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Withdrawer

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File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (9 OF 19)

FOIA

M11-443

Box Number 12

HAENNI

95

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
141134	CABLE	STATE 067786 <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	2	3/11/1983	B1
141154	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE MEETING <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	7	3/10/1983	B1
141156	CABLE	RE BOOK <i>R</i> 9/5/17 <i>M443/5</i>	3	3/16/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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ACDA/OSA 3-7-83
C.A. Sorrels

INSTRUCTIVE EXAMPLE OF HOW ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO PURSUE
DEPLOYMENT RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET BUILD-UP OF SS-20s
PROMPTED SOVIETS TO BE MORE MOTIVATED TO PURSUE ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ON INF

N

Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Bonn at the end of November 1979, shortly before NATO's scheduled meeting to approve the "twin track" policy, i.e., a commitment both to deploying new US INF missiles in response to the burgeoning SS-20 threat to Western Europe and to beginning arms control talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on such INF missiles.

At a press conference in Bonn (November 23, 1979) after his talks with the West German government, Gromyko fervently expressed exasperated annoyance that the Government of Chancellor Schmidt had maintained, despite Soviet arguments, its adherence to the position that NATO should first approve plans for deployment of the new US-operated INF missiles and then enter talks with the Soviet Union on such systems. Gromyko reiterated the offer President Brezhnev had made in East Berlin on October 6, 1979 that the Soviets were "prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear means deployed in the western areas of the Soviet Union" on condition that NATO not proceed with deployment plans, an imprecise (the SS-20 was not even specifically mentioned, for example) Soviet proposal that the US, West Germany, and other NATO Governments had found unacceptable. Gromyko then three times

issued an emphatic warning that NATO's approving and proceeding with planned deployment would "destroy the basis" for arms control talks on such systems.*

"We are proposing that talks start immediately in the situation that exists without deciding on deploying new types of missile nuclear weapons in West Europe, that is, without putting into motion the whole mechanism for producing and deploying these weapons. But we are told no. First we will decide to produce these weapons and to deploy them and only then will we start talks with you."

Certain governments of the NATO countries -- you know them well -- flatly state that it is necessary to conduct the talks with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. These statements reek of a (?kind of) political mothball, if I may be allowed to use this expression. We have openly stated that such a formulation of the matter means political preconditions., This destroys the basis for talks. I repeat: Such a position by certain NATO countries destroys the basis for talks.

* * *

Question: Do you consider that talks will be possible in the event that a decision on supplementing arms is adopted at the forthcoming NATO session?

Answer: The present position of the NATO countries, including the FRG, as it now appears, destroys the basis for talks. ...

* * *

*He expanded the scope of the threatened impact of NATO's proceeding to approve deployment by referring to the MBFR talks in Vienna. Gromyko stated: "... the implementation by the NATO countries of the plans to deploy new types of nuclear missile weapons will complicate, and complicate greatly, the possibility of achieving success at the Vienna talks."

I repeat, that if such a decision is adopted and our proposal on the start of talks is rejected, by the same token the position of the Western powers will destroy the basis for the talks. The basis will not exist.

This categorical Soviet position of ruling out talks if NATO-approved deployment was maintained by the Soviets until the summer of 1980, when NATO's will to proceed had been demonstrated in face of Soviet warnings. 1/

During Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in early July 1980, The Soviet Union reportedly dropped its insistence that the NATO deployment plans be abandoned as a precondition for talks. In a press conference at that time in Brussels, NATO's Secretary General Joseph Luns reportedly stated that the Soviet decision to reverse its refusal to pursue negotiations on deployment of intermediate range missiles

1. The Soviet Ambassador to France, Stephan Chervonenko, for example, reiterated the Gromyko position in mid-April 1980, stating that as a result of NATO's decision (described as a "provocative operation") the bases for negotiations on such systems had "collapsed." -- Flora Lewis, "Soviet Assails Plan for Deploying Arms", New York Times, April 16, 1980.

For further reference, see John Vinocur, "Brezhnev Announces Soviet Forces in East Germany will be Reduced", New York Times, October 7, 1979 (page 12), which notes that Egon Bahr, leader in the Social Democratic Party in Bonn, stated prior to Brezhnev's speech that the Soviet Union should agree to stop production of its SS-20 missiles as a preliminary condition in the next phase of arms control negotiations.

6
4.

in Europe resulted after NATO's uncompromising decision
to proceed with the new missile systems. 2/

2. New York Times, July 3 and July 4, 1980.

SECRET

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Blair *U*

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *(not seen)*

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Dailey's Proposals on Presidential Speech

Ambassador Dailey has sent you two memoranda (Tab A) proposing a Presidential Easter message on the Administration's arms reductions and peace efforts, thereby also gaining support for our defense modernization programs. Dailey believes the President should focus his defense budget efforts on private conversations, and that any public talks defending the modernization programs must be balanced with the theme of arms reductions.

Dailey urges that the theme of restoring the "margin of safety" should be matched by the President with the theme of beating our "nuclear swords into plowshares." He suggests that we make the latter theme our peace symbol to be buttressed by the distribution of materials with pictures of the UN statue of a man beating a sword into a plowshare. He feels this act might be particularly effective because the Soviets donated the UN statue, and the East German Government has recently banned the symbol, which had been adopted by the East German peace movement.

In addition to the above, Dailey urges that the President continue to meet regularly with his arms reductions negotiators, show continuing personal interest in this issue, and seek an opportunity to offer an open hand to Andropov again, perhaps with an offer to meet Andropov at the UN session this fall.

The above ideas appear worthy of careful consideration by you, although distribution of pictures of the UN statue might be a bit excessive. The President's American Legion speech and his address to the Evangelicals are steps in the direction suggested by Dailey.

MS Robert Sims and Dennis Blair concur. *DB*

RECOMMENDATION

That careful consideration be given to Ambassador Dailey's proposals.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
BY NARA ON DATE 6/16/12

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: President's Profile on Arms Reductions and
Defense Issues

We are off to a fast start in our effort to build public support for the President's INF Arms Reductions program. The President's speech to the VFW combined with the Vice President's trip through Europe have given us the themes and momentum that we must build upon over the months ahead.

One focus of our efforts must be to foster European perceptions that our nation, and the President himself, is committed to nuclear arms reductions and peace. Our battle is to build the President's personal credibility as much as it is an effort to explain and defend a rational policy. It is particularly important, therefore, that we carefully manage the President's profile on arms reductions and defense issues over the ten months ahead.

The balanced position that the President struck in his VFW speech--a man committed to arms reductions, but willing to build up our arsenal if the Soviets will not compromise--may prove difficult to maintain. The demands of the defense budget fight in Congress will create pressures for the President to speak more forcefully about the Soviet threat and the urgent need for America to re-arm. And our detractors will harp on the military aspect of the President's combined message in an effort to characterize the President as someone committed to more and better armaments, without any commitment to arms reductions or control.

I believe that we are all agreed that we should concentrate on building the President's image as a statesman committed to arms reductions and peace, particularly in the wake of his strong efforts to support a revitalized defense program during the first two years of the Administration. In that regard, I suggest the following guidelines:

SECRET/SENSITIVEDECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY CU NARA, DATE 8/16/12

- (1) The President should deliver an Easter message on our program for arms reduction and peace.
- (2) The President should focus his efforts to support the defense budget on private conversations. Any public talks in which he speaks about the arms build-up should have the balancing theme of arms reductions.
- (3) The President should continue to meet regularly with his arms reductions negotiators and show continuing personal interest in this issue.
- (4) We should search for an opportunity in the late Spring for the President to offer an open hand to Andropov again and thereby show that the Soviets are the inflexible party. (This move could take the form of a US offer to meet Andropov at the UN session this Fall.)


Peter H. Darley, Chairman
Interagency Committee on
Security and Arms Control



March 1, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Speech on Nuclear Arms Reductions

The week preceding Easter offers a good opportunity for the President to restate his commitment to nuclear arms reductions and his program for peace. As we have discussed, building the President's personal credibility on this issue is central to our INF public diplomacy program and overall political strategy. Addressing the nuclear question in conjunction with the holidays of Easter and Passover would give the President a good setting for enhancing his personal stature as a man of peace and for outflanking the peace movement that is likely to take to the streets soon thereafter.

The President's address should be short, focused, and designed to capture public imagination and the moral high ground. The theme should be the need to beat "nuclear swords into plowshares." The President should reiterate his conviction that nuclear war is unwinnable; that nuclear imbalance and fear is unacceptable; and that deep reductions of nuclear arsenals offer the solution.

While the President faced the urgent task of restoring the nuclear "margin of safety" when he came to office, he has offered an alternative to nuclear modernization programs--his proposals for arms reductions in START and INF. Through the nuclear age, America has generally sought to have the smallest practice nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the number of weapons and the destructive power of the weapons we possess have both declined since the 1960's. Our current programs are designed to modernize and replace aging nuclear forces--not simply to add new weapons to old ones already in place.

But this is not enough. If our children are to live in a world free of the danger and the fear of nuclear war and nuclear blackmail, then we must forge the path to arms reductions. We must beat our nuclear "swords into plowshares." A freeze is not enough. Quick solutions that would offer one side a nuclear advantage that could be exploited during military or diplomatic tensions are not wise. We must work to achieve deep reductions to balanced, stable levels.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADRDECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Collection, July 21, 1997
DATE E/16/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-


We have already made some progress. Through his START and INF initiatives the President has changed the focus of arms negotiations from arms control to arms reductions. We have made it abundantly clear to the Soviets that our nation, and the West as a whole, seeks to reduce the number of weapons in the world. But, on the other hand, such reductions cannot be one-sided. If there is to be balance and security, there must be reciprocity. If all sides are to live in freedom, there must be parity and equality.

In closing the President should reiterate his affinity for the goals and objectives of the legitimate peace movement. He should observe that it is the responsibility of everyone, those who govern and those who are governed alike, to build a force for peace. If we work together to find the keys to reverse the arms race, we can build a future in which our children can be free from the dangers and the fear of nuclear war.

FOLLOWING-UP

After the President's speech, we should make the "swords into plowshares" our peace symbol standing for deep reductions to balanced, equitable levels. We would encourage friendly forces here and abroad to distribute banners with pictures of the UN statue of a man beating a sword into a plowshare. (The Soviets donated the statue, and the East German Government recently banned that symbol which had been adopted by the East German peace movement.)

If churches in this country, East European peace demonstrators, and peace marchers begin to use the symbol we will have gone a great step toward recapturing the word "peace" and making the legitimate peace movement an ally in our program for responsible arms reductions.



Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
Interagency Committee for
European Security and Arms Control

cc: CIA - William Casey, Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

March 9, 1983

F.6:

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE (not seen)

FROM: SVEN KRAEMER SK

SUBJECT: Ambassador Dailey's Proposals on INF Public Affairs

In the attached memorandum (Tab A), Ambassador Dailey recommends a contingency plan for a Soviet walkout from the INF negotiations and the use of former US officials in support of our INF position.

Dailey is working on a contingency plan, should the Soviets walk out. In such a case, US negotiators should brief a special meeting of NATO ministers, and with the confidentiality restriction no longer operative, we should give the Western public a full accounting of the Soviets' stonewalling tactics. Our delegation might be kept in Geneva, and Allied spokesmen should press the case against the Soviet position.

The activation of former US officials could involve reconvening the "Friends of the Alliance" group and might include former Secretaries of State, National Security Advisors, and others for special White House briefings and public affairs taskings.

These, and Ambassador Dailey's follow-on ideas on the same subject, make a lot of sense.

Robert Sims, Dennis Blair, and Robert Linhard concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That Ambassador Dailey's ideas be given positive consideration.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Incoming Memorandum from Ambassador Dailey

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Classified
White House Guidelines, Dept 11, 2006
BY NARA [initials], DATE 8/12/12

February 28, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

SUBJECT: Ongoing INF Project: Issues for Action

We have begun to sketch out the details of the INF game plan that we have been discussing and expect to present a comprehensive strategy shortly. Pending the presentation of that report there are three issues that I want to bring to your immediate attention for action by the IPC:

A. Contingency Plan for a Soviet Walkout.

It seems likely that the Soviets may walk out of the negotiations in Geneva this Spring in an effort to make us appear intransigent. This has been mentioned by Nitze as a real problem. No doubt the Soviets would try to time such an effect to produce maximum public impact. If we are to blunt their effort we must be prepared to respond quickly and credibly. We need to prepare a game plan now, to guide our public statements and our negotiating team's behavior should the Soviets walk out.

We will want to counter immediately with a hard hitting public statement indicating our disappointment and our continued availability for talks. The US negotiators should brief a special meeting of NATO Ministers, perhaps even before their report to the President, to highlight the alliance character of the INF issue.

It would seem that if the Soviets halt negotiations, confidentiality rules would no longer apply. We would owe it to ourselves and to the Western public at large to provide a full public accounting that would explain the Soviets' stonewalling tactics. Furthermore, we should take advantage of a Soviet walkout for a little posturing of our own. We might keep members of our negotiating team in Geneva and have a member of the delegation arrive at the negotiating site once a week for the first month, just to see if the Soviets will show up.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State OADR Date: July 21, 1997
BY LN 8/16/12

B. Highlighting the NATO Character of INF.

All participants at the London meeting agreed that we should emphasize the fact that NATO as an alliance took the INF decision and that any missiles deployed will be an alliance force. We need to translate that general agreement into specific symbols and actions. For example, we should decide to mark the missile and ancillary equipment with NATO, rather than US, military markings. We should appoint host government spokesmen to handle press and public affairs at each INF base. We should set up a NATO INF briefing center in Brussels so that journalists wishing to learn more about this issue can file their stories dateline Brussels rather than dateline USA.

C. Activating Former US Officials.

It is important for us to demonstrate bipartisan domestic support for the INF policy. One effective way to do this is to encourage former US officials to express support for our INF position in their public and private communications. It may be very effective for you to reconvene the "Friends of the Alliance" group that met to discuss the Stevens amendment during the last session of Congress. We might even expand the group to include former Secretaries of State, National Security Advisors and others for a White House briefing on our overall arms reductions policy and INF in particular. Many influential Europeans turn to these former officials for insights on US policy and directions. They will be very impressed if former and current officials can sing from the same libretto.



Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
Interagency Committee for
European Security and Arms Control

cc: NSC/William P. Clark

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

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Blair:

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH:

RICHARD T. BOVERIE *(not seen)*

FROM:

SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT:

Ambassador Dailey's Proposals on Presidential Speech

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Dailey urges that the theme of restoring the "margin of safety" should be matched by the President with the theme of beating our "nuclear swords into plowshares." He suggests that we make the latter theme our peace symbol to be buttressed by the distribution of materials with pictures of the UN statue of a man beating a sword into a plowshare. He feels this act might be particularly effective because the Soviets donated the UN statue, and the East German Government has recently banned the symbol, which had been adopted by the East German peace movement.

In addition to the above, Dailey urges that the President continue to meet regularly with his arms reductions negotiators, show continuing personal interest in this issue, and seek an opportunity to offer an open hand to Andropov again, perhaps with an offer to meet Andropov at the UN session this fall.

The above ideas appear worthy of careful consideration by you, although distribution of pictures of the UN statue might be a bit excessive. The President's American Legion speech and his address to the Evangelicals are steps in the direction suggested by Dailey.

Robert Sims and Dennis Blair concur. *DS*

RECOMMENDATION

That careful consideration be given to Ambassador Dailey's proposals.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3A(2), EO 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2000
BY NARA DATE 8/16/12



Washington, D.C. 20520

March 1, 1983

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Speech on Nuclear Arms Reductions

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The President's address should be short, focused, and designed to capture public imagination and the moral high ground. The theme should be the need to beat "nuclear swords into plowshares." The President should reiterate his conviction that nuclear war is unwinnable; that nuclear imbalance and fear is unacceptable; and that deep reductions of nuclear arsenals offer the solution.

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CONFIDENTIAL
DECL:OADRDECLASSIFIED
BY 11 DATE 8/16/12

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

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Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
Interagency Committee for
European Security and Arms Control

cc: CIA - William Casey, Director

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

February 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: President's Profile on Arms Reductions and
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SECRET/SENSITIVEDept. of State
BY W. P. CLARK 8/16/12
July 21, 1997

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Peter H. Darley, Chairman
Interagency Committee on
Security and Arms Control

NO

CBS EVENING NEWS
with
DAN RATHER
as broadcast over the
CBS TELEVISION NETWORK

Wednesday, February 9, 1983

6:30 - 7:00 PM, EST
7:00 - 7:30 PM, EST

PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Howard Stringer

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RATHER: Rarely has an issue dominated so much time, talk and controversy as nuclear arms control. But of course, it is an issue of paramount importance. In a message to Congress today, President Reagan said he is encouraged by the "serious and businesslike" nature of the current Soviet arms talks, and he appealed to Moscow to match what he called his "good faith" in those negotiations. But the Soviet Union has a deep-seated mistrust of others, especially the United States. Tonight, Don McNeil begins the first of two reports probing the Soviet military mentality. Travelling throughout the Soviet Union, McNeil found that there, war is by design a pervasive obsession.

DON McNEIL: Last month, six American children travelled to Moscow with their parents to express their individual fears about nuclear war to a Soviet peace committee. Psychiatric studies in the United States show some children to be deeply disturbed and have nightmares about an early death.

(Excerpt of Soviet TV news)

Last week, Soviet TV news broadcast a story from the United States about such children.

TRANSLATOR (Soviet TV news show): The atmosphere of war hysteria poisons the brains and souls of young Americans, depriving them of the joy of childhood, killing in them the dreams about the future.

McNEIL: The Soviets say they are victims of a propaganda campaign conducted by Washington, which is training television viewers to accept the inevitability of nuclear war. But the Soviet children who have met the Americans were not very responsive. They are never taught about the possible horrors of a nuclear conflict. The reason: according to Soviet military policy, nuclear missiles are the decisive weapons of the future, not an irrational choice for oblivion, and Soviet children must never be allowed to fear the prospect of war in defense of the motherland. In fact, they are taught the opposite.

Patriotic indoctrination begins early. Kindergarten children are taken to war memorials and lectured about the sacrifices of the second world war. Teen-agers compete fiercely for the honor of guarding these memorials; a guard that is kept throughout the day, everyday, in freezing temperatures. In the schools, there are war museums, collections of the uniforms of heroes, photographs of heroes, and examples of the leftover debris of war. On state-controlled television, which young people watch just as much as in the United States, about 25 percent of program content is related to war.

in the classroom, up to 30 percent of the curriculum is devoted to the study of the great patriotic war. That's what the Russians call World War II. To the study of the Russian Revolutionary war and the military discipline of the Communist Party, vigilance, preparedness, and above all obedience are taught as the greatest virtues. At the Piskaryovskoye Cemetery in Leningrad, small children are taken to see the graves of 500,000 people who died during the siege of the city in World War II. Marina Tkacheva, a school teacher and grandmother has many friends buried here. She, for one, worries about the psychological affect of all the talk about war and death on childrens' minds.

MARINA TKACHEVA: Yes, they are frightened. They are surprised, always surprised, and sometimes frightened.

McNEIL: Ludmila Pobedinskaya is another school teacher, a hero of the battle of Stalingrad and a member of the local peace committee. She firmly believes it's right to teach children to hate their enemies, and that constant talk about war does not frighten them.

LUDMILLA POBEDINSKAYA (through translator): No, no. We teach them very tactfully in conformity with their age and knowledge.

McNEIL: By the time these young men and women have come of age, the educational system and those who run it hope they will have created yet another generation of citizens who will never question the military decisions of the state. It is not their right, the state says, to have anxieties and fears about premature death in war.

Don McNeil, CBS News, Volgograd.

(Next: A Real Spine-Tingler)

(ANNOUNCEMENTS)

ZAGLADIN: USSR WILL DEPLOY MISSILES NEAR U.S.

PM111139 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 9 Mar 83 p 7

[Interview with Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Section, by Sandro Viola in Rome; date not given]

[Text] Rome -- It cannot have been pleasant for the Soviets to attend the congress of the "wrench" [of Italian Communist Party from USSR]. Nevertheless, despite the displeasures of his 5 days in Milan, Vadim Zagladin has not lost his habitual good humor. "I know," he said, smiling, "everyone noticed how Berlinguer called Craxi 'comrade' but not

Andropov. Well, that is nothing serious: After all, the Socialist secretary was referred to only by his surname, Craxi, whereas the CPSU secretary was entitled to both forename and surname, Yuriy Andropov. We can console ourselves...."

But once the lighthearted quips were over, the deputy chief of the Soviet Party's International Section did not conceal his disappointment. His days in Milan unquestionably marked the lowest point in relations between the Italian Communists and the USSR. At least on this point, on which Berlinguer intended to demonstrate the extent of the "wrench" with Moscow, the Italian Communist Party [PCI] congress was clear. Zagladin weighed his words and used all the prudence of the good diplomat, but his verdict was precise enough.

"No, I do not believe that one should speak in terms of a rupture. In any case, as far as we are concerned, the idea of a break does not even occur to us. But the fact remains that increasingly profound divergences are emerging. We cannot have Berlinguer say to us, for instance, that the USSR too was a direct responsibility for the exacerbation of the international situation. On this point, our protest during the conversations that we have had with all top PCI leaders has been most resolute. What were these conversations like? Frank, I assure you. The tone was always friendly but both sides displayed unprecedented frankness...."

In the ritual terminology of intercommunist relations, the expression "unprecedented frankness" does not exist. One must therefore infer that voices must sometimes have been raised in the talks that Zagladin and PRAVDA editor Afanasyev had with top PCI leaders in Milan, during which of the many conversations (the two Kremlin guests spoke with Berlinguer and Pajetta, with Napolitano and Reichlin, with Bufalini and Cossutta) we do not know. But the novelty of an actually "unprecedented" frankness indicates that the dialogue between the PCI and the Soviets is becoming increasingly harsh.

But which specific elements since 1979 (the date of the last Berlinguer-Brezhnev meeting, which still reflected a substantial harmony between the parties) have caused the relations binding the Italian Communists to the USSR to deteriorate so rapidly? How important were Afghanistan and Poland and how important the tactical motivations of a party that needed to "emerge from the ford?"

Zagladin shook his head. "What can I tell you? Certainly, everything has happened incredibly quickly. What I can tell you with absolute certainty is that for our part, there has been not a single gesture or word aimed at a deterioration in relations with the PCI. In any case, you will perhaps recall what I told you 2 years ago following a round of talks at PCI headquarters. I told you that some PCI representatives were setting their sights on a break. As became apparent subsequently, these individuals have continued along the path of the "wrench" without concealing their intentions any longer. And the result is what it is: the phase of greatest conflicts between the PCI and us -- and this at the very time when our relations with the Spanish party are improving and our relations with the French party are getting stronger and stronger...."

Having exhausted his grievances, however, Zagladin discussed at length that which is still shared in the two parties' outlooks.

"One of the reasons why it would be absurd to talk in terms of a break is that when one gets down to specific issues -- for instance, the analysis of the international situation -- our convergence is almost total. Of course, we set aside the Italian Communists' assessment that the USSR's policy has contributed to the deterioration of the international framework. We sharply and resolutely reject this assessment. But apart from that, you too will have seen that there is very broad agreement. As far as Berlinguer is concerned, the only "imperialist" policy is that of the United States, of which we are absolutely convinced. What about the Middle East? And the issue of the Euromissiles, and Central America? Our agreement is complete. So let there be no talk of a break. We deplore the changes that have occurred in relations between the parties but we are sure that we can continue to have fruitful relations with the PCI."

Let us pass on from the Communist congress to a couple of foreign policy topics. How does Zagladin assess the German election results, Vogel's defeat and the return of the moderates to the government in Bonn?

"Of course the Social Democratic defeat displeases us. But it was no surprise, because we saw it taking shape several weeks ago. An artificial but very heavy atmosphere of alarm and danger was created around the German elections, and to this, very explicit external pressures against Vogel and his party were later added. And this favored the conservative forces. Now, however, it remains to be seen what line the new government will take. When Gromyko visited Bonn 2 months ago Kohl gave him ample assurances of the continuity of FRG policy toward the socialist countries. Of course the new government's stance over nuclear disarmament in Europe is not that of the Social Democrats: The approach is much more "American," more rigid. But, I repeat, we must wait a few months before we can form any assessment.

"However, any real backtracking seems to me impossible. Indeed, let us not forget that the Social Democratic opposition will exert a not inconsiderable influence on the new government's options...."

What news from Geneva? Is it true, as is being said, that the Americans promised Kohl himself that they will soon put forward a "new proposal" in the Euromissiles negotiations? There are persistent rumors of an abandonment of the "zero option," of a possible "intermediate solution...."

"You see," Zagladin said, "one must be clear about this. As far as we are concerned, 'intermediate solutions' cannot be valid: If, instead of deploying the envisaged 108 Pershing missiles, the Americans deployed 30 or 40 or however many, it would be the same for the USSR. We would have to take countermeasures. So if there is a desire to negotiate, it is necessary to proceed from the concept of 'reduction,' not an increase, of the missiles strength on both sides. In short, at least for the time being this talk about 'intermediate solutions' seems to us an attempt to conceal the intention of, in any case, attaining the deployment of the new missiles. And if this does ultimately occur, I will repeat what I told you earlier: We will have to deploy missiles equivalent to the Pershing II's, with an equally rapid flight time, in the vicinity of the United States...."

What is the atmosphere like in Moscow? How is the transition from the Brezhnevian paralysis to Yuriy Andropov's "new style" proceeding? And what real substance, what real political innovation, lies behind the "new style" formula?

Zagladin was silent for a moment, as if hesitating, and gathered his ideas: "I would like to reply to you with a very brief remark. What is new in Moscow? Well, Moscow is at work.... No, do not misunderstand me. It is not a matter, as you say, of the end of Brezhnevian immobilism, because there was no such immobilism. If anything, there was a kind of separation between political decisions and their implementation. Major delays, and inertia too, of course. Professional ineptitude on the part of some leaders. Thus it was that the party laid down guidelines for action to resolve the various problems, especially economic problems in recent years, but this action failed to occur. Bear in mind that the first to condemn this gap between principles and their implementation was Brezhnev himself back at the 1979 summer plenum and later at the 26th congress. Indeed, the substance of what we are now trying to implement, to set in motion, is exactly the same as was announced at the congress...."

"Except that now," Vadim Zagladin continued, "we are working harder. Much more scope has been granted to the initiatives of individuals or bodies. But at the same time more rigorous conduct is required. So if I were to give a piece of advice to Western Sovietologists, I would say this: In the post-Brezhnev USSR, there is not, as some of them believe, absolute continuity with the past, but neither is there a chance, a swing, as others among them believe.

In fact there are both. Continuity because, as I have said, the substance of the past months' action was laid down some time ago. And of course there is change. On the other hand, how could it be otherwise? For one thing, there is Andropov's personality, which is very different from Brezhnev's. Then one must bear in mind that in the space of a single year our party lost three of its top leaders: Suslov and Brezhnev died and Kirilenko became seriously ill and had to leave the Politburo. In their place we have Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev. So it is natural for different aspects of behavior and tones to emerge...."

How are the "consultations" with the Chinese proceeding? The second round of Russian-Chinese meetings, begun last fall, are going on in Moscow at the moment. After years of silence and bitter polemics, Beijing and Moscow have started talking to each other again. Perhaps in Europe, where attention is understandably centered on the question of the missiles and the Geneva negotiations, proper importance has not been attached to the fact that the Chinese and the Russians are again negotiating shared problems, finding solutions and rebuilding -- albeit laboriously -- relations that seemed impossible to restore.

Undoubted progress is being made in the dialogue with the Chinese and, as you can imagine, we consider this extremely important. My forecast is that this second round of conversations will continue for a long time. The Chinese are putting forward proposals for a solution to the Kampuchean problem, implying that we are in Kampuchea. The fact is an understanding must be found with the Vietnamese, who are themselves making proposals that seem to us very balanced. We shall see... What we want is to attain a normalization of relations. And of course when you look at the successes of the past year -- the increased trade, the increased sporting and cultural contacts, and so forth -- you get the impression that we are on the right road...."

CBS EVENING NEWS
with
DAN RATHER

as broadcast over the
CBS TELEVISION NETWORK

Thursday, February 10, 1983

6:30 - 7:00 PM, EST
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RATHER: But the Soviet view of military weapons is much different than the American. To the Moscow mind, defense is the absolute first priority. And as Don McNeill tells us in his second of two reports, the Soviet military mentality is instilled practically from birth.

DON McNEILL: These children are on their way to take part in a never ending Soviet ritual: an indoctrination into a military society. They are visiting the statue of Rodina, the motherland, a colossal monument dedicated to the victims of World War II, what the Soviets call the Great Patriotic War. The statue can be seen for miles, soaring to the sky on top of Mamayev Hill, the site of one of the most savage battles in history, during the war when this city was called Stalingrad.

(World War II battle footage)

Thousands of Russians lost their lives taking and losing and retaking this strategic hill. Two million men fought in bitter street battles, battles so fierce that only one tree was left standing in this city when it was all over.

(Choir singing)

Soviet citizens come to the memorial now to stare at the names of the fallen and mourn. The average Russian will automatically say he does not want war, that he is for peace as much as the average American. But the Soviet government uses the Great Patriotic War and its memories, uses it like no other country, as a binding force, holding the people together with fear in support of its policies. The result, by Western standards, is a morbid indulgence in the memory of war and suffering all across the Soviet Union.

And that raises a nagging question, perhaps a paradox. If the Russian people truly do not want war, why are they so fascinated with war? Why is the complete society so militaristic? Why are they so belligerently insecure?

MARSHALL GOLDMAN (Soviet expert): If you live in the Soviet Union long enough, one of the things you do sense is this— this paranoia of the outside world. And indeed there is something that's substantial about this because they have been invaded from the east, they have been invaded from the west, and they've suffered millions of lives in the process.

(Soldiers marching in military parade)

The state then must set itself up, the leadership must set itself up as a defense mechanism to protect the people, to protect the agriculture, to protect the resources.

McNEILL: To accomplish that, the Communists have assembled an enormous military-industrial complex. Fourteen percent of the gross national product goes to the military, compared to just over five percent in the United States. The entire nation is kept in a state of readiness for war at the expense of the long-suffering consumer who all too often finds empty shelves in the stores. Yet no one seriously complains about this military preparedness, and according to one of President Reagan's top advisers on the Soviet Union, the leadership has a reason.

RICHARD PIPES (Soviet expert): Unless they create tension and friction, unless they create this bogymen of America or advances Germany and China as threatening the Soviet Union, they'll find it very difficult to justify that particular power and privilege which they enjoy.

(Child reading monument inscription)

McNEILL: In a closed society such as the Soviet Union, it's difficult to measure the effect of this constant pressure, from the cradle to the grave, to remember the war as if it ended yesterday. There are no public opinion polls here. The system that produced these soldiers is based on fears that are centuries old. What to do about this ancient distrust of the foreigner, this unwillingness to communicate freely, this obsession with military strength is one of the greatest dilemmas of the nuclear age.

Don McNeill, CBS News, Volgograd.

RATHER: And that's the CBS EVENING NEWS for this Thursday. Dan Rather reporting from New York. Thank you for joining us. Good night.

(ANNOUNCEMENTS)

DIANE SAWYER: We'll have the latest news from Israel and Pat Collins talks to the Rolling Stones: tomorrow on the CBS MORNING NEWS.

ANNOUNCER: This is CBS.

Department of State

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EO 12356 NA
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, INF, ML
SUBJECT: QUERY ON U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE, INF

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A QUERY FROM LAURENS HOGENBRINK OF THE INTERCHURCH PEACE COUNCIL (IKV) ASKING CLARIFICATION OF TWO ASPECTS OF THE U. S. POSITION RELATING TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INF. HOGENBRINK NEEDS THE MATERIAL FOR A PAPER HE IS WRITING. AS A MEMBER OF THE MOST PROMINENT ORGANIZATION IN THE DUTCH "PEACE" MOVEMENT, HOGENBRINK MAY NOT BE CONVINCED BY OUR ANSWERS. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO US THAT, WHATEVER HIS FINAL ANALYSIS, HE AT LEAST OUGHT TO GET THE FACTS STRAIGHT.

2. HIS FIRST QUESTION IS DRAWN FROM AN ARTICLE BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERLE ON THE NUCLEAR FREEZE. PERLE SAYS "AMERICA HAS, OVER THE LAST 15 YEARS, REPAIRED, REPLACED AND IMPROVED CERTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, BUT WE HAVE NOT INCREASED THE SIZE OF OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL. IN FACT, IT IS SMALLER BY SEVERAL THOUSAND NUCLEAR WARHEADS THAN IN 1967." THE QUOTE COMES FROM AN EMBASSY USIS TEXT DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 1982.

3. HOGENBRINK CONTRASTS THIS QUOTE WITH A CHART IN FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN'S REPORT TO CONGRESS DATED JANUARY 16, 1981. CHART 4-1 (PAGE 54) OF THAT REPORT, LABELLED "CHANGES IN U.S./USSR STRATEGIC LEVELS," SHOWS U.S. INVENTORY WARHEADS, BASED ON FORCE LOADING ESTIMATES, RISING BETWEEN 1970 AND 1980 AND LEVELING OFF AT AROUND 9,000.

4. WE SUSPECT THE REASON FOR THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT THE CHART REFERS TO STRATEGIC WARHEADS, WHEREAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY PERLE WAS REFERRING TO THE ENTIRE STOCKPILE. HOGENBRINK IS WELL INFORMED ON DEFENSE ISSUES AND RAISES THIS POSSIBILITY HIMSELF. HE IS MORE INTERESTED IN AN EXPLANATION OF WHAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY PERLE (AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS WHO HAVE MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS) MEANT THAN IN RECONCILING THE QUOTE AND THE CHART.

5. HOGENBRINK'S SECOND QUESTION REFERS TO A SPEECH ASSISTANT SECRETARY EURT GAVE ON "A NEW FUTURE IN SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL" AT THE TUTZING DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, MARCH 1-4, 1982. THE TEXT (AGAIN FROM USIS) SAYS SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE WAS "FIRST MADE PUBLICLY IN OCTOBER 1975 AND REPEATED IN VARIOUS FORMS SINCE." HOGENBRINK ASKS WHEN AND WHERE THIS PROPOSAL WAS FIRST MADE, NOTING THAT IT IS NOT IN BREZHNEV'S OCTOBER 6, 1979 SPEECH OR IN USTINOV'S EXPLANATORY ARTICLE IN PRAVDA ON OCTOBER 25.

6. PLEASE ADVISE. DYESS

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RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

~~SECRET~~ STATE 067786

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE/USIA MESSAGE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: INF, SCOM
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE ON PRESS ACCESS TO INF BASING SITES

- ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
- FOLLOWING ON EXCELLENT DISCUSSION DURING FIRST DAY OF RECENT LONDON MEETING ON INF PUBLIC HANDLING, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY HAS EXAMINED CAREFULLY THE QUESTION OF PRESS AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO INF BASING SITES. THE LONDON DISCUSSION WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD AND PLAYED AN INSTRUMENTAL ROLE IN FORMULATION OF THE GUIDANCE WHICH FOLLOWS.
- BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE OF PRESS AND PUBLIC ACCESS, WE WANT TO ENSURE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COORDINATION AMONG WASHINGTON AGENCIES, OUR EMBASSIES AND PERTINENT MILITARY COMMANDS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS ULTIMATELY A HOST NATION PREROGATIVE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO GRANT PRESS OR PUBLIC ACCESS. WE WANT TO ENSURE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS, AND THAT WE ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM FOR KEEPING OTHER INTERESTED ALLIES INFORMED AS NECESSARY OF ARRANGEMENTS U.S. MAY WORK OUT BILATERALLY IN ONE OF THE BASING COUNTRIES.
- IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE QUESTION OF PRESS AND

PUBLIC ACCESS MUST BE HANDLED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO ESTABLISH OVERALL GUIDELINES AND UNIFORM PROCEDURES TO GOVERN U.S. RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR SITE VISITS. WE WILL APPLY THEM BOTH IN MAKING DECISIONS ON REQUESTS FOR VISITS TO INF-RELATED FACILITIES IN THE U.S., AND IN MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO HOST GOVERNMENTS ON ACCESS TO EUROPEAN BASING SITES. WE WILL APPROACH THE ISSUE SELECTIVELY, BUT WE WILL SEEK TO APPLY THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA, BASED LARGELY ON LONDON DISCUSSION:

- EMBASSIES AND MILITARY COMMANDS SHOULD NOTIFY WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY WHEN THEY RECEIVE ANY REQUEST FOR PRESS OR PUBLIC ACCESS, OR AN INDICATION OF HOST GOVERNMENT PLANS TO PERMIT SUCH ACCESS.
- ACCESS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED.
- HOST COUNTRY SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN PROVIDING CONTROLLED ACCESS TO BASING SITES, AS IT IS ESSENTIAL TO EMPHASIZE HOST COUNTRY AND NATO ROLE IN THE INF ISSUE.
- EMBASSIES SHOULD REPORT TO WASHINGTON AND DISCUSS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT ANY MEDIA REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO U.S. BASING SITES.
- EMBASSIES SHOULD ENCOURAGE HOST GOVERNMENTS TO INFORM OTHER BASING COUNTRIES OF ANY ACCESS PLANS. IF TIMING PERMITS, SUITABLE MECHANISM FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD BE THE INFORMAL INF PUBLIC HANDLING GROUP WHICH HAS MET ON FRINGES OF SCG.
- WHEREVER POSSIBLE, GRANTING OF ACCESS TO A BASE SHOULD BE PART OF A PACKAGE APPROACH. WE SHOULD ENSURE WITH HOST COUNTRY THAT TOUR OF BASE SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY BRIEFINGS BY QUALIFIED HOST COUNTRY AND (AS NECESSARY) U.S. PERSONNEL ON THE THREAT WHICH THE ALLIANCE FACES, ALLIANCE RESPONSES AND ALLIANCE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES. GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE AND DELICACY OF THE ISSUE, WE WOULD BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE FOR SENIOR SUBSTANTIVE OFFICIALS OF HOST GOVERNMENTS--SUCH AS SCG OR HLG REPS--TO PARTICIPATE ALONG WITH APPROPRIATE US CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. BEST DIVISION OF LABOR MIGHT BE FOR HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL TO TAKE LEAD IN PROVIDING THE TOUR, FOR U.S. OR PREFERABLY HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE THREAT BRIEFING AND FOR SUBSTANTIVELY QUALIFIED U.S. PERSONNEL TO JOIN WITH HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL (E.G. SCG REP) IN DISCUSSING ALLIANCE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES. IN ANY EVENT, HOST COUNTRY NATIONALS SHOULD FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN ALL BRIEFINGS.
- VISIT PROGRAM SHOULD BE CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO AVOID OVEREMPHASIS ON HARDWARE, TO TRY TO ENSURE BALANCED REPORTING WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ALLIANCE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES, AND TO AVOID PROVIDING INFORMATION (E.G. ON DEPLOYMENT DETAILS) WHICH WOULD SIMPLY PROVIDE GRIST FOR THE MILL OF THOSE WHO ARE IRREVOCABLY OPPOSED TO ALLIANCE INF POLICY.
- 5. EMBASSY LONDON SHOULD BRIEF HMG IN DETAIL CONCERNING OUR VIEWS ON PRESS AND PUBLIC ACCESS, AND SHOULD URGE HMG TO APPLY THESE CRITERIA TO THE PROPOSED GREENHAM COMMON PRESS VISIT. PLEASE KEEP WASHINGTON CLOSELY INFORMED OF PROGRESS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. WE WOULD HOPE TO ESTABLISH IN THIS MANNER EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR BILATERAL US/UK COORDINATION ON THIS AND ANY SUBSEQUENT VISIT REQUESTS. EMBASSIES BONN, ROME, BRUSSELS AND THE HAGUE SHOULD -- PROVIDED YOU AGREE

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THAT THIS IS ADVISABLE -- BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENTS ON OUR VIEWS CONCERNING PRESS AND PUBLIC ACCESS ON PROPOSED GREENHAM COMMON VISIT, WHICH WILL LIKELY INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR NATIONAL PRESS. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THEM OF CONSULTATIONS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE UK AMONG US EMBASSY, US MILITARY AND HMG REPRESENTATIVES. AT YOUR DISCRETION, EMBASSIES BONN AND ROME -- AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH APPROPRIATE US MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES -- SHOULD ASK HOST GOVERNMENTS WHETHER THEY MIGHT WISH TO ESTABLISH SIMILAR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH US. IN OUR VIEW, FRG AND ITALIAN DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES WOULD MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH PROCEDURES TIMELY.

6. IF PRESS ACCESS IS TO BE GRANTED, WE RECOGNIZE THAT SELECTION OF JOURNALISTS WOULD ALSO BE HOST COUNTRY PREROGATIVE. WHEN SUCH ACCESS IS BEING CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE RESPECTIVE U.S. EMBASSY SHOULD POINT OUT TO HOST GOVERNMENT THAT ALLIANCE INTERESTS MAY BE SERVED BEST IF JOURNALISTS ARE CAREFULLY SELECTED -- FOR EXAMPLE, BY INCLUDING ONLY REPUTABLE AND RESPONSIBLE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES FROM NATO COUNTRIES. HERE, TOO, WASHINGTON WOULD APPRECIATE AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AS POSSIBLE.

7. WHEN ABOVE CRITERIA CAN BE APPLIED, WE BELIEVE SELECTIVE GRANTING OF ACCESS CAN INDEED SERVE ALLIANCE INTERESTS. WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EACH COUNTRY IS VERY DIFFERENT, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCESS DECISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES -- WITH SOME REGARD FOR PRECEDENTIAL EFFECTS ON OTHER ALLIES. WE ARE AMENABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO PLANS BEING DEVELOPED BY BRITISH MOO FOR A CAREFULLY CONTROLLED PRESS VISIT TO GREENHAM COMMON, AND WE WILL WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE BRITISH IN DEVELOPING THE DETAILS. WE VIEW THIS AS A TEST CASE WHICH WILL PROVIDE USEFUL EXPERIENCE IN EVALUATING HOW WE HANDLE THE ACCESS ISSUE AS THIS YEAR PROCEEDS.

8. ON PUBLIC ACCESS, WE BELIEVE THE SAME PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE APPLIED, AGAIN ON A VERY SELECTIVE BASIS. WE ARE AWARE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SPECIAL PUBLIC DAYS HAVE BEEN A TRADITION AT SOME BASES -- SUCH AS THE ANNUAL GREENHAM COMMON SUMMER AIR SHOW TO RAISE MONEY FOR CHARITY. TO DROP SUCH EVENTS OR TO MAKE THEM MORE RESTRICTIVE COULD UNDERMINE ALLIANCE INTERESTS. SIMILAR TO CIRCUMSTANCES WITH PRESS ACCESS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AS POSSIBLE TO WASHINGTON OF EVENTS INVOLVING PUBLIC ACCESS TO BASING SITES.

9. WE ALSO INTEND TO COORDINATE OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON ACCESS IN EUROPE WITH OUR DECISIONS ON ACCESS TO INF-RELATED SITES AND EVENTS IN THE U.S. DECISIONS WILL BE MADE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS UNDER A COMMON POLICY. THIS PROCESS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH CONTRACTORS, AS WELL AS WITH DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS. WE WILL PROVIDE APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE TO SELECT U.S. AND EUROPEAN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES SEEKING UNCLASSIFIED DATA ON INF PROGRAMS, BUT WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE INVITING LARGE NUMBERS OF U.S. OR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS TO EVENTS SUCH AS TEST FIRINGS OF GLCMS AND PIIS. WE WOULD PREFER THAT MOST EUROPEAN MEDIA COMMENTARY ON INF ORIGINATE IN EUROPE. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED OF REQUESTS BY MEDIA IN YOUR COUNTRIES TO MAKE INF-RELATED VISITS TO THE U.S.

10. ONCE PRESS ACCESS HAS BEEN GRANTED AT ANY SITE, WE WILL ALSO WISH TO REVIEW CLOSELY WITH POSTS AND HOST

NATION AUTHORITIES THE QUESTION OF ANY FURTHER ACCESS. WE BELIEVE RESULTS OF FIRST EVENT IN ANY COUNTRY (E.G. THE GREENHAM COMMON VISIT) SHOULD BE WEIGHED BEFORE ANY COMMITMENT IS MADE ON FURTHER ACCESS. EVEN WHERE ACCESS IS CLEARLY IN OUR INTEREST IN ONE PARTICULAR BASING COUNTRY, WE MUST REMAIN SENSITIVE TO PRESSURES WHICH GRANTING OF FREQUENT ACCESS IN THAT COUNTRY COULD PLACE ON OTHER HOST NATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THEREFORE, WHEN EMBASSIES AND COMMANDS RECEIVE REQUESTS FOR FURTHER ACCESS, THEY SHOULD HOLD THEM WITHOUT GIVING ANY COMMITMENT PENDING FURTHER COORDINATION WITH WASHINGTON. WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS FAR EASIER TO ADOPT A MORE LIBERAL POLICY ON ACCESS THAN TO RESTRICT ACCESS WHERE IT HAD BEEN LIBERALLY GRANTED EARLIER. SHULTZ

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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S/S J... US Public
March 10, 1983
(have we one?)

TO: The Secretary
FROM: PA - John Hughes
SUBJECT: General Public Highly Selective Regarding Countries
U.S. Should Defend; "Elite" Public Even More Selective

SDV
RPM
GUK

During the past four years, the general American public has become more willing to commit U.S. troops to help defend this country's closest allies. But Americans remain opposed to committing troops in defense of less-valued countries.

The "elite" public is even more selective. Such individuals are much more in favor of committing U.S. troops in defense of U.S. allies (Western Europe, Japan, South Korea) and certain other highly valued countries (Israel, Saudi Arabia). But, they are even more opposed than the general public to using U.S. troops to counter a Soviet attack against Poland or China or to assist the El Salvador government against "leftist rebels."

These findings come from two late-1982 Gallup polls, commissioned by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, that were released a few days ago. One poll surveyed the general public. The other surveyed 341 leaders in "government, international business, labor, academia, mass media, religious institutions, private foreign policy organizations, and special interest groups."

Public Willing to Help Defend Major Allies,
But Not Other Countries

Compared to 1978, when Gallup previously polled for the Chicago Council, the new poll of the general public found sizably increased support for "using U.S. troops" to help defend: Western Europe against a Soviet attack (from 54% in 1978 to 65% in 1982); Japan against a Soviet attack (from 42% to 51%); and Israel against an invasion by "Arab forces" (from 22% to 30%).

In contrast, there has been hardly any change since 1978 in the proportion--roughly one-fifth--who are willing to use American troops to help defend South Korea against a North Korean attack or Taiwan against an attack by the PRC.

In the most recent polls, respondents were also asked about a number of other situations involving use of force, including a Soviet invasion of China, an Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia, and an imminent guerrilla victory in El Salvador. In each case, less than one-third of the general public favored using U.S. troops to counter the threat.

3)

"Elite" Respondents Distinguish More Sharply than General Public Regarding Where to Commit U.S. Troops

Compared to the general public, an even larger majority of "elite" respondents favored committing U.S. troops in defense of Western Europe (92%) and Japan (78%) against a Soviet attack. But far fewer favored committing U.S. troops to counter military threats against China (6%) or the El Salvador government (10%).

In November-December, 1982, Gallup interviewed samples of the "elite" public and general public with the same questions:

"There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops..." (percent "oppose" and "don't know," which were not distinguished by the interviewers, are omitted):

	IN FAVOR OF "USING U.S. TROOPS"		
	Leaders	General Public	
	Nov. 1982	Nov. 1982	Nov. 1978
"If Soviet troops invaded Western Europe	92%	65%	54%
"If Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union	78	51	42
"If Iran invaded Saudi Arabia	54	25	Not Asked
"If North Korea invaded South Korea	50	22	21
"If Arab forces invaded Israel	47	30	22
"If the Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the U.S.	36	39	36
"If the People's Republic of China invaded Taiwan	15	18	20
"If the government of El Salvador were about to be defeated by leftist rebels	10	20	Not Asked
"If the Soviet Union invaded Poland	6	31	Not Asked
"If the Soviet Union invaded the People's Republic of China	6	21	Not Asked
"If South Africa invaded Angola	5	8	Not Asked

Public Support for Defending European Allies
Down Slightly from 1980 High Point

Other polls have shown that public support for committing U.S. troops abroad rose substantially in the late 1970's and reached a high point in early 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At that time, several polls found that 70 percent of the public were in favor of U.S. troops helping to defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack. The Chicago Council's latest poll indicates that support for committing U.S. troops abroad, at least in defense of our European allies, has diminished only slightly since 1980.

cin
Drafted: PA/OAP:ARichman:mdr
3/9/83 632-2257



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TO: EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUBGROUP
FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*
SUBJECT: Report on Meeting of March 10

At the March 10 meeting the following actions were discussed and agreed:

1. INF Speakers Packet: USIA reported that the packet was being pouched on March 10 and copies were being distributed to other agencies on the same date. Half of the packets, however, lack a copy of the NATO Force Comparison Study. State/PA and DOD assistance would be appreciated in obtaining more copies of the NATO study ASAP. USIA also reported that it was sending a covering cable to all posts explaining the material in the pouch. It would be appreciated if copies of this cable were distributed at the next meeting, 3/17.

State/EUR reported that it would provide the SCG representatives at the 3/18 meeting with copies of the speakers packet. It was suggested that DOD do likewise at the coming HLG meeting.

2. Press Access to INF Basing Sites: The cable received final interagency clearance and was sent to diplomatic and military posts on 3/11. Copies will be distributed at the 3/17 meeting.

3. New GIST on INF: This is being given to State/PA for editing this week and should be ready on 3/25.

4. USIA's Qs and As: We are expediting this. A status report will be given at next meeting.

5. Size of Arsenal: A proposed one-page handout will be presented for consideration at the 3/17 meeting.

6. Sample Speech: This received final interagency clearance on 3/14 and was sent to posts on 3/15. Copies will be circulated at 3/17 meeting.

7. ITV Program on INF: Interviews were completed on 3/14. A wrap-up will be given at next meeting.

8. White Paper: State/EUR will distribute this at the next meeting.

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9. Speakers and Opportunities in Europe: State/EUR, coordinating with USIA, has made several suggestions to Under Secretary Eagleburger for public appearances during his next trip to Europe (late April). Deputy Secretary Dam has agreed to do three events with the European press before his departure for Europe on 3/18: a brief TV interview on 3/17 with journalists from each of the countries to be visited, a print backgrounder with journalists from these and other European countries on 3/17, and a personality profile interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 3/18. Assistant Secretary Burt will address the European Institute on Security matters in Luxembourg on May 18-20. As was done last time, he will also provide an on-the-record briefing after the 3/18 SCG briefing.

USIA promised to send to members of the group a written mark-up of events scheduled in Europe with U.S. speakers and those being worked on now. This would be appreciated ASAP.

10. Briefing Europeans in U.S.: USIA indicated that it will be making proposals on how we might provide more and better briefings for resident and visiting European media representatives. Sven Kraemer, NSC Staff, asked that USIA also provide a list of briefings provided already by the Foreign Press Center and a statement of FPC needs in order that we may make more effective use of the facility. State reported that Assistant Secretary Burt gave an on-the-record briefing to resident Norwegian, Danish and Icelandic journalists on 3/8 and that Palmer and Dobbins of EUR and Dean of PM gave substantive briefings to the group of prominent Belgian journalists visiting here the same week.

11. Zagladin Interview: Reporting on the Zagladin interview in Il Giornale will be provided at the next meeting.

12. Briefing Teams: NSC/Kraemer reported that a "murder board" met on 3/9 to help put the briefing materials into shape. It was noted that we have been asked to be ready to provide briefings in three general areas: overall arms control, INF, and an integrated security briefing. The preparations for the first two are well underway; no decision has been made on whether to organize the third. Target groups will be Members of Congress, staffers, and prominent private citizens. These briefings are for use in the U.S. only.

13. Projects Completed: Dennis Blair, NSC staff, asked if we could provide a mark-up of projects completed and those underway. A draft will be distributed at 3/17 meeting. Since this is not likely to be comprehensive, we will need information on other projects.

14. Calendar: An updated calendar is attached.

15. INF Principles: Ed Hamilton, JCS, asked whether we could include as one of our publicly-stated principles in the INF negotiations the requirement that an INF agreement cannot be permitted to have an adverse impact on our conventional defenses, particularly DCA. He said that JCS would put this in writing for comments by others.

16. INF Press Packet: State/EUR will provide at next meeting our views on a packet for Stateside use.

Next Meeting: The next meeting will be held at 10:00 a.m., Thursday, March 17, EUR Conference Room, 6226.

DRAFTED: EUR/P:SESteiner
3/15/83:x20850
wang 1085A

Steve Skinner's Mtg - 3/10/83 NA
141154

- Speaker's Packets are ready
Being punched today
(GO to FRG / 40 to U.K.)

- More copies of Force Comparison
Paper

- Access to INF briefing sites

~~Get Witwa the message
on speaking~~

~~Get Phil info on acid rain~~

Zag

Zagladin in Italian interview
rejected interim solution

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BY hw NARA DATE 9/5/17

Benny will circulate a status report on speakers scheduled and foreign news center tending

Steve will add a list of the materials in prep.

Give Steve a copy of WPC calendar for incorporation

~~Criteria for~~ Add the fifth criteria

- Put in NPG

Draft article from London

Case Helman Saturday a.m. breakfast
O.L.P. - No exposure of Andropov
proposal - dissection
"In sorrow" at the end of the
London speech

Feb. 14th - Detailed refutation at
SCG - Maybe better than Nixon
VP speech.

Andropov Proposal
More missiles than when
the talks began

P.P. Key to the Geneva negotiations
Hot hitting at Sov enough

Pick - Soviet unequal status
- Turn Europe into second-class
citizen
- "What kind of people are they"

Geny - simple message that
Sovs trying to change the
balance

N
X

Get the right phrases
"race for peace - - -"
"more missiles - - -"

The steadfastness theme
Once Sovs know we are
firm and united, Sovs will move

Prosperity:

Reck: Proof of creativity on
all fronts after the war - political
unity, cultural diversity,
prosperity & security

Are Arapuca pub

Reck - Japan has done some
pulling in the Far East

-- Polling questions

- Need to get the division between what U.S. can do and what least countries can do.

- Whether our govt has a say R.P. - Effect?

- Keep it in mind as a keeper
—— 1 —— 1 ——

* Administration speakers

* Investigative story on what goes on in Geneva - during in the seminal period

* Cony Anderson guidance

Another see speech

- Possible acceleration of the 572 withdrawal

Quay's point - Nothing we have ~~at~~
talked about gets to the point
of countering the 1983 mass
demonstrations / civil disobedience.

R.D.

Can announce an accelerated
withdrawal

R.B.'s "405" ideas "

- Sec State / Gromyko meeting
- Weinberger / Ustinov meeting
- Upgrading the test ban
can make a package

R.D. Question is one or two
bang or to put them
out one at a time

Jerry - Need the German
speakers to get out to
other areas.

* - hate February - 2 weeks before^{AS}
the election - around 25-Feb.

Questions

- Special forum meeting on
arms control?

* Organize some demos against
the Soviet ambassador - ?

* R.P. to ramp up suggestions for
the speech

D-day - use it if possible

Peter

* Talk to Lane Kirkland
and Jerry Brown

14118 46

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12	SPEAKERS RESOURCE BOOK			
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	MBFR	5		
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BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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BY AL NARA DATE 8/16/12

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