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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
141259	MEMO	JOHN KELLY TO AMB HELMAN RE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGIES <i>R 9/5/2017 M443/5</i>	4	4/19/1983	B1
141261	PAPER	RE INF <i>R 9/5/2017 M443/5</i>	10	ND	B1
141263	PAPER	RE US-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 9/5/2017 M443/5</i>	6	ND	B1
141265	PAPER	RE START <i>R 9/5/2017 M443/5</i>	8	ND	B1

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KEYWORDS: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

DEFENSE BUDGET

INF

START

VERIFICATION

USSR

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPERS FOR 21 APR IPC WORKING GRPS MTG

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 21 APR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1983

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(With Secret Attachments)

MEMORANDUM TO: OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg S/S 8312089
~~NSC~~ - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler S/S 8312090
DOD - Colonel John Stanford S/S 8312091
USIA - Ms. Teresa Collins S/S 8312092
ACDA - Mr. John Tierney S/S 8312093

Subject: International Political Committee Working
Groups Meeting, Thursday, April 21, Room 4313

Attached are draft papers for discussion at tomorrow's IPC
Working Group meetings.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM

April 19, 1983

TO: P - Ambassador Helman

FROM: PA - John H. Kelly *JHK*

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Strategies for National Security
Issues: Basic Audiences and Their Priority

The following is offered for use of the various drafting groups now at work. I would appreciate your distributing copies.

A key consideration is common to all six public affairs strategies tasked by the NSC: the basic audiences to be reached and the priority that should be accorded to each audience. The most appropriate programming is not necessarily different for each issue. There will also be a good deal of overlap among the issues, which strongly suggests the need for an integrated overview.

As an introduction to such an overview, this paper examines audience priorities in three basic categories: (a) the Congress; (b) the general American public; (c) overseas publics. Priorities are assigned in terms of the Administration's policy objectives for each issue and the immediacy of these objectives.

Issue I. Defense Budget, M-X, and Strategic Defenses

Congress: Highest priority audience on this issue, on the basis of budgetary objectives. Congress will be very responsive to public and media. The Administration's deterrence rationale and total arms control program will be a key source of persuasive arguments in support of this issue.

American public: Second highest priority audience for this issue, in order to maintain and bolster support for defense modernization despite economic stringencies. Public attitudes will have a significant impact on Congress' attitudes. Here too, deterrence rationale and the Administration's arms control program will be a key source of persuasive arguments in support of modernization.

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Overseas Audiences: Lowest priority relative to previous two audiences. However, negative reaction, e.g., to the INF deployment, would likely have a negative effect on Congress and the American public.

Issue II. INF in Europe

Congress: Congress needs to be briefed, as always. If positive attitudes are fostered, it will be helpful in terms of the entire range of nuclear issues.

American public: A relatively low-priority issue, except as it is perceived within the overall context of arms control. Does not appear to require speaker programming on this specific issue in isolation.

Overseas Audiences: European audiences have highest priority, in order to promote understanding of why deployment is necessary and reduce opposition to deployment. There may be some benefit in programming in areas of East Asia within Soviet INF range.

Issue III. START

Congress: For the near term, START will be perceived in terms of nuclear issues that are more pressing, such as MX, the freeze, INF. Congress needs to be briefed and positive attitudes fostered, looking toward the time when a START treaty becomes a Congressional concern. Keeping in mind the erosion of support for SALT II, Congress should not be neglected in the near term.

American Public: Positive perceptions need to be fostered early on, in order to promote support for the Administration's various arms control initiatives. The Administration's overall intent can be explained with emphasis on specific objectives that can be discussed.

Overseas Audiences: Important in Europe; for the present, mostly in the context of arms control negotiations and the US-Soviet relationship.

Issue IV. Miscellaneous Arms Control Issues

A. CBW -

Congress: Administration proposals could be utilized to reinforce the credibility of its concern with arms control. A potentially high-visibility issue if Administration chooses to make it so.

American Public: Not, as yet, highly visible to the general public. As with Congress, Administration proposals could be utilized to reinforce the credibility of its concern with arms control.

Overseas Audiences: Highest priority for this issue. An exceptional issue, in terms of European audiences, for bolstering Administration credibility and undermining Soviet credibility. Likewise, an exceptional issue for third-world audiences, because of its immediacy. Multilateral forums, because of their multiple overseas audiences, should be sought.

B. Verification/Compliance

Congress: Again, Congress is of highest long-term significance in terms of eventual treaty ratification. As was the case with SALT II, Congress will very likely become more sensitive to matters of verification/compliance if actual INF/START agreements are reached.

American Public: Past poll data clearly show that, for this audience, verification/compliance eventually comes to be viewed as a critical aspect of arms-control. This is illustrated in the case of attitudes toward a freeze; polls show that raising the questions of verification and compliance erodes support for a freeze. The subject should be given a good deal of attention within larger context of Administration's arms control efforts.

Overseas Audiences: In contrast to American public, we have no evidence this is a particular concern abroad. Overseas emphasis on this aspect of arms control might boomerang, possibly being seen as an attempt to excuse not reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union.

Issue V. Nuclear Freeze

Congress: Highest priority because of imminent votes on resolutions and possible impact thereof on negotiations.

American Public: High priority in order not to impede progress on Administration's arms control policies; also, to preclude independent Congressional initiatives. START/INF as well as verification/compliance should be addressed within the larger context of freeze issue in order to demonstrate the Administration efforts to move towards nuclear reductions.

Overseas Audiences: Far lower priority than, for example, INF. Important only if it becomes an aspect of anti-deployment campaign.

Issue VI. US-Soviet Bilateral Relations

Congress: High priority in terms of the range of specific US-Soviet issues in which Congress is interested, rather than as a single subject. This range includes not only the strategic relationship, but also agricultural policy and the transfer of technology.

American Public: High priority, since the public, while accepting that the USSR is our principal adversary, is also deeply concerned that each side has the capability to destroy the other. The public demands reassurance that: while our defenses will be maintained, we will not try to foster an arms race with the Soviets and we will continue to seek reductions in tensions. Everything said about public affairs programming on the various aspects of arms control is relevant to the bilateral relationship.

Overseas Audiences: Relatively low priority, except for the need to reassure allies and friends that the U.S. intends to maintain its security obligations and is committed to diminishing the likelihood of US-Soviet conflict. Technology transfer may again become a priority overseas issue depending on events.

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Strategy Paper on INF Public Diplomacy

The President's proposal for an interim INF agreement provides a useful bench-mark for assessing our public diplomacy strategy in the coming months. The period leading up to deployment of Pershing IIs and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe, if there is no arms control agreement, will be an especially challenging and crucial one for the Alliance. A sustained effort by the Alliance will be needed to maintain the requisite public support in Europe. In this connection, we need to assess where we are, what we can expect of the Soviets, and what we need to do to reinforce our own message--first of all in the period preceding the re-opening of talks on May 17.

The Current Situation

In the course of the past several months, in our view, we have done much to regain the public offensive. The President's initiative, more aggressive U.S. public diplomacy efforts in Washington and at our European posts, and increased public activity by several key Allied governments have helped us to regain some previously lost ground with European public opinion and strengthened our ability to influence the nuclear debate in Europe and Japan. We have been generally successful in reminding the public that the West seeks parity in response to the continuing Soviet build-up, and in demonstrating our flexibility and desire to make progress in Geneva. We believe we have put the ball back in the Soviet court for now and that we are now in a better position to make it clear that it is the Soviet Union which has raised obstacles to progress in arms reductions.

As a result of the close Allied coordination and prior consultation on the President's new initiative, we have received supportive public statements from all of our European Allies, with the exception of Greece. The NAC "warmly welcomed" and "strongly supported" the President's initiative and reaffirmed the Alliance decision to proceed with deployments in the absence of an agreement. Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone expressed his support directly to the President. Further, the great majority of the U.S., European and Japanese press and Members of Congress also welcomed the President's initiative, although they generally expressed skepticism that the initiative would provide a basis for progress at the negotiating table.

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Sustaining the West's momentum and increasing public support for the Alliance's position will require a vigorous and continuing effort. The Soviets have a considerable credibility problem in Europe now, particularly in the wake of the expulsions of Soviet representatives from France and other countries. Yet without continued efforts by Western leaders, current perceptions will likely fade and publics may adopt the view that it is incumbent upon the U.S. to modify its position further in order to achieve an agreement with the Soviets. We must constantly anticipate and preempt such pressure to negotiate with ourselves.

The European "peace" groups will try to foster this view and will no doubt seek to promote the theme of "a plague on both superpowers." Although the "peace" movements were unable to draw the crowds they expected in the Easter marches, their ability to undercut the NATO position on INF should not be underestimated. They can be expected, for example, to focus in the coming months on headline-grabbing actions designed to fuel emotions and gain broader support. At the same time, some elements of the "peace" movements may undertake increasingly militant--perhaps violent--actions, stemming from "revolutionary" zeal and possibly from a perception that they will not be able to sway a majority in their countries.

Opponents of deployment will also likely turn their attention to creating and exploiting parliamentary and other obstacles, e.g. lobbying against defense budget allocations on INF and--in the Netherlands--forcing a nuclear debate in the context of discussions of the Defense White Paper expected to be released this Fall. There is need to identify future public and parliamentary problems as far as possible in advance so that we and our Allies will be in a better position to deal with them. In this connection, we are asking posts to provide us with their assessment of the problems that lie ahead in each country and with their recommendations on how to deal with them.

The U.S. anti-nuclear movement has not thus far concentrated on the INF issue. Likewise, among the U.S. foreign affairs "establishment," support for INF may be greater than support on other nuclear issues, since our policy is based on Alliance-wide decisions and Allied political considerations. We also have received considerable Congressional support for NATO and US positions on INF and for the President's initiative. To build upon this support, we should brief Members of Congress on INF, particularly Members who will be travelling to Europe, and we should work with Members who are supportive of the Alliance in making the public case on INF and other European security issues.

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Despite the extensive support which the President's initiative received within the U.S., we should not assume that the INF issue will remain uncontentious at home. The NATO position has been criticized by some anti-nuclear activists here, and -- given the collaboration between the movement here and elements of the "peace" movement in Europe -- this could be stepped up if an arms control agreement is not in sight as deployments near. Further, the perception on the Hill and among the public that the Allies "do not contribute their share" for the common defense could spill over to the INF issue.

We should remain alert to such signals at home. Further, our INF policy cannot be treated in isolation. If we fail to develop an overall strategy for public and diplomatic handling of the wide range of security issues, poorly coordinated public actions in other areas could undermine our recent accomplishments in INF. Related to this, we also need to enhance European public confidence in our overall ability to manage major foreign policy issues -- such as US/Soviet relations. If most Europeans do not have such confidence in us, any successes in the INF area will not do as much as they could to improve our standing in Europe.

Possible Soviet Moves

The Soviets have responded promptly and at high levels to the President's initiative in an effort to dissipate its impact. They undertook a major effort, begun long before Gromyko's April 2 press conference, to discredit publicly any idea of an interim solution which would allow some U.S. deployments and to characterize our proposal as a fig leaf for a strategy of nuclear deployment. At this point, it seems evident that the Soviets are still intent on preserving a monopoly in these systems, and on undermining politically both our negotiating position and our ability to deploy. They hope to stimulate public pressures on us to make further concessions -- perhaps a delay in deployment schedules -- and to foster US-European strife.

The Soviets are also trying to play off Asian and European security concerns -- putting the U.S. between two groups of allies. Gromyko's rejection of limits on SS-20s in the Eastern part of the USSR has heightened concerns in Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing that the threat to Asia might be increased through any reductions in Europe. It is important, therefore, that our European Allies remain supportive of our global limits

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policy and that the global element be fully taken into account in our public diplomacy efforts on INF. In this connection, we also need to develop a coordinated dialogue with our Asian Allies and friends, in particular Japan, Korea and China.

In Japan, our efforts -- marked by close, continuing consultations -- have had some success, as evidenced by the strong, unqualified rebuff just accorded Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa's suggestion of a trade off between a Soviet commitment not to target missiles on Japan in return for Japanese reaffirmation of Japan's non-nuclear policy. Nonetheless, we can anticipate further Soviet efforts to stir up a campaign -- which will be backed by the "peace" movement in Japan -- to bargain elements of the U.S. nuclear umbrella against some sort of Soviet commitment to limit the level of SS-20s in the Eastern areas of the USSR.

As a result of the German election outcome and of the President's INF initiative, the Soviets may feel themselves to be on the public defensive on this issue once again. Related to this, they appear to be increasingly pessimistic as to their chances of blocking NATO deployments. If this is the case, the Soviets will do everything possible to stir up trouble in Western Europe to try to ensure that we pay a high political price for those deployments.

Since the Soviets still do not seem prepared to negotiate seriously, they will likely try to place themselves in the best possible public posture to blame lack of progress in the talks on the U.S. To try to ensure this, they will probably need to make some kind of gesture in the talks in the coming months. What we do in this period can influence the effectiveness of Soviet efforts through the end of the year.

We nonetheless believe that at least through the resumption of the talks on May 17 the Soviets will be unlikely to change their substance or their tactics substantially. We should be ready in this period, however, for a series of high visibility Soviet public statements on the issue and for INF-related themes in the Soviet slogans for their May Day holiday. During this period, the Soviets will probably continue to emphasize issues aimed at undermining our negotiating position and creating barriers to our deployments. The issues they emphasize will likely continue at least for now to be French and UK systems, NATO aircraft and the global dimension of the U.S. position.

While unlikely to take a major substantive initiative over the next month, the Soviets might publicize a new variant of the Andropov proposal. For example, while continuing to insist on counting British and French systems, the Soviets might suggest a willingness to reduce "in Europe" to a level where Soviet warheads would equal those on UK and French missiles. We need to be better prepared in general to rebut the Andropov proposal, and should ensure that we are ready to respond to a Soviet announcement of any variations on it.

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By staying on this track through the resumption of the talks, the Soviets will be able to hear us out as we add detail to the new U.S. initiative. This will not likely bring a new substantive element in the Soviet position, but it will enable the Soviets to claim for propaganda purposes that they have heard us out and that we had "nothing new" to offer.

Once this process has been completed, perhaps in mid-June, the Soviets may well shift to a two-track approach of their own: making more "serious" proposals billed as addressing Western concerns, while at the same time adding more explicitness to their threats about Soviet counter-deployments. Both tracks of such an approach would have one basic feature in common -- a continued and concerted Soviet effort to prevent any U.S. LRINF deployments.

If the Soviets make a significant substantive move, this may come at the end of the coming round or the beginning of the next one. If so, the Soviets may package this with a major public announcement on the eve of the September round so as to try to enter that round on the high ground just as they probably perceive us as doing in the coming round. This timing would seem to be ideal for the Soviets in trying -- as they obviously will -- to fuel the large demonstrations being planned for several European cities in the early Fall.

If this approach does not appear to be succeeding, the Soviets may become all the more threatening concerning the consequences of any U.S. deployments. They may at first threaten to end their "moratorium" on SS-20 deployments in the European USSR, and may ultimately do so demonstratively. They may also announce even further nuclear weapons programs of their own, and provide behind-the-scenes encouragement to those in Western Europe susceptible to Soviet influence to resort to increasingly violent measures to halt our deployments.

Such actions may be accompanied by dramatic Soviet actions to capture headlines. This may be part of a "carrot and stick" approach in which the Soviets also undertake -- or offer to undertake -- a gesture of "good will," such as unilaterally transferring beyond the Urals a symbolic number of SS-20s. Such a move would likely appeal to anti-INF opinion in Europe, while alarming our Asian friends and Allies. As a "carrot" for Asia, the Soviets might offer as well to accept some sort of cap on their systems in the Eastern parts of the USSR.

We will need to be better prepared to rebut Soviet arguments that new Soviet systems will be necessary to "counter" our PII and GLCM deployments. We could point out, inter alia, that particularly with the earlier removal of our Thor, Jupiter and Mace systems from

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Europe, there was no military justification whatsoever for SS-20 deployments and that any further Soviet buildup would be even more destabilizing. Further, we should be ready to rebut any Soviet claim that our LRINF deployments would violate an earlier understanding -- e.g., that arising from the Cuban missile crisis.

During the coming months, the Soviets may also make increasingly more explicit threats that if we deploy they will cut off the negotiations. While this may gain some ground for them with members of the public who are concerned about the fate of arms control, we do not believe it likely that the Soviets would take the onus of actually leaving the talks. It should be noted that Gromyko was very careful on this point in his April 2 press conference.

If, however, the Soviets did in fact leave the talks once we started deployments, to try to minimize the public onus they would likely combine this with an "offer" to return if we made some concession--e.g., a halt to NATO deployments or (if not yet deployed) a ban on PIIs. If, on the other hand, the Soviets were to stay at the talks, but started new deployments of their own, they might offer only these new deployments in exchange for U.S. reductions.

We also need to watch carefully any linkage which the Soviets (and others) may make between INF and other issues. For example, if the Madrid CSCE Review Conference ends with agreement to hold at some time a Conference on European Disarmament (CDE), the Soviets may try to persuade European publics that going forward with any INF deployments in the meantime could ruin the prospects or atmosphere for holding such a conference. Or, also possibly with CSCE in mind, the Soviets might claim that unspecified human rights progress might be possible if NATO postponed deployments. And, bearing both European and U.S. public opinion in mind, we need to be ready to put into diplomatic perspective likely Soviet threats that any U.S. deployments would "create a crisis" in U.S./Soviet and East/West relations. Finally, we should expect and be ready in the Fall for major Soviet initiatives at the UNGA designed to undermine our position in INF and other arms control areas.

A Near Term Strategy to Reinforce our Message

To meet these challenges, we must promote the fullest possible public understanding of the history of INF and the NATO Alliance, as well as of our continuing commitments in Asia and our determination to address the INF issue on a global basis. Allied governments' active involvement in this effort is crucial. We have consulted with our European Allies on our public diplomacy objectives and strategy and indicated that we depend upon them to present the case to their own people. We must avoid the impression that the U.S. is engaged in "selling" its policy to the people of Europe. Our INF policy is based on a NATO decision, and -- while we wish to be as helpful as possible -- it is incumbent upon each NATO government to try to ensure the requisite public support in its own country.

We have a good working relationship with the basing countries on INF public diplomacy. We have deferred to the host governments to determine the level of public activity in their own countries. The British government has already undertaken an aggressive public campaign on the issue, apparently with considerable beneficial effect thus far. The Italian, Dutch, and Belgian governments, on the other hand, believe Alliance interests are best served in their countries by keeping a low profile on the issue. In our view, the one basing country where greater efforts may possibly be in order is the FRG.

We have also deferred to our Asian Allies in determining the proper level of public activity in their own countries on INF issues.

Our embassies should continue to work in conjunction with host governments in coordinating public efforts by USG officials in those countries. A major effort has been made by the Washington community to provide our diplomatic posts and military commands with extensive initial guidance on the President's new INF initiative and on the Soviet response. Material sent to posts and commands through State and USIA channels has included:

- the President's March 30 statement on INF;
- the President's March 31 speech on arms control;
- the March 30 White House fact sheet spelling out the new initiative;
- the report of the SCG chairman concerning the new initiative;
- the Department's statement of April 2 in response to Gromyko's criticism of the US proposal;
- the text of the Department's background briefing on April 2; and
- Q's and A's related to the President's initiative.

We currently are working on an extensive series of actions designed to update material which has already been sent to the field, to provide some new perspectives and information for the field and to build up a reservoir of useful background material which can be used by posts and military commands in support of Allied positions.

While additional efforts may be required at some point in Asia, we do not wish to play into the Soviet hand by stirring up the issue. Our best approach is to continue to keep Asian governments and our posts well informed and to provide our public affairs materials on INF to our embassies and to

Asian Allies, but to leave the primary burden of dealing with the public and media to the governments concerned. So far, Soviet heavy-handedness has facilitated this approach.

Our current projects include:

a) New Materials

-- We are revising and updating materials and themes already sent to the field. We have underway, for example, a comprehensive review of the INF Speakers Packet which was sent to posts in March. Revised and updated sections of the packet will be cabled to the field as soon as completed and recleared.

-- New materials, specifically addressed to Soviet arguments, are in the final stages of preparation in the INF Working Group.

-- An INF press packet containing useful background material will be made available to correspondents here and in Europe.

-- A White Paper on the full range of US arms control efforts in the postwar period is under interagency preparation. We hope to have this available for worldwide circulation in time for the NAC Ministerial in June.

-- A new gist on INF is in the final stages of preparation and should be circulated to the field in the near future.

-- Materials useful for Asian audiences, such as refutation of Soviet statements offensive to Asians, will also be prepared.

-- USIA, working with Gallup Affiliates in Europe, has just begun a new series of polling efforts in the basing countries. As we receive the data from each part of this five-part project, we will make use of it to review our public diplomacy efforts.

-- USIA has prepared a new one-hour film on the Soviet arms buildup and is producing a special half-hour version specifically for TV placement abroad.

b) Expanded Speakers Program

-- We are trying to ensure that senior spokesmen include INF and other arms control issues in their forthcoming speeches and press briefings.

o Building on his highly successful European trip in February, we will recommend useful public events and themes for the Vice President's June trip to Europe.

o Both in the US and in his May and June trips to Europe, we will try to engage the Secretary of State more fully on the public handling of security and arms control issues in view of his exceptional credibility with the US and European publics.

o Under Secretary Eagleburger will address Alliance security issues in his speeches in Hamburg, Vienna, and Madrid during his coming trip to Europe.

-- USIA is preparing, in cooperation with posts, an augmented speakers program in Europe. As part of this effort, we are seeking to make available for selected forums more private sector Americans and Europeans knowledgeable about European security issues.

-- We are beginning to provide expert speakers for selected forums in Japan and Korea.

-- We also have stepped up considerably the number and level of special briefings provided for European correspondents resident in the United States.

c) Cable to Posts and Commands

-- In an effort to pull all of this together for our posts and relevant military commands, we shortly will send to the field a comprehensive cable outlining the actions we are taking in Washington, seeking our posts' assessment of where we stand on the INF issue with publics in their countries and asking the posts to reinforce their own public diplomacy efforts. At the same time, we will provide to our posts and pertinent military commands some suggestions for shaping their own public affairs efforts and some new themes which build upon the President's most recent initiative.

d) Looking Ahead

We will begin now to consider what we want to do and say publicly on INF in connection with three scheduled events:

- The resumption of INF talks in Geneva on May 17;
- the Williamsburg Summit and preceding bilaterals; and
- the NATO Ministerial on June 9-10.

In each case, how we choose to express our INF position -- in terms of context, participants and associated activities -- will be important in trying to maintain the momentum we have developed over the past month. Above all, Allied leaders -- both European and Asian -- should continue to take the lead on this issue in their own countries.

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In addition, we are encouraging more public efforts in support of Alliance positions by pro-NATO Europeans and Americans from the private sector. And, looking at both the near and longer term, we need to do everything possible to expand youth exchanges with Europe, and particularly to provide more opportunities for exchanges among politically active young people. USIA is examining, in the first instance, how this might be worked into existing programs and available resources.

Finally, we need to examine how we can best: a) neutralize Soviet propaganda efforts directed against Asia; b) expose Soviet front groups such as the World Peace Council; and c) counter Soviet efforts to exploit the "peace" movement in Europe.

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Strategy Paper on Public Diplomacy
in US-Soviet Relations

I. Setting

Political Situation/Substance of Issue: The cultivation of Congressional and public support for our overall approach to US-Soviet relations must always be a central element in our public diplomacy. This task will take on particular importance in coming months because public perceptions of the Soviet challenge and our response to it will be critical to Congressional action on several key elements of the Administration's program, including strategic forces modernization and supplemental assistance for El Salvador. The overall theme of our public diplomacy should be to stress that we have in place a comprehensive approach to US-Soviet relations which protects our interests and those of our Allies, while leaving open the possibility of a more constructive US-Soviet relationship if warranted by Soviet restraint. Thus, it must always be clear that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, which is responsible for the current level of tension in the relationship.

Public Perceptions: There is considerable public support for a strong U.S. policy of resistance to Soviet expansionism and maintenance of the East-West military balance. However, there are also strong currents in public and Congressional opinion which desire a reduction in US-Soviet tensions and progress in arms control. An effective public diplomacy must take account of both of these strands in public opinion while stressing our approach of realism, strength, and negotiation.

Expected Developments: We can expect continuation of the Soviet "peace offensive" designed to portray the U.S. as responsible for tensions in the relationship and for the lack of progress in arms control. While the primary Soviet target will be West European publics, Moscow will also be alert for opportunities to affect U.S. public opinion. At the same time, we must increase our capabilities for effective management of events which we cannot fully anticipate or control, but which may have an important impact on our public diplomacy. For example, pressures are likely to build through 1983 for a US-Soviet summit, as Allied leaders and some segments of U.S. domestic opinion increasingly view such a meeting as the best means for bringing about a reduction of US-Soviet tensions in the short term.

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/11/17

II. OBJECTIVES

The Administration's objectives in US-Soviet relations are set forth in NSDD 75. Briefly stated they are:

1. To contain and reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas.

2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system.

3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.

The NSDD also recognizes that our policy approach is unlikely to yield a "breakthrough" in our relations with the Soviet Union and that there will be public pressure for a more "normal" US-Soviet relationship. It is therefore essential that we avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, we must demonstrate credibly that our policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet relations.

III. Target Audiences

--Domestic

1. Congress: The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee recently held hearings on US-Soviet relations and has subsequently asked for more information on our policy, including the text of NSDD 75. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold hearings on US-Soviet relations in April, with Secretary Shultz as the leading Administration witness. In addition Congressional interest is high on other issues, such as Soviet compliance with arms control agreements and the Soviet-Cuban military relationship.

2. Press interest in all aspects of US-Soviet relations remains high. High officials of the Department of State, including the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, have met often with media representatives on the general subject of US-Soviet relations.

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3. Interest Groups: A wide variety of special interest groups have a keen interest in US-Soviet relations. For example, numerous groups take an active role in supporting prisoners of conscience and other victims of Soviet human rights violations. Our policy toward the USSR is also a major preoccupation of groups which stake out a strong position on defense and nuclear issues, including the nuclear "freeze" movement. American business interests, particularly in the Agricultural sector, are intensely interested in developments in the U.S. bilateral economic relationship with the Soviet Union. In short, virtually every articulate sector of American public opinion has a strongly held position on US-Soviet relations -- and many of these are contradictory. Thus, a vigorous public debate on US-Soviet relations has become one of the "givens" of American public life. The Administration must participate vigorously in this debate, but we must guard against our policy becoming hostage to the viewpoint of any particular interest group.

--Foreign: Foreign leaders, particularly in Allied governments, will continue to be under public pressure to seek an improvement in East-West relations. This is likely to be translated into pressures on the U.S. to explore fully all possibilities for constructive agreements with the Soviet Union -- particularly in arms control. These pressures from Allied and other governments can best be managed by a combination of active U.S. diplomatic dialogue at all levels with the Soviet Union and effective public presentation of our own positions on major issues. The Williamsburg Summit and June NATO Ministerial will be major tests of our ability to sustain Allied support for our East-West strategy.

IV. Themes

-- U.S. is sincerely committed to constructing a durable basis for a more productive US-Soviet relationship.

-- Task is not an easy one: US-Soviet relationship is fundamentally adversarial, given incompatibility of our basic values and Soviet expansionism in many parts of world.

-- Long-term nature of US-Soviet competition means it is essential we maintain a strong defense posture, strengthen relations with key allies, and support democratic forces throughout the world.

-- But we are also making good-faith efforts on several fronts to expand areas where we and Soviets can cooperate to mutual benefit.

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-- President's new INF proposal demonstrates we are willing to engage in real give-and-take in quest for agreement to reduce substantially the numbers of intermediate-range missiles.

-- In addition to talks on arms control, we are engaged in an intensive dialogue with the Soviets on a broad range of international issues where we seek to resolve problems. We are also exploring ways to expand bilateral cooperation where it is in our mutual interests.

-- Human rights is also a central component of our approach to US-Soviet relations. Our own values compel us to be concerned about those suffering persecution for their beliefs and those denied the right to emigrate from the USSR.

-- We have never expected to find quick and simple solutions to the problems that complicate US-Soviet relations. But we are hopeful that, with good will and patient efforts on both sides, progress can be achieved.

-- Still cannot make prediction with respect to Summit meeting between the President and Andropov. As both sides have stressed, such a meeting would require careful preparation.

V. Initiatives:

High-level statements: It will be essential that our public statements continue to emphasize the full range of our concerns about Soviet behavior -- their military buildup, geopolitical expansionism, and human rights violations. Against this background of Soviet behavior, we must continue to stress the necessity for a renewal of U.S. economic and military strength.

The Democracy Initiative: We must do more than criticize the Soviet record. It is essential that the U.S. continue and expand the effort launched by the President in his London speech to promote our values of political democracy, human rights, and freedom of economic opportunity. We must continue to make the case before Congress for full funding of the democracy initiative and passage of the proposed supplemental for the radios.

Dialogue with the Soviet Union: A vital part of our public diplomacy must be a visible diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union on the full range of East-West issues. We have advanced the starting date of the next round of INF negotiations in order to give additional prominence to the President's new interim proposal. Our proposals on strengthening the TTBT and negotiating new CBMs have become public. But we must ensure against the public perception that our dialogue with Moscow has

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narrowed to arms control alone. Therefore, we should take advantage of appropriate opportunities, such as Secretary Shultz' upcoming SFRC testimony, to put on the public record the fact of our dialogue with the Soviet Union on regional issues -- particularly Afghanistan and southern Africa. We should also ensure that human rights remains a major element in our public diplomacy, at Madrid and elsewhere. At the same time, in the handling of specific cases we must retain the capability to act quietly in order to maximize Soviet flexibility.

The question of further high-level dialogue should be kept under review. If warranted by events and the substance of our dialogue with Moscow, we could consider another meeting between Secretary Shultz and Gromyko before the next UNGA this fall. There is at present no need for change in our public posture on a summit e.g. willingness to meet when positive results could be expected and following carefully preparations.

Access, Presence, and Reciprocity: We should take steps to broaden our access to Soviet society. It is also important that the Soviets not enjoy an advantage over us in their ability to take advantage of relatively unfettered access to the U.S., while denying us reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. As noted in NSDD 75, this situation is likely to persist unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges with the USSR.

VI. Senior Officials Participation: It is essential that the President, the Secretary of State, and other senior officials take the lead in articulating our policy toward the Soviet Union. The President's recent speeches on the Soviet military buildup and arms control have underscored our determination to resist Soviet expansionism, while keeping open the possibility of a reduction of US-Soviet tensions. Secretary Shultz' upcoming testimony on US-Soviet relations before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be another major opportunity to articulate our policy. Obviously, the participation of the President and Secretary Shultz would be central to any enhanced high-level bilateral dialogue with Moscow which we might undertake. Appropriate participation by other high-level USG officials can also be effective in our public diplomacy, as demonstrated by Secretary Weinberger's involvement in the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin to convey our new CMBs proposals to the Soviet Union.

VII. Calendar of Events

--April 26, Secretary Shultz testimony before SFRC on US-Soviet relations;

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- May 17, INF negotiations resume in Geneva;
- May 28-30, Williamsburg Summit
- June 8, START negotiations resume;
- June 8-9, NATO Ministerial in Paris
- September-October, Shultz-Gromyko meeting at UNGA.

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START Strategy Paper

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The Setting

A) Political Situation/Substance of the Issue

Over the past year, nuclear weapons and arms control have become the most hotly debated issues on the public agenda. The nuclear freeze and disarmament movements have stimulated growing public concern and opposition to nuclear weapons in general, and challenged many of the assumptions on which our policy is based. These groups are, for the most part, well organized and active, with supporters in virtually all levels of society. They have gained great media visibility, and increasing political clout, which they will try to use to force changes in the US negotiating position -- i.e. adoption of a freeze -- and to challenge development and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems.

The high visibility of the anti-nuclear voices in turn, could have a serious adverse impact on the negotiations themselves. Passage of a congressional freeze resolution for example, even if only advisory in nature, will be widely seen as implying a lack of support for the US negotiating position. It could encourage the Soviets to continue to stall at the negotiations in the hope that public pressure in the US will lead us to make unilateral concessions. Passage of a freeze resolution will also add to the burden of allied governments in dealing with their domestic anti-nuclear critics.

B) Public Perceptions

1. The President's May 9 speech at Eureka College outlining our START proposals produced a positive change in public and international perceptions of the U.S. commitment to nuclear arms reductions. Our public programs and the President's recent statements, particularly his March 23, and March 31 speeches, have reinforced the point. In fact, a recent CBS-NYT poll shows that 49% of those polled now believe the President is sincere about seeking genuine arms limitations. However, that perception does not necessarily translate into general support of US START proposals for several reasons:

-- there is still widespread ignorance about the U.S. proposals and our call for deep reductions. Many people are still not even aware of the fact that negotiations are underway;

-- criticism of the U.S. proposal by nuclear freeze advocates and some arms control specialists as either "unrealistic" or "one-sided" or not going far enough to stop the arms race have not been adequately rebutted publicly; and

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-- even those who may support our approach to reductions are frustrated by the prospect of a long wait for concrete results and the seeming lack of movement in the talks.

Except among arms control specialists, there has been little public criticism of our START proposals per se. Instead, public concern has been expressed over the apparent lack of visible progress in the negotiations, and on related issues, such as the development and deployment of new strategic weapons systems, defense costs, and the risk of accidental war. Even in Congress, there has been relatively little opposition to our START proposals themselves: criticism has focused instead on allegations of lack of US commitment to arms control, the failure to ratify SALT II, and the continuing costs of the strategic modernization program.

C) Expected Developments

The upcoming House debate on the nuclear freeze resolution and the MX and defense budget debates will generate renewed public scrutiny and criticism of our arms control proposals, and overall strategic posture in the coming weeks. In addition, the Soviets are likely to try to take advantage of domestic and European concerns about the risk of war to renew their public and diplomatic criticism of the US START proposals, or to float other public initiatives, such as a new call for a nuclear freeze. They may argue that the talks are now stalled and blame the US for the lack of progress, or attempt to link progress in START to INF. Although there are no clear benchmarks when such Soviet initiatives might be undertaken, the period following the House freeze vote (likely on April 19-20), or just preceding the resumption of the START talks in June would be a likely time frame.

On the positive side, in contrast to last year, we do not have any indications that large-scale anti-nuclear demonstrations will take place this spring. We should remain alert, however, to the possibility of such activities by American groups later in the year to support European peace groups.

Objectives:

Barring a Soviet decision to offer new substantive proposals before the opening of the next round or to accept those we have made, our most difficult task will be to increase public awareness of and sustain media interest in the START negotiations, when we can offer no realistic hope of early agreement or even evidence of progress.

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- Our public affairs strategy should be designed to address the distinct concerns of three different groups:

- Domestic and Congressional critics
- European and other Allies
- Other foreign groups

1. Domestic Public, and Congressional

, -- over the long term, to parlay public interest in and concern about nuclear weapons into support for our arms control proposals, building the foundation for eventual approval and ratification of an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

-- getting the word out on the existence of the START negotiations and our far-reaching proposals for reductions

-- continuing to hold out public hope about the prospects for agreement. If we are pessimistic and downbeat we can hardly expect enthusiastic public support.

-- encouraging private individuals and groups who support our policies to take a more active public role

-- In the Congress, ensuring that even if a freeze resolution is passed by the House, it will not be passed by the Senate;

-- promoting Congressional support in general of our negotiations

-- ensuring Congressional approval of the defense modernization program.

Obstacles/Necessary Pre-Conditions

Since public attitudes toward START are closely tied to public perceptions of the Administration's commitment to nuclear arms control and other defense issues, developments in these areas will have an impact on the effectiveness of the public diplomacy effort. The tone of Administration statements on arms control and defense issues in general will be important: in particular, we should continue to

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emphasize our strong commitment to substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions as well as modernization; refute allegations that we are seeking superiority over the Soviet Union; and that we are building "first-strike" weapons.

Our START policy cannot be treated in isolation. If we fail to develop an overall strategy for public and diplomatic handling of the wide range of security issues, poorly coordinated public actions in other areas could undermine recent support for our proposals. If we do not enhance public confidence in our overall ability to manage major foreign policy issues -- such as US/Soviet relations -- any successes in the area may not go far to improve our standing domestically or in Europe.

Although we should respond to Soviet disinformation on our proposals, playing up the theme of Soviet stalling at the negotiations tends to hurt our own case that the negotiations offer the best prospects for a sound agreement to reduce nuclear weapons.

Target Audiences

-- Domestic

1. Congress: There is considerable latent support for our START policies in the Congress, which should be nurtured over the coming months. We should continue to brief Members of Congress on START, particularly those with a well-established interest in strategic issues, and consider expanding the number of briefings to reach more individuals and staffs. It is particularly important that Ambassador Rowny brief the relevant committees and Congressmen at an early stage.

2. Press: Sustaining general press interest in the negotiations will be difficult unless there are newsworthy developments. We should therefore concentrate on backgrounders and the specialized press to improve knowledge of the negotiations and our position. Preparation of articles for the specialized publications should be a major target of our public policy effort in the coming months.

3. Interest Groups: Apart from the traditional foreign policy councils and arms control specialists, we should direct some of our efforts toward establishing a dialogue with groups who have expressed strong concern over nuclear issues, i.e. women, religious groups, minorities, professional and business associations, particularly those that are active in civic affairs at the community level.

-- Europe

European publics and governments are understandably preoccupied with the INF issue, and will continue to focus on that question over the coming year. Allied governments are generally supportive of our START approach, however, European publics and opinion leaders are more aware of and receptive to Soviet criticisms of our START proposals, particularly the charge that our proposals are incomplete or one-sided, requiring unequal concessions by the Soviets. In addition, many Europeans are still unaware of the existence of the START talks, and skeptical of the US commitment to arms control and a more cooperative US-Soviet relationship. Therefore, our strategy for Europe should include:

--- ensuring that we continue to keep the Allies informed of developments in the START negotiations,

--- providing them with materials, such as the recent NAC paper, that address their specific concerns and can be used by Allied governments at their discretion, to inform their publics of our START policies;

--- making available for European programming speakers on START issues as well as INF

--- preparing briefing materials, articles, etc. on START which are suitable for European audiences.

Worldwide Effort

Although we have paid considerable attention to domestic US and Allied (especially European) concerns, we have not done enough to provide information on our strategic arms reduction proposals to neutral/nonaligned and Third World countries, many of whom are critical of superpower arms production and deployment. An effort to reach key political leaders and opinion makers in these countries could pay long-term dividends in encouraging them to take less critical stand with respect to US arms policies.

At present, we have virtually no information materials keyed to this audience. Our strategy therefore should be to

-- develop information materials, including briefings for government officials and information packages for distribution

by our Embassies to host governments where appropriate; These materials would have to take into account the special concerns developing countries have about the financial and economic implications of the arms race, and to suggest that they have a positive role to play in supporting the process of achieving genuine arms reductions.

-- sensitizing our Embassies and public affairs officers to the need for a special effort to explain our arms control policies to neutral, non-aligned countries

-- a greater effort to reach them through multilateral fora, including UN publications, and by paying more attention to Third World journalists in the US and in their home countries.

Themes: With all the audiences in question, we should stress the following:

-- Our START proposals offer real hope for substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions, not merely the preservation of already high levels of strategic arms.

-- Our proposals are balanced, fair and comprehensive: they concentrate on achieving reductions in the categories of weapons of most concern to both sides -- ballistic missiles and warheads -- but also include proposals for limitations on other nuclear weapons systems. .

-- Not only are we seeking reductions in numbers, but our proposals are designed to strengthen the stability of the strategic balance.

-- We have also made proposals, in the context of these negotiations, to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, and to promote better understanding of each others' military establishments and intentions.

-- Although such negotiations are by their nature, complex and difficult, we are negotiating seriously.

-- In the short time these negotiations have been underway, we have persuaded the Soviet Union of the merits of negotiating for reductions, rather than preserving the status quo, or allowing increases in nuclear arsenals. That is an important difference between the current negotiations and previous arms control efforts.

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-- We will continue to do everything in our power to move the process forward: in the last round, for example, we presented new proposals for limitations on heavy bombers and cruise missiles, and laid out what we believe to be the basic elements for a strategic arms reduction agreement.

-- If the Soviets negotiate in the same spirit, the prospects for an agreement would be very good.

Initiatives and Communications Tools

We have not done enough to publicize our proposals at the recently completed START round. In addition, many of the materials we originally produced on our proposals is somewhat out of date. Therefore, consistent with the confidentiality requirement, we should move quickly to revise and update our public information materials. This process is already underway in the Nuclear Arms Control Information Policy Working Group:

-- We are reviewing and will revise the Nuclear Arms Control Speakers' Book, with special attention to the Section on START, and distribute it to our diplomatic posts worldwide.

-- The START GIST should also be revised to reflect the new proposals made by the US in the Third Round, and Soviet acceptance of the principle of reductions.

-- We should prepare a "press package" on START to include background material, Qs and As, articles, and whatever else may be helpful.

-- New articles and Op Ed pieces on the negotiations should be initiated now, for publication closer to the time the negotiations resume. In particular, articles that could be placed in smaller local and regional papers and articles for European audiences prepared.

-- Administration spokesman on our START and arms control policies have generally had an impact on public perceptions: we need to train and send out more of them in the US and to Europe. Establishing a speakers' training program, possibly at FSI to ensure a good pool of speakers should be undertaken.

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-- More high-level statements on START and US arms control efforts in general should be planned. Another speech by the President in early June, just before the delegation leaves for Geneva could have an important impact on public perceptions. A visit by the Secretary of STATE to Europe at the time of the START reopening could also be very helpful for both the START and INF negotiations.

-- A White Paper on Arms Control is being prepared by EUR to address sophisticated audiences in Europe and the US. In addition, the Nuclear Arms Control Information Group is preparing a pamphlet/brochure on "frequently asked questions" on nuclear arms issues for general audiences.

-- The START awareness program should be continued and expanded to include other posts and more arms control/background materials.

-- In addition to the by now standard send-off for the START Del, the White House should find an opportunity to organize a photo opportunity of the President and the entire START delegation.

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