

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: European and Soviet Affairs
Directorate, NSC: Records
Folder Title: Public Diplomacy 1983 (13)
Box: RAC Box 12

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

State Department Statement
Regarding Gromyko's April 2 Press Conference

The President has proposed the elimination of an entire category of nuclear systems -- Soviet and U.S. land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In view of the Soviet rejection of this proposal and following consultations with our Allies, the President announced on Wednesday a U.S. proposal for an interim agreement to reduce these systems on an equal basis. Foreign Minister Gromyko has rejected this proposal as well. Although we note that Mr. Gromyko's tone was relatively restrained by Soviet standards, we are disappointed at this unconstructive initial Soviet reaction. For its part, the United States will continue the process of searching for concrete solutions to all of the problems in the US-Soviet relationship. However, Mr. Gromyko has not yet indicated willingness to accept an approach to arms control which would bring about genuine equality and significant reductions.

At U.S. urging, the Soviets have agreed to return to Geneva earlier than planned to begin the next round of INF negotiations. At that time, we will engage the Soviet Delegation in a comprehensive discussion of the President's interim agreement proposal. That proposal is based on five simple criteria:

1. There must be equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviets are demanding that their INF force be as large as the forces of all other countries combined. They should accept the equal limits the President has proposed.
2. Inclusion of UK and French systems is wholly unjustified. Those forces are national strategic deterrents designed to defend France and Britain, not to deter attack upon the other countries of NATO. American missiles provide the necessary link between American strategic power and the security of Europe. Indeed, the balance of intermediate-range forces is so heavily weighted in the Soviets' favor, that even if British and French forces were included, the Soviets would still retain an overwhelming preponderance. This is also true of Asia, where the U.S. has no intermediate-range missiles to counter the Soviet SS-20s.
3. Limitations must be global in scope. Because of their range, mobility and transportability, SS-20s -- wherever deployed in the Soviet Union -- pose a threat to our friends and Allies in Europe and Asia. That is why merely shifting SS-20s from West to East, as Mr. Gromyko suggests, is not a real reduction at all. This underscores the necessity of global limitations.

4. There must be no degradation of NATO's conventional defense capability. The negotiations should focus on reducing the systems of greatest concern -- longer-range INF missiles like the Soviet SS-20s. These are weapon systems which can strike their targets within a few minutes, and against which there is no adequate defense. To include aircraft, as Mr. Gromyko suggests, would divert attention from the most threatening and destabilizing systems and complicate the negotiations. Moreover, the Soviet Union and its allies deploy a substantially greater number of nuclear-capable aircraft than the U.S. and its Allies. The approach the Soviets have put forward in Geneva would remove virtually all U.S. aircraft from Europe.
5. An agreement must be effectively verifiable.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement about a supposed 50-percent U.S. advantage in intermediate-range warheads does not square with the facts. Before NATO took its decision on INF in 1979, the USSR had over 400 SS-20 warheads, and Brezhnev declared that a "balance exists." By the time INF negotiations began in November 1981 -- when the U.S. still had zero INF warheads -- the Soviets had over 800 SS-20 warheads, yet claimed as before that there was a "balance." Today the USSR has well over 1050 SS-20 warheads. The total number of warheads on Soviet intermediate-range missiles now exceeds 1300. It should also be stressed that Soviet deployment of SS-20s continued -- in Europe as well as in Asia -- despite Brezhnev's declaration of a "unilateral moratorium" in March 1982.

President Reagan's new offer of an interim agreement could produce tangible progress in the Geneva negotiations toward the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons entirely. Our Allies in Europe and Asia strongly support it.

The Soviet Union owes the world a more positive response; we hope that during the recess between rounds of the INF talks, taking into account the concerns of other nations, the Soviet Union will take a more flexible view. As the President's proposal makes clear, we intend to return to Geneva in a constructive search for a solution which provides for equality at reduced levels. As he said, "it would be better to have none than to have some. But if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many."

Overall, the United States has launched the most comprehensive program of arms control initiatives ever undertaken. We have put forward proposals in the talks on strategic, intermediate-range, and conventional forces that seek substantial reductions in the level of East-West military confrontation. We have also proposed a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and a wide range

of measures to reduce the risk of war from accident or miscalculation. We urge Moscow to give serious consideration to our proposals. At the same time, we have made clear that we will ensure a stable military balance through appropriate defense efforts.

In addition to our arms control initiatives, we have sought to engage the Soviet Union in an intensive dialogue on the many other problems in US-Soviet relations: human rights, Soviet expansionism beyond its frontiers, and bilateral issues. We have made clear that we will leave no stone unturned in the search for mutually acceptable solutions to these problems.

INF: Gromyko's Press Conference

Q: In his press conference today, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made it clear the President's new INF proposal is completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Any comment?

A: We regret this unconstructive initial Soviet reaction, made less than five days after our proposal was introduced. There has not even been time for a full discussion of the proposal at the negotiating table in Geneva. While making clear that we continue to regard the elimination of the entire class of land-based longer range INF missiles as the best solution, the President has offered to negotiate an interim agreement calling for reduced and equal levels of warheads on both sides. This is an eminently fair proposal which demonstrates very great flexibility and takes full account of the security needs of both sides. It has been strongly and unanimously endorsed by the NATO Allies. The US position is based on the principle of equality. As the President said, with regard to these missiles, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many. By contrast, as is clear from Mr. Gromyko's statement, the Soviets remain attached to their goal of preserving their unacceptable and destabilizing monopoly on longer-range land-based INF missiles. Mr. Gromyko seems to be

5

saying that no equal level of LRINF missiles could form the basis for a satisfactory agreement. By turning their backs on our open-ended proposal, the Soviets contradict their own claims to be negotiating seriously.

Ambassador Nitze presented the new US initiative in Geneva March 29. He will be pursuing it when the talks reconvene May 17. We hope the Soviet Union, despite this initial reaction, will consider our proposal carefully during this period and will return to the bargaining table prepared to negotiate seriously to achieve an agreement in the interests of the security of all nations.

9
Q. Why is the United States not prepared to accept the Soviet demand that they be compensated for British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations?

A. The Soviet Union has raised this demand not as a serious negotiating objective but as an obstacle to reaching agreement.

-- The Soviets, of course, know that British and French systems are different in type and function from the U.S. and Soviet systems under negotiation.

-- They know that British and French systems are nationally based strategic deterrents, designed to defend France and Britain, not to deter attacks upon the other countries of NATO.

-- They know that only new American INF missiles can offset Soviet SS-20's, and ensure retention of the necessary link between American strategic power and the security of Europe.

-- They know that the British and French forces consist almost exclusively of sea-based, submarine-launched strategic missiles, not land based INF missiles like the SS-20, Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile.

-- They know that their own nuclear forces are a hundred times more powerful and their nuclear weapons are eighty times more numerous than those of the UK and France combined.

-- They know that, in addition to their strategic forces targeted upon the United States, they have a very substantial superiority in nuclear forces targeted upon Europe, a superiority which more than offsets the British and French forces.

-- They know that the United States has rejected these same Soviet demands for compensation for British and French systems

in the SALT I and SALT II negotiations. Like the SALT talks, the INF negotiations are bilateral, and neither France nor Britain would permit its forces to be included.

-- Finally, the Soviets must realize that their demand to be allowed nuclear forces as large as every other country of the world combined is tantamount to a demand for effective military superiority, and thus global hegemony:

We hope that the Soviet Union, in responding to President Reagan's latest initiative, will drop this artificial barrier to progress in the negotiations and bargain seriously on the basis of U.S.-Soviet equality, which is the only reasonable foundation for arms control agreements between our two countries.

8

Q. CAN YOU RESPOND TO GROMYKO RAISING THE QUESTION OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT IN INF?

A. -- The United States is concerned with eliminating, if possible, or at least limiting the systems of greatest concern to both the US and Soviet Union; LRINF missiles. These systems pose the greatest threat to stability and security, and deserve our full attention to gain an equitable agreement as quickly as possible.

-- Aircraft carriers and the few nuclear capable aircraft they carry are systems of a different category -- they don't pose the same kind of threat in terms of numbers deployed, effective range, delivery time, or capability to penetrate defenses.

-- To include these aircraft and not mention the thousands of Soviet aircraft is misleading and serves to mask the preponderance of forces possessed by the Soviet Union. Further, these negotiations are not addressing sea-based systems.

April 2, 1983

PRESS GUIDANCE

SUBJECT: Gromyko's Press Conference

- Q. What about Gromyko's points on Asia? Don't they face a nuclear threat in that region? Isn't it legitimate for them to shift missiles from Europe to Asia?
- A. In fact Gromyko's stress on Asia raises the very issue the United States has been pointing to from the beginning. There cannot be a meaningful agreement on these systems limited to one region alone. As Gromyko himself notes, these systems are located in Asia as well as in Europe. He also points out that they can be moved from one region to another. He fails to note that they can strike one region even while still located in another region. And he fails to note that there are no U.S. land-based LRINF missiles in Asia.

Taking into account Gromyko's comments about transferring SS-20s from Europe to Asia, the latest Soviet proposal would lead to the following situation. The Soviets would have 486 warheads on SS-20 launchers in Europe. In the Far East, Soviet SS-20s would be completely unconstrained. They could transfer to Asia the excess in Europe (currently 81 missiles with 243 warheads), adding them to the 324^{warheads} currently in Asia. Their proposal^{therefore} would actually leave them with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the negotiation began in 1981.

10

Q. GROMYKO REFERS TO A UNILATERAL MORATORIUM THE USSR OFFERED ON DEPLOYMENTS OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS?

A. -- The Soviets announced a so-called unilateral moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European USSR in March 1982. In May, they said this moratorium meant termination of preparations for deployment of missiles. After announcing their "unilateral moratorium," however, the Soviets continued construction of and deployments at SS-20 bases begun before they announced the moratorium. Between March and December 1982, the Soviets completed and put into operation four additional SS-20 bases in the western USSR, adding over 100 SS-20 warheads to the Soviet arsenal.

. -- In addition, this unilateral Soviet moratorium does not restrict SS-20 deployments in areas of the USSR outside Europe. The range, mobility and transportability of the SS-20 are such that the Soviets can still threaten NATO Europe from bases deep in the eastern USSR.

. -- Between May 1982 and March 1983 the Soviets increased the number of operational SS-20 bases targetted on NATO from 23 to 27. That's an increase of 36 missiles with 108 warheads.

-- In other words, in less than a year, and while a so-called freeze was in effect, the Soviets deployed as many warheads on SS-20 missiles against NATO as we will field in our entire planned deployment of Pershing II missiles.

-- The current figure for operational SS-20s is 243 targetted on NATO, and another 108 targetted on the Far East. Also, the Soviets have approximately 250 older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in service.

April 1, 1983

INF

Q: Is the U.S. going to propose a specific number in the INF negotiations?

A: The President has put forward a proposal for equal levels of warheads on land-based, longer-range INF missile launchers which demonstrates maximum U.S. flexibility. If the Soviets are seriously interested in reaching agreement, the ball is now in their court. For 18 months, the Soviets have insisted they will not accept zero-zero. Now we are asking what equal level they will accept.

Drafted: PM/TMP:OGrobel:dij
4/1/83: Ph. 632-3136
WANG # 1124P

Clearances: PM - RDean
EUR/RPM - BBurton
OSD - RPerle
NSC - Gen. Boverie
JCS - Col: T. Giles

Q. WHY ARE WE CONDUCTING SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS IN START AND INF?

A. -- We have stressed from the ^{OUTSET} ~~onset~~ that the INF negotiations are being conducted in the framework of the negotiations to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The negotiations, while related, each address separate forces with different characteristics and capabilities. This, we believe, facilitates discussion of what are highly complex issues, and enhances the chances for progress.

Q. WHY DOES THE U.S. NOT INCLUDE AIRCRAFT IN ITS INF PROPOSAL?

A. -- The U.S. position focuses on land-based missiles as those are the systems over which both NATO and the Soviet Union have expressed greatest concern.

. -- In the interest of addressing these highly accurate and destructive nuclear missiles, the U.S. proposed the total elimination of an entire class of these missiles -- long range INF missiles. Specifically the U.S. called for a global ban of the triple warhead SS-20, and the SS-4 and SS-5 deployed by the USSR; and for the U.S., the PII/GLCM. Gaining an agreement to limit these systems is an important, arduous and time-consuming task as we have seen. In the interest of finding some common middle ground the President offered his interim solution of equal numbers of these systems. Rather than seriously discuss this proposal the Soviet Union choose to raise again their claims of a balance which is contrived to mask a gross imbalance of intermediate-range forces including aircraft. I would refer you to the Force Comparisons Paper published last year by NATO for the precise numbers.

. -- Gromyko implies the U.S. has an advantage in INF aircraft. In fact, however, the Soviet Union has a significant advantage in INF aircraft -- an advantage numbering in the thousands.

16

Q. GROMYKO CLAIMS THAT THE U.S. HAS A WARHEAD ADVANTAGE OF 50% OVER THE USSR, CAN YOU COMMENT ON THIS?

A. -- This assertion is based on an erroneous claim that there is a balance of INF forces between NATO and the USSR. The fact is that there is a gross imbalance.

-- The Soviet "balance" is based on a contrived and manipulative selection of data which counts a number of NATO systems as "medium-range" while omitting large numbers of comparable Soviet systems. For example, U.S. aircraft such as the F-4 are counted, but the Soviets make no mention of thousands of their own comparable aircraft based on East Europe or the western USSR.

-- Second, the Soviet "balance" ignores SS-20's based in the eastern areas of the USSR which, because of their long range, mobility and transportability, pose a threat to NATO Europe as well as to the countries of the Far East, and elsewhere.

-- Third, the Soviet "balance" includes UK and French missiles and aircraft. These are independent deterrent systems of sovereign states dedicated to the defense of these countries, about which the US has no right to negotiate. In effect, by including third country deterrent forces in their calculation of the balance, the Soviets are asking for the right to have nuclear forces equal to those of all their potential adversaries combined -- a principle which the U.S. cannot accept.

-- Soviet claims that a balance exists go back many years. In 1979, they said there was a balance. In 1980, 1981, and 1982, they again said there was a balance. Yet Soviet INF deployments were increasing markedly. The number of deployed SS-20's, for example, climbed from 140 in December 1979 to over 351 today, and the number of Soviet longer-range INF missile warheads increased from about 800 to over 1300, while not a single U.S. longer-range INF missile was deployed.

-- There is no balance in INF. The Soviet Union presently deploys some 351 SS-20 missiles and over 1300 warheads on its longer-range INF missile force of SS-20s, SS-4, and SS-5s. The U.S. deploys no comparable missiles and zero warheads.

-- Moreover, it should be noted that the Soviet Union holds a quantitative advantage in all categories of INF systems. I would refer you to the Force Comparisons Paper published last year by NATO for the precise numbers.

GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE ON U.S. INF PROPOSALS

LD020843 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 2 Apr 83

[Press conference by Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR foreign minister, in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center in Moscow -- live]

[Text] First of all, I would like to greet the esteemed representatives of the press, radio and television. As for the organization of the press conference, first of all I would like to make a statement -- not a very long one -- about certain questions of the international situation and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. After that there will be a question and answer session. Those present may put any question and I will try to answer them. The questions may be posed in written form or orally. All of them will have equal validity. If there are no other wishes, we will consider that the mode of organization has been resolved.

What would I like to say at the beginning of my statement? The reason, as it were, for the press conference is the latest speeches by the U.S. President. Not only the latest ones, but mainly the latest ones. He has touched on a number of important questions of the international situation, the United States' and the Soviet Union's policy. He almost never fails to speak about the Soviet Union's policy. This is not the only reason for the press conference. Certain other questions have accumulated that certainly need coverage in the press and on radio and television.

What did the U.S. President draw attention to, first and foremost, in his speeches -- in both his recent speeches, the speech on 30 March and, I would say, the 1 April speech -- if you go by European time? The President said that in its foreign policy the United States, or rather the current U.S. Administration, pursues lofty moral values, seeks to defend and protect the peoples' rights, and seeks to properly defend U.S. interests wherever they might be, in whatever part of the earth these interests might be.

Of course, the American President has had and continues to have his own interpretation of both these and other things. High moral values cannot be defended by a state that is preparing for war, above all nuclear war. Indeed, everyone present and every honest person, if he considers whether it is possible to defend high moral values at the present time and at the same time prepare for a nuclear war that would consume hundreds and hundreds of millions of people -- and many politicians and almost all scientists are now correctly saying that this would be a catastrophe for the whole of earth's civilization. [sentence as heard]

I would go further and say that a government that is preparing for nuclear war at the present time is not entitled to speak about defending high moral values in connection with its foreign policy activities. [Moscow TASS in English at 1350 GMT on 2 April carries a report on Andrey Gromyko's Moscow press conference. The TASS report has been compared with the above Moscow Domestic Service in Russian live broadcast of the press conference and renders the above passage as follows: "...all nuclear war. If one asks whether it is possible to defend lofty moral values and at the same time to engage in preparations for a nuclear war in whose flames hundreds and hundreds of millions of people would die, every honest person will answer in the negative. (new paragraph) A government engaged in preparations of nuclear war, which, as said correctly by many politicians and almost all scientists, would be a catastrophe for the civilisation on earth, has no right to speak about defending lofty moral values in connection with its foreign policy activities...." (rewording for clarity)]

Concerning the defense of American interests, this would be fine if it were a question of defending the United States' legitimate interests and, indeed, what belongs to the United States, but how Washington understands the formula for defending U.S. interests is now widely known -- and in general there are few people in the world who are not familiar with this. In this way it comes out that any corner of the world where Washington simply considers that suitable conditions for the United States to obtain something in the material, political and, even more so, military-strategic regard is declared a place where American interests exist that need to be defended with every force, including military force.

If I were to use concrete facts, this would require much time -- very much time. Let everyone here think only about the Persian Gulf zone and the waters adjacent to the Persian Gulf. Then he will most likely receive a fairly convincing answer to the question of the rights of man, the peoples' rights. [TASS here reads: "...to the question as to how Washington understands 'American interests,' human rights and the rights of people. In itself, the ..." (supplying additional phrase)] In itself, the formula is a good one: The Soviet people, the Soviet nation, our country and leadership, have never objected to the fact that the foreign policy of each state should be steeped, if one can put it that way, by the idea of defending the peoples' rights and, consequently, defending the rights of man.

Since the days of Lenin this demand of the peoples' rights and the rights of man has been an inseparable part of our foreign policy. But we are well aware of how this formula -- not a bad one in itself, even a good one -- is exploited when other interests are dominant in politics -- how the true content of this formula of defending peoples' rights, the rights of man, is emasculated and other demands are substituted -- demands that suit a certain power's political, military-strategic and, not lastly, economic purposes.

What can be said of our foreign policy? Our foreign policy, the Soviet Union's foreign policy, is defined by the congresses of our party, the ruling party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and decisions of the party Central Committee. It is expressed in many of our actions, including the major actions that we would think are familiar to everyone.

It is reflected in our statesmen's speeches on concrete issues of policy, on concrete proposals -- above all in the speeches by Yuriy Valdimirovich Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I think you remember these speeches, most of which were made recently. This is a peaceful policy, a policy of friendship among peoples. It is a policy of noninterference in other states' internal affairs. It is a policy aimed at relaxing tension in the world and eliminating the tension from the international situation. It is aimed at reversing the mindless arms race and, above all, arriving at ways to reduce and limit armaments, which is a good formula, and, subsequently, ways to eliminate armaments. For some reason, in the West the Soviet proposal concerning universal and full disarmament is not currently spoken or written about.

I should emphasize this in front of everyone here: After the end of the World War II the Soviet Union proposed two things that will go down in history in letters of gold -- and it can be said that this has already happened. The first thing concerned the conclusion of an international convention banning the application and use of nuclear weapons in perpetuity. Second, the Soviet Union proposed full and universal disarmament.

It emerged that other states intended to drag out deciding the question of disarmament, on various pretexts -- how to precisely define ratios, how to approach reductions in weapons of one type or another, and how to combine all this. Under the pretext of complexity they began to frustrate the solution of this task. The Soviet Union proposed: Let us cut short the disputes. Let us work toward full and universal disarmament.

Then our partners began to ask how can we implement full and universal disarmament without being convinced that it is being implemented in practice? In other words, they raised the question of control, [here and throughout paragraph TASS renders "control" as "verification"] thinking that here the Soviet Union could be leaned on and made to feel uncomfortable. The Soviet Union then proposed full and universal control. Full and universal disarmament must be combined with full and universal control. This proposal of ours remains in force today. I repeat: In the West it is not customary to write about this. A pity! Yet the reason it is not written about is more or less understandable: It is difficult to underline the importance of full and universal disarmament and control while at the same time pursuing a policy of preparing for war, implementing the arms race, escalating military budgets and so on.

I should like to stress these two things at the very beginning. Further, I should like to tell those present that recently the Soviet Union proposed steps that nobody has the right to ignore without acknowledging their own feebleness, if you like, and unconditional, open -- I repeat: open -- adherence to militarist policy.

What are these steps? First, the Soviet Union has unilaterally pledged that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It did not wait for other powers' agreement to this. This step is resolute and bold. I think that everyone present will probably agree with this. The other powers are not even making the slightest move in this direction and yet the Soviet Union pledges not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Yes, it is a bold, peace-loving step. In the West they are not very keen on covering this problem. That is a pity.

Second, at the session of the Consultative Political Committee the Soviet Union and its friends and allies in the Warsaw Treaty adopted a decision to propose a treaty to the NATO countries on the conclusion of an agreement between the two groups -- NATO and the Warsaw Treaty -- not to use nuclear weapons or conventional weapons. That is, not to use force in relations between states.

Why should such a proposal be made in this form? Because in the West there has been very much demagoguery regarding the fact that the Soviet Union might attack one state or another or a group of states -- that it could carry out aggression, and not necessarily with nuclear weapons. It could do this using conventional weapons. I repeat: Of course, this was demagoguery. But uninformed people, people who are not experienced in foreign policy issues, could be misled by this. The Warsaw Treaty countries' proposals knock out the argument -- knock our opponents' [protivniki] argument completely out of hand.

Even today we are ready to sit with the NATO countries at the negotiating table, discuss this issue and, even better, sign the relevant document. The treaty would be an agreement to make mutual obligations not to use force against each other. How they react -- I think those here have a general idea of how the countries of the North Atlantic alliance, the NATO countries, react to this proposal of ours.

Most of them give us replies of this sort -- that this proposal is being studied. But how much time has passed, and still it is being studied. Not so long ago, I was in West Germany. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher also declare that this proposal is being studied. So it is in the other countries, and this is what the governments of the other countries also say.

There is a somewhat different reaction from American statesmen. They are not giving an official, final, negative response; they are holding back from that. We have the impression that this is a tactical consideration. From the separate hints which are being made, one can draw the conclusion that this proposal is not to Washington's liking. We are sorry if this is the case; one would like to express the hope that this proposal by the Warsaw Treaty countries will find understanding, will be attentively examined.

If there are any questions to be put to us, we are ready to meet together to examine these questions, and perhaps they will be removed or (?taken into consideration). Perhaps there are some sort of amendments; we are ready to discuss these amendments together. Perhaps following discussion, they or some of them, will be accepted. Perhaps there are proposals on improving some of the formulations concerning the various parties' pledges -- we are also ready to exchange views on these matters. Perhaps the exchange of views will lead to the treaty's being amended, but in the end a common language will have been found.

Comrades and gentlemen, here one has two things. If there is the will for peace, there is no convincing argument against accepting this proposal. Just think. This is a proposal that there should be no war, that one state or group of states should not use force against another state or another group of states. Can there really be any sensible objection to this proposal if people, if mankind wish to live in peace? No. There can be no sensible objections. This is confronted by the course toward the arms race, the course toward the militarization of the economy and life as a whole, the course toward preparation of war. And only that. Only that. We address our proposal, a proposal which, we say, expresses the will of the peoples of the socialist states, to the governments and, of course, to the peoples and appeal to them to weigh everything up and to come to final conclusion. And this proposal which we have made will be recorded in gold letters in the history of international relations.

Certain questions of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons in the global sense -- strategic nuclear armaments -- and European nuclear weapons, medium-range nuclear weapons -- have now, of course, come to the forefront. They are now in the focus of international life. The peoples, politicians and public figures in Europe, the United States, Canada and other countries are actively concerned with them because all the peoples and politicians realize what kind of questions these are: what their influence is, how they could be resolved or fail to be resolved, and what this entails.

I would like to dwell on questions of nuclear weapons in Europe in connection with the talks being held between the USSR and the United States and on how we perceive the near future and how we assess the current situation with regard to this. One would first and foremost like to emphasize the incorrectness of assertions being made in Washington that, in general, serious talks are underway in Geneva; that there are no major problems and that the thing is to put pressure on the Soviet Union, to harden the position, and then things will start rolling. They even go further and say: The more pressure we put on the USSR, the greater the chance of reaching an accord. This is reflected in concrete proposals which are being proposed during the course of these talks. These statements contain a great deal of untruths, false assertions, cheating and juggling with the facts, in as much as what we are dealing with is factual data, and it is necessary to dwell on this question.

Above all, it is essential to dwell upon an assertion which has been formulated with the greatest precision in the recent statements by the American President, the assertion alleging that his proposals regarding medium-range missiles are the way toward an agreement and the way toward peace.

No. This is an incorrect assertion. This is not the way to peace and not the way to agreement. The gap between agreement and these proposals will become even wider.

Does everyone all know that the President is leaving aside entire components of huge scale and significance? He leaves them aside and does not touch on them. This refers to aviation, aircraft which are nuclear weapons carriers. They are missing in the President's statements and reasoning. Neither political nor military figures have the right to exclude this component from the talks and from the agreement.

What difference does it make to people whether they die from a nuclear charge delivered by a missile or a nuclear charge delivered by an airplane? Is it not well known that what was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was dropped from an airplane? But now more terrible weapons exist which can be delivered by aircraft. How can this entire component be excluded?

The delegations in Geneva tried to discuss this question. They approached it. However, nothing emerged from this discussion. Why? Because the American representatives have instructions not to reach agreement on this question. For example, I will cite this example: You see, they say there are medium-range aircraft which can deliver both nuclear weapons and completely peaceful objects. They can have both a military purpose and a peaceful purpose. Therefore, they cannot be included in the number of nuclear weapons carriers. But it is the same if somebody said that the most powerful, terrible -- let us say ground-based -- ballistic missile can be described in this way; true, it can deliver a nuclear charge but it can also be used for meteorological aims. And therefore, it is better not to include it in the number of those which deliver nuclear charges.

Therefore, it is absurd -- yes, completely absurd -- but indeed, the official representatives expressing the opinion of the United States Government declare such a position.

Further, in the West they hardly ever write about this, and they do not write about it at all in the United States of America. The United States possesses aircraft carriers, and sea-borne aircraft. There are many aircraft carriers, or groups of aircraft carriers, in the United States. According to the figures, which are widely known, there are at least six of them. They have taken a liking to Europe, being stationed either in the waters of Europe, in the Mediterranean sea, or around it. They could cross any line dividing the European waters from the non-European ones in minutes, in seconds if you like. This is a huge force, each carrier containing at least about 40 aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, nothing other than nuclear weapons.

So surely we, the Soviet Union, are not to shut our eyes to this, and not count them. It is absurd. The intentions of a government that suggests that we close our eyes and not see this, are not serious. Therefore, any proposal which excludes the whole, one could say terrible, component of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, such as aviation, is not a serious proposal. And one cannot look for an agreement on this basis.

The second, important element of the picture -- and one needs to know this, otherwise one would get muddled because so many words are said, so many statements made, that without knowing the specifics, one has to know at least a minimum. Without knowing this minimum, one might get muddled; without wishing to, of course. Britain and France have weapons, missiles, nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union proposes to include them in the talks. One cannot close one's eyes to them, reckoning them as if they did not exist, and only agreeing on American weapons. For these missiles themselves are part of the overall forces of the North Atlantic alliance. How many declarations have been made of this? Hundreds, thousands, if you will, of declarations of the most solemn nature, including one recently during the talks in Geneva, have been made. It was declared in Geneva that, yes, the nuclear forces of Britain and France are an integral part of the nuclear forces of the United States, of the nuclear forces of NATO as a whole. It is being proposed that we seek agreement leaving aside these nuclear forces. Not a serious proposal.

Imagine that a terrible tragedy has occurred: A British missile, say, is flying with nuclear warheads. What then, do you do? Perhaps hang a label on it saying I am British? But if it is to drop its charge people are still going to get killed as from any other missile. A French one is flying. It may also be flying with a label saying: I am French -- you do not count me. Absurd, it will kill people just the same as any other one. Therefore, these missiles -- both the English ones and the French ones need to be taken into account in the overall number. This is the only approach that is justified in the political respect, in the military-strategic respect, in the scientific respect, in the technical respect, and, however you will, the only correct approach. It would seem that this is as clear as could be. But, even up to now the position has not been changing and has not changed judging by the latest statements of the American President.

Further -- this is also clearly reflected in the statements referred to -- the demand is made: Well, if we are talking about any reduction of missiles in Europe, bear in mind that it is not enough to reduce and abolish those missiles in Europe. It is necessary to abolish the corresponding class of missiles in Asia as well. Why Asia all of a sudden? Asia was previously absent. They must be abolished in Asia, too! It is necessary to say that this too, by itself -- and this alone makes accord impossible.

On what grounds is Asia brought in? We concede, as Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov said in introducing the relevant proposal -- which is well known -- we concede that we might transfer -- I repeat, if an agreement were reached -- some of our missiles from Europe, from the European zone to Asia. That is our affair and our right. And we are willing to put them in an area from which they will not reach central Europe. And we have said this in the course of the talks. The American Administration know this. I repeat: We will transfer them to an area from which they will not reach the central European countries. We are told: No, that is not enough. All the arguments of the American Administration, and of the President personally, are to the effect that these missiles must also be abolished. Take that demand alone, and it already excludes the possibility of agreement.

These missiles pose no threat to the countries of Europe. But why are they needed? The Soviet Union needs them in order to make itself secure. After all, it is well known by what ring of military bases the Soviet Union is encircled by the United States.

Japan and the waters surrounding Japan are stuffed full of nuclear weapons and the corresponding launchers [nositeli]. The island of Okinawa is an enormous nuclear weapons base. South Korea is an enormous base, or more precisely a complex of nuclear weapons bases. The Indian Ocean, especially the Diego Garcia base, is stuffed full of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The Persian Gulf and adjacent waters are stuffed full of nuclear weapons.

And what is more -- take note, I ask you to pay attention -- that it is a matter of medium-range weapons. All these weapons are capable of reaching Soviet territory. Moreover -- and if anyone is unaware of this, then what I am about to say will probably be of special interest -- moreover, they cover all of Siberia, all of the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Even the northernmost part, the island [as heard] of Taymyr, is also covered.

What is more, we are only talking about medium-range weapons. We do not mean strategic weapons in this context, which exist and are deployed in the same areas I have been mentioning. Strategic weapons are controlled by another agreement, by a provisional agreement, but so far, in effect, the parties have reached agreement on extending the period of operation of this agreement. Consequently, we are only talking about medium-range weapons. These weapons cover the entire Asian territory of the Soviet Union. So the question arises: Can it be that the Soviet Union does not have the right, for purposes of defense -- for purposes of defense -- to have something to oppose these weapons? It does have the right.

They do not pay attention to all of this, do not mention it publicly and do not tell the truth to the people. If the truth were told and explained to the people on each one of these questions, we are sure that there would be a change in opinion and it would probably not be to the advantage of the government and the [TASS here supplies a U.S.] administration which ignore these aspects and facts. They simply do not speak -- they simply do not speak about this. They do not speak of it in the press; they do not speak of it on the radio; they do not speak of it on television. They pass over it in silence.

And if you take the United States, they hear only one thing from morning to night: The Soviet Union is a threat -- the Soviet Union is a threat -- it is not moving toward agreement; it submits a proposal which is not in accordance with the United States' line.

However, factual material, even factual material for a person to reflect on, is not provided. This may sound sharp, but it is impossible to keep from saying that in general the population is being presented with deceitful propaganda. This idea which is being formed in people who, through no fault of their own, are poorly informed, is distorted, totally distorted.

As for the assertion that the more pressure put on the Soviet Union, the greater the chances of agreement is concerned, this is also completely lacking in substance. It is possible to explain it to a certain extent by lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union -- lack of knowledge of our character, if you like -- but the proposal is not serious and is not designed to create the possibility of agreement. This is what we think, that it is not designed to promote agreement.

Therefore, without knowing how they will regard this in Washington, we call for a more objective approach to this matter, for a more objective renunciation of unilateralism, taking into account all factors, taking into account the legitimate interests and security of the Soviet Union; and we call for a line to be taken toward agreement, toward rapprochement [sblizheniye] with the Soviet Union. The line the United States is currently taking at the talks is not a line toward rapprochement, but a line moving away from agreement, a line of complicating the situation, a line toward spiraling the arms race even further, in order to further worsen relations with the Soviet Union, in order to achieve an even greater increase in military budgets, in order to even further fetter those forces which stand for finding a common language with the Soviet Union and for resolving the problems of disarmament.

Incidentally, from time to time Washington, and first and foremost the representatives of the administration, talk about the United States' move for a freeze of nuclear weapons allegedly being almost inspired by the Soviet Union. Or they say it might be inspired or it might be led by the Soviet Union. One way or the other we must point out the absurdity of such an assumption, the absurdity of such statements, in the most categorical manner. This movement is a spontaneous American movement. The Soviet Union has nothing to do with the fact that this movement is based on a desire to promote the finding of a common language with the Soviet Union, or that it desires to fetter the forces preparing for war -- militaristic forces. We can only express solidarity with this movement, because we are of a like mind regarding the prevention of war and the need for agreement, for a search for agreements and understandings [dogovorennosti] on these issues.

One cannot charge either the movement or us that there is some kind of unified center for which responsibility is to be borne by the Soviet Union or the leaders of that movement. We shall hope that those reproaches will not live long and that they will be dispelled; and that the people who understand -- intensely, one may say -- what corresponds to the interests of the American people and what does not, that they will even more effectively and with an even louder voice show and make themselves felt in the political life of the United States.

So, in conclusion, in view of the latest pronouncements, chiefly the President's, we can say that the so-called interim solution -- which is what the President called his idea -- is unacceptable. It is unacceptable for the following reasons: First, it does not take the British and French medium-range nuclear weapons, including 162 missiles, into account; second, it does not take many hundreds of American nuclear weapon carrying aircraft based in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers into account; and third, Soviet medium-range missiles in the Soviet [as heard] part of the USSR would be dismantled [likvidatsiya] even though they have no relation to Europe. [Here TASS reads: "...] Thirdly, the Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the USSR would also be subject to liquidation although they do not have relation to Europe..." (rewording for clarity)].

As a whole, if NATO now has a 1 and 1/2 superiority in medium-range nuclear warheads [boyezaryady] in Europe, then in the event of the implementation of the President's interim option, NATO would have almost 2 and 1/2 times as many such warheads as the Soviet Union has.

That, in a concentrated form, is our attitude on the American Administration's so-called intermediate proposal. Moreover, we do not doubt the fact that Washington did not count on a different reaction from us. We have reasons for this.

Before ending my statement I would like to draw the attention of those present to two circumstances, without which the picture would probably be incomplete -- from the viewpoint of the people who provide the news today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow understanding the situation as a whole, at any rate. This would be useful for people.

Once and for all everyone should remember that not one of our weapons, that is our missile armaments, in Europe will reach U.S. territory. This task, of course, is not being set. That is a different matter. The missiles cannot reach and are not capable of reaching the United States. In the case of the American weapons that are to be deployed in Europe, each missile can reach the Soviet Union's territory. That is a factor of geography. In whose favor does this factor operate? It operates in favor of the United States and to the detriment of the Soviet Union.

We are not asking for compensation for this and we are not raising this question. But in order to scrupulously and precisely work out of the balance we could raise the question of compensation.

Further, a missile is a missile and a missile flies. Well, now, the flight time for an American missile from Western Europe to Soviet territory is roughly six to seven times shorter than the flight time of a missile from the territory of the Soviet Union to the United States in the event of a terrible tragedy befalling mankind.

The Soviet Union also has to scrupulously and precisely approach and construct an appropriate equation for observing the principle of equality. It also has the right and would have the right to set the question of compensation. But we are not setting this question and we are withdrawing this factor, as it were, into parenthesis. Why? In the interests of making the path to agreement easier -- in these interests. Furthermore, we consider that if agreement were reached, it would then be evident that steps had been taken toward further, more radical reductions and perhaps -- who knows? -- to the complete eradication of missiles weapons. To the complete eradication of missile weaponry.

I also ask you to bear this circumstance in mind: Here we are displaying extreme flexibility -- even magnanimity, if you like -- in the interests of agreement, bearing in mind, as I have already said, that the aim that has to be sought, that the world has to seek, is the complete eradication of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy for purely peaceful aims and purely for the good of humanity. Our policy in these questions, questions of both medium-range weapons and strategic weapons outside the confines of Europe, is to preserve the equality -- the principle of equality -- come what may. This has come about over a period of many years.

You could say that life itself has brought the principle of equality into being. It is not the result of any mere bureaucratic labors. Life itself. We are for preservation. U.S. policy is directed toward breaking, demolishing, that principle. We will do all to observe that principle, whether an agreement is achieved or not.

If the principle is violated as a result of action by the U.S. Government and NATO, then the Soviet Union would most certainly -- and no one can waver and no one can have any doubts -- take steps to guard its legitimate interests and see that the principle continues to operate.

That we will do. That we will do. We have the material and intellectual capability -- of that there can be no doubt. We think that, in fact, even those who bear the guilt for the present situation know that, too.

There I conclude my statement. If there are any questions, please ask them and I will try to answer them. [Except where otherwise noted, all questions are asked in Russian by an unidentified speaker. All questions are answered in Russian by Gromyko.]

[Question] A question from IZVESTIYA political observer Matveyev: It seems that Washington is still calculating that as the end of the year, when the deployment of American missiles in Europe is planned, approaches the USSR will be more compliant. What can you say about this?

[Answer] This is not a correct viewpoint. It is a profoundly mistaken one. This is such an exposure, you know, of the tactics, the tactical aspect, which shows that in point of fact people think too little. This cannot be the situation. On the contrary, the United States and the Soviet Union will be further from an agreement than now -- all the further from an agreement. [as heard] Therefore, the information media -- the press, radio and television -- will do a good service if they speak the truth and say that an agreement requires accord, consideration for the legitimate interests of both sides and observance of the principle of equality.

[Question] A question from American ABC television company correspondent (Walter Rogers): What will the Soviet Union's response be if the Americans deploy the Pershing and cruise missiles. Will the installation of these missiles be in any way similar to the Cuban nuclear missile crisis of 1962?

[Answer] In my statement I said that if this occurs, if the missiles are installed and an agreement is foiled and there is no accord, the Soviet Union would endeavor in material and other ways to guard its interests. We will not permit the parity -- or the balance, if you like to call it that -- to be upset. [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 April 1983 First Edition carries on pages 4 and 5 Gromyko's press conference. The report in PRAVDA entitled "A.A. Gromyko's Press Conference" has been compared with the above Moscow Domestic Service in Russian live broadcast of the press conference and here inserts the additional sentence: "We will not permit it."] With us there will be no divergence between word and deed. We do possess the possibilities. We do possess the possibilities and we have repeatedly proved this. But that is the worse course. It would be a forced measure on our part. Our first and preferred position is that the issue be resolved on the basis of an accord with the United States and NATO.

[Question] A question from Mikhaylov, member of the editorial board of the newspaper PRAVDA: The Soviet Union upholds the principle of equality and identical security. The U.S. side, on the other hand, speaks of the principle of equal rights and limits. What is the difference between the two?

[Answer] If you had asked the U.S. representatives who are negotiating what the formula equal rights and equal limits means they would not have given you an answer. They would have given you a completely feeble answer -- made a feeble statement -- because they themselves do not know what it means. One can guess that at the center of this is the question of the British and French missiles, their limits and rights. We are now told: If you don't mind, the British and French missiles are not American ones, and it is the Americans who are conducting talks with the Soviet Union. How can we include them and resolve questions relating to them?

2A

One can assume that the point at issue here is the British and French missiles. This stems from certain remarks -- from the logic, so to speak, of the talks. But this formula has been specially devised to confuse the issue. Imagine, please, asking the first person you meet on the street: Do you know what the phrase identical rights and identical limits, which the Americans are upholding, means? What does this formula, which they are going by, mean? He would just shrug his shoulders and say nothing. Furthermore, I would say that if an intelligent, cultured, educated person were to sit at the negotiating table -- or even a short distance from it -- he would also be unable to say.

The mathematically and politically precise formula that is acceptable from a military-strategic point of view is equality -- equality and identical security, taking all factors into account. For example, I have already spoken about Central Asia and a few other things. All factors: This is a simple but scientifically grounded formula.

[Question] A question from (Samuel Rachlin), correspondent for Denmark's radio and television. Mister Minister, you have recently stated that the public in the West would be deluding itself if it thought the Geneva talks would continue despite the deployment of new missiles. Does this mean that the Soviet Union will break off the talks the moment the first American missile is deployed?

[Answer] I should tell you that this fact will be a very negative one for Europe and the world as a whole. The position will be such that we will be bound to reexamine it as attentively as possible, and, taking all circumstances into consideration -- I emphasize this, taking all circumstances into account -- arrive at a relevant decision.

[Question] A question from (Devi Murarka), correspondent for the Finnish papers AAMULEHTI and HUFVUDSTADSBLADET: Mister Foreign Minister, in his latest speeches President Reagan has termed the USSR as an empire and center of evil. How do you appraise these assertions?

[Answer] Yes, we are aware that the American President is prone to such turns of phrase, that he organizes a crusade or forecasts it -- but organizes rather than just forecasts it. Now he proclaims the USSR to be the center of evil. Well, it is not as if he were the first in history to do so. History has had instances of statesmen whose approach to this was to forecast the demise of socialism when socialist science was in its infancy. Then, when socialist states were formed they forecast the demise of socialism. As for socialism, it proceeds along its own way. Simple mathematics testify to this, as well as some other things, too. It proceeds, gathering strength, and this is a legitimate way.

We do not think these forecasts will add to the authority of American foreign policy. We do not think they will shake socialism, its foundations, or our foreign policy by even one iota. It is our conviction that never in the period since World War II has the USSR's star, our banner, and the banner of our foreign policy shone as brightly as it does today for the whole world -- in the North, the South, the West, and the East.

As for the liquidation of colonialism, would it, generally speaking, have been at all possible without the USSR and our victory in the war against the fascist aggressors? No, not a single discriminating, reasoning, and clever person would say that.

Our theory and ideology are founded on the acknowledgement of the objective laws of the development of human society. We are convinced that what has been accomplished by socialism, the socialist states and, above all, the Soviet Union is a granite foundation for future activity -- a foundation that serves our people well as they go forward to fulfill their plans and serves as an example for all mankind.

25

It serves as an example. Noninterference in the internal affairs of other states is one of the principles of our foreign policy. But an example is an example, you cannot liquidate it. Even if somebody goes on a crusade he cannot liquidate it. I repeat: We do not think that will increase the opportunities for U.S. foreign policy. You know, these insults, these strong words that the leaders in Washington practice and love to practice, only demonstrate, you know, what threshold of decorum Washington has adopted in conducting affairs with other states, especially with the Soviet Union -- just how they conduct affairs.

Just how do they conduct affairs? Imagine the corresponding U.S. and Soviet representatives meeting at the negotiating table and exchanging such words. Some would try to prove that, you know, you are the center of evil, and the others would, of course, give a rebuff and try not to be outdone. What sort of talks would that be? What sort of talks would that be? If someone were to start compiling a table of evil -- a table of indices for evil -- I assure you that this table would be hundreds of times longer for the United States.

Those who are harmed by the United States, those on whose feet the United States is stepping by proclaiming whole territories and dozens of countries to be the zone of U.S. interests -- almost the United States' backyard or own lake -- appeal to us to defend their legitimate interests. They appeal to us. Well, what is this then? Do they appeal to the center of evil? Nothing of the kind. Well then was it the center of evil that put forward proposals at the United Nations for the liquidation of colonialism and the colonial system? This was put forward by a socialist state, the USSR. This is an open book. Everyone can read it.

Was it the center of evil that as long ago as in 1946 proposed an international convention proclaiming that nuclear weapons are incompatible with mankind's conscience and providing for a ban on nuclear weapons and for turning nuclear power to peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind? What was it, then, the center of evil? No, it was the Soviet socialist state. Then is it the center of evil that is now proposing to curtail military budgets, to pledge not to use force among states -- that is to say, to prevent war and build relations upon a peaceful foundation? Is this the center of evil? No, it is a state that bears the policy of peace and friendship among peoples.

We do not impose our ideology on anyone. Our ideology is a reflection of what is objectively taking place in human society. If I were to enlarge on this more, in all probability someone would say that this is propaganda. But there is propaganda and propaganda. Surely you would not agree, all of you present here, to being called -- on and all -- simply propagandists, but to some extent you are propagandists since you disseminate information among people, and there is information and information that opens up people's eyes. This is the truth, and the strength of our policy lies in truth.

That is why the President's or someone else's exercises in attaching labels, such as the center of evil, in picking all kinds of spicy words is a thankless task, and neither it is a viable one. It is not a viable one. It may well be that it will shine for someone who happens to stand or sit near the President, but it will wither without fail. We are proud of the role being fulfilled by the Soviet state and we know that there are many states, the majority of states in the world, which give due appraisal to this role. We are proud. We are in the great struggle of peoples for peace and against nuclear war. We have in this respect many partners, if you like, and many allies.

[Question] A question from TASS observer Bogachev: What is concealed behind the American proposal concerning the global limitation of medium-range missiles?

[Answer] You probably have the United States' proposals or demands to eliminate missiles in the Asian part of the USSR in mind. I have already spoken on this subject in connection with the question concerning the possibility of reducing Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and the possibility -- and our right -- of transferring some of the missiles to the Asian part of the USSR's territory. I said that the United States has put forward proposals that the missiles should be eliminated, and not just in the European part, but also in the Asian part. And all the same, the proposal put forward by the President concerning the sharp reduction of Soviet missiles encompasses also the Asian part. If we translate all this into concrete language, it would mean that the United States would then have almost 2 and 1/2 times more warheads. [boyezaryad]. Why do I say warheads and not missiles? Because warheads is more precise. Mathematically it is a more precise expression of, well, the power of nuclear weapons, to use a word that is in common currency.

[Question] In your view, is the interim version proposed by President Reagan now a way of really seeking a solution to the problem, or does it pursue some sort of other aims, perhaps propagandist or some other aims?

[Answer] We definitely think that it pursues other aims. And these other aims are that the United States, the American Administration, to be more precise, has set itself the task of achieving at all costs the deployment in West Europe of additional types of nuclear weapons and not allowing any agreements. This is the real aim.

[Question, in English] (Stewart Parker), Cable News network: I take it from everything that you said in your statement here and your response to the IZVESTIYA question, that you see no hope at all... [at this point the question in English becomes inaudible under the now superimposed Russian translation] In replying to IZVESTIYA you said that there is no hope of reaching an agreement with the United States on medium-range missiles before the end of the year. First, is this assertion correct? Second, connected with this question, you have just been appointed first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Does this mean that you will be spending less time on foreign affairs and what will be your responsibilities as first deputy premier?

[Question, given again in Russian] Representative of the American company, Cable News: I have two questions. As I understand it from the reply, from your reply to the question from the IZVESTIYA correspondent, you, in essence, do not feel any hope about the possibility of reaching an agreement on intermediate-range missiles [promezhutochnoy dalnosti] before the end of this year. Do I understand the position correctly? And my second question: You were recently appointed first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Does this mean that you will now be spending less time on foreign affairs, and what will your additional responsibilities be in this connection?

[Answer] So, the first question.

[Question given again in Russian] Would it be correct to suppose that there is no hope of the possibility of reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles before the end of the year?

[Answer] This is how I would answer the first question: If the position of the United States of America is to be as it has been announced, then there are no chances of agreement. Therefore, it would be a good thing if the American Administration adopted a more objective position in keeping with the requirement of preserving the principle of equality and equal security and full consideration of the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and of all states of the Warsaw Pact.

Regarding your second question, it concerns me personally. I could, indeed, refrain from answering it, but I would say that I very much doubt that there will be less work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [laughter] Rather, I think there will be more work, and it will concern the increased volume of work of coordinating -- to put it briefly -- foreign political activity.

[Question] A question from (Banko Stosec), correspondent of the Yugoslav press agency TANJUG: Esteemed Andrey Andreyevich, despite the United States' position, do you consider an improvement in Soviet-American relations to be possible? Do you believe that, in general, in the next few years it will be possible to reach an agreement between the USSR and the United States?

[Answer] He has asked a very easy question. I shall just say one thing: We would like relations between the United States and the USSR to improve. How many times have statements on this theme come from our side -- from the rostrums of the party congresses, the USSR Supreme Soviet and Central Committee plenary meetings. Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov has also spoken on this. I repeat: We would like this. But it is clear that the U.S. Administration does not want an improvement in relations with the USSR. It wants the USSR to make radical concessions to the detriment of its legitimate interests -- its legitimate and justified interests. This has not happened and it never will.

Therefore, we would appeal to the United States to adopt a more objective approach to questions of Soviet-U.S. relations and to understand that normal, and, what would be even better, good relations between the United States and the USSR are in accord with the interests not only of the world situation as a whole, but also the interests of the American people. In the past we have frequently said that this would be in accord with the interests of the Soviet people.

In order to prevent war, primarily nuclear war, it is first of all necessary to change the nature of relations between the USSR and the United States for the better. We are in favor of this. The U.S. Administration does not want this. It is not inappropriate to recall that we were once wartime allies. That means that we found common ground for cooperation at that time, even though our states had different social systems and different ideologies. We consider that two powers - powers with vast military potential -- can arrange normal relations in spite of these differences in social system and ideology. We are sure that the peoples of the two countries, the USSR and the United States, would breathe more easily for this.

[Question] A question from (Gupta), correspondent of the Indian agency PRESS TRUST OF INDIA: Would you be so kind as to describe the nature of the proposals that, as is reported, you made to the Chinese side last month in order to promote the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

[Answer] I shall speak in very general terms. Consultations have begun between China and the USSR. The objects of the consultations are many questions. They have not yet gone far enough to draw definite conclusions, and all the more so on the major questions. The sides have agreed to continue the consultations. The atmosphere during the consultations is normal on the whole. The consultations will be continued. We consider it a good thing that they have begun and will continue. We shall see what happens next. We are in favor of normal relations with China.

[Question] A question from correspondents of the Bulgarian newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO, (Rorninski) and (Koseva): Washington continues to claim that the Soviet Union is not observing the unilateral moratorium it announced on the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. What can you say on that?

[Answer] I can answer that briefly. It is a fraudulent [obmannoye] statement. There is no divergency in the words and deeds of the Soviet Union. That applies in this case too. That is all.

[Question] A question from (Bernard), American television company NBC News: Yuri Andropov said that there are solutions that will not infringe upon the interests of either of the sides. However, your position seems inflexible. Will the Soviet Union agree to any new deployment of missiles?

[Answer] We, in the course of talks, have expressed our opinion and we have heard the opinion of the United States. I have spoken about the basic policy lines in these talks, both ours and those of the United States. What is now known about U.S. policy excludes the possibility of accord. We do not know about tomorrow, but the apparent, visible prospect is not very good, if only because the American position is already being drawn up now, and it applies to the future, too. It is being specially emphasized that missiles, according to schedule, are to be deployed -- are to be, are to be, are to be -- it is maintained every hour, every day. One would like to see a change for the better, but for the time being it is not evident.

[Question] A question from a correspondent of the Hungarian newspaper NEPSZABADSAG, (Medvedszky): The United States, according to President Reagan, considers effective verification one of the basic principles of any agreement on arms control. What is the fundamental position of the Soviet Union on this question?

[Answer] Esteemed representatives of the media, I want to stress most decisively that verification has never been a bottleneck in the implementation of agreements or talks during agreements [as heard], although we have heard from the other side a great deal of demagogy on this subject, especially outside the framework of the negotiations table. [Here TASS renders Gromyko's answer as follows: ... "I would like to stress most emphatically that for the Soviet Union verification has never been a bottle-neck in the compliance with agreements, or in negotiations on agreements, although we have heard from the other side very many demagogic statements on this score, especially beyond the framework of the negotiating table" (recording for clarity)] Whenever verification is necessary, we are for verification. Where there is no need for special verification, well, that means there should not be any and there is no need for it. Both sides agreed on this, incidentally, meaning, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Let me stress, many people possibly do not know that since it is a question of certain treaties -- in particular the SALT II treaty, which because of the actions of the American side did not come into force and was not ratified -- much was based on bilateral, independent national verification, bilateral in the sense that each side, or rather both sides, acted in his own way on this question. Bilateral, not joint, but precisely national verification.

And there were no serious criticisms of any kind. This suited both sides. Now, it is sometimes said that there are doubts -- incidentally, they do not say to us directly that violations actually take place -- that there are doubts about how far various obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union are being observed. If we are talking about doubts, we, too, have more than once expressed doubts to the Government of the United States. We have expressed them, yes. So as not to make unsubstantiated statements, I will cite one instance. In the course of the talks -- it was necessary to conduct them with restraint and honesty -- we suddenly notice that for some time certain objects in the United States are being concealed from observation. We raise a question. We are told: Yes, they are being concealed; we are being hindered by the weather. A month or two passes, even more. We raise the question again: Certain objects are being concealed. They must not be concealed. So that we may see them with the means at our disposal, they must not be concealed at all. It was agreed that they must not be concealed. We get the answer: Look, it's raining. It's raining. We have to cover them. Well, of course we, half seriously, half ironically, ask: When are these covers of yours coming off? Have you had rain for months on end?

What is this, the second flood? It was a ruse, of course. But we took it fairly calmly, and it didn't happen again. There were other cases, too. But we don't want to exploit that for propaganda. We admit that in some secondary matters there may be something of the kind, but there was nothing serious from our side. We do not intend -- it is not a feature of our policy -- to enshrine one thing in a treaty or agreement and then act in another way. If the United States behaved the same it would be a good thing.

[Question] A question from (Faruq), a correspondent for the Syrian newspaper AL-BA'TH: How do you assess the situation which has now come about in the Near East? How do you assess Washington's reaction to the Soviet Government statement on the essence of Israel's aggressive schemes against Syria? Have there been contacts recently between the USSR and the United States with regard to the situation in that region?

[Answer] Between the USSR...[(Faruq) interrupts]

[Question] And the United States, yes.

[Answer] [Words indistinct] I should begin with the final point. There are no systematic contacts between the USSR and the United States. If there are such contacts, usually there are mutual representations [predstavleniya], representations, which mean that sparks of electricity fly. It would be better, of course, to conduct matters differently, in a calmer form, but -- one has sometimes to tell the truth, the unpleasant truth, maybe even in a quite sharp form -- how can one speak mildly about what is now going on in the Near East, particularly in Lebanon? How can one speak mildly about what is required of people in terms of nerves and frame of mind not to absorb in the most lively and energetic way, and with great alarm, what is going on? After all, there was a time when, in connection with a certain action, an aggressive action, by Israel toward Lebanon, Washington made a statement: Washington would not send its forces to Lebanon. Some time went by. A statement is made: Yes, by all means, it can send forces, but only for a limited period, if asked. Some time goes by: They appear there, contingents of American forces. Again an official statement is made by the administration. Yes, there are American forces there and Washington, for the time being, is not about to withdraw its forces. It does not have a deadline for withdrawal.

This is the American position, as everyone knows. Washington therefore (?urgently) places its contingents in Lebanon. Or they say: Yes, the Americans will leave Lebanon with their military contingents, but Israel and all other foreign troops must also leave. Then Israel says: I do not intend to leave. And Washington says: Ah, since Israel does not intend to leave, neither do I. I think it is not difficult for these two partners to agree on the division of roles between themselves. Every objective-thinking outside observer draws the correct conclusion: Yes, there is, in fact, collusion. The Soviet Union is in favor of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Lebanon, all of them. Syria is in favor of this. Israel does not wish this; it wants to keep a part of Lebanon for itself; it wants to break Lebanon up into parts. This is, generally speaking, a small country, and breaking it up into parts -- what happens? It ceases to exist.

Washington has stated that in the vicinity actually -- a huge region that encompasses 19 countries -- there are states of particular interest to the United States. There are states to which the strategic interests of the United States are spread, and a special command has even been formed. A strategic command center has been set up for these regions. In the list of tasks pursued by Washington is the task of interfering even when certain internal events are taking place that do not suit American interests in these countries.

The Near East is falling [podpadat]. The Near East is falling. What rights exist here? What lofty morals are here? What high moral principles? What can be defended here if one approaches the matter with the objectivity and honesty? If some internal social changes take place in these countries, then Washington gives itself the right to interfere and even use armed force. What is one to call this? I do not wish to use too strong words.

We, of course, sympathize with the Arab cause. We are in favor of peace in the Near East. But at the same time, we are in favor of Israel's existing as a state. No one can reproach us with having changed our position toward Israel as a state. The USSR raised its hand in favor when the question of the fate of Palestine was being discussed -- in favor of the existence, the creation of a special state of Israel. [Here TASS reads: "... in favor of the establishment of an Israeli state side by side with a Palestinian one..." (adding additional phrase)] We continue to think so now.

We do not share the point of view of extremist Arab circles that Israel should be eliminated. This is an unrealistic and unjust point of view. But Israel should be a peace-loving state. It should arrange good and peaceful relations with its neighbors. That is the sort of Israeli state of which we are in favor. Unfortunately, everything that Israel has been doing over a period of many years simply undercuts the basis, the political and historical basis, which was defended in general by all of those who supported the creation of Israel as an independent state. In voting for Israel, we were voting for a peaceful Israel, not for an aggressive Israeli state. Perhaps this will now sound old-fashioned, but all the same I wish that Israel would in the end have healthy realistic tendencies in its policy, in political life, in its political and social life, favoring the idea that Israel would live in peace with its neighbors.

We support the Arabs. We support their just cause. We support the Palestinians and believe they have the right to establish their own independent, albeit small, Palestinian Arab state.

[Question] One more final question, Andrey Andreyevich. There are other questions, but they in one form or another repeat those that have already been presented. A question from the correspondent of the Czechoslovakian newspapers MLADA FRONTA and SMENA ZDENEK: As is known, in February this year the Soviet delegation at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe submitted a complex of specific proposals on behalf of the socialist countries aimed at breaking the deadlock in the Vienna talks. What was the reaction of the other participating countries? What are the further prospects for the Vienna talks?

[Answer] To begin at the end, the prospects are bad. The prospects are felt to be bad because Washington, London, and other Western participants -- our partners in the talks -- are not devoting serious attention to them, and their positions are firmly cemented. We have several times made approaches from various directions. We have made proposals and shown flexibility in the hope that in the final analysis, things would begin to move. Not so long ago -- only 2 or 3 months ago -- we submitted proposals to simplify the total numbers of troops. We have proposed simplifying this and dismissing any side circumstances. Unfortunately, not much interest was displayed in this, although no official answer has yet been given. This method has been adopted fairly solidly of late in certain Western capitals. We do not have an answer to our proposal and there is no movement in these talks, no movement. There is no movement in a number of other areas concerning talks that have begun and those that should have begun. Our partners do not want to hold talks. On cessation of testing nuclear weapons, we reproach the Western countries -- above all, the U.S. Administration -- which are refusing to reach an agreement on this question, or even to hold talks.

Strange as it may seem, even the Madrid forum has not yet been completed. Yet, given anything like an objective attitude, it should have been completed long ago because the main political framework has already been determined by the Helsinki agreement, the Helsinki Final Act. The concrete questions that arise and have arisen should be resolved in the framework of that basic agreement. If the desire were there, they ought to be resolved. Let us hope that in the end that forum will also be completed with positive results. One would like to believe that it will.

I must thank all those present. I hope that the results of this press conference will be reported objectively. Especially concerning this last wish, I address myself to the representatives of the foreign news media. Thank you. I leave you my best wishes. Goodbye. [applause]

TASS VIEWS 'HASTE' OF U.S. RESPONSE TO GROMYKO

LD041038 Moscow TASS in English 1004 GMT 4 Apr 83

[Text] Moscow April 4 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Reporting about the response by Washington's officials to Andrey Gromyko's press conference, the American press stresses that the Reagan administration's reply was made in an unusual haste. State Department officials in their propagandist fever probably failed even to read carefully the account of the press conference. Otherwise, how can one explain their misinterpretation of the remarks made at the press conference.

According to the American NBC television network, for instance, State Department officials believe that Gromyko's statement is far from being the final response to the U.S. proposals.

Thus, the correspondent of the T.V. company points out, they in Washington believe that although the USSR rejected the American proposals, it may still accept them in the future.

The following words by Andrey Gromyko should be recalled in connection with these declarations by U.S. officials: "If the position of the United States of America remains as it was announced by the President, then there are no chances for an agreement. That is why it would be good if the U.S. Administration adopted a more objective position meeting the need to preserve the principle of equality and equal security, and fully taking into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and of all the states of the Warsaw Treaty."

The calculations by certain circles in the United States on a change in the clear and unambiguous stand of the Soviet Union with regard to Reagan's "interim proposal" are built on sand.

Further Reaction Noted

LD021952 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 2 Apr 83

[Text] Foreign news agencies have transmitted detailed reports -- with the marking: urgent priority -- on the Moscow press conference by Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR minister of foreign affairs.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED

05 APR 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1987
BY CN NARA, DATE 8/16/12

TO: European Public Diplomacy Subgroup
FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*
SUBJECT: Report on 3/31 Meeting

Following items were covered at the 3/31 meeting:

1. Strategy: There was a discussion of our strategy over the next several months in keeping our position before European publics and in ensuring firm allied support over this period. State will prepare a draft strategy paper for interagency consideration. It was agreed that we need to revise certain aspects of the Speakers Packet and other guidance to take into account our new initiative. We will also send to the field a joint State/USIA cable reinforcing and strengthening our public affairs approach on INF.
2. White Paper: A revised copy of the White Paper, incorporating comments from all participating agencies, will be distributed at the 4/7 meeting. Your clearance would then be appreciated at or before the following meeting on 4/14. Our goal now is to issue the paper by May 1.
3. Speakers Packet: Now that we have made the interim proposal, EUR (Rueckert) and PM (Mandel) will lead the process of revising those parts of the packet which require it.
4. Press Packet: A revised press packet for use as a hand out will be distributed at the next meeting.
5. Netherlands Petition: EUR reported that State has sent a memorandum to the White House recommending an appropriate US/Dutch ceremony at the White House on April 19 to receive the petition signed by over 100,000 Dutch citizens proclaiming US/Netherlands friendship. Dennis Blair, NSC staff, agreed to check the status.
6. New GIST on INF: The new GIST on INF is being revised to take the new initiative into account.
7. USIA Q's and A's: The original Q's and A's have been effectively incorporated into the draft USIA special publication entitled "INF: Qs and As on Issues of Arms Reductions and Modernization," which was distributed at the 3/31 meeting. Comments/clearance on this publication would be appreciated at the next meeting.

8. Size of Arsenal: The guidance done in response to the letter from Biden and other Senators is enclosed. Susan Koch agreed to check on when OSD will release further information on the size of our arsenal.
9. Next Steps Cable: We are working on a cable to all European posts setting out the next steps in our INF public affairs strategy following the President's recent initiatives and the Soviet reaction. We hope to have a draft of this cable ready for circulation at the next meeting.
10. INF Article: Embassy London has sent in a draft article on INF which Amb. Louis would like to place in the UK media. A revised draft containing EUR comments is enclosed. Please provide your clearance or comments at the next meeting (4/7).
11. USIA Film on Soviet Military Power: As requested earlier, USIA distributed at the 3/31 meeting the text accompanying this film, which consists of 35 short clips.
12. Speakers and Opportunities: USIA distributed its weekly update of events completed in Europe and at the Foreign Press Center. EUR reported that Assistant Secretary Burt, in addition to participating in the three backgrounders at the White House along with other Administration officials, gave a backgrounder at the Foreign Press Center on our new initiative on 3/30; gave back-to-back TV interviews on 4/4 to journalists from the Netherlands, FRG, UK, Norway and Denmark; and will address the Overseas Writers Association on INF and related issues on 4/5.
- EUR conveyed to the Subgroup State's view that U.S. officials should not participate in debates on U.S. TV with representatives of the Soviet Union.
13. Press Access to Basing Sites: EUR agreed to provide to the group, when received, copies of the press clips on the 3/24 press visit to Greenham Common led by MOD Heseltine. OSD reported that it has received numerous requests for visits by European journalists to INF-related military sites in the U.S. DOD is considering grouping these into one organized tour. Others agreed with this approach, and emphasized the importance of including briefings on arms control as part of the package. DOD is requested to keep the group closely informed on this issue.
14. Projects Completed: An integrated update will be provided by EUR next week.
15. Militarization of Soviet Society: USIA is continuing its effort to get a prominent private individual to write a by-liner on the militarization of Soviet and Eastern European societies.

16. Milan Arms Control Seminar: USIA reported that Ambassador Glitman has been requested to represent the U.S.

17. Belgian Parliamentarians: USIA reported that a group of six prominent Belgian parliamentarians will visit the U.S. on April 17-21. It was asked that other agencies help to ensure that they are briefed at senior levels, and that we also assist in assuring productive appointments on the Hill.

18. Presidential Statement on INF: USIA reported that the President's statement of 3/30 was satellited live to Europe by EBU and was accepted by TV networks in each Western European country, as well as by Intervision. (A full one-minute clip was shown without comment in Hungary.)

19. USIA Polling: USIA reported that two new questions have been added for its polls in Europe on attitudes towards INF. These questions take into account the new U.S. initiative.

20. Belgian TV: USIA noted that a Belgian Flemish TV crew will visit Washington in mid-April and wishes interviews with the Secretaries of State and Defense. The group agreed to examine this.

21. Terminology: There was a discussion of when we need in our public presentations to use the term "LRINF" as opposed to simply "INF." It was agreed that the longer term is required when we refer to the specific class of weapons which we have proposed to eliminate, but that "INF" will suffice in most other contexts.

22. April 2 Statement: The State Department Statement of April 2, in response to Gromyko's comments on our initiative, is enclosed, along with cleared guidance on the Gromyko comments.

23. Calendar: A new calendar of INF-related events will be distributed at the next meeting.

NEXT MEETING: The next meeting will be held on the regular schedule, at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday 4/7 in the EUR Conference Room, 6226.

NOTE: The senior level "Dailey Group," now chaired by Ambassador Helman, will meet on Wednesday 4/6 at 10:00 a.m. in Room 6226. The meeting will focus on longer term strategy.

*EUR-217 (4/5/83)

*

BURT SEES SOVIETS DISCUSSING INF PLAN (1,600)

BY EDMUND SCHERR AND WILLIAM DURHAM

USIA STAFF WRITERS

*

WASHINGTON -- A SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SAYS THAT HE EXPECTS THE SOVIET UNION TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM INF (INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE) AGREEMENT WHEN NEGOTIATIONS RESUME NEXT MONTH.

DESPITE WEEKEND COMMENTS BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PLAN IS UNACCEPTABLE, RICHARD BURT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, SAID HE BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIETS ULTIMATELY WILL SERIOUSLY DISCUSS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL.

THE U.S. PRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED AN INTERIM ACCORD ON WORLDWIDE LEVELS OF U.S. AND SOVIET INF MISSILES, WHILE STATING THAT HIS ULTIMATE GOAL IS STILL THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF THIS CLASS OF MISSILES.

IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS HELD RECENTLY WITH FIVE EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS IN WASHINGTON, BURT STRESSED THAT ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS FIND A NUMBER OF THINGS UNACCEPTABLE IN REAGAN'S PROPOSAL, HE BELIEVES AN AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

ON APRIL 5, BURT TOLD A MEETING OF THE OVERSEAS WRITERS CLUB THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL BE "FLESHING OUT" THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INF FORCES BETWEEN NOW AND MAY 17.

(MORE)

BURT SAID THAT "THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL THAT WE WILL TABLE IN MAY WILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY WORKED OUT WITHIN THE (NATO) ALLIANCE."

THE REAGAN PROPOSAL, WHICH CALLS FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET AND U.S. LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, WILL ALSO BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, BURT SAID.

HE SAID THAT U.S. NEGOTIATOR PAUL NITZE, NOW BACK FROM GENEVA FOR A SIX-WEEK RECESS, WILL BE CONSULTING BOTH WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS PRIOR TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE INF TALKS MAY 17.

ASKED IF NITZE WOULD HAVE A SPECIFIC, EQUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AND U.S. WARHEADS TO PROPOSE TO THE SOVIETS MAY 17, BURT SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER A DECISION ON A SPECIFIC NUMBER HAD BEEN MADE YET, ADDING THAT NITZE WILL HAVE FLEXIBILITY TO DISCUSS ANY SPECIFIC NUMBER THE SOVIETS MIGHT PROPOSE.

BURT SAID THAT EQUALITY IS "ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ARMS CONTROL" THAT WILL BE ADHERED TO IN ANY AGREEMENT THAT MIGHT BE REACHED. HE NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT AGREE TO SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN ANY TREATY ON ARMS CONTROL.

THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AGREED IN DECEMBER 1979 TO A "TWO-TRACK" APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE GROWING THREAT TO EUROPE CAUSED BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SOVIET SS-20 MISSILE.

THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AGREED TO MODERNIZE ITS THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES WITH U.S. PERSHING TWO AND CRUISE MISSILES -- BEGINNING AT THE END OF 1983 -- TO COUNTER THE SOVIET SS-20 BUILDUP AND

(MORE)

36

AT THE SAME TIME SEEK NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOSCOW TO LIMIT INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES.

"WE WANT TO MAKE PROGRESS" IN THE INF TALKS IN GENEVA, BURT SAID IN HIS INTERVIEWS WITH EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS. "IT IS THE SOVIET UNION THAT HAS BEEN INFLEXIBLE," HE SAID. "WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY, AND WE THINK THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE A PRODUCTIVE SERIES."

THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL SAID THAT AS THE SOVIETS BECOME MORE CONVINCED THAT THE NATO ALLIES WILL DEPLOY THE PERSHING TWO AND CRUISE MISSILES, "THEY WILL BECOME MORE SERIOUS" IN TALKS. BURT SAID THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE END OF 1983.

HE POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOW HAVE TWO PROPOSALS ON THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TABLE. "THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE A CHOICE," HE SAID, EITHER TO TAKE THE "LARGE, BOLD, VISIONARY STEP" OF ELIMINATING AN ENTIRE CLASS OF MISSILES OR DISCUSSING AN INTERIM PROPOSAL TO SET LIMITS TO INF FORCES.

"IF IT IS VERY CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION ... THAT WE WILL DEPLOY IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THEN WE HAVE A CHANCE FOR REAL NEGOTIATIONS," HE SAID.

BURT SAID THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "VERY SERIOUS PROPOSAL" FOR AN INTERIM INF ACCORD REFLECTS THE GENUINE DESIRE BY ALL WESTERN NATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL.

HE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE INF TALKS IS "NOT A QUESTION OF THE EUROPEANS PUSHING THE AMERICANS OR THE AMERICANS PUSHING THE EUROPEANS... WE ARE EXCHANGING VIEWS AND COMING UP WITH JOINT DECISIONS."

(MORE)

M

REFERRING TO NATO'S TWO-TRACK DECISION, BURT SAID THAT WHAT IS REMARKABLE ABOUT THIS NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS THAT "THE ALLIANCE HAS REMAINED UNITED. WE HAVE LISTENED TO ONE ANOTHER. WE HAVE CONSULTED ON A VERY HIGH LEVEL... AND WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH." IT IS NOT AN AMERICAN POLICY, HE EMPHASIZED. "IT IS AN ALLIANCE POLICY."

"WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITHOUT INCENTIVES," HE ADDED. "THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE AT GENEVA IF THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT TAKEN THE DECISION" TO DEPLOY IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ACCORD.

WHILE NOTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SOME LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS, BURT SAID THAT IF YOU LOOK AT THE SOVIETS' OVERALL MILITARY CAPABILITIES IT IS CLEAR THE SOVIETS HAVE FAR MORE MILITARY POWER THAN IS NEEDED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST ATTACK.

"THAT SURPLUS OF (SOVIET) CAPABILITY," HE CONTINUED, "GIVES THE SOVIETS OFFENSIVE POWER, THE MEANS TO BLACKMAIL THEIR NEIGHBORS."

WHAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS IS "MILITARY POWER AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL." BURT SAID, ADDING THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT NEED 351 SS-20'S WITH OVER 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO DETER AN ATTACK AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

"NOBODY LIKES THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE," BURT EMPHASIZED. "NOBODY LIKES THE SITUATION THAT WE ARE IN AT PRESENT, WHERE BOTH SIDES ARE HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO AN ATTACK BY THE OTHER."

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES THAT THE WAY TO ACCOMPLISH REAL ARMS REDUCTIONS IS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, HE CONTINUED, AND TO "MAKE IT VERY CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT UNLESS THEY AGREE TO EQUAL, VERIFIABLE (TREATY) OUTCOMES THAT WE WILL HAVE TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT

(MORE)

18

OUR OWN SECURITY."

BURT WAS QUESTIONED IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS BY CORRESPONDENTS FROM THE NETHERLANDS, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, DENMARK AND NORWAY.

WHEN ASKED ABOUT U.S. REACTION TO THE EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. MISSILES, BURT SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHARES THE EFFORTS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN ITS DEVOTION TO ARMS CONTROL. "WE DISAGREE ON THE WAY TO BRING IT ABOUT."

BURT SAID THAT "WE ARE PART OF THE ANTI-MISSILE MOVEMENT." THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE IS ANTI-U.S. MISSILE, "WE ARE ANTI-U.S. AND ANTI-SOVIET MISSILE."

HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT OPPOSES INF DEPLOYMENT BY THE WEST, "ALMOST REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE SOVIETS DO WITH THEIR SS-20 PROGRAM."

YOU WOULD NOT GET THE SOVIETS TO THE GENEVA BARGAINING TABLE, HE SAID, IF THE NATO ALLIANCE UNILATERALLY DECIDED NOT TO DEPLOY INF MISSILES.

WHILE UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHIZING WITH THE GENERAL CONCERNS OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT, BURT SAID THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DISAGREES WITH IT ON WHAT COULD CAUSE A WAR IN EUROPE. "WE BELIEVE THAT A WAR IN EUROPE WOULD COME IF THERE IS AN IMBALANCE IN FORCES, IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PERMITTED, YEAR AFTER YEAR, TO BUILD UP ITS FORCES AND IS NOT FORCED TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AND NEGOTIATE A MUTUAL REDUCTION."

HE STRESSED THAT UNILATERAL ARMS REDUCTIONS BY THE WEST IS NOT GOING

(MORE)

NA

TO MAKE WAR LESS LIKELY. "IT IS GOING TO MAKE WAR MORE LIKELY."

EMPHASIZING THE NEED TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE OPEN WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO BOTH NATIONS, BURT SAID THAT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS OF "FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO US."

HE NOTED THAT THIS IS A "HIGHLY COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP" WITH REAL DISAGREEMENTS AND "ANY EFFORTS AT IMPROVEMENT HAVE GOT TO FOCUS ON THE ROOTS OF THAT COMPETITION."

"WE ARE PREPARED TO HOLD A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION," BURT SAID, ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, ABOUT OUR "CONCERNS." HE SAID THAT "AS LONG AS THAT DIALOGUE REMAINS SERIOUS, AS LONG AS WE GET TO REAL ISSUES, THEN I SEE SOME HOPE IN THE PROSPECTS OF THAT RELATIONSHIP."

SUCH TALK, HE CONTINUED, CANNOT SIMPLY DEAL WITH THOSE ISSUES THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO DISCUSS. BURT SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF 100,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND.

HE SAID THE SOVIETS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO IMPROVE, "THEY HAVE TO MEET US HALFWAY."

*

item ET

(END)

8

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1987
BY CS NARA DATE 8/16/12

Revised 4/5/83

CALENDAR OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL

The following calendar includes three categories of events which could be relevant to our INF and other arms control interests: (1) useful opportunities, such as public forums where we can get our case across; (2) meetings with European leaders or among Europeans where we can seek supportive statements; and (3) events which are likely to cause us difficulties, such as demonstrations by anti-nuclear groups.

	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
<u>APRIL</u>		
	"World Peace Conference," Uppsala, Sweden, sponsored by Scandanavian Protestant Churches	Stress US pursuit of peace
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	End of START round	Possible high level public report on state of arms control
	Series of SFRC Hearings on US/Soviet Relations, to include Rostow as witness.	Provide Senior USG official?
4/1	Ambassador Rowny's meeting with NAC	
4/1	"Chain of Peace" peace demonstration at Greenham Common	
Easter 1-4	CND March from Burfield and Aldermarston to Greenham Common and back	
Easter week	Peace marches in Europe	Stress US approach to peace
Easter week	Possible Foley Codel to Moscow, with 15-20 Members of Congress	Brief on security issues and provide materials
4/6-7	Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting, Prague	

AH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

<u>APRIL</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
4/11-12	Visit of Canadian Foreign Minister MacEachen to Washington	Theme of Alliance Solidarity
4/11-15	Defense Symposium for Civilian Dignitaries Rome.	Theme of "NATO and Nuclear Arms." Amb. Brement, USG Rep.
4/12-13	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
4/19	MBFR Talks resume	
4/23	Florennes: First of planned series of anti-INF demonstrations	
4/24-5/6	Eagleburger trip to Europe and North Africa	Speeches: 4/25, Time Conf. on Atlantic Alliance in Hamburg; 4/29, E/W Seminar in Vienna; 5/6, Intl. Studies Inst. in Madrid
4/25	General Elections in Portugal	
4/25	European Institute on Security Matters, London Conference	Asst. Secy. Burt likely to speak
4/25-26	NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns visit to Washington	
	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Luxembourg	
4/25-29	USIA security issues tour for 15 leading West European foreign and defense affairs journalists	
4/26	Secretary Shultz working lunch with EC Ambassadors at FRG Embassy	
4/26	President's Meeting with NATO SG Joseph Luns	

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-3-~~

EVENTS

POSSIBLE ACTIONS

APRIL

4/27-28

Copenhagen Seminar on INF, sponsored by Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament; papers to be published

Provide high level USG speaker (at least DAS)

4/30

Comiso Peace March

Late April/
Early May

USIS Stockholm to program START Deputy Goodby and INF Deputy Glitman in Sweden

MAY

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	Possible Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting	Do analysis of possible WP initiatives, have press line ready and consider preempting them
	Meeting of socialist heads of government, Paris	
	NATO Defense Ministerial	
	Possible US visit of Romanian Foreign Minister	Seek balanced statement including ref to <u>Soviet</u> arms
May-June	Former ACDA Director Rostow to speak in USSR as Ampart	
5/4-5	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
5/7	4th CND Festival, London	
5/9-10	Secretary to OECD Ministerial, Paris	
5/9-6/3	UN Disarmament Commission meeting, New York	
5/11-14	Bilderberg Conf., Chateau Montebello, Canada	DepSec Dam to speak
5/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers informal "Gymnich" weekend	
5/15	Berlin "Peace Conference," in connection with 50th Anniversary of Hitler's rise to power.	
5/15	Bordeaux Festival of "Youth For Peace": Campaign to speed Geneva Negotiations and a CDE	
5/17	INF talks resume in Geneva	
5/18-20	European Institute for Security Matters Conf. Luxembourg	Need high level USG speaker.

MAY (Continued)

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

5/19	MBFR negotiations resume in Vienna	
5/21	CND "Peace Pentacost" march to Upper Heyford	
5/24	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Bonn	
5/26-27	UK Prime Minister Thatcher to visit Washington (tentative)	
5/28-30	Williamsburg Summit	Seek demonstration of Allied unity in security as well as economic area
5/31-6/1	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

SPRING/EARLY SUMMER

(no date yet)

US Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter to be issued

Possible Italian elections

Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez to Washington

Stress Western unity and Spain as example of expansion of democracy

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

JUNE

Visit of FRG Chancellor in his capacity
as EC President

6/6-7

European Council Meeting, Bonn

6/6-9

Plenary Session of the Assembly of the Western
European Union. Paris.

6/8

Round IV of START talks opens

6/9-10

Secretary to NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris

Obtain full Allied support
on arms control and other
East-West issues

6/12-17

Wilton Park Conference on Europe's role in
E/W dialogue

Need high level speaker:
possible Burt attendance

6/16-22

Pope's visit to Poland

6/17-22

Third World Congress, International Physicians
for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Amsterdam

Mid-June

High Level Defense Group: Turkey meeting

6/23-24

Friedrich Ebert Foundation
German-American Security Conference, Bonn

Possible VP, Burt, Perle
attendance

6/25

Vice President to take part in
US/FRG Tricentennial Celebration in Krefeld
and to visit other European countries.

6/28-30

Thirteenth ICFTU Congress, Oslo (will be
discussing disarmament

resolution)

JULY

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

7/11-16

Fourth Seminar on International Security Affairs, Geneva

Seeking senior US speaker probably private sector

7/28

Greenham Common Air Tatroo, with 200-300,000 public visitors expected

Provide arms control

AUGUST

8/6

Hiroshima Anniversary

8/19-21

America Days in Helsinki
40th Anniversary League of Finish-American Societies

SEPTEMBER

Expected release of Dutch Defense White Paper

Late Sept/
early Oct

Annual Party Conferences in UK, possible prelude to general elections

OCTOBER

10/23

World Peacd Day demonstration in UK

10/23

Brussels - national demonstration orgainzed by "CNAPD" and "UAKA"

10/29

Anti-nuclear demonstration in The Hague

0002A