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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
140981	LIST	RE DISTRIBUTION	1	ND	B3
140982	MEMO	FOR EUROPEAN AND SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COMMITTEE RE CLEARANCE PROCEDURES	2	1/28/1983	B1

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REMARKS

Yesterday as discussed in the daily meeting. Attached is the nuclear arms speakers' list we are using for domestic purposes.

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FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) John Kelly -- PA	Room No.—Bldg. 6800
	Phone No. 632-0954

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
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January 24, 1983

TO: PM - Mr. Robert Dean
EUR - Mr. Steve Steiner
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Lehman

FROM: PA - Robert M. Smalley *RMS.*

Attached is the composite list of speakers on nuclear arms control, as submitted by the agencies involved.

Your comments would be appreciated.

Attachment:
List of speakers.

cc: Messrs. Kraemer (NSC); d'Amecourt (DOD)

PA:RMS*RMS.*ley:bds

NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION SPEAKERS LIST

LEVEL I

White House:

The President
The Vice President
Judge Clark

Department of State

Secretary Shultz
Deputy Secretary Dam
Under Secretary Eagleburger
Under Secretary Schneider

DOD:

Secretary Weinberger
Under Secretary Ikle
Under Secretary Le Lauer
Secretary Lehman

LEVEL II

White House:

*Robert McFarlane
*Richard Boverie

*KRAEMER, Sven
*LINDHARD, Robert

Department of State:

ABRAMS, Elliott - HA
*BLACKWILL, Robert - EUR
*BURT, Richard - EUR
*DEAN, Robert - PM
*DOBBINS, James - EUR
HAASS, Richard - EUR
*HOWE, Jonathan T. - PM
Counselor Edward Derwinsky
*GOODBY, James - PM
KELLY, John - PA
*PALMER, Mark - EUR
*RAPHEL, Arnold - PM
SCANLAN, John - EUR
SMALLEY, Robert - PA
*WOLFOWITZ, Paul - EA

*Denotes Expert Per PM List of 9/28/82

ACDA:

*FIELDS, Louis
*NITZE, Paul
*ROWNY, Edward

DOD:

HOEBER, Amoretta
*HOEHN, William
LASATER, John
LEHMAN, Ronald
*PERLE, Richard
*PONOMAREV, Dmitriy
*STANSBERRY, Kenneth
WADE, James
WAGNER, Richard

LEVEL III

Department of State:

BLEHA, C. Thomas - PA
BURTON, Bruce - EUR
*CALDWELL, Raymond - EUR
CLARK, Richard - PM
COMBS, Richard - EUR
DUNKERLY, Craig - EUR
GORDON, John - PM
HAWES, John - EUR
HECKLINGER, Richard - P
*IFFT, Edward - PM
JOHNSON, Darryl - P
KANE, Stephen - PA
KANTER, Arnold - PM
*LEHMAN, Christopher - PM
LEONARD, James - PM
LOWENFELD, David - P
*MAC DONALD, Bruce - PM
*MANDEL, Judyt - PM
MAUTNER, Martha - INR
NAPPER, Larry - EUR
PAPPAGEORGE, John - S/P
PERNICK, Irwin - PA

PIFER, Steve - EUR
POORMAN, Donald - PM
SANDFORD, Gregory - PM
*SIENKIEWICZ, Stanley - T
SIMONS, Thomas - EUR
STEINER, Steve - EUR
STOFFER, Howard - PM
*SUCHAN, Gregory - PM
SWIERS, Peter - PM
*VERSHBOW, Alexander - EUR
WARREN, Louis - PM

ACDA:

*ALESSI, Victor
*EINHORN, Robert
FINEGOLD, Edward
GRADY, Hank
*GRAHAM, Thomas
HALLORAN, Bernard
HOINKES, Mary Lib
KEALEY, James
KUPPERMAN, Charles
LAMBESIS, Paul
*LEHMAN, Joseph
MARKOFF, Michelle
MC KEAN, Joel
MC NEILL, Jack
MENDELSON, Jack
MURPHY, Matthew
RUST, Dean
SEARLE, William
SELL, Louis
STETTNER, Carolyn
TEPLITZ, Vigdor
THORNE, Carl
TICE, Donald
WATSON, Samuel
WINSTON, Mary Ann
WULF, Norman

DOD:

BUCKLEY, Sheila
HANMER, Stephen
*HINDS, Hugh
*HORN, Sally
*MILLER, Franklin
*SHULSKY, Abe

1/19/83

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THE WHITE

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MESSAGE NO. 274

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PAGE 3

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140982 MEMO

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FOR EUROPEAN AND SECURITY AND ARMS
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THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION IN EUROPE AND AMERICA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

Stephen F. Szabo

February 1983

Paper presented to the conference , "The Successor Generation and the Atlantic Alliance, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. February 14-17, 1983

DRAFT--NOT FOR CIRCULATION WITHOUT THE AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

The Postwar Generation in Europe

A new generation is about to assume the leadership of Western Europe. A majority of Europeans alive today were born since the end of World War II. Many of this postwar generation already occupy key second echelon positions in parliaments, parties and foreign offices. By the end of this decade they will be in control of their nations' foreign and defense policies.

This generational changing of the guard will have important implications for the Atlantic Alliance and the American role in Europe in the 1990's and beyond. Manifestations of the coming changes can already be seen in the sudden emergence of the peace movement in Europe last year, a movement dominated by young Europeans and motivated by a deep suspicion of American motives and policies. The peace movement is an expression of a new generation with a different historical experience, values and attitudes. A look at their background and views on foreign and defense issues may provide a glimpse into the future of U.S. European relations.

The experience of the Founders generation of the McCloy's, Kissingers and Schmidts was radically different from that of

Europeans born since the war. Europeans of prewar vintage shaped their views of the U.S., the Soviet Union and the security environment in a Europe devastated by war and threatened by Stalinist Russia. The United States stood as an example, or model, of a self confident and dominant power whose values and social system contrasted favorably with those of Europe and the USSR.

Postwar Europeans have matured in a new Europe in which the European Economic Community and NATO, affluence and political stability are givens. Rather than Cold War and reconstruction as a formative experience, many postwar Europeans have at best only a vague memory of the building of the Berlin Wall. To many even the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is history. Having come of age during an era of detente, their views of Soviet society have been shaped by Brezhnev's system rather than Stalin's. America does not connote the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift, or even John Kennedy, but rather it means the Vietnam War and Watergate.

Postwar Europeans are also distinctive in their social backgrounds and the values and attitudes these backgrounds have fostered. University education expanded so rapidly in the 1960's and early 1970's that today three to four times as many young Europeans attend a university as in the 1950's. This expansion created a more socially diverse student population (although working class students are still scarce) and placed large numbers

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of young people into a political and cultural network which few of their parents had known.

Consequently they are less likely to defer to the established political leadership, more likely to want to become involved in decisions which effect their lives and more likely to share a critical or neo Marxist attitude on domestic and international issues. Many were socialized on campuses which produced the Vietnam protest movement and on which little sympathy for American policy can be found.

more urban
In addition to the expansion of universities, the social environment young Europeans have known has consisted of the city rather than the small town and modern rather than traditional values. They tend to be more likely to have white collar ("new middle class") rather than blue collar occupations. An important consequence of this modernization process has been a marked decline in the practice of religion among postwar Europeans. In 1980, for example, 2 percent of Germans between the ages of 16-29 attended church regularly compared to 18 percent over the age of 60. In 1963 the number of 16-29 year old practicing religion was 11 percent. In Italy twice as many Italians born before 1940 (44%) attend mass at least weekly than those born after 1940. Twenty years ago little age variation could be found concerning religious practice.

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Secularized

This secularization has had important political consequences due to the close association between religious practice and support for parties of the right, particularly in Catholic Europe. Postwar Europeans are more likely to support parties of the left than their parents. They tend to be drawn, however, to the nontraditional left, parties of the new left such as the French Socialists, Italian Radicals, the New Left wing of the German SPD and ecologist-anti nuclear parties.

Again the preference of the young for the left is not part of a life cycle phenomena in which to paraphrase Bernard Shaw those who are 19 and are not socialists have no heart and those who remain socialists at 39 have no brain. In fact the young were not naturally left in the Europe of the 1950's. In West Germany 32 percent of the 18-29 age group in 1950 preferred the Social Democrats and 24 percent the Christian Democrats; by 1980 50 percent of this youngest age group favored the SPD and only 31 percent the CDU. In Italy the age contrasts are most dramatic among the university educated. While the prewar university educated preferred the right by 47 to 21 percent, Italians born later than 1949 who have been university educated support the left by a 46 to 28 percent margin. No such dramatic age differences occurred in the 1950's or early 1960's concerning party

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preference. Similarly in France the Socialists have become the party of France's postwar generation. A growing number of the politically active members of the European left are from the Successor Generation. Only in Britain of the four larger European states did an age related shift in party preference fail to materialize. The young, also tend to be both the strongest supporters of the ecologist and anti nuclear parties and the largest group of non voters in Western Europe. Polls conducted in 1982 found that support for the Greens was equal to support for the SPD among the 18 - 21 year cohort. In France, 37 percent of the ecological movement's support in 1977 came from the 18 - 24 year age group. (3)

These contrasting historical and social backgrounds have produced a postwar generation which is distinctive from previous age groups. While no single historical event has shaped a postwar generation such as 1914, the depression, or 1939-45 did previous ones, it has been, rather, the lack of dramatic events and discontinuities which separates postwar Europeans from their elders. This experience and background has been most intensely felt and articulated by the university educated portion of the postwar group. The coming generation of new leaders will emerge from this element, and it is this small but influential minority which will "speak" for their generation and shape the future policies of European states. It is therefore, the views of this group rather than those of all postwar Europeans which will be

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examined and the term "Successor Generation" will be used to describe them.

Views of the Superpowers

A look at their views of foreign and defense policies, as expressed in public opinion surveys conducted between 1979 and 1981 reveals that postwar university educated Europeans differ sharply with prewar university graduates on a number of issues. The Successor Generation is not generally anti American, but is clearly more reserved in its attitudes toward American society and American leadership than preceding generations. Young Europeans of all educational backgrounds still recognize a substantial contrast between Soviet and American societies. America continues to be viewed as a democratic and open society, despite its many perceived flaws in the area of social and racial inequalities and violence. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is seen as repressive, bureaucratic and boring. The critique of Solzhenitsyn and other dissidents has combined with the New Left's condemnation of East European socialism as "barbarism with a human face" to remove for the young left any of the remaining luster of the Soviet model.

Still recognize much

Neither of the "two superpowers" as they are frequently referred to, however, holds much of an attraction for young Europeans, in spite of the continued popularity for certain artifacts of American culture such as pop music and jeans. Having grown up in a resurgent Europe, the awe produced by dramatic discrepancies between U.S. and European living standards is gone. Postwar Europeans, rather, have begun to look for European

alternatives to the two dominant models, an alternative of a less
ureaucratic and decentralized social democracy. The idea of a
"third force" between Russia and America which appealed to some
Europeans in the 1940's may well be revived in the 1980's.

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NATO and Defense

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There is little fear in Western Europe of a Soviet invasion.
This is true for Europeans of all ages.(4) Detente and the
stability with which it has been associated has resulted in a
"dedemonization" of the Soviet threat. Support for NATO
membership is widespread but lukewarm in most European publics.
There is a small constituency for increased defense spending,
especially at the cost of social programs. A similarly small
group supports decreases in defense spending. A majority of most
European publics believe that American military power has declined
in the last decade vis a vis the power of the USSR, but most still
assess the balance of power to be one of rough parity.

The attitudes of the Successor Generation do not run contrary
to these trends but rather are "out ahead" on many. They tend to
be more neutralist than the prewar university educated groups,
more opposed to increases in defense spending and in general have
less belief that force can be used as an instrument of foreign
policy. Table 1 presents the results of a 1981 six nation survey

of attitudes toward neutrality. The data indicate that support for NATO membership remains strong across the best educated of all age groups. However, clear signs of erosion of support is clear across generations.

TABLE 1 GOES HERE

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Similarly on defense spending only 13 percent of university educated Italians born since 1950 favor increased defense efforts as compared to 50 percent of the prewar better educated group. In West Germany, 16 percent of the postwar "educated" group support increases in defense spending compared to 38 percent of their prewar counterparts. In France, parallel if less dramatic age contrasts appear. In Britain they do not. At a time of growing youth unemployment, young Europeans are most likely to see increased defense spending as diverting resources from social and especially employment priorities.

Generations and Nations

The Successor Generations do hold roughly similar views on defense spending, neutralism and the superpowers across national boundaries. However, the similarities of a generation should not obscure persistent national diversity. Contrasts in attitudes between generations varies from country to country. Clearly the generation gap appears to be greatest in West Germany and Italy and the smallest in Britain and France.

W

In both the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, the United States played a major role in the social and cultural reconstruction of the postwar period. In both societies the immediate past was discredited and America served as an alternative social and political model, to the point that Gunther Grass referred to the U.S. as an Ersatzvaterland for Germans in the 1950's. The emergence of a postwar generation and the radicalization of many universities in the 1960's marked the opening of a period of growing criticism of U.S. policy and society.

The association of many of their parent's generation with Fascism also served to weaken parental and societal authority and has resulted in a distancing from the U.S. among the young. A full 81 percent of Italians who were born before the war and attended a university (a small elite group of less than 5 percent of their generation) continue to answer in polls conducted in 1981 that American leadership was desirable and believe that the U.S. takes West Europe into account in its economic decisions (59 percent). Postwar Italians with a similar educational background (a much larger 20 percent of their age groups) tend to be less likely to think American leadership is desirable (32 percent) or to believe that the U.S. considers European views in its economic policy (25 percent). The growing independence of the Italian Communists from the Soviet Union contributed to a similar distancing from that model as well.

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Similar trends can be seen among the better educated segment of the West German Successor Generation. Analysis of survey data from the mid 1960's also indicates that age related differences did not appear among the best educated concerning neutrality or images of American reliability. Today there are clear age related differences among this group

A recent extensive analysis of 1981 Eurobarometer data done by Philip Everts of the University of Leiden also found important age related variations in ^{Dutch ~~Security~~ VIEWS} security along the lines of the West German and Italian cases. (5).

In three other large West European states, Britain, France and Spain, generations appear to be less distinctive in their security views. The Gaullist critique of the "Yalta duopoly" and the stress upon an independent foreign and defense policy as well as a generally cynical and Realpolitik view of international politics has left little in the way of an idealization of the U.S. A desire for an independent course, as measured by polls, is strong across all age groupings. The young remain supportive of loose but friendly ties with the U.S. and strongly favor an independent European defense. They have little interest in pacifism although they tend to be less defense oriented than their elders. The myth of the Resistance appears to have muted the vulnerability of parents to their offspring on the collaboration issue.

The decline of any reservoir of support among the postwar French for the USSR has been perhaps a more dramatic aspect of

generational change. The Events of May 1968, the New Left critique of the French and Soviet Communists and especially the critique by Solzhenitsyn has removed whatever luster was left on the Soviet image. The emergence of the New Philosophers in Paris is more significant for what they say about this change than for their contribution to political thought.

In Britain no important generational gap exists on international issues. Preoccupation with the consequences of economic decline have overshadowed foreign issues and produced a parochialism tinged with an increasing xenophobia. The evidence of this inward turning has been the growing resentment of the European Economic Community, an issue which is far more domestic than international in the British context. The absence of the sharp historical discontinuities which have characterized the contemporary German and Italian experience, including the nonexistence of a collaboration issue, and the slower pace of economic and social change have resulted in few if any important generational differences. In spite of their large involvement in the new Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, young Britons are not more pacifist, anti defense or neutralist than their older compatriots. (They tend, as the rest of the British public, to favor either an independent foreign policy or one tied to the Atlantic Alliance rather than a European orientation.)

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In Spain, younger Spaniards hold views that are in the mainstream of twentieth century Spanish foreign policy perspectives. World War II had a very limited impact and no memory exists of a close and vital relationship with the U.S.. Spain has turned to Europe more as the result of internal politics than because of shared security concerns. If generational contrasts emerge they are likely to develop as the consequence of the Socialist governmental experience and the growing involvement in European affairs.

The European Successor Generation and Historical Change

The Successor Generation argument must be viewed with selectivity. There are at least three postwar groups - again referring to the university educated. Those born during the 1940's are clearly transitional, sharing the values and attitudes of both the prewar and postwar groups. The postwar generation really begins with those born in the 1950's and later. Within this group two somewhat distinctive subgroups emerge - the 60's generation of the Vietnam protests many of whom have remained politically active in the major parties of the left; and a 70's generation more influenced by the economic security concerns of the post oil shock world. While the younger group is more private in their concerns and less active in the major political parties, both groups tend to be heavily involved in grass roots and protest activities and tend to share similar perspectives on defense and foreign policy issues.

Age is only one factor in a larger complex of social and historical change. Younger Europeans are not alone in their experience of the transformation of the international and social context, yet they have no other reference point. As they mature and assume the responsibilities of power they will certainly modify their views. It is unlikely, however, that they will eventually become like their parents and hold views roughly similar to those held by contemporary governmental elites. The evidence of value change and shifting political preferences outlined above indicate that their parents were not like them at similar stages of their lives. The international and domestic environments in which the maturing generation will operate will be too dissimilar to the Europe of the 1950's and early 1960's to assume a plus ca change attitude. The balance of power both in the East-West relationship, and just as importantly within the West-West relationship, has shifted too far.

reference points

In some respects what is occurring is a normalization process associated with a revival of power centers after an artificial period of American predominance. The Successor Generation is less awed by American power and more skeptical of American leadership. The burden of proof in their eyes will increasingly come to rest upon the United States. The new leadership of Europe will be even less supportive of the military aspect of foreign policy, less

likely to accept an East-West context in viewing international issues, especially in the Third World, and more likely to want to go its own way than the current leaders.

The changing of the guard will be most important in the area of European security. The importance of the balance of power to detente and stability in Europe may be increasingly ignored by a generation which has grown up taking it for granted. This is especially the case in West Germany. Efforts of NATO to increase defense spending and modernize nuclear forces will have an even less receptive audience in the future than it does today. The "democratization" of foreign policy as evidenced in the peace movement is likely to remain an important factor in policy formulation and will place greater restraints upon political leaders. The domestic factor in European foreign policy will have more weight in the future.

While a growing independence from American leadership appears predictable, the form and outcome is less certain. The European Idea which held some attraction for the generation of the 1950's appears to have weakened considerably for Europeans who have come of age since. Support for European integration among the young appears to be much like their support for NATO, formalistic and lukewarm. Europe has come to symbolize regulations, technocracy and centralization rather than an overcoming of the past divisions and devastation of two world wars.

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Consequently, the United States, is likely to face a difficult audience in a Europe which will become increasingly influenced by the attitudes and preferences of the Successor Generation. In prescribing options to deal with the changing policy context it is important to emphasize the long term nature of the problem. The attitudes, perceptions and values of postwar Europeans are the result of gradual, cumulative change rather than the product of a single event or administration. Vietnam and the protests of the 1960's played an important catalytic role for a segment of the postwar generation as did the peace movement for younger Europeans, yet they were more symptomatic than casual. Rather it has been the gradual, cumulative effect of historical, social and value change which has shaped attitudes and perceptions. In both Italy and West Germany the fact that the generation which was born in the 1940's is transitional in its attitudes, that it stands between the prewar groups and those that were born after 1949, indicates the evolutionary nature of the change. So does the lack of significant contrasts in the international attitudes of the Vietnam generation of the 1960's and those of the post oil shock generation of the 1970's. Just as no one event suddenly transformed values and attitudes, so no single occurrence, say a Soviet invasion of Poland, is likely to dramatically reverse the process. The changes are long term and require patient and long term responses.

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Policy emphasis should be placed upon changing the images of America held by young Europeans, especially during their formative years, as well as upon changing American views of Europe. First, it is important that cultural exchanges between postwar generations from both sides of the Atlantic be increased. Direct experience should supplement the indirect sources of information which shape European stereotypes of America and Americans. It is better for Europeans to visit Dallas than to get their pictures of it and American society from the television series of the same name now airing throughout Western Europe. American public diplomacy, however, has been seriously weakened by inflation and budget cutting over the past decade. The number of people involved in U.S. government sponsored exchange programs has decreased by over one half during the past decade. Spending for the Fulbright exchanges has been reduced by 40 percent in real terms over the same period. (3) The International Visitors program of the U.S. International Communication Agency which brought an estimated 33 current heads of state and 378 Cabinet Ministers from 92 countries to the U.S. in their formative years has also been hit by budget cutbacks. International visitors often subsist on small stipends and find they must supplement their grants with their own funds. Few incentives exist now to attract these individuals.

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Student and faculty exchanges with Europe have also suffered a relative decline. Although the total number of foreign students in the United States has increased six fold over the last twenty years, the European proportion of that total has declined from 13 to 8 percent. Because of the great expansion of university enrollments in Europe there are more Europeans studying in the U.S. today than there were twenty years ago, but the proportion of the European university student population studying in America has declined. In the crucial German case, the percentage of university students abroad has declined from 3 percent in the early 1960's to about 1.7 percent today. In addition, most student and faculty exchanges occur with little American public funding and therefore with limited selectivity. Only 2 percent of the foreign students in the U.S. receive support from the American government. The best and the brightest in Europe are increasingly likely to study at home while the less talented, unable to gain entry in their national universities, come to the U.S.

The American Successor Generation

In spite of some very vocal dissatisfaction with the Europeans expressed in elements of the media, government and academia, the polls reveal that American public and elite support for Western Europe and NATO has been increasing. According to a Gallup survey conducted last October and November, the West European countries

are among those evaluated as most crucial to American interests.¹⁰
Over three quarters of the American public consider the U.S. to
hav vital interests in Great Britain (80 percent) and West Germany
(76 percent), dropping off to 58 percent listing France and 35
percent Italy as vital to U.S. interests.(7)

If the USSR were to invade Western Europe, 65 percent would
favor committing troops. This compares to only 39 percent who said
they would favor such a commitment in 1975, and 54 percent in
1978. Support among governmental, media and business elites is
even higher (92 percent). Only 4 percent of the American public
favors a withdrawal from NATO.

The American Successor Generation did not diverge in
significant ways from the general public's evaluations. However
datá breakdowns which allow an analysis of the attitudes of the
better educated in each age group were not available. Regional and
racial characteristics appear to have greater weight in shaping
attitudes on Europe.

Amorality
A more important aspect of the postwar American generation may
be its relative parochialiam. Only about one quarter of all
Americans surveyed by Gallup were very interested in news about
other countries as compared to 51 percent very interested in
national news and 61 percent very interested in local news.
Younger Americans are not any more interested in foreign affairs

than their older countrymen.

Numerous recent studies including the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies and a Task Force of the National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies have reported a serious erosion of American foreign area expertise. (g) While the United States becomes increasingly enmeshed in the world and American jobs and prosperity become more dependent upon exports, attitudes about the global context shaped in the immediate postwar era of American predominance continue to shape public expectations. The margin of error has been reduced for American policy makers as the military and economic balance of power has shifted, yet knowledge of the international environment has not correspondingly increased.

Foreign language and area expertise has declined to the point that the National Council's Task Force has written of an "endangered species of foreign area specialists." The reduction or elimination of foreign area and language requirements in American universities has contributed greatly to the problem. The President's Commission, for example, reported that only 5 percent of prospective teachers had taken a course in international affairs or foreign areas. Only 8 percent of American colleges and universities now require a foreign language for admission compared to 34 percent in 1966. A 1979 study found that over 40 percent of 12 th graders could not locate Egypt and 20 percent were equally ignorant about the location of France and China.

The American media, due in part to rising costs, has reduced the number of bureaus and correspondents based in Europe. The Europe oriented journalists of the Murrow, Lippmann and Cronkite generation have been replaced with reporters who have made their careers in the U.S., the Middle East or Southeast Asia. The power shift away from the Europe oriented East Coast to the Sunbelt and the virtual end of European immigration into the U.S. have also contributed to a diminished American interest in and knowledge of Europe.

There are fewer mediators or interpreters in both continents who can explain the views of each side to the other and to their own publics. Both continents are becoming increasingly parochial. Part of this is due to shifting national interests but at least part is due to a growing deficit in contacts and understanding. Parochialism can easily lead to indifference and antagonism based upon insensitivity and misunderstanding. These developments argue for a stronger American effort at public diplomacy.

While U.S. support for informational and cultural activities has dropped by \$51 million in the last five years, both the Soviets and the West Europeans have substantially increased their efforts. Soviet expenditures on public diplomacy are at least four times greater than American outlays and have been

increasing at a rapid rate. They have also enhanced their expertise in area studies, especially on the U.S., Japan and Western Europe. Both France and West Germany spend more on exchanges than does the United States, both in relative and absolute terms. At a time when these two European states are spending 1 percent of their national budgets on exchanges, the American government spends only 0.1 percent for similar activities. The Europeans have also picked up an increasing share of the costs of academic exchanges with the U.S. The Germans, for example, pay 80 percent of these costs and have given increased youth contacts with the U.S. a high political and budgetary priority. It is clear that a major American effort to promote exchanges and contacts must be made at least for the remainder of this decade. The next few years will be crucial. The European baby boom generation must be reached now. By the end of the decade the proportion of young Europeans will decrease.

The Reagan Administration has started to recognize the importance of the problem and has begun to make an effort to turn around the decline of public support for exchanges which began in the late 1960's. The International Youth Exchanges Initiative announced at the Versailles summit is an example. The establishment of a U.S.-West German working group to promote exchanges is another.

A larger American governmental effort is required. The goal should be to spend 0.5 percent of what is spent on defense for

exchanges and informational activities. This may be unrealistic in these tight budgetary times but the pay off, both in terms of American foreign policy, and of American competitiveness in the international marketplace, will be great. The administrative infrastructure is already in place within the USIA so that additional administrative costs would be minimal. More of the money therefore would go directly to the program recipients rather than to the bureaucracy. 1000

Private sector involvement has always been one of the strong points in American informational and exchange efforts and much can be done by foundations, universities and privately supported groups. Foundations should give exchanges a higher priority than they have in the past. Only about 2 percent of private philanthropic funds are currently given to exchanges or to international studies. More could certainly be done. A temporary diversion of some funds from research activities into exchanges would be an important step in the right direction. Some public support could also pay large dividends. The Administration has been playing an increasingly active role as a broker, bringing together various private groups and encouraging their activities. Additional public funds could be used as seed money to support matching private funds.

Universities, hard hit by inflation and falling student enrollments will be less able to support foreign students in the future. Foreign students who can pay their own way, particularly those from oil producing states, will make up a larger proportion of the American student body. Without outside assistance university exchange programs will continue to decline. Curriculum and research questions maybe more important than exchanges in the univeristy context.

Major changes need to be made in curriculum and degree requirements to foster a knowledge of foreign languages and areas. Language and area training should be closely integrated and basic courses in international relations, foreign area studies and the American role in the world should be core requirements in any undergraduate education. Public support similar to the NDEA program of the late 1950's and 60's is required to strengthen area expertise and foreign area studies centers.

Finally attitudes in official Washington need to be changed. It is still difficult for all but the most senior European leaders to gain access to both executive and legislative leaders. Most Members of Congress see little incentive in spending time in discussions with foreign visitors and create an impression that American officials don't know or care very much about Europe.

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Executive branch officials, outside of the departments which deal directly with foreign affairs, also tend to give short shrift to visiting Europeans. European journalists as well have great difficulties in gaining access to American decision makers. A first step in the direction of changing these attitudes has been taken by the West Germans who have begun a program of short term exchanges between Congressional and Bundestag staffers. The American Political Science Association and the German Marshall Fund have also cooperated to include young Germans in the Congressional Fellowship Program which will place them on a Congressional staff for six months. Perhaps changes in the perspectives of legislative staffers is the first step to changes in the views of legislators. An expansion of exchanges between young trade unionists, ecologists, feminists, university students and political activists will hardly result in a unanimity of views, but will at least foster an appreciation of the diversity of view points and of the openness of the Western political systems.

While, exchanges are important, a broader problem concerns the reestablishment of a new strategic consensus within the West. Surveys indicate that the Successor Generation is likely to demand greater independence for their nations in foreign policy and is

likely to support some degree of closer European cooperation while hoping to maintain a link to NATO. This new relationship can only develop through a greater sharing of responsibility, decision making and military burdens. The old pattern of America deciding and Europe complaining will no longer do. Only a European defense force closely linked to the U.S. is likely to provide young Europeans with the sense of independence and responsibility required for the support needed for increased defense efforts.

A consistent, balanced and restrained American approach may not convince the Successor Generation but the alternative strategy which emphasizes the military component without a broader political approach will certainly further erode the Alliance. A shock treatment of threatening U.S. troop withdrawals or lecturing ungrateful Europeans for past American sacrifices is not likely to prove fruitful among the postwar generation.


Confidence in the longevity of the Atlantic Alliance because of its firm roots in common national security interests of its members are persuasive and are based upon a firm historical perspective. National interests, however, do not exist independently of those who perceive and define what those interests are. Subjective perceptions of threat or of the military balance may not always be congruent with the "objective" facts. The possibilities for mistrust, misunderstanding and frustration will be even greater between postwar European and

*Memorandum
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American generations than among the Founders generation. However it is as facile to assume that the Successor Generation is lost to pacifism and neutralism as it is to assume that the problem is a transient one which will disappear with maturity. The danger lies in a growing misunderstanding on both sides fueled by an excessive concern for self interest and an underestimation of the importance of the collective interest. The costs of frustration and misunderstanding are particularly great when combined with a growing Soviet sophistication of analysis and strategy in its dealings with Europe. The effort at a new consensus will be difficult but the implications of failure outweigh the costs of the attempt.

TABLE I

PERCENTAGE OF BEST-EDUCATED WHO FAVOR
NATO OR NEUTRALITY



Source: *Public Opinion*, August - September 1981, p. 10

1. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or of the United States government. This paper is based upon an analysis of public opinion in the major West European states, to be found in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans (London: Butterworth, 1983).
2. Elizabeth Noelle Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1967-1980 (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 235; for Italian data see Douglas G. Wertman, Italian Attitudes on Foreign Policy Issues: Are There Generational Differences?" in Szabo, ed., The Successor Generation.
3. Data taken from Ibid
4. See Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman, "Is NATO In Trouble?" A Survey of European Attitudes," Public Opinion August - September 1981.
5. Philip P. Everts, "The Mood of the Country: New Data on Public Opinion in the Netherlands on Nuclear Weapons and Other Problems of Peace and Security." Institute for International Studies, University of Leiden, mimeograph, 1982.

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6. The following information on exchange activities and levels of funding were provided by the U.S. International Communication Agency. See also the Atlantic Council, The Successor Generation (Washington, 1981)

 7. Gallup survey conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

 8. President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, Strength Through Wisdom: A Critique of U.S. Capability (Washington, 1979); National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies, Report of the Task Force on National Manpower Targets for Advanced Research on Foreign Areas (New York, 1982)

CALENDAR OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL

The following calendar includes three categories of events which could be relevant to our INF and other arms control interests: (1) useful opportunities, such as public forums where we can get our case across; (2) meetings with European leaders or among Europeans where we can seek supportive statements; and (3) events which are likely to cause us difficulties, such as demonstrations by anti-nuclear groups.

	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
<u>FEBRUARY</u>		
2/1	FRG Disarmament Commissioner Ruth to visit Moscow	Reaction to any public mention by Soviets
	McGeorge Bundy to speak in Bonn on "no first use"	Guidance to posts
2/1-4/15	Committee on Disarmament (CD) Spring session, Geneva	Emphasize all U.S. arms control initiatives
2/2	START talks resume	Rowny press briefing
2/2-2/14	Senator Tower in Europe -- FRG, Geneva (at same time as Vice President), USSR, Sweden, UK and Iceland	Provide briefing and materials
2/7-10	HLG Meeting in San Diego	
2/7-19	US Visit of Dutch Defense Minister	Stress Allied unity
2/8	CSCE Review Conference resumes, Madrid	Good demonstration of Allied unity
2/10-11	NATO Conference of National Information Officers, NATO Hdqrs.	Seek greater Allied coordination on public handling of overall security approach
2/10-11	USIA Conference on new directions in US foreign policy, Georgetown University	

DECLASSIFIED
Sec 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept 11, 2006
BY NARA CS DATE 8/9/12

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EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

2/11-13	Wehrkunde Conference, Munich; Navy Secretary Lehman, NSC Advisor Clark, Under Secretary of State Schneider and Asst. Secretary Burt	
2/10	Vice President returns	Brief the President, then meet the press
2/13-14	SCG Meeting at NATO Hdqrs., followed by press conference by SCG Chairman Burt	Seek prompt, favorable coverage in Allied capitals
2/14-16	Bilateral meeting of US and Soviet UN Associations, Moscow--Scowcroft, Brown, Stoessel, etc. (discussion to include INF and other arms control)	Department is providing a briefing
2/15-16	London meeting of US PAOs, USAF & Pol-Mil officers from our NATO embassies	Seek improved coordination of INF public handling
2/15-16	EC Political Directors Meeting, Bonn	
2/16	Burt Satellite Interview with Iceland	
2/16	British Council of Churches Debate on Nuclear Policy	U.S. Embassy Officer will provide briefing on arms control policy
2/16-18	French FM Cheysson to Visit Moscow	
2/16-18	US working visit of Norwegian PM Willoch	Seek supportive statement
2/17	Burt Backgrounder at White House following Willoch-Reagan Meeting	
2/17	US Visit of Luxembourg Foreign Minister	Show Allied unity, European support
2/17	HFAC Hearings on Arms Control	
2/18-20	Nuremberg "Peace Tribunal", FRG	

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

2/21-22	EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels	
2/22	Presidential Speech	
2/22-3/13	Strategic & Theater Arms Negotiations The U.S. Position	
2/24-3/9	NATO Wintex-Cimex Exercise	Guidance to rebut charges of "nuclear warfighting"
2/24 or 25	Burt Backgrounder for Norwegian, Danish & Icelandic Journalist (tentative)	
2/25-3/9	Queen Elizabeth to visit West Coast, with Foreign Minister Pym accompanying	Obtain maximum press cover- age; seek Pym public statements on security?
2/26-27	Copenhagen Seminar on "Western Security and the Soviet Union: Agenda for the 80s", sponsored by USNATO, USEC and Copenhagen University	Provide Washington speaker?
2/28	Eagleburger and Burt to address 40-60 senior Canadian business executives brought to Washington by Canadian Institute of International Affairs	Encourage Canadians to help promote NATO unity.
Late Feb.	Possible high-level speech on arms control	Seek approval
Late Feb.	Possible high-level briefings for selected European correspondents	Seek approval

<u>MARCH</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
	SCG Meeting	
	Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov to visit Greece (tentative)	
	Papandreou to visit Canada (tentative)	
Early March	Peace Demonstration in New York--World Peace Council to seek visas	Have press line ready on any visa refusals
3/1	Italian Group to Visit Moscow for Arms Control Discussions	Have Embassy Rome brief and debrief them.
3/1	EC Foreign Ministers Political Cooperation Meeting, Bonn	
3/6	FRG elections	
3/7	EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Brussels	
3/7-9	Conference on "Intellectual and Organizational Trends in the Western Alliance", sponsored by Italian Center for International Relations, Rome	
3/8-9	Nuclear Freeze groups to demonstrate at U.S. Congress	Use public statements and appearances during this period to emphasize that that we seek real reductions.
3/11	HLG Meeting in Brussels	
3/14-15	EC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels	
3/14-16	High Official Working Visit of Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers	
3/15-17	U.S. visit of Dutch PM Lubbers and Foreign Minister van der Broek	Show Allied unity; possible joint press conference
3/21-22	European Council Meeting, Brussels	

MARCH (Continued)

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

3/21-4/10	Atlantic Security	
3/22-23	Spring NPG in Portugal	
3/24-26	Conference sponsored by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, American Council on Germany and the Atlantic Bridge, Berlin	Provide high level participation?
3/25	Possible Burt Address in London	
3/26-27	Ditchley Conference, UK on "The Atlantic Partnership: Cooperation and Diversity" Asst. Secy. Burt to participate	Provide high level USG speaker
3/31	End of INF and MBFR rounds	Have our Amb. brief NAC & then meet with press. Also prepare inter-round public affairs plan to fill gap.
Late March	Aspen-type seminar, French Alps	French want senior USG participation
Late March	Possible Burt trip to Scandinavia with public appearances.	

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EVENTPOSSIBLE ACTIONAPRIL

SCG Meeting

HLG Meeting

End of START round

Possible high level public
report on state of arms
controlSeries of SFRC Hearings on US/Soviet
Relations, to include Rostow as witness.Provide Senior USG
official?Secretary's Spring bilateral with Canadian
FonMin MacEachen

Easter 1-4

Street Theater

Easter week

Peace marches in Europe

Stress US approach to peace

Easter week

Possible Foley Codel to Moscow, with 15-20
Members of CongressBrief on security issues
and provide materials

4/12-13

EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn

4/25-26

EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Luxembourg

4/27-28

Copenhagen Seminar on INF, sponsored by
Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament;
papers to be publishedProvide high level USG
speaker (at least DAS)Late April/
Early MayUSIS Stockholm to program START Deputy Goodby
and INF Deputy Glitman in Sweden

MAY

EVENTS

POSSIBLE ACTION

SCG Meeting

HLG Meeting

Possible Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting

Do analysis of possible WP initiatives, have press line ready and consider preempting them

Possible US visit of Romanian Foreign Minister

Seek balanced statement including ref to Soviet arms

Conference sponsored by Movement on European Disarmament, West Berlin

May-June

Former ACDA Director Rostow to speak in USSR as Ampart

5/4-5

EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn

5/9-10

Secretary to OECD Ministerial, Paris

5/11-14

Bilderberg Conf., Chateau Montebello, Canada

DepSec Dam to speak

5/14-15

EC Foreign Ministers informal "Gymnich" weekend

5/15

Berlin "Peace Conference," in connection with 50th Anniversary of Hitler's rise to power.

5/18-20

European Institute for Security Matters Conf. Luxembourg

Need high level USG speaker.

5/24

EC Foreign Ministers meeting, Bonn

5/28-30

Williamsburg Summit

Seek demonstration of Allied unity in security as well as economic area

5/31-6/1

EC Political Directors meeting, Bonn

End of May

INF talks resume, Round V

Nitze meet President and consult in Europe

X

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

SPRING

(no date yet)

US Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter to be issued

Possible Italian elections

Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez to Washington

Stress Western unity and Spain as example of expansion of democracy

START talks resume

Rowny to see President, brief press

SCG meeting

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<u>JUNE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTION</u>
6/6-7	European Council Meeting, Bonn	
6/9-10	Secretary to NAC Ministerial, Paris	Obtain full Allied support on arms control and other East-West issues
6/18	Pope's Visit to Poland (Tentative)	
6/25	Vice President to take part in US/FRG Tricentennial Celebration in Krefeld and to visit other European countries.	

JULY

EVENT

POSSIBLE ACTION

11-16

Fourth Seminar on International
Security Affairs, Geneva

Seeking senior US speaker
probably private sector.

AUGUST

6

Hiroshima Anniversary