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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS
File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (14 OF 19)
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Withdrawer CAS 8/16/2012
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
141218	HANDWRITTEN NOTES	RE MEETING	6	4/7/1983	B1
141220	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GROUP RE REPORT ON 4/7/83 MEETING (INCLUDES TAB)	5	4/11/1983	B1
141233	MEMO	STEVE STEINER TO EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GROUP RE REPORT ON 4/14/83 MEETING	3	4/19/1983	B1
141243	PAPER	RE INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	10	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR DON FORTIER
BOB LINHARD
SVEN KRAEMER
WALT RAYMOND

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR

SUBJECT: INF Public Diplomacy Materials

Attached are the materials passed out at this morning's INF public diplomacy working group.

- Latest draft of arms control white paper;
- INF calendar of events;
- Shultz press briefing on March 31.

Please give me any comments you have on the working paper by close of business Monday, April 11. Current plans are for Shultz to issue this document. What is your opinion on the President issuing it?

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UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

15
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Tab 21

PAGE 01

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05/1451Z

ACTION OFFICE EU-03
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGF-02 PGMP-01 PPP-01 BVB-01 BBCA-01
BBCX-01 BVBE-01 BVBU-02 BVG-01 PPMI-02 PPPE-01
/021 AS 17

O 051445Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1295
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7840
BT
UNCLAS COPENHAGEN 02304

USIA FOR EU (PERLMAN)

E. O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY PRESS BACKGROUNDER IN
COPENHAGEN: QUESTION RE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE
PRIOR TO DECEMBER 79

1. DURING DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM'S MARCH 23 PRESS
BACKGROUNDER IN COPENHAGEN, ONE OF THE JOURNALISTS
QUESTIONED THE U. S. STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE
UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON INF PRIOR TO NATO'S ADOPTION
OF THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SET THE
RECORD STRAIGHT IN DETAIL AND REQUEST WASHINGTON PROVIDE
FURTHER INFORMATION WHICH WE CAN PASS TO THE JOURNALISTS
WHO ATTENDED THE BACKGROUNDER. PERTINENT QUESTION
FOLLOWS.

2. Q. "SINCE THIS IS OFF THE RECORD, YOU CAN MAYBE
ENLIGHTEN ME ON AN ISSUE THAT HAS PUZZLED ME. YOU STATED
IN YOUR QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION IN NORWAY THAT THE
SOVIET UNION WAS NOT WILLING TO NEGOTIATE AT ALL UNTIL
THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION WAS TAKEN. NOW, BEFORE THAT DATE
THERE WERE SEVERAL PUBLIC SOVIET INDICATIONS OF
WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE: DURING THE MAY 78 MEETING
THAT BREZHNEV HAD IN BONN, DURING HIS SPEECH ON THE 2ND
OF MARCH 79 BY BREZHNEV, AND ON THE 6TH OF OCTOBER. BUT
I SUPPOSE THAT WE HAVE EXPLORED THESE THINGS AND THAT WE
HAVE SOME REASON FOR THIS STATEMENT?" OPSTEIN ACTING

BT
*2304

AS - Can
you get
answer?

debate and vote on it in Chicago next month. (Bruce Morton)

KLAUS BARBIE - CBS News has learned that documents not yet made public establish that from 1947 to 1950 Barbie was in occupied Germany, an employee of U.S. Army intelligence. (Dan Rather)

The evidence gathered so far by the Justice Department is now indisputable. Klaus Barbie, Nazi SS officer and war criminal, became Klaus Barbie, secret agent, paid for and protected by American intelligence in post-war Germany. Pentagon documents and eyewitnesses trace Barbie's shadowy moves through U.S. headquarters and safe houses from 1946 to 1950. In 1949 and 1950 France formally requested Barbie's extradition for wartime atrocities without success. One French document notes, "Barbie enjoys the protection of American occupation authorities." The reasons why the U.S. would protect a war criminal are cloudy, but these were the early cold war years when combatting Soviet influence took first priority. Whatever U.S. intelligence knew about Barbie, U.S. authorities nonetheless issued him a transit visa under the alias Klaus Aultman (sp) for his escape first to Argentina and eventually to Bolivia. CBS News has also been told that interest in Barbie continued. In the mid-1960s, at the time of the Che Guevarra insurgency in Bolivia, American military intelligence discussed recruiting Klaus Barbie until the CIA said "no". (Robert Shakney)

AFGHANISTAN: UNDER THE SOVIET GUN - With rare exception news of the Soviet military operation in Afghanistan was limited to Moscow-approved despatches, or from eyewitnesses traveling out of the country. On TV Kabul became the forbidden city. Now, a journalist under contract to CBS News has come out with exclusive pictures that show in detail the impact of the occupation. (Dan Rather)

The Russians have controlled Afghanistan for three years and three months. The music on the streets is Russian. The traffic cop is Russian. Everywhere there are Russian soldiers--more than 100,000 of them throughout the country. The pictures (videotape) were taken by Eric Dirschmeade (sp), an independent journalist on assignment for CBS. He was accompanied by a guide from the Communist Party of Afghanistan and permitted to roam the streets of Kabul for five weeks. As long as he took what the Russians determined were innocent pictures of Afghans he had few problems. When he photographed anything else the censor stepped in. Dirschmeade beat the system by concealing copies of censored videotapes--pictures that show clearly the extent of the Russian military occupation and their political control of Kabul. Dirschmeade spotted a Russian convoy bringing oil, gas and food from the Soviet Union. Before the war Afghanistan was self-sufficient in food. Not anymore. According to the U.S. State Department, the Soviet Union is now spending a billion dollars a year to keep Afghanistan alive economically. The country has in effect become a province of the Soviet Union. The government claims it has the support of the majority of the people, but it does not trust them. The city is not normal at night, for the resistance--the mujahadin (sp)--come out and the war resumes. The resistance has blown up buildings and destroyed power lines, indicating that despite appearances Kabul is not as secure as the government would like you to believe. (Dan Rather)

15

known that they have identified almost 200 Soviets working throughout France with the KGB and the GRU. Soviet principal targets have been military, all high-tech and very specific. The French make the world's best tank armor, and rank among the world's best in composite metals for helicopter air frames. These are sought by the Soviets. They also seek a range of nuclear and missile technology, including the neutron bomb which France has developed, reportedly built, but not yet tested or deployed. Former Minister of the Interior Bournet (sp) says that four years ago his agents uncovered a Soviet military intelligence officer preparing to steal an entire Exocet missile and ship it back to Moscow. French intelligence officials have told CBS they are often just outmanned and outgunned. They have less than a dozen men to monitor all of France's defense industries. (David Andelman)

AFGHANISTAN: UNDER THE SOVIET GUN (Part 2) - In part 2, independent journalist Eric Dirschmead gives us an exclusive look at the Soviet war machine always on its guard. There are more than 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. The government insists that they are part of a limited contingent, that they have not actually occupied the country and are only helping the government. The Kabul International Airport is a major Soviet air base. Helicopters and more than 30 MIG jet fighters were photographed in one pass from a plane window. The jets are only a few minutes flying time from the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. At the end of the runway sit SAM-2 missile launchers. At the major military base and staging area on the outskirts of Kabul security is extremely tight; tanks patrol the base perimeter. To get the pictures (being run concurrently with the narration) Dirschmead had to slip away from his escorts, climb a thousand feet up a mountain--all without being spotted. The Soviets tend to stay inside their bases for their own safety. Soldiers have been attacked on the streets. When the Russians come out it is to fight.

It is now springtime in Afghanistan. According to various intelligence sources, both sides are gearing up for a new season of fighting. Dirschmead photographed a column of T-212 anti-tank guns moving toward the mountains. These guns are used to blast the resistance fighters from their deep bunkers and caves. U.S. officials say approximately 10,000 fresh Soviet troops have been moved into the Kandahar area in the last two months. Troops, armor and ammo have also been positioned near the border with Pakistan. The Russians may be preparing to try and seal that border, cutting the resistance's escape and supply routes. When the Russians invaded there were nearly 100,000 soldiers in the Afghan Army. Today there are 30,000. The rest have either deserted, defected or been killed in action. Morale is so bad and their ranks so depleted that there are reports that Afghan and Russian agents have forced teenagers as young as 15 and men as old as 50 to join the army and fight. It is one sign the government does not have the support of the people. The Soviets do not trust the Afghan Army with their best weapons. Some units have shot their Russian and Afghan officers. Others have turned their equipment over to the resistance. (Dan Rather)

ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

STUDY CRITICAL OF U.S. POLICIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA - There was polite but pointed criticism today of the Reagan Administration's policies in Central America from a group of prominent citizens in both

Under the Soviet Gun

RATHER: The Soviet news agency TASS today criticized the three part CBS Evening News report, Afghanistan: Under the Soviet Gun. In a long commentary, TASS charges CBS with helping to implement Reagan administration policy, which it claims is designed to justify, what it calls, undisguised US interference in Afghan affairs. TASS says the CBS Evening News report, "will hardly win it any laws."

Independent journalist Eric Gershmeid (?) recently spent five weeks inside Afghanistan on assignment for CBS News. Tonight, Afghanistan: Under the Soviet Gun concludes with part III.

Drum majorettes, Afghan style. The government takes a traditional Afghan New Year's celebration and turns it into a show of support for the Communist regime. The farmers come from villages around Kabul. The men with the rifles represent defenders of the revolution. The men with sticks, Afghan farmers.

The image that you're supposed to see, that the revolution is popular, the people are happy. The Afghan government is anxious to show that it controls the countryside. Eric Gershmeid, the independent journalist CBS News sent into Afghanistan, was taken to a village where he watched the local militia on patrol, almost every man armed with a new karashnikov rifle.

These men all say they are pledged to fight the resistance and defend the government. But, reported Gershmeid, one day after these pictures were taken, a Russian convoy was attacked near this village.

With all the energy of a Madison Avenue ad campaign, the Afghan government is trying to sell itself. These tribal

leaders were brought to the capital and put up in a hotel before going to hear a speech of tribal and border affairs. He tells them that the Communist revolution will free Afghanistan from poverty and ignorance, if they will accept the Communist government, if they will accept the Russians as their friends, not enemies pulling the strings of a puppet regime.

One tribesman is afraid to be seen collaborating with the government, with good reason. Sources in Kabul told Gershmeid that this man was shot five times when he returned to his village. This man was found hacked to death.

Resistance fighters who have allegedly switched sides, are treated like national heroes. These three said they were guilty of horrible crimes, including torture and murder. Their confessions were broadcast by local television. Most of the Russian press corps was there to send the message to Moscow.

To the Afghans, support for the Communist government means support for the Russians, for the outsiders, for a political ideology that denies the existence of God, of Allah.***

Karmal says the United States is trying to destroy the revolution. He accused Washington of training and arming the resistance. He told the workers the Russians and other Socialist countries are their friends and will leave as soon as the fighting stops. The workers had to listen for a grueling four and a half hours. They applauded without enthusiasm.

After more than three years in Afghanistan, the Russians are still losing the popularity contest. They are fighting a war with an enemy they can control, but not conquer, unless they are willing to dramatically increase their forces.***

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DENNIS ~~BLAIR~~ WALT RAYMOND

SUBJECT: Tasking Memorandum for SPG, April 14, 1983

The attached memorandum for distribution to SPG principals at the Thursday, 14 April, SPG meeting outlines the elements of our overall national security public diplomacy strategy. Individual strategies will be requested from the ad hoc groups for submission next week and incorporation into an overall strategy to be approved by the President. The individual public diplomacy strategies to be requested are as follows:

INF - Peter Dailey Group
 START - Ed Rowney (new initiative)
 Defense Budget - Bill Greener Group
 MX)DoD, (working through IIC Subcommittee on
 Strategic Defense) Defense and Arms Control Policy)
 Central America - Stone Group
 Middle East - State (new initiative)
 Williamsburg Summit - Rentschler Group

As the discussion develops at the meeting, you may wish to mention these groups. The plan will be to integrate these individual strategies into an overall national security public diplomacy strategy which the President can approve, and which will guide us for the rest of the year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I, then distribute it at the SPG meeting this afternoon.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Tab I Memo for SPG

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2492

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR PLANNING GROUP

SUBJECT: Integrated Public Diplomacy Strategy

Background: A number of promising individual public diplomacy initiatives have been launched in recent weeks: INF (Peter Dailey), Central America (Dick Stone), Defense Budget (Bill Greener), and Williamsburg Summit (Jim Rentschler). It is time to bring these ad hoc efforts under an overall strategy to guide our public diplomacy effort in the national security area for the rest of the year.

Coherent National Security Strategy: By emphasizing separate aspects of our policies (arms control vs. defense budget) and by unauthorized characterizations of our policy (leaks), we create the perception of a disjointed strategy. All government officials should emphasize at every opportunity that the Reagan administration is following a coherent national security based on the following elements:

- Economic recovery, both in the United States and worldwide - the foundation for further efforts in all areas of defense and foreign policy.
- Prudent Defense Buildup - to overcome a decade of neglect and to give incentives to our adversaries to respect our interests.
- Regional Initiatives - the search for peace in the Middle East, Central America, Southern Africa.
- Arms Reductions/Strategic Defense Research - to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear threat.
- Democracy Initiative - to build the infrastructure of democracy worldwide.

Recognizing that the Administration will be emphasizing different components of this strategy at different times, it is important to project this complete, unified approach to America's responsibilities in the world as frequently as possible.

Individual Public Diplomacy Strategies

In each of the individual areas of public diplomacy, a strategy will be requested for submission to the SPG by next week's meeting. These strategies will include the following elements:

- Current situation
- Objectives
- Public themes
- Key upcoming dates and events
- Strategy elements

The SPG will review the individual strategies for consistency, and to identify conflicts in key upcoming dates and events. The SPG will incorporate the individual strategies into an overall national security public diplomacy strategy for approval by the President.

William P. Clark

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 14, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SUBJECT: SPG on Public Diplomacy

To summarize what we should get out of the meeting let me list a few points.

1. Your talking points undercored the need for a comprehensive strategy on security issues. Your talking points from Bob and myself summarize the range of issues for which we need to develop a broad public diplomacy strategy. The integration of these issues is critical to present a coherent and solid Reagan foreign policy in this field.

2. We should task public diplomacy strategy papers on the following subject (this updates on papers):

-- INF. IPC/Peter Dailey group.

-- START. Rowney initiative to serve as basis for IPC paper (tie in START IG, and ACDA)

-- Defense budget, MX, strategic defense. These three initiatives require strategy papers. Suggest you turn to Cap and ask DOD to develop these papers through the PAC.

-- Other arms control issues including CBW, CBMs, and Soviet compliance. To be developed by arms control and defense subcommittee co-chaired by Scott Thompson and Richard Perle. Your tasking is, among other things, designed to make this group start to function.

-- Nuclear freeze. PAC

-- US/Soviet bilateral relations. IPC. The key point here is that many of our strategies above relate to the Soviet Union. Therefore, we should have a key document which highlights our public diplomacy strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This should be keyed to NSDD objectives.

3. We recommend that these six papers be requested from the various SPG sub-elements. We recommend that the papers be given to the IPC for staffing by close of business April 22. The IPC, in turn, should develop a paper for the SPG, identify specific issues requiring SPG decision. This paper should be completed by April 29

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA GJS, DATE 01/16/12

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

and made available to each SPG principal. The SPG in turn will meet and thrash out any issues on May 5. The result should be an integrated public diplomacy strategy on major security, defense and arms control issues. NOTE: This is a change in our proposed tasking and timetable.

4. Dennis Blair has given you a paper for circulation to the SPG on "integrated public diplomacy strategy." This is an important paper but we recommend that we attach it to a subsequent tasking memorandum that you will send to SPG principals after the meeting. I would recommend that you note that there should be simultaneously three basic additional strategy papers prepared:

-- Central America. IPC/Dick Stone group will develop this paper. We should seek to discuss this at a SPG dedicated exclusively to Central America on April 28.

-- Middle East. No paper exists. Recommend IPC with State lead take a first cut.

-- Williamsburg Summit. This leads to the second major item on the agenda. When you turn to this item we should dismiss some members in the sitroom and request Henry Nau, Richard Morris and Jim Rentschler.

-- In the context of the meeting, as noted in early talking points we should underscore the need for a deeper commitment of resources to the effort and more attention to this commitment by management.

cc: Sims
Lord

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Blair
25



SUBJECT: SPG Follow-up Actions

I was on leave for part of this week so there has been some delay in transmission of paper. The attached memorandum came from State and requests NSC presence at several meetings on April 21. I have attached the original tasker at which several NSC staffers were present. I think we should be represented at each of these meetings and I would assume the noted persons will wish to attend. If you can not possibly you could send a stand-in.

Rose Ann will call in the following names but make any adjustments you feel necessary.

START -- Kraemer

US/Soviet Relations -- Lenczowski and/or Dobriansky, Blair

Middle East -- Kemp or Teischer

Central America -- Al Sapia-Bosch

If anyone else wishes to attend these meetings certainly do so. The call in is not intended to be exclusive.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Raymond

~~SECRET~~

April 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SPG PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: SPG Tasking (U)

On the basis of the Special Planning Group (SPG) meeting of April 14, public diplomacy strategy papers are requested on the following subjects:

- INF. IPC/the "Peter Dailey" Group.
- START. IPC. Ed Rowny's initiative will serve as a basis to develop this paper. The IPC paper should include ACDA considerations and should tie in with the START IG.
- Defense Budget, MX, Strategic Defense. PAC. These three initiatives should be considered as a package although initially we may need to develop three separate strategy papers. DOD should take the lead and work through the PAC.
- Other Arms Control issues including CBW, CBMs and Soviet compliance. IIC. Should be developed by the Richard Perle-Scott Thompson Arms Control and Defense Sub-Committee of the IIC.
- Nuclear Freeze. PAC. The Nuclear Arms Control Information Policy Group chaired by State PM should take the lead and work through the PAC.
- US/Soviet bilateral relations. IPC. This document should highlight our public diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, keyed to NSDD objectives. (S)

These papers should be prepared and submitted to the IPC for staffing by COB April 22. The IPC in turn should develop an action calendar containing proposed specific actions by the President and other senior officials as well as themes to be promoted in each subject area. This paper should be circulated to each SPG principal by April 29. The SPG in turn will meet and thrash out any unresolved issues. The result will be an integrated strategy on major security, defense, and arms control issues. (S)

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Executive Order 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA [signature], DATE 8/16/12

~~SECRET~~

The SPG requested three additional papers. Public diplomacy strategy should be developed on these and submitted. The same timetable should be followed:

-- Central America. IPC/Dick Stone Group will develop this paper with the support of the Central American Working Group. I would hope to discuss this subject at an upcoming SPG focused exclusively on Central America probably as early as April 28.

-- Middle East. IPC. Department of State should take the lead in a review of possible options in this area to foster public understanding of and support for our policy.

-- Williamsburg Summit. Ambassador Rentschler was designated as the public diplomacy pointman for this program. He will be following up immediately with all concerned offices to develop a broad strategy. (S)

The public diplomacy papers which are developed should include inter alia a statement of the current situation, objectives, public themes, key dates and events and the necessary tailored, thematic content to appeal to our three audiences -- overseas, congressional and domestic U.S. (S)

Polling. The SPG endorsed accelerated and expanded polling efforts in Europe. USIA was tasked to initiate this effort. (S)



William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~

SPG Principals:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Administrator, USAID
Director, USIA
Mr. David Gergen, White House

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 15, 1983

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ^{WR} WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SIGNED

SUBJECT: SPG Tasking

Attached is the tasking memorandum summarizing the highlights of the April 14 meeting. The only change is that I did not specifically name a date for the SPG to meet to deal with unresolved issues concerning security, defense and arms control. I hope this will take place on/about May 5.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Agree 

Disagree _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to SPG Principals

cc: Sims
Lord

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA W, DATE 8/16/12

~~SECRET~~

MA

13

TO WHEELER

FROM HILL

KEYWORDS: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

START

USSR

MIDDLE EAST

CENTRAL AMERICA

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR INTL POLITICAL COMM WORKING GRP MTG ON APR 21

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES ~~11~~

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

LORD

SIMS

✓KRAEMER

✓DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

REF# 8311961

LOG

NSCIFID NSDD0077 (M / M)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

NSC
Public Information

April 19, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg S/S 8311908
 NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler ✓ S/S 8311961
 AID - Mr. Gerald Pagano S/S 8311962
 DOD - Colonel John Stanford S/S 8311963
 USIA - Ms. Teresa Collins S/S 8311964
 ACDA - Mr. John Tierney S/S 8311965

SUBJECT: International Political Committee Working Groups
 Meeting, Thursday, April 21, Room 4313

The IPC working groups will meet on Thursday, April 21, to review draft strategy papers tasked by the SPG, under Judge Clark, to the IPC. Please inform Tain Tompkins (632-5804) who will attend for your agency.

In order to proceed as efficiently as possible, discussion of the strategy papers will proceed on the basis of the following schedule:

1045 - 1130 Start *Kraemer*
 (OVP, NSC, State, DOD, USIA, ACDA)

1130 - 1200 U.S.-Soviet Relations *Lenchinsky, Johnson, Main*
 (OVP, NSC, State, DOD, USIA, ACDA)

1200 - 1230 Middle East *Kemp - Teichner*
 (OVP, NSC, State, DOD, USIA, AID)

1230 - 1300 Central America *Sagan - Borck*
 (OVP, NSC, State, DOD, USIA, AID)

Katharine Swibly for
 Charles Hill
 Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
 DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
 Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
 BY 41 NARA, DATE 8/16/12

Blair
Raymond

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR SPG PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: SPG Tasking (U)

On the basis of the Special Planning Group (SPG) meeting of April 14, public diplomacy strategy papers are requested on the following subjects:

-- INF. IPC/the "Peter Dailey" Group.

-- START. IPC. Ed Rowney's initiative will serve as a basis to develop this paper. The IPC paper should include ACDA considerations and should tie in with the START IG.

-- Defense Budget, MX, Strategic Defense. PAC. These three initiatives should be considered as a package although initially we may need to develop three separate strategy papers. DOD should take the lead and work through the PAC.

-- Other Arms Control issues including CBW, CBMs and Soviet compliance. IIC. Should be developed by the Richard Perle-Scott Thompson Arms Control and Defense Sub-Committee of the IIC.

-- Nuclear Freeze. PAC. The Nuclear Arms Control Information Policy Group chaired by State PM should take the lead and work through the PAC.

-- US/Soviet bilateral relations. IPC. This document should highlight our public diplomacy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, keyed to NSDD objectives. (S)

These papers should be prepared and submitted to the IPC for staffing by COB April 22. The IPC in turn should develop an action calendar containing proposed specific actions by the President and other senior officials as well as themes to be promoted in each subject area. This paper should be circulated to each SPG principal by April 29. The SPG in turn will meet and thrash out any unresolved issues. The result will be an integrated strategy on major security, defense, and arms control issues. (S)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 14, 2006
BY NARA *014*, DATE *6/16/12*

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The SPG requested three additional papers. Public diplomacy strategy should be developed on these and submitted. The same timetable should be followed:

-- Central America. IPC/Dick Stone Group will develop this paper with the support of the Central American Working Group. I would hope to discuss this subject at an upcoming SPG focused exclusively on Central America probably as early as April 28.

-- Middle East. IPC. Department of State should take the lead in a review of possible options in this area to foster public understanding of and support for our policy.

-- Williamsburg Summit. Ambassador Rentschler was designated as the public diplomacy pointman for this program. He will be following up immediately with all concerned offices to develop a broad strategy. (S)

The public diplomacy papers which are developed should include inter alia a statement of the current situation, objectives, public themes, key dates and events and the necessary tailored, thematic content to appeal to our three audiences -- overseas, congressional and domestic U.S. (S)

Polling. The SPG endorsed accelerated and expanded polling efforts in Europe. USIA was tasked to initiate this effort. (S)



William P. Clark

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SPG Principals:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Administrator, USAID
Director, USIA
-Mr. David Gergen, White House

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 15, 1983

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ^{WR} WALTER RAYMOND, JR.


SIGNED

SUBJECT: SPG Tasking

Attached is the tasking memorandum summarizing the high-
lights of the April 14 meeting. The only change is that I
did not specifically name a date for the SPG to meet to deal
with unresolved issues concerning security, defense and arms
control. I hope this will take place on/about May 5.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Agree  Disagree _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to SPG Principals

cc: Sims
Lord

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec 1.4, 1.5, 1.6
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA LS, DATE 8/16/12

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19 April 83
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Strategy Paper on INF Public Diplomacy

The President's proposal for an interim INF agreement provides a useful bench-mark for assessing our public diplomacy strategy in the coming months. The period leading up to deployment of Pershing IIs and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe, if there is no arms control agreement, will be an especially challenging and crucial one for the Alliance. A sustained effort by the Alliance will be needed to maintain the requisite public support in Europe. In this connection, we need to assess where we are, what we can expect of the Soviets, and what we need to do to reinforce our own message--first of all in the period preceding the re-opening of talks on May 17.

The Current Situation

In the course of the past several months, in our view, we have done much to regain the public offensive. The President's initiative, more aggressive U.S. public diplomacy efforts in Washington and at our European posts, and increased public activity by several key Allied governments have helped us to regain some previously lost ground with European public opinion and strengthened our ability to influence the nuclear debate in Europe and Japan. We have been generally successful in reminding the public that the West seeks parity in response to the continuing Soviet build-up, and in demonstrating our flexibility and desire to make progress in Geneva. We believe we have put the ball back in the Soviet court for now and that we are now in a better position to make it clear that it is the Soviet Union which has raised obstacles to progress in arms reductions.

As a result of the close Allied coordination and prior consultation on the President's new initiative, we have received supportive public statements from all of our European Allies, with the exception of Greece. The NAC "warmly welcomed" and "strongly supported" the President's initiative and reaffirmed the Alliance decision to proceed with deployments in the absence of an agreement. Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone expressed his support directly to the President. Further, the great majority of the U.S., European and Japanese press and Members of Congress also welcomed the President's initiative, although they generally expressed skepticism that the initiative would provide a basis for progress at the negotiating table.

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NLRR M443/5 #141243
BY AW NARA DATE 9/5/17

Sustaining the West's momentum and increasing public support for the Alliance's position will require a vigorous and continuing effort. The Soviets have a considerable credibility problem in Europe now, particularly in the wake of the expulsions of Soviet representatives from France and other countries. Yet without continued efforts by Western leaders, current perceptions will likely fade and publics may adopt the view that it is incumbent upon the U.S. to modify its position further in order to achieve an agreement with the Soviets. We must constantly anticipate and preempt such pressure to negotiate with ourselves.

The European "peace" groups will try to foster this view and will no doubt seek to promote the theme of "a plague on both superpowers." Although the "peace" movements were unable to draw the crowds they expected in the Easter marches, their ability to undercut the NATO position on INF should not be underestimated. They can be expected, for example, to focus in the coming months on headline-grabbing actions designed to fuel emotions and gain broader support. At the same time, some elements of the "peace" movements may undertake increasingly militant--perhaps violent--actions, stemming from "revolutionary" zeal and possibly from a perception that they will not be able to sway a majority in their countries.

Opponents of deployment will also likely turn their attention to creating and exploiting parliamentary and other obstacles, e.g. lobbying against defense budget allocations on INF and--in the Netherlands--forcing a nuclear debate in the context of discussions of the Defense White Paper expected to be released this Fall. There is need to identify future public and parliamentary problems as far as possible in advance so that we and our Allies will be in a better position to deal with them. In this connection, we are asking posts to provide us with their assessment of the problems that lie ahead in each country and with their recommendations on how to deal with them.

The U.S. anti-nuclear movement has not thus far concentrated on the INF issue. Likewise, among the U.S. foreign affairs "establishment," support for INF may be greater than support on other nuclear issues, since our policy is based on Alliance-wide decisions and Allied political considerations. We also have received considerable Congressional support for NATO and US positions on INF and for the President's initiative. To build upon this support, we should brief Members of Congress on INF, particularly Members who will be travelling to Europe, and we should work with Members who are supportive of the Alliance in making the public case on INF and other European security issues.

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Despite the extensive support which the President's initiative received within the U.S., we should not assume that the INF issue will remain uncontentious at home. The NATO position has been criticized by some anti-nuclear activists here, and -- given the collaboration between the movement here and elements of the "peace" movement in Europe -- this could be stepped up if an arms control agreement is not in sight as deployments near. Further, the perception on the Hill and among the public that the Allies "do not contribute their share" for the common defense could spill over to the INF issue.

We should remain alert to such signals at home. Further, our INF policy cannot be treated in isolation. If we fail to develop an overall strategy for public and diplomatic handling of the wide range of security issues, poorly coordinated public actions in other areas could undermine our recent accomplishments in INF. Related to this, we also need to enhance European public confidence in our overall ability to manage major foreign policy issues -- such as US/Soviet relations. If most Europeans do not have such confidence in us, any successes in the INF area will not do as much as they could to improve our standing in Europe.

Possible Soviet Moves

The Soviets have responded promptly and at high levels to the President's initiative in an effort to dissipate its impact. They undertook a major effort, begun long before Gromyko's April 2 press conference, to discredit publicly any idea of an interim solution which would allow some U.S. deployments and to characterize our proposal as a fig leaf for a strategy of nuclear deployment. At this point, it seems evident that the Soviets are still intent on preserving a monopoly in these systems, and on undermining politically both our negotiating position and our ability to deploy. They hope to stimulate public pressures on us to make further concessions -- perhaps a delay in deployment schedules -- and to foster US-European strife.

The Soviets are also trying to play off Asian and European security concerns -- putting the U.S. between two groups of allies. Gromyko's rejection of limits on SS-20s in the Eastern part of the USSR has heightened concerns in Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing that the threat to Asia might be increased through any reductions in Europe. It is important, therefore, that our European Allies remain supportive of our global limits

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policy and that the global element be fully taken into account in our public diplomacy efforts on INF. In this connection, we also need to develop a coordinated dialogue with our Asian Allies and friends, in particular Japan, Korea and China.

In Japan, our efforts -- marked by close, continuing consultations -- have had some success, as evidenced by the strong, unqualified rebuff just accorded Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa's suggestion of a trade off between a Soviet commitment not to target missiles on Japan in return for Japanese reaffirmation of Japan's non-nuclear policy. Nonetheless, we can anticipate further Soviet efforts to stir up a campaign -- which will be backed by the "peace" movement in Japan -- to bargain elements of the U.S. nuclear umbrella against some sort of Soviet commitment to limit the level of SS-20s in the Eastern areas of the USSR.

As a result of the German election outcome and of the President's INF initiative, the Soviets may feel themselves to be on the public defensive on this issue once again. Related to this, they appear to be increasingly pessimistic as to their chances of blocking NATO deployments. If this is the case, the Soviets will do everything possible to stir up trouble in Western Europe to try to ensure that we pay a high political price for those deployments.

Since the Soviets still do not seem prepared to negotiate seriously, they will likely try to place themselves in the best possible public posture to blame lack of progress in the talks on the U.S. To try to ensure this, they will probably need to make some kind of gesture in the talks in the coming months. What we do in this period can influence the effectiveness of Soviet efforts through the end of the year.

We nonetheless believe that at least through the resumption of the talks on May 17 the Soviets will be unlikely to change their substance or their tactics substantially. We should be ready in this period, however, for a series of high visibility Soviet public statements on the issue and for INF-related themes in the Soviet slogans for their May Day holiday. During this period, the Soviets will probably continue to emphasize issues aimed at undermining our negotiating position and creating barriers to our deployments. The issues they emphasize will likely continue at least for now to be French and UK systems, NATO aircraft and the global dimension of the U.S. position.

While unlikely to take a major substantive initiative over the next month, the Soviets might publicize a new variant of the Andropov proposal. For example, while continuing to insist on counting British and French systems, the Soviets might suggest a willingness to reduce "in Europe" to a level where Soviet warheads would equal those on UK and French missiles. We need to be better prepared in general to rebut the Andropov proposal, and should ensure that we are ready to respond to a Soviet announcement of any variations on it.

By staying on this track through the resumption of the talks, the Soviets will be able to hear us out as we add detail to the new U.S. initiative. This will not likely bring a new substantive element in the Soviet position, but it will enable the Soviets to claim for propaganda purposes that they have heard us out and that we had "nothing new" to offer.

Once this process has been completed, perhaps in mid-June, the Soviets may well shift to a two-track approach of their own: making more "serious" proposals billed as addressing Western concerns, while at the same time adding more explicitness to their threats about Soviet counter-deployments. Both tracks of such an approach would have one basic feature in common -- a continued and concerted Soviet effort to prevent any U.S. LRINF deployments.

If the Soviets make a significant substantive move, this may come at the end of the coming round or the beginning of the next one. If so, the Soviets may package this with a major public announcement on the eve of the September round so as to try to enter that round on the high ground just as they probably perceive us as doing in the coming round. This timing would seem to be ideal for the Soviets in trying -- as they obviously will -- to fuel the large demonstrations being planned for several European cities in the early Fall.

If this approach does not appear to be succeeding, the Soviets may become all the more threatening concerning the consequences of any U.S. deployments. They may at first threaten to end their "moratorium" on SS-20 deployments in the European USSR, and may ultimately do so demonstratively. They may also announce even further nuclear weapons programs of their own, and provide behind-the-scenes encouragement to those in Western Europe susceptible to Soviet influence to resort to increasingly violent measures to halt our deployments.

Such actions may be accompanied by dramatic Soviet actions to capture headlines. This may be part of a "carrot and stick" approach in which the Soviets also undertake -- or offer to undertake -- a gesture of "good will," such as unilaterally transferring beyond the Urals a symbolic number of SS-20s. Such a move would likely appeal to anti-INF opinion in Europe, while alarming our Asian friends and Allies. As a "carrot" for Asia, the Soviets might offer as well to accept some sort of cap on their systems in the Eastern parts of the USSR.

We will need to be better prepared to rebut Soviet arguments that new Soviet systems will be necessary to "counter" our PII and GLCM deployments. We could point out, inter alia, that particularly with the earlier removal of our Thor, Jupiter and Mace systems from

Europe, there was no military justification whatsoever for SS-20 deployments and that any further Soviet buildup would be even more destabilizing. Further, we should be ready to rebut any Soviet claim that our LRINF deployments would violate an earlier understanding -- e.g., that arising from the Cuban missile crisis.

During the coming months, the Soviets may also make increasingly more explicit threats that if we deploy they will cut off the negotiations. While this may gain some ground for them with members of the public who are concerned about the fate of arms control, we do not believe it likely that the Soviets would take the onus of actually leaving the talks. It should be noted that Gromyko was very careful on this point in his April 2 press conference.

If, however, the Soviets did in fact leave the talks once we started deployments, to try to minimize the public onus they would likely combine this with an "offer" to return if we made some concession--e.g., a halt to NATO deployments or (if not yet deployed) a ban on PIIs. If, on the other hand, the Soviets were to stay at the talks, but started new deployments of their own, they might offer only these new deployments in exchange for U.S. reductions.

We also need to watch carefully any linkage which the Soviets (and others) may make between INF and other issues. For example, if the Madrid CSCE Review Conference ends with agreement to hold at some time a Conference on European Disarmament (CDE), the Soviets may try to persuade European publics that going forward with any INF deployments in the meantime could ruin the prospects or atmosphere for holding such a conference. Or, also possibly with CSCE in mind, the Soviets might claim that unspecified human rights progress might be possible if NATO postponed deployments. And, bearing both European and U.S. public opinion in mind, we need to be ready to put into diplomatic perspective likely Soviet threats that any U.S. deployments would "create a crisis" in U.S./Soviet and East/West relations. Finally, we should expect and be ready in the Fall for major Soviet initiatives at the UNGA designed to undermine our position in INF and other arms control areas.

A Near Term Strategy to Reinforce our Message

To meet these challenges, we must promote the fullest possible public understanding of the history of INF and the NATO Alliance, as well as of our continuing commitments in Asia and our determination to address the INF issue on a global basis. Allied governments' active involvement in this effort is crucial. We have consulted with our European Allies on our public diplomacy objectives and strategy and indicated that we depend upon them to present the case to their own people. We must avoid the impression that the U.S. is engaged in "selling" its policy to the people of Europe. Our INF policy is based on a NATO decision, and -- while we wish to be as helpful as possible -- it is incumbent upon each NATO government to try to ensure the requisite public support in its own country.

We have a good working relationship with the basing countries on INF public diplomacy. We have deferred to the host governments to determine the level of public activity in their own countries. The British government has already undertaken an aggressive public campaign on the issue, apparently with considerable beneficial effect thus far. The Italian, Dutch, and Belgian governments, on the other hand, believe Alliance interests are best served in their countries by keeping a low profile on the issue. In our view, the one basing country where greater efforts may possibly be in order is the FRG.

We have also deferred to our Asian Allies in determining the proper level of public activity in their own countries on INF issues.

Our embassies should continue to work in conjunction with host governments in coordinating public efforts by USG officials in those countries. A major effort has been made by the Washington community to provide our diplomatic posts and military commands with extensive initial guidance on the President's new INF initiative and on the Soviet response. Material sent to posts and commands through State and USIA channels has included:

- the President's March 30 statement on INF;
- the President's March 31 speech on arms control;
- the March 30 White House fact sheet spelling out the new initiative;
- the report of the SCG chairman concerning the new initiative;
- the Department's statement of April 2 in response to Gromyko's criticism of the US proposal;
- the text of the Department's background briefing on April 2; and
- Q's and A's related to the President's initiative.

We currently are working on an extensive series of actions designed to update material which has already been sent to the field, to provide some new perspectives and information for the field and to build up a reservoir of useful background material which can be used by posts and military commands in support of Allied positions.

While additional efforts may be required at some point in Asia, we do not wish to play into the Soviet hand by stirring up the issue. Our best approach is to continue to keep Asian governments and our posts well informed and to provide our public affairs materials on INF to our embassies and to

Asian Allies, but to leave the primary burden of dealing with the public and media to the governments concerned. So far, Soviet heavy-handedness has facilitated this approach.

Our current projects include:

a) New Materials

-- We are revising and updating materials and themes already sent to the field. We have underway, for example, a comprehensive review of the INF Speakers Packet which was sent to posts in March. Revised and updated sections of the packet will be cabled to the field as soon as completed and recleared.

-- New materials, specifically addressed to Soviet arguments, are in the final stages of preparation in the INF Working Group.

-- An INF press packet containing useful background material will be made available to correspondents here and in Europe.

-- A White Paper on the full range of US arms control efforts in the postwar period is under interagency preparation. We hope to have this available for worldwide circulation in time for the NAC Ministerial in June.

-- A new gist on INF is in the final stages of preparation and should be circulated to the field in the near future.

-- Materials useful for Asian audiences, such as refutation of Soviet statements offensive to Asians, will also be prepared.

-- USIA, working with Gallup Affiliates in Europe, has just begun a new series of polling efforts in the basing countries. As we receive the data from each part of this five-part project, we will make use of it to review our public diplomacy efforts.

-- USIA has prepared a new one-hour film on the Soviet arms buildup and is producing a special half-hour version specifically for TV placement abroad.

b) Expanded Speakers Program

-- We are trying to ensure that senior spokesmen include INF and other arms control issues in their forthcoming speeches and press briefings.

o Building on his highly successful European trip in February, we will recommend useful public events and themes for the Vice President's June trip to Europe.

o Both in the US and in his May and June trips to Europe, we will try to engage the Secretary of State more fully on the public handling of security and arms control issues in view of his exceptional credibility with the US and European publics.

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o Under Secretary Eagleburger will address Alliance security issues in his speeches in Hamburg, Vienna, and Madrid during his coming trip to Europe.

-- USIA is preparing, in cooperation with posts, an augmented speakers program in Europe. As part of this effort, we are seeking to make available for selected forums more private sector Americans and Europeans knowledgeable about European security issues.

-- We are beginning to provide expert speakers for selected forums in Japan and Korea.

-- We also have stepped up considerably the number and level of special briefings provided for European correspondents resident in the United States.

c) Cable to Posts and Commands

-- In an effort to pull all of this together for our posts and relevant military commands, we shortly will send to the field a comprehensive cable outlining the actions we are taking in Washington, seeking our posts' assessment of where we stand on the INF issue with publics in their countries and asking the posts to reinforce their own public diplomacy efforts. At the same time, we will provide to our posts and pertinent military commands some suggestions for shaping their own public affairs efforts and some new themes which build upon the President's most recent initiative.

d) Looking Ahead

We will begin now to consider what we want to do and say publicly on INF in connection with three scheduled events:

- The resumption of INF talks in Geneva on May 17;
- the Williamsburg Summit and preceding bilaterals; and
- the NATO Ministerial on June 9-10.

In each case, how we choose to express our INF position -- in terms of context, participants and associated activities -- will be important in trying to maintain the momentum we have developed over the past month. Above all, Allied leaders -- both European and Asian -- should continue to take the lead on this issue in their own countries.

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In addition, we are encouraging more public efforts in support of Alliance positions by pro-NATO Europeans and Americans from the private sector. And, looking at both the near and longer term, we need to do everything possible to expand youth exchanges with Europe, and particularly to provide more opportunities for exchanges among politically active young people. USIA is examining, in the first instance, how this might be worked into existing programs and available resources.

Finally, we need to examine how we can best: a) neutralize Soviet propaganda efforts directed against Asia; b) expose Soviet front groups such as the World Peace Council; and c) counter Soviet efforts to exploit the "peace" movement in Europe.

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Public Diplomacy Strategy--Security Issues

Background: The President has made recent major presentations on the defense budget, the Soviet threat, future defenses against ballistic missiles, INF negotiations, and overall arms control policy. He will soon decide on the recommendations of his Commission on Strategic Forces. International public diplomacy and domestic public affairs efforts have supported administration policy in all these areas. While much has been accomplished, especially with regard to European security issues, our public efforts to support the President are loosely coordinated. Often there are competing priorities, and there appear to be times when a positive initiative directed at the domestic public has a negative impact on the international audience.

Note: Suggest you make a plea for a deeper commitment of resources by all agencies and departments. This is a key point not only for the issues today but also re Central America!

Strategy:

-- Develop action programs to deal with the key security issues in the public diplomacy framework.

- INF
- START
- Other arms control issues such as CBW and Soviet compliance
- Defense program and MX
- Future defense against ballistic missiles

-- Tie these vertical plans of action into a coordinated program to support the President's goals.

-- Continue action in support of individual policies, and convene SPG to approve and prioritize coordinated action programs.

Action:

-- Bud McFarlane establish and chair Ad Hoc committee to coordinate public diplomacy on national security issues.

-- International Political Committee/Dailey Group

a. develop, in conjunction with INF IG, INF strategy/action paper to cover period to May 17 resumption of INF talks. Provide strategy paper to McFarlane Ad Hoc committee by COB April 15. (We understand from Jerry Helman such a paper is in draft form now.)

b. develop, in conjunction with START IG, START strategy/action paper to cover period to resumption of negotiations. Due McFarlane by COB April 18.

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-- International Information Committee


a. develop strategy/action plan for other arms control issues, including CBW and Soviet compliance, due McFarlane Ad Hoc committee by COB April 18. Note: This will be done by the IIC Arms Control & Defense Subcommittee co-chaired by Scott Thompson and Richard Perle. It is on paper ONLY and you should give a strong tasking to this group to force it to start to work.

-- Public Affairs Committee

a. develop MX strategy/action paper to cover period to Congressional vote, about June 1. Provide to McFarlane Ad Hoc Committee by COB April 18.

b. develop public affairs plan to support President initiative for future defense against ballistic missiles.

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Talking Points

1. Defense, arms control and MX themes

-- President has interlocking set of themes:

- o Modernization of strategic TRIAD must be completed by deployment of new land based component.
- o Arms reduction a central theme of this Administration and its allies.
- o Reasonable forward-leaning and comprehensive US proposals in contrast to Soviet intransigence in negotiations, and non-compliance to treaties already signed.
- o Hope and vision for the future through defense against ballistic missiles.

-- Public diplomacy must emphasize themes, especially the President's commitment to real reductions in nuclear weapons.

-- Introduction of defense concept changes the debate by stressing hope for elimination of ballistic missile arsenals -- entirely consistent with our policy of reductions, technically worth trying, offers another way for the future.

-- Need plans of action to support our initiatives, and coordinate and prioritize them. McFarlane form Ad Hoc Committee, IIC take on INF, START, other arms control issues. PAC take on MX and future missile defense issues. Papers due April 18.

2. Williamsburg Summit

-- Jim Rentschler to return in mid-April to coordinate and expedite public diplomacy.... This will be similar to our earlier experience with Pete Dalley and Dick Stone. He will be responsible to the Summit White House Group and will look to Allen Wallis, the President's representative, for policy guidance and direction. He will have access to the resources of the IIC's Economic Subcommittee to facilitate his work.