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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** GENEVA MEETING: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY--SDI

**FOIA**

2001-061

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ZUBOK

5310

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
14939	MEMO	STEINER RE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL AND SDI PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 17 [ 18 - 20 ]	3	9/17/1985	B1
14940	MEMO	SDI PUBLIC, CONGRESSIONAL AND DIPLOMATIC CALENDAR [ 25 - 29 ]	6	9/18/1985	B1

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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SDI 7266

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

**MATLOCK**

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

September 14, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: *JM* JUDYT MANDEL/STEVEN E. STEINER *Steve*

SUBJECT: Soviet Strategic Defense Publication

Attached at Tab I for your approval is a copy of the Soviet Strategic Defense publication which Bob Linhard's SDI "Mafia" and our Arms Control and Defense Public Diplomacy IG have put together. It is factual, and presents information on the full range of Soviet strategic defenses, including research on advanced technologies, which has needed to be put in the public domain. It also documents the growth of Soviet strategic offensive forces. Most of the illustrations are taken from Soviet Military Power, but there are some new charts, and the information is more tightly organized.

We are aiming for a joint Defense-State publication, with a preface to be signed by Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz. The text has been agreed upon interagency, and the recommendation for co-sponsorship has been sent to both Secretaries. We are aiming for release on or about September 30.

Gameplan for Release

A detailed gameplan for the distribution and release is being developed by OSD, State, and USIA. It will feature:

-- repositioning the publication on an embargoed basis in allied capitals and distributing it to Allied officials on the fringes of the NPG;

-- announcing the publication and making it available simultaneously at State, Defense, ACDA, and the White House press offices. USIA will distribute abroad;

-- extensive distribution in the U.S. via DOD, State, White House, and ACDA networks;

-- a press conference/briefing at Defense or State with an appropriate spokesman (perhaps Paul Nitze) to discuss Soviet strategic defense programs in the overall strategic context and their implications for U.S. security.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 10/16/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Timing of Release

One of the reasons for the selection of September 30 as the release date is that Secretary Weinberger and General Abrahamson will be making major addresses on SDI at a Philadelphia World Affairs Council Conference on October 3, which will focus on SDI. They wish to focus on Soviet programs and to make available copies of the publication.

DOD and State are preparing a package of talking points and Q&As, as well as a coordinated gameplan for release, which will be ready next week. However, in order to meet printing contract deadlines, we would be grateful if you could take a look at the publication over the weekend and give us your clearance on the text on Monday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the publication of this document and authorize us to proceed with the development and implementation of the gameplan for release and distribution. We regret the short notice, but were unable to submit the document until final interagency closure on the text was assured.

Approve RCW

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*BR* Bob Hanhard, *Bill* Bill Wright, *JM* Jack Matlock, and *WR* Walt Raymond concur.

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Soviet Strategic Defense Publication

FINAL

DRAFT (with  
corrections  
marked)



# SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

# SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations on the maps are not necessarily authoritative.

The illustrations of Soviet strategic defense facilities and systems included in this publication are derived from various U.S. sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible.

## Preface

In 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, designed to determine if advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles could be used to strengthen deterrence. The SDI research effort is the result of the President's desire for a more stable and secure future in which deterrence would be based increasingly on advanced defenses which would protect people, not threaten them.

Information and analyses about the technological and policy aspects of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative are widely available throughout the world. The United States Government is continually engaged in informing the American public and our friends and allies abroad concerning the program. We have explained that U.S. policy is intended to ensure that, if we decide in the future to develop and deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles, they would enhance global security and stability. We are also seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva the issues of the relationship between offensive and defensive forces and of a possible future transition to greater reliance on defensive forces for deterrence.

The Soviet Union, in contrast, has not freely discussed with the public and other governments its activities in the area of strategic defense and indeed has intentionally tried to mislead the public about them. Soviet leaders frequently claim that the SDI research program is a dangerous new development whose outcome could destabilize the strategic balance. As this publication documents, however, Soviet efforts in most phases of strategic defense have long been far more extensive than those of the United States.

Soviet strategic defensive activities are not limited to one or two areas. They have major passive defense programs, designed to protect important assets from attack. They also have extensive active defense systems, which utilize weapons systems to protect national territory, military forces or key assets. Soviet developments in the area of active defenses fall into three major categories: air defense; conventional ballistic missile defense; and research and development on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Distinctions among those categories, however, often are blurred by overlapping capabilities.

Important recent Soviet activities in strategic defenses include:

- Upgrading and expansion of the world's only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system around Moscow;
- Construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty;
- Extensive research into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles including laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons;
- Maintenance of the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system;
- Modernization of their strategic air defense forces; and
- Improvements in their passive defenses by hardening key military assets, maintaining deep bunkers and blast shelters for key personnel, and enhancing the survivability of some offensive systems through mobility — the road-mobile SS-20 and SS-25 and the rail-mobile SS-X-24.

## Overview

In his speech on March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his idea of a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation but rather on the ability to defend against potential attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is designed to determine whether, and if so how, advanced defensive technologies could contribute to the realization of this vision.

The Strategic Defense Initiative has been the subject of much discussion and debate within the United States and allied countries since its initiation. Such exchanges are essential in our free societies and can only help ensure that the vision behind our research program can be achieved. There has been comparatively little public discussion, however, about the trend in Soviet defensive as well as offensive forces which provides the essential backdrop to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

In the late 1960s, given the state of defensive technology at the time, the United States came to believe that deterrence could best be assured if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly beyond any potential gains. That concept called for a reduction by both the Soviet Union and the United States in their strategic defensive forces, the maintenance of a balance between the two sides' offensive nuclear forces, and negotiated nuclear arms reductions which would maintain the balance at progressively lower levels.

In accordance with those principles, the United States exercised great restraint in offensive nuclear arms and at the same time dramatically lowered its defensive forces. Thus, we removed most of our defenses against Soviet bombers; decided to maintain a severely limited civil defense program; ratified the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed strict limits on U.S. and Soviet defenses against ballistic missiles; and then deactivated the one

ABM site which we were allowed under that Treaty. The basic idea that stability and deterrence would be maintained if each side had roughly equal capability to retaliate against attack also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process of the 1970s.

The Soviet Union, however, failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that the United States hoped for when the SALT process began. The USSR has consistently refused to accept meaningful and verifiable negotiated reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have greatly expanded and modernized their offensive nuclear forces and invested an approximately equal sum in strategic defenses. The USSR has an extensive, multifaceted operational strategic defensive network which dwarfs that of the United States as well as an active research and development program in both traditional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory —precisely what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.

Soviet offensive and defensive force developments pose a serious challenge to the West. If left unchecked and unanswered, they would undermine our ability to retaliate effectively in case of Soviet attack. The situation would be even more severe if the Soviet Union were to have a monopoly on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles in addition to its sizable offensive and defensive forces. In that case, the USSR might come to believe that it could launch a nuclear attack against the United States or our allies without fear of retaliation. At the very least, it might see a realistic chance of successful nuclear blackmail.



# Soviet Strategic Defense Programs

## The Soviet Approach

The Soviet emphasis on strategic defense is firmly grounded in Soviet military doctrine and strategy, which call for the following actions in the event of nuclear war:

- destruction and disruption of the West's nuclear-associated command, control, and communications;
- destruction or neutralization of as many of the West's nuclear weapons as possible on the ground or at sea before they could be launched;
- interception and destruction of surviving weapons — aircraft and missiles — before they reached their targets; and
- protection of the Party, the State, military forces, industrial infrastructure, and the essential working population against those weapons that survived attacks by Soviet offensive forces.

In pursuit of these goals the USSR puts considerable stress on a need for effective strategic defenses as well as offensive forces. In the Soviet view, the USSR could best achieve its aims in any nuclear war if it attacked first, destroying much of the U.S. and allied capability for retaliation. Defensive measures, both active and passive, would in turn prevent those enemy forces that survived a Soviet first-strike from destroying targets in the USSR.

Marshall V. D. Sokolovskiy, in *Military Strategy* — the basic Soviet strategic treatise, originally published in 1962 — defined the aim of Soviet strategic defenses in this way: "They have the task of creating an invincible system for the defense of the entire country. ... While, in the last war, it was sufficient to destroy 15-20 percent of the attacking air operation, now it is necessary to assure, essentially, 100 percent destruction of all attacking airplanes and missiles."

Soviet offensive and defensive force development over the past 25 years demonstrate that the strategy articulated by Sokolovskiy still applies. The following pages present a detailed description of the actions undertaken by the Soviets in the area of strategic defenses. In order to explain the totality of the Soviet strategic military effort, a description of offensive force developments is provided in the annex to this document.

## Defensive Forces

Over the last 25 years the Soviets have increased their active and passive defenses in a clear and determined attempt to blunt the effect of U.S. and allied retaliation to any Soviet attack. Passive defenses are non-weapons measures — such as civil defense and hardening — which protect important assets against attack. Active defenses utilize weapon systems to protect national territory, military forces, or key assets.

Evidence of the importance the Soviets attach to defensive damage-limitation can be traced back to the beginning of the nuclear age. National Air Defense became an independent service in the late 1950s and since 1959 has generally ranked third in precedence within the Soviet Armed Forces, following the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Ground Forces.


By the mid-1960s, two new mission areas — anti-satellite defense and anti-missile defense — were added to the National Air Defense mission. As a result, the Soviet Union has the world's only operational anti-satellite (ASAT) system, which has an effective capability to seek and destroy critical U.S. satellites in low-earth orbit. In addition, Soviet efforts to attain a viable strategic defense against ballistic missiles have resulted in the world's only operational ABM system and a large and expanding research and development program.

The Soviet emphasis on the necessity of research into defenses against ballistic missiles was demonstrated by then-Minister of Defense Grechko shortly after the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, when he told the Soviet Presidium that the Treaty "places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed towards solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes."

## Ballistic Missile Defense

The Soviets maintain the world's only operational ABM system around Moscow. In 1980, they began to upgrade and expand that system to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. The original single-layer Moscow ABM system included 64 reloadable above-ground launchers at four complexes and DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE battle management radars south of

**Ballistic Missile Early Warning, Target-Tracking and Battle Management Radars**



Hen House radars \_\_\_\_\_ [Solid black box]

Dog House/Cat House radars \_\_\_\_\_ [Stippled box]

New radars \_\_\_\_\_ [Diagonal lines box]

Krasnoyarsk radar \_\_\_\_\_ [Cross-hatched box]

launchers permitted by the ABM Treaty and could be fully operational by 1987.

The Soviet system for detection and tracking of ballistic missile attack consists of a launch-detection satellite network, over-the-horizon radars, and a series of large phased-array radars.


The current launch-detection satellite network can provide about 30 minutes warning of any U.S. ICBM launch and determine the general origin of the missile. Two over-the-horizon

radars directed at the U.S. ICBM fields also could give 30 minutes warning.


The next operational layer of ballistic missile detection consists of 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars at six locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite and over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide target-tracking data in support of anti-ballistic missile forces.

space tracking network. Indeed, the design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of other radars that are known —

and acknowledged by the Soviets — to be for ballistic missile detection and tracking, including ballistic missile early warning. Finally, it



*The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation and capability of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk.*



*The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Pechora. The design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of the Pechora radar.*

may be capable of damaging some components of satellites in orbit, and a laser that could be used in feasibility testing for ballistic missile defense applications. A laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet effort would cost roughly \$1 billion per year in the U.S.

The Soviets are conducting research in three types of gas lasers considered promising for weapons applications: the gas-dynamic laser; the electric discharge laser; and the chemical laser. Soviet achievements in this area, in terms of output power, have been impressive. The Soviets are also aware of the military potential of visible and very short wave-length lasers. They are investigating excimer, free-electron, and x-ray lasers, and have been developing argon-ion lasers for over a decade.


The Soviets appear generally capable of supplying the prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary components needed for most laser and other directed-energy weapons. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic generator which produces over 15

megawatts of electrical power — a device that has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack their targets. Thus, they produced a 1.2-meter segmented mirror for an astrophysical telescope in 1978 and claimed that this was a prototype for a 25-meter mirror that would be constructed in the future. A large mirror is considered necessary for a space-based laser weapon.


Unlike the U.S., the USSR has now progressed in some cases beyond technology research. It already has ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites, and could have prototype space-based antisatellite laser weapons by the end of the decade. The Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s, and could begin testing components for a large-scale deployment system in the early 1990s.

The remaining difficulties in fielding an oper-

### Soviet ABM/Space Defense Programs



Soviet programs for ABM and Space Defense, which include advanced technologies and space based weapons, were in place prior to the 1972 ABM Treaty and have continued to expand in scope and size. During the same time period, U.S. ABM/Space Defense research has been limited in scope as well as the level of effort in terms of resources invested.



*The Soviet orbital antisatellite (ASAT) weapon is operational and designed to destroy space targets with a multi-pellet blast.*

warheads probably would require several additional years of research and development.

It is still uncertain whether ground-based charged particle-beam weapons are feasible — that is, whether the beam will propagate in the atmosphere. A space-based neutral particle beam weapon, however, would not be affected by the atmosphere or by the earth's magnetic field.

Soviet efforts in particle beams, and particularly on ion sources and radio frequency quadrupole accelerators for particle beams, are very impressive. In fact, much of the U.S. understanding as to how particle beams could be made into practical defensive weapons is based

on Soviet work conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

#### ***Radio Frequency***

The USSR has conducted research in the use of strong radio frequency signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets could test a ground-based radio frequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the 1990s.

#### ***Kinetic Energy Weapons***

The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic en-

Currently, the Soviets have nearly 12,000 SAM launchers at over 1,200 sites, 10,000 air defense radars, and more than 1,200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An


additional 2,800 interceptors assigned to Soviet Air Forces (SAF) could also be employed in strategic defense missions. In contrast, the U.S. has approximately 300 interceptor aircraft based in the U.S. dedicated to strategic defense, 118 strategic air defense warning radars, and no operational strategic surface-to-air missile launchers. These figures do not include tactical air defenses deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.




The new Il-76/MAINSTAY aircraft is illustrated as configured for its Airborne Warning and Control Systems mission.

The newest Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft, the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, has a look-down/shoot-down and multiple-target engagement capability. More than 85 FOXHOUNDS are now operationally deployed at several locations from the Arkhangelsk area in the north-western USSR to the Far East Military District. Two new fighter interceptors, the Su-27/FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM, also have look-down/shoot-down capabilities and are designed to be highly maneuverable

**USSR Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft**



**US Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft**




The Soviets maintain the world's most extensive early warning system for air defense, composed of a widespread network of ground-based radars linked operationally with those of their Warsaw Pact allies. As previously noted, more than 10,000 air surveillance radars of various types provide virtually complete coverage at medium to high altitudes over the USSR, and in some areas well beyond the Soviet Union's borders. Three over-the-horizon radars for ballistic missile warning could provide additional warning of the approach of high-flying aircraft.

The USSR also has an active research and development program to improve its air surveillance network. In 1983, it began to deploy two new types of air surveillance radars which will enhance Soviet capabilities for air defense, electronic warfare and for early warning of cruise missile and bomber attacks. The So-

viets are also continuing to deploy improved air surveillance data systems that can rapidly pass data from outlying radars through the air surveillance network to ground-controlled intercept sites and SAM command posts.

Soviet strategic surface-to-air missiles provide low-to-high-altitude barrier, area, and terminal defenses under all weather conditions. Five systems are now operational: the SA-1, SA-2, and SA-3, and the more capable SA-5 and SA-10. The recent Soviet air defense reorganization permits efficient integration of strategic and tactical SAM systems. While most tactical SAMs have a shorter range than their strategic counterparts, many have better capabilities against targets flying at low altitude.

Over the years the Soviets have continued to deploy the long-range SA-5 and have repeatedly modified the system. Further deployment



*The mobile version of the SA-10 SAM will soon be operational.*

out the Soviet Union in the 1980s. They could, if properly supported, add a significant point-target defense coverage to a nationwide Soviet ABM deployment.

**Passive Defenses**

Soviet military doctrine calls for passive defenses to act in conjunction with active forces to ensure the wartime survival and continuity of Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, military command and control units, war-related industrial production and services, the essential work force, and as much of the general population as possible. The U.S. passive defense effort is far smaller and more limited; it is no way comparable to the comprehensive Soviet program.

Physical hardening of military assets to make them more resistant to attack is an important passive defense technique. The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities, and key command and control centers to an unprecedented degree. Much of today's U.S. retaliatory force would be ineffective against those hardened targets. To maintain effective deterrence, the United States must be able credibly to threaten prompt retaliation against the full spectrum of Soviet targets, including those which have been greatly hardened.

Soviet leaders and managers at all levels of the government and Communist Party are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from urban centers — in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities. This comprehensive and redundant system, patterned after a similar system for the Soviet Armed Forces, provides hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000 key party and government personnel throughout the USSR.

Elaborate plans have also been made for the full mobilization of the national economy in support of a war effort. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Redundant industrial facilities are in active production. Industrial and other economic facilities have been equipped with blast shelters for the work force, and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment. By planning for the survival of the essential work force, the Soviets hope to reconstitute

vital production programs using those industrial components that could be redirected or salvaged after an attack.

In addition, the USSR has greatly emphasized mobility as a means of enhancing the survivability of military assets. The SS-20 and SS-25, for example, are mobile. Rail mobile deployment of the SS-X-24 is expected before the end of the decade. The Soviets are also developing an extensive network of mobile command, control, and communications facilities.

**Statements of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative**

These extensive Soviet activities in strategic defense, combined with the large Soviet buildup in offensive forces over the past two decades, have been eroding the retaliatory capabilities of U.S. strategic forces on which deterrence has long rested. If the USSR in the future were unilaterally to add an effective advanced defense against ballistic missiles to its offensive and other defensive forces, it would pose a very serious new threat to U.S. and allied security.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is designed to counter the trend in the Soviets' favor. It is thus not unexpected that Soviet reactions to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative have been strongly negative. Through an intensive, worldwide propaganda campaign, the USSR evidently hopes that it can dissuade the United States from pursuing this research program, thereby preserving the possibility of a Soviet monopoly in effective defenses against ballistic missiles — a monopoly that could give the USSR the uncontested damage-limiting first-strike capability that it has long sought.

Thus, Soviet statements on the Strategic Defense Initiative must be seen in light of the extensive, long-term Soviet research efforts to develop advanced weapons for defense against ballistic missiles. They should also be viewed in light of comparable Soviet propaganda campaigns on other issues. The USSR engaged in a major propaganda effort in the late 1970s and early 1980s to preserve its monopoly in longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has adopted many of the same tactics to prevent the United States from acquiring an operational ASAT system to balance its own.

On April 22, 1983, a month after the Presi-



to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. Extensive discussions with our allies would take place prior to any future decision to move beyond research to development and deployment.

Any future deployment would also be a matter for discussion and negotiation as appropriate with the Soviet Union, as provided in the ABM Treaty. Even now we are seeking to engage the Soviets at Geneva in a discussion of the relationship of offensive and defensive forces and of a possible future transition to greater reliance on defensive systems.

While we could not allow a Soviet veto over a decision which would have such a major impact on U.S. and allied security, it is our intention and hope that — if new defensive technologies prove feasible — we and the Soviets would be able both to move to a more defense-reliant balance. What we envision is thus just the opposite of an arms race or a search for military superiority. We seek instead a jointly-managed approach that would serve the security interests of the United States, our allies, the Soviet Union, and the world as a whole.

## Annex

### Offensive Forces

Soviet military doctrine and strategy call for superior offensive forces capable of executing a successful first strike. The Soviet buildup in offensive forces over the last two decades has been designed to move in that direction.

Soviet strategic offensive forces introduced since 1971 include:

- four new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — the SS-17, 18, 19, and 25. In addition, the USSR probably has deployed the SS-16 in violation of the SALT II Treaty;
- five new types of ballistic missile-carrying submarines;
- four new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs);
- five improved versions of existing SLBMs;
- long-range cruise missiles; and
- a new variant of the BEAR bomber carrying strategic air-launched cruise missiles.

That buildup is all the more striking when compared to the relative restraint exercised by the U.S. in its acquisition of nuclear weapons systems during the same period. The number of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile peaked in 1967. We had one-third more nuclear weapons then than we have now. Moreover, the total explosive power (measured in megatonnage) of our nuclear weapons was four times greater in 1960 than it is today.

Our latest B-52 bomber was built in 1962. Although we modernized the missiles our submarines carried with the POSEIDON C-3 in 1971 and TRIDENT I C-4 in 1979, we did not introduce a single new ballistic missile-carrying submarine from 1966 until 1981, when we began deploying the TRIDENT submarine at the rate of about one a year. In fact, our ballistic missile submarine force declined by one-fourth between 1966 and 1981, from 41 boats to 31. During the time we were decreasing the number of our SSBNs, the Soviet Union deployed 62 new ballistic missile-carrying submarines.

Similarly, the U.S. began deploying its newest ICBM, the MINUTEMAN III, fifteen years ago; today, we have fewer ICBMs than we did in 1967. By contrast, the Soviet Union has added about 800 ICBMs to its arsenal since that year. Of greatest concern for strategic stability has been the development and deploy-

ment of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. Since the late 1970s, the USSR has deployed more than 300 SS-18s, each twice as large as the U.S. PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying ten warheads, and 360 SS-19s, each approximately the size of the PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying six warheads. The Soviets already have enough hard-target-capable ICBM warheads today to attack all U.S. ICBM silos and launch control centers and will have a larger number of hard-target capable warheads in the future. (A weapon with hard-target capability has sufficient accuracy and yield to destroy targets that have been hardened to withstand the effects of a nuclear detonation.)

In addition to the rapid growth in its ICBM force, the Soviet Union is engaged in a major modernization and expansion of its strategic bomber and submarine forces. The bulk of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear warheads has traditionally been on ICBMs, while the U.S. has maintained a balanced force, with fewer than one-quarter of our strategic weapons on ICBMs. The growth in modern Soviet strategic offensive forces of all types is thus not only exacerbating the imbalance between U.S. and Soviet ICBMs, but also steadily eroding the traditional countervailing U.S. advantage in SLBMs and strategic bomber systems.

When the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms was signed in 1972, the USSR had roughly 2,300 strategic ballistic missile warheads, and the throw-weight of its ballistic missile force was about 3 million pounds. (Throw-weight is a basic measure of ballistic missile destructive capability and potential.) By the time the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979, the Soviet strategic arsenal had more than doubled to roughly 5,500 strategic ballistic missile warheads with a ballistic missile throw-weight of about 4 million pounds. Today, the Soviet Union has over 8,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads and a ballistic missile throw-weight of about 12 million pounds.

Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that the USSR's offensive nuclear force buildup continues unabated, with a large number of new systems at or nearing deployment. For example, the Soviets are:

- continuing production of the BEAR H bombers which carry the AS-15 long range air-launched cruise missile. They are also

SLBM. We are also deploying long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and TRIDENT SSBNs. Our strategic modernization program is essential not only for the military balance, but also to induce the Soviets to agree to negotiated offensive force reductions which would enable us to maintain the balance at far lower levels of armaments.

The Soviet Union has also greatly expanded its nuclear forces of less-than-intercontinental range, which primarily threaten our friends and allies. The USSR has developed an entirely new generation of nuclear short-range ballistic missiles. Of gravest concern has been the creation and subsequent rapid expansion of the SS-20 longer-range intermediate-range

missile force, which threatens our friends and allies in Europe and Asia. NATO had no equivalent systems when the USSR began to field this modern, mobile, highly accurate, triple-warhead missile. As of August 1985, the Soviets have deployed 423 SS-20s, with over 1,200 warheads. Not only is the SS-20 force continuing to grow, but the Soviets are also testing a modified version of the SS-20 which is expected to be even more accurate. In contrast, NATO plans to deploy 572 single-warhead PERSHING II and ground-launched cruise missiles and stands ready to reduce or reverse those deployments ~~in accordance with the terms of an equitable, verifiable arms reduction agreement with the USSR.~~

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INTERAGENCY GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL AND  
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FIND WAYS TO ENHANCE CONTACTS WITH RELIGIOUS AND OTHER OUTSIDE  
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS.  
NOTE: KOJELIS WH/OPL IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE.  
CONTINUING UPDATES NEEDED.

DEFINED BY: NITZE/KAMPELMAN  
RESPONSIBLE: KRAEMER/LEHMAN NSC, ACDA/PA  
TASK IDENTIFIED: March 5, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

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UPDATE ON U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD SDI.  
ONGOING REPORTS NEEDED.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: RICHMAN STATE/PA  
TASK IDENTIFIED: April 9, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

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COMPLETION OF ABRAHAMSON 30-MINUTE VIDEOTAPE. SCRIPT BEING  
DEVELOPED BY SDIO. DELORME SHOULD BRIEF ON STATUS.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: DELORME SDIO  
TASK IDENTIFIED: April 9, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

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DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS CONTROL SPEAKERS HANDBOOK.  
STATUS REPORT NEEDED.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: MANDEL  
TASK IDENTIFIED: April 9, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CAJ NARA, Date 10/16/02

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DEVELOP GUIDELINES FOR MEETINGS IN EUROPE ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE.

GROUP RECOMMENDED DEFERRAL OF SEMINARS UNTIL AT LEAST EARLY 1986.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: PETERSON OSD  
TASK IDENTIFIED: May 8, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

SEND NON-CLASSIFIED PACKAGES OF MATERIALS TO EMBASSIES IN ASIAN COUNTRIES VISITED BY SDI BRIEFING TEAMS -- CONTINUING EFFORT NEEDED.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: STATE/PA & EAP USIA  
TASK IDENTIFIED: July 2, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

DEVELOP A "STUDY GUIDE" OR HANDOUT TO ACCOMPANY THE SDI VIDEOTAPE FROM STATE. STATE/PA SHOULD PROVIDE STATUS REPORT.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: KANE STATE/PA  
TASK IDENTIFIED: July 2, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

COMPLETION OF THE DRAFT GIST ON COMPLIANCE. STATUS REPORTS NEEDED.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: STATE S/P & PA  
TASK IDENTIFIED: July 16, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

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INTERAGENCY GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL AND  
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CONTINUE BRINGING PRESS GUIDANCE TO THE TUESDAY AND THURSDAY MEETINGS.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: ALL  
TASK IDENTIFIED: July 16, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

CONTINUE WORK ON THE COMPLIANCE PAPER AND THE VERIFICATION PAMPHLET. ACDA SHOULD PROVIDE STATUS REPORTS.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: ACDA/PA  
TASK IDENTIFIED: July 16, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION:

COMMENTS BY 19 SEP (WORKING GROUP MEETING) ON THE ONE PAGER ON U.S. ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES.

DEFINED BY: MANDEL STATE/NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: ALL ALL  
TASK IDENTIFIED: September 17, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION: September 19, 1985

GIVE GUIDANCE ON INF.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: THIELMAN STATE/S/ARN  
TASK IDENTIFIED: September 17, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION: September 24, 1985

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COMPLETE A TALKER ON THE HOTLINE UPGRADE AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL BE INCORPORATED IN THE STATE GUIDANCE ON THE NEW ROUND IN GENEVA.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: MICHEL OSD/ISP  
TASK IDENTIFIED: September 17, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION: September 24, 1985

DEVELOP LIST OF THOSE ON THE HILL WHO WILL NEED ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE DOD'S RELEASE OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM PUBLICATION.

DEFINED BY: STEINER NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: FORTIER ACDA/H  
TASK IDENTIFIED: September 17, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION: September 24, 1985

FINALIZE RELEASE PLAN FOR PUBLICATION ON SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS. OSD TO PROVIDE TALKERS AND Q/AS FOR CLEARANCE. ACDA TO PROVIDE LIST FOR CONGRESSIONAL ALERTS.

DEFINED BY: LINHARD NSC  
RESPONSIBLE: STEINER/MANDEL SDI IG  
TASK IDENTIFIED: March 19, 1985  
TARGET COMPLETION: October 7, 1985

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