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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
140983	MEMO	JOHN BOYLE TO THE AMBASSADOR RE NOTES FROM DINNER <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	5	2/8/1983	B1

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Washington, D.C. 20520



CONFIDENTIAL

Feb 2

*Andropov
Proposals*

MEMORANDUM TO: NSC - Dennis C. Blair

FROM: PM - Robert Dean

SUBJECT: European Security and Arms Control Public
Diplomacy Committee: "Response to Andropov
Proposals"

Attached are the incorporated comments from the interagency clearance process of the draft guidance on the Andropov package.

Attachments:

As stated.

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DECLASSIFIED


Dept of State Collection, July 21, 1997

CONFIDENTIAL

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Drafted: PM/TMP:HStoffer
2/2/83:x28681

Clearances: PM - RDean
EUR - JDobbins
JCS - EBrooks
USIA - SThompson
JShirley
OSD - SCook
RHammer
ACDA - LFischer (in substance)



February 2, 1983

SOVIET INF POSITION

Q: What is your response to the announcement by Andropov that the Soviet Union is ready to reduce the number of its missiles in Europe to the number of missiles deployed by the UK and France and to consider separate ceilings for missiles and aircraft?

A. -- Mr. Andropov's proposal was not new; major elements of it surfaced during the Fall round of negotiations in Geneva. We carefully considered and discussed the proposal with our NATO allies, and our public reaction to Mr. Andropov's speech was based on the unanimous view of the Alliance that the Soviet offer was unacceptable.

-- The Soviet proposal fails to meet the fundamental criterion of equality. It would perpetuate a dangerous military imbalance and prevent our ability to counter the threat posed to NATO by Soviet deployment of the triple-warhead mobile SS-20 force, resulting in a significant increase in deployed warheads. It would permit the Soviets to retain a substantial force of SS-20 missiles while blocking NATO's planned deployment of any modernized U.S. longer-range INF missiles. A Soviet monopoly over the United States in longer-range INF missiles is unacceptable.

-- The Soviet Union is seeking to limit the US ability to defend Europe and is trying to decouple the US strategic deterrent from NATO forces.

-- Failing a concrete arms control agreement, modernization of NATO's INF is necessary to restore a military balance in Europe which is the necessary condition for peace. It will strengthen NATO's deterrent, which for 30 years has kept the

peace in Europe, and will keep the US strategically linked to the defense of Europe.

-- If NATO does not take steps to correct the imbalance of forces in Europe and preserve its deterrent, the imbalance could over the long run, result in a Soviet perception that the defense of Europe had indeed been decoupled from the US central strategic force thus encouraging the Soviets to use their preponderance of nuclear forces to intimidate Europe politically.

-- We have offered to forego our deployments of longer-range land-based INF missiles if the Soviets eliminate all their SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 LRINF missiles regardless of where they are located. We have made it clear that we will not accept an unequal agreement.

-- The Soviet proposal is not acceptable as a basis for negotiation because it is fundamentally unbalanced and would leave them a large force of LRINF missiles on the one hand and the US none on the other. It would permit Soviet retention of 162 SS-20 systems or 486 warheads threatening Europe, and would not limit SS-20s in the Soviet East. The SS-20 is a mobile, accurate, triple-warhead missile with a 5000 kilometer range, capable of threatening Europe from most parts of the Soviet Union.

-- The talks in Geneva are strictly bilateral negotiations focusing on US and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles. Justifying a continued Soviet monopoly over the US on the basis of British and French missiles is unacceptable.

British and French forces are the independent nuclear systems of sovereign governments. They are strategic forces which deter Soviet nuclear threats to Britain and France—and do not provide deterrence for non-nuclear NATO nations. They are not designed to deter attack on the rest of NATO Europe nor to ensure coupling with the United States strategic force. In the overall numbers balance, the Soviets overwhelmingly outnumber the nuclear systems of the UK, France, and the US combined. The USSR has at least a 4 - 1 advantage over NATO in comparable nuclear systems deployed in Europe.

-- We cannot accept the proposition that the US should agree to the principle of compensating the Soviets for British and French nuclear systems. The Soviets are, in fact, claiming the right to be stronger than any one nuclear power, and indeed equal to all combined. The United States will not negotiate on the forces of independent countries, nor will we discuss compensation for such forces.

-- Although the Soviets have an overwhelming preponderance of nuclear capable aircraft, we believe the talks should focus on the systems of greatest concern -- longer-range INF missiles. In any case, the Andropov proposal for reductions in nuclear-capable aircraft is vague, despite requests by the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Arthur Hartman, for more details. We have no reason to expect that it is anything more than a repetition of previous Soviet proposals to reduce the US contribution to NATO's conventional and nuclear deterrent without accepting comparable constraints on Soviet air power, which is vastly superior numerically to NATO.

-- By all appearances, the Soviet objective in the negotiations, as in this proposal, is to prevent NATO deployments through political means, and ultimately to eliminate the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe while retaining their own nuclear forces.

-- Although the Andropov proposal is unacceptable as a basis for serious negotiations, there are some positive aspects:

- By offering to reduce its LRINF missiles to a level equal to those of Britain and France, the Soviet Union implicitly recognizes the imbalance in longer-range INF missiles in their favor, thus eroding the balance argument upon which their entire negotiating position is based.
- By this proposal the Soviets may also recognize the need to handle LRINF missiles and aircraft separately, and the need to reduce LRINF missiles as a matter of first priority. This has been a basic tenet of the US negotiating position from the beginning.

-- In the negotiations, we continue to propose the elimination of the entire class of longer-range INF missiles. The adjustments the Soviets have made in their position may reflect some recognition on their part of the merits of our proposal and the need to respond to it, in the public domain as well as in Geneva. We believe that a determined stand on our current position can evince further Soviet movement.

February 2, 1983

INF - Regional vs. Global Limitations

Q: Why do we support global versus regional limits on longer-range INF missiles?

A: -- Andropov's proposal would not require the Soviet Union to reduce or even constrain Soviet systems in the Soviet East. Because of their long range and transportability, Soviet SS-20s deployed in the Soviet East presently pose a threat to NATO as well as to our friends and allies in Asia. If Soviet missiles now in Europe were simply withdrawn and redeployed to the Soviet East, they too would pose a threat to areas of NATO Europe and Asia. Therefore, we cannot agree to the Soviet proposal for regional LRINF limitations which would permit the Soviets to retain mobile missile forces in the Soviet East that could be moved back into position to threaten NATO. We propose a global ban on SS-20s, a ban which is easier to verify than either a regional limitation or a numerically limited force of INF systems.

February 2, 1983

INF -- SOVIET MOVEMENT?

Q: The previous Soviet position would have allowed the USSR to maintain a force of up to 300 SS-20s in the European USSR. The position disclosed by Mr. Andropov could require the reduction of a large number of Soviet missiles, including some SS-20s. Doesn't this show movement on the part of the Soviets?

A. -- Soviet expressions of willingness to reduce their LRINF missiles indicate the Soviets may be coming to recognize the problem created by their overwhelming superiority in longer-range INF missiles and by their negotiating proposals which seek to preserve that advantage.

-- Nevertheless, the overall Soviet position continues to contradict the principle of equality.

-- This position would result in the basic outcome sought by the Soviets since before the negotiations began -- preservation of a substantial LRINF monopoly over the U.S. which poses a threat to our friends and allies. Such an outcome is unacceptable.

-- Moreover, the "hundreds" of missiles which Mr. Andropov has offered to reduce would consist mostly of aging SS-4s and SS-5s which already were slated for retirement. The Soviets would retain a large force of modern, triple-warhead, mobile SS-20 missiles which are capable of striking targets throughout all of Europe and much of Asia and North Africa. Those SS-20s which would be reduced in the Soviet proposal may not be destroyed, but merely transported to other regions of the USSR where they would still be able to pose a threat to NATO and Asian Allies and friends.

-- The so-called concessions by Mr. Andropov and others are merely variations on an old theme of maintaining a superior nuclear force in Europe and of preventing NATO from deterring that threat with a modernized force of its own. These proposals do not address the fundamental security needs of NATO and therefore cannot be viewed as serious attempts to move the negotiations forward. Rather, they are efforts to play to the Western publics and create the impression of making concessions and showing flexibility.

-- Although the Andropov proposal is unacceptable as a basis for serious negotiations, there are some positive aspects:

- By offering to reduce its LRINF missiles to a level equal to those of Britain and France, the Soviet Union implicitly recognizes the imbalance in longer-range INF missiles in their favor, thus eroding the balance argument upon which their entire negotiating position is based.
- By this proposal the Soviets may also recognize the need to handle LRINF missiles and aircraft separately, and the need to reduce LRINF missiles as a matter of first priority. This has been a basic tenet of the US negotiating position from the beginning.

February 2, 1983

INF -- UK AND FRENCH FORCES

Q: Andropov and other Soviets are suggesting that their missiles in Europe be reduced to the level of UK and French missiles. Since the UK and France are U.S. Allies, why does the U.S. refuse to take account of UK and French systems in the INF negotiations?

A. -- The Soviet argument that an agreement must include UK and French nuclear forces is intended to substantiate a highly contrived claim that a balance in so-called "medium-range" forces exists in Europe. The Soviet goal is to bring about a result that would decouple the U.S. from its European allies. It should be noted that in all past arms control agreements over the last 13 years the Soviets have reached agreement with the U.S. based on equality of U.S. and Soviet forces without reference to the forces of other countries. Moreover, in overall numbers, the Soviets overwhelmingly outnumber the medium-range missiles and aircraft of the UK and France.

-- The Geneva INF talks are explicitly bilateral negotiations focusing on U.S. and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles. The UK and France are sovereign nations. The U.S. cannot negotiate or discuss compensation for their independent sovereign nuclear forces. The British and French Governments have firmly rejected any consideration of the inclusion of their nuclear forces in the INF negotiations.

-- They are strategic forces which deter Soviet threats to the UK and France alone. The Soviets are inconsistent in asking for compensation in the INF talks for British and French nuclear forces, since they acknowledged in both the SALT I and

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SALT II negotiations that the British/French systems are strategic systems. Moreover, British/French systems are mainly sea-based and thus are consequently less stabilizing than land-based systems and are outside the scope of the INF talks.

-- The forces of the UK and France represent minimum unilateral national deterrents and are not comparable to the land-based longer-range INF missiles of the US and USSR.

-- In essence, the Soviet position amounts to a demand that the Soviet Union be granted the right to maintain nuclear forces equal to those of all other powers combined. This totally contradicts the principle of equality in U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements.

-- Moreover, Andropov's proposals, if implemented, would leave only French and British nuclear forces in Europe to face Soviet missiles and bombers. UK/French nuclear forces are the minimum essential for unilateral national deterrence. They provide no protection for other, non-nuclear NATO nations, as the US LRINF is designed to do and which can deter a huge and growing Soviet nuclear arsenal. The USSR has at least a 4-1 advantage over NATO in comparable nuclear systems deployed in Europe.

-- The Soviet Union is seeking to limit the US ability to defend Europe and is trying to decouple the US strategic deterrent from NATO forces. Failing a concrete arms control agreement, modernization of NATO's INF will strengthen NATO's deterrent and will keep the US strategically linked to the defense of Europe.

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February 2, 1983

U.S. RESPONSE

Q: Will you be formally responding to the Andropov proposal now that the negotiations have resumed in Geneva.

A. -- The Andropov proposal of December 21, 1982 was not new. A missile sub-ceiling tied to the nuclear forces of the UK and France was proposed in Round Three of the INF negotiations in the Fall of 1982.

-- We expect the Soviets will discuss this proposal further during this current negotiating round. We intend to continue negotiating seriously and we are willing to consider any constructive Soviet proposal that adequately addresses the security concerns of NATO. But as we have repeatedly stated, we continue to believe that the zero/zero outcome, which would eliminate the entire class of longer-range INF missiles, provides the best and most equitable arms control solution.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 3, 1983

Dear Dennis:

As you know from our conversations and the discussions of the Interagency Committee on European Security and Arms Reduction, the President and I believe that we must make a concerted effort to get our arms control message across to European publics. In that context your active participation is vital to the success of our program.

We hope that you will, in the weeks and months ahead, be available to speak to select groups in Europe, just as you have made your time and talents available in the past.

In order to determine your current travel plans and other dates when you may be available to go to Europe, I have asked Richard Bissell, Director, Office of Program Coordination and Development of USIA to contact your staff.

Many thanks in advance for your continuing effort and assistance on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Peter H. Dailey".

Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
European Public Diplomacy Committee

Mr. Dennis Blair
National Security Council
Washington, D.C.

Problems in Promoting Democracy

NEW YORK TIMES—Fri. Feb. 4

By JEFF GERTH 1983

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 — The Reagan Administration's public campaign to promote democracy, announced with great fanfare by the President last June, has been embroiled in a bureaucratic tussle over funding and the question of whether the Central Intelligence Agency should have a significant role.

Ultimately, the participation of the C.I.A. and plans for unspecified covert activities were dropped from the program, because it was thought that "the quickest way to destroy the program was to have any association with the agency," according to Robert C. McFarlane, deputy director of the National Security Council.

The bureaucratic struggle illustrates two realities in Washington: first, involvement with the C.I.A. has become so sensitive that the agency's participation in any public project is often counterproductive, and second, whenever new funds become available, agencies will inevitably stumble over one another to get a piece of the project.

In addition, aides to Senate conservatives this week raised their own questions about the ideological roots of the organizations that are to receive some \$65 million being sought by the Administration for the democracy project.

Announcement to Parliament

Specifically, aides to four conservative Republican Senators told Charles Z. Wick, director of the United States Information Agency, that they would not support the project unless conservative organizations got more financing, according to Congressional and Government sources.

The public diplomacy program was first announced by President Reagan in his address to the British Parliament last June and was started last month by a classified executive order signed by Mr. Reagan.

To carry out the campaign, which is to be coordinated by William P. Clark, the national security adviser, the Administration is proposing numerous training, education and exchange programs involving such Government agencies as the U.S.I.A. as well as private institutions.

But funds for the program have yet to be approved by Congress and the Administration's \$65 million budget request for the fiscal year 1984 is in jeopardy.

News Conference Scheduled

In an attempt to answer some of these questions, Administration officials, possibly Mr. McFarlane and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, are scheduled to hold a news conference in the near future. Parts of last month's executive order may be disclosed at that time in order to allay concerns about any possible covert component. Earlier this week Mr. McFarlane agreed to try to declassify the order, National Security Decision Document (NSDD) 77, after a request by a reporter from The New York Times.

Other Government documents obtained by The Times show the following:

¶A document prepared on Aug. 3 by Mark Palmer, a State Department official, for a Cabinet-level meeting

noted that the agenda included discussion of a four-part Government organizational structure for the project — information, political, covert and a quasi-governmental institute. The C.I.A. and a subcommittee of the National Security Council, the National Security Planning Group, were to be responsible for the covert component, according to the document. The con-

**'If we have the
C.I.A. in this
we can call it off
right off the bat.'**

*—Robert C. McFarlane,
National Security Council*

templated covert activities were not spelled out.

¶The Palmer document, which was labeled secret/sensitive, noted under the heading "DOD input" that "Both in the N.S.C. organizational structure and the N.S.D.D., one must address how much of the political action contemplated is already covered by law and Executive Order providing for Covert Action."

It added: "We need to examine how

law and Executive Order can be made more liberal to permit covert action on a broader scale, as well as what we can do through substantially increased overt political action."

¶A proposed list, dated Oct. 2, of more than 75 programs funded by the U.S.I.A., included a "Public Diplomacy Data Base" project that would have an "interactive computer network" that would tie "in with certain elements of the C.I.A. system." Mr. McFarlane and officials of the information agency say this project has been dropped and that the final list of projects is still being worked on.

Mr. McFarlane said that he, Mr. Eagleburger and others began to worry about the intelligence agency's involvement in late July, and succeeded in getting the C.I.A. "put firmly out of the program" at a meeting Aug. 31.

"Let's not be naive — if we have the C.I.A. in this we can call it off right off the bat," Mr. McFarlane said he remembered thinking at the time.

Revelations in the 1960's about covert financing of educational and charitable institutions by the C.I.A. led to a national policy adopted in 1967 prohibiting covert financial assistance or support to such institutions. Some of the same institutions that figured in that debate are slated to receive open, noncovert assistance in the public diplomacy project, according to Mr. McFarlane.

FILED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY



COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH



AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

John M. Fisher
President

FROM: John Fisher
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL
DATE: February 8, 1983
RE: NATIONAL NETWORK TIME FOR
COUNTDOWN FOR AMERICA

Directors

- Gus A. Buder, Jr.
- Stephen L. Donchess
- John M. Fisher
- Steven R. Fisher
- Col. Phelps Jones (Ret.)
- A. B. McKee, Jr.
- Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.)
- Maj. Gen. Milnor Roberts, USAR
- Mrs. June Stolte
- Mrs. Florence Taylor

National Strategy Committee

- Co-Chairman
- Amb. Elbridge Durbrow
- Maj. Gen. Robert E. L. Eaton
USAF (Ret.)

- John M. Fisher
- Robert W. Galvin
- Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, USAF (Ret.)
- Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.)
- Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.)
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- Gen. Bernard A. Schriever
USAF (Ret.)

- Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF (Ret.)
- Dr. William R. Van Cleave
Members

- James Angleton
- Prof. James D. Atkinson
- G. Duncan Bauman
- Brig. Gen. E. F. Black, Jr., USA (Ret.)
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- Francis B. Burch
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- Lt. Gen. G. M. Graham, USAF (Ret.)
- Vice Adm. E. W. Grenfell, USN (Ret.)
- Gen. Paul D. Harkins, USA (Ret.)
- Clifford F. Hood
- Dr. Montgomery H. Johnson
- Gen. Leon W. Johnson, USAF (Ret.)
- Amb. William R. Kintner
- Vice Adm. Fitzhugh Lee, USN (Ret.)
- Gen. Curtis E. Lemay, USAF (Ret.)
- Maj. Gen. V. B. Lewis, Jr.
USA (Ret.)

- Amb. John Davis Lodge
- Amb. Clare Boothe Luce
- A. B. McKee, Jr.
- Gen. Theodore R. Milton, USAF (Ret.)
- Dr. Robert Morris
- Charles J. V. Murphy
- Asa E. Phillips, Jr.
- Dr. Stefan T. Possony
- Brig. Gen. R. C. Richardson, III
USAF (Ret.)

- Ira G. Ross
- Vice Adm. W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
- Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub
USA (Ret.)

- Prof. Raymond S. Sleeper
- Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
- Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
- Harvey E. Stoehr
- Dr. A. B. Suttle
- Dr. Edward Teller
- Gen. Lewis W. Walt, USMC (Ret.)
- Dr. Kenneth M. Watson
- Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
USA (Ret.)

- Gen. I. D. White, USA (Ret.)
- Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
- Harvey Williams

The Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign has selected March 7 and 8 as NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE NATIONAL LOBBY DAY in both Houses of Congress.

Speaker Tip O'Neill plans to bring up the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution in early March. He expects that his 26 more Democrats will give him a win this time. (The freeze campaign is aiming at 300 votes in the House.)

This would be 1) a devastating blow to the President's nuclear weapons modernization program and 2) escalate the Nuclear Freeze issue in the 1984 campaign.

We urge that the Republican National Committee mount a major campaign on this issue built around network showings of our TV documentary COUNTDOWN FOR AMERICA.

COUNTDOWN FOR AMERICA was produced in cooperation with Senator Tower - who plays the central role in the film. A special team representing the Department of Defense and the National Security Council was set up to provide advice and criticism. This team reviewed the film at all stages of production to ensure accuracy.

Charlton Heston has now become the host of the documentary. We are now editing the film to include three Heston segments: introduction, comments on the freeze and close.

We cannot buy network time because the networks insist on producing their own news and public affairs programs.

Political parties are the only exception to this network policy. That's why the RNC's decision is so important.

Last fall, I had lined up the money for the RNC to sponsor a network showing for COUNTDOWN. This was approved at the RNC, but not at the White House.

If the RNC is interested, I will try to reactivate that support for a network showing.

John M. Fisher
John M. Fisher

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PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH DAY

MARCH 8, 1983

Featuring Rallies in Washington, D. C. and in 50 State Capitals

At 12:00 Noon, March 8, 1983, members of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, a bi-partisan alliance of pro-defense leaders and organizations, will rally at the nation's capitol and in 50 state capitals in support of the passage of the Peace Through Strength Resolution in the Congress and by the state legislatures which haven't already passed it.

These rallies are also intended to express opposition to the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution whose supporters will be rallying at the U.S. Capitol at the same time.

The rallies by both sides will call visual attention to the head-to-head confrontation between the two Resolutions in the Congress and the state legislatures. And, both sides will be visiting Members of Congress on March 7 and 8 in person and by phone and letter.

To date, each Resolution has been passed by 12 state legislatures.

Members of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength include 229 Members of Congress from both parties, and 126 national organizations. A major purpose of the March 8 effort is to significantly increase this support.

President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey, Jr. have all endorsed the Peace Through Strength Resolution.

The Coalition for Peace Through Strength believes that the Nuclear Freeze has gained support primarily because it has had little opposition. The Coalition believes that given a clear choice the American people, and the Congress and legislatures which represent them, will overwhelmingly back Peace Through Strength rather than a Freeze into military inferiority.

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PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH DAY
Observed in 50 State Capitols

PURPOSE: 1) To support the Peace Through Strength Resolution passage in state legislature (12 legislatures have passed it - see attached list)
2) To oppose the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution

MAJOR EVENT: Rally on steps of state capitols March 8, 1983 at 12 noon local time

STATE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE: To be formed by local units of national organizations active in Coalition for Peace through Strength then expanded to include as many other organizations as possible including patriotic veterans, business, labor, political, clerical, professional, ethnic and other groups. The first meeting will be coordinated by the state VFW.

EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN: To be selected at first meeting to coordinate all committee activities and be the primary communication link with the national Peace Through Strength Day.

CHAIRMAN: Prominent citizen to be selected by state committee. First consideration should be given to whether the governor would be supportive enough to serve in that role. In seven states, the governor is state chairman for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.

SPEAKERS: The speakers at the rally will be leaders of sponsoring organizations, state legislators and prominent citizens. The American Security Council and the VFW will prepare a folder presenting the primary arguments for Peace Through Strength and against the nuclear weapons freeze for all speakers and participants.

MEDIA: The purpose of the rally is to provide a visual representation of the nationwide support for peace through strength and opposition to the freeze media. Press kits and media contact suggestions will be prepared nationally for local adaptation.

NATIONAL COORDINATION: The American Security Council, as the administrative arm of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, will be the national coordination point and will be in close touch with the state executive chairmen.

Contact John M. Fisher, President or David Spray, Special Projects Director
Phone number: 703/825-8336

American Security Council
Washington Communications Center
Boston, Virginia 22713

Battle Score Sheet 19

Nuclear Freeze vs. Peace Through Strength

	ENDORSEMENT OF NUCLEAR FREEZE NOW	ENDORSEMENT OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH
Passage by State Legislatures	12	13 + Guam
Passage in State Referenda	9	0
U.S. Senators Sponsoring	20	54
U.S. Representatives Voting for or Sponsoring	202	233
Department of Defense	NO	YES
Joint Chiefs of Staff	NO	YES
State Department	NO	YES
National Security Council	NO	YES
President Ronald Reagan	NO	YES
Organizations	72	127
TV Networks	<i>Frequent mention to point of advocacy</i>	<i>Never mentioned</i>

The nuclear freeze supporters have aggressively promoted their views while peace through strength supporters have been relatively passive. For example, tens of millions of dollars have been spent promoting the nuclear freeze against hundreds of thousands for peace through strength.

But, pro-defense leaders are now realizing the seriousness of the nuclear freeze threat and will be reacting more vigorously.

Just as in the SALT II Treaty debate, a majority of Americans now favor the idea of a freeze but would overwhelmingly oppose a freeze at a time when the United States is inferior. The more they know about it, the more Americans oppose a nuclear freeze.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 97th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 128

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1982

No. 145

Senate

(Legislative day of Tuesday, November 30, 1982)

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 133—CONCURRENT RESOLUTION RELATING TO PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

Mr. LAXALT (for himself, Mr. TOWER, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. BOREN, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. CANNON, Mr. CHILES, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. DENTON, Mr. DOLE, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. EAST, Mr. GARN, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. HATCH, Mrs. HAWKINS, Mr. HAYAKAWA, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. JEPSEN, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. LONG, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. McCLURE, Mr. MATTINGLY, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. NUNN, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. ROTH, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. SASSER, Mr. SCHMITT, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. SYMMS, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. WALLOP, Mr. WARNER, and Mr. ZORINSKY), submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

S. CON. RES. 133

Whereas the Soviet Union has exploited United States peace initiatives in order to build up Soviet strategic and conventional warfare capabilities;

Whereas these capabilities have given the Soviet Union the means to support worldwide aggression of an increasingly bold nature;

Whereas there is a basis for concern that the Soviets may use these capabilities in armed aggression in Pakistan, Iran, and Yugoslavia;

Whereas the Soviet Union has demonstrated an unwillingness to live by the principles of international law;

Whereas the United States is the one world power that can stop Soviet expansionism: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the national security policy of the United States should reflect a national strategy of peace through strength, the general principles and goals of which would be—

(1) to inspire, focus, and unite the national will and determination to achieve peace and freedom,

(2) to achieve overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union,

(3) to create a strategic and civil defense which would protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is protected,

(4) to accept no arms control agreement which in any way jeopardizes the security of the United States or its allies, or which locks the United States into a position of military inferiority,

(5) to reestablish effective security and intelligence capabilities,

(6) to pursue positive nonmilitary means to roll back the growth of communism,

(7) to help our allies and other non-Communist countries defend themselves against Communist aggression, and

(8) to maintain a strong economy and protect our overseas sources of energy and other vital raw materials.

Mr. LAXALT. Mr. President, the greatest problem we have as a Nation is how to deal with the growing Soviet politico-military threat to us and the rest of the free world.

The invasion of Afghanistan and the repression of Poland are reminders that the Soviets are as ruthless as were the Nazis in expanding and consolidating their totalitarian empire.

Soviet expansionism has been driven by the goal of world domination and guided by a grand strategy to achieve that goal.

Soviet successes have been possible only because the United States has had neither a goal or a strategy in this conflict. U.S. policy has been essentially that of reacting to Soviet initiatives in defense of the status quo.

Now, the Soviets have gained a significant nuclear and conventional military superiority over the United States. This, together with the powerful Soviet worldwide propaganda and disinformation network promoting disarmament in the West, makes rebuilding our defenses an urgent necessity.

First, though, we should adopt a national goal in this conflict and a grand strategy based on all elements of our national power—economic, political and military—to achieve that goal.

On June 8, 1982, before the British Parliament, President Ronald Reagan proposed that this goal should be “a world in which all people are at least free to determine their destiny.”

To achieve that goal, President Reagan called for a “crusade for freedom” designed to “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history” through a “global campaign for democracy.”

In this connection, President Reagan declared that “it is time that we committed ourselves as a Nation—in both the public and private sectors—to assist democratic development.”

I believe that most Americans agree with the goal so eloquently expressed by President Reagan and will support the adoption of a national strategy of peace through strength to achieve that goal.

That is why I and 54 other Members of this body are cosponsoring a concurrent resolution calling for the adoption of a national strategy of peace through strength.

There are eight basic principles inherent in a national strategy of peace through strength. These principles will serve to clarify the direction of the strategy and the basis of some of its details, and they will serve as a yardstick to evaluate competing programs and initiatives. Unless the United States speedily adopts such a strategy to coordinate its national security efforts, it is doomed to ineffective policies, uncoordinated responses to Soviet aggression, and ultimately, a great growth in the power and influence of the Soviet Union.

President Reagan was an early endorser of this resolution and it appeared as the defense strategy plank of the 1980 Republican Convention platform.

The President has said that he will sign this resolution, when it is passed by both Houses of Congress.

In this connection, it is important to note that this resolution, as House Concurrent Resolution No. 163, has been cosponsored by 238 Members of the House of Representatives and has been referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

This resolution has been endorsed by Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense; Gen. John Vissey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Powell Moore, Deputy Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; and Judge William Clark, National Security Assistant to the President. I ask unanimous consent that the letters be printed in the *Record* at the end of this statement.

This resolution has already been passed by 13 State legislatures; Arizona, Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas, and the Territory of Guam.

In addition, 127 national organizations have endorsed the resolution. I request that the organizations be listed at the end of this statement.

Whatever the outcome of the outcome of the conflict between Soviet totalitarianism and democracy, the result is sure to be “peace through strength.” What is being decided now is whose strength and whose peace.

So I urge that we all make this commitment to peace because, as President Reagan told the British Parliament, the struggle is “a trial of spiritual resolve” and at stake are “the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.”

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

Washington, D.C., September 16, 1982.

HON. STEVEN D. SYMMS,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: I understand that you, together with a large number of co-sponsors, are preparing to introduce the Peace Through Strength Resolution in the Senate. The passage of this Resolution will again demonstrate the strength of bipartisan support for the President's national security programs, which are designed to restore the margin of safety to U.S. military power. The Department of Defense strongly supports the intent and purpose of this initiative. We appreciate the effort you and your colleagues are making to express so effectively the support of the Senate for a strong defense program.

CAP WEINBERGER.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

September 27, 1982.

HON. STEVEN D. SYMMS,

U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SYMMS: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently maintained the view that the security of our country and peace in the world can only be preserved if the defenses of the U.S. are strong. Bipartisan support for the passage of a Peace Through Strength resolution will send a clear signal of this Nation's commitment and resolve to continue to provide for the common defense. We appreciate and support your initiative.

Sincerely,

JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.,
Chairman.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., September 22, 1982.

HON. STEVEN D. SYMMS,

U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR SYMMS: Thank you for your letter of September 20 concerning the Peace Through Strength Resolution.

From the outset, this Administration established as a national priority the correction of important shortcomings in our defense posture. As the President's very difficult budget decisions reflect, we are committed to strengthening our defenses. This Administration will never accept an inferior position, recognizing that our national security and that of our Allies is at stake. A strengthened defense posture is essential to the successful conduct of our foreign policy, and is thus a critical ingredient in maintaining peace and stability in today's troubled world. It is also essential to the achievement of the balanced, verifiable and effective arms control agreements the President has proposed—agreements which would substantially reduce strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces, and conventional

forces in Europe to equal levels on both sides.

Passage of the Peace Through Strength Resolution would provide a strong measure of support for our military programs, and our arms control objectives, which are so important to the cause of peace.

With cordial regards,

Sincerely,

POWELL A. MOORE,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 16, 1982.

Hon. STEVEN D. SYMMS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SYMMS: I understand that you and many of your colleagues intend to offer a resolution at this time reaffirming the "Peace through Strength" language, which was incorporated into the 1980 Republican Party Platform.

As the President said when the Resolution was considered last year, "Passage of the Resolution by both Houses will be a powerful symbol of bipartisan support for our national security programs, which are designed to restore the margin of safety to our military power."

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. CLARK.

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH—
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ENDORSING RESOLUTION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

Air Force Sergeants Association
America's Future
American Cause
American Civil Defense Association
American Coalition of Patriotic Societies
American Conservative Union
American Council for a Free Asia
American Council for World Freedom
American Czech Republican Clubs
American Federation of Small Business
American Foreign Policy Institute
American Freedom Network
American Hungarian Federation
American Legion
American Legion Auxiliary
American Legislative Exchange Council
American Military Retirees Associations, Inc.
American Notary Association
American Research Foundation
American Rhodesia Association
American Security Council
American Security Council Foundation
American Security Council Political Action Committee
Americans to Free Captive Nations, Inc.
Armed Forces League
Armenian American Republican Clubs
Assembly of Captive European Nations
Association of Americans to Save Africa
Association of Byelorussian-American Veterans in America
Association of Former Intelligence Officers
Association of Former POW's
Black Silent Majority Committee
Bulgarian National Front, Inc.
Byelorussian American Association
Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation
Catholics for Christian Political Action
The Center for Financial Freedom and Accuracy in Financial Reporting
Center for International Security
Chinese Academic & Professional Association
Chinese American Republican National Federation
The Church League of America
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Citizens for Freedom, Inc.

Citizens for Seafarer
Coalition for a Democratic Majority
College Republican National Committee
Committee for a Free Afghanistan
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Inc.
The Committee to Unite America, Inc.
Concerned Citizens for an Effective Strategic Policy
Confederate Air Force
Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc.
Congressional Majority Committee
The Conservative Caucus, Inc.
Cossack American Nationalist in U.S.
Council Against Communist Aggression
Council on American Affairs
Council for Inter-American Security
Croatian-American Committee for Human Rights
Czechoslovakian-American Association
Czechoslovak American National Republican Federation
Federation of Cuban Masonic Lodges in Exile
Filipino American Republican Association
Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc.
German-American National Congress
Gospel Advance Mission, Inc.
Greater Overseas Alliance for the National Restoration of Viet Nam
Heritage Groups Council for Citizenship Education
Hungarian Organization, Magyar Szervezet, Inc.
Hungarian Unity Association, Inc.
The Information Council of the Americas
Institute of American Relations
Institute on Strategic Trade
The John Paul Jones Foundation
Labor United for a Strong America
Leadership Foundation, Inc.
The Lincoln Institute
Lithuanian American Council
Marine Corps League
Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association
Military Order of the World Wars
Moral Majority
National Alliance of Senior Citizens
National Association of Uniformed Services
National Captive Nations Committee
National Committee for Responsible Patriotism
National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups
National Conference on Asians in America and Asian Americans
National Conservative Public Affairs Council
National Defense Council
National Filipino American Republican Association
National Republicans of Italian Descent
National Republican Heritage Groups Council
National Screw Machine Products Association
National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution
National Sojourners, Inc.
National Traditionalist Caucus
Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
Naval Order of the United States
Naval Reserve Association
Non-Commissioned Officers Association
NORSE (Scandinavian American Republican Federation)
Order of the Saint John of Jerusalem
The Paul Revere Foundation
Polish American Congress
Polish American Republican Federation
Polish Legion of American Veterans, USA
Reserve Enlisted Association
Reserve Officers Association
Romanian American Republican Clubs
The Second Amendment Foundation
Security and Intelligence Fund
Slovak American Republican Federation
Slovak World Congress

Slozhnitsyn Society
Stockholders for World Freedom
Truth About Rumania Committee
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Ladies Auxiliary
Veterans of Pearl Harbor, Inc.
We the People
World Federation of Cossack National Liberation Movement of Cossackia
World Federation of Free Latvians
Young Americans for Freedom
Young Republican National Federation
Total: 125; 2/5/82.

Mr. ZORINSKY. Mr. President, the principal goal of the United States has been the preservation of peace and freedom. No responsible American disputes this goal, but differences on how best to achieve it have badly divided our Nation and led to disastrous reverses in foreign policy. Because of these differences, it has proved impossible to adopt or adhere to a national strategy. Without a national strategy to give it direction and coherence, our foreign policy has been reactive, inconsistent, and far weaker than it need be.

On no issue has there been greater division than on the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union. Although Soviet strength and destabilizing behavior were recognized as potential dangers, for the past two decades, American policy responding to them was based on accommodation and unilateral gestures of restraint. The Soviet Union, it was argued, had such a dismal history of war and invasion that a strong American policy would immediately trigger suspicion and hostility. But if the United States avoided provoking this reaction, increased contact through trade, arms control negotiations, and growing cultural ties would convince the Soviet leadership of American good faith.

This argument formed the basis for the American policy of détente. During this period the United States drastically cut defense spending, froze its strategic nuclear forces, halved the size of its Navy, and allowed its conventional land and air forces to undergo a significant decline. At the same time, it dramatically reduced its international presence, dismantled much of its intelligence services, and let most of its defense alliances deteriorate.

Soviet détente behavior was diametrically different. It not only enormously increased the quantity of its nuclear forces, but went for a qualitative change as well, achieving a large force with the explosive yield and accuracy to destroy the U.S. strategic force on the ground. It increased its overall defense spending by as much as 7 percent annually each year of this period, not only greatly increasing its ground forces but also creating for the first time in Soviet history a blue water navy. The Soviet Union greatly increased the size and scope of the KGB First Directorate, responsible for foreign operations, especially subversion and disinformation. It invaded, direct-

ly or through proxies, a half dozen Third-World nations; has proved a major impediment to a negotiated Middle East settlement; and has promoted instability by training and arming terrorist worldwide.

In view of this, it is no surprise that the Soviet Union defines détente as "an intensification of the ideological struggle in the absence of nuclear war."

The United States has at last recognized that détente cannot help to achieve the national goal of peace and freedom and has begun the first steps toward strengthening its defenses and foreign policy. However, because these steps have not been explained to the American people in the context of a well-articulated national strategy, the political consensus for making them has been eroding. Such a strategy has been worked out—the national strategy for peace through strength.

The national strategy for peace through strength is based upon the realization, backed by over 20 years of experience, that the Soviet Union cannot be cajoled into good behavior by weakness or unilateral restraint. At the same time, it is neither possible nor desirable to coerce the Soviet Union by the direct use of military force. Instead, the national strategy of peace through strength, while providing for the military and strategic forces necessary to establish a margin of safety, will arrest and counteract the spread of Soviet influence by non-military means.

The national strategy for peace through strength is embodied by eight principles, which will serve as a yardstick by which future U.S. defense and foreign policy initiatives can be evaluated. These principles outline the steps necessary to preserve the safety of the United States and its allies, while at the same time promoting greater understanding of and respect for democratic principles.

I urge that the U.S. Senate resolve that the national strategy of peace through strength be adopted as the national strategy for the United States. By doing so, we will not only greatly strengthen the national security policy of this country, but will also be reaffirming our support for the principle goal of the United States—peace and freedom.

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the peace through strength resolution because it provides a Reagan-approved strategy for carrying out President Reagan's crusade for freedom.

In his speech to the British Parliament on June 8, President Reagan offered "a plan and a hope for the long term." He called for—

—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history, as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.

In the closing paragraph the President said:

Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best—a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation. For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny.

It is the positive note which is so vital in that statement. A successful strategy cannot be static. Our society, values, and way of life have been targeted for extinction by the force of Soviet communism, and cannot be preserved merely by attempting to maintain the status quo.

Under our value system, military forces can only be used to defend the status quo when it is militarily threatened.

Communism is an ideology that has achieved its greatest successes by playing on mankind's best aspirations. It must be fought—and ultimately defeated—by having its abuses and brutal nature exposed, and by being countered by better and more honest ideas. In the end its own victims will eliminate it, a day which will come more quickly if enough American strength is available to blunt or prevent Soviet employment of naked force.

Once again, a focusing of the national will is a crucial precondition to forging effective policies in this area. The United States cannot convince a skeptical world of its good intentions and probability of survival if its own people are not united behind a goal and a strategy to achieve that goal.

Nor is it possible for the United States to lower its voice about the dangers posed by the Soviet system without losing much ground. In the past, U.S. policies, whether containment or détente, were based upon the hope that the Soviet Union would eventually moderate its ideology as it experienced American good will. Instead, the Soviet Union has grown more assertive and more imperialistic as its military strength and aggressive momentum have increased.

A key tool available to the United States in rolling back this Soviet momentum is communications. Chief among them are the radios—Voice of America and Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe—and satellite television, which can reach into areas barred to other forms of American influence.

Other forms of communications should not be overlooked, including overseas libraries, language and cultural instruction in American schools, exchanges, art, and entertainment.

To date our communications have been among the most effective means of spreading the Western values of freedom and democracy, even with the minimal official encouragement they have received. This should be greatly expanded and focused.

A second means of rolling back the influence of communism is to describe the shambles its "scientifically planned" economy makes of the lives of its citizens. Merely the existence of well-made Western merchandise is a

destabilizing influence in Communist systems, which are forced to explain away their own shoddy products. Of more importance is the disruption "centralized planning" causes in the Soviet Union, where meat is rationed; or Poland, where food is rationed; or Cuba, where everything is rationed.

The greatest weakness of all in the Communist system should be exploited—its total denial of freedom to its citizens. Walls have to be built to contain people within the Soviet system. This fact should be more than enough to totally alienate all nations of the world except for those that have adopted their own form of repression.

But our lack of a strategy and our inability to explain our motive for foreign policy initiatives have in many cases opened the United States to charges of hypocrisy. Few nations are willing to believe the lack of coordination in U.S. policy is due to ineptness.

In short, the national strategy of peace through strength is built upon the understanding that military force is simply not appropriate for actions beyond deterring attack or containing aggression. The offensive role in a U.S. national strategy must be carried out by nonmilitary means which will take many years to bear fruit.

That is why one of the principles of a national strategy of peace through strength is to pursue positive, nonmilitary means to roll back the growth of communism.

And, that is why another principle is to help our allies and other non-Communist countries defend themselves against Communist aggression.

The emphasis on consensus and coordination that a national strategy of peace through strength places on the formulation of American foreign policy also holds true in relations with our allies. The struggle with the Soviet Union is by no means bilateral—every nation not already in the Soviet orbit is ultimately threatened by its expansionism. Therefore, it is clearly in the U.S. national interest to provide appropriate assistance to other nations whose independence or security is threatened.

By strengthening alliances and supplying aid to other nations sharing the U.S. strategic predicament, the national strategy of peace through strength not only addresses problems of U.S. security, but also demonstrates that the United States is a faithful partner whose political system deserves emulation.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I have cosponsored the resolution for peace through strength because a "global campaign for democracy" must be based on the principles of strategy which utilize all elements of national strength—political, military, and economic—in achieving national goals.

Democracy does not need military power to win the fight for the minds of men. Democracy needs nothing more than energetic advocates and a

world political environment in which it can demonstrate its superiority.

The key to a peace through strength strategy is to achieve our goals without armed conflict. To do this, we must deter the Soviets from starting a war.

History shows that only superior war fighting capability can deter an aggressor. Forces that cannot win cannot deter.

The United States can have a superior war fighting capability without the cost of across-the-board numerical superiority if it exploits advanced technology such as the cruise missile and space-based laser.

In a recent speech at the Army War College, Secretary of Defense Weinberger summarized the need for strengthening United States military power. He said "••• in dealing with the Soviets, peace must be purchased with strength." That is why one of the eight principles of a national strategy of peace through strength is to: achieve overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union.

Mr. DENTON. Mr. President, I am proud to cosponsor the resolution for peace through strength because the United States must finally adopt a strong and coherent strategy. Perhaps the most important principle of a national strategy of peace through strength is inspire, focus, and unite the national determination to achieve peace and freedom.

Public support is necessary if the United States is to implement a national strategy of peace through strength. We are a democracy, and no major policy can long be followed in the face of strong popular opposition.

But adopting a national strategy that will influence the entire range of U.S. defense and foreign policy, including issues of such public concern as trade and military acquisition, will require far more than simple public acceptance. It must be vigorously promoted and explained.

As far as possible, all U.S. initiatives should be justified publicly in terms of their relation to the national strategy. This implies that not only will the U.S. Government have to involve the isolated and compartmentalized foreign policy community with the public, but also that we must make an extra effort to share with the public more facts about the Soviet threat.

The advantages of informing the public will be enormous. Public support for U.S. defense and foreign policy has often weakened because the people simply did not understand the realities it was based on. This lack of understanding not only has given rise to opposition to particular policies, but also has weakened public support for defense and foreign policy as a whole.

Better justification of defense and foreign policy initiatives to the public in terms of how they further the national interest would also improve policymaking.

In short, including a central element a better identification and expression by the defense and foreign policy community of U.S. national priorities and goals, implementation of a national strategy of peace through strength would not only rally the American people behind the Government, but would also prove a powerful incentive to improve the quality and coherence of national policy initiatives.

Mr. GARN. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor of the peace through strength resolution because it is vital that we have a coherent, balanced overall national security strategy. Otherwise individual actions tend to be taken without regard to their impact on other policy objectives.

In few areas has the lack of a national strategy had more disastrous results than in arms control. Beginning with the SALT I treaty of 1972, the United States has entered into numerous agreements with the Soviet Union that are unbalanced, self-ensnaring, unverifiable, or not enforceable. Because there is no overall standard by which treaties can be evaluated in the context of a total strategy, political leaders have found it easier to heed those advisers who counsel accommodation, appeasement, and unilateral disarmament.

But arms control is important—too important to be negotiated without reference to a clear overall strategy.

For example, it makes no strategic sense to bargain away the right and responsibility of the United States to defend its citizens from Soviet nuclear missiles.

Arms control can only be one of many means to reach the goal of establishing peace and freedom. It is not a goal in itself. Arms control on its own cannot create stability, but it can help to maintain stability already established, while reducing the probability of war, the costs of maintaining deterrence, and the levels of damage should deterrence fail.

That is why one of the principles of a national strategy of peace through strength is: Accept no arms control agreement which in any way jeopardizes the security of the United States and its allies, or which locks the United States into a position of military inferiority.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of the peace through strength resolution, I am particularly interested in the principle dealing with the economic component of strategy.

A key element of the Soviet Union's strategy is to gain control over overseas sources of raw materials and the routes for transporting them to the industrialized heartland of the West.

Yet, in few areas is the division between the United States and its allies so acrimoniously displayed as in that of economic policy.

It is difficult for some Western leaders to understand why the establishment of Soviet political control over a

region should be of concern, for this seldom results in access to markets being cut off. For example, Angola sells most of its oil to the United States, and Cuba its agricultural products to Europe.

It is an important premise of the national strategy of peace through strength that these differences must be resolved by explaining and publicizing the long-term consequences of a failure to secure access to vital sources of raw material. Unless this is done, the short-term self-interest of the corporations and governments concerned will continue to undermine the enormous leverage and power which could be applied by the economic system of the West.

The most effective area of competition with the Soviet Union should be in the economic field.

However, the United States and Western Europe have helped the Soviet bloc avoid the impact of its own inefficiency by extending massive credits and loans.

The best way to accelerate the process of Communist decline, as described by President Reagan, is to let the Soviet system fall of its own weight by sharply reducing this subsidization.

That is why one of the principles of a national strategy of peace through strength is to: Maintain a strong economy and protect our overseas sources of energy and other vital raw materials.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I support Senator LAXALT's introduction of the peace through strength resolution. All Americans yearn for peace. All Americans are strongly in favor of preventing nuclear war. I, myself, have always been a proponent of preserving world peace and preventing nuclear war. It is for this reason that I favor a strong national defense, because a strong national defense is the best guarantor of world peace. The peace through strength resolution embodies my views on how the United States can most effectively safeguard world peace and our national security.

On June 8, 1982, President Reagan in his speech to the British Parliament called for "a global campaign for democracy." This establishes a goal for the United States and the free world which can be achieved by a national strategy of peace through strength.

President Reagan endorsed a national strategy of peace through strength and has committed to sign legislation for its adoption. And, this strategy has been endorsed by 238 Representatives and 53 Senators.

The Department of Defense has long needed an agreed upon grand strategy so that it might plan a force structure to carry out that strategy. While the principles of an overall strategy go beyond purely military considerations, there is no way the Department of Defense can properly plan without knowing the overall strategy.

There is no way DOD can fully justify its major weapons programs without placing them in the context of an overall strategy. That is why it is necessary to now give our defense leaders the guidance embodied in the eight principles of a national strategy of peace through strength.

THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL STRATEGY OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

The most common complaint about U.S. defense and foreign policy over the past 35 postwar years has been that it is reactive and only in defense of the status quo. We have had no unifying goal and thus no strategy.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union and its Communist bloc allies have the goal of a world socialist state, and they have an overall strategy for achieving it.

U.S. GOAL ESTABLISHED

President Reagan, in his historic speech to the British Parliament on June 8, established the long needed unifying goal for the United States. He began his speech by reviewing the failure of the Communist economic and political system everywhere in the world. He noted, for example, that 20 percent of the work force in the U.S.S.R. is engaged in agriculture; yet Soviet agriculture cannot feed the people in the U.S.S.R.

He stressed that the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, despite 30 years of control, have not yet been able to risk elections. In a memorable phrase, he declared: "Regimes planted by bayonets do not take roots." The President, pointing toward a new political order, declared that the world was at a turning point, that the tide had turned against communism, and that a "democratic revolution is now gathering new strength." At a later point, he spoke of a "global campaign for democracy now gathering force."

He called on open and free societies to "take actions to assist the campaign for democracy." The President made it plain that communism cannot be overcome without effort, risk and an organized strategy for the free world.

He said:

"... we must not hesitate to make clear our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move towards them." He added, "The objective I propose is quite simple to state: To foster the infrastructure of democracy..."

Speaking for the United States, he said:

"It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation—in both the public and private sectors—to assisting democratic development."

In regard to the role of American military power in this process, he said, "Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used." In the contest between democracy and Communist totalitarianism, the "ultimate determinant," he said, will not be bombs and rockets but wills and ideas. He described the struggle as "a trial of spiri-

tual resolve," and at stake were "the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated."

President Reagan has long endorsed the adoption of a national strategy of peace through strength.

A NATIONAL STRATEGY OF PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

There are eight basic principles inherent in a national strategy of peace through strength. These principles will serve to clarify the direction in which the details of the strategy are formulated, and serve as a yardstick to evaluate competing programs and initiatives. Unless the United States speedily adopts such a strategy to coordinate its national security efforts, it is doomed to ineffectual policies, uncoordinated responses to Soviet aggression, and ultimately, a great growth in the power and influence of the Soviet Union.

These eight principles are:

(Editors Note: Senator Symms described all eight principles. But, only two are reprinted here because the other six were also discussed by the Senators preceding him.)

THIRD PRINCIPLE: TO CREATE A STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND A CIVIL DEFENSE WHICH WOULD PROTECT U.S. CITIZENS AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR AT LEAST AS WELL AS THE SOVIETS DEFEND THEIR CITIZENS

Since the early 1960's, the United States has structured its military forces and designed its strategies in keeping with a concept called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

According to the MAD principle, the U.S. and the Soviet Union will be equally deterred, and therefore secure, if the population and industrial centers of both nations are defenseless and can be easily destroyed by either a nuclear first strike or a retaliation. According to MAD, the absence of defensive weapons enhances deterrence.

As a matter of policy, therefore, the United States has scrapped nearly all its defenses. We have no defenses against Soviet ballistic missiles and only a few aged fighter interceptors to defend against Soviet bombers.

This MAD concept was never accepted in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have built a modern, nationwide anti-aircraft defense system with a small Ballistic Missile Defense force around Moscow, backed by the missile defense capabilities of its anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs).

Over and above these active defenses, the Soviets have a very large civil defense or passive defense system. The Soviets have spent billions of dollars to build blast and fall-out shelters for political and industrial leaders and key workers in and around major Soviet cities. And, they have detailed plans for the evacuation of cities in the event of a nuclear war.

It is intolerable that the Soviet government should conscientiously provide for the survival of its people, while the U.S. government makes no effort at all to defend its people.

Using advanced technology, the United States can and must defend its citizens against the horror of nuclear war. For example, the Government Accounting Office has strongly advocated a satellite based defense.

FIFTH PRINCIPLE: REESTABLISH EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

Good intelligence is central to any nation's security, yet over the past ten years ferocious and disabling assaults have been made on the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence services to carry out clandestine data collection, engage in covert operations, or coordinate counterintelligence.

A national strategy of peace through strength requires the most accurate information possible, not merely for foreknowledge to forestall moves by the Soviet Union and other adversaries, but also to defend against terrorism and other internal security threats.

The United States should therefore rebuild its intelligence and internal security capabilities.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat that the peace through strength resolution is an excellent expression of American's deep desire for a stable and lasting world peace. It is our most fundamental hope as Americans that we can live in peace with our neighbors and preserve our freedoms, liberties, and way of life. A strong national defense is the best and time-tested guarantor of world peace.

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

CONGRESSIONAL DIVISION

SENATE CO-CHAIRMEN

Hon. David L. Boren, (D) OK
Hon. Dennis DeConcini, (D) AZ
Hon. Jeremiah Denton, (R) AL
Hon. Robert J. Dole, (R) KS
Hon. Jake Garn, (R) UT
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston, (D) LA
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- Hon. Robert A. Young, (D) MO

Total: 229 2/4/83

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COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Air Force Sergeants Association
America's Future
American Cause
American Civil Defense Association
American Coalition of Patriotic Societies
American Conservative Union
American Council for a Free Asia
American Council for World Freedom
American Czech Republican Clubs
American Federation of Small Business
American Foreign Policy Institute
American Freedom Network
American Hungarian Federation
American Legion Auxiliary
American Legislative Exchange Council
American Military Retirees Associations, Inc.
American Notary Association
American Research Foundation
American Rhodesia Association
American Security Council
American Security Council Foundation
American Society of Professional Emergency Planners
Americans to Free Captive Nations, Inc.
Armed Forces League
Armenian American Republican Clubs
Assembly of Captive European Nations
Association of Americans to Save Africa
Association of Byelorussian-American Veterans in America
Association of Former Intelligence Officers
Association of Former POW's
Black Silent Majority Committee
Bulgarian National Front, Inc.
Byelorussian American Association
Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation
Catholics for Christian Political Action
The Center for Financial Freedom and Accuracy in Financial Reporting
Center for International Security
Chinese Academic & Professional Association
Chinese American Republican National Federation
The Church League of America
Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Citizens for Freedom, Inc.
Citizens for Seafarer
Coalition for a Democratic Majority
Coalition for a True Peace
College Republican National Committee
Committee for a Free Afghanistan

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, Inc.
The Committee to Unite America, Inc.
Concerned Citizens for an Effective Strategic Policy
Confederate Air Force
Congress of Russian-Americans, Inc.
Congressional Majority Committee
The Conservative Caucus, Inc.
Conservatives Against Liberal Legislation
Cossack American Nationalists in U.S.
Council Against Communist Aggression
Council on American Affairs
Council for Inter-American Security
Croatian-American Committee for Human Rights
Czechoslovakian-American Association
Czechoslovak American National Republican Federation
Federation of Cuban Masonic Lodges in Exile
Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc.
German-American National Congress
Gospel Advance Mission, Inc.
Greater Overseas Alliance for the
National Restoration of Viet Nam
Heritage Groups Council for Citizenship Education
Hungarian Organization, Magyar Szervezet, Inc.
Hungarian Unity Association, Inc.
The Information Council of the Americas
Institute of American Relations
Institute on Strategic Trade
The John Paul Jones Foundation
Labor United for a Strong America
Leadership Foundation, Inc.
The Lincoln Institute
Lithuanian American Council
Marine Corps League
Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association
Military Order of the World Wars
Moral Majority
National Alliance of Senior Citizens
National Association of Uniformed Services
National Captive Nations Committee
National Committee for Responsible Patriotism
National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups
National Conference on Asians in America and Asian Americans
National Defense Council
National Filipino American Republican Association
National Republicans of Italian Descent
National Republican Heritage Groups Council
National Security Council Political Action Committee
National Screw Machine Products Association
National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

National Sojourners, Inc.
National Traditionalist Caucus
Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
Naval Order of the United States
Naval Reserve Association
Non-Commissioned Officers Association
NORSE (Scandinavian American Republican Federation)
Order of the Saint John of Jerusalem
The Paul Revere Foundation
Polish American Congress
Polish American Republican Federation
Polish Legion of American Veterans, USA
Reserve Enlisted Association
Reserve Officers Association
Romanian American Republican Clubs
The Second Amendment Foundation
Security and Intelligence Fund
Slovak American Republican Federation
Slovak World Congress
Solzhenitsyn Society
Stockholders for World Freedom
Truth About Romania Committee
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
Veterans of Foreign Wars
Veterans of Foreign Wars, Ladies Auxiliary
Veterans of Pearl Harbor, Inc.
We the People
World Federation of Cossack National Liberation Movement of Cossackia
World Federation of Free Latvians
Young Americans for Freedom
Young Republican National Federation

Total: 126

2/4/83

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH RESOLUTION PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES

ALABAMA	House Joint Resolution #15	House - 9/29/81 Senate - 9/30/81
ARIZONA	Senate Concurrent Memorial #1001	Senate - 2/22/82 House - 3/25/82
CALIFORNIA	Assembly Joint Resolution #11	9/9/81
COLORADO	Senate Joint Resolution #29	Senate - 5/7/80 House - 5/7/80
DELAWARE	Senate Concurrent Resolution #39	Senate - 4/30/81 House - 6/17/81
INDIANA	House Concurrent Resolution #26	House - 1/8/82 Senate - 2/15/82
KANSAS	House Resolution #6060 Senate Resolution #1836	House - 4/2/81 Senate - 4/9/81
LOUISIANA	Senate Concurrent Resolution #80	Senate - 5/21/81 House - 7/11/81
MISSISSIPPI	Senate Concurrent Resolution #511	Senate - 2/5/81 House - 3/11/81
NEBRASKA	Nebraska Legislative Resolution #343	4/18/80
TENNESSEE	Senate Joint Resolution #257	Senate - 4/1/82 House - 4/8/82
TEXAS	Senate Concurrent Resolution #25	Senate - 5/22/81 House - 6/1/81
TERRITORY OF GUAM	Resolution No. 147	8/27/81

PASSED BY HOUSE ONLY

ILLINOIS	House Resolution #615	1/13/82
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PASSED BY SENATE ONLY

KENTUCKY	Senate Resolution #85	3/26/82
MASSACHUSETTS	(Not a numbered document)	7/30/81
NEW HAMPSHIRE	Senate Resolution #2	2/10/82
VIRGINIA	Senate Resolution #1	2/9/82

STATE GOVERNORS WHO SERVE AS STATE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE
COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

Governor Robert Orr of Indiana

Governor David Treen of Louisiana

Governor Allen Olson of North Dakota

Governor William Janklow of South Dakota

Governor Richard Snelling of Vermont

Governor Charles Robb of Virginia

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The President has decided to strengthen the organization, planning and coordination of the various aspects of public diplomacy of the United States Government.

He has established a Special Planning Group (SPG) under the chairmanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Membership consists of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and the Assistant to the President for Communications. The SPG is responsible for the overall planning, direction, coordination and monitoring of implementation of public diplomacy activities.

Four interagency standing committees also have been established and will report regularly to the SPG.

The International Information Committee will be chaired by a senior representative of the United States Information Agency. This committee will be responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing international information activities in support of US policies and interests.

The International Political Committee will be chaired by a senior representative of the Department of State. This group will be responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing international activities in support of United States policies and interests. For example, this committee will coordinate the interagency effort to support the growth of democracy and democratic institutions abroad. It will provide the nexus for the policymaking and information functions and will devise and monitor implementation of broad public diplomacy strategies for key issues and interests.

The International Broadcasting Committee will be chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This committee will be responsible for the planning and coordination of international broadcasting activities sponsored by the US Government consistent with existing statutory requirements.

The public Affairs Committee will be cochaired by the Assistant to the President for Communications and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This group will be responsible for the planning and coordinating on a regular basis of US Government domestic public affairs activities relating to foreign policy and national security issues. This will include the planning and coordination of major speeches on national security subjects and other public appearances by senior officials and will otherwise coordinate public affairs efforts to explain major US foreign policy initiatives.

February 8, 1983

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A BRIEF SUMMARY

WHAT IS PROJECT DEMOCRACY?

Project Democracy is an integral part of a presidential initiative, announced by President Reagan in his address to the British Parliament. It is a long-range, bipartisan project not tied to the particular policy goals of any one administration. In the President's words, it will help "foster the infrastructure of democracy... which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their differences through peaceful means."

An interagency group, working in consultation with our missions overseas, has designed a program with five principal components.

1. Leadership training in the skills of democracy.
2. Educational exchanges to increase mutual understanding.
3. Programs to strengthen the institutions of democracy.
4. Meetings and publications to convey ideas and information.
5. Development of institutional and personal ties between groups here and abroad.

Individual programs will be administered by the appropriate bureaus of USIA, State, and AID. To ensure the coherence and focus of the Project, the Director of the USIA will be responsible to the President and Congress for the overall budget.

\$20,000,000 for the current fiscal year (FY 83) has been requested of Congress to begin funding of Project Democracy activities. \$65,000,000 has been requested for FY 84.

Project Democracy: An Overview

The Idea of Project Democracy

Project Democracy is an integral part of a presidential initiative announced by President Reagan in his address to the British Parliament on June 8, 1982. The President urged that the United States make a major effort to "foster the infrastructure of democracy...which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means." He noted the efforts of other democratic governments and institutions to assist fraternal political and social institutions to bring about peaceful and democratic progress and human rights around the world and urged the United States to take additional steps toward realizing these goals. Project Democracy is a major step in the realization of this initiative. It will be a long-term, cooperative, bipartisan venture, involving both political parties, the Congress and private groups. It will transcend the particular policy goals of any one administration.

The President has also endorsed the study proposed by the Chairmen of the Democratic and Republican parties, acting through the American Political Foundation (APF), to determine how the United States, especially private organizations, can most effectively strengthen democratic forces abroad. Project Democracy will take the recommendations made by the APF study, now underway, fully into account.

A bipartisan spirit is essential to the success of Project Democracy. The proposal submitted to Congress for its approval has no ideological premise or bias other than a commitment to the principles of democracy, such as a free press, free trade unions, freedom of association, freedom of choice in religion, a government chosen by the people in free elections, and protection of human rights.

The program proposals in the project were designed by a staff of professionals from the Department of State, AID and USIA. There were also discussions with our missions abroad and experts from the private sector. All the programs are to be completely open; they will be implemented without the involvement of any intelligence agency, here or abroad.

There are and there will continue to be extensive consultations with both Houses of Congress in refining Project Democracy programs. The principles and premises upon which the project is founded serve to ensure

that programs included in the project are broad-based and bipartisan and that they reflect the views and values of America and of all democratic political parties. This is the natural outgrowth of a long American tradition. For over two centuries, successive American administrations have made clear their commitment to democracy and human rights at home and abroad. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote in 1850 that "Well-known circumstances in their history," have made Americans, "the representatives of purely popular principles of government. In this light they now stand before the world. They could not, if they would, conceal their character (or) condition...the prevalence (in Europe) of a sentiment favorable to republican liberty is the result of the reaction of America upon Europe; and the source and center of this reaction has doubtless been, and now is, in these United States."

In our own time, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter have all spoken eloquently of the importance of democratic values. Thirty-three years ago, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that "...our own faith in freedom is a burning and a fighting faith...We believe in freedom as fundamentally as we believe anything in this world...And we don't restrict this belief to freedom for ourselves. We believe that all people in the world are entitled to as much freedom, to develop in their own way, as we want ourselves...We must use every means we know to communicate the value of freedom to the four corners of the earth. Our message must go out through leaflets, through our free press, radio programs and films, through exchange of students and teachers with other countries and through a hundred other ways...."

These premises on which Project Democracy is based may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. All men and women naturally wish to be treated with human dignity and to control their own destinies. Democracy, in the words of the President, is not just for "a lucky few."
2. Democratic institutions are dynamic yet stable. Historical experience demonstrates that democratic governments best accommodate peaceful change.
3. Each people must choose their own way. Although certain basic principles, such as freedom of the press, are constant, democratic institutions exist in many different forms.
4. International order and peace and respect for the rights of other nations evolve naturally among democratic nations. Democracies, which share traditions of justice, freedom and equality, strengthen international stability and peace. It is a historical fact that there have been very few wars between democracies.

5. Democratic institutions are the most critical factor in advancing human rights. Again, it is a historical fact that democratic governments have much better human rights records than do non-democracies.
6. The basic principles of democracy are internationally recognized by a number of important multi-lateral agreements, such as the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Convention.

Project Democracy will not advocate partisan political views or support one democratic institution over another. Democratic values encourage a free expression of views and an open competition of ideas. It is up to the peoples of each nation to choose freely from among these views and institutions.

The purpose of Project Democracy is not to influence that choice, only to support the notion that this choice in itself should be allowed to exist.

The Content of Project Democracy

Introducing the foreign policy section of the State of the Union Address (January 25, 1983), the President stressed that

"Fortunately, we and our allies have rediscovered the strength of our common democratic values, and we're applying them as part of a comprehensive strategy for peace with freedom.... We intend to pursue this democratic initiative vigorously."

To successfully carry out the President's pledge, we will need to employ new and imaginative approaches. The United States has long recognized the value of providing military and economic assistance to friends and allies. While support for liberty and human rights has been an integral part of U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the Republic, there historically has been relatively less attention to the political, intellectual, and social infrastructure necessary to support democratic institutions and strengthen bilateral ties.

What makes Project Democracy different from past efforts is that it is an attempt to institutionalize a continuous strand in American foreign policy since 1776.

The projects contained in the proposed Project Democracy budget represent both reinforcement of current, proven programs as well as new programs designed to support these infrastructures. Programs are included for all regions of the world.

These detailed programs will be administered through the traditional and time-tested educational, cultural and exchange mechanisms of USIA and AID and the traditional grant-making mechanisms of USIA, AID and the Department of State.

The same standards of professional excellence and objectivity which have been applied by these agencies to program selection and implementation will continue. A detailed set of guidelines has been developed and Congressional guidance is being sought to refine them.

As Secretary of State George Shultz has outlined to Congress, Project Democracy consists of five major components:

Leadership Training. This includes making available to current and future leaders education and training in the theory and practice of democracy and the skills necessary both to build the basic institutions of democracy and to counter the actions of non-democratic forces. Programs would be conducted both in the United States and foreign countries. Non-governmental institutions such as political parties, labor, universities, business, state and local government associations, legal and community action organizations, and others will play a key role.

Education. We should strive to encourage exposure to the principles and practice of democracy and to the character and values of the United States in the educational systems of other nations. We, therefore, intend to strengthen book programs, American studies institutions, English teaching, scholarships and fellowships, and related programs.

Strengthening the Institutions of Democracy. A number of our programs will strengthen the basic institutions of a democratic society: unions, parties, media, universities, business, legal/judicial systems, religious and community action groups, and others. Here again, we will rely on American non-governmental organizations to carry most of the load.

Conveying Ideas and Information. Through conferences; meetings; dissemination of books and journals; and special programs in universities, other institutions, and the media, we hope to promote an intellectual and political interest in democracy and a reinvigorated sense of the shared values of democratic societies.

Development of Personal and Institutional Ties. Perhaps the most important result of all our programs will be the development of lasting ties and working relationships between American individuals and organizations and their foreign counterparts. The proponents of democracy need an international network which will provide them with moral support, intellectual stimulation, practical and technical assistance, and protection against their adversaries.

It should be noted that many of the programs in Project Democracy are similar to successful programs long administered by USIA and AID. These include grants to a variety of non-governmental organizations such as the AFL-CIO and the Asia Foundation. These organizations have proven track records. This new commitment to our common goals by the U.S. government will in no way interfere with their complete independence and continued institutional integrity.

Project Democracy also includes new programs for advancing democratic values and institutions such as support of regional institutions for the study of democracy and free elections, workshops to train leaders of all political views in the skills of democratic government and research on the forms, development and history of democratic institutions. A number of USIA posts have already reported local requests for technical advice in several developing countries where new constitutions are now being written. All of these new programs will be subject to the same objective, professional, and stringent review process that regulates current USIA and AID programs.

Project Democracy will seek to work closely with other democracies to provide the ideas and support needed to allow the ideals of democracy the optimum chance for success. We will always bear in mind that if democratic institutions are to be successful, they must adapt fundamental principles to the unique historical, cultural and social traditions of their respective nations.

What Project Democracy Is NOT

Project Democracy, a long-term, bipartisan commitment of the President and Congress should not be confused with any short-term effort to explain the particular policy views on particular issues of a current Administration. Guidelines being developed in cooperation with the Congress will ensure that programs will be open and public, that they will be free of any ideological bias or partisanship, that they will be designed to transcend any particular administration, and that they will not be employed for any short-term policy goal or for any covert purpose.

Responsibility for Project Democracy

Project Democracy is an interagency project initiated by the President and will be developed in close cooperation with Congress.

Since individual programs will be undertaken by USIA, AID, or the Department of State, each agency will be responsible for the implementation of those programs which fall within its purview. For the purpose of coherence and focus, overall budgetary responsibility for Project Democracy will lie within one agency, USIA.

*This fact sheet has been cleared by the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development, March 22, 1983

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bi-partisan alliance of organizations and pro-defense leaders working together for the adoption and implementation of a National Strategy of Peace Through Strength.

The Coalition membership is a "Who's Who" of pro-defense leaders which includes 226 Members of Congress and 2,544 retired admirals and generals.

The ASC serves as the program secretariat of the Coalition.

PROGRAM COORDINATOR

For twenty-seven years the American Security Council has been the means by which leaders from all segments of society and differing political views have cooperated for a strong and free America.

The American Security Council is tax exempt under Section 501 (c) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code (the same tax category as Chambers of Commerce).

EDUCATIONAL COORDINATOR

The American Security Council Foundation works with other educational institutions and organizations to improve public understanding of national security issues. In this connection it serves as the educational coordinator of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength and manages the United States Congressional Advisory Board.

The ASC Foundation is tax exempt under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Contributions are fully deductible.

POLITICAL ACTION COORDINATOR

The American Security Council Political Action Committee, serves as the political action coordinator of the Political Action Division of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. It supports the re-election of Congressional Members of the Coalition and opposes the re-election of anti-defense Members of Congress.

COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

CONGRESSIONAL DIVISION

Co-Chairmen

- Senator David L. Boren, D Okla.
- Senator Dennis DeConcini, D Ariz.
- Senator Jeremiah Denton, R Ala.
- Senator Robert J. Dole, R Kans.
- Senator Jake Garn, R Utah
- Senator J. Bennett Johnston, D La.
- Senator Paul Laxalt, R Nev.
- Senator Edward Zorinsky, D Neb.
- Representative Bill Chappell, Jr., D Fla.
- Representative Dan Daniel, D Va.
- Representative William L. Dickinson, R Ala.
- Representative Jack F. Kemp, R N.Y.
- Representative Robert H. Michel, R Ill.
- Representative Samuel S. Stratton, D N.Y.

ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS

Partial list of 127 National Organizations

- American Coalition of Patriotic Societies
- American Federation of Small Business
- American Foreign Policy Institute
- American Legion Auxiliary
- Coalition for a Democratic Majority
- Marine Corps League
- Naval Reserve Association
- Reserve Officers Association
- Veterans of Foreign Wars



FOR FURTHER INFORMATION WRITE:

John M. Fisher, President
 American Security Council
 Washington Communications Center
 Boston, Virginia 22713



EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

TELEVISION

The ASC Foundation produces television documentaries for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. Its first six documentaries, together, have been shown over 4,000 times on local television stations. The most recent documentaries are:

COUNTDOWN FOR AMERICA deals with the nuclear freeze issue. It is hosted by Charlton Heston and features leaders such as Senator John Tower (R-TX), Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Secretary of Defense Weinberger.

ATTACK ON THE AMERICAS deals with the Soviet-Cuban threat to Central America. It features experts like U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick and U.S. Ambassador to the O.A.S. William Middendorf.

UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

The United States Congressional Advisory Board of the ASC Foundation is made up of leaders who advise and sponsor educational programs in partnership with the Congressional Division of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. Annual meetings feature interaction with Congressional and administration leaders.



Senator Tower



SECDEF Weinberger

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH REPORT

The Peace Through Strength Report covers key national security developments in the Congress. It is prepared by and for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength caucus with the assistance of the United States Congressional Advisory Board of the American Security Council Foundation.



SPEAKERS BUREAU

The Foundation's Speakers Bureau has 150 top experts on different aspects of national security. During the past year it has arranged over 1,000 speeches and radio and television appearances.



CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

The Center for International Security Studies of the ASC Foundation serves as a "think tank" serving scholars, professionals and Coalition membership.

RESEARCH CENTER




The Center maintains an extensive library on defense and foreign policy as a fact resource for continuing studies, publications and films.

SEMINARS



The Foundation conducts leadership seminars on national security issues. Its Seminar Center is one of the finest facilities in America.



Headquarters is located on an 850-acre campus in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains.

ACTION PROGRAMS


CONGRESSIONAL DIVISION

The ASC serves as the coordinator for the bi-partisan congressional division of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. On request of the congressional co-chairmen, it assists the 226 Members of Congress who belong to the Coalition on legislative matters.



ISSUES

The ASC coordinates Coalition for Peace Through Strength action on key issues. For example, in the SALT II debate, NBC-TV, and U.S. NEWS and WORLD REPORT described the Coalition as the leader of the opposition to SALT II. It plays a similar role in the nuclear freeze debate.



POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS

The more active members of the ASC participate in a political action network, in which they are alerted to pending issues in time to communicate to their Congressman and Senators before the vote. The Network is now based on telephone hot lines and will later use a computer network as well.



VOTING INDEX

The ASC compares key national security votes in the Congress with public opinion, in order to rate each member. For 12 years this has been the major measure of how members of Congress vote on national security issues.



Washington Operations Center



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—
JOHN M. FISHER
PRESIDENT

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—
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DRAFT MEMO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Glenn Blair
140903 49

TO : The Ambassador February 8, 1983
FROM : DCM - John A. Boyle
SUBJECT : Notes from Dinner - February 7

Ambassador outlined briefly for attendees (NATO Ambassadors, Charges and France) parameters of his responsibilities in Washington and explained he wanted to share with them some perceptions he had and to gain the benefit of their diverse experience. Ambassador explained that on a range of issues, but most particularly on nuclear issue, the allied countries had not properly explained existing situation to their own publics. There was a need to work to create a base of public opinion in European countries generally, and in siting countries in particular, which would allow the Geneva negotiators latitude to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons from the world.

The Ambassador indicated the Washington perception was that this issue should be approached from the standpoint that the policy of deterrence has maintained peace in Europe for over 40 years and that the planned deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles, which was originally suggested by Chancellor Schmidt and acquiesced in by the United States, reflects a NATO-wide decision to insure that NATO's deterrent abilities are modernized in the face of increased Soviet pressures. The Ambassador said the START efforts to achieve arms reductions, which are quantitatively, ^{and qualitatively} than freezing arms at existing levels, should be emphasized. Andropov has cultivated successfully a public image of reasonability and deftness in creating splits in European countries on the nuclear issue. It is important that he be judged by his deeds not his words. Allied governments have to deliver their message to their publics clearly, simply, and repetitively to explain the issues. Since the

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1979 dual track decision was a NATO decision, each NATO country must deal with this issue as it sees best; however, if the USG can be helpful to any country in doing this, we would want to be. The Ambassador indicated that European perceptions of President Reagan, which were formed largely in response to Reagan's domestic ^{US} efforts to mobilize/support for increased military spending, have a negative aspect of militarism. This, he said, has been a problem internationally and now the President will be concentrating on peace efforts, such as the current proposal to ban an entire class of nuclear weapons. Ambassador then invited informal comments from his guests which are incapsulated below.

DENMARK - Agreed that existing nations generally are at a disadvantage in dealing with security issues because Western publics are: 1) unaware of Soviet military build-up and keenly aware of Western military modernization efforts; and, 2) unfamiliar with details of Geneva discussions between US and USSR. In addition, the weapons to be deployed provide potential political blackmail for many of the minority governments in NATO countries. Politicians in these countries know the pros and cons of planned weapon deployments as well as Reagan and Schmidt. However, these politicians are understandably reluctant to raise these matters as a central issue in domestic politics because the "fear factor" could easily topple their governments.

BELGIUM - Over the last 15 years the fear of the Soviet Union and the prestige of the United States have both eroded in Europe generally, but particularly among the young. The Vietnam and Watergate experiences have hurt the United States. Young Europeans in particular, whose opinions often are shallow and based on impressionistic media response, tend to equate US and Soviet motives as being identical, namely striving for their own interest at the expense of Europe. To counter this, US credibility in the eyes of

the young must be restored. The US must lead the alliance because European countries, either individually or as part of the European community, are not able to do so. The US should act in a way that European Foreign Ministers will not be afraid to speak out in support of common goals and policies.

ITALY - Stressed need for US leadership and clearer explanation of issues involved in INF deployment. In addition, the US' public relations efforts vis-a-vis European publics in response to Soviet efforts (i.e., Andropov's recent rejections of the President's open letter) needs a quick and subtle response. Failure to respond assists the Soviet cause.

SPAIN - Many high level US political personalities fail to distinguish between the coherence of the United States, particularly in the foreign policy area and the incoherence among European states. US experiences and reactions to foreign policy issues have a great deal of commonality but this is not true in Europe. Most European nations, excluding Germany, have not faced the Soviet Union in war. 30-35% of the people in most European countries do not support NATO and clearly do not believe in further nuclear deployments. Failure to take these country differences into account in formulating US policy badly distorts efforts and messages aimed at achieving Western goals.

FRENCH - The French generally believe US military systems are relatively weaker to the Soviet's versus ten years earlier. France does not have a strong pacifist movement and ^{PUBLIC}generally seems of the Russian threat. He stressed that each country in Europe be approached individually to consider how NATO message implemented.

GERMANY - Counting weapons is not the answer. a new trans-Atlantic confidence and solidarity, .

young people. Hope for the future and common ideals should be stressed.

BELGIUM - The West is hypnotized by the nuclear issue but a much more corrosive problem for the Atlantic community is the prospect of trade war. Recent examples of the Soviet pipeline, steel exports being blocked to the US and USDA sales of highly subsidized flour to Egypt are big news in Europe and quickly affect the totality of US/European relations. Europe would lose a trade war with the United States but such a war would damage NATO mortally.

DENMARK - In discussing US policies and trans-Atlantic relations, bipartisan US policies receive a much more attentive hearing in Europe than the views of a given President. When possible, such policies should be bipartisan and not identified exclusively with one President, who might not be in office in two years time.

UNITED KINGDOM - The initial impact of the Reagan Presidency in Europe seemed to be "bombs and more bombs". The US enthusiasm about the Cruise missile, which received massive amounts of publicity on British TV channels, worked against US interest. No one ever saw a picture of Soviet S-20 rockets and the general impression was that the US was unilaterally gearing up for a nuclear advantage. Economic issues, such as the Soviet pipeline, place a considerable strain on good trans-Atlantic relationships.

GREECE - Subscribed to views expressed by a number of other speakers and emphasized that economic, political and security issues were all intertwined. Damaging any one could quickly affect the others.

TURKEY - The Turks have been invaded a number of times by the Soviets. Turkish young people are reminded through their education of the nature of the Soviet threat which has not changed over the years. Turkish public, therefore, recognizes need for strong defense and supports such efforts.

CANADA - Living next to US can be a problem: there are economic issues between the two countries heightened at time of recession but these are worked out amicably. Fear of Cruise missiles (guidance system which is made in Canada) is high in Canada. Would subscribe to views expressed by most speakers and suggested President demonstrate his concern with Europe by address to US Congress. Such an effort would grip European imagination.

Ambassador Dailey asked what should be the major themes in a hypothetical Presidential speech to a European audience. The following emerged:

-- appeal to youth - give them hope for the future;

-- community of economic, political and cultural interest between Europe and the US should be stressed;

-- 14 million people are unemployed in Europe, many of the young are increasingly alienated from their own societies as well as the United States. Hold out the promise of a better future for these people;

-- NATO is a defense organization composed of nations whose sovereignty is not threatened; Europe must remain economically healthy; people with common ideals in Europe and the US want to live in peace and freedom; weapons should not be mentioned. President Reagan should find occasion to speak in Europe to demonstrate his concern for Europe.

-- President Reagan should speak before a joint session of US Congress to demonstrate his concern for Europe and the bipartisan nature of this concern.

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Actions for Consideration

February 8, 1983

- Presidential Proclamation of March 8, 1983 as Peace Through Strength Day?
- Congressional Liason Staff to work for congressional passage of Peace Through Strength Resolution as the positive counter to the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution?
- Coalition for Peace Through Strength leaders to meet with the President about 2:00 p.m., March 7, 1983 to report on plans to Peace Through Strength day events planned all across the country and the status of the Resolution in the U.S. Congress. Meeting to be followed by press conference at White House?