D. Financial Plan**

The following is the Financial Plan for this Grant. Revisions to this Plan shall be made in accordance with Standard Provision 6. Revision of Financial Plans:

<u>Cost Element</u>	<u>From: 12-1-82</u> <u>To: 6-30-83</u>
Salaries	\$ 60,000
Travel & Per Diem	25,000
Consultants	25,000
Administrative	
a. Rental: office furnishings, equipment	30,000
b. Communications	5,000
c. Supplies, Printing, etc.	5,000
Total	<u>\$150,000</u>

The grantee may not exceed the total obligated amount of the Budget. Adjustments of more than 25% in the line items will require the written approval of the AID Project Manager.

The study is budgeted for a total of \$300,000. AID will finance the initial costs of organizing the study and salaries for the first three months. Private funds will finance the remaining costs. If additional private funds are raised, they will be used to increase the overall effort by expanding certain activities, such as the numbers of consultants and Advisory Committee meetings.

*OK* | The Grantee *understands that consultants will not be paid more than \$ per* ~~will obtain the written approval of the Project Manager of all consultants and their salaries prior to employing them under this Grant.~~

**I. Special Provisions**

1. The Standard Provisions applicable to this Grant are contained in Attachment 2 with the following exceptions:

- a. Standard Provision 72 "Payment - Federal Reserve Letter of Credit (FRLC) Advance"
- b. Standard Provision 7C "Payment - Reimbursement"
- c. Standard Provision 13B "Title to and Care of Property (US Government Title)"
- d. Standard Provision 13C "Title to and Care of Property (Cooperating Country Title)"
- e. Standard Provision 15 "Termination" delete and substitute the attached Standard Provision 15. "TERMINATION AND SUSPENSION"

## PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

### A. Objective

The objective of this Grant is to determine the feasibility of various programs and institutional arrangements to promote the development and strengthening of democratic forces overseas.

### B. Implementation

In undertaking the feasibility study no assumption is made on the desirability of any particular program or structure or on the conditions under which these may operate.

The feasibility study will have three major areas of investigation:

1. Identify and evaluate existing public and private programs from the U.S. and other Western countries that encourage democratic forces in ~~developing~~<sup>other</sup> countries. The study will survey international political and related activity by democratic parties, foundations and other institutions. Of particular interest are the activities on the party foundations in West Germany.

2. Identify the types of democratic forces and <sup>other</sup> institutions that need to be strengthened in ~~non-developed~~ countries and recommend the type and level of support needed. Democratic forces to be identified include political parties and movements, labor unions, voluntary organizations, education programs and the communications media. The types of needs to be identified include training, technical assistance, materials and equipment, and local and international contacts. The study should also recommend new forms of support not currently undertaken by American or foreign institutions.

3. Recommend alternative ways in which democratic forces overseas can be supported through ongoing programs an/or new mechanisms.

The study will be carried out by a small staff with appropriate expertise. Consultants will be used for specific areas of the study, especially in the evaluation of ongoing programs where country specific expertise is required.

→ to minimized travel expenses, the travel will focus on a few countries in each geographical region. These countries will be selected on the basis of the level and importance of external assistance as well as providing a representative sample of the assistance programs that have been identified by the study.

→ The APF will appoint, <sup>to</sup> An Advisory Committee will provide overall guidance and review of the study. Approximately forty members will be on the Advisory Committee. They will be leading figures in their fields and represent a broad sample of American society.

→ The APF has appointed an, <sup>to</sup> An Executive Board will provide the detailed guidance for the study. The Board will be composed of twelve members including a Chairman, two Co-chairmen, and two Vice Chairmen. → The Project Director and Counsel ~~to the Executive Board~~ <sup>the Pres. of A</sup> shall be ex-officio members of the Executive Board. The Executive Board will review and approve the management and financial decisions of the Project Director, oversee and direct the conduct of the study and approve the allocation of study funds by the Project Director.

→ The Project Director will be responsible for the direction and management of the study, including all financial matters of the overall study and the A.I.D. contribution.

### C. Required Reports

→ <sup>APF</sup> The Project Director will submit to A.I.D. a brief report upon completion of the 2nd and 4th month of the study. The report will describe the work accomplished to date, planned work to be undertaken in the upcoming months, and expenditures to date. A final report containing the recommendations of the study and the accounting of the funds will be submitted at the end of the six month study. Reports submitted to the Executive Board by the Project Director will also be sent to the A.I.D. Project Manager.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01  
EOB322

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ GENEVA 12042  
FOR P  
EO 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PGOV  
SUBJECT: **DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE**  
REFS: A. STATE 321662  
- B. STATE 298999

1. ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MISSION GENEVA OFFERS THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS  
IN RESPONSE TO REFTELS:

(A) A MORE PRODUCTIVE PROGRAM OF DEMOCRATIZATION  
MIGHT BE FOUND BY DIRECTING LIMITED RESOURCES TOWARD  
COUNTRIES THAT ARE AT PRESENT UNDECIDED AS TO THEIR  
FORM OF GOVERNMENT (E.G., COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA  
AND AFRICA).

(B) WE AGREE COMPLETELY THAT THE DEMOCRATIZATION  
OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WILL, AT BEST, BE A LONG-TERM  
PROCESS WHICH MUST BE APPROACHED REALISTICALLY.

(C) MISSION BELIEVES THAT CHANGE MUST ACTUALLY COME  
FROM WITHIN. "...SEEN TO COME FROM WITHIN" IMPLIES  
THAT CHANGE WILL BE DIRECTED FROM OUTSIDE, HARDLY  
A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY IN A HARD-CORE COMMUNIST  
COUNTRY.

(D) ALL OF THE TOOLS MENTIONED IN REF B, FOR  
EXAMPLE, RADIOS, LITERATURE, EXCHANGES, ETC., ARE  
USEFUL PROVIDED THEY ARE FASHIONED TO FIT EACH  
COUNTRY. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IS A  
POLICY DETERMINATION TO PROMOTE VIGOROUSLY SUCH  
PROGRAMS WITH TIME, MAN-POWER, MATERIAL AND, MOST  
IMPORTANT OF ALL, FUNDING.

(E) FINALLY, THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF  
THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AS TO WHICH SYSTEM TO  
CHOOSE IF A CHOICE IS PRESENTED. AMERICA AND  
OTHER DEMOCRATICALLY-ORIENTED GOVERNMENTS WIN HANDS  
DOWN EVERY TIME. SWABE

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 101.108



~~SECRET~~

115147

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 3, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: <sup>WR</sup> WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy/Project Democracy Package

In seeking to implement your instructions, I have run into several concerns over the presentation of this package in the budget and to Congress. State for example, is reluctant to accept the role of "lead agency" in terms of the budget without further discussion. I believe a short interagency meeting is needed as soon as possible to insure we have a coordinated approach. It would be a logical follow-up to your memorandum, dated November 17, 1982, same subject. As you are aware the essential plan is to include \$100 million in the FY 84 budget request for this program. The overall direction of this program will be under the aegis of the Special Planning Group as spelled out in the projected NSDD on Public Diplomacy. The sequence of events are a bit out of phase in that ideally we would have the SPG in place, it would review and approve the program and then submit it to OMB. The imperative of the OMB deadline has necessitated that we share with them a preliminary cut of the program. We will, in the immediate future, submit the program to the concerned agencies for final approval (or to the SPG if it exists at that time).

Special management issues, however, have to be resolved now. These include:

-- Packaging: Does the \$100 million go forward as a single program with one "lead agency" carrying the ball?

-- There is majority support for this approach, although State Department lawyers believe the lead agency concept complicates the issue.

-- The arguments in favor are that it permits the program to be seen and discussed in totality. Allocations could be made subsequently by the "manager" to concerned agencies.

-- Whoever is designated as "lead agency" would provide the budget defense on the Hill, but this would be preceded by a policy presentation by the Secretary of State.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NLRRM430/2 \*115147  
BY KML NARA DATES 5/10/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-- Organizational Sponsorship:

The argument for State.

-- The Secretary is the President's principal foreign policy advisor and is the best placed to articulate an interagency program.

-- Most convincing advocate on the Hill. In this regard we are talking both about "plausibility" as well as a willingness to make the time commitment and undertake the selling effort necessary.

-- Some (OMB, State) are concerned that State does not have sufficient authorization; our understanding is that the basic State authorization (Title 22, US Code) provides sufficient latitude.

-- State (Comptroller/M) is concerned about the impact on its budget if there is heavy pressure for resources. (This argument will be made by any organization.)

The argument for USIA.

-- The largest amount of the program is to be run by USIA and most of the program according to OMB falls under existing USIA authorization. OMB prefers this option as the most effective "package" for Hill presentation and defense.

-- It is the preferred option of State. AID is prepared to accept either State or USIA as the lead agency.

The argument for Presidential appropriation.

-- Both USIA and State have expressed enthusiasm for this as a compromise option. (Possibly their enthusiasm is that they see this as a way to keep their budgets intact.) State Department lawyers state that separate legislation, with funds appropriated by the President and the concurrent designation of the Secretary of State to execute the program, would be a sound way to respond to this specific Presidential initiative. If the Secretary were designated as manager, he would give funds to concerned agencies as appropriate (and on the basis of SPG deliberations).

-- A possible downside is the uncertainty of how this might be perceived on the Hill and whether this is the best way to guarantee the integrity of these funds. The President's "discretionary" funds can experience unexpected drawdowns if circumstances warrant and this could jeopardize program funding levels. Discussion of this is necessary. OMB strongly opposes including Project Democracy under Presidential appropriation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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-- Congressional Strategy:

The key here is to identify the most "plausible" and most "effective" defender of the program. Frankly, I think State is better prepared and more credible. Nevertheless, this is related closely to whom will work hard. Helman worries about Secretary Shultz's availability. I should think Eagleberger's office could be counted on. Larry's request for 14 full-time officers for this area suggests a serious commitment. One concern: Dick Kennedy (M area) was not effective or committed to defending the Asia Foundation and this is analogous to the projected programs. "M" worries about the budgetary impact on State's other functions. Given the general parallelism of USIA's program to much of "Project Democracy", Helman believes USIA can and would give it a good shot.

Note 1: To put the \$100 million "in the budget" by the December 1 deadline, Gil Robinson wrote a letter to Stockman acknowledging the inclusion of the sum in the USIA budget. I am assured by OMB this can be shifted to State if we so choose.

Note 2: Bob Kimmitt and I believe the State option is viable, particularly if State is prepared to push the case aggressively on the Hill. We also believe that a brief meeting, chaired by you, will cut through the various concerns and establish a clear and coherent plan for the lead agency and a Hill strategy. Two earlier meetings (one in October and one in November) have set the stage.

Options:

- 1) Meet with the Ad Hoc Working Group at your earliest convenience in the week of December 6.
- 2) Let the Robinson memo stand with USIA as lead agency.
- 3) Call Eagleberger and sort it out telephonically.

Recommendation:

That you meet with the Ad Hoc Working Group.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Bob Kimmitt has concurred.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7927

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Raymond*

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR GERALD HELMAN  
Deputy to the Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs  
Department of State

GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  
for Policy

MR. W. SCOTT THOMPSON  
Associate Director, Bureau of Programs  
United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy -- Project Democracy (U)

As you are aware, the Ad Hoc Working Group's efforts to foster public diplomacy have most recently focused on finding FY 83 funds to initiate our efforts now. Following extensive discussions, I believe that we should focus our efforts on a full policy presentation to the 98th Congress shortly after it convenes in January 1983. ~~(S)~~

Before formally seeking Congressional funding we need specific Presidential endorsement via the NSDD on Public Diplomacy. We are currently working toward obtaining Presidential signature. ~~(S)~~

There is, however, considerable preparatory work that the concerned departments and agencies can begin now so we will be in a position to move out smartly early in the new Congress. We need to begin work on the following: ~~(S)~~

1. Presidential approval of the NSDD on Public Diplomacy (Action: NSC).
2. A draft Presidential statement launching Project Democracy to be accompanied by a detailed policy paper for presentation to Congress (Action: State).

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 1-95-0412 #56

BY *[Signature]*

NARA, DATE 8/27/99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. Budget submissions for FY 84 should include funds for Public Diplomacy (Action: USIA in close association with State, AID, DoD, and perhaps Labor).


Working on the assumption that we will have Presidential concurrence and present our case to Congress early in 1983, we should further examine steps which we can take within existing authorization to augment our FY 84 request by taking certain steps involving FY 83 funding. These include: (S)

1. Identification of FY 83 funds already available that may be cited for presentational purposes as aimed toward implementing Project Democracy (Action: USIA, State, AID, Defense, and Labor. The NSC Staff will contact Labor separately).

2. Identification of FY 83 funds for reprogramming action (USIA, State, AID, Defense, and perhaps Labor). Reprogramming requests, which require Appropriations Committee concurrence, must be supported by a strong budget presentation.

3. Preparation of an FY 83 supplemental request. USIA should take the lead, but work closely with OMB and the NSC. Under current planning, we envisage that the supplemental funding will be obtained via a "re-appropriation" action. Coordination with the other concerned departments to include beefed-up budget supporting documentation is absolutely essential.

I suggest that we meet again on November 30. I hope by that time we will have the NSDD signed. I request that each department/agency come to the meeting equipped with the specifics for reviewing the steps outlined above. (C)



Robert C. McFarlane  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

cc Philip A. DuSault, OMB  
Robert Searby, Department of Labor  
John Bolton, AID

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number: 1241

Date: 17 NOV 1982

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY -- PROJECT DEMOCRACY (U)

Subject:

Classification:  Top Secret  Secret  Confidential  Unclassified

ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ADDRESSES SHOULD INCLUDE ADDRESSES AND ROOM NUMBER TO INSURE PROMPT/APPROPRIATE DELIVERY:

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<u>W SCOTT THOMPSON</u> <u>USIA</u>	<u>1</u>			
<u>PHILIP A. DUSAULT</u> <u>OMB</u>	<u>1</u>			
<u>ROBERT SEARBY</u> <u>DEPT OF LABOR</u>	<u>1</u>			
<u>JOHN BOLTON</u> <u>AID, DEPT OF STATE BLDG</u>	<u>1</u>			

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO:  
BT MERCHANT  
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~

7927

KW

115149

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*  
PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy -- Project Democracy

In response to your note to Walt, we appreciate the need to get the NSDD on Public Diplomacy signed. The NSDD, as you noted, would provide the framework to boost "public diplomacy." This would give us an interagency organization which would permit us to marshal governmental resources for a more coherent and integrated approach to public diplomacy strategies, which includes information programs, political aid and the Democracy Project initiative. It would also give us the clout to drive an interagency approach to resource allocations for this activity. The President has already endorsed the "Democracy Project," but he is not personally on board with the broader aspects of "public diplomacy."

We do not want to get out in front of the process, but the budgetary/funding complexities are such that we need to lay the groundwork now to have any hope for early implementation of Project Democracy following Presidential approval of the NSDD.

To explore the way forward, we had two informal meetings last week with the Ad Hoc Working Group (Scott Thompson, Dick Stilwell, and Jerry Helman). The Working Group, supported by agency budget experts, concluded that it would be nearly impossible to obtain Congressional approval for enhanced funding in the field of public diplomacy -- even for initial funding via reprogramming -- during the lame-duck session. The Working Group was particularly concerned that a push for this activity during the lame-duck session could jeopardize other international broadcasting and foreign assistance requests.

Against this backdrop, the Working Group's consensus was that we should submit a comprehensive plan of action, with a full explanation of Administration plans to expand our work in the field of public diplomacy, very early in the 98th Congress. State would probably spearhead this presentation, which would be in the form of a consolidated budget request for FY 84. OMB has earmarked \$35 million for Public Diplomacy initiatives within

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NLRR M430/2 # 115149

BY KML NARA DATE 5/10/13

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the USIA budget for FY 84. We understand they have an additional \$100 million unallocated, but identified as available for Public Diplomacy and Lebanon.

If we are to have funding for Public Diplomacy programs before next summer, we need to task the line agencies (with help from OMB) to examine further the possibility of reprogramming some FY 83 funds and reappropriating some FY 83 funds from one agency to another (e.g. refugee money).

Given the complex funding situation associated with these initiatives we suggest that you send the memorandum at Tab I to the Ad Hoc Working Group. It underlines that we will not make a submission to Congress prior to Presidential approval of the NSDD, but asks their departments/agencies to do the necessary preparatory work so we will be ready to move out smartly, hopefully early in the new Congress. Walt could, of course, send the memo, but it would carry considerable more weight if you signed it.

#### Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum at Tab I to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Public Diplomacy.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Bob*

Bob Kimmitt has concurred in the above.

#### Attachment

Tab I      Memorandum to the Working Group on Public  
Diplomacy for Signature

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dec 2

Bud:

Tentatively scheduled Walt Raymond to see you for 5 mins tomorrow 9:00 am re:


State-sponsored \$100M democracy project: When he returned from Langley, he had a proposed draft letter to Stockman from Robinson re \$100 M democ proj. He called State re your recommendation that they sponsor it and they gave him a very mixed signal which he needs to talk to you about.

Okay to schedule \_\_\_\_\_

Instead, put on call list \_\_\_\_\_

Walt--Please pose the proposition to someone in Eagleburger's office; then let me know what he thinks. If he's again State having it in their budget let's go ahead with USIA and move it.

Bud



UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1982

*Walt Mond  
Raymond  
This is my concept that*

*State should be requested  
Bud  
12-2-82*

Dear Bud:

You probably have heard that the Secretary has agreed to an NSDD which establishes an NSC-led inter-agency structure for public diplomacy and political action. I hope you can move the draft NSDD ahead promptly so that we have an interagency structure to supervise the array of democracy projects which are being drawn up for submission under the FY 84 budget. The Secretary has already rejected the OMB passback to reduce to \$35 million the \$100 million target for democracy projects. We also are objecting to OMB's denial of an increase in the Department's staff to handle public diplomacy and political action. Our concept for this staff is attached. I hope I can count on your support.\*

Sincerely,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

*\*We will need the positions if we are to  
Enclosure: make this*

*As stated. thing work  
LR*

The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane,  
Deputy Assistant to the President,  
The White House.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Resources for Public Diplomacy and Political Action

President Reagan has developed, both conceptually and operationally, a broad new concept for the role of public diplomacy and political action in the US foreign policy. It constitutes one of the principle elements of our strategy with respect to the Soviet Union and third world countries. The democracy initiative, described to the British Parliament by the President in June 1982, is characteristic of the scope of the Administration's concept of political action. Currently, an NSDD is being developed to establish an inter-agency structure for public diplomacy and political action. A \$100 million program package is in the final stages of preparation for presentation to Congress. There must be a strong central staff which can tie all the strands of public diplomacy/political action together, both within the Department and between agencies under the proposed NSDD.

Presently, there are four officers attached to P doing public diplomacy/political action work. I believe we need a minimum of ten fulltime officers plus provision for four man-years of consultants who can provide more specialized skills.

The functions of this new staff will include:

- integrating public diplomacy into the regular conduct of our foreign policy;
- developing policy initiatives that will put the US on the political offensive;
- initiating and implementing political action projects such as the conferences on elections and the democratization of the communist world;
- assessing and devising actions to counter the overwhelming larger Soviet effort;
- implementing the President's democracy initiatives through private and public sector programs;
- providing liaison with other agencies;
- directing and serving as a catalyst for regional bureaus;
- covering issues not handled elsewhere, such as youth politics and international broadcasting;

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BY                      NARA, DATE 8/27/99

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- 2 -

- serving as liaison with non-governmental organizations with international scope (e.g., religious groups, labor) and transnational movements (e.g., Socialist International);
- working with FSI on the development of training programs for the Foreign Service;
- working on public statements.

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**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



December 1, 1982

Dear Dave:

Director Wick left for Morocco shortly after he signed the letter appealing OMB's proposed allowance on USIA's regular FY 1984 budget request. After he departed, members of your staff asked the Agency to address the issue of funding for Project Democracy.

We concur in the FY 1984 estimate of \$100 million for the Democracy projects as recommended by Secretary Shultz in his recent letter to you and repeated in the proposed memo to the President from Judge Clark presently being circulated for concurrence to Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger and Directors Wick and Casey.

We welcome the opportunity to play a significant role in the implementation of this initiative on behalf of the entire foreign affairs community. However, in asking that you establish the FY 1984 estimate for this effort at \$100 million, we must emphasize the fact that this initiative must complement, not replace, USIA's basic programs as manifested in yesterday's budget appeal letter. An enhanced level of those program activities is essential to the Agency's effectiveness in carrying out its own national security mandate.

Your staff has a draft of the individual programs contained in the Democracy project. These are currently under review by inter-agency committees and an updated version will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Gilbert A. Robinson  
Acting Director

The Honorable  
David A. Stockman  
Director  
Office of Management and Budget

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON  
December 1, 1982

~~EX~~  
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FY - setting up  
Hahn - then

Dear Bud:

You probably have heard that the Secretary has agreed to an NSDD which establishes an NSC-led inter-agency structure for public diplomacy and political action. I hope you can move the draft NSDD ahead promptly so that we have an interagency structure to supervise the array of democracy projects which are being drawn up for submission under the FY 84 budget. The Secretary has already rejected the OMB passback to reduce to \$35 million the \$100 million target for democracy projects. We also are objecting to OMB's denial of an increase in the Department's staff to handle public diplomacy and political action. Our concept for this staff is attached. I hope I can count on your support.\*

Sincerely,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

\* We will need the  
positions if we are to  
Enclosure: make this

As stated. *thing work*  
*LR*

The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane,  
Deputy Assistant to the President,  
The White House.

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PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 2689 DTG: 091831Z DEC 82 PSN: 030782  
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EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: (DECL: OADR)  
TAGS: BR, CO, CS, ES, GT, HO, OVIP REAGAN, RONALD W.  
SUBJECT: INFORMATION MEMORANDUM: PRESIDENT'S TRIP:  
COMMITMENTS MADE S/S 8237887,

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. TO THE SECRETARY FROM ARA - TOM ENDERS

3. YOU ASKED FOR A LIST OF COMMITMENTS MADE BY OUR SIDE DURING THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA AND ACTION RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT FOR FOLLOWING UP.

THERE WERE CENTRAL COMMITMENTS THROUGHOUT THE TRIP WHICH ARA WILL FOLLOW UP:

-- TO DO "OUR BEST" TO SECURE PASSAGE OF THE CBI TRADE AND INVESTMENT PROVISIONS DURING THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS.

-- TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- TO CONTINUE STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE SAN JOSE PEACE PROCESS.

-- TO WORK CLOSELY WITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN HELPING THEM TO DEAL WITH THEIR FINANCIAL PROBLEMS DURING HARD TIMES.

-- TO TRY TO ALTER OUR SUGAR QUOTAS OR, IF NECESSARY, THE LEGISLATION TO ALLOW THE LATINOS TO SELL SUGAR IN OUR MARKET AT CLOSE TO THEIR PREVIOUS VOLUME. THREE OF THE COUNTRIES VISITED, BRAZIL, COLOMBIA AND HONDURAS, ARE AMONG THOSE MOST HURT BY OUR SUGAR PROTECTION PROGRAM.

IN ADDITION, THERE WERE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS BY COUNTRY AS FOLLOWS:

BRAZIL

-- TO SET UP A BILATERAL WORKING GROUP CHAIRED BY THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WITH SUB-GROUPS AT MUTUALLY AGREED SENIOR LEVELS TO DO A ONE-TIME STUDY

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WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FOLLOWING AREAS IN OUR  
RELATIONSHIP. FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING TO BE IN  
JANUARY.

- ECONOMICS AND TRADE;
- NUCLEAR;
- COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY;
- SPACE COOPERATION E. G., TO TAKE A BRAZILIAN ON SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT,; AND
- COOPERATION BETWEEN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES.

ACTION: ARA TO COORDINATE.

-- TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATION BY CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS ON BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES. ACTION: ARA TO FOLLOW UP.

-- TO BE SUPPORTIVE IN HELPING BRAZIL WORK THROUGH ITS FINANCIAL CRISIS. ACTION: TREASURY.

COLOMBIA

-- TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' LEVEL ON BILATERAL ISSUES AND ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. ACTION: ARA WITH BETANCUR THROUGH PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE, AND THROUGH COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR/DESIGNATE GOMEZ.

-- TO BE "SYMPATHETIC" WITH THE SITUATION OF THE NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN BOLIVIA. ACTION: AID PACKAGE ALREADY IN PLACE.

-- TO "LOOK INTO" THE LIST OF COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC AND TRADE CONCERNS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE COLOMBIANS GAVE US A 180 PAGE DOCUMENT ON THE SUBJECT WHICH OUR EMBASSY IS ANALYZING. THEIR CONCERNS INCLUDE:

- THE U. S. TRADE SURPLUS SINCE 1979 ; ROUGHLY ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN 1981, . U. S. ECONOMIC RECOVERY IS THE BEST WE CAN DO FOR THE COLOMBIANS. FROM 1975 TO 1978 THE TRADE BALANCE WAS EITHER EQUAL OR IN COLOMBIA'S FAVOR.

- A PRELIMINARY FINDING OF COLOMBIAN SUBSIDIES ON CUT FLOWERS COULD LEAD TO COUNTERVAILING DUTIES. FINAL DETERMINATION IS PENDING A VERIFICATION TRIP TO COLOMBIA THIS MONTH. THE PROCESS LEAVES US NO FLEXIBILITY. ACTION: ARA.

- THE CONGRESS IS CONSIDERING A HIGHER DUTY ON SHRIMP IMPORTS. THE ADMINISTRATION IS OPPOSED; IT IS NOT LIKELY TO PASS. ACTION: H, ARA.

- COLOMBIA WOULD LIKE TO ADD PRODUCTS SUCH AS TEXTILES, GLASS, TRANSMISSION BELTS TO GSP. WE HAVE AGREED TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES. ACTION: ARA.

- COLOMBIA WOULD LIKE PREFERRED ACCESS TO OUR MARKET FOR ITS MANUFACTURED GOODS IN WHICH U. S. PRODUCERS ARE NOT COMPETITIVE. IN RETURN THE COLOMBIANS WOULD GIVE FAVORED ACCESS TO THEIR MARKET FOR CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. OTHER THAN GSP WE HAVE NO TARIFF CUTTING AUTHORITY. WE WILL HEAR OUT THE COLOMBIAN PROPOSAL. ACTION: ARA.

- ON THE IDB REPLENISHMENT NEGOTIATIONS, WE AGREED TO

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BE FLEXIBLE ON SIZE OF THE OVERALL LENDING PROGRAM.  
ACTION: EB AND TREASURY.

- COLOMBIA WANTS FURTHER COOPERATION IN ERADICATION OF  
HOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE. WE CAN CONSIDER THIS ON A  
CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. ACTION: ARA.

- U. S. FINANCING FOR TECHNICAL TRAINING IN COLOMBIA FOR  
NATIONALS FROM CBI COUNTRIES. WE WILL EXPLORE THE  
POSSIBILITY OF A COST SHARING FORMULA. ACTION: ARA.

-- LOOK INTO STOPPING THE U. S. DEPORTATION PROCEEDING  
AGAINST ANGEL RAMA, URUGUAYAN INTELLECTUAL TEACHING AT  
THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND. ACTION: CA.

-- NARCOTICS WAS DISCUSSED ONLY IN THE PRESIDENT'S SMALL  
BILATERAL. WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY COMMITMENTS THE  
PRESIDENT MAY HAVE MADE.

COSTA RICA

-- TO PROVIDE A PACKAGE OF ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE OF ABOUT  
\$30-MILLION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ACTION: ARA, :

- SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN SCHOLARSHIPS;

- AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OR PRESIDENTIAL STUDY GROUP  
TO VISIT COSTA RICA AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON AID FOR  
AGRICULTURE;

- SPECIAL STUDY GROUP TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE NORTHERN  
DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAM AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS;

- FOLLOW-ON HIG HOUSING INVESTMENT GUARANTEE, PROGRAM  
OF \$15 MILLION, POSSIBLY NOT UNTIL FY 84;

- \$5 MILLION MORE IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN FY 83  
REPROGRAMMED FROM EASTERN CARIBBEAN; AND

- AT LEAST \$5 MILLION IN PL-480 IN FY 83.

-- TO HELP FINANCE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE  
REGIONAL ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION ANNOUNCED AT  
THE OCTOBER 4 SAN JOSE CONFERENCE. ACTION: ARA.

-- TO HELP FINANCE OTHER ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMO-  
CRACY, SUCH AS TRAINING OF POLITICAL LEADERS. ACTION:  
ARA, P.

EL SALVADOR

-- THE U. S. WILL HELP FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR, BUT NO  
NEW SPECIFIC COMMITMENT WAS MADE ON EITHER ECONOMIC OR  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

HONDURAS

-- TO SEE WHAT ADDITIONAL HELP CAN BE PROVIDED IN CARING  
FOR 40,000 REFUGEES IN HONDURAS. ACTION: ARA.

-- TO FIND WAYS TO LOWER COSTS OF FMS CREDIT ALREADY  
PROVIDED. ACTION: ARA.

GUATEMALA

-- TO CONSIDER ENCOURAGING U. S. BANKS AND BUSINESSES TO  
VIEW GUATEMALA AS CREDITWORTHY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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-- TO CONSIDER PROVIDING MILITARY SPARE PARTS REQUESTED BY  
GUATEMALA.

-- TO EXPLORE WITH MEXICO THE CLOSING OF REFUGEE CAMPS  
NEAR THE GUATEMALAN BORDER.

-- BUT THE PRESIDENT MADE NO FIRM ACTION COMMITMENT TO  
GUATEMALA.

4. WE PROPOSE TO HAVE MORE DETAILED ACTION PLANS ON EACH  
ITEM READY FOR YOUR REVIEW UPON YOUR RETURN.

DRAFTED: ARA/PPC: GBROWN

CLEARANCES:  
CA: DASENCIO  
EB: RWOODY

DAM  
BT

EXDIS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 December 1982  
51 East 42nd St.-Suite 517  
New York, New York 10017  
USA

Leopold Labedz,  
30 Western Road,  
London, N2 9HY,  
England, United Kingdom

Dear Leo,

It was uplifting as always to see you when you were over here, and I hope we can get something going out of all that was said. I have read your letter to George Agree and will comment. But first, some miscellaneous queries if I may.

Do you have Boris Souvarine's current address (and phone)? He may know something of Chambers' sojourn(s) in France. Can you think of anyone else who may be in a position to know about underground work Chambers would have carried out in Germany and France 1931-36? I know it's a bit of shooting in the dark. You mentioned a Dane, now head of Danish TV news service in Sweden, who would know about Scandinavian leads on Chambers' work there (was it Yerden Schreimman?). Do you have his address?

When you have a chance to copy for me (for East-West Round Table use) the index to Survey, I'll be most grateful to have it. I understand that you published an article by Kazmierek on Polish-Soviet economic relations, and could greatly use a copy of this; I am writing on the question of economic détente and need all the back-up I can find. If you know of other published (or unpublished) English versions of his work, I'd like to know about them. Is Est et Ouest still being published? And also, a quarterly (I think) out of Paris called Quatres Fleuves; I can't find either in the computerized library systems here, so if you have any address for either, I'd appreciate it. I'm trying to build up a basic flow of information and analysis for our East-West Round Table people here.

The fellow who produced "The KGB Connections" film, Kit Vincent (Canadian and very good, if you haven't met him), is doing a sequel documentary for international distribution on Soviet disinformation. He's quite ingenious and dogged about getting some of the most most flagrant cases on tape, so if you have some prize cases that could be documented or followed up, let me know and I'll pass them on. I'm assisting his work in whatever ways possible, as he's quite keen to make up some of the vast ground our side has lost to the accomodationists and fellow travellers in the area

of film and video. I've put him in touch with Steve Morris, for instance, to bear down on the Vietnam story of Communist disinformation tactics used on the West; perhaps you have some suggestions.

Let me pick up on a few points in your letter to Mr. Agree. The monthly bulletin ~~celebrates~~ twists and turns in the Soviet line, juxtaposing these with Western press accounts and commentary, is I think a potentially devastating weapon. So simple, so irrefutable, yet no one bothers to do it. This could at least have the result of forcing the apologists onto the embarrassed defensive, and leaving them there. Shifting the ground of the debate by playing upon what few assumptions in our favor still prevail here (like: ~~maybe~~ something's up if Prayda and The Washington Post regularly come up with congruent arguments) seems to me just the sort of thing we want to be doing.

The Committee of Correspondence idea could also be quite effective, as people really do read the letters columns, the media surveys show, even more carefully than the news and comment columns written by the professional journalists.

Getting Europeans and Americans together at more and more levels is of course essential, so your mention (to me and in your letter) of the Italian Social Democrats is suggestive. I have on my desk a number of proposals and invitations from both U.S. and European groups to send representatives from the East-West Round Table to conferences, on exchanges, and simply for one-on-one meetings. More and more people are working along the lines of "networking" that you sketched out when we spoke. The demand is certainly there, at all levels I would say, and especially among the young who find themselves, even very many of the best and brightest, having to work through the rationale for the alliance from ground zero. We do not have the network of natural friendships and associations that grew up out of the Second World War. We have friendships, yes, but these are mainly personal and have not had the political value that so aided Atlantic relations for a generation, and in turn buttressed the West in its struggle with the Soviet bloc. So we have to do two things, it seems to me: Turn many personal friendships into a more political way, and create new links through the likeliest route, that is, professional association.

Now I sense around me, among talented Americans under 40, a hunger for relations that would cross not only oceans but also material considerations. The business traveller especially feels the frustration

of being only financially or legally or industrially ~~involved~~ with other countries, and yet exposed to so much more. I think we can play on this desire that exists in at least some American and European professional and business people and draw them into our activities integrally. The East-West Round Table, as it is developing here, could well become an umbrella for the sort of activities on this side of the Atlantic that you spell out to Mr. Agree. But I would stress the importance of involving bankers and lawyers and businessmen and technicians in whatever we do. The Poles should have taught us not to rely solely on intellectuals in forging our solidarity.

We are developing much more consciously now a model, in the East-West Round Table, that could be "franchised" in this country and abroad. ~~They seem~~ Some key points of the model are: Bring together tough-minded anti-totalitarians from every sector (labor, business, finance, academe, media, émigré circles, science, art), and organize a program that can hold the interest of some younger specialists (like Steve Morris) as well as bright lay-readers, as it were. Get them as close as possible to primary sources of information and first-water analysis about East-West: selected émigrés, journalists, free-lances and academics, ~~xxxxxxx~~ public servants, and so on. Try to cover new as well as old bases in selecting members for such a group, so that one does not merely create a repository for all the existing "sound" minds to collect in. The formula can be altered slightly for different "markets," (e.g., a Washington group would have a notably different character than a Chicago group), but such locally financed groups could form a confederation that would be worldwide. If one had even a half dozen of these groups in the U.S., with some sort of central office and lecture tour funding, then all sorts of people could be brought over here (and sent ~~to Europe~~ to cross-fertilize. I think that the impact of such a group in a Houston or a Philadelphia could be especially large, since there are so many fewer competitors for political and media attention in this <sup>Area</sup> than there are in New York or Washington.

Most of this is typing aloud, for now, but you'll pardon me for that I hope. While we're perfecting this model, and while I'm finishing the book, it would be very well to get something on the ground here, even if it's just an office and two people, so that energies have a place to flow through. I will be speaking with Walt Raymond soon about this, and trying to coordinate some compatible proposals from different quarters into a workable "firm." One of

these proposals could prove quite helpful in my being the sort of point man for Europe from New York that you asked me to be. I am of course very happy to do all that's imaginable, but am still for the moment quite constrained logistically. I do think that Round Tables for the under-40s will spawn, as ours is doing, myriad other beneficial effects in the field, and could serve as our most natural and unassailable way of getting into new markets and ~~people~~ to new people.

In this regard, I commend to you a quite entrepreneurial, most personable friend of mine, Michal Giedroyc (also a friend of Jan Chodakowski), who will be returning to London in January to Schroder Bank, and will be running the East-West Club of London which he founded two years ago. I spoke of him to you, and I think the best thing would just be to let the two of you link up without further ado. He's seen what we've done in New York, and has been getting all sorts of great ideas about what can be done in Europe. Through Miko you'll have extensive cadres before you know it, if you wish them. (As to European networking, Leopold Unger knows ~~of~~ some good groups that are already meeting in Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, and West Germany, I believe, and which should be brought into a possible federation).

I should know a good deal more about how much of a load we can shoulder from New York, by about late January. If we get an office, and secretary with part-time research assistance, then we can be of help to more than just the New York group. There are a number of specific projects that <sup>will</sup> be in much clearer view by that time, as well. In the meantime, let me hear of moves at your end. I hope I've not been too wandering or imprecise. You're the one man I want to talk to about all this, and it's hard to have the conversation without you here.

With very best wishes,

Yours ever,



John Fox

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SUBJECT: AFL/CIO Labor Institutes

The AFL/CIO sponsors regional labor institutes for Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Each institute is significantly underbudgeted. Operating with virtual straight line budgeting for the past five years, these institutes now, as a result of inflation, spend significantly larger amounts of their budgets for overhead rather than programs. An infusion of \$3 million for each institute would restore the balance between operations and overhead and could be handled with the existing structures. A discussion of possible use of this money is included in the attached memoranda.

3 Attachments

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BY

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F95-041/2 #59

NARA, DATE 2/27/99

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SUBJECT: African American Labor Center (AALC)

Through radical unions in Angola, Mozambique, Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia and other countries, the Soviets have tremendous inroads into the Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU). The current splint in the OAU affords an opportunity to split the OATUU and form a moderate Pan African Trade Union organization to counter the OATUU Soviet-oriented leadership.

Nigeria. When the FGN ordered the melding of 3 National Centers into one National Trade Union Center, the leadership of the new national center came from the communist union. This could be turned around with money. One half the affiliates of the current National Center are friendly moderates who could build their support and dominate the National Center. The Soviets have trained more than 500 Nigerian Trade Unionists in the Soviet Union and the Bloc. AALC can do nothing because Nigeria is not an AID recipient country. The National Center could influence the way the government goes when elections are held.

South Africa. AALC should be building a union inside South Africa which could be an organization to help change the government to a more democratic system. The objective would be to keep the trade unionists pro-West as the government changes instead of combining leftist political organizations with labor to form an opposition to apartheid. South Africa is not an AID recipient country. Congress appropriated about \$4 million during the last couple of years, administered by AID. The money went mostly to an International Institute in New York training mostly non-labor. Money had to be spent in the US. We want to spend money to train in US. During eventual blow-up, we want to have labor stay in our camp. Get a little from ICA. Congressional Subcommittee on Africa is trying to get another \$2-2 1/2 million to spend in country. AALC might get a little of it but not a significant amount.

In moderate countries like Kenya, Sudan, etc, AALC has to do things AID approves of. The Soviets are doing straight political teaching. Money needed to counteract Soviets.

Training Institute. AIFLD currently trains about 500 Latin Americans a year at the George Meany Institute. AALC said with money, it would propose establishing that amount of training for each developing geographic area plus some limited European exposure. Build a cadre of people who think like us and back them for leadership positions. AIFLD does it because it was established before AID took over funding and this was part of their charter. Training here was never part of AALC and AAFLI. This could be done for under a million bucks. Equipment, space, translation facilities, translators, instructors, travel.

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\$3.3 budget this year being reduced to \$3 million next year. With inflation, this amount will do even less in Malawi, Sudan, etc, we must see that Trade Union movements get into hands of people who see things our way. In Sudan, the whole railway union is communist controlled. The fight is still going on. The government has leaned heavily on this union but the radical element is still there. With money, moderates could be supported.

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SUBJECT: Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI)

Oceania or Pacific Basin: State is very concerned about WFTU moving heavily into this area. They are rising communist unions and CP's to sponsor Nuclear Free Pacific, Peace Forum, and other meetings throughout Asia.

WFTU is moving in on unions in Thailand and Manila. They have a WFTU secretariat in Sri Lanka and an Asian representative in Hanoi. These people travel all over Asia and sponsor meetings. WFTU just picked up its first affiliate in the Solomon Islands. The World Council of Churches is providing money for charity in rural areas of the Philippines which is being used to teach communist ideology. All of these things need to be fought and that takes money AID cannot or will not put up.

Visitor program. AAFLI brought one visitor to the US last year. The Soviets have sent hundreds of trade unionists from Asia to the Soviet Union for meetings and training.

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NLS 95-0412 #61

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NARA, DATE 2/27/99

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SUBJECT: American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)

In Chile and Nicaragua the UDT and the CUS need assistance on a sustained basis to keep democratically-oriented unions alive. Neither are AID recipient countries. We need to do the same thing we did in Venezuela in the '50's.

Brazil. There are eight separate National Centers. There is a move to join the eight with European support. AIFLD is against this because it would place all eight under radical leadership (Lulu and his people). Need money to support the maintenance of the moderate unions separately.

Peru. APRA party is split into two factions--one is making common cause with the communists. The left wing of APRA is launching a new rival to the CTP (good guys) which would be communist controlled. AIFLD has been giving CTP \$25,000 a year. AID won't support this any more. Money really needed or CTP will go under and leave the field to the communists.

ORIT (ICFTU L. A. regional organization). Desperate for help. Field programs at zero. Recent meetings between AFL/CIO, AIFLD and ICFTU spelled out differences between Europeans and Americans (trade unions) on L. A. covered every country. Need money to support ORIT and to educate Europeans on real situations in L. A.

CDUSTAL (WFTU regional for L. A.) Headquartered in Mexico. Detrimental to our interests. Affiliates are winning battles in Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Caribbean area. They are operating underground in Brazil. Openly in Nicaragua. Jamaicans need more help than AIFLD can give them. Granda is considered communist and is heavily helped by Cuba. A person who runs the Seamen Waterfront Dockworkers Union--powerful union--is the only hopeful opposition to Bishop. This union should be helped.

AFL/CIO International Department.

Could establish trade union Trade Union Center at G. Meany Institute as suggested above by AALC to bring trade unionists from all developing areas and some from Europe to associate with those trainees from developing areas to give Europeans education on situations in developing area.

Could establish training center to train Americans to serve with institutes abroad. Right now, half the people they hire prove ineffective. Similar to our old programs.

AFL could fund specific projects (earmarking money) through ICFTU, ITS's, other National Centers--such as CGT-FO in France, when

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NLS F95-04/12 #62  
BY d NARA, DATE 8/27/99

# MISSING

↓ 1. L/L

↓ 2. ME: Arab moderation  
Gulf Cons. Comm  
South Asia

↓ 3. Sov Institute

↓ 4. Rationalize "ADF", "IAP", "TOP"  
+ equivalence for NE, EUR  
Why not use TAF as model. |||

↓ 5. Bologna Centre (List via some  
other item)

↓ 6. Gotsomi's pages

7. Japan + Antislavery role

GET FILES CLARIFIED

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR GERALD HELMAN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GENERAL RICHARD STILWELL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MR. SCOTT THOMPSON  
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

MR. JOHN BOLTON  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MR. ROBERT SEARBY  
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

MR. PHILIP DUSAULT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy and Democracy (U)

I appreciate the time that you and your representatives devoted to the meeting on public diplomacy and democracy. The following represents the conclusions of the meeting as approved by Robert C. McFarlane:

-- USIA will serve as "lead agency" and will defend a budget of \$100 million.

-- We will not probe Congressional attitudes on this subject at this time. As the legislative calendar develops, Department of State and National Security Council staff officers will participate actively with USIA to garner support for the President's program.

-- The program should be proposed as public diplomacy and democracy. It is necessary that the double objective be in mind and on paper in the presentation.

-- USIA will be the principal spokesman at the BRB meeting on December 11. It is recommended that USIA be assisted by the Department of State.

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
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BY A NARA, DATE 8/27/99

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-- A letter will be prepared designating USIA as "lead agency" for the defense of the budget for the Public Diplomacy and Democracy Project. The letter will also indicate the Secretary of State, on behalf of the President, will initially present the program to Congress.

-- USIA and State should participate in a reclama with OMB for supplemental funds for this program for FY 83. It is our understanding the current project needs approximately \$30 million to permit us to initiate a meaningful program early in 1983. (S)

  
Walter Raymond, Jr.  
Senior Staff Officer

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NATIONAL SECURITY DOCUMENT

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December 9, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: <sup>WR</sup> WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy

In your absence I held the public diplomacy meeting with representatives from State, USIA, DOD, AID, Labor and OMB. Everyone had an opportunity to express their views. Bob Kimmitt, Peter Sommer, and I met subsequently and distilled from the discussion what we believe is the best course of action. In order to get this moving forward immediately, we should communicate the conclusions of the meeting to the agencies. If you concur, the attached memorandum sets out a plan of action. We are prepared to discuss any of these points in greater depth with you.

The principal point with which you may have concern is the designation of the "lead agency." Considerable discussion on this issue ensued and the most persuasive arguments were made in favor of the USIA option. USIA was favored because they already have appropriate authorization; they are willing to vigorously defend the program; and confusion might be caused by State including within its program activities that to USIA.

We will need a letter mandating that USIA take the lead. Our first choice would be a Presidential letter. A fall back would be a letter from Secretary Shultz since he chaired the August 30 meeting.

## Recommendation:

That you approve my release of the attached memorandum to the concerned agencies.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove  \_\_\_\_\_

That we prepare a letter for the President to send to Charlie Wick mandating his role.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove  \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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NLS F95-0412-64

~~SECRET~~BY anj NARA, DATE 7/3/00

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Alternatively that we ask State to have Secretary Shultz send a letter requesting USIA to take the lead role.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

OK  OK

Bob Kimmitt and Peter Sommer concur.

Attachment

Tab A Letter for release

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE BRITISH  
PARLIAMENT ON PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

1. The President proposed that the U.S. actively join "the growing campaign for democracy now gathering force." He announced that the American Political Foundation would be conducting a bipartisan study of how the U.S. could best institutionalize this function.
2. The need for democratic initiatives is too important to await the Foundation's final report; some U.S. government actions can be begun now, building on existing programs, to promote the democratic infrastructure of key countries. These actions could be taken in concord with the Foundation, or the Foundation could be asked to evaluate them in the course of their study.
3. One aspect of the "infrastructure of democracy" specifically mentioned by the President was unions. Because foreign trade unions play a pivotal political role in many countries, a U.S. program to promote free trade unions can help to weaken the anti-democratic, anti-American elements of important foreign unions, and also help to combat Communist penetration of labor institutions. Labor unions can be an important force for democracy, or an important force against it.
4. Because of tight FY 1983 budget constraints, there are good arguments for targeting the new labor initiatives to one region, and this should be Latin America and the Caribbean. There are three main reasons for this: (a) the Administration has already assigned a high priority to this region, (b) there are serious labor problems there, and (c) there is a well-organized AFL-CIO Institute (the American Institute for Free Labor Development--AIFLD) that can be a strong partner to the U.S. efforts.
5. If this region is to be targeted for the new pro-democracy labor initiatives, country strategies should be developed for about ten countries to include the specific ways that U.S. public and private efforts can be channeled. In order to develop these strategies, it will be necessary for U.S. agencies to improve their information on foreign labor unions.
6. To implement these country strategies, the U.S. labor attache should be designated as the point-man to coordinate

all U.S. government efforts and to perform liaison with U.S. private sector (trade union and business) efforts. In some cases, new labor attaches will be needed who can mix with and influence local trade unions.

7. Several actions can be taken to foster the infrastructure of democratic trade unions. These include: (a) DOL's Free Labor Leader Program for a coordinated two-way labor exchange, (b) expanding the activities of AIFLD, and (c) influencing international trade union organizations.

8. If the NSC agrees with the policies of (a) starting the campaign for democracy, (b) including a major labor component, and (c) targeting the program, for now, to Latin America, then the following actions should be taken:

--establish one interagency working group (with NSC, State, AID, DOL, USICA, and the intelligence community) to draft an action plan for the funding, implementation, and coordination of the new efforts;

--establish another interagency working group (with NSC, State, AID, DOL, USICA, the AFL-CIO, AIFLD, and selected business groups) to seek private sector involvement in developing and carrying out the U.S. efforts.

*James F. Taylor*  
James F. Taylor  
August 24, 1982

*for Robert W. Searby*

This paper outlines a strategy for obtaining private sector support and funding for the President's democracy initiative. Private sector involvement would not be restricted to US individuals, corporations and foundations. As we engage other Western governments in a common enterprise to spread democracy, we would seek to involve their private sectors as adjuncts.

#### Present Situation

-- The President defined the democracy initiative in his speech to Parliament in June 1982. He has returned to the subject several times publicly, most recently on November 4 to participants in the Conference on Free Elections.

-- Two conferences have been held, on the democratization of communist societies and on free elections. The turnout was good; the possibilities for follow-up are also good.

-- Other governments are beginning to associate themselves with the initiative. Costa Rica is giving strong support to a regional institute for free elections. Nigeria has expressed its sense of mission to advance democracy in Africa. The Council of Europe will be sponsoring a Conference on Democracy in October 1983.

#### Looking Ahead

-- our objectives will be to engage additional governments in the effort and to begin to institutionalize the promotion of democracy.

-- The APF study will be particularly important in determining how US private associations can contribute to the process. The report will be ready probably in April 1983.

-- Within the government, we are looking at present and prospective budgetary resources. Our aim is to have Secretary Shultz send a message early in 1983 to Congress describing the democracy initiative, and the money we will need to implement associated programs.

Private Sector Involvement

-- Government funds will largely go to government sponsored and controlled projects. What is needed is a source of money for non-governmental associations (such as our political parties, the AFL-CIO, church and student groups, and organizations such as the ABA and The League of Women Voters). These associations are potentially very effective promoters of democratic institutions.

-- The private sector might be engaged in the following way:

- A core group might be formed of prominent industrialists, philanthropists. The participants could be rallied by a letter from the President. Secretary Shultz might give a lunch for them.
- The core group would plan a White House Conference hosted by the President. Its purpose would be to establish a Fund for Democracy.
- The core group would also develop a prospectus which would describe the purpose of the Fund, and give some idea of the kind of projects involved.

In this, it might draw on the APF study (even if it is still in progress).

- The core group would also incorporate the tax exempt Fund for Democracy and provide seed money necessary to hire a staff to consider projects and disburse grants.
- At the White House conference, participants would be asked to give support to the democracy project both through their own institutional activities and through contributions to the Fund for Democracy.

#### Looking Ahead

-- Optimistically, the Fund could be established at the White House Conference by late spring 1983 and could begin to pick up some of the projects identified by the APF study. It could supplement government sponsored programs authorized by Congress with private association efforts overseas.

-- The President could describe his achievement at the Williamsburg summit. He could ask his colleagues there to undertake a parallel effort, offering to coordinate our programs with theirs and to put the management of the Fund in touch with counterpart associations in their countries.

-- He could further suggest ongoing coordination of the effort under the aegis of the seven heads of government, with the possibility of a joint meeting at the next summit with the major private contributors from all seven democracies.

Drafted: P:GBHelman:atp  
Ext. 29818:11/22/82

## LABOR PROGRAMS

### Overview

The US and democracies throughout the world would benefit enormously from a strengthened international free labor movement. Free trade unions have proved to be strong supporters of democracy, which they regard as necessary for their existence. Free labor usually has proven to be a bulwark against Soviet and communist attempts to control the domestic and international labor movements and labor-oriented political parties. Free trade unions also have been "schools for democracy" enabling millions of workers, farmers, and peasants to affect their lives and working conditions through democratic elections and collective bargaining. A strengthened national and international labor movement would bolster democracy both in countries where the Soviets are engaged in overt and covert political action programs in the labor sector to shift the political balance of power (e.g., Western Europe and Oceania), as well as those regions where the Soviets are supporting communist and radical insurgents in an effort to undermine stability and the democratic labor movement (e.g., Central America and southern Africa).

To support democratic trade unions and labor-oriented politicians and undermine Soviet efforts to use labor to shift the "correlation of forces" against the US, it is necessary

- (1) to support free trade unions abroad, both on the national

and international levels and (2) to ensure that the foreign policy perspectives of American labor, reflected for over 100 years in the AFL, and the AFL-CIO, become widely accepted in labor-political circles throughout the world. American labor, more than any other trade union movement, has been steadfast in its support of democracy, virulently opposed all forms of dictatorship, and has a proven record of effective moral and material assistance to the international labor movement.

By bolstering American labor's efforts, directly through the AFL-CIO, and by supporting youth, university, and public policy centers which cooperate closely with organized labor in the US and abroad, the US will be able to strengthen democratic elements throughout the world. They should be targetted at key US strategic priorities and regions which include Western Europe (particularly southern and central Europe), Central America (Mexico to Columbia) and Southern Africa. In addition, key countries such as Brazil, Nigeria, and regions such as Oceania should receive priority attention.

The following programs would accomplish these purposes:

- (1) Trade Union Educational Exchanges (\$3 million)
- (2) Foreign Policy and Defense Information Programs (\$3.5 million)
- (3) Assistance to Democratic Trade Unions and National Labor Centers in Priority Regions and Countries (\$6 million)
- (4) Assistance to International Labor Bodies Which Support Democratic Trade Unions (\$1.5 million)

(1) Trade Union Educational Exchanges

There is a need to (a) improve foreign union leaders understanding of the political/military threats to democratic labor; (b) familiarize foreign union leaders with the perspectives of the US government and American labor; and, (c) strengthen the organizational and programmatic ties of foreign and US labor with respect to furthering freedom and democracy.

This can be accomplished only by (i) carefully identifying promising labor leaders who are sympathetic to but often unaware of US labor and its concerns; (ii) arranging for these foreign leaders to have substantive, sophisticated study tours in the US (and for US labor leaders to meet with foreign labor leaders abroad in "educational" settings); and, (iii) engaging in substantive follow-up with the participants in these exchanges in order to bring the free labor movement together to meet the challenges and threats to democracy.

Those responsible for this exchange must be able to arrange (i) substantive programming on democracy and the threats to democracy worldwide; (ii) day-to-day arrangements for travel and hospitality; and, (iii) careful attention to personalities and to building strong personal relations between foreigners and Americans.



The primary focus of the exchanges should bring foreigners to the US to get first-hand knowledge of the country and its foreign policy. However, a number of American trade union leaders and Americans with a knowledge of labor and democratic concerns should travel abroad to reinforce the message and also to familiarize themselves with foreign perspectives so they can be more effective as hosts. A mix would be approximately two foreigners visiting the US to every one American sent abroad. The length of the trip, particularly for elected trade union leaders, usually should be two weeks. (Most elected leaders do not like to be away from their constituency for longer periods.)

The following institutions have demonstrated considerable abilities to perform these exchanges during the past few years and increased support should be provided.

- (1) AFL-CIO and its regional institutes--AIFLD, AALC, AAFLI
- (2) US Youth Council Labor Desk
- (3) Labor Committee for TransAtlantic Understanding

Costs for the identification, educational program, and modest follow-up activities are \$7,000 per person for two-week trips.

- (a) 85 West Europeans to the US  
40 Americans to Europe
- (b) 70 Latin and Central Americans to the US  
30 Americans to Latin America
- (c) 80 Asians to the US  
30 Americans to Asia
- (d) 60 Africans to the US  
30 Americans to Africa

TOTAL -- 425 exchanges = \$3 million

(2) Democratic Labor Information Program

In the face of the multi-million dollar annual overt and covert propaganda programs carried on by the Soviet Bloc to discredit the western concept of freedom and the United States and its allies, there is a need to provide trade union leaders and labor-oriented politicians around the world with detailed current information particularly about (a) the fate of labor in countries ruled by Communist Parties, (b) the political/military threats to democratic labor, and, (c) the positive roles which the United States and the American labor movement are playing to enhance democracy and democratic values throughout the world.

While there has been some limited attention to this subject in US government exchange programs, much more needs to be done. Some of this can be accomplished by the US government itself. But American trade unions and labor-related nongovernmental organizations credible in trade union, Social Democratic, and Socialist circles also can play a most significant role. These labor-related university, youth, and minority outreach programs could engage in an effective foreign information program without directly involving the US government. Indeed several organizations already are receiving US government support, either directly or indirectly.

The Labor Desk of the US Youth Council, for example, works closely with the AFL-CIO and International Labor Program of Georgetown University. It organizes seminars and carefully structured exchanges for young Americans and foreign union leaders. Most recently the Labor Desk and the Georgetown Labor Program have developed a close working relationship with the National Strategy Information Center and the pro-NATO Labor Committee for TransAtlantic Understanding and Labor Committee for Pacific Affairs. (The Pacific Committee is in process of formation.)

These foreign-based Labor Committee consist of important union leaders and politicians from both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific. They hold conferences, print and distribute a labor press service and pamphlets, and organize exchanges which focus on the threats to democratic labor in their region and how trade unions and labor-oriented politicians can help meet the challenges. The activities of these Committees, foreign-based but with substantial US participation, are particularly important in Western Europe and also Australia and New Zealand, whose democratic labor movements and parties in large part have drifted apart from the United States on security issues.

For purposes of efficiency and political credibility some information-education activities would be based in the US but others would be based abroad.

The information program would enable Americans and foreign union leaders and politicians to organize seminars, prepare and distribute pamphlets, press materials, and films primarily for trade union and labor/political audiences on the threats and opportunities facing the free labor movement in different regions of the world. It would also enable these materials to be translated and distributed to foreign trade union organizers and the national and trade union press abroad.

This information program would require small staffs in the US, in various European countries, and in the South Pacific. Small core reference collection, reproduction facilities, and translators with facilities in major languages, including Russian, would also be needed.

#### US-Based Programs

1. International Labor--University, Youth, National Defense, and Minority Outreach Programs. (US Youth Council Labor Desk, Georgetown University International Labor Program, A. Philip Randolph Institute, Labor Council for Latin America, National Strategy Information Center)

\$2 million

2. AFL-CIO International Affairs  
Department \$250,000

Foreign-Based Programs

1. AFL-CIO Paris Office \$500,000

2. Labour Committee for TransAtlantic  
Understanding (offices in London  
and Dusseldorf) \$500,000

3. Labor Committee for Pacific  
Affairs (Melbourne office) \$250,000

(3) Support to Democratic Trade Unions and National Trade Union Centers

In many countries and regions of strategic value to the US, there are trade union national labor centers struggling to survive in the face of difficult odds. Most are faced with strong competition from Soviet-backed and well-financed Communist rivals, e.g., southern Europe and Nigeria. Some are harrassed and terrorized by the extreme Right, e.g., Central America. Others face harrassment and terrorism at the hands of governments, e.g., southern Africa and Central America.

To ensure that democratic labor organizations throughout the non-communist world, friendly to the US, survive and grow, it is necessary to provide material assistance to them. These democratic centers will not only assist in furthering the cause of democracy in their own countries, but by participating in regional and international labor organizations, they will add a strong international voice of the forces of democracy.

In the developing regions of the world, the AFL-CIO, in the 1960's, created three institutes which have provided technical and educational assistance to democratic trade unions. These institutes are controlled

by the AFL-CIO, but they are not a part of the AFL-CIO. They are staffed by experienced men and women, some of whom are based in Washington and some in the developing countries themselves. The Institutes currently receive approximately 90% of their funding from AID, most of which is limited to technical training and self-help projects for trade unions in union-run cooperatives in the developing world.

The additional funds would be designed to assist democratic trade unions and national centers specifically in priority countries and regions facing threats to their existence from terrorists or totalitarian groups, organizations, and governments. Among the most critical countries and regions would be (1) Latin America -- particularly Central America, from Mexico to Columbia, and Brazil; (2) Africa -- particularly South Africa and Nigeria; (3) Asia -- particularly the Philippines and the Pacific Islands; and (4) Western Europe -- particularly Iberia and southern Europe, where democratic unions are faced with well-financed, Soviet-backed opposition. Some modest technical assistance has been provided to Portuguese unions in recent years. Much more is needed in Portugal and other countries.



In each case, the additional assistance would provide support to (1) a small American liaison staff stationed abroad, and (2) local trade union organizers. In the developing regions, assistance would be provided for specific projects through the AFL-CIO's regional institutes. In Europe, assistance would be channeled directly through the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department.

Europe	\$2 million
Latin America	\$2 million
Africa	\$1.25 million
Asia	\$750,000

#### (4) Assistance to International Labor Bodies

Two kinds of international organizations of unions deserve support: one, International Trade Secretariats (ITS) (professional organizations of unions in the same industry); two, regional organizations of national trade union centers. These organizations continue to play an effective role in supporting affiliates faced with anti-democratic threats as well as in supporting the cause of free trade unionism in international forums such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Socialist International, etc.

Several ITS have very good programs, especially the International Transport Workers Federation, the Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Workers, and the International Federation of Free Teachers. American unions, through their respective ITS, could reach many unions in countries where a unilateral American program would not be productive. The ITS representatives can travel to support causes where an American union presence would not be tolerated or would disadvantage the union being assisted. While they receive support from their affiliates' dues, their information activities and their material support to pro-democratic unions and causes, could be enhanced considerably by additional support

provided through either the AFL-CIO's regional institutes or through their American union affiliates.

Proposed salaries and support to approximately four ITS programs would be \$1 million.

On the regional level, the outstanding organization of national centers is the Interamerican Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT). This is the Western Hemisphere's regional organization of the ICFTU. It has had an up and down history but during its most effective period in the 1950's, it employed large numbers of organizers, particularly democratic elements forced into exile by the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in Venezuela. These individuals were instrumental in setting Venezuela on a pro-Western course when the Perez Jimenez dictatorship fell and democracy was reestablished. Support to ORIT would be designed to help that organization replicate its Venezuelan success in countries in the region dominated by (1) pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet governments; or, (2) unstable military governments of the right whose dictatorial regimes encourage Marxist penetration of opposition elements creating the threat that a successor government will ally itself with the communist bloc.

ORIT would use these funds to pay the salaries of activists promoting democracy within their home countries.

It would also assist carefully selected cadres of exiles encouraging them to strengthen their ideological grounding and keeping them active in trade union and political affairs. These exiles could quickly return to their home countries and offer an alternative to those exiles now being carefully trained in Cuba, Moscow, and Eastern Europe awaiting the chance to establish a Marxist state in their homelands when the train arrives at "the Finland station."

Salaries and support for 40 activists at \$10,000 per person	\$400,000
Democratic Education Program	<u>100,000</u>
Total Support for International Labor Bodies	\$500,000