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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC
: RECORDS

Withdrawer

CAS 8/16/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (17 OF 19)

FOIA

M11-443

Box Number 12

HAENNI

101

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
141274	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP RE REPORT ON 4/21/MEETING	3	4/25/1983	B1
141275	CABLE	RE INF <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	10	4/28/1982	B1
141276	DRAFT MEMO	WALTER RAYMOND TO NSC STAFF OFFICERS RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	3	ND	B1
141277	MEMO	STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP RE REPORT ON 5/5 MEETING <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	3	5/9/1983	B1
141278	MEMO	STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP RE REPORT ON 5/2 MEETING <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	3	5/16/1983	B1
141280	MEMO	CHARLES WICK TO LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER ET AL RE STATUS REPORT #14 (INCLUDES ATTACHED LIST) <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	7	5/16/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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SS-20 MORATORIUM

Q. Do you have any comment on the column by Mr. Garthoff in today's Washington Post regarding Soviet compliance with their unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployments?

A. The simple fact is that SS-20 deployments have continued, the so-called Soviet moratorium notwithstanding. The moratorium announcements made by the Soviets last year clearly indicated that the Soviets were halting all activities associated with additional SS-20 deployments oriented against Europe. This was very misleading. Let me review the record.

-- On March 16, 1982, the Soviets announced "a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR." They noted that this included a suspension of the replacement of the SS-4 and SS-5 by the SS-20.

-- In April 1982, NATO disclosed that construction at SS-20 sites in the European USSR had been continued.

-- On May 18, 1982, the Soviets said the moratorium included systems within range of Central Europe and stated that the moratorium envisaged "a termination of preparation for the deployment of missiles ... including an end to the construction of launching positions for such missiles."

-- After May 1982, the Soviets completed construction at four SS-20 bases in the European USSR and two east of the Urals. The activation of these six bases added 54 SS-20s with 162 warheads to the Soviet arsenal. This works out to an average of one additional missile per week.

-- NATO disclosures of SS-20 base completions were:

- June 1982: two SS-20 bases in the European USSR had been completed and were now operational.
- September 1982: another SS-20 base in the European USSR was completed and judged to be operational.
- December 1982: an SS-20 base in the central USSR became operational.
- March 1983: two more bases had been completed and were operational, one in the European USSR, the other east of the Urals.

both in range of Europe

-- SS-20 base construction continues at locations east of the Urals in the central USSR within range of NATO countries.

These missiles indeed affect the military balance in Europe and pose an increasing threat to Asia. SS-20s deployed at those bases, given their 5000 kilometer range, can strike the NATO flank countries. Moreover, the SS-20 is a mobile and transportable system; such missiles deployed in the central USSR can be moved to areas from where they could strike all of NATO Europe.

-- The United States and NATO have not charged the Soviets with beginning new SS-20 bases in the European USSR. What we have pointed out is that -- contrary to the impression one would receive from Soviet statements -- construction activity at SS-20 sites already begun in the European USSR was not in any way halted and that new SS-20 bases have been begun in Central Asia, within range of NATO Europe.

Drafted: EUR/RPM: SKPifer
4/26/83 x22057 (0218A)

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JCS: EHamilton
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SKP
for

Raymond L. Garthoff

That SS20 Moratorium: Who Is Telling the Truth?

Trading charges on a Soviet missile moratorium.

The recent exchange of charges of lying between President Reagan and Yuri Andropov over Soviet SS20 missiles has left a bitter residue. Few people even knew the concrete issue that precipitated the charges. The exchange was seen as merely a manifestation of the deterioration of relations between the two powers, and most people here assumed the president must be right—not so much because they had confidence in his assertions perhaps as because they lack confidence in what the Soviet leaders say.

What was the issue? It was whether the Soviet unilateral moratorium on additional SS20 deployments, announced with some fanfare by Leonid Brezhnev a little over a year ago, had in fact been carried through. Reagan, on March 23 of this year, said that the Soviets had increased the number of SS20s despite the fact that "Mr. Brezhnev pledged a moratorium, or freeze, on SS20 deployment. 'Some freeze,' he added ironically. Andropov responded on March 26 that Reagan had "uttered a deliberate untruth in asserting that the Soviet Union does not observe its own unilateral moratorium."

What has happened to the Brezhnev moratorium? Brezhnev had announced on March 16, 1982, a Soviet decision "unilaterally to place a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons," specifically to "freeze" the replacement of older SS4 and SS5 missiles by SS20 missiles "in the European part of the U.S.S.R." The moratorium would last either until agreement in negotiations or until the United States went ahead with "practical preparations to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe." The statement was not precise on the terms of this freeze—a vagueness that was later to reduce considerably the impact of the action on Western opinion, which had, of course, been its target.

After the initial reports on it, the moratorium drew little comment in the West until a spate of statements by American officials in September and October to the effect that the Soviets were ignoring and not abiding by their own moratori-

um, since new SS20s were being deployed as before. Accounts referred to SS20s being added at a rate of "one a week." Reagan said so on March 23 of this year and again, after Andropov's rejoinder, on March 31. No references were made to the fact that the moratorium had been limited to the European part of the Soviet Union.

At the time of Brezhnev's statement, the Soviet Union had deployed 207 operational SS20 launchers within range of Western Europe (on both sides of the Urals), and 297 overall. From August 1982 to February 1983, an additional 54 launchers became operational, for the present total of 351, of which 243 are within range of Western Europe. In other words, since the moratorium, 54 additional SS20 launchers have become operational. That fact is the basis for the administration's charge that the Brezhnev moratorium was a sham.

It is also true, however, that at the time of Brezhnev's declaration, the Soviet Union had, operational *and under construction*, a total of 351 launchers, with 243 within range of Western Europe. If deployment is defined to count those operational and those under construction, the moratorium has been abided by. No new SS20 launch sites "in Europe" (or even within range of Western Europe) have been added to those existing—operational and under construction—at the time of the declaration of a moratorium.

Reagan and other administration spokesmen continue to say that the Soviets are still adding an SS20 per week. In fact, that is no longer true. The number under construction means the total this year will be far less than one a week. The implication that those missile launchers still under construction—all in Eastern Siberia—affect the military balance in Europe is misleading.

No administration spokesman has acknowledged either that deployment vis-à-vis Europe has stopped or that no new SS20 deployment vis-à-vis Europe began after the moratorium

was announced.

It is quite clear that the Soviet interpretation of the moratorium meant no further SS20 deployments, in substitution for older missile launchers, beyond those already under way when the moratorium was declared. Yet the administration, aware at some levels (almost certainly not including President Reagan) of the actual situation, has repeatedly told European and American audiences that the moratorium was a fraud.


The administration might better have argued that the moratorium meant less than met the eye, since it was probably proclaimed only when the Soviets had met their planned level of deployment, that some 36 more launchers facing Western Europe were being completed even under the moratorium, and that the moratorium did not apply in the Far East.

But while the shortcomings of the Soviet action are fair game, the moratorium based on the Soviet interpretation of an end to further deployments in Europe was not a sham. They did stop SS20 deployment vis-à-vis Europe. Moreover, while it was a unilateral moratorium, it was in the pattern set by the Soviet-American SALT I interim agreement in 1972, when a freeze was placed on new construction of ICBM launchers, but those already under construction could be and were completed.

Since the Soviet moratorium on further SS20 deployments in (and facing) Europe is not a sham or a lie, to suggest as much was, as Andropov stated, "an untruth."

The moratorium, under the conditions set forth by Brezhnev, may be ended at any time, since "practical preparations" for deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM missiles are actively under way. If so, the limiting conditions could properly be recalled, but it should not be said to have been "broken" by the Soviets.

The writer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, was a member of the SALT I delegation.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

File:
PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY

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May 3, 1983

TO: EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner SES

SUBJECT: Report on 4/28 meeting and Agenda for 5/5

The 4/28 meeting was devoted exclusively to a discussion of the strategy cable to posts and commands. It was a useful discussion, which enabled us to work out some difficult public handling points and to find agreed language. All of the agreed comments were incorporated into the text, final clearances were received and the telegram was sent to Under Secretary Eagleburger for final approval.

At the 5/5 meeting, the following are among the items which we would like to review:

1. USAREUR request for guidance on access to Pershing II site: OSD has given us a proposed response, which will be prepared as a State cable to the Polad and will be distributed for clearance at the 5/5 meeting.
2. Calendar: A new calendar is attached. Please help us to keep it up-to-date.
3. Soviet Publication: We would appreciate an update from USIA concerning coverage given the Soviet publication "How to Avert The Threat to Peace in Europe."
4. Speakers and Opportunities: Would appreciate an update from USIA and others on public affairs activities related to Europe during the past two weeks, and on opportunities ahead.
5. German TV: Would appreciate a report from OSD on the reported interest of one of the German TV channels in doing a special program on INF.
6. Media Day at Davis-Monthan AFB: Would appreciate OSD report on preparations.
7. Speakers Refresher Course: Could PA please give a read-out on the results?
8. White Paper: EUR will provide a status report.
9. Status Report on USIA Publications.

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BY CW NARA, DATE 8/16/12

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10. Status Report on Revision of Speakers Packet.

11. Size of Arsenal: Could OSD report on when we would have new materials for public use?

12. USIA Polling: Could USIA advise when we can be briefed on the raw data from the first polls in Europe

Attachments:

as stated

1227A

Revised 5/3/83

CALENDAR OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL

The following calendar includes three categories of events which could be relevant to our INF and other arms control interests: (1) useful opportunities, such as public forums where we can get our case across; (2) meetings with European leaders or among Europeans where we can seek supportive statements; and (3) events which are likely to cause us difficulties, such as demonstrations by anti-nuclear groups.

<u>MAY</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting--Turkey meeting (mid-May)	
	Possible Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting	Do analysis of possible WP initiatives, have press line ready and consider preempting them
	FRG Bundeswehr Inspector General Wolfgang Altenberg will visit Washington and meet with senior Defense and State Department officials	
	Meeting of socialist heads of government, Paris	
	CEMA Summit in Moscow (proposed)	
	NATO Defense Ministerial	
	Possible US visit of Romanian Foreign Minister	Seek balanced statement including ref to <u>Soviet</u> arms
May-June	Former ACDA Director Rostow to speak in USSR as Ampart	
5/3	US Catholic Bishops Pastoral letter to be issued	
5/3	DOD Assistant Secretary Korb in Turkey	
5/4-5	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	

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<u>MAY (Continued)</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
5/7	4th CND Festival, London	
5/9-10	Secretary to OECD Ministerial, Paris	
5/9-6/3	UN Disarmament Commission meeting, New York	
5/11-16	Greek Army Chief Panagopoulous to visit US	
5/13-14	Bilderberg Conf., Chateau Montebello, Canada	DepSec Dam to speak
5/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers informal "Gymnich" weekend	
5/15	Berlin "Peace Conference," in connection with 50th Anniversary of Hitler's rise to power, with meetings and possible demonstrations May 9-14	
5/15	Bordeaux Festival of "Youth For Peace": Campaign to speed Geneva Negotiations and a CDE	
5/16-17	Visit of British Defense Minister Michael Heseltine (tentative)	
5/17	INF talks resume in Geneva	
5/18-20	European Institute for Security Matters Conf. Luxembourg	Need high level USG speaker
5/18-20	Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans visit to Washington	
5/19	MBFR negotiations resume in Vienna	
5/21	CND "Peace Pentacost" march to Upper Heyford	
5/23-25	Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to visit Hungary	
5/24	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Bonn	
5/26-27	UK Prime Minister Thatcher to visit Washington	
5/27 - 6/5	Codel Lugar visit to Western Europe	

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MAY cont.

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

5/28-30

Williamsburg Summit

Seek demonstration of
Allied unity in security
as well as economic area

5/31-6/1

EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn

End May

Expected release of letter of Dutch Catholic
Bishops likely to be critical of Alliance deployments
in

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EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

JUNE

	Swedish PM Palme to visit Athens (early June)	
	Visit of FRG Chancellor in his capacity as EC President	
6/1-2	NATO Defense Planning Committee Ministerial in Brussels. (Greek PM Papandreou to attend)	
6/6-7	European Council Meeting, Bonn	
6/6-9	Plenary Session of the Assembly of the Western European Union. Paris.	
6/8	Round IV of START talks opens in Geneva	
6/9-10	Secretary to NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris	Obtain full Allied support on arms control and other East-West issues
6/10-12	High Level Defense Group: Turkey meeting (tentative)	
6/12-17	Wilton Park Conference on Europe's role in E/W dialogue	Need high level speaker: possible Burt attendance
6/15	Comm. on Disarmament Summer Session begins in Geneva	
6/16-22	Pope's visit to Poland	
6/17-22	Third World Congress, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Amsterdam	
6/20-23	Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain to visit Washington	
6/21	Official Working Visit of Spanish PM Gonzalez to Washington	
6/23-24	Friedrich Ebert Foundation German-American Security Conference, Bonn	Possible VP, Burt, Perle attendance

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	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
11-16	Fourth Seminar on International Security Affairs, Geneva	Seeking senior US speaker probably private sector
7/28	Greenham Common Air Tatroo, with 200-300,000 public visitors expected	Provide arms control
<u>AUGUST</u>		
8/6	Hiroshima Anniversary	
8/19-21	America Days in Helsinki 40th Anniversary League of Finish-American Societies	
<u>SEPTEMBER</u>		
	Expected release of Dutch Defense White Paper	
Late Sept/ early Oct	Annual Party Conferences in UK, possible prelude to general elections	
<u>OCTOBER</u>		
10/22	"Peace" demonstrations in NATO capitals	
10/23	World Peace Day demonstration in UK	
10/23	Brussels - national demonstration orgainzed by "CNAPD" and "UAKA"	
10/29	Anti-nuclear demonstration in The Hague	

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EUR/P:GRUECKERT/SESTEINER
04/28/82 EXT. 20850 WANG 1216A
P:LSEAGLEBURGER

EUR:RBURT
EUR:JDOBBINS
NSC:DBLAIR
PA:JKELLY

JCS:EHAMILTON
PM:OGROBEL
ACDA:CSORRELS
OSD:SKOCH

IMMEDIATE ALEDP, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, SEOUL IMMEDIATE, BEIJING
IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY WELLINGTON, MANILA PRIORITY, BANGKOK PRIORITY,
CANBERRA PRIORITY, USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY, GENEVA PRIORITY

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

E.O. 12065: DECL:OADR

TAGS: SCUL, PARM, INF

SUBJECT: INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

REF: {A} STATE 58000; {B} STATE 80226

LSE
GR/SES
RB SES
EH SES
JD SES
OG SES
DB/SKSES
CSSES
JK SES
SK SES
DL
BF
SP } SES
JP
MP

1. AS ON THE SUBSTANCE ITSELF, WE ARE AT A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT STAGE IN OUR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OF THE INF ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED THE US COMMITMENT TO MOVING THE TALKS FORWARD AND AT THE SAME TIME HAS DONE MUCH TO HELP US REGAIN MOMENTUM IN OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT. BUT THE PERIOD AHEAD PROMISES TO BE A PARTICULARLY COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT ONE, AND A CONCERTED AND SUSTAINED EFFORT IS NEEDED IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THE REQUISITE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE POSITIONS. WE THEREFORE CONSIDER IT TIMELY TO PROVIDE POSTS WITH A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE STAND IN OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS, WITH AN OUTLINE OF OUR NEXT STEPS AND WITH SOME ADDITIONAL PUBLIC AFFIARS THEMES ON OUR OVERALL APPROACH AND ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. IN TURN, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING POSTS' STATUS REPORT ON PRESENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS CLIMATE AND YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND OBSTACLES

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NLRR M443/5 #141275

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BY

rw

NARA DATE 9/5/17

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

ADDITIONAL ADDRESSEES:

- USIA WASHDC PRIORITY
- HQ THIRD USAF MILDENHALL UK PRIORITY
- HQ USAREUR HEIDELBURG GE PRIORITY
- HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
- USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
- CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
- SACLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
- USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
- USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:

SES

- P: DLOWENFELD
- USIA/PGM: BFULTON
- S/P: JPAPPAGEORGE
- EUR/RPM: SPIFER
- EUR/CE: JKORNBLUM
- EUR/NE: JBINNS
- EUR/WE: RGELBARD
- EUR/SOV: TSIMONS
- EA/RA: MPRATT

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RELATED TO INF WHICH WE CAN EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER IN HOST COUNTRIES THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. FOR ACTIONS REQUESTED, SEE PARAS 8-11.

2. {S} THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT--WHILE PRESERVING THE ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME AS OUR ULTIMATE GOAL--HAS DEMONSTRATED U.S. FLEXIBILITY AND OUR DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN GENEVA. THE NEW INITIATIVE WAS BASED ON VERY CLOSE CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND THE REACTION OF ALLIED LEADERS WAS HIGHLY POSITIVE. THE RESPONSE OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE PRESS AND OF CONGRESS WAS SIMILARLY FAVORABLE, DESPITE THE GENERAL SKEPTICISM OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR A FAVORABLE SOVIET RESPONSE. IN ADDITION, THE ACTIVE PUBLIC DIALOGUE UNDERTAKEN BY SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND OUR EUROPEAN POSTS HAS BEGUN TO HAVE AN IMPACT. AS A RESULT, WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE NOW IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO OBTAIN THE NEEDED PUBLIC SUPPORT AND MOMENTUM ON WHICH TO BUILD DURING THE COMING MONTHS.

3. FOR THEIR PART, EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ASIAN DIMENSION OF INF, IN REGARD TO BOTH THE DEPLOYMENT OF INCREASING NUMBERS OF SS-20S IN THE EASTERN AREAS OF THE USSR AND THE IMPACT WHICH THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS COULD HAVE ON DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA. GROMYKO'S HARSH STATEMENTS ON ASIA HAVE ALSO CAUSED ASIAN GOVERNMENTS TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION TO THIS ISSUE.

4. {S} THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO DIVIDE NATO OVER THE INF ISSUE, AND PERHAPS TO PLAY OFF OUR EUROPEAN AGAINST OUR ASIAN ALLIES ON THE QUESTION OF GLOBAL LIMITS. THEY HAVE RESPONDED PROMPTLY AND AT HIGH LEVELS TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IN AN EFFORT TO DISSIPATE ITS IMPACT. THEY UNDERTOOK A MAJOR EFFORT, BEGUN EVEN BEFORE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S APRIL 2 PRESS CONFERENCE, TO DISCREDIT PUBLICLY ANY IDEA OF AN INTERIM SOLUTION. AT THIS POINT, IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STILL INTENT ON AVOIDING MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS IN THEIR LRINF SYSTEMS, WHILE PREVENTING ANY INF DEPLOYMENTS BY THE ALLIANCE AND UNDERMINING OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION BY POLITICAL MEANS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HOPE THAT THEIR PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL, THEIR VIGOROUS PUBLIC ATTACKS ON ALLIANCE POSITIONS AND THEIR THREATS AGAINST THE U.S., EUROPE AND JAPAN WILL ERODE WESTERN EUROPEAN SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION AND GENERATE

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PUBLIC PRESSURES ON US TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS.
5. {S} IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT, WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES, WE CHANNEL OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF ALLIANCE INF POSITIONS AND U.S. ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVES. IN THIS CONNECTION, A CONCERTED EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE POSTS AND MILITARY COMMANDS AS RAPIDLY AND COMPLETELY AS POSSIBLE WITH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, BACKGROUNDERS, PRESS STATEMENTS AND INF- AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL-RELATED Q'S AND A'S.

6. {S} WE CURRENTLY ARE WORKING ON AN EXTENSIVE SERIES OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO UPDATE MATERIALS PREVIOUSLY SENT TO THE FIELD, TO PROVIDE SOME NEW PERSPECTIVES AND INFORMATION AND TO BUILD UP A RESERVOIR OF USEFUL BACKGROUND MATERIAL WHICH CAN BE USED BY POSTS AND MILITARY COMMANDS IN SUPPORT OF ALLIED POSITIONS.

7. {S} A LISTING OF THE MAJOR PROJECTS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY FOLLOWS:

A) NEW MATERIALS:

-- WE ARE REVISING AND UPDATING MATERIALS AND THEMES ALREADY SENT TO THE FIELD. WE HAVE UNDERWAY, FOR EXAMPLE, A COMPREHENSIVE UP-DATING OF THE INF SPEAKERS PACKET SENT TO THE POSTS IN MARCH AND OF THE ARMS CONTROL SPEAKERS BOOK SENT TO POSTS EARLIER. REVISED AND UPDATED SECTIONS OF THE PACKET WILL BE CABLED TO THE FIELD WHEN COMPLETED. THE REVISED BOOK WILL BE POUCHED SEPARATELY.

-- ADDITIONAL NEW MATERIALS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING SOVIET ARGUMENTS WILL BE SENT SHORTLY.

-- A WHITE PAPER ON BROADER U.S. ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD IS UNDER PREPARATION AND WILL HOPEFULLY BE READY FOR RELEASE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN JUNE.

-- A NEW GIST ON INF WILL SOON BE SENT TO POSTS.

-- A NEW PAMPHLET ENTITLED "38" WILL BE SENT TO POSTS WITHIN A WEEK FOR TRANSLATION AND DISTRIBUTION TO CONCERNED PUBLICS.

B) EXPANDED SPEAKERS PROGRAM

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-- SENIOR SPEAKERS ARE BEING ALERTED TO INCLUDE INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN THEIR FORTHCOMING SPEECHES AND PRESS BRIEFINGS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

-- USIA IS PREPARING, IN COOPERATION WITH POSTS, AN ENHANCED SPEAKERS PROGRAM IN EUROPE. AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, MORE PRIVATE SECTOR AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE. IN ADDITION, WE WILL SEEK TO PLACE EXPERT SPEAKERS IN SELECTED FORUMS IN ASIA.

-- WE ALSO HAVE STEPPED UP CONSIDERABLY THE NUMBER AND LEVEL OF BRIEFINGS PROVIDED FOR EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS RESIDENT IN THE U.S.

-- WE HAVE GIVEN INCREASED RESOURCES AND ATTENTION TO COOPERATIVE TV PRODUCTIONS.

8. {S} ACTION REQUESTED: IN LINE WITH THIS GENERAL EFFORT, EUROPEAN POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THEIR INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ALLIANCE INF POLICY AND US NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ARE BEING CONVEYED TO KEY PUBLICS IN THE HOST COUNTRY AS COMPLETELY AND EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS REGARD, WE SEE NO NEED TO CHANGE THE GENERAL APPROACH OUTLINED IN REFTEL A. IT REMAINS ESSENTIAL THAT EACH ALLIED GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ITS OWN COUNTRY IN BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT BEHIND THE NATO POSITION. AS EARLIER, U.S. EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO COMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT THESE EUROPEAN EFFORTS AND BE CAREFULLY TAILORED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN EACH COUNTRY. ON THE SUBSTANCE, POSTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO CAST THEIR PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH WITHIN THE BROADER FRAMEWORK OF NATO'S SUCCESS IN KEEPING THE PEACE AND PRESERVING WESTERN FREEDOM AND SECURITY, AND OF OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL, EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS. IN OUR VIEW, THESE EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD THE INFORMED GENERAL PUBLIC AND OPINION LEADERS IN HOST COUNTRIES.

9. {S} WITHIN THIS GENERAL FRAMEWORK, POSTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO PROMISING AVENUE FOR PRESENTING NATO AND US POSITIONS ON INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IS OVERLOOKED. YOU SHOULD DEVOTE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO IMPROVING YOUR DIALOGUE WITH INFLUENTIAL GROUPS AND OPINION-MAKERS WHO ARE UNDECIDED ON KEY INF ISSUES. WE WILL WELCOME ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS FOR YOUNG IV GRANTEEES

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WHO ARE OPINION LEADERS ON THIS ISSUE AND WHOSE FIRST HAND EXPOSURE TO US VIEWS WOULD ASSIST THE MISSION IN COMMUNICATING THE US POSITION--USIA WILL CONSIDER AUGMENTING IV FUNDING IF REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE. ALSO, INCREASED PRIVATE U.S. AND EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF NATO POSITIONS WOULD BE VALUABLE. CREATIVE POST INITIATIVES WOULD BE WELCOMED. AS ONE EXAMPLE OF AN EXCELLENT INITIATIVE, EMBASSY LONDON HAS RECENTLY SUBMITTED FOR WASHINGTON COMMENT A VERY USEFUL DRAFT INF ARTICLE TAILORED TO BRITISH PUBLIC CONCERNS FOR PLACEMENT IN AN APPROPRIATE BRITISH PUBLICATION UNDER AMBASSADOR LOUIS' BYLINE.

10. {S} EACH WESTERN EUROPEAN POST IS REQUESTED TO SUBMIT BY MAY 10: A) A STATUS REPORT CONCERNING ATTITUDES IN HOST COUNTRY ON INF AND RELATED SECURITY ISSUES; B) A REPORT ON PROGRAMS PLANNED OR UNDERWAY; C) A REPORT ON THE KEY ISSUES AND PROBLEMS YOU SEE AHEAD--INCLUDING PUBLIC, PARLIAMENTARY AND OTHER POTENTIAL OBSTACLES; D) A LIST OF THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS ENCOUNTERED IN HOST COUNTRY AND ARGUMENTS FOUND MOST EFFECTIVE IN COUNTERING THEM; AND E) A LIST OF THOSE SOVIET STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS WHICH HAVE RECEIVED THE MOST ATTENTION IN HOST COUNTRY. THIS INFORMATION WILL ENABLE US TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION IN ADVANCE TO WORK WITH THE ALLIES IN DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE HURDLES AHEAD.

11. {S} SIMILARLY, EMBASSIES TOKYO, SEOUL AND {AS APPROPRIATE} BEIJING ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT ON DEGREE OF OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONCERN ON INF ISSUES AND ON ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO AND SOVIET POSITIONS. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR INITIAL THOUGHTS ABOUT ACTIONS ALLIES AND/OR USG SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO ADDRESS ASIAN CONCERNS.

12. {U} BROAD THEMES: PUTTING THIS IN TERMS YOU FIND MOST APPROPRIATE TO HOST COUNTRY CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SUGGEST THAT POSTS EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL THEMES IN THEIR PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF INF-RELATED ISSUES:

-- WESTERN COMMITMENT TO PEACE THROUGH DETERRENCE BASED ON STRONG DEFENSES HAS GIVEN EUROPE A LONG PERIOD OF PEACE. THIS IS THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION OF NATO, THE REAL PEACE MOVEMENT.

-- ALLIANCE UNITY HAS BEEN CENTRAL TO THIS SUCCESS AND

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REMAINS ESSENTIAL IN CONTINUING TO ENSURE THE WEST'S PEACE, FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO REAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND STRONG DEFENSES OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT EVER TO REVERSE THE GROWTH IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS, REDUCE THE TOTAL LEVELS OF WEAPONS AND BRING GREATER STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS.

-- NATO HAS MAINTAINED THE SMALLEST PRACTICABLE NUCLEAR ARSENAL NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE DETERRENT. SINCE THE 1960'S WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED BOTH THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS AND THE EXPLOSIVE POWER OF OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL, WHICH CURRENTLY IS AT ITS LOWEST LEVEL IN TWENTY YEARS.

13. {U} SPECIFIC THEMES: IN DISCUSSING THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING MORE SPECIFIC INF THEMES. MORE DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE MATERIAL ON THESE POINTS WILL FOLLOW.

A. THE PRESIDENT'S NEW PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM INF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S NEW PROPOSAL IS INDICATIVE OF THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SHOW IN THE GENEVA INF TALKS. WE ARE MAKING A DETERMINED EFFORT TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. REGRETTABLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO DISPLAY A SIMILAR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY OR TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF LEGITIMATE WESTERN SECURITY CONCERNS.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS THE PRODUCT OF AN EXTENSIVE PRIOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS IN BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON AND ALLIED CAPITALS INCLUDING TOKYO. THIS HAS INCLUDED CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS DURING THE EUROPEAN TRIPS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, AND AN EXTREMELY INTENSIVE--AND CONTINUING--SCG PROCESS.

-- THIS NEW INF INITIATIVE ALSO WAS DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AND PLACED ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA BEFORE ANY PUBLIC MENTION WAS MADE OF THIS MOVE. THE U.S. INITIATIVE WAS TIMED TO OCCUR PRIOR TO THE CURRENT RECESS SO THAT IT COULD BE COMPREHENSIVELY REVIEWED BY THE SOVIET SIDE BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS.

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-- MOREOVER, THE U.S. SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF INF TALKS BE CONVENED EARLY IN AN EFFORT TO STEP UP THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRY TO REACH THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THIS U.S. SUGGESTION, AND TALKS WILL RESUME MAY 17. THE U.S. WILL RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL, TO ELICIT A SOVIET RESPONSE AND TO RESPOND TO CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSALS.

B. SOVIET REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS:

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA. IF THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY WANTS A SOUND AGREEMENT, THEY WILL RESPOND IN THAT SAME SPIRIT. UNLESS AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IS REACHED WHICH OBTVIATES THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENT, NATO WILL PROCEED WITH PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENTS AT THE END OF 1983. IF WE ARE ABLE TO REACH AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS, AS PROPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT ON MARCH 30, WE WILL NATURALLY REDUCE THE LEVEL OF SUCH DEPLOYMENTS ACCORDINGLY.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET PUBLIC RESPONSE THUS FAR HAS BEEN AIMED PRIMARILY AT U.S. AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND DESIGNED TO TRY TO UNDERCUT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION, WHILE AVOIDING THE NEED FOR REAL REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET SYSTEMS.

-- WHEN THE SOVIETS FINALLY REALIZE THAT THEY CANNOT PREVENT ALLIED INF DEPLOYMENTS FROM TAKING PLACE PURELY BY PROPAGANDA MEANS AND BY THEIR EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN PUBLICS, WE EXPECT THEY WILL BEGIN TO BARGAIN SERIOUSLY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE SOVIETS INITIALLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES UNDER THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DECISION AND DID NOT AGREE TO NEGOTIATE UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR TO THEM THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS INDEED DETERMINED TO IMPLEMENT BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECISION.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS STILL ARE LEAVING THEIR NEGOTIATING OPTIONS OPEN.

-- THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT PROPOSED AT THIS TIME A SPECIFIC NUMBER FOR EQUAL LEVELS OF WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES IS FURTHER

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EVIDENCE OF U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN AN EFFORT TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. THIS GIVES THE SOVIETS THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL US WHAT EQUAL LEVEL THEY WOULD ACCEPT.

-- BY HIS REMARKS THAT WHEREAS U.S. SYSTEMS IN EUROPE COULD REACH THE SOVIET UNION, SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEMS COULD NOT REACH THE U.S., GROMYKO HAS ONCE AGAIN CONFIRMED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPE ARE SECONDARY TO THOSE OF THE USSR. THIS MAKES IT MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER THAT WE PERMIT NO WEAKENING OF THE VITAL DEFENSE LINK BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATO.

-- THE CONTINUING SOVIET CLAIM THAT A "BALANCE" EXISTS IS EVEN LESS CREDIBLE NOW. THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING THAT CLAIM BACK IN 1979, WHEN THEY HAD 300 SS-20 WARHEADS ON LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INF TALKS IN 1981 WHEN THEY HAD 750 SS-20 WARHEADS. AND THEY ARE STILL MAKING THAT CLAIM TODAY WHEN THEY HAVE SOME 1,050 WARHEADS ON SS-20 MISSILES -- EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. STILL HAS DEPLOYED NO SYSTEMS AT ALL IN THIS CLASS.

-- THE SOVIET APPROACH STILL SEEMS MORE DESIGNED TO CREATE BARRIERS THAN TO MAKE NEGOTIATING PROGRESS. GROMYKO PUBLICLY CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THREE GROUNDS: IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS; THERE WERE NO AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS IN THE PROPOSAL; AND IT CALLED FOR LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN ASIA. NONE OF THE SOVIET DEMANDS HOLD UP UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY.

O. FIRST, BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS ARE NATIONAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND DO NOT PLAY THE SAME ROLE AS U.S. SYSTEMS IN LINKING THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES--THE MAJORITY OF WHICH ARE NOT NUCLEAR POWERS--TO THE U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR GUARANTEE. NOR ARE THESE SYSTEMS EQUIVALENT IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS TO THE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES WHICH ARE THE REAL ISSUES IN THESE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN IF ALL SOVIET LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES WERE REMOVED FROM CONSIDERATION, THE SOVIETS WOULD STILL HAVE THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND OTHER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARRAYED AGAINST THE UK, FRANCE AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. {FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS ISSUE WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL.}

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0. SECOND, AS TO AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS, WE HAVE NEVER RULED THESE OUT. WE HAVE STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE FIRST ON SYSTEMS WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE CHARACTERIZED AS THE MOST DANGEROUS AND DESTABILIZING: LAND-BASED LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES. THE SOVIETS CURRENTLY HAVE ABOUT 1300 WARHEADS ON THIS CATEGORY OF SYSTEM WHILE THE U.S. HAS NONE AT ALL. THE SOVIETS CURRENTLY HAVE NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES IN ALL CATEGORIES OF INF SYSTEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES HAVE SOME 2500 AIRCRAFT BELIEVED TO HAVE A NUCLEAR ROLE WHILE THE EQUIVALENT FIGURE FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE IS ABOUT 800. IN SHORT, EVEN IN NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, THE SOVIETS HAVE A VERY SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE. {RATIOS VARY ACCORDING TO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, NUCLEAR ROLE AND RANGE.}

0. THIRD, IN REGARD TO ASIAN SYSTEMS, A GOOD PART OF THOSE SS-20S DEPLOYED IN THE EASTERN AREAS OF THE USSR FROM WHICH THEY CAN TARGET OUR ASIAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES CAN ALSO REACH TARGETS IN EUROPE BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVE RANGE OF THE SS-20 {5000 KILOMETERS VS ONLY 1800 FOR PERSHING II AND 2,500 FOR GLCM}. IN ADDITION, THE SS-20 IS MOBILE AND TRANSPORTABLE AND THUS COULD EASILY AND QUICKLY BE MOVED FROM EAST TO WEST. INDEED, A NUMBER OF SOVIET SS-20 BASES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED CLOSE TO RAIL LINKS AND OTHER TRANSPORTATION CENTERS, ENABLING RAPID MOVEMENT. SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA THUS REMAIN A THREAT TO THE NATO COUNTRIES OF EUROPE, EVEN AS THEY INCREASE THE THREAT TO OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ASIA.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS OWE THE WORLD A MORE POSITIVE AND REASONED RESPONSE. WE HOPE THEY WILL USE THE CURRENT RECESS IN THE GENEVA INF TALKS TO TAKE WESTERN CONCERNS MORE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT.

-- {IF ASKED} GROMYKO'S CHARGES THAT JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE "STUFFED FULL" OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A TRANSPARENT EFFORT TO JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE FAR EAST AND THE UNWARRANTED SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20S AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN ASIA. SOVIET SS-20S THREATEN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT, THE MIDDLE EAST AND MUCH OF AFRICA, AS WELL AS ASIA AND EUROPE. WE HAVE DEPLOYED NO RPT NO COMPARABLE MISSILES. WE HAVE NOT ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF MAJOR MILITARY BUILD UP IN ASIA, AND WE HAVE FAITHFULLY HONORED OUR OBLIGATIONS TO JAPAN CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

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May 3, 1983

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: CARY LORD

REF: NSC Staff Relationship to SPG

I would very much appreciate your thoughts and recommendations for strengthening the ref paper. I would like to circulate it to the staff.


Walt

cc: Dennis Blair

FILES
PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY

Terry - pls get me
a copy of
this paper -
JEB

DRAFT

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141276

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MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF OFFICERS

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND
SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy

At the suggestion of several NSC staffers I would like to describe the new initiatives in this area. As the Judge has said on many occasions most of us will be involved in this activity one way or another.

I have attached the unclassified version of NSDD-77. This document is identical to the early classified version. The basic purpose of this decision document is to provide a more integrated approach to a variety of governmental initiatives. It is designed to orchestrate a number of elements of the United States Government and to try to make the sum greater than the independent parts. It is not a substitute for the designated policy making bodies, including the various IGs and SIGs, but rather it is designed to help develop and implement initiatives to support national security policy, objectives and decisions. Since the Judge chairs the SPG ultimately the NSC is in a position to ensure the consistency of guidance, but more importantly to help in the energizing of those parts of the bureaucracy that tend to become parochial or simply bogged down. We have a good foreign policy in many areas. This mechanism is designed to help us get that foreign policy implemented.

The attached chart describes the broad outlines of the group:

Special Planning Group (SPG). This group is chaired by Judge Clark. It includes the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Administrator of AID, Director of USIA and Dave Gergen in his position as Assistant to the President for Communications. The SPG can provide focus, direction and impetus to our overall efforts. An executive committee meets in my office weekly (Monday at 11:00 a.m.) to discuss SPG matters as well as matters effecting the four committees. This group includes:

- Walter Raymond (SPG)
- Bob Sims (Public Affairs Committee)
- Cary Lord (International Broadcasting Committee)
- Scott Thompson (International Information Committee)
- Gerald Helman (International Political Committee)

In this way each of the committees is represented at the Excom. Each NSC staff officer is cordially urged to bring items to one of the three NSC staffers who attend this meeting as well as to participate in discussions of any issue they think is relevant for this overall organization.

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NLRR M443/5 #141276
BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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International Political Committee (IPC). This group is chaired by Larry Eagleburger with Gil Robinson serving as vice-chairman. Representation parallels the SPG in makeup, usually at the Assistant Secretary level. Others are invited dependent upon the subject matter. Agenda are made available approximately 3-5 days in advance of a meeting and will be circulated to NSC staffers as appropriate. If you have questions concerning the agenda items, if you want to make additions or you want to participate please let me know. There is no exclusivity to the meetings; you should come if it is a matter of interest to you. The IPC to date, has covered a wide range of subjects including INF, Afghanistan, Poland, Central America, Project Democracy, Liberia. When sub-committees are formed, IPC takes the responsibility of insuring staffing and working with the concerned policy making IGs. Ambassador Gerald Helman, deputy to Larry Eagleburger, is the principal staff officer concerning the IPC and will respond to any questions that you may wish to pose to him directly. I attend regularly.

International Information Committee (IIC). This committee is chaired by Gil Robinson and vice chaired by Gerald Helman. It meets every two weeks and provides agendas in advance. These will be shared with NSC staffers with the same proviso noted above. Both the IIC and the IPC have tended to focus on specific issues of the moment. Both intend to start looking at longer term and planning questions. Contemporary issues now being covered by the IIC include: Afghanistan, Yellow Rain, forced labor, human rights, defense speech, INF, etc. For the longer range two new sub-committees--economics and arms control and defense issues--have been established to consider downstream public diplomacy issues in these areas. Further, the IIC is responsible for developing an NSSD on international information policy. Scott Thompson is the principal staff officer for this committee. Cary Lord and I both attend regularly and are available for any questions you may have as well.

International Broadcasting Committee (IBC). This group is chaired by Bud McFarlane and vice chaired by Ken Tomlinson, Director of VOA. Because of special concerns and interests of this committee its membership is broader and includes certain specialized agencies and departments. Cary Lord is the principal staff officer for this committee and can answer any specific questions you may have. The committee has established several sub-committees dealing with such issues as diplomatic and technical issues concerned with new sites for broadcasting, study on hostile jamming, frequency allocations and other related issues concerning our radio and television capabilities. The sub-committees meet regularly, while the IBC tends to meet monthly.

Public Affairs Committee (PAC). This group is co-chaired by Bud McFarlane and Dave Gergen. The principal staff officer is Bob Sims. It tends to deal with the specific issues involved in the direct support to the President. PAC has been very active in developing strategies concerning the defense budget, MX, nuclear freeze and related issues which have major domestic implications. The inclusion of USIA factors in a foreign dimension to the development of the strategies.

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An effective SPG will focus on the need for short term integrated approaches to specific issues. An effort will be made to see to it that there is an integrated public strategy for specific policy questions and to insure an effective inter-relationship between and among divergent strategies. The recent SPG called for a series of papers designed to identify strategies that exist or that should be developed on a series of areas that represent high priority concerns of this Administration. The consequence of this first cut should give us the beginning of a more comprehensive package of our public diplomacy strategies. To be effective, this should really be only the first step.

We should begin to move shortly thereafter to longer term planning and a more comprehensive approach not only to public diplomacy strategies but also to develop the instruments that are needed to be effective in the overall political activity field. The IBC is probably the only committee that so far has begun to look at longer term issues. The IIC will start to do this after the completion of the NSSD on information and when several of its new working groups, such as the economic group, begin to move forward. The IPC must begin to move forward in that direction. It will have a major role to play in the implementation of the democracy program. That effort includes requested funding of \$85 million covering FY 83-84. Many of those programs, whether funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, State, AID or USIA will be reviewed by the IPC. The IPC can serve as home for an inter-agency committee for international labor. It can also stimulate long range discussions of the proper role of AID or other related matters. Thoughts on what types of instruments or vehicles are needed to help the President carry out his foreign policy would be enthusiastically received by me as well as by others in the IPC. The PAC has had to devote most of its time to date to fighting fires, but is clearly concerned with the need to come up with longer range planning.

The key is open dialogue not only within the SPG and its constituent parts, but also within the NSC staff. Let Cary, Bob Sims and I know of your interests.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Public def.

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May 9, 1983

TO: EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner SES

SUBJECT: Report on 5/5 meeting and Agenda for 5/12

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NLRR M42/5 # M427

BY HW NARA DATE 9/9/17

The following items were reviewed at the 5/5 meeting:

1. White Paper: USIA has determined that it will need about 4,000 copies for overseas distribution. Other agencies have conveyed their needs directly to State/PA, which will do the printing.

2. FRG TV on INF: It was agreed that all agencies wish to be helpful to Peter Staisch of South German Television, who has come here to do a special program on INF. This was first conveyed to USG in a letter from Uwe Nehrlich to DOD Under Secretary Ikle. Interviews were arranged with Ikle, Perle and Burt, among others. It has also been arranged for Staisch to visit Martin-Marrietta and the White Sands Proving Ground.

3. Arms Control Briefings: It was agreed that, where possible, we should try to persuade European media to broaden their coverage to take into account our other arms control initiatives. In this regard, ACDA Director Adelman has offered to have ACDA specialists provide briefings on the wide range of arms control issues to visiting European journalists and parliamentarians. It was agreed that we will try to arrange such briefings early in the visits of such groups.

4. Cables to Field: Both the strategy cable to posts and the response to USAREUR concerning press access to the Pershing II site have been cleared and sent to the field.

5. Update on Andropov "Proposal": it was agreed that we do not wish to give undue prominence to Andropov's statement at his meeting with Honecker that the Soviets would be willing to consider limits on warheads in the INF talks. Prior to doing additional guidance to posts, we will see how the talks go in the first week or so following resumption on May 17. In the meantime, texts that can be drawn upon for guidance are: the President's remarks to journalists on 5/4 (distributed at 5/5 meeting); our guidance of 5/3 (likewise distributed); and Assistant Secretary Burt's remarks on McNeil-Lehrer on 5/4-- full transcript is attached. It was noted that the Burt remarks are particularly helpful on the issue of UK and French systems. It was also pointed out that the Allies are sensitive to public discussion which gives exact numbers of their systems.

6. Materials to Ottawa: It was pointed out that we need to be careful to include Embassy Ottawa in our cables and pouches involving this issue. (EUR was informed that for some reason the INF Speakers Packet was not received by Embassy Ottawa. It has since been provided to them.)

7. Access to Davis-Monthan AFB: DOD reported that a small group of journalists--possibly including BBC, ABC's Nightline, Life, and Peter Staisch--would be permitted to visit the GLCM training site at Davis-Monthan on 5/16.

DOD asked whether we should volunteer visits to Davis-Monthan and other INF-related sites in the US. DOD pointed out that since Davis-Monthan is not involved in missile testing, authorization for legitimate US news media representatives to visit the base has been granted routinely. The consensus of the subgroup was that there was no reason why this policy toward US media should not be continued, but that any requests from European media should be screened through the subgroup. It was also agreed that in regard to other INF-related military installations in the US we should not volunteer media visits and should avoid granting frequent access. In these cases too, access should be screened through the subgroup.

8. Soviet Publication: USIA reported that the Soviet publication "How to Avert the Threat to Peace in Europe" had made very little impact in Western Europe. It was agreed that no further response from the US would therefore be needed at this time.

NOTE: 9. INF Speakers Packet: Revised material for the packet is included under this cover. This is for discussion at a meeting at 10:30 am Tuesday, 5/10 in the EUR Conference Room, 6226.

10. Size of Arsenal: OSD distributed a proposed new press release giving newly declassified information on the percentage decline, in both numbers and megatonnage, in our nuclear arsenal since the high point in the 1960's.

11. Speakers Seminar: PA reported that 45 persons attended the speakers' refresher course on nuclear issues, almost all of whom were not on the list of speakers which we have drawn upon to date. Nine of the 45 subsequently volunteered for the list, while the other 36 will be contacted to ascertain if they are willing to speak publicly on these issues. As with the original list, final clearance of the additions will be up to the NSC.

12. USIA Publication^s: USIA reported that its publication "38" (representing 38 years of peace) will be prepared in final on 5/9 and sent to posts for translation and use at posts' discretion. The "pocket handbook" prepared by USIA is expected to receive final interagency approval by the middle of this week, and will then go into final printing.

Agenda for 5/12: The next meeting will be held on schedule, at 10:00 AM Thursday, 5/12 in the EUR Conference Room, 6226. In addition to follow up on the above items, the following will be covered:

-- USIA Polls: USIA Research Director Hursh-Cesar will brief the group on the initial data received in the first of USIA's new five part series of polls in the basing countries.

-- Stoppel Briefing: It would be appreciated if USIA could give a brief rundown of the Stoppel meeting for subgroup members who were unable to make the USIA briefing on 5/9.

-- NATO Flag for GLCM Bases: Discussion of USNATO 3025 (attached).

-- Soviet Themes: could DDI or DDO possibly provide us on a weekly basis with key Soviet themes and statements on INF-related issues?

Attachments:

as stated

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INF OPPOSITION PREVAILS ONLY IN ITALY AND BELGIUM

This paper summarizes major findings from late-April public opinion surveys in the five INF basing countries. Local firms, mostly Gallup affiliates, were used; and samples of about 1000 were obtained -- 500 in Belgium.

INF Opposition Rises in Belgium; Little Change Elsewhere

In the wake of Easter demonstrations, USIA surveys in the basing countries show no dramatic changes in opposition to INF deployment, except in Belgium where opposition has risen sharply (by 16 points, since last measured in July 1982).

The late-April surveys show that when INF deployment is linked to negotiations:

- o Majorities are unconditionally opposed in Italy (54%) and in Belgium (62%). And about one-third are similarly opposed in the FRG (36%) and in the U.K. (29%).
- o Combining all of those who "would accept" INF deployment (1) without conditions or (2) contingent on the arms talks, acceptance prevails in the U.K. (65%) and -- but only narrowly -- in the FRG (45%). The Dutch remain divided at the forty percent level:

	<u>BRITAIN</u>	<u>WEST GERMANY</u>	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>NETHERLANDS</u>	<u>BELGIUM</u>
Oppose INF	29%	36%	54%	41%	62%
Accept INF	65	45	42	39	39

With minor variations, the current findings are consistent with poll results from last July and October. Other than Belgium, the trends suggest generally increasing INF opposition in Italy and generally increasing acceptance in Britain. The pattern in the FRG and the Netherlands has changed very little.

However, when given deployment as a fait accompli, hard-core opposition decline in Italy and Belgium, indicating some softness in the high levels of opposition there.

That is, when asked their future reactions should their governments deploy in the absence of an arms agreement, people's "strong" opposition is markedly less in Italy (40%) and Belgium (24%) and slightly less in Britain (23%) and the Netherlands (35%). Opposition to this hypothetical deployment in Germany is at the same level (36%) as unconditional opposition today.

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TO CLARK FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 16 MAY 83

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 8/16/12

*File: Public
Diplomacy
B*

KEYWORDS: USIA ARMS CONTROL
MEDIA NETHERLANDS

SUBJECT: STATUS RPT NO. 14 RE ARMS REDUCTION & SECURITY ISSUES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 24 MAY 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LORD

LENCZOWSKI

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FILE:
PUBLIC
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May 16, 1983

TO: European Public Diplomacy Subgroup
FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner^{SES}
SUBJECT: Report of 5/12 meeting

141272

The following items were reviewed at the 5/12 meeting:

1. USIA Polling: Dr. Gerald Hursh-Cesar, Director of Research at USIA, briefed the group on the preliminary data obtained in USIA polls taken in the five basing countries in April. This is the beginning part of a five-part series of polls to be taken in the basing countries during the remainder of this year. In addition, "customs studies" which provide deeper analyses will be conducted in the UK and FRG at the end of May and followed up with the same people--approximately 2,000 in each country--in September.

Basic elements of the findings in the five basing countries are provided in the attached background briefing paper from USIA. This shows no dramatic changes in any of the countries, except in Belgium where opposition has increased by 16 points since last measured in July 1982. It also shows that opposition to deployment dropped somewhat in each of the countries when respondents were asked how they would react if their governments simply went ahead and accepted deployment. This would seem to indicate increasing expectation of deployments and increasing acquiescence in that likelihood.

The USIA poll also shows serious misconceptions still held by the public in the basing countries: (a) roughly 60% remain unaware of the Soviet monopoly in LRINF and most seem to believe that the US already has such missiles on the Continent; (b) about one-third in each country believes that the deployments are simply to serve US interests--they do not know of the NATO decision or of their own government's support for the US/NATO position. Even the better educated seem to be confused on these points.

In each country, awareness of the talks has increased, and 50 - 67% also claim awareness of the President's interim proposal. The majority of these respondents said they support the proposal, although most still prefer the President's proposal for a zero-zero outcome. At the same time, 60 - 65% overall either did not know where their own government stands or perceived their government as favoring the Andropov proposal.

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NLRR M443/5 #141278
BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

The polls also showed some improvement in European public perception of our seriousness in the talks. The Soviets have been even lower in this category, but they too seem to have made some headway at least in the Netherlands and the FRG.

In all of the countries, 60 - 70% favored superpower parity, but the same percentage perceived each of the superpowers to be seeking superiority.

In the next part of this project, USIA will seek more data on attitudes towards British and French systems and will seek to establish the intensity of public feelings on the INF issue. In the latter regard, data available thus far seems to indicate that, except for the Netherlands, intensity is limited. For example, 70 - 80% in all of the countries indicated that other than forming their own views, they have not tried to persuade others or taken any other actions on the INF issue. This was not the case in the Netherlands, however, where 25% said they have already participated in demonstrations against NATO deployments.

2. Size of US Arsenal: OSD indicated that if it releases in the near future its unclassified fact sheet on the size of the US nuclear arsenal, this will be done without public fanfare. This release will show that our arsenal has gone down both in numbers and in the average yield per weapon. It was suggested that the release also include charts showing the increase in the number of Soviet strategic warheads in recent years. The point would be to demonstrate that the US has prudently managed its inventory in order to maintain the minimum required deterrence, while the Soviets have continued a steady buildup which goes beyond any legitimate defensive needs. (Some declassification would be required in this regard.)

OSD is requested to keep the subgroup informed of the status of this project.

3. Vice President's Trip: Phil Hughes, OVP, briefed the subgroup on the Vice President's planned trip to Europe in June, and on the public affairs activities planned thus far in Europe. He noted that suggestions would be welcomed for media events prior to departure which would help to set the stage for the trip. EUR agreed to work with USIA to provide such suggestions.

4. NATO Flag for GLCM Bases: In response to USNATO 3025 discussing the possibility of flying the NATO flag at GLCM bases in Europe, all members of the subgroup agreed that this would be helpful in demonstrating that deployments are based on a NATO decision. EUR agreed to draft a proposed response to the USNATO message.

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5. Public Handling of Soviet "GLCM": The subgroup was informed by the PM representative that the INF IG has asked for the preparation of a paper providing recommendations on how to handle publicly the new Soviet SS-C-4. EUR agreed to produce such a draft as soon as possible.

6. Soviet Themes: DDI agreed to try to provide for the subgroup on a weekly basis, either orally or in writing, a report on the most recent public themes used by the Soviets on the INF issue. It was also agreed that EUR would work with DDI and others to get what public mileage we can from Andropov's endorsement of the peace movements in the West as contrasted with Soviet and GDR repression of indigenous peace movements.

Next Meeting: The next meeting will be held on schedule, Thursday, 5/19, 10:00 a.m. in the EUR Conference Room--6226. At this meeting, Dr. Hursh-Cesar will provide further data on the nature of European support and opposition to INF deployments, and will discuss the public affairs problems involved.

Attachment: USIA Briefing Paper (one sheet)

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

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May 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Chairman, International Political Committee

The Honorable
Gerald B. Helman ✓
Chairman, Public Diplomacy Committee

FROM: Charles Z. Wick 
Director

SUBJECT: Status Report No. 14 — Arms Reduction and
Security Issues (Week of May 2-6)

HIGHLIGHTS

Netherlands-U.S. Information Talks Held, May 3-5:

— A delegation of senior Dutch government information officials participated in wide-ranging talks at USIA on public affairs aspects of Dutch-American relations from May 3-5. The talks centered upon bilateral security relations in the public affairs context. The Dutch delegation, which included the Directors of Information of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries, emphasized that time was on the side of the NATO decision to deploy. The delegation emphasized that the best approach to the public debate in Holland is low-key support for Dutch government initiatives and provision of regularly up-dated information about the Geneva talks. At the conclusion of the meetings, both sides agreed that more frequent exchanges of information on INF-related public affairs issues would be helpful to the common effort.

Public Attitudes in Basing Countries Remain Largely Unchanged:

— USIA has begun to analyze data from the first of a series of public opinion polls which will be taken in the basing countries throughout the rest of this year. The first poll, which is the first such USIA survey since October, 1982, shows no significant changes in public opposition to INF deployment in the basing countries, except in Belgium, where opposition has risen sharply, and in the UK, where it has moderately declined.

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- Majorities in Italy (54%) and in Belgium (62%) are unconditionally opposed to INF deployment. In the FRG and the UK, roughly one-third oppose deployment, but are outnumbered by supporters, most of whom link their support to continuing efforts to reach a negotiated agreement on INF forces. The poll reveals the Dutch public as evenly divided on the issue.
- In the FRG, the UK and the Netherlands, majorities credit the U.S. with sincerely seeking an INF agreement, but opinion is divided in Italy on this point; in Belgium, skepticism predominates.
- Majorities in all basing countries except the UK agree that British and French nuclear forces are national forces, not primarily intended for defense of other NATO countries.
- Subsequent USIA polls on attitudes toward INF will include for the first time a section on sources of information. These polls are designed as a series to measure changes in public attitudes and the reasons for them.

On May 4, Secretary Weinberger's open press conference attracted numerous foreign correspondents to the Pentagon. Others heard the briefing live at the Washington Foreign Press Center.

Also on May 4, the Foreign Press Center arranged for eleven Western European journalists to meet with Under Secretary Ikle for a discussion of security issues in general, as well as the situation in Central America. This backgrounder resulted in four planned follow-up interviews on Atlantic defense issues.

During the week, a representative of the West German ARD television network arrived in Washington to begin filming for an hour-long program on INF deployment, scheduled to be aired on June 24. USIA has established appointments with Assistant Secretary Burt, and with Assistant Secretary Perle and Under Secretary Ikle at the Department of Defense. The producer also plans to incorporate footage from the USIA-produced film on Soviet military power into his program, whose working title is "Year of Deployment--1983".

Posts in Western Europe report that distribution there of the Soviet booklet "How to Avert the Threat to Europe" has apparently failed to achieve any resonance. Paris reports that the only notable reaction has been an article in Le Monde by commentator Michel Tatu, in which he takes issue with the booklet's allegation that the U.S. had made a decision to deploy INF systems by 1975 and that the SS-20 was a response to this decision. Terming this a "deliberate distortion of the truth", Tatu says it is on this point that the booklet is least convincing.

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The Hague reports that several of their journalist contacts have received the booklet in the mail, and one, from NRC-Handelsblad, said he found it fascinating that the section on the European peace movement implies criticism of the movement for focussing its protests on the East as well as the West.

The Washington Foreign Press Center assisted many European journalists with INF-related coverage during the week. Among them were Kees Wiese (Nieuweblad van het Norden); Leo Wolleborg (Il Tempo); Pauli Jarvenpaa (Helsingin Sanomat); Sven Rohne (Nordic News); and Sidney Weiland (Reuters). In addition, the Foreign Press Center arranged for Rob Meines of the NRC-Handelsblad (Rotterdam), to meet with Bud McFarlane of the NSC and with Professor Kupperman at the School of Advanced International Studies to discuss INF and other security issues.

A USIA-produced question-and-answer text on INF is now being printed, and will be distributed to posts in Europe and Asia. Designed as a resource which can be tailored to local requirements and translated and printed in any format, this text deals with key INF issues in substantial detail but in layman's language.

A pocket-sized handbook on INF talking points is also in final stages of preparation, and will be supplied to posts during mid-May. This product is a quick reference guide on INF issues for speakers on the subject and for Embassy officers dealing with INF matters in their personal contacts.

During the week, the Wireless File ran a number of articles on INF issues:

- Secretary Weinberger's appearance on "Press Conference USA" was carried on May 3. The Secretary characterized Moscow's threat to take "comparable action" to NATO INF modernization as designed to prevent that modernization.
- The transcript of Assistant Secretary Burt's interview with Der Spiegel also ran on May 3, as did a byliner by Deputy Secretary Dam entitled "Soviet Demands on British, French Missiles a Barrier?"
- A May 4 item dealt with President Reagan's and Secretary Weinberger's responses to the Andropov INF proposal. The item underscored U.S. interest in apparent Soviet willingness to count warheads in negotiations, but also dealt with the deficiencies in the Soviet proposal, as outlined by the two U.S. leaders.
- The May 5 File included a byliner by ACDA Director Adelman on "ACDA's Role in U.S. Arms Control Policy", based upon his Congressional testimony.

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- The May 5 File also ran the transcript of Secretary Weinberger's May 4 news conference on the Andropov proposal. A McNeil-Lehrer interview with Assistant Secretary Burt, also carried that day, suggested caution on the Soviet proposal. The text of the President's statement on the nuclear freeze resolution was also carried that day.

On May 2, Alexander Vershbow, of the State Department's Office of Soviet Union Affairs, participated in a busy USIA-arranged program in Bonn. After discussing U.S. arms control policy with a leading arms control advisor to the SPD Bundestag group, Vershbow met with a seminar on arms control at Bonn University. Included in the group of graduate students and professors was a member of the FRG Ministry of Defense planning staff. Vershbow reviewed the status of both the START and INF talks, and the reasons for current lack of movement in either. Vershbow's grasp of his subject matter, and his pragmatic, reasonable approach, led one participant to term the session "extraordinarily interesting and useful".

U.S. Representative to the European Communities George Vest visited Stuttgart from May 3-4 for discussions on American security and economic policies with a cross-section of Stuttgart Consulate contacts. During the visit, Vest addressed the Stuttgart chapter of the American Chamber of Commerce on the shared interests and values which bind the Western Allies and then met with the mayor of the city, who subsequently endorsed the U.S. position on arms talks with the Soviets.

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cc: Judge William P. Clark, Jr., SPG ✓
Secretary George P. Shultz, SPG
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, SPG
Administrator M. Peter McPherson, SPG

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May 10, 1983

Project Status Report Number Seven
Security Issues Working Group

<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>TARGET DATE</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>
P/P-1	Offer posts articles on INF by women	ongoing	
P/P-2	Offer posts pro-INF articles by Europeans on Wireless File	ongoing	
P/P-3	Offer posts by-liners on INF	ongoing	
P/P-4	Prepare INF speakers pamphlet	4/15	X
P/P-5	Offer posts articles in layman language on Soviet military doctrine	ongoing	
P/P-6	Offer posts INF talking points booklet	5/16	
P/P-7	Upcoming "Problems of Communism" articles on Soviet military and foreign policy	ongoing	
P/P-8	Offer posts by-liners on militarization of Soviet society	ongoing	
P/F-1	Facilitative assistance for EU journalists on INF issues	ongoing	
P/F-2	Provide security issues briefings by Administration officials and others	ongoing	
P/F-3	Semi-annual West European foreign/ defense editors' and correspondents' tour	4/25	X

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<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>TARGET DATE</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>
P/G-1	In cooperation with State, provide INF policy guidance to the field	ongoing	
P/G-2	Alert posts by cable of Wireless File articles on INF	ongoing	
P/D-1	Program USG officials and AmParts on INF	ongoing	
P/R-1	Conduct public opinion surveys in basing countries	ongoing	
B/TVF-1	Prepare and distribute reel of archival clips on Soviet arms		X
B/TVF-2	Prepare and distribute short version of clips on Soviet arms		X
B/TVF-3	Produce animated film on Soviet arms	ongoing	
B/TVF-4	Facilitate RAI-2 Italian TV coverage for 6-part series on arms issues	ongoing	
B/TVF-5	Facilitate Belgian TV coverage for program on INF and defense issues		X
B/TVF-6	Facilitate Swiss TV coverage for program on INF and defense issues		X
B/TVF-7	Facilitate West German TV coverage for program on INF deployment	ongoing	

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<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>TARGET DATE</u>	<u>COMPLETED</u>
E/V-1	Conduct program for Belgian parliamentary group		X
E/V-2	Conduct program for French defense specialist group	4/11	
E/V-3	Conduct program for Norwegian Journalism Institute group	5/26-27	
E/V-4	Conduct program for Spanish parliamentarians group	5/9-27	
E/V-5	Program EU IV's with interest in INF	ongoing	
EU-1	Dutch bilateral information talks, to include security topics		X

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