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14127

SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL:
THE SEARCH FOR A STABLE PEACE

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In the initial round, which extended into early 1982, the United States suggested that the talks focus on the systems over which the two sides were most concerned -- longer-range INF missiles -- and formally tabled its proposal to eliminate this entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. In February, the United States delegation tabled a draft treaty embodying this proposal.

The Soviet Union responded with two proposals of its own. The first was for a moratorium on so-called "medium-range" nuclear missiles and aircraft in Europe. The second was a plan whereby NATO and the USSR would each reduce to 300 "medium-range" missiles and aircraft in or "intended for use" in Europe.

The Soviet moratorium proposal was deemed unacceptable for a number of reasons discussed earlier. It would codify the Soviet advantage in INF systems; it would apply only to Europe (leaving the Soviet Union free to continue deployment of SS-20s in the eastern USSR); and a moratorium would bring to a halt the U.S. modernization program ... thus giving the Soviets little incentive to pursue genuine reductions.

As the negotiations progressed, several primary areas of disagreement between the two sides became clear.

First, on the central issue of the negotiations -- longer-range INF missiles. The United States has proposed to eliminate this entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, suggests an agreement that would prevent the deployment of any U.S. missiles but allow the USSR to deploy a large force of modern SS-20s in Europe; and an unlimited number of these systems in the eastern USSR.

The parties differ in their basic perception of the balance. The Soviets claim a balance exists, using what appears to be a manipulative selection of data. The Soviets include independent British and French systems and some U.S. aircraft not physically located in Europe. At the same time, they ignore many of their missiles in the eastern USSR which can strike NATO targets and do not count literally thousands of their own nuclear-capable aircraft with characteristics similar to those of the U.S. aircraft they do include.

There is no balance. The Soviets presently deploy over 1200 warheads on longer-range INF missiles; the U.S. deploys none. In fact, the Soviet Union holds an advantage in every category of INF systems (the Force Comparisons Paper published by NATO in May, 1982 provides precise figures).

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The question of geographic scope also divides the sides. The United States argue for global limitations. The Soviets propose limits only on systems in or "intended for use" in Europe, leaving unconstrained their systems in the eastern USSR. However, the long range, mobility and transportability of the SS-20 would render a regional limitation virtually meaningless -- SS-20s in the east could readily be redeployed to areas from which they could strike all of Europe.

Aircraft are a further point of contention. The Soviets seek limits on aircraft, though they excluded from their count literally thousands of nuclear-capable aircraft on their own side. They also ignore the conventional roles of U.S. dual-capable aircraft, thus proposing an agreement that would constrain the Alliance's conventional deterrent capabilities.

The parties are also divided over the question of third country forces. The Soviets seek to "take into account" the independent forces of the United Kingdom and France. This is not only procedurally inappropriate, but substantively without merit. In the first place, the INF talks are bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Britain and France are sovereign countries, each with the right to determine its own national interests. Neither Britain nor France is disposed to authorize the U.S. to negotiate limits on its independent forces. Both have made eminently clear they do not agree to the direct or indirect inclusion of their strategic forces in a negotiation to which they are not parties.

This is a fundamental political point; the Soviet position is wrong on the substance as well, since British and French forces are different in characteristics and purpose from the U.S. and Soviet land-based missiles which are the subject of the INF negotiations. Given the massive Soviet nuclear forces, moreover, there is no substantive basis for compensating them for British and French systems. Were one to include in the INF equation the forces of Britain and France, the Soviet Union would continue to hold superiority. Even were one to discount all Soviet longer-range INF missiles from the equation, the Soviet Union would have more than sufficient nuclear forces vis-a-vis Britain and France.

Finally, the Soviet demand for the inclusion of British and French forces violates the principle of equality. The USSR is seeking to have forces equal to those of the U.S., Britain and France combined, while maintaining that its missiles in the Far East should not be limited. In effect, the Soviets are asking for the right not only to have more nuclear forces than the U.S., but to have nuclear forces equal to those of all other powers combined. Surely, the Soviets must have realized that this was unacceptable.

In December, 1982, Secretary General Andropov disclosed a new Soviet proposal, elements of which surfaced during the previous round of the INF talks. He announced that the Soviet Union would agree to a ceiling on its LRINF missiles in Europe equal to the number of British and French ballistic missiles. This new Soviet proposal incorporates the same shortcomings as the original Soviet position and does not provide an adequate basis for agreement.

In particular, the current version of the Soviet proposal would still preserve the Soviet monopoly over the U.S. in LRINF missiles. There would be a large force of Soviet SS-20s in the European USSR (and an unlimited number in the eastern USSR), but no comparable U.S. missiles deployed. Moreover, the current Soviet proposal makes more explicit than ever before the unacceptable Soviet demand that the forces of third countries be included in bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

The current Soviet proposal would allow the Soviet Union to maintain, at a minimum, more than twice the number of SS-20's it deployed in late 1979, when NATO took the dual-track decision. Assuming that all SS-20's to be reduced in the European USSR were destroyed, and not merely withdrawn to the eastern USSR, and that the Soviets added no SS-20's in the eastern USSR (two extremely generous assumptions, neither of which is borne out by any Soviet statement to date), the Soviet Union would retain a number of SS-20's roughly equal to the number it deployed at the time the INF negotiations opened.


The United States is and has always been prepared to negotiate in good faith and is and has always been ready to consider any serious Soviet offer. What is necessary for progress in the negotiations is for the Soviet Union to make a proposal which begins to address the legitimate security concerns that prompted the December 1979 decision and which is consistent with the basic principles for arms control set forth in that decision. The United States already has such an offer on the table, and the U.S. and its Allies remain convinced that the elimination of the class of U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles is the best and most equitable outcome for both sides.

LRINF MISSILES -- JANUARY 1983

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Warheads</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Warheads</u>
Pershing II	0	0	SS-20	333	999
GLCM	0	0	SS-4	---	---
			SS-5	--	--
Total	0	0		@ 600	@ 1250

SS-20 GROWTH: 1977 - 1982

END YEAR TOTALS -- DEPLOYED SS-20'S (EACH WITH THREE WARHEADS)



THE NATURE OF MBFRIntroduction

The East/West negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) represent the longest continual multilateral arms control negotiation in history. Five years in gestation, the MBFR talks have been going on inconclusively for almost another ten. They were called into existence, at Western initiative, to deal with the security problems caused by the greatest concentration of military power ever assembled in peacetime. Together, the ground forces of East and West in Central Europe total some 1.75 million men. On the one hand, the sheer maintenance of such forces is a charge on Eastern and Western societies which it is in everyone's interest to reduce. On the other hand, the risks of instability and potential conflict posed by the Eastern manpower superiority of approximately 170,000 ground force personnel is a constant threat to the security of Europe.

Precisely because they have lasted so long, and have involved so many participants, the MBFR talks offer a unique opportunity to assess the dynamics of a complex East-West arms control negotiating effort involving fundamental questions of peace and stability in Europe.

Despite an imaginative Western offer made in the summer of 1982 in an effort to break the logjam, there is still no sign of movement by the Soviets on the central issues. But even if the prospects for significant progress have been blocked, the U.S. and its Allies have not given up their commitment to this major arms control enterprise.

The negotiations currently have as their agreed goal the reduction of each side's military manpower in a "zone of reductions" which includes the FRG, and the Benelux countries on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Eastern side, to parity at a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined. In addition, the West is seeking "Associated Measures" which would apply to a more extensive geographical area and which are intended to give each side confidence that the other will abide by the agreed manpower limits and is not planning a surprise act of aggression.

Beyond the highly technical issues which have been associated with the MBFR negotiations from their inception is the larger question of whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept in concrete terms an effectively verifiable agreement guaranteeing equality to both sides: despite Soviet acceptance

of the Western principle of parity, the Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted agreement on the data relating to the size of its forces, in an apparant effort to avoid necessary reductions to parity

Geographical Asymmetry and Force Disparity

Central to the question of the conventional force balance in Europe is the geographical asymmetry of the two Alliances, an asymmetry which works to the clear advantage of the Warsaw Pact over NATO, as a glance at the map makes clear.

The Western border of the Soviet Union is only some 600/700 kilometers from the Eastern border of the Federal Republic of Germany. Between the U.S. and the Allies it is pledged to defend lies the Atlantic Ocean. In the event of severe tension or actual conflict, the Soviet Union, drawing on its vast manpower reserves, could quickly move these forces forward over an excellent network of railways and paved roads; in order to reinforce NATO, the U.S. would have to transport troops by sea and air from bases over 5000 kilometers away -- and in doing so would have to overcome all the severe logistical problems which such a movement implies.

Furthermore, the geographical compactness of Western Europe makes defense in depth difficult and undesirable: a quarter of the industrial production of West Germany and some 30 percent of its population is less than 100 kilometers from the demarcation line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The threatening paradox for NATO, therefore, is that while the geographical shallowness of Western Europe (and the Alliance's commitment to preserve the territorial integrity of its members) makes a policy of forward defense imperative, the distance separating Europe from the United States makes such a policy substantially more difficult; in calculating the forces it needs to deploy forward for its defense, NATO has little margin for error.

The Soviet Union and its allies have sought to wring maximum military advantage from the geographical situation. This endeavor is most graphically demonstrated by the superiority of approximately three-to-one which they maintain in main battle tanks -- a weapon perfectly suited to exploit through blitzkrieg tactics Western Europe's lack of strategic depth and the difficulties involved in rapid reinforcement from the U.S.

Backing up this tank force is an impressive array of other ground force weapons such as Multi-barrel rocket launchers, artillery, armored personnel carriers, air defence systems, etc., as well as an increasingly offense-oriented air force. During the ten years of MBFR negotiations, the Soviets have consistently sought to strengthen forces whose posture -- Warsaw Pact protestations to the contrary -- can only be seen

as essentially offensive in nature. (The three-to-one tank ratio, for instance, corresponds to what most experts believe is required for successful attack, and goes well beyond any requirement for defense.)

Alliance Dissimilarities and the MBFR Negotiations

NATO draws its strength from the fact that it is an association of free nations, joined together in the belief that by sharing common risks they can obtain common security benefits. The implication of this for the MBFR negotiations is obvious: the Western position is one of consensus, arrived at in NATO headquarters in Brussels and transmitted to the negotiating team in Vienna. For a decade, the process of developing and amending the Alliance position in the Vienna talks has been one of the most successful exercises in the history of coalition diplomacy. All positions taken in Vienna have received multilateral approval in Brussels.

Finally, NATO is a purely defensive alliance -- not merely in declared policy, but in its military posture and perhaps most importantly, in the minds of its people and their leaders. What NATO seeks to obtain at Vienna is greater security for itself from aggression -- and by extension, a lessening of the risk of war for all the people of Europe. Any impartial examination of the various Western proposals made in MBFR over the past ten years will note, for instance, the consistent element of a search for parity; only the most brazen Eastern propaganda could seek to assert that the West has ever sought in MBFR to change the European conventional balance to give it superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

In contrast to NATO, the Warsaw Pact is an instrument of Soviet security policy based on the principle that Soviet security requires the subordination of the nations of Eastern Europe in an Alliance under total Soviet control and direction; membership is compulsory, as was demonstrated explicitly in Hungary in 1956 and implicitly in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1981-82.

The Eastern negotiating position in Vienna is thus a direct reflection of the Soviet Union's perception of its national interests. Although the Warsaw Pact is nominally a defensive alliance, it has sought consistently in MBFR, either directly through its draft treaties, or indirectly through the falsification of its manpower figures, to maintain the supremacy of its conventional forces in Europe.

Western Objectives in MBFR

The geographical, military and political disparities between the two alliances outlined above have set fairly precise requirements for the kind of MBFR agreement which NATO can accept without diminishing its conventional defensive ability vis-a-vis the east -- and, therefore, lowering the

threshold at which nuclear weapons would have to be used to prevent a Warsaw Pact victory in the event of conflict.

These requirements, which run like a thread through the series of Western MBFR proposals made over the years, may be set forth in outline as follows:

-- Parity. The reinforcement problem and Western Europe's lack of strategic depth make even parity a risky proposition for NATO, although it has never sought anything more. The present force disparity is a significant threat to NATO security, and potentially lowers the nuclear threshold. It is this force disparity which the MBFR negotiations are intended to address; any outcome of the negotiations which perpetuated that disparity would be unacceptable.

-- Reductions. Given the present disparity in forces, parity can only be obtained through asymmetrical reductions, that is with the East reducing more than the West. But the West seeks parity at a lower level and would make proportionate reductions of its own. The West believes that not merely equal, but lower force levels will enhance European security in general. In addition, lower force levels will permit a reduction of military expenditures -- an important consideration for democratic nations sensitive to the needs of their peoples.

-- Associated Measures. Clearly, no arms control agreement can be effective unless it has adequate provisions to ensure that it is complied with, and that this compliance can be verified. In addition, the geographical factors mentioned above make it imperative that any MBFR treaty include provisions which will prevent the launching of a surprise attack, and that these provisions apply to part, at least, of the Soviet Union's territory.

-- Collectivity. The concept of collective responsibility for collective security is basic to NATO; It is a longstanding Soviet goal to undermine this principle, which the Soviet Union correctly understands to be the source of NATO's cohesion and strength. For this reason, the West has consistently resisted Soviet demands for national subceilings on force levels. MBFR is an Alliance to Alliance negotiation, and the obligations for Central Europe should be Alliance to Alliance obligations.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The Genesis of MBFR

MBFR represented a creative effort by NATO to address the threat posed by Eastern conventional superiority in a manner more conducive to security and stability in Europe than an escalating an arms race. NATO's attempted solution in the form of MBFR essentially began in 1967 with the adoption of the Harmel Report on "The Future Tasks of the Alliance"

The Harmel Report was set forth the principle that relations with the Soviet Union should be based on one hand on a strong defense and deterrent capability, and on the other, on readiness for dialogue and detente. As a concrete manifestation of these principles, the report examined the prospect for force reductions in Central Europe. It concluded that as long as adequate reductions in Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe could be obtained, the Alliance could safely cut its own conventional strength there by some 15 to 20 percent without diminishing its own security.

At the conclusion of their June, 1968 ministerial in Reykjavik the NATO countries -- with the exception of France -- expressed their interest in "a process leading to mutual force reductions" in Europe. "Balanced and mutual force reductions," the declaration stated, "can contribute significantly to the lessening of tension and to further reducing the danger of war."

Two months later, 32 Warsaw Pact divisions rolled into Czechoslovakia to reimpose Soviet-style ideological orthodoxy on that country. Five Soviet divisions stayed permanently.

This Soviet action relegated the idea of conventional force negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to the deep freeze, at least temporarily. Paradoxically, however, by increasing the number of Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe from 27 to 31 -- an addition of 100,000 Soviet soldiers -- the invasion of Czechoslovakia rendered parity under an MBFR agreement which would establish force parity both harder to achieve -- even greater Soviet reductions would be required -- and all the more desirable.

In addition, the the U.S. Administration believed that the most constructive answer to calls in Congress for unilateral U.S. force reductions in Europe -- exemplified by the "Mansfield Amendment" -- was to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union which would permit U.S. withdrawals but match them with greater Soviet withdrawals, thus enhancing, rather than diminishing, U.S. and NATO security.

As a result of the above considerations, at its ministerial in Rome on May 27, 1970, the Alliance renewed the offer made in Reykjavik to the Warsaw Pact.

In May, 1972, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev dropped the Soviet insistence that the "reduction of foreign troops" could only be considered in the context of the Soviet-proposed European Security Conference and invited the West to begin exploratory negotiations. That month, on the signing of the Interim Agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation, Brezhnev and President Nixon endorsed "the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe through reciprocal reduction of forces." Almost simultaneously on May 31 the NATO ministerial renewed its call for MBFR negotiations.

On January 31, 1973, representatives of 12 members of the two alliances met in a preparatory conference to determine the Terms of Reference for the negotiations. On October 30 of that year, the first negotiating round of the MBFR talks began.

The Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference inevitably represented a compromise between Western and Eastern views on a considerable number of issues. For instance, although the status of Hungary was left undecided, it was agreed that the zone of reductions would cover the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the East. It was further agreed that no naval or amphibious forces would be covered in the negotiations, nor would border guards and security forces. It was also agreed that the talks would cover "Associated Measures", although it left these undefined.

One omission from the terms of reference was to have serious consequences for the future: the absence of a declaration on existing force levels, or of a mechanism for establishing these figures. At a later date the Soviet Union would use this absence of agreed data in an effort which continues to this day to in effect circumvent any MBFR agreement before it is even signed.

The Course of the Negotiations

In the almost ten year existence of MBFR, both East and West have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however, beneath the welter of technical detail, a strong continuity of negotiating objectives can easily be discerned.

The West has consistently sought parity of forces at a reduced level. Indeed, for the West achievement of such parity is the raison d'être of the negotiations; achievement of it would bring increased stability to Europe, to the ultimate benefit of all.

The East, with equal consistence, has resisted acceptance of such parity. Initially, it did so explicitly; later, it did so implicitly by accepting parity as a goal for the talks while refusing to admit to the size of its forces -- and consequently to the size of reductions which would actually establish that parity.

On November 8, 1973, the East tabled a draft agreement calling for overall reductions of about 17 percent for ground and air forces of both sides. The reductions were to take place in three consecutive phases: 20,000 men were to be withdrawn from each side in 1975, followed by reductions of 5 percent of residual forces in 1976 and 10 percent in 1975. Forces non-indigenous to the area of reductions would be withdrawn within national boundaries.

The equal reductions called for in the Eastern draft would, of course, have perpetuated the force disparity which already existed in the East's favor. In addition, the provision regarding non-indigenous forces was clearly aimed at taking full advantage of the geographical factors which favor the Soviet Union in the European force equation: Soviet forces would merely be withdrawn behind the Soviet frontier; U.S. (and Canadian) forces would have to be withdrawn to the other side of the Atlantic.

On November 22, 1973, the West tabled its proposal. In sharp contrast to the Eastern proposal, this draft called for asymmetrical reductions in two phases down to a common level of 700,000 ground force personnel. The first phase would be limited to U.S. and Soviet personnel, and involve 29,00 of the former v. 68,000 of the latter, along with withdrawal of 1,700 Soviet tanks. The Soviet withdrawal was envisioned as the withdrawal of a complete Soviet Tank Army, representing the most threatening offensive force in the area.

By 1975 it was clear that there was no chance of the East accepting the Western proposal as it stood; following the December, 1975 NATO ministerial, the West sought to give new impetus to the MBFR talks by offering in exchange for Eastern agreement to the basic principle of its treaty (two-phase asymmetrical reductions to parity) to withdraw 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing I missiles, together with 1,000 warheads. This offer was known as "Option 3", as it was the third of three negotiating options originally considered by NATO before the MBFR talks began.

The East failed to agree to the "Option 3" package, however, which was subsequently superseded by NATO's decision in 1979 to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces if the Soviet Union failed to agree to reverse its own modernization program in this field. With the 1979 decision the explicit linkage between conventional and nuclear force levels in Europe which the West had made in its negotiating approach in Option 3 was broken.

The East followed its cold shoulder to Option 3 by tabling a new proposal in February 1976. This time, withdrawals were expressed solely in percentage terms; forces would be withdrawn in regiments and brigades; and -- picking up on the Option 3 idea of including intermediate range nuclear forces, 54 nuclear capable aircraft and short range ballistic missile systems would be withdrawn on each side. While the latter offer might at first glance appear equitable, in reality it involved the equation of systems of very different capabilities: equating the F-4 Phantom, with its 8/9000 km range with the 4/5000 km range SU-7, and the U.S. Pershing I (range 750 km) with the Soviet Scud B (160/300 km).

In June, 1976, the East made a major change in its tactics, while yielding nothing of substance. Hitherto, it had tabled no figures for the size of its forces. Now, it declared that it had 987,300 ground and air force personnel, 805,000 of whom were ground personnel; these figures suggested that the East had a numerical superiority of no more than about 14,000.

From this point on, the Soviet Union's argument shifted to acceptance for the first time of the principle of "balanced" reductions coupled with the contention that given the alleged rough equality of forces, to be "balanced" the reductions of the two sides had to be numerically very similar. It was thus hardly surprising that the East followed up its data figures in 1978 with a new proposal calling for equal ceilings of 700,000 for ground forces arrived at through substantially equal reductions: 105,000 from the Warsaw Pact and 91,000. In addition, the East sought the withdrawal of 1,000 Western nuclear warheads and of 54 F-4 nuclear capable aircraft and 36 Pershing I launchers.

The West's quarrel with the new Eastern position was not, of course, with the proposed common ceiling of 700,000, which had been the centerpiece of its own initial draft treaty of 1973; rather, it was with the Eastern contention that the current level of forces on the two sides was approximately equal, and that the common ceilings would thus be reached by approximately equal reductions of the kind the Soviets had proposed.

In fact, Western intelligence was fully confident that the Eastern ground forces were larger by some 157,000 men than the tabled Eastern figures indicated. For the West, the conclusion was inescapable: the East sought to make falsified data a substitute for a difficult-to-justify refusal to accept the principle of parity of forces as the goal of an MBFR agreement; if the West would accept an agreement based on its data, the East would be able to take the credit for agreeing to parity, while in fact preserving intact the very military disparity which the MBFR talks -- in Western eyes, at least -- were intended to address. This goal remained the centerpiece of the Soviets latest draft treaty, presented in February, 1982, which contained some cosmetic changes but otherwise repeated familiar themes.

The Soviet Union has, however, refused to co-operate in a substantial way with Western efforts to identify the source of the manpower discrepancy in Eastern forces. Their negotiators allege that Western probing is solely for the purpose of extracting secret information about Eastern forces which the Soviet General Staff considers essential to national security. Comparable information on Western forces is public knowledge.

Related to the data problem is that of associate measures. The East tabled several such measures in 1979, but has declined to discuss specifics until the West softens its

position on data. Such failure to address subjects essential to a meaningful agreement are indicative of Eastern intransigence to achieving an equitable and verifiable outcome.

It remains the position of the West that the "data discrepancy" between the Warsaw pact figures and its own intelligence estimates must be resolved before an MBFR treaty can be signed; as the East continues to reassert the validity of its data, and to maintain that any slight discrepancy which might exist can be resolved subsequent to signing a treaty, the "data dispute" has since 1976 been the central feature of the existing deadlock in the talks.

Despite lack of indications that the Soviet Union is willing to move away from its falsified data and accept parity as a genuine goal, the West remains committed to making what progress it can towards an MBFR agreement. In June of 1982, President Reagan, speaking to the German parliament, affirmed that an MBFR agreement remained an important objective of his Administration, which the U.S. would work with its Allies to pursue. A month later, the West tabled a new draft treaty which represented a major effort to address legitimate Eastern security concerns while preserving the Western requirement for parity and adequate Associated Measures.

THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY

The draft treaty tabled by the West in 1982 in many respect was a significant departure from previous Western approaches, although the fundamental principle -- asymmetrical reductions to reach equal ceilings of 700,000 ground force personnel and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined, remained unchanged.

The major innovation of the Western draft is that it binds all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the reductions which will be required to reach the ceiling. This provision seeks to address the frequently-expressed Soviet concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed by reductions in the force of the West German army, while avoiding acceptance of any national sub-ceilings of a kind which would undermine the principle of collective Alliance security.

Consistent with previous Western approaches, the treaty calls for Associated Measures intended to give each side confidence in the other's compliance. These measures are pre-notification of out-of-garrison activity by one or more division formations; permitting observers at such activities; prenotification of major movements on ground forces into the area of reductions; an annual quota of inspections; permanent entry and exit points, with observers; exchange of information on forces to be withdrawn, and continuing periodic exchanges of information on residual forces; and non-interference with national technical means of verification

In addition, an annex to the treaty provides for exceptions to the common ceiling to permit annual readiness exercises.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PROGRESS

The West does not expect the East to accept its draft treaty on an unchanged, as-is basis. The treaty is, however, a major initiative intended to enable MBFR talks to move forward, and that it is up to the East to respond in a constructive fashion. In particular, it is up to the East to resolve the data discrepancy, and to show willingness to accept adequate Associated Measures of the kind outlined in the treaty.

The East has criticized various aspects of the draft treaty both privately in Vienna, and publicly. On the other hand, it has so far shown willingness to discuss it in some detail rather than reject it outright. The East also continues to recommend its own draft of 1982 as the basis for negotiation -- despite the fact that the West has made clear the unacceptability to it of that text.

The MBFR talks came into being because the West believed that the only satisfactory solution to the problem posed by Eastern conventional force superiority was a negotiated agreement leading to force parity.

The West remains as committed to that goal -- and as convinced that such an agreement would ultimately increase the security of all the peoples of Europe -- as it was almost thirteen years ago in Reykjavik.

[Drafted:THOchiltree
Wang 5689A]

IV-D. Confidence Building Measures

In addition to agreements on the reduction and limitation of armed forces, the US and its allies have pursued measures designed to enhance mutual understanding of military activities, lessen the dangers of misperception in crisis, and thus reduce the risk of conflicts. Such measures, which have acquired the generic title of "confidence building measures", range from provisions for exchange of data through inspections, notifications of exercises and other military activities, and invitations for observers. Proposals have been developed relating to both conventional and nuclear forces, for application on both bilateral and multilateral bases.

This section will have to develop:

--The theoretical objectives of CBMs: warning time, mutual knowledge, etc.

--The path to the Helsinki Final Act CBMs;

--MBFR associated measures

--CBMS in the START and INF context

--CBMs in the further development of CSCE and the CDE

What follows is a brief essay on the 1958 surprise attack conference, which is an essential piece of the history of CBMs and an illustration of the difficulties of the subject.

The Geneva Surprise Attack Conference brought together experts from five NATO and five Warsaw Pact countries for six weeks in late 1958. The Conference was marked by conflicting approaches: the Western side, whose approach was purely technical, presented a series of technical papers outlining methods of monitoring all means of surprise attack; while the Soviet side made political proposals linking the surprise-attack problem with the general question of disarmament. The two sides were unable to agree even on an agenda, and on December 18, 1958, the Conference recessed and was never reconvened. However, the proposals made by each side and the reaction of the other side to them may be helpful in putting present-day confidence building measures under consideration in historical perspective.

As a result of correspondence exchanged between the governments of the US and USSR

arrangements were made for experts from the US, UK, France, Canada and Italy to meet with experts from the USSR, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and *ALBANIA* in Geneva, beginning November 10, 1958, to discuss the problem of surprise attacks.

The surprise attack problem had been prominently identified in disarmament discussions in 1955, the year the Soviets proposed control posts ("at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways, and in aerodromes..."), and the year Eisenhower made his proposals for "Open Skies" (aerial inspection of US-USSR) and a US-USSR exchange of "Military Blueprints". The idea of technical discussions on surprise attacks came up in 1956 and 1957 at Disarmament Negotiations in London and in 1957 in the UN. The successful conclusion on

August 20, 1958 of the Conference of Experts on the detection of nuclear tests gave added impetus to the Surprise Attack Conference idea.

Conflicting Agendas

In the US-Soviet correspondence preceding the Conference, no precise understanding of the scope of the Conference was reached; furthermore, no agreed agenda was ever adopted by the Conference.

The US believed the primary purpose of the meeting should be to examine the methods and objects of control, with a view to preparing a technical report for consideration by governments. The composition of the Western delegation, predominately scientific and military experts, with few political advisors, reflected this approach. On the other hand, the Soviet view was that the Conference should not be confined to technical discussions but should deal with predetermined and largely political proposals, including measures for disarmament.

The divergence of view which separated both sides of the table was evident in the agendas submitted and never reconciled. The Western agenda or plan of work, stated in brief, was as follows: 1) Identification of the objects of control (the instruments of surprise attack); 2) means and techniques of observation and inspection; 3) the application of inspection and observation techniques to the problem of surprise attack and the evaluation of the results of such applications; 4) general technical characteristics of reliable systems; and 4) report to Governments..

In contrast to the Western plan of work the Eastern delegations proposed the following agenda: 1) Exchange of opinions on practical steps that can be taken now with a view to preventing the danger of a surprise attack and on partial disarmament measures to be carried out in conjunction with these steps; 2) consideration of the tasks of ground control posts and aerial photography; and 3) preparation of the experts' report to the governments of the countries represented at this conference, containing conclusions and recommendations on measures for prevention of a surprise attack in conjunction with certain measures regarding disarmament.

Position and Work of the Western Experts

The West wanted to discuss new weapons technology and the growing capability for quick, more destructive initial strikes, with due attention to long-range missiles and aircraft. Their aim was to avoid political issues by considering technical arrangements for observation and inspection to forewarn against surprise attack. Their work plan was consistent with the increasing stress the US had given to the technical problems of inspection and control in order to develop more negotiable proposals.

In the course of the conference, the West submitted a series of technical papers including:

- An analytical listing of instruments of surprise attack (e.g., missiles, aircraft, ground forces, submarines, etc.), with technical data on each;
- A survey of techniques for the observation and inspection of the instruments of surprise attack:

- Aerial and satellite techniques
- Photographic
- Radar
- Electronic
- Infra-Red

-- Ground Techniques

- Observers and technological aids

for observers:

- optical devices
- photographic devices
- radar devices
- infra-red devices

- Illustrative outlines of observation and inspection for certain instruments of surprise attack

- Long-Range aircraft
- Ballistic missiles
- Ground forces

(Since this is the Western paper most relevant to CBMs, the outline is attached as TAB A).

Because of Eastern rejection of the West's plan of work and refusal to put forward any technical data on propositions, these explanatory documents were never developed into finished technical submissions.

The Soviet Reaction and Position

The Soviets found in the Western approach these obstacles:

1) They insisted the problem of surprise attack was primarily that of military policies of specific governments, and the Western emphasis on technical data about weapons and detection

methods was designed to evade "political realities."

2) They insisted that discussion of the surprise attack problem should not be limited to the technical aspects of observation and inspection (which they maintained would only serve to gather military intelligence), but should clearly embrace certain measures for arms limitations in the field of European security.

3) They refused to discuss the surprise attack implications of long-range missiles and aircraft, and said they would only discuss missiles when agreement had been reached on the elimination of nuclear weapons or on simultaneous discussion of this subject.

For their part, Soviet bloc delegates advanced various proposals previously offered in somewhat similar form, including:

- Ban on flights of nuclear-armed aircraft over states and open seas;
- Ban on nuclear weapons and rockets in Germany;
- One-third reduction of foreign forces in Europe;
- Establishment of ground control posts at railway junctions, major ports, and on main roads (note: airfields, included in earlier proposals, omitted) (28 posts on Bloc territory, 54 on Allied side, with 6 each in USSR (Western border regions) and US (Eastern seaboard));
- Zone of aerial photography 800 kilometers each side of NATO/Warsaw Pact line, including (for first time) Turkey, Greece, Iran;
- Zone of aerial photography to include Eastern Siberia, Western half of the US, and all of Japan and Okinawa, contingent on acceptance of European inspection zone.

There were no immediate Western reactions to the Soviet proposals at that conference. However, at later Senate hearings, Ambassador Foster noted the US had "succeeded in bringing the Soviets to present for the first time an outline of the specific type of air and ground inspection they envisage, the shortcomings of which will be easily recognized by informed peoples. (Outline of their system is at TAB B.) It is quite obvious that what they proposed was a system of self-inspection, inadequate at best, with very limited numbers of personnel assigned to the ground control posts, with very definite limitations on the way that they could move out, and with an unrealistic assignment of responsibilities."

The Soviet proposals and position led the West to conclude the sides could not move on to a useful discussion without widening the scope of the conference well beyond the area they were authorized and prepared to treat. When the conference adjourned December 18, 1958, the Soviets wanted to reconvene January 5, 1959. The US would not set a date at that time, but said it would "stand ready to resume discussions that show any signs of achieving progress."

Introduction

On April 22, 1915, the German army attacked French lines near Ypres with chlorine gas in an attempt to break through and end the prevailing stalemate on the Western Front.

The military objective was not achieved, but the example set by this first use of chemical weapons was followed on both sides: to the victims at Ypres were added well over a million more chemical weapons casualties before World War I ended -- dead men, blind men, men barely able to breathe.

The memory of the dead, and the haunting presence of the disabled survivors, inspired a profound revulsion in the years following the conflict: a widespread feeling that the use of chemical weapons had not merely one of the war's many horrors, but should be considered a special falling away from the values of civilization. If any good was to come from the war, many felt, it must include the prohibition of chemical warfare for all time.

Out of this sentiment grew the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous materials, liquids or devices," as well as "bacteriological methods of warfare." It is the oldest arms control agreement still in force.

Although it unequivocally prohibits the use of both chemical and biological weapons, the Geneva Protocol places no limits on their production and stockpiling. Moreover, it had no provisions for verification and enforcement, an omission which has proven to have tragic consequences. The Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 closed a part of loophole: its signatories undertook "never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" biological warfare agents, including toxins (chemicals produced biologically), or the means of delivering such agents. It too lacked verification provisions, however.

The signature of the Soviet Union is on both these solemn and vital international undertakings, (as is that of the United States), but today, the Soviets are flagrantly violating both of them through the use of chemical and toxin weapons on defenseless people in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.

There has long been consensus in the world community that a treaty is needed which would ban the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Soviet violation of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention should make abundantly clear to all who sincerely desire such a ban that promises are not enough, and that to be of any value, such a

treaty must have strong provisions enabling compliance to be carefully verified.

Attaining such a verifiable prohibition is a major objective of the United States, and one which it is actively pursuing.

Soviet Chemical Weapons Use

Special Report No. 104 of the Secretary of State, "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan", which was issued in November of 1982, fully sets forth the details of Soviet violation of the Geneva Protocol and Biological Weapons Convention through use of chemical and toxin weapons on the defenseless people of those countries. Suffice it to say here that a variety of evidence is described in the Special Report, including blood, urine and tissue samples of victims, accounts by the latter of chemical attacks on their villages, and even two captured Soviet gas masks from Afghanistan contaminated with chemical weapons.

This evidence permits the following conclusions:

-- Soviet and Afghan forces continue their use of chemical and toxin weapons against the Mujahedin resistance fighters who are struggling against the Soviet occupation of their country.

-- Vietnamese and Laotian troops under direct Soviet supervision continued to use lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and toxins against the H'Mong resistance in Laos at least through June 1982; Vietnamese troops continued at least through that date to use chemical weapons on the Kampuchean resistance forces.

-- Continued analysis of prior data and newly acquired information about Soviet mycotoxin research and development, chemical warfare training in Vietnam, the presence of Soviet chemical warfare advisers in Laos and Vietnam, and the presence of the same unusual trichothecene toxins in samples collected from all three countries, make clear the nature and extent of Soviet complicity in CW use in Southeast Asia.

Arms Control Implications of Soviet Chemical Weapons Use

The suffering of Soviet chemical weapons victims in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia -- the peeling, blistered skin, the blood flowing from the noses, the burning of the throat, the suffocation -- recalls all too well the horrors of World War I which inspired in the 1925 Geneva protocol. That toxin weapons are an important element in the infliction of this suffering underlines the wisdom of the world community in banning production of such weapons through the Biological Weapons Convention.

On the other hand, the fact that the Soviet Union is able to inflict such suffering in flagrant disregard for these treaties indicates that something additional is needed -- and makes clear what that "something" is.

A fundamental defect of both the Geneva protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, valuable though they are, is that they contain no provisions to determine lack of compliance which would enable to world community to take some appropriate action.

In the case of the latter treaty, the United States strongly supports an initiative in the United Nations to convene a conference of the parties to the treaty with a view to strengthening its compliance provisions. The General Assembly vote of 124 to 15 with one abstention in favor of such a conference made clear the repugnance which virtually the entire world community feels towards biological weapons. The pressure exerted by the Soviets in the UN in their unsuccessful attempt to use intimidation to defeat the resolution made it equally clear that this repugnance is not shared by them.

In regard to the prohibition against use of chemical weapons contained in the Geneva protocol, clearly one of the most effective way of making sure it was obeyed would be to negotiate a ban on chemical weapons production and stockpiling: if a country has no chemical weapons and cannot produce them, it clearly cannot use them.

But such a prohibition must -- as Soviet violation of the Biological Weapons Convention so clearly shows -- have strong provisions for verifying that each signatory is living up to the ban. Since chemical weapons production can be carried on in factories outwardly identical to those engaged in production of other chemicals, and since the existing chemical weapons stocks which would be destroyed under such a treaty could be hidden almost anywhere, this verification must include on-site inspections.

Soviet propoganda has consistently sought to portray the Soviet Union as desirous of a chemical weapons ban, and to paint U.S. insistence of verification as a means whereby we seek to hinder achievement of such a prohibition.

In fact, our insistence is a reflection of our determination to get the only kind of treaty prohibiting chemical weapons which is worth having: one which its signatories must obey rather than one which would merely serve as a smokescreen behind which nations could continue to build up their chemical weapons arsenals.

U.S. opposition to Chemical warfare is as old as such warfare itself: In May, 1915, a month after the first use of poison gas at Ypres, President Wilson proposed the "discontinuance" of such use. The offer was rejected by both sides. In 1921, chemical warfare was on the agenda of the Washington Arms conference called by the United States, and it was at American initiative that a prohibition on "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices" was included in the abortive Washington treaty. This language was repeated in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, with the inclusion of language prohibiting bacteriological warfare. The Protocol itself grew out of a U.S. suggestion that the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms address itself to the task of banning chemical weapons. Unfortunately, lacking as it did any provisions for enforcement, the Protocol did not offer adequate guarantees for against the threat of illicit chemical weapons use by others, as use of poison gas in Ethiopia in the 1930's, and in China in the 1930's and early 1940's, confirmed. Because of this defect, the U.S. did not ratify the protocol until 1975.

What did prevent use by the Nazis of their large stocks of nerve gas was instead deterrence: the United States and Great Britain made clear that they would not use chemical weapons first, but would retaliate on military objectives if Germany employed them. In 1943, President Roosevelt stated that the United States would regard a chemical attack upon any of its Allies as an attack upon itself. Faced with this resolute policy of deterrence, the Nazis left their poison gas stocks unused, even as their empire crumbled.

Deterrence is, of course, fundamental to NATO's whole defence strategy, and it is hardly surprising that the United States maintains a limited chemical weapons retaliatory capability for that purpose. At the same time, the U.S. has always made clear its preference for replacing deterrence with an effective chemical weapons ban.

In 1969, the United States unilaterally renounced first use of chemical weapons, and use under any circumstances of biological weapons, and the U.S. played a leading role in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament -- forerunner of the Committee on Disarmament -- in negotiating the Biological Weapons convention.

In addition, from 1976 to 1980, the U.S. engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to find common ground for progress towards a chemical weapons treaty. The effort proved fruitless for a reason regularly encountered in arms control endeavours involving the Soviet Union: Soviet unwillingness to accept the kind of verification

and compliance measures which would enable a chemical weapons convention to be an effective instrument of international law, and not simply a propaganda ploy.

U.S. efforts at banning chemical weapons are currently focused in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. For the past three years, the United States has been active in the CD's Chemical Weapons Working Group, helping elaborate the elements which an adequate Chemical Weapons prohibition would need to include. On February 4, 1983, Vice President Bush announced a major new U.S. initiative in this field: the U.S. would support a new negotiating mandate for the Working Group, and would present a paper outlining its "detailed views" on requirements for a Chemical Weapons ban. These "detailed views" are not a draft treaty, but specific, practical ideas intended to focus the Working Group's efforts on resolving the most important obstacles to a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons, and prevent it from being distracted by Soviet propaganda proposals intended to obscure the fact that Soviet obduracy on verification and compliance have always been the main such obstacle.

It is not possible here to describe at length the "detailed views" paper; suffice it to say that its main elements include:

- systematic on-site inspection;
- declaration of chemical weapons production facilities and provisions for their destruction over a ten-year period;
- declaration of facilities for permitted production of chemicals which pose a particular risk of being misused for chemical weapons production;
- a multilateral complaint and verification mechanism for ensuring compliance with the treaty, with the right to inspect possible violations.

Prospects for the Future

As Vice President Bush made clear in his February 4, 1983 address to the CD, the United States is fully committed to working towards an acceptable prohibition of chemical weapons production, stockpiling and transfer.

But the lessons of the past and present alike, from Ethiopia in the 1930's to Afghanistan and Southeast Asia today, make clear that such a prohibition must include means of verifying compliance and investigating suspected cases of non-compliance. Such investigation must include on-site inspection; so-called "national technical means" such as satellite photography simply cannot do the job, when any warehouse could contain clandestine stocks of chemical weapons.

Our legitimate concern for our security and that of our Allies, and our desire for a meaningful treaty, will not allow us to accept anything less.

The U.S. will continue to work conscientiously in the CD for an effective chemical weapons ban. We believe our "detailed views" will help keep efforts concentrated where they belong -- on the issue of verification and compliance.

As mentioned above, U.S. involvement in chemical weapons arms control is as old as the weapons themselves. We are ready to negotiate in good faith a treaty which takes account of the legitimate interests of all.

It is now up to the Soviet Union to decide whether it wishes to work constructively to ban chemical weapons, or whether it will continue in the CD to tout proposals which if accepted would lead to a toothless treaty which as a practical matter would ban nothing.

It is up to the Soviet Union to determine whether it will accept effective arms control in place of its massive chemical weapons offensive potential in Europe.

Above all, it is up to the Soviet Union to cease using chemical weapons upon defenseless people, a morally repugnant practice which raises the most legitimate of doubts concerning the Soviets' willingness to keep their own word.

If the Soviet Union is wants a treaty which is verifiable and enforcable, a treaty which in reality as well as on paper finally puts back in the bottle for all time the evil genie released at the Ypres Salient almost 70 years ago, it will find no more willing negotiating partner than the United States.

V F. Nuclear Testing

Restraint in nuclear testing has long been seen as an important symbolic and substantive step toward controlling the nuclear arms competition. Since the 1950's, successive U.S. Administrations have actively pursued the objective of negotiating limitations on nuclear testing that

- Make a genuine and meaningful contribution to arms control and the reduction of international tensions;
- Can be monitored and verified with a high degree of confidence; and
- Are consistent with the requirements of maintaining an adequate national defense through nuclear deterrence.

Over the years, efforts to ban or restrain nuclear testing have been pursued in a variety of channels, including various UN bodies and tripartite negotiations involving the U.S., Soviet Union, and United Kingdom. From the very first, an important but stubborn issue to be resolved has centered around how such specific testing limitations and prohibitions can be guaranteed.

The U.S. has maintained that simple declaratory pledges not to test without adequate guarantees of compliance would be dangerously insufficient, offering a sense of progress and security that was at best illusory. This position was borne out by the experience of the three-year nuclear testing moratorium of 1958-1961. This suspension of testing, during which U.S. laboratory work was restricted and redirected, was abruptly and dramatically ended by the Soviet Union with the longest series of nuclear tests ever conducted, 40 explosions in two months. These had clearly been in clandestine preparation for many previous months during the supposed moratorium. This led then President John F. Kennedy to note:

"We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations and long test series never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."

Thus, as with other important arms control measures, adequate verification represents an essential prerequisite for any meaningful testing agreement. The necessity of having positive assurance of detecting and identifying all nuclear tests, particularly those conducted underground whose effects may be difficult to distinguish from natural seismic phenomena, presents special problems. These have been magnified by the long-standing reluctance of the Soviet government to allow broader efforts at monitoring arms control compliance within the Soviet Union itself.

In August of 1963 a Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was signed in Moscow by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet and British Foreign Ministers. It was an important step forward. The parties to the LTBT agreed "not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, underwater, or outer space (environments in which verification was more readily possible) or underground in a manner which would cause the spread of radioactive debris. Since 1963, most of the countries of the world, with the important exceptions of France and the Peoples Republic of China, have signed the treaty.

An important follow-on to the LTBT came with the negotiation of the U.S.-Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) in the 1970's. The former established a nuclear "threshold" through the agreement of both parties not to conduct underground nuclear weapons tests (others being prohibited by the LTBT) with planned yields exceeding 150 kilotons.

The setting of this threshold helped to limit the possibilities of testing new or existing weapons with especially high nuclear yields. This restraint on the development of new high-yield weaponry was a significant step towards the longer-term goal of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and has particular significance for the strategic balance on which deterrence depends because of the relationship between the reliability and explosive power of such new warheads and the development of a dangerously destabilizing first-strike capability.

Concurrent with the negotiation of the TTBT, the U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to apply through the PNET a similar threshold of 150 kilotons and various aggregate limits on multiple tests of their underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The PNET is a necessary supplement of the TTBT, for there is no essential distinction between the technology of a nuclear explosive device which can be used as a weapon and that used for explosions for peaceful purposes.

The TTBT and PNET have not yet been submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification. The U.S. has nevertheless limited all its testing to below this threshold and will continue to do so. There is, however, continuing uncertainty regarding Soviet observance of the 150 kiloton limit. Several times since 1976, Soviet nuclear tests have produced monitoring estimates whose "central value" of the yield were in excess of the threshold -- some by large margins (the Soviet response to formal U.S. queries about these tests has been that they were continuing to observe the 150 kiloton limit). Thus because of the current level of uncertainty in U.S. estimates of Soviet tests, there is an unwelcome degree of ambiguity as to whether in fact the Soviet Union is limiting its tests to 150 kilotons.

The inadequacy of existing verification arrangements is underscored by the fact that during this same period, the Soviet Union itself inquired about the yields of several U.S. tests, all of which had been below the threshold.

The supplementary verification procedures measures of the current Protocols to the TTBT/PNET would not significantly improve our ability to verify the 150 kt limit. Even with these measures, the uncertainty in our estimates of Soviet test yields would be at a factor of two [This means that about 95 percent of the time the seismic signals from a Soviet 150 kt test would result in a US estimate of the yield ranging from 75 kt to about 300 kt]. In the context of evidence of Soviet violations of existing agreements on chemical and biological weapons, this great a range of uncertainty in monitoring Soviet observance of the TTBT/PNET is unacceptable.

During 1977 through 1980, the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union also met periodically to negotiate a possible CTB, but failed to reach agreement -- again in considerable part because of significant differences over effective verification.

During the past decade, the Soviet Union pursued a massive buildup of nuclear weaponry that was accompanied by a rate of nuclear testing significantly exceeding that of the U.S. As noted previously, this unrestrained expansion of power, giving the Soviet Union a superior position in several important indicators of strategic power, has threatened to destabilize the strategic balance.

Achievement of a ban on all nuclear weapons tests remains the long-term goal of the U.S. Government -- as it has been since the mid-1950's. In the present situation, however, an immediate Comprehensive Test Ban by itself would do nothing to counter these destabilizing trends in the strategic balance. It would actually inhibit the U.S. from taking those steps necessary to maintain the credibility of its deterrent forces.

As part of its broader security and arms control strategy to restore the strategic balance and to restrain nuclear arms competition, the U.S. is seeking through the START and INF negotiations significant reductions in the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons. As part of this approach, the U.S. is continuing to explore ways in which verification of nuclear test limitations can be improved. A major element in this effort is the active U.S. participation in the discussions on compliance and monitoring within the 40 Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

At the same time, the President has decided that the U.S. should seek verification improvements which would significantly enhance our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the existing TTBT and PNET. Accordingly, the U.S. has proposed an additional Protocol to the TTBT allowing for the direct measurement by personnel of the inspecting party of all US and Soviet nuclear weapons tests with planned yields above a certain level well below the existing 150 kiloton threshold. While some uncertainty would remain even under this measure, its implementation would significantly reduce the scope in which any potential violation might be cloaked.

To ensure that the 150 kiloton threshold cannot be circumvented by weapons testing in the guise of civil nuclear explosions, the U.S. is also seeking corresponding improvements in the verification of the PNET as well. In addition, the U.S. will seek Soviet agreement to the establishment of an institutional mechanism to address TTBT compliance issues by extending the scope of the Joint Consultative Commission set up under the PNET to cover TTBT issues as well.

The U.S. is convinced that through specific and attainable improvements in the verification of limitations on nuclear testing, realistic progress toward overall arms control objectives is possible.

VI. Annexes (to be provided)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, INF, UK
SUBJECT: INF: THE MOD ORGANIZES
REF: LONDON 2815 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: IN RECENT DAYS, NEW DEFENSE SECRETARY HESELTINE HAS REORGANIZED THE MOD BUREAUCRACY TO COPE MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF CRUISE DEPLOYMENTS. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARA 5. END SUMMARY
3. HENCEFORWARD, HESELTINE HIMSELF WILL CHAIR A CABINET COMMITTEE WHICH WILL MEET WEEKLY AND EXERCISE OVERALL CONTROL OF BOTH THE SUBSTANCE AND THE TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN. THIS COMMITTEE WILL BE BACKSTOPPED BY A COMMITTEE OF OFFICIALS FROM RELEVANT MINISTRIES, CHAIRED BY ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MOREY STEWART.
4. FINALLY, A NEW DIVISION HAS BEEN SET UP WITHIN THE MOD DEFENSE SECRETARIAT, HEADED BY JOHN LEDLIE. LEDLIE HAS BEEN GIVEN A STAFF OF SEVEN AND THE EXPLICIT MANDATE TO "SELL" THE HMG INF POSITION. HE WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE.
5. EMBASSY COMMENT: ONE OF THE FIRST ISSUES THE NEW STRUCTURE WILL DEAL WITH IS THAT OF PRESS ACCESS WE WILL HAVE OUR FIRST MEETING WITH LEDLIE ON FEBRUARY 24 AND WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE BY THEN ON QUESTIONS RAISED REFTEL. STREATOR
BT

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NLRR M443/5 #11128
BY lw NARA DATE 9/5/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

22 FEB 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: EUROPEAN SECURITY SUBGROUP
FROM: EUR/P - Steven Steiner *SES*
SUBJECT: Report on Third Meeting, February 18

The following actions were reviewed at the February 18 meeting:

1. Calendar: We will update the calendar again this week. The question of whether to include in the calendar events connected with deployment was discussed. PM and OSD agreed to look into the advisability and to give us their views.
2. Press Access to Deployment Sites: In response to the briefing provided on the 2/15-16 London meeting on INF public handling, it was asked whether we might suggest that any host nation tours of INF sites include only host nation journalists. There was a split view on this, with some feeling that any such tour--once approved-- should be open to selected journalists from all NATO countries--including the U.S. All agreed that we will need to coordinate carefully with host countries concerning the selection process. Guidance on press access to INF bases is being drafted for approval this week. (EUR action)
3. Speakers: The lists of USG and private sector American speakers have been completed and approved and were distributed at the 2/18 meeting. USIA will match speakers to speaking opportunities in Europe and keep this subgroup closely informed.
4. IDD: It was suggested that the IDD be redistributed to our posts as guidance which is still pertinent on INF arms control. Consensus at the meeting, however, was that only the communique should be redistributed.
5. Speakers Packet: PM reported that the packet is pending only PM and OSD clearances. It was agreed that the clearance process would be completed ASAP and the packet submitted to USIA for distribution by COB 2/22. USIA indicated that it will need five days to print the packets. USIA agreed to take care of all distribution in the U.S. and overseas. It was agreed that about 300 copies would be supplied for pertinent military installations in Europe.

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NARA DATE *8/16/12*

6. Private Sector Europeans: USIA agreed to circulate for interagency comment the proposed list of private sector Europeans who would be willing to write and speak supportively on INF and broader European security questions. The list is based on cables which USIA solicited earlier from the field. This will form part of a pool of potential private sector resources to be worked into our plan for the private sector.

7. Vice President's Trip: Dennis Blair provided a wrap-up of the Vice President's trip. He suggested that in building on the trip we should stress the moral dimension of our position in INF arms control and the fact that the only reason we have heard against the U.S. proposal is that the Soviets do not like it. We should also continue to stress U.S. efforts for a secure and just peace, alliance unity and our commitment to arms control.

8. CBS Program: The two-part CBS series on the militarization of Soviet society was discussed. A printed transcript is being obtained.

9. British ITV Program on INF: It was reported that Max Hastings and his crew will now do this program in two phases, with the military aspects and the visit to General Dynamics to take place in the week of 2/28-3/4 and the proposed interviews with the Vice President and Under Secretary Eagleburger to take place during the week of 3/14-18. State - EUR will now make action requests to the appropriate agencies on the program.

10. Sample Speeches: It was agreed that our sample speeches still need some work, and that we will try to develop a short and a longer sample speech on INF. (Action EUR/P, George Rueckert and OSD - Susan Koch)

11. Soviet Military Power: It was agreed that the initial draft from DIA still needs considerable work, particularly from the standpoint of our political concerns in Europe. Comments are being given to DIA by those involved in this subgroup. (Action NSC, PM, OSD, etc.)

12. Other Documents: State/PM circulated a memo providing recent U.S. and European public statements on INF. PM also circulated a revised draft GIST on INF, on which comments should be submitted to Judyt Mandel in PM by COB, Wednesday 2/23. USIA indicated that it is preparing an abridged version of several of our key Qs and As on INF; comments on these should be submitted to Judyt Mandel by OOB, Thursday 2/24.

NEXT MEETING: Our next meeting will take place in our regular time slot, Thursday (2/24), 10:00 am, in the EUR Conference Room 6226. I will use that occasion to give a brief readout on the IPC meeting of 2/22.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 23, 1983

TO: EUR/P - Steve Steiner

FROM: EUR/PHD - Peter H. Dailey, Chairman, European Security
and Arms Control

USIA tells me that clearance on the INF Questions and Answers have been held up for two weeks. Thought we had agreed all INF questions should be cleared quickly. If you are having a problem, please let me know.

Additionally, we should pass all INF cables directed at PAO Missions through USIA. It should be done in a manner that does not slow down our guidance. If you have a problem, get back to me.

Dailey

*cc David
Seuss*

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FROM: **AMB. PETER H. DAILEY** **EUR/PHD** **1206 STATE**
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

TO: **NSC DENNIS BLAIR** **NSC**
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

PART V
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**Speech Material and Memo Arms Reduction &
INF Negotiations 2/23/83**

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Dept. of State
BY AW 8/16/12

Washington, D.C. 20520
February 23, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Arms Reduction Policy Credibility and Current
INF Negotiations

The current stalemate in the INF negotiations gives us time to set the stage to claim a major victory in President Reagan's arms reduction program when and if negotiations are concluded. To claim such a victory we must make a major effort to educate editorial boards, key journalists and other influential figures to make sure that they are led to this proper conclusion.

At the current level of understanding of the President's arms reduction policy, a compromise of the zero option on the President's part could be interpreted by influential columnists and the press as a defeat for the President, i.e. "Reagan capitulates on U.S. Zero Option Policy."

However, any movement that the President makes from his zero option proposal would lead to fewer missiles being deployed by the Soviets and the U.S. than are currently in place or planned.

With the press having a firm understanding that the President's policy is one of "overall" arms reduction, strategic, intermediate and other then his compromise on INF resulting in fewer missiles for both sides would be perceived as brilliant negotiating by the President.

If we are going to get this kind of result from the press, we must begin now to have selected people briefing editorial boards and key members of the press. We must be very careful not to brief in a way that would imply a lack of resolve in the President's current policy. But we must prepare the ground in a subtle way so that any conclusion on the President's zero option or something less than that would be a victory not a defeat.

If this concept is approved, we will submit a schedule of proposed backgrounders and organizations to be briefed.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

*All major Council
- Sec, Undersecretary
- VP, Port JP*

[Signature]
Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
Interagency Committee on
Security and Arms Control

cc: SPG Principals



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

February 24, 1983

TO : EUR/P - Mr. Steiner
PM/TMP - Mr. Swiers
PM/SNP - Mr. Lehman
PA/OAP - Mr. Pernick

FROM : EUR/CE - John C. Kornblum

SUBJECT: INF and START: Help Our Consuls and POLADS!

In 1983, as perhaps never before, it is crucial that our posts in German-speaking Europe keep up-to-date on INF and START so that they can explain our position, especially in contacts with members of the local media.

It is particularly important not to overlook our posts in Switzerland, whose media can exert considerable influence outside Switzerland itself.

Unfortunately, many of the excellent pieces of guidance or background information on START and INF sent to "All European Diplomatic Posts" (ALEDP) do not reach Geneva, Zurich, our German consulates or our Political Advisors on a timely basis.

To get the information to these posts, it is necessary to add the following separate addressees:

-- Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart, Zurich;

-- Geneva (slugged for USINF and USSTART); and

-- EUROP (to cover our political advisors at the European military commands).

I know this requires an extra effort, but it's worth it!

Drafted:
EUR/CE:BWClark:tk
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WASHFAR REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

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 SUBJECT Nuclear Stockpile Fact Sheet
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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

FACT SHEET

June 1, 1982

No. 227-82
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THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE

One aspect of the current debate about our national defense policies and recent arms control initiatives has focused on the size of the United States nuclear weapon stockpile, addressed in this fact sheet. It is often stated or assumed that the quantity of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States has steadily increased and that we now possess more nuclear weapons than ever. This is not so. By the term "stockpile," we mean the totality of our nuclear weapons, whether mounted on delivery systems such as ICBMs, deployed with forces overseas, or stored in the United States. The size and makeup of the stockpile has varied considerably over the thirty-seven years that nuclear weapons have been in existence. Since 1946, both nuclear weapons production and the aggregate totals have been authorized annually by the President (as required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, as amended).


During the first few years after World War II, the US stockpile was very small, due to the limited supply of nuclear material (plutonium and enriched uranium) and because the Soviets had not yet developed nuclear weapons. For example, in 1945, we had only two nuclear weapons in the stockpile; in 1946, nine; in 1947, thirteen; and in 1948 we had fifty. However, in response to the international situation and the Soviets' first nuclear test in 1949, the US began to build a larger stockpile. This increase was accelerated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The US nuclear weapons stockpile quantity reached its highest level in the mid-1960s at a few tens of thousands (the precise number being classified). Since that time, despite a few fluctuations, the stockpile quantity has declined. Moreover, the total yield (detonation energy) of the stockpile has decreased significantly.

MORE

Because the bulk of the US stockpile was built during the 1960s, those weapons are now becoming obsolete. At the present time, the production rates are increasing in order to replace those obsolete weapons with newer versions whose characteristics are better suited to today's needs. As they are replaced, we disassemble and destroy the older weapons. In general, there are two types of changes being introduced into the stockpile. The nuclear weapons themselves are being improved, often to take advantage of new developments in safety and security, and the systems of which the weapons are a part are being modernized to meet today's deterrence needs. During this several year period of increased weapon production, as new weapons are built and old ones destroyed, with current planning the net change in the size of the stockpile will nevertheless be small. Of course, if we can reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the arms control initiatives for strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces proposed by President Reagan, the size of the projected stockpile would be reduced.

The variations in stockpile size which we have discussed are shown in the sketch below. The approximate relative quantities are indicated by the graph; the actual quantities are classified. Until we are able to totally eliminate the threat of nuclear war, the United States must possess nuclear weapons as a deterrent. We have avoided nuclear war, and met our national and international objectives and commitments, by continuing to ensure that our nuclear weapon stockpile is safe, secure, and capable of deterring the Soviet Union from using or threatening to use their nuclear weapons against us or our allies.

TOTAL WEAPONS IN STOCKPILE ¹



The curve is discontinuous because the actual number of weapons in the stockpile at any time beyond 1948, is classified.

END