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141090	CABLE	THE HAGUE 01089 R 9/5/17 M443/5	5	2/12/1983	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- Areas to strengthen
- Too long, too wordy
- Could be tightened
- Tighter - too much on Bia
  - -- Headlines
  - -- Lead paragraphs
- That section

- Meeting Tuesday 2:00 - NSC w. Clark
  Board

- About speech

DC another 1½ weeks

Visit cap. talks
Team

N

- Weave in proof of defensive posture
- 60% of 10 years ago
- Not added missiles

and

MX a replacement

cruise replace

Pershing replaces

Replace and reduce
Begin talks to reduce
and withdraw

3

DATE SENT: 2/15/83

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FROM: Amb. Peter H. Dailey EUR/EPD 1206
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

TO: Dennis Blair NSC
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)

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Agenda —

1 — Regional issues

2 - Arms control

3 Little military

4 INF news —

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Memo to Judge Clark re VP's Trip to Europe

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Vice President's Visit to Europe and Followup

It is important that we do not lose the positive thrust of the Vice President's visit by actions here that would give contrary signals to the Europeans. It is particularly important that we build on this positive base at least through March 6, date of the German elections.

I have just learned that there is a possibility of an overall foreign policy speech that is planned for the President tentatively before an audience of American Legionaires.

I think this would be most inappropriate at this time.

The President can not make a speech of this type without using a part of the speech to discuss our defense and military capacity. While obviously this must be discussed at some time, doing it prior to March 6 German elections will only cause European press to focus on that part of the message that relates to "hardware" at the expense the reassuring part about arms reduction..

It would be another example of our giving mixed signals...a major part of our current problem with people in Europe. An audience composed of former military people is also inappropriate at this time...for the same reason.

RECOMMENDATION

However, we strongly recommend that the President followup the Vice President's visit with a short, clear, speech outlining American policy on arms reduction. It is needed to reemphasize the Vice President's trip. It is needed to clearly position the President as the leader in seeking world peace.

1. Strategic Arms Reduction. The President is the first world leader to address the arms issue with a meaningful and positive program to reduce arms. Proposals by other world leaders have dealt with limiting arms or controlling them.

The President should emphasize his leadership and his role in beginning the strategic arms reduction talks. He has proposed a 25% reduction in strategic arms. This is a very important fact, and one that is not well known by the public, in the United States and in Europe.

This proposal undercuts the previous nuclear freeze movement and we should make this point strongly in view of their coming demonstration in Washington on March 7 and 8..

2. Elimination of Intermediate Range Weapons. Following on the theme of identifying the President as the initiator of strategic arms reduction explain the President's proposal to rid Europe of an entire category of weapons (the INF proposals).

This initiative also completely undercuts the Freeze Movement

. Perhaps wonder could be expressed that peace groups and the freeze movement are noticeably absent from support of this issue which goes far beyond their current propositions. Why?

3. Excess Capacity? The truth, less megatonnage than 10 years ago.The President should point out the fact that in strategic arms megatonnage the United States has substantially less nuclear weapons today than it had 25 years ago, and continues to reduce its excess capacity continually, maintaining only what is necessary for defense.

This would help overcome the feeling of many people that we constantly add more and who are not aware that the size of the deterent is substantially less than it has been in the past.

4. Positive Gesture. As a gesture of his continuing desire to reduce nuclear weaponry, the President's speech should announce his commitment to remove 1,000 nuclear shells from Europe this year.

In summary the speech should be short, 10-15 simple, clear in its statement in the President' goals in arms reduction and under no circumstar with any of our defense posture. I.E., mentic any other weapons system of that nature.

The speech should be delievered prior to March 6, German elections, and it should be delivered before an au that would be appropriate.

It has been suggested that the Washington Diplomatic Corps would be appropriate, I would endorse this. Alternatively he could speak to a young audience..e.g. university. That would demonstrate that we want public support for our policy and indicate the President's commitment to build a future of peace and security.

Conclusion .We should do nothing to undercut the positive momentum of the Vice President.

One of our problems in the past has been conflicting signals to Europeans which cancel out or confuse our messages and are creating increasing creditably problems about our true positions.

At this point in time Europe does not need to have its views about our military capacity reassured. It is our commitment to arms reduction, our sincerity to achieve that and our commitment to European Community and its Alliance which must be enhanced.

Ambassador Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
European Public Diplomacy Committee

cc: USIA-Mr. Wick
STATE-Mr. Eagleburger

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

ACTION PLAN - USNATO

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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GENEVA FOR USDELINF AND USSTART
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, INF
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED INF PUBLIC AFFAIRS INITIATIVE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA INITIATIVES AND ADDRESS THE GROWING PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE WESTERN ZERO/ZERO OPTION AND THE NATO DUAL TRACK DECISION, USNATO WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT BRIEF, TO-THE-POINT TALKING POINTS BE DISTRIBUTED ON A MONTHLY BASIS DURING THIS "YEAR OF DEPLOYMENT" TO ALL US OFFICIALS WHO MIGHT IN ANY WAY BECOME INVOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO INF ISSUES.

3. WHEN WE SAY US OFFICIALS, WE DO NOT RPT NOT MEAN ONLY SENIOR AND SUBSTANTIVE OFFICERS, BUT ALSO COMMERCIAL, CONSULAR, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER PERSONNEL -- ANYONE WHO MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE IN A POSITION OF DISCUSSING INF WITH OUR OWN PUBLIC OR WITH EUROPEANS, ESPECIALLY MEMBERS OF THE "PEACE" OR "FREEZE" MOVEMENTS.

4. BEARING IN MIND THAT WE ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE THE EXPERTS, THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON ABSOLUTE BREVITY, WITH OUR ARGUMENTS STATED IN THE SIMPLEST, MOST STRAIGHTFORWARD AND EFFECTIVE TERMS POSSIBLE.

5. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF THE SORT OF THING WE HAVE IN MIND:

A. ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL

-- WE FAVOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE ON BOTH SIDES: ZERO FOR THE US AND ZERO FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

B. THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS

-- THE SOVIET DEMAND TO COUNT BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES ALONG WITH THOSE OF THE US IS A DEMAND FOR THE RUSSIANS TO HAVE AS MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS ALL OTHER COUNTRIES COMBINED. THIS IS A DEMAND FOR SOVIET SUPERIORITY, NOT EQUALITY.

C. SOVIET CLAIMS OF A NUCLEAR BALANCE

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE MORE THAN 12ØØ LONG-RANGE INF MISSILE WARHEADS; NATO HAS Ø. 12ØØ TO ZERO IS NOT A BALANCE, IT'S A MONOPOLY.

D. WHY NO NUCLEAR FREEZE

-- THE SOVIETS WANT A FREEZE SO THEY CAN QUIT WHILE THEY ARE AHEAD: 12ØØ-Ø. WE WANT REDUCTIONS TO ZERO-ZERO ON BOTH SIDES.

6. IN DEVELOPING AND REGULARLY UPDATING SUCH TALKING POINTS, DEPARTMENT WOULD DOUBTLESS NEED TO COMBINE THE SUBSTANTIVE EXPERTISE OF POLITICAL-MILITARY OFFICERS WITH THE PUBLIC RELATIONS SKILLS OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS. IN ANY CASE, WE BELIEVE THAT A CONSCIENTIOUS EFFORT TO PRODUCE MONTHLY TALKING POINTS ALONG THIS LINE COULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN OUR ONGOING STRUGGLE AGAINST SOVIET AGIT-PROP EFFORTS AIMED AT STOPPING NATO'S TWIN-TRACK DECISION.

FROWICK
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ACTION PLAN - THE HAGUE

9

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 01089

STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK
FROM AMBASSADOR DYESS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PROP, PEPR, NATO, NL
SUBJECT: (S) PUBLIC AFFAIRS HANDLING OF SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
REF: A) STATE 027312, B) THE HAGUE 0152 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
SETTING

2. THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THE 1979 DUAL DECISION, BUT HAS NOT DECIDED ON DEPLOYMENTS ON DUTCH SOIL. NOR HAS IT SPECIFIED PRECISELY WHEN IT WILL DO SO. THE GON POSITION IS BOTH TO SUPPORT THE U.S. AT GENEVA, AND TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS. THIS INCLUDES CAUTIOUSLY MOVING FORWARD WITH GLCM PREPARATIONS.

3. WHILE THE VOTE WOULD LIKELY BE CLOSE, THERE IS PROBABLY NOT A MAJORITY IN THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT FOR DEPLOYMENT AT PRESENT. A MAJORITY MAY WELL BE ATTAINABLE IN THE FUTURE, DEPENDING ON EVENTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PUBLIC OPPOSITION IS SUBSTANTIAL. GIVEN THE ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE ALLIANCE THAT A NEGATIVE DUTCH DECISION WOULD HAVE, OUR INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY THE DUTCH CONTINUING PREPARATIONS BUT NOT RISKING A PARLIAMENTARY VOTE UNTIL A MAJORITY IS CLEARLY ATTAINABLE, AND/OR BASING IS WELL UNDER WAY ELSEWHERE.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

4. THESE ARE SEVERAL:
--ULTIMATELY, TO PERSUADE THE GON TO DEPLOY 48 GLCM'S IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DUAL-TRACK DECISION;
--DURING 1983-4, TO PERSUADE THE GON TO CONTINUE PREPARATIONS ESSENTIAL FOR DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO (A) ADHERE AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO THE NATO SCHEDULE FOR THE NETHERLANDS, AND (B) STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF U.S. NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA;
--AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, TO PERSUADE THE GON TO AGREE ON SELECTION OF A GLCM SITE, AND THE PARLIAMENT TO APPROVE THIS STEP (WE SEE NO WAY TO AVOID A VOTE) FOR REASONS (A) AND (B) MENTIONED ABOVE;
--AT THE VERY LEAST, TO AVOID A NEGATIVE DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT (OR ON FURTHER PREPARATIONS) BY THE CABINET, AND/OR A "NO" VOTE BY THE PARLIAMENT ON DEPLOYMENT (OR PREPARATIONS) AS WELL AS UNHELPFUL PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE GON WHICH COULD UNDERMINE OUR POSITION IN GENEVA.
--TO PREVENT TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE EROSION OF WHAT PUBLIC SUPPORT WE ENJOY ON THE ISSUE, OR CONVERSELY AN INCREASE IN PUBLIC OPPOSITION, AS DEPLOYMENT DEADLINES DRAW NEAR. (COMMENT: THE CABINET AND PARLIAMENT--AND NOT PUBLIC OPINION--WILL DECIDE THE ISSUE. BUT THE MINISTERS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS WILL BE INFLUENCED BY POLLS SHOWING A SHARP INCREASE IN PUBLIC OPPOSITION, BY MASSIVE DEMONSTRATIONS, AND BY THE BELIEF THAT VIOLENT CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE WOULD ACCOMPANY DEPLOYMENT.)
TARGET AUDIENCES

5. IN PRIORITY ORDER THESE ARE:
(A) THE CABINET. GOVERNMENT MINISTERS, JUST AS THE PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC, WANT THE ISSUE TO GO AWAY. THEY SENSE INCREASINGLY THAT IT WILL NOT. WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT INSIDE THE CABINET, AS WELL AS SOME--MUCH LESS-OPPOSITION. HOWEVER, THE GON HAS A HIGHER PRIORITY THAN DEPLOYMENTS: ECONOMIC RECOVERY, ENTAILING PAINFUL MEASURES REQUIRING EXPENDITURE OF MUCH POLITICAL CAPITAL. HAMPERED AS WE ARE BY THIS "DISTRACTION," OUR PLAN IS TO CONTINUE TO WORK INDIVIDUALLY AND QUIETLY WITH MINISTERS AND STATE SECRETARIES ON INF, AND EXPOSE THEM TO SENIOR AND INFORMED U.S. LEADERS AND OFFICIALS. THIS HAS BEEN GOING WELL WITH THE VISITS HERE BT

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~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 THE HAGUE 01089

STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK
FROM AMBASSADOR DYESS
OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, THE TRIP TO WASHINGTON BY DEFENSE MINISTER DE ROITER, AND THE MARCH VISITS BY FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BROEK AND PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS, AS WELL AS NATO MINISTERIALS.
(B) THE PARLIAMENT. WE ARE CONCENTRATING ON MEMBERS OF THE THREE PARTIES IN THE SECOND CHAMBER WHICH WILL BE DECISIVE IN ANY SHOWDOWN VOTES: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, LIBERALS, D'66. EXPOSURE OF THESE PARLIAMENTARIANS TO PERSUASIVE AND WELL-INFORMED USG OFFICIALS, ESPECIALLY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, IS INDISPENSABLE. EXPOSURE CAN TAKE PLACE HERE OR IN WASHINGTON, BUT MAY BE MORE EFFECTIVE HERE BECAUSE THE AMERICANS CAN THUS GAIN A BETTER "FEEL" FOR THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM WHERE THE DUTCH DECISIONS WILL BE MADE.
(C) DUTCH JOURNALISTS. SOME DUTCH PRINT AND BROADCAST JOURNALISTS ARE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO DEPLOYMENTS (HERE OR ELSEWHERE) AND OUR COURTING THEM SIMPLY ENHANCES THEIR PRESTIGE. OTHERS THOUGH ARE PROFESSIONALLY NEUTRAL AND WILL GIVE US A FAIR SHAKE, WHILE A FEW ARE CLOSET SUPPORTERS. WE SHOULD FAVOR THOSE IN THE TWO LATTER CATEGORIES, WHILE BEING VERY CAREFUL NOT TO APPEAR TO ANOINT THEM, WHICH COULD EMBARRASS THEM AND US AND UNDERMINE THEIR CREDIBILITY. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND A MORE CONCERTED EFFORT TO CULTIVATE THE U.S.-BASED DUTCH PRESS. THIS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO OCCASIONAL LARGE BRIEFINGS BUT SHOULD INCLUDE FREQUENT, SYSTEMATIVE ONE-ON-ONE CONTACT WITH SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. (THE NRC'S SYTSE VAN DER ZEE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A PROLIFIC JOURNALIST WHO HAS AT LEAST ONE, SOMETIMES TWO, ARTICLES DATELINED WASHINGTON IN NEARLY EVERY ISSUE OF HIS PAPER.)
COMMENT: MASS OPINION IN THE NETHERLANDS IS SHAPED MORE BY EVENTS THAN BY ARGUMENTS. BUT THERE IS AN OPINION ELITE HERE OF SOME ONE THOUSAND PERSONS WHO HAVE EXCEPTIONAL INFLUENCE ON WHAT GOVERNMENT POLICY WILL BE. THEY READ EACH OTHERS' ARTICLES AND ATTEND EACH OTHERS' SEMINARS AND DINNER PARTIES. THIS ELITE INCLUDES THE MINISTERS AND STATE SECRETARIES, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS, JOURNALISTS; SOME CHURCH LEADERS, AND CERTAIN SCHOLARS, AS WELL AS BUSINESS AND LABOR LEADERS. THE LATTER TWO, HOWEVER, SELDOM EXERT THEMSELVES ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN ECONOMIC ISSUES.
ALONG WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS (POLITICAL AND CAREER), PERSUADABLE PARLIAMENTARIANS, AND REALLY PROFESSIONAL (OR SYMPATHETIC) JOURNALISTS, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON CERTAIN OF THE CHURCH LEADERS, PUBLISHING SCHOLARS AND SOME LABOR LEADERS. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THOSE WHO SHOULD GET SPECIAL ATTENTION ON THIS ISSUE--THEY ARE SUPPORTERS OR PERSUADABLES--IS NO MORE THAN 300. END COMMENT.
(D) CHURCH LEADERS. THE AMERICAN BISHOPS' LETTER HAS HURT US. WE NEED REPLIES. THESE CAN BE IN WRITING, WHICH WE CAN CIRCULATE BY HAND AND SEEK TO HAVE PUBLISHED IN CHURCH PERIODICALS. PERHAPS EVEN MORE HELPFUL WOULD BE VISITS BY PERSUASIVE CHURCH LEADERS AND INTELLECTUALS. WE WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME THE ASSISTANCE OF SOMEONE SUCH AS MICHAEL NOVAK, FOR A START. WE NEED A SERIES.
(E) PUBLISHING SCHOLARS (THOSE THAT WRITE FOR JOURNALS AND NEWSPAPERS AS WELL AS PUBLISH BOOKS). AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS ARE A LOGICAL CHOICE TO APPROACH THESE PERSONS, AS ARE USG OFFICIALS. TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE, THE AMERICAN SCHOLARS SHOULD UNDERSTAND POLITICS AS WELL AS KNOW THE SUBSTANCE OF THE INF ISSUE. IT WOULD ALSO HELP IF ONE OR MORE OF THE AMERICANS WERE KNOWN TO BE A BIT LEFT-OF-CENTER ON NON-DEFENSE ISSUES.
(F) THE PUBLIC. PRIMARILY, WE DO NOT WANT TO LOSE GROUND. THERE IS PROBABLY NOTHING THAT WE CAN DO TO CAUSE A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT OF OPINION IN OUR FAVOR (40 TO 50 PERCENT OF THE PUBLIC OPPOSES DEPLOYMENTS UNCONDITIONALLY, BUT A SOLID MAJORITY "EXPECTS" DEPLOYMENTS WILL ULTIMATELY TAKE PLACE HERE). WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE SPEECHES, WORK WITH THE MASS MEDIA, AND PROVIDE MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES FOR VISITING AMERICANS. WHAT IS SAID BY USG LEADERS WILL OVERSHADOW ALL OF THIS. EFFECTIVE THEMES

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~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 THE HAGUE 01089

STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK
FROM AMBASSADOR DYESS

6. SELECTING EFFECTIVE THEMES IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF OUR EFFORT. IF WE SAY THE WRONG THINGS, OR EVEN THE RIGHT THINGS IN THE WRONG WAY, WE LOSE GROUND WITH ALL OUR AUDIENCES--FROM THE CABINET TO THE PUBLIC. WHILE REQUIREMENTS MAY VARY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, WE SUSPECT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF COMMONALITY TO THEMES THAT WILL REALLY PROVE EFFECTIVE.

7. FIRST, WE HAVE TO SEIZE THE HIGH GROUND: PEACE. PRESERVATION OF PEACE IS OUR GOAL, AND ALL OUR POLICIES--FROM CREDIBLE DETERRENCE TO ARMS REDUCTIONS--ARE PURSUED WITH THE AIM OF PROTECTING PEACE WITH FREEDOM. WE TOUCHED ON THIS THEME IN REFTEL "B", AND IT CAN BE DEVELOPED FURTHER. A PERSUASIVE CASE FOR PEACE ADDRESSES THE FEARS AND LONGINGS OF DUTCH MEN AND WOMEN, AND WE SUSPECT PEOPLES FAR BEYOND THIS NATION. WE HAVE MADE A TERRIBLE MISTAKE IN LETTING THE SO-CALLED "PEACE" MOVEMENTS MONOPOLIZE THIS ISSUE. WE MUST REPEAT OUR GOAL AND THE ARGUMENTS WHY OUR POLICIES ARE WORKING--AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN. THIS THEME SHOULD DOMINATE ALL OUR OFFICIAL STATEMENTS. THE BIG TRUTH HAS ONE THING IN COMMON WITH THE BIG LIE; IF IT IS REPEATED OFTEN ENOUGH, PEOPLE WILL BELIEVE IT.

8. THE SECOND MAJOR THEME--WITH ACCOMPANYING ARGUMENTATION--SHOULD BE THAT PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENTS AND DEPLOYMENTS THEMSELVES ARE THE MOST POWERFUL SUPPORT THE DUTCH CAN GIVE IN SUPPORT OF THE NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA. INDEED, NEGOTIATIONS NEED NOT CEASE AFTER DEPLOYMENTS HAVE BEGUN; IT MAY WELL BE THAT THEN AND ONLY THEN WILL THE SOVIETS MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS. (EXAMPLES FROM THE HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CITED.)

9. A THIRD THEME FOR USE WITH THE DUTCH IS THAT RESPONSIBILITIES FLOW FROM THEIR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, A MEMBERSHIP WHICH IS WIDELY SUPPORTED AMONG VIRTUALLY ALL ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION. WHILE THE DUTCH ATTACHED A RESERVATION TO THE 1979 DECISION IN REGARD TO DEPLOYMENTS HERE, THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO SHOULDER RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP AS WELL AS SHARING IN ITS BENEFITS. THEY CAN BE REMINDED THAT THE EXTENT OF THEIR INFLUENCE ON ALLIANCE POLICY IS CLOSELY PROPORTIONAL TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON DEFENSE. THIS THEME WILL BEAR ONLY SO MUCH WEIGHT, BUT IT CAN USEFULLY BE REFERRED TO AT LEAST ONCE IN EVERY PRESENTATION. ANOTHER NATO ASPECT WORTH HIGHLIGHTING IS THE EXTRAORDINARILY CLOSE ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS THAT THE ALLIES PARTICIPATE IN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1979 DECISION. THIS CAN HELP MITIGATE THE FEELING MANY DUTCH HAVE THAT THEY ARE HELPLESS TO CONTROL THEIR OWN DESTINY.

10. A FOURTH THEME, WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT INTRODUCED AND WE BELIEVE (WITHOUT FIRM PROOF) WAS EFFECTIVE IS THE MORALITY OF THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION--TO RID THE WORLD OF A WHOLE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ONLY COUNTER-ARGUMENT ONE HEARS HERE IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ACCEPT IT BECAUSE WE ARE ASKING THEM TO TAKE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD "UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT," GIVING UP ONLY "PAPER MISSILES" IN RETURN. THE ANSWER TO THAT IS TO DEPLOY "REAL MISSILES" AND NEGOTIATE.

11. A FIFTH THEME, WHICH CAN BE USED SELECTIVELY WITH THOSE WHO TRY TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT SECURITY ISSUES, IS THE COUPLING EFFECT (U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE) OF DEPLOYMENT. WHILE WE PREFER A ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME AT GENEVA, THERE IS A BENEFIT IN STRENGTHENED COUPLING IF DEPLOYMENTS TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE FOUND THE COUPLING ARGUMENT EFFECTIVE WITH SOME OF OUR TARGETED INDIVIDUALS WHO DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT. IT ALSO HELPS TO REMIND DUTCH INTERLOCUTORS THAT SINCE DEPLOYMENTS WOULD IN FACT INCREASE THE NUMBERS OF WARHEADS THAT COULD STRIKE THE U.S.S.R. BY ONLY A SMALLPERCENT, THE COUPLING

EFFECT OF DEPLOYMENTS MAY BE THE PRIME MOTIVATION FOR SOVIET OPPOSITION RATHER THAN AN INCREASED THREAT AS THEY CLAIM.

12. THE SIXTH AND FINAL THEME WE SUGGEST FOR USE HERE IS THAT WE STRESS THAT THE ACTUAL NUMBERS OFOUR WARHEADS IN EUROPE HAVE DECLINED IN RECENT YEARS, AND THAT
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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9119
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 5709
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USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6172
USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0085

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 THE HAGUE 01089

STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK
FROM AMBASSADOR DYESS
DEPLOYMENTS WILL NOT RPT NOT INCREASE THE NUMBERS.
COOPERATING AND OPPOSING ORGANIZATIONS

13. COOPERATING GROUPS ARE NOT MANY NOR TERRIBLY EFFECTIVE. SOME HELP IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY COME FROM THE DUTCH ATLANTIC COMMISSION, THOSE INVOLVED WITH THE ANTI-UNILATRALIST "MUTUAL" DISARMAMENT GROUPS, THE NEWLY-FORMED INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND A HANDFUL OF OTHERS. WE KNOW THEM, AND CAN CALL ON THEM AS SPECIFIC NEEDS ARISE.

14. THE ACTIVE ORGANIZED OPPONENTS, WHILE A DECIDED MINORITY, ARE MORE NUMEROUS THAN ACTIVE SUPPORTERS; THESE OPPONENTS FEEL VERY INTENTLY ABOUT THE ISSUE, ARE WELL ORGANIZED AND HIGHLY MOTIVATED. THEY INCLUDE: THE LABOR AND SMALL LEFT PARTIES; THE DUTCH INTER-CHURCH PEACE COUNCIL (IKV); PAX CHRISTI; THE "STOP THE N-BOMB/STOP THE ARMS RACE" GROUP; WOMEN FOR PEACE; WOMEN AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AS WELL AS ASSORTED SMALLER GROUPS WHOSE MEMBERS OPENLY DISLIKE THE UNITED STATES AND WANT TO SEE IT LOSE INFLUENCE AND POWER. THERE ARE OTHER GROUPS WHO ARE NOT ANTI-AMERICAN BUT SIMPLY FEAR, AND THEREFORE DISLIKE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE ARE UNLIKELY TO WIN ANY OF THESE GROUPS TO OUR SIDE, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT WASTE OUR TIME WITH THEM ON THIS ISSUE. MOREOVER, WE SHOULD DO NOTHING TO ENHANCE THEIR PRESTIGE, SUCH AS INCLUDING THEM IN EVENTS WE SPONSOR.
KEY DATES

15. THE GON WILL POSTPONE MAKING DECISIONS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS LONG AS IT CAN. BUT THERE ARE FEW DECISIONS REMAINING ON THIS ISSUE THAT THE GON CAN TAKE BEHIND THE SCENE. LABOR AND THE OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL DOUBTLESS SEEK THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR A PARLIAMENTARY VOTE IN WHICH THEY CAN WIN OR SERIOUSLY EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST TEST WILL COME IN MARCH IF LABOR ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE BUDGET (A LA DENMARK). THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY WIN. PUBLIC DEBATE WILL CONTINUE THROUGH THE SPRING AND SUMMER (AND BEYOND). THE DEFENSE PAPER--PROJECTING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE NEEDS OVER THE NEXT DECADE--IS DUE IN SEPTEMBER, AND ITS PUBLICATION WILL INTENSIFY THE DEBATE, ESPECIALLY IN PARLIAMENT. IN ADDITION, WHEN A BASING SITE FOR POSSIBLE DUTCH DEPLOYMENT IS ANNOUNCED--POSSIBLY TOWARDS THE END OF THE YEAR--A PARLIAMENTARY VOTE WILL SURELY FOLLOW, WHETHER IN A MATTER OF DAYS OR MONTHS IS MOOT. ON OCTOBER 29, VERY POSSIBLY IN THE COURSE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON THE DEFENSE PAPER, THERE WILL BE A LARGE ANTI-DEPLOYMENT PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION IN THE HAGUE, WHICH MAY ECLIPSE THE NOVEMBER 21, 1981 DEMONSTRATION IN AMSTERDAM.
USIA SUPPORT REQUIRED

16. WE CAN USE MORE PERSUASIVE SPEAKERS (WHOM WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF THOROUGHLY). SPEAKERS WITH GOOD CHURCH CREDENTIALS, LEFT-OF-CENTER REPUTATIONS ON NON-DEFENSE ISSUES, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, CAN ALL BE UTILIZED. THE MORE ADVANCE NOTICE THE BETTER, BUT WE CAN USUALLY PUT SOMETHING WORTHWHILE TOGETHER IN TWO WEEKS.

17. NEWSCLIPS, FILMS, VTR'S, PHOTOS, ETC., ARE HARD TO PLACE IN THE ULTRA-SENSITIVE MASS MEDIA, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT ARTICLES OR COMMENTS BY CHURCH LEADERS CAN BE USED IN CHURCH PUBLICATIONS. WIRELESS FILE PIECES ARE READ HERE BY MANY OF THE "300" THAT WE HAVE SPECIALLY TARGETED. OUR WORD-PROCESSING SYSTEM IS TOO SMALL AND THE ABSENCE OF A SKILLED PROGRAMMER LIMITS FURTHER ITS USE. THE SOON-TO-BE INSTALLED VS-80 COMPUTER REPORTEDLY DOES NOT HANDLE THE CURRENT DRS-PROGRAM. SINCE THE INF DEBATE WILL DOUBTLESS CONTINUE WELL INTO 1984 AND PROBABLY BEYOND, WE BELIEVE A TDY-ASSIGNMENT OF A USIA COMPUTER/DRS EXPERT WOULD BE A GOOD INVESTMENT.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

18. YOU PROBABLY KNOW WITHOUT OUR REPORTING IT THAT THE PERSONNEL CHANGES IN ACDA HAVE CONFOUNDED OUR FRIENDS AND DELIGHTED THE OPPOSITION. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE

BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

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~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION Ø5 OF Ø5 THE HAGUE Ø1Ø89

STATE FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY AND USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK
FROM AMBASSADOR DYESS
FORMATION OF AMBASSADOR DAILEY'S GROUP WAS NOT HELPFUL. OUR EFFORT REPLACED OUR MESSAGE AS THE MEDIA STORY. GENERALLY, WE DO NOT WANT TO HYPE THE INF ISSUE; RATHER, WE WANT TO WORK PERSISTENTLY--ESPECIALLY WITH THE TARGETED 300--TO SHOW THAT INF DEPLOYMENT AND OUR GENEVA EFFORTS ARE THE SUREST, SAFEST WAY TO CONTINUE THE PEACE ENJOYED FOR NEARLY FOUR DECADES. WHAT USG LEADERS SAY AND DO IN THE COMING MONTHS WILL HAVE FAR GREATER IMPACT HERE THAN ANYTHING WE IN THE NETHERLANDS SAY OR DO.
DYESS
BT

~~SECRET~~

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 15, 1983

TO: USIA - Mr. Gerald D. Hursh-Cesar,
Director, Office of Research

FROM: STATE - David Lowenfeld
European Public Diplomacy Committee

SUBJECT: Public Opinion Survey on Security Matters

Attached are comments that Ambassador Dailey and I have received on the survey. The recommended modifications should be incorporated in the next survey.

General Observations

1. The questions should be reformed so that they present simple dichotemous choices (to the extent possible). Rather than asking respondants to choose one of four phrases that describe both the US and USSR, we should separate them and ask whether each single phrase is more descriptive of the US or the USSR. Respondants will be able to answer both either or neither on their own.

2. The dichotemous questions should be followed with an intensity measure question--Is the difference (just described above) between the US and USSR slight or large?

3. The open ended questions should be moved up in the survey. Before we begin to pepper the interviewee with questions on INF, we might ask what his first thoughts are when he hears the term "intermediate range nuclear forces," and why he favors or opposes NATO deployment.

4. The questions that provide information about the INF status quo and policy should be moved to the back of the survey. We are interested in gauging both current impressions and how those impressions could be changed when more information is provided.

5. We should include questions about the host government's INF policy. Do the populations see a gap between the US and other NATO governments on this issue?

6. There should be a screening question--whether the respondant has been publicly active on the INF question--before asking the specifics.

7. We should include agree/disagree questions on the themes that we and the Soviets have been using. We must find out what sells.

Comments on Specific Questions

#2. Simplify. Is the US or the USSR better described by the following phrase:

Their strategy is to achieve military superiority. Is there a big difference or slight difference between them on this issue?

Is the US or the USSR better described by the phrase:
Their strategy is to achieve military equality and balance. Is there a big difference or a slight difference between the US and USSR?

#3. Simplify, break up the questions, and add an intensity measure.

#6. Measure whether the populations fear that US as well is likely to try to press the country to do things against their best interests. Structure this as a dichotemous question with an intensity indicator follow-up.

#8. This should be preceded by an an open ended question about first thoughts on intermediate range nuclear weapons.

#10. Simplify, add an intensity indicator.

#11. Move this question back in the survey - Providing the information at this point means you no longer can measure pre-existing attitudes.

#13. Move this question back

#14. Add a screen about whether they have been politically active on this issue.

#15. Break this question up into approve disapprove with an intensity indicator. It may be that people have inconsistent views.

#16. Add a question about the host government.

#18. Move this question earlier in the survey.

From what you have heard and read which of the following two positions best describes the way Ronald Reagan feels about nuclear weapons?

Position A

Ronald Reagan believes that we must build as many nuclear weapons as quickly as we can so that we won't be pushed around by the Russians any more.

Position B

Ronald Reagan believes that the Soviets and the United States should have about the same strength in nuclear weapons to assure lasting peace and security and is doing all he can to reduce the number of weapons on both sides.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL

2/16/83

The following calendar includes three categories of events which could be relevant to our INF and other arms control interests: (1) useful opportunities, such as public forums where we can get our case across; (2) meetings with European leaders or among Europeans where we can seek supportive statements; and (3) events which are likely to cause us difficulties, such as demonstrations by anti-nuclear groups.

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
FEBRUARY		
2/1	FRG Disarmament Commissioner Ruth to visit Moscow	Reaction to any public mention by Soviets
	McGeorge Bundy to speak in Bonn on "no first use"	Guidance to posts
2/1-4/15	Committee on Disarmament (CD) Spring session, Geneva	Emphasize all U.S. arms control initiatives
2/2	START talks resume	Rowny press briefing
2/2-2/14	Senator Tower in Europe -- FRG, Geneva (at same time as Vice President), USSR, Sweden, UK and Iceland	Provide briefing and materials
2/7-10	HLG Meeting in San Diego	
2/7-19	US Visit of Dutch Defense Minister	Stress Allied unity
2/8	CSCE Review Conference resumes, Madrid	Good demonstration of Allied unity
2/10-11	NATO Conference of National Information Officers, NATO Hdqrs.	Seek greater Allied coordination on public handling of overall security approach
2/10-11	USIA Conference on new directions in US foreign policy, Georgetown University	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
2/11-13	Wehrkunde Conference, Munich; Navy Secretary Lehman, NSC Advisor Clark, Under Secretary of State Schneider and Asst. Secretary Burt	
2/10	Vice President returns	Brief the President, then meet the press
2/13-14	SCG Meeting at NATO Hdqrs., followed by press conference by SCG Chairman Burt	Seek prompt, favorable coverage in Allied capitals
2/14-16	Bilateral meeting of US and Soviet UN Associations, Moscow--Scowcroft, Brown, Stoessel, etc. (discussion to include INF and other arms control)	Department is providing a briefing
2/15-16	London meeting of US PAOs, USAF & Pol-Mil officers from our NATO embassies	Seek improved coordination of INF public handling
2/15-16	EC Political Directors Meeting, Bonn	
2/16	Burt Satellite Interview with Iceland	
2/16	British Council of Churches Debate on Nuclear Policy	U.S. Embassy Officer will provide briefing on arms control policy
2/16-18 ✓	French FM Cheysson to Visit Moscow	
2/16-18 ✓	US working visit of Norwegian PM Willoch	Seek supportive statement
2/17 ✓	Burt Backgrounder at White House following Willoch-Reagan Meeting	
2/17 ✓	US Visit of Luxembourg Foreign Minister	Show Allied unity, European support
2/17 ✓	HFAC Hearings on Arms Control	
(1) 2/18-20	Nuremberg "Peace Tribunal", FRG	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
2/21-22	EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels	
2/22	Presidential Speech – American Legion	
2/22-3/13	Strategic & Theater Arms Negotiations The U.S. Position	
2/24-3/9	NATO Wintex-Cimex Exercise	Guidance to rebut charges of "nuclear warfighting"
2/24 or 25	Burt Backgrounder for Norwegian, Danish & Icelandic Journalist (tentative)	
2/25-3/9	Queen Elizabeth to visit West Coast, with Foreign Minister Pym accompanying	Obtain maximum press coverage; seek Pym public statements on security?
2/26-27	Copenhagen Seminar on "Western Security and the Soviet Union: Agenda for the 80s", sponsored by USNATO, USEC and Copenhagen University	Provide Washington speaker?
2/28	Eagleburger and Burt to address 40-60 senior Canadian business executives brought to Washington by Canadian Institute of International Affairs	Encourage Canadians to help promote NATO unity?
Late Feb.	Possible high-level speech on arms control	Seek approval
Late Feb.	Possible high-level briefings for selected European correspondents	Seek approval

MARCH	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
	SCG Meeting	
	Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov to visit Greece (tentative)	
	Papandreou to visit Canada (tentative)	
Early March	Peace Demonstration in New York--World Peace Council to seek visas	Have press line ready on any visa refusals
3/1	Italian Group to Visit Moscow for Arms Control Discussions	Have Embassy Rome brief and debrief them.
3/1	EC Foreign Ministers Political Cooperation Meeting, Bonn	
3/6	FRG elections	
3/7	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Brussels	
3/7-9	Conference on "Intellectual and Organizational Trends in the Western Alliance", sponsored by Italian Center for International Relations, Rome	
3/8-9	Nuclear Freeze groups to demonstrate at U.S. Congress	Use public statements and appearances during this period to emphasize that that we seek real reductions.
3/11	HLG Meeting in Brussels	
3/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels	
3/14-16	High Official Working Visit of Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers	
3/15-17	U.S. visit of Dutch PM Lubbers and Foreign Minister van der Broek	Show Allied unity; possible joint press conference
3/21-22	European Council Meeting, Brussels	

MARCH (Continued)	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
3/21-4/10	Atlantic Security	
3/22-23	Spring NPG in Portugal	
3/24-26	Conference sponsored by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Council on Germany and the Atlantic Bridge, Berlin	Provide high level participation?
3/25	Possible Burt Address in London	
3/26-27	Ditchley Conference, UK on "The Atlantic Partnership: Cooperation and Diversity" Asst. Secy. Burt to participate	Provide high level USG speaker
3/31	End of INF and MBFR rounds	Have our Amb. brief NAC & then meet with press. Also prepare inter-round public affairs plan to fill gap.
Late March	Aspen-type seminar, French Alps	French want senior USG participation
Late March	Possible Burt trip to Scandinavia with public appearances.	

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
APRIL		
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	End of START round	Possible high level public report on state of arms control
	Series of SFRC Hearings on US/Soviet Relations, to include Rostow as witness.	Provide Senior USG official?
	Secretary's Spring bilateral with Canadian FonMin MacEachen	
Easter 1-4	Street Theater	
Easter week	Peace marches in Europe	Stress US approach to peace
Easter week	Possible Foley Codel to Moscow, with 15-20 Members of Congress	Brief on security issues and provide materials
4/12-13	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
4/25-26	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Luxembourg	
4/27-28	Copenhagen Seminar on INF, sponsored by Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament; papers to be published	Provide high level USG speaker (at least DAS)
Late April/ Early May	USIS Stockholm to program START Deputy Goodby and INF Deputy Glitman in Sweden	

MAY	EVENTS	POSSIBLE ACTION
	SCG Meeting	
	HLG Meeting	
	Possible Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting	Do analysis of possible WP initiatives, have press line ready and consider preempting them
	Possible US visit of Romanian Foreign Minister	Seek balanced statement including ref to Soviet arms
	Conference sponsored by Movement on European Disarmament, West Berlin	
May-June	Former ACDA Director Rostow to speak in USSR as Ampart	
5/4-5	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
5/9-10	Secretary to OECD Ministerial, Paris	
5/11-14	Bilderberg Conf., Chateau Montebello, Canada	DepSec Dam to speak
5/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers informal "Gymnich" weekend	
5/15	Berlin "Peace Conference," in connection with 50th Anniversary of Hitler's rise to power.	
5/18-20	European Institute for Security Matters Conf. Luxembourg	Need high level USG speaker.
5/24	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Bonn	
5/28-30	Williamsburg Summit	Seek demonstration of Allied unity in security as well as economic area
5/31-6/1	EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn	
End of May	INF talks resume, Round V	Nitze meet President and consult in Europe

	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
SPRING		
(no date yet)	US Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter to be issued	
	Possible Italian elections	
	Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez to Washington	Stress Western unity and Spain as example of expansion of democracy
	START talks resume	Rowny to see President, brief press
	SCG meeting	

JUNE	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
6/6-7	European Council Meeting, Bonn	
6/9-10	Secretary to NAC Ministerial, Paris	Obtain full Allied support on arms control and other East-West issues
6/18	Pope's Visit to Poland (Tentative)	
6/25	Vice President to take part in US/FRG Tricentennial Celebration in Krefeld and to visit other European countries.	

JULY	EVENT	POSSIBLE ACTION
11-16	Fourth Seminar on International Security Affairs, Geneva	Seeking senior US speaker probably private sector.

AUGUST

6	Hiroshima Anniversary	

CONFIDENTIAL

EUR/P:GRUECKERT

02/16/83 EXT. 20850 1000A

EUR:RBURT

OVP:PHUGHES

JCS:EHAMILTON

EUR/EPD:PDAILEY

USIA:BFULTON
NSC:SKramer
PA:JKelly

OSD:EDKRAKOWSKI

EUR/RPM:TOCHILTREE

ACDA/PA:HGRADY

PM/SNP:JMANDEL
EUR:JDobbins
EUR/P:SESteiner

PRIORITY ALEDP, TOKYO, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, SEOUL, BANGKOK

MANILA

FOR AMBASSADORS FROM AMB. DAILEY, INFORM CONSULS

DECL:OADR

SCOM, PARM, INF

INF PUBLIC AFFAIRS PACKET

REF: USNATO 980

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS YOU ARE AWARE, I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT TO DEVELOP OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WHILE MORE PERMANENT MACHINERY IS BEING PUT INTO PLACE. I KONW THAT SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF THE INF ISSUE IS ONE OF YOUR HIGHEST PRIORITIES, AND I WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL TO YOU AS POSSIBLE IN THIS REGARD. AS PART OF OUR BROADER STRATEGY FOR CARRYING THE WESTERN CASE ON SECURITY ISSUES TO EUROPEAN PUBLICS MORE EFFECTIVELY, WE HAVE PREPARED A COMPREHENSIVE SPEAKERS PACKET ON INF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION. THIS WILL BE POUCHED TO YOU THE WEEK OF FEB 28 - MARCH 4. WE INTEND TO SUPPLEMENT THIS PACKET WITH ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AS SOON AS THIS BECOMES AVAILABLE, INCLUDING DRAFT SPEECH MATERIAL AND A COMPENDIUM OF SOVIET STATEMENTS RELATING TO INF WHICH CAN BE USED AS AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO SPECIFIC SOVIET

PROPAGANDA THEMES. WE HOPE THAT THIS MATERIAL WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU AND WOULD WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON ADDITIONAL ITEMS WHICH WE MIGHT USEFULLY PROVIDE.

3. WE WELCOME USNATO'S SUGGESTION (REFTEL A) NOTAL FOR REGULAR MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF BRIEF TALKING POINTS ON INF. WE DO INDEED INTEND TO SUPPLEMENT THE PACKET OF BRIEFING MATERIALS WITH PERIODIC CABLES ADDRESSING NEW SOVIET PROPAGANDA THEMES, AS THEY APPEAR, AND PROVIDING ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ELABORATING ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF THE WESTERN INF POSITION WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN GREATER DETAIL.

4. THE INF SPEAKERS PACKET IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE POSTS WITH A BROAD RANGE OF USEFUL, PUBLICLY USEABLE INFORMATION ON THE WESTERN AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON KEY INF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION ISSUES. IT ALSO PROVIDES REBUTTAL MATERIAL AIMED AT COUNTERING THE MAJOR SOVIET PROPAGANDA THEMES. THE CONTENTS OF THE PACKET COVER A BROAD RANGE OF MATERIAL. THIS INCLUDES KEY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS; SUGGESTED THEMES AND APPROACHES TO BE USED IN DISCUSSING ALLIED POSITIONS; AN INF CHRONOLOGY; QS AND AS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES AND FACT SHEETS. THE PACKAGE ALSO PROVIDES POSTS WITH INFORMATION ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES INCLUDING START, MBFR, CSCE, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS,

NON-PROLIFERATION, CBMS, AND NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS, AS WELL AS ON THE NATO FORCE COMPARISON PAPER -- WHICH SHOULD BE DRAWN ON IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE EAST-WEST FORCE BALANCE.

5. AMBASSADORS SHOULD MAKE THE PACKET AND ALL SUBSEQUENT MATERIAL IN THIS INF INFORMATION SERIES AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL AND ENSURE THAT IT IS USED AS EFFECTIVELY AND WIDELY AS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, MEDIA, ACADEMICS AND GENERAL PUBLIC WE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL, CAREFULLY TAILORED PRESENTATIONS TO FIT THE PARTICULAR SITUATION PREVAILING IN EACH COUNTRY. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT TAKE THE LEAD IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESENTATIONS ON THE INF ISSUE WITH POSTS PROVIDING AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE TO HOST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT POSTS VIEW THE INF PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAMPAIGN AS A HIGH PRIORITY PROGRAM REQUIRING AN IMAGINATIVE, CREATIVE AND ENERGETIC COUNTRY TEAM EFFORT UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP. IT IS

PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR SPEAKERS TO PUT OUR INF PROPOSALS WITHIN THE BROADER FRAMEWORK OF US FOREIGN POLICY, OUR PURSUIT OF PEACE AND OUR DESIRE FOR REAL REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONRY. SPEAKERS SHOULD AVOID AT SAME TIME BECOMING BOGGED DOWN IN DISCUSSIONS OF TECHNICAL DETAILS.

6. YOU WILL WANT OF COURSE TO HIT HARDEST AT THOSE THEMES OF GREATEST CURRENCY AND INTEREST IN THE HOST COUNTRY. HOWEVER FOR YOUR GENERAL GUIDANCE, WE ARE PROVIDING IN PARA 7 BELOW SOME SUGGESTED THEMES WHICH HAVE PROVEN PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN PAST PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESENTATIONS. IN ADDITION, IN PARA 8 BELOW IS A SUGGESTED "ROADMAP" FOR APPROACHING THE INF ISSUE. THIS REFLECTS OUR OWN JUDGMENT THAT THE BEST WAY TO LEAD OFF A DISCUSSION OF INF IS TO STRESS THT THIS IS AN ALLIANCE ISSUE.

7. SUGGESTED THEMES FOR GENERAL SECURITY DISCUSSION

I. PEACE

-- THE WEST IS WORKING FOR PEACE: (1) DIPLOMACY AROUND THE WORLD (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA) (2) EFFECTIVE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF WEAPONS OF VARIOUS KINDS; (3) DETERRENCE.

PROGRESS TOWARD GREATER SECURITY AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS IS MADE POSSIBLE BY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WEST'S PRUDENT DETERRENCE POLICY.

DETERRENCE IS THE ESSENTIAL FOUNDATION FOR PEACE.

-- NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIES WILL NEVER BE THE FIRST PARTY TO EMPLOY MILITARY FORCE IN A CONFLICT. YOU COULD QUOTE REAGAN NOV. 18, 1981 SPEECH.

II. ALLIANCE UNITY

-- STRONG ALLIANCE HAS KEPT PEACE IN EUROPE FOR ALMOST 35 YEARS. UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT OR ABANDONING THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE WOULD INCREASE RISK OF WAR. SOVIET EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE THE ALLIES (RECALL RECENT THREATS AGAINST JAPAN, AND THREATS TO EXPAND NUCLEAR ARSENAL TARGETTED ON WESTERN EUROPE) WILL NOT SUCCEED.

-- ALLIANCE UNITY IS BASED ON MORE THAN RECOGNITION OF A COMMON SECURITY THREAT. NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL STRENGTH IS THAT IT IS VOLUNTARY ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES. ALLIANCE UNITY REFLECTS OUR COMMON ADHERENCE TO CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES--E.G., FREE AND OPEN SOCIETIES AND GOVERNMENT BY THE ACTUAL CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED. ALLIANCE UNITY IS THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE STRENGTH AND IS THEREFORE THE BASIS OF A SECURE PEACE.

-- THE TWO-PART INF DECISION WAS AN ALLIANCE DECISION. INF POLICY HAS BEEN COORDINATED CONTINUOUSLY AMONG THE ALLIES.

III. NEGOTIATIONS

-- PRESIDENT HAS CHANGED FOCUS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE NO LONGER SPEAKING ONLY OF LIMITING INCREASES OR CAPPING AT PRESENT UNACCEPTABLY HIGH LEVELS. THE OBJECTIVE NOW IS REAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS PRESENTED IN THE INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE ARMS REDUCTION PROGRAM EVER OFFERED BY ANY GOVERNMENT.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S INF PROPOSAL, STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIES, AIMS TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IF THE PRESIDENT'S SOLUTION IS ACCEPTED, THERE WOULD BE NO LAND-BASED LRINF MISSILES ANYWHERE; ABANDONMENT OF THIS PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD MEAN MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NOT FEWER. OUIR PROPOSAL IS A MORAL ONE, WHICH OFFERS THE SAFEST AND MOST STABLE OUTCOME FOR ALL CONCERNED.

-- THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR NATO TO DEPLOY LAND-BASED LONG RANGE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (LRINF) IF THE SOVIETS AGREED TO DISMANTLE THEIR SS-4S, SS-5S, AND SS-20S.

-- SOVIETS AGREED TO DISCUSS ELIMINATION OF INF ONLY AFTER NATO DECIDED TO DEPLOY IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ARMS AGREEMENT. THE ONLY ARGUMENT WE HAVE HEARD AGAINST OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT LIKE IT. IT IS THE SOVIETS, NOT THE WEST, WHO ARE INSISTING UPON MAINTAINING THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS.

-- HOPE FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS HINGES ON MAINTENANCE OF BALANCE, CONTINUED NATO UNITY AND STRONG DEFENSE. PROSPECTS FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS DEPEND ON CONTINUED NATO ADHERENCE TO BOTH TRACKS OF THE 1979 DECISION.

B. SUGGESTED "ROADMAP" FOR DISCUSSING INF

A. NATO UNITY: NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND THE REAL PEACE MOVEMENT. THE ALLIANCE'S STRATEGY IS TO DETER ANY AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO COUNTRIES BY MAKING CLEAR THAT THE AGGRESSOR HIMSELF WOULD PAY AN UNACCEPTABLY HEAVY PRICE FOR HIS AGGRESSION. NATO'S UNITY AND ITS DETERRENT FORCES HAVE THEREBY KEPT THE PEACE AND MAINTAINED THE FREEDOM OF WESTERN EUROPE FOR ALMOST FORTY YEARS.

B. SOVIET GOALS: CENTRAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE IS TO DESTROY WESTERN UNITY AND TO EXERCISE PREDOMINANT INFLUENCE OVER EUROPE.

-- SS-20 BUILD-UP IS A THREAT DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AT WESTERN EUROPE, DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE EUROPEANS AND CUT THEM OFF FROM THE U.S.

C. NATO RESPONSE: ESSENTIAL MEANING OF NATO DECISION OF 1979 ON INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) WAS TO

REAFFIRM THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE LINK BETWEEN U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE U.S. STRATEGIC UMBRELLA. THE DECISION HAS TWO PARTS: TO MODERNIZE OUR OWN FORCES IN RESPONSE TO THIS SOVIET BUILD-UP AND TO TRY TO BRING DOWN THE LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES THROUGH U.S./SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. THESE TWO PARTS ARE INSEPARABLY LINKED.

D. U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL: U.S. PROPOSES TO ELIMINATE THIS ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS

-- DETERMINED NEGOTIATING EFFORT

-- READY TO HEAR OUT SERIOUS PROPOSALS FROM SOVIETS

-- GLOBAL APPROACH -- WON'T LET SOVIETS PLAY THESE SYSTEMS OFF AGAINST OUR FRIENDS IN ASIA

-- IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SOVIET EQUALITY AND DANGERS OF IMBALANCE; WE WILL BALANCE OFF SOVIET POWER BUT PREFER REAL REDUCTIONS.

-- FALSITY OF SOVIET BALANCE CLAIMS:

O CONTINUED THEIR SS-20 BUILD-UP WHILE THEY CLAIMED THERE WAS ALREADY A BALANCE AND KEPT BUILDING EVEN AFTER THEY ANNOUNCED A "MORATORIUM;"

O SOVIET "OFFER" TO REDUCE ACKNOWLEDGES IMPLICITLY THAT THEY HAVE CREATED IMBALANCE;

O SOVIET VIEW OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: USSR DEPLOYS SYSTEMS WHICH THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE BUT INSISTS THAT NO BALANCING SYSTEMS CAN BE DEPLOYED IN WEST.

E. NATO MODERNIZATION: IT IS IMPORTANT TO ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS THAT MODERNIZATION PART OF NATO DECISION STAY ON TRACK.

-- IT WAS THE NATO DECISION THAT BROUGHT SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATING TABLE. CONTINUED NATO ADHERENCE TO THE DECISION WILL PERSUADE THEM TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

-- US SYSTEMS PLAY UNIQUE ROLE IN PROVIDING SECURITY FOR ENTIRE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING NON-NUCLEAR ALLIES. FRENCH AND UK SYSTEMS ARE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. YY

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We should follow this closely and ensure a very good man —

FOR AMBASSADOR DAILEY

1. The "European Institute for Security Affairs" (EIS) has asked Ambassador Dyess in The Hague for help in arranging for a high-level U.S. key-note speaker during its conference "On West European Defense" scheduled for 18-20 May, 1983 in Luxembourg. To date, the EIS has received no response.

2. Featured speakers will include:

Franz Josef Strauss	FRG
Kai Uwe von Hassel	FRG
David Owen	U.K.
Prof. Dr. Alting von Geussau	Netherlands
Mme Monique Garnier Lancon	France
Henri Simonet	Belgium
Gerhard Redderman	Council of Europe

Schmidt and Vogel have been invited from the FRG

3. Organizers of the conference believe this will be an excellent forum for a high-level representative of the U.S. Administration and Secretary Eagleburger's name has been suggested. The Government of Luxembourg will host the conference. Gaston Thorn will speak. There will be strong media coverage from France, Holland, Belgium and Germany. The conference will be attended by 250 delegates and members drawn primarily from the same countries.

SECRET

Making INF case to the left 18 FEB

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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INCOMING
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GENEVA FOR USINF
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NATO, US, UR
SUBJECT: INF: MAKING OUR CASE TO THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT

REF: STATE Ø36860

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS RECENT EVENTS IN DENMARK AND NORWAY HAVE DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN, OPPOSITION SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES -- MANY OF WHICH BACKED THE 1979 INF DECISION WHEN THEY WERE IN GOVERNMENT -- ARE PLAYING AN ASSERTIVE AND ALL TOO OFTEN UNSUPPORTIVE ROLE IN THE EVOLVING INF DEBATE. AS A RESULT THEY ARE ABLE TO INFLUENCE BOTH PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE AND, IN SOME CASES, THE APPROACH AND PUBLIC POSTURE OF GOVERNMENTS THEMSELVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1979 DECISION. POSTS SHOULD THEREFORE PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY ON SUSTAINING WITH INFLUENTIAL DEMOCRATIC LEFT OPPOSITION GROUPS A DIALOGUE ON INF FOCUSING ON THE SAME POINTS -- SUCH AS IN REFTEL -- THAT WE ARE CONVEYING TO GOVERNMENTS AND PARTIES IN POWER.

3. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOME ARGUMENTS ARE MORE RELEVANT TO THE CONCERNS OF CERTAIN GROUPS THAN OTHERS, AND JUDICIOUS SELECTION AND EMPHASIS ARE ESSENTIAL IF OUR MESSAGE IS TO GET THROUGH. WE WOULD THUS WELCOME ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ABOUT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO "REACH" LOCAL LEFT OPPOSITION GROUPS OR THE LEFT OPPOSITION GENERALLY IN EUROPE.

4. POSTS SHOULD ALSO BE ALERT TO AND INFORM DEPARTMENT OF OCCASIONS WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BY PROVIDING CURRENT INF ARGUMENTATION TO SELECTED PARTICIPANTS. THESE RANGE FROM POSTS' OWN CONTACTS WITH HIGH-LEVEL INTERLOCUTORS ON THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT TO SCHEDULED SI MEETINGS OR OTHER GATHERINGS, SUCH AS THOSE OF THE SMALL COUNTRY PARTIES, WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF OR GENERATE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON INF. WE WILL IN PARTICULAR WANT TO ENSURE THAT, BEFORE THESE PARTIES, INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY, TAKE PUBLIC POSITIONS ON INF, WE HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE OUR MOST RELEVANT ARGUMENTS KNOWN IN A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE WAY. SHULTZ
BT

SECRET

The United Irish & American Society of Illinois

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the tragic situation in Northern Ireland escalates and the possibility of a solution remains static, the Irish and Irish American clubs in the United States are uniting into coalition groups for the purpose of political action. The United Irish and American Society of Illinois is such a coalition. The Society represents thousands of Irish and American Irish in the greater Chicago area.

As Irish and American Irish we can no longer remain silent or passive while our fellow men and women in Ulster suffer personal grief, economic depression, and blatant abuse of their human rights at the hands of a foreign power. The Irish Declaration of Independence of 1916 states, "...We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies..."

We urge you, as President of the United States to take a firm stand against the British occupation of Northern Ireland. We entreat you to use the great power of your office to explore every means at your disposal to initiate peace talks between the various political factions involved in this continuing controversy.

Freedom loving people of the world cannot remain neutral in regard to Northern Ireland. Ireland has waited for eight hundred years to be united and to be free. The time for a free and united Ireland is NOW.

Very respectfully yours,

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ

FROM: AMBASSADOR DAILEY

SUBJECT: MAjor Address on Arms Reduction Issues

In our public campaign to retain the initiative on arms control issues in general, and INF in particular, we are our plan is to keep

One important aspect of our public campaign to retain the initiative on INF is a series of authoritative public statements by ~~U.S. government~~ high U.S. government officials. The President addressed arms reduction issues in his State of the Union message, and in his address to the American Legion on February 22. The Vice President during his trip to Europe and in two major addresses put forward the U.S. position on I.N.F.

It is important for our INF policy that you take a more active role in explaining U.S. arms reduction policies, and INF policies in particular. You have not made a mojor address on this subject, You are a trusted and respected figure in Europe, and a n address by you in the next veral weeks would help keep the initiative on these issues. The overall approach of your speech, as I would envision it, would be to emphasize that this Administration has taken a new approach to arms control - arms reductions.

CRITERIA FOR AN INF AGREEMENT

Nitze in Geneva

1. Equality of rights and limits between the US and the USSR.

2. These negotiations, being bilateral in nature, should address only the systems of the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. Limits should be applied to LRINF missiles regardless of location.

4. An agreement limiting nuclear forces should not weaken the contribution of the United States to NATO's conventional deterrence and defense.

5. An agreement resulting from these negotiations must be verifiable.

President's Feb 22 Speech

- The only basis on which a fair agreement can be reached is that of equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- As a corollary, British and French strategic systems are, by definition, not a part of these bilateral negotiations and, therefore, not to be considered in them.
- In addition, Soviet proposals—which have the effect of shifting the threat from Europe to Asia—cannot be considered reasonable.
- And finally, as in all areas of arms control, it will be essential that an INF agreement be underwritten by effective measures for verification.