

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: European and Soviet Affairs Directorate,
NSC: Records

Folder Title: Public Diplomacy 1983
(1 of 19)

Box: RAC Box 12

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC : RECORDS
File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (1 OF 19)
Box Number 12

Withdrawer
CAS 8/8/2012

FOIA
M11-443
HAENNI

87

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
140979	CABLE	RE STRATEGY <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	18	4/28/1982	B1
140980	PAPER	RE WESTERN EUROPE (ANNOTATED)	21	12/3/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

ASC

Master
Public
diplom
17 79

EUR/P:GRUECKERT/SESTEINER

04/28/82 EXT. 20850 UANG 1216A

P:LSEAGLEBURGER

EUR:RBURT

JCS:EHAMILTON

EUR:JDOBBINS

PM:RDEAN

NSC:DBLAIR/SKRAMER

ACDA:CSORRELS

PA:JKELLY

OSD:SKOCH

P:DLOWENFELD

USIA:BFULTON

S/P: J Peppageorge

IMMEDIATE ALEDP, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, SEOUL IMMEDIATE, BEIJING

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY WELLINGTON, MANILA PRIORITY, BANGKOK PRIORITY,

CANBERRA PRIORITY, USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY, GENEVA PRIORITY

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

DECL:OADR

SCUL, PARM, INF

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M443/5 #140979

BY DW NARA DATE 9/5/17

Subj: INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY

REF: {A} STATE 58000; {B} STATE 80226

1. AS ON THE SUBSTANCE ITSELF, WE ARE AT A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT STAGE IN OUR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OF THE INF ISSUE. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED THE US COMMITMENT TO MOVING THE TALKS FORWARD AND AT THE SAME TIME HAS DONE MUCH TO HELP US ~~RE~~ REGAIN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFENSIVE. BUT THE PERIOD AHEAD PROMISES TO BE A PARTICULARLY COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT ONE, AND A CONCERTED AND SUSTAINED EFFORT IS NEEDED IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN THE REQUISITE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE POSITIONS. WE THEREFORE CONSIDER IT TIMELY TO PROVIDE POSTS WITH A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE STAND IN OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS, WITH AN OUTLINE OF OUR NEXT STEPS AND WITH SOME ADDITIONAL PUBLIC AFFIARS THEMES ON OUR OVERALL APPROACH AND ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. IN TURN, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING POSTS' ^{States} REPORT ON PRESENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS CLIMATE AND YOUR ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS AND OBSTACLES

~~SECRET~~

3

RELATED TO INF WHICH WE CAN EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER IN HOST COUNTRIES THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR.

For Action Requested, see paras 8-11.

2. {S} THE PRESIDENT'S ^OPROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT--WHILE PRESERVING THE ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME AS OUR ULTIMATE GOAL--HAS DEMONSTRATED U.S. FLEXIBILITY AND OUR DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN GENEVA. THE NEW INITIATIVE WAS BASED ON VERY CLOSE CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND THE REACTION OF ALLIED LEADERS WAS HIGHLY POSITIVE. THE ^ORESPONSE OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE PRESS AND OF CONGRESS WAS SIMILARLY FAVORABLE, DESPITE THE GENERAL SKEPTICISM OVER THE PROSPECTS FOR A FAVORABLE SOVIET RESPONSE. IN ADDITION, THE ACTIVE PUBLIC DIALOGUE UNDERTAKEN BY SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND OUR EUROPEAN POSTS HAS BEGUN TO HAVE AN IMPACT. AS A RESULT, WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE NOW IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO OBTAIN THE NEEDED PUBLIC SUPPORT AND MOMENTUM ON WHICH TO BUILD DURING THE COMING MONTHS.

3. FOR THEIR PART, EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ASIAN DIMENSION OF INF, IN REGARD TO BOTH THE DEPLOYMENT OF INCREASING NUMBERS OF SS-20S IN THE EASTERN AREAS OF THE USSR AND THE IMPACT

WHICH THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS COULD HAVE ON DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA. GROMYKO'S HARSH STATEMENTS ON ASIA HAVE ALSO CAUSED ASIA GOVERNMENTS TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION TO THIS ISSUE.

4. (S) THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO DIVIDE NATO OVER THE INF ISSUE, AND PERHAPS TO PLAY OFF OUR EUROPEAN AGAINST OUR ASIAN ALLIES *on the question of global limits.* THEY HAVE RESPONDED PROMPTLY AND AT HIGH LEVELS TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IN AN EFFORT TO DISSIPATE ITS IMPACT. THEY UNDERTOOK A MAJOR EFFORT, BEGUN EVEN BEFORE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S APRIL 2 PRESS CONFERENCE, TO DISCREDIT PUBLICLY ANY IDEA OF AN INTERIM SOLUTION. AT THIS POINT, IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STILL INTENT ON AVOIDING MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS IN THEIR LRINF SYSTEMS, WHILE PREVENTING ANY INF DEPLOYMENTS BY THE ALLIANCE AND UNDERMINING OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION BY POLITICAL MEANS. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HOPE ^ATHAT THEIR PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL, THEIR VIGOROUS PUBLIC ATTACKS ON ALLIANCE POSITIONS ^N AND THEIR THREATS AGAINST THE U.S., EUROPE AND JAPAN WILL ERODE WESTERN EUROPEAN SUPPORT OF OUR ^OPOSITION AND GENERATE PUBLIC PRESSURES ON US TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25

5. {S} IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT, WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES, WE CHANNEL OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF ALLIANCE POSITIONS ^{and US arms reduction initiatives.} IN THIS CONNECTION, A CONCERTED EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY TO PROVIDE POSTS AND MILITARY COMMANDS AS RAPIDLY AND COMPLETELY AS POSSIBLE WITH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, BACKGROUNDS, PRESS STATEMENTS AND ^{and other arms control} INF ~~RELATED Q'S AND A'S. ON BOTH THE~~ ~~PRESIDENT'S NEW PROPOSAL AND ON THE SOVIET PROPOSALS~~

6. {S} WE CURRENTLY ARE WORKING ON AN EXTENSIVE SERIES OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO UPDATE MATERIALS PREVIOUSLY SENT TO THE FIELD, TO PROVIDE SOME NEW PERSPECTIVES AND INFORMATION AND TO BUILD UP A RESERVOIR OF USEFUL BACKGROUND MATERIAL WHICH CAN BE USED BY POSTS AND MILITARY COMMANDS IN SUPPORT OF ALLIED POSITIONS.

7. {S} A LISTING OF THE MAJOR PROJECTS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY FOLLOWS:

A) NEW MATERIALS:

-- WE ARE REVISING AND UPDATING MATERIALS AND THEMES

ALREADY SENT TO THE FIELD. WE HAVE UNDERWAY, FOR EXAMPLE, A COMPREHENSIVE UP-DATING OF THE INF SPEAKERS PACKET SENT TO THE POSTS IN MARCH AND OF THE ARMS CONTROL SPEAKERS BOOK SENT TO POSTS EARLIER. REVISED AND UPDATED SECTIONS OF THE PACKET WILL BE CABLED TO THE FIELD WHEN COMPLETED.

The revised book will be pouched separately.

-- ADDITIONAL NEW MATERIALS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING SOVIET ARGUMENTS WILL BE SENT SHORTLY.

-- A WHITE PAPER ON BROADER U.S. ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD IS UNDER PREPARATION AND WILL HOPEFULLY BE READY FOR RELEASE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN JUNE.

-- A NEW GIST ON INF WILL SOON BE SENT TO POSTS.

~~-- AN INF PRESS PACKET CONTAINING USEFUL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ALSO WILL BE FORWARDED SHORTLY.~~

B) EXPANDED SPEAKERS PROGRAM

-- SENIOR SPEAKERS ARE BEING ALERTED TO INCLUDE INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN THEIR FORTHCOMING SPEECHES AND PRESS BRIEFINGS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7

-- USIA IS PREPARING, IN COOPERATION WITH POSTS, AN ENHANCED SPEAKERS PROGRAM IN EUROPE. AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, MORE PRIVATE SECTOR AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE. IN ADDITION, WE WILL SEEK TO PLACE EXPERT SPEAKERS IN SELECTED FORUMS IN ASIA.

AA79

-- WE ALSO HAVE STEPPED UP CONSIDERABLY THE NUMBER AND LEVEL OF BRIEFINGS PROVIDED FOR EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS RESIDENT IN THE U.S.

B. {S} ACTION REQUESTED: IN LINE WITH THIS GENERAL EFFORT, EUROPEAN POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THEIR INF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT ALLIANCE INF POLICY AND US NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ARE BEING CONVEYED TO KEY PUBLICS IN THE HOST COUNTRY AS COMPLETELY AND EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS REGARD, WE SEE NO NEED TO CHANGE THE GENERAL APPROACH OUTLINED IN REFTEL A. IT REMAINS ESSENTIAL THAT EACH ALLIED GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ITS OWN COUNTRY IN BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT BEHIND THE NATO POSITION. AS EARLIER, U.S. EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO COMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT THESE EUROPEAN EFFORTS AND BE CAREFULLY TAILORED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN

EACH COUNTRY. ON THE SUBSTANCE, POSTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO CAST THEIR PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH WITHIN THE BROADER FRAMEWORK OF NATO'S SUCCESS IN KEEPING THE PEACE AND PRESERVING WESTERN FREEDOM AND SECURITY, AND OF OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL, ^LEQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS. IN OUR VIEW, THESE EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD THE INFORMED GENERAL PUBLIC IN HOST COUNTRIES.

9. {S} WITHIN THIS GENERAL FRAMEWORK, POSTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO PROMISING AVENUE FOR PRESENTING NATO AND US POSITIONS ON INF AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IS OVERLOOKED. YOU SHOULD DEVOTE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO IMPROVING YOUR DIALOGUE WITH INFLUENTIAL GROUPS AND OPINION-MAKERS WHO ARE UNDECIDED ON KEY INF ISSUES. ~~THE~~ ALSO, ~~BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO INCREASE~~ ^d PRIVATE U.S. AND EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF NATO POSITIONS ^{would be valuable.} CREATIVE POSTS INITIATIVES WOULD BE WELCOMED. AS ONE EXAMPLE OF AN EXCELLENT INITIATIVE, EMBASSY LONDON HAS RECENTLY SUBMITTED FOR WASHINGTON COMMENT A ^{very} USEFUL DRAFT INF ARTICLE TAILORED TO BRITISH PUBLIC CONCERNS FOR PLACEMENT IN AN APPROPRIATE BRITISH PUBLICATION UNDER AMBASSADOR LOUIS' BYLINE.

~~SECRET~~

~~at the State Dept~~

~~SECRET~~

Western European 9

10. {S} EACH ~~NATO~~ POST IS REQUESTED TO SUBMIT BY MAY 10: A) A STATUS REPORT CONCERNING ATTITUDES IN HOST COUNTRY ON INF AND RELATED SECURITY ISSUES; B) A ~~REVIEW~~ PROGRAMS PLANNED OR UNDERWAY; ~~AND~~ C) A REPORT ON THE KEY ISSUES AND PROBLEMS YOU SEE AHEAD--INCLUDING

report on

PUBLIC, PARLIAMENTARY AND OTHER POTENTIAL OBSTACLES; THIS INFORMATION WILL ENABLE US TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION IN ADVANCE TO WORK WITH THE ALLIES IN DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE HURDLES AHEAD.

The most difficult questions encountered in host country and arguments found

D) a list of most effective in country them; ad E) a list of those of Soviet ~~statements~~ statements and actions which have received most attention in host country actions

11. {S} SIMILARLY, EMBASSIES TOKYO, SEOUL AND {AS APPROPRIATE} BEIJING ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT ON DEGREE OF OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC INTEREST AND CONCERN ON INF ISSUES AND ON SPECIFIC OPPOSITION TO NATO POSITIONS. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR INITIAL THOUGHTS ABOUT ~~OUR~~ ALLIES AND/OR USG SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO ADDRESS ASIA CONCERNS.

12. {U} BROAD THEMES: PUTTING THIS IN TERMS YOU FIND MOST APPROPRIATE TO HOST COUNTRY CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SUGGEST THAT POSTS EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL THEMES IN THEIR PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF INF-RELATED ISSUES:

-- WESTERN COMMITMENT TO PEACE THROUGH DETERRENCE BASED ON STRONG DEFENSES HAS GIVEN EUROPE ITS LONGEST PERIOD OF PEACE IN ^{more than a} ~~THE~~ CENTURY. ~~THIS~~ THIS IS THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION OF NATO, THE REAL PEACE MOVEMENT.

-- ALLIANCE UNITY ^{HAS} ~~IS~~ BEEN CENTRAL TO THIS SUCCESS AND REMAINS ESSENTIAL IN CONTINUING TO ENSURE THE WEST'S PEACE, FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO REAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND STRONG DEFENSES OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT EVER TO REVERSE THE ARMS RACE, REDUCE THE TOTAL LEVELS OF WEAPONS AND BRING GREATER STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS.

-- NATO HAS MAINTAINED THE SMALLEST PRACTICABLE NUCLEAR ARSENAL NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE DETERRENT. SINCE THE 1960'S WE HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED BOTH THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS AND THE EXPLOSIVE POWER OF OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL, WHICH CURRENTLY IS AT ITS LOWEST LEVEL IN TWENTY YEARS.

13. {U} SPECIFIC THEMES: IN DISCUSSING THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING MORE SPECIFIC INF THEMES. MORE DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE MATERIAL ON THESE POINTS WILL FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2 11

A. THE PRESIDENT'S NEW PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S NEW PROPOSAL IS INDICATIVE OF THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH THE U.S. CONTINUES TO SHOW IN THE GENEVA INF TALKS. WE ARE MAKING A DETERMINED EFFORT TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. REGRETTABLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO DISPLAY A SIMILAR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS THE PRODUCT OF AN EXTENSIVE PRIOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS IN BRUSSELS AND IN ALLIED CAPITALS INCLUDING WASHINGTON AND TOKYO. THIS HAS INCLUDED CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND HEADS OF STATE, HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS DURING THE EUROPEAN TRIPS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY, AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, AND AN EXTREMELY INTENSIVE--AND CONTINUING--SCG PROCESS.

~~SECRET~~

-- THIS NEW INF INITIATIVE ALSO WAS DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS IN ^A WASHINGTON AND PLACED ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA BEFORE ANY PUBLIC MENTION WAS MADE OF THIS MOVE. THE U.S. INITIATIVE WAS TIMED TO OCCUR PRIOR TO THE CURRENT RECESS SO THAT IT COULD BE COMPREHENSIVELY REVIEWED BY THE SOVIET SIDE BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS. ALL OF THIS IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV'S DECEMBER PROPOSALS WHICH WERE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY OVER A MONTH BEFORE BEING PRESENTED TO OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA.

-- MOREOVER, THE U.S. SIDE HAS ~~PROPOSED~~ THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF INF TALKS BE CONVENED EARLY IN AN EFFORT TO STEP UP THE PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRY TO REACH THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS AGREED TO THIS U.S. SUGGESTION, AND TALKS WILL RESUME MAY 17. THE U.S. WILL RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL ^{IN} GREATER DETAIL, TO ELICIT A SOVIET RESPONSE AND TO RESPOND TO SOVIET INITIATIVES.

B. SOVIET REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS:

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA. IF THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY WANTS A SOUND AGREEMENT, THEY WILL RESPOND IN THAT SAME SPIRIT. UNLESS AN AGREEMENT ^{is reached} ~~IS REACHED~~, NATO ^{obviating the need for deployments}

~~ELIMINATING ALL U.S. AND SOVIET LAND BASED~~

~~LRINF. WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL PROCEED WITH~~ ^{at the end of 1983.} ~~PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENTS AS AGREED BY THE~~ ~~ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER 1979.~~ AS THE PRESIDENT

MADE CLEAR IN HIS PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE LEVEL OF SUCH DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY THE LRINF MISSILES ^{they have} DEPLOYED AGAINST OUR EUROPEAN AND ASIAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET PUBLIC RESPONSE THUS FAR ^{HAS} ~~IS~~ BEEN AIMED PRIMARILY AT U.S. AND EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AND DESIGNED TO TRY TO UNDERCUT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION, WHILE ~~AVOIDING~~ THE NEED FOR REAL REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET SYSTEMS. WE HOPE THEIR RESPONSE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA WILL BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE.

-- WHEN THE SOVIETS FINALLY REALIZE THAT THEY CAN NOT PREVENT ~~THE~~ ALLIED INF DEPLOYMENTS FROM TAKING PLACE ~~BY~~ PURELY BY PROPAGANDA MEANS AND BY THEIR EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN PUBLICS, WE EXPECT THEY WILL BEGIN TO BARGAIN SERIOUSLY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE SOVIETS INITIALLY REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES UNDER THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DECISION AND DID NOT AGREE TO NEGOTIATE UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR TO THEM THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS INDEED DETERMINED TO IMPLEMENT BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECISION.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS STILL ARE LEAVING THEIR ~~NEGOTIATING~~ NEGOTIATING OPTIONS OPEN. IN THIS REGARD, WE WOULD NOTE THAT SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S OVERALL TONE WAS RESTRAINED BY SOVIET STANDARDS.

-- THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT PROPOSED AT THIS TIME A SPECIFIC NUMBER FOR EQUAL LEVELS OF WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF U.S. FLEXIBILITY IN AN EFFORT TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. THIS GIVES THE SOVIETS THE

OPPORTUNITY TO TELL US WHAT EQUAL LEVEL THEY WILL ACCEPT.

-- BY HIS REMARKS THAT WHEREAS U.S. SYSTEMS IN EUROPE COULD REACH THE SOVIET UNION, SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEMS COULD NOT REACH THE U.S., GROMYKO HAS ONCE AGAIN CONFIRMED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPE ARE SECONDARY TO THOSE OF THE USSR. THIS MAKES IT MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER THAT WE PERMIT NO WEAKENING OF THE VITAL DEFENSE LINK BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NATO.

-- THE CONTINUING SOVIET CLAIM THAT A "BALANCE" EXISTS IS EVEN LESS CREDIBLE NOW. THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING THAT CLAIM BACK IN 1979, WHEN THEY HAD 400 SS-20 WARHEADS ON LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES, AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INF TALKS IN 1981 WHEN THEY HAD 750 SS-20 WARHEADS. AND THEY ARE STILL MAKING THAT CLAIM TODAY WHEN THEY HAVE OVER 1,050 WARHEADS ON SS-20 MISSILES -- EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. STILL HAS DEPLOYED NO SYSTEMS AT ALL IN THIS CLASS.

-- THE SOVIET APPROACH STILL SEEMS MORE DESIGNED TO CREATE BARRIERS THAN TO MAKE NEGOTIATING PROGRESS. GROMYKO PUBLICLY CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON THREE GROUNDS: IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS; THERE WERE NO AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS IN THE PROPOSAL; AND IT CALLED FOR LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN ASIA. NONE OF THESE ARGUMENTS REALLY HOLDS UP UNDER CLOSER SCRUTINY.

0. FIRST, BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS ARE NATIONAL ^{Strategic} SYSTEMS AND DO NOT PLAY THE SAME ROLE AS U.S. SYSTEMS IN LINKING THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES--THE MAJORITY OF WHICH ARE NOT NUCLEAR POWERS--TO THE U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR GUARANTEE. NOR ARE THESE SYSTEMS EQUIVALENT IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS TO THE U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES WHICH ARE THE REAL ISSUES IN THESE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

~~THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS ARE FOR THE MOST PART SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, COMPARABLE IN THEIR MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS TO U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC SLBMs, NOT TO INF SYSTEMS~~

(Details on this issue will follow by Septel.)

0. SECOND, AS TO AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS, WE HAVE

NEVER RULED THESE OUT. WE HAVE STRESSED THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE FIRST ON SYSTEMS WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE CHARACTERIZED AS THE MOST DANGEROUS AND DESTABILIZING: LAND-BASED LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES. THE SOVIETS CURRENTLY HAVE ABOUT 1300

WARHEADS ON THIS CATEGORY OF SYSTEM WHILE THE U.S. HAS NONE AT ALL. ~~HOWEVER, WE WOULD ALSO~~

The Soviets currently have advantages in all categories of INF systems. For example,

~~NOTE THAT~~ THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES HAVE SOME 2500 ~~NUCLEAR-CAPABLE~~ AIRCRAFT, WHILE THE

believed to have a nuclear role

EQUIVALENT FIGURE FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE IS ABOUT 800. IN SHORT, EVEN IN NUCLEAR-CAPABLE

AIRCRAFT, THE SOVIETS HAVE A ~~THREE TO ONE~~

very significant

ADVANTAGE. *(Ratios vary according*

2, 1

0. THIRD, IN REGARD TO ASIAN SYSTEMS, A GOOD PART OF THOSE SS-20S DEPLOYED IN THE EASTERN AREAS OF THE USSR FROM WHICH THEY CAN TARGET OUR ASIAN FRIENDS AND ALLIES CAN ALSO REACH TARGETS IN EUROPE BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVE RANGE OF THE SS-20 {5000 KILOMETERS VS ONLY 1800 FOR PERSHING II AND 2,500 FOR GLCM}. IN ADDITION, THE SS-20 IS MOBILE AND TRANSPORTABLE AND THUS COULD EASILY AND QUICKLY BE MOVED FROM EAST TO WEST. INDEED, A NUMBER OF SOVIET SS-20 BASES HAVE BEEN

CONSTRUCTED CLOSE TO RAIL LINKS AND OTHER
TRANSPORTATION CENTERS, ENABLING RAPID
MOVEMENT. SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS IN ASIA THUS
REMAIN A THREAT TO THE NATO COUNTRIES OF EUROPE,
EVEN AS THEY INCREASE THE THREAT TO OUR FRIENDS
AND ALLIES IN ASIA.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS OWE THE WORLD A
MORE POSITIVE AND REASONED RESPONSE. WE HOPE
THEY WILL USE THE CURRENT RECESS IN THE GENEVA
INF TALKS TO TAKE WESTERN CONCERNS MORE FULLY
INTO ACCOUNT.

-- {IF ASKED} GROMYKO'S CHARGES THAT JAPAN,
SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE "STUFFED
FULL" OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A TRANSPARENT
EFFORT TO JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY
BUILDUP IN THE FAR EAST AND THE UNWARRANTED
SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20S AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE
AIRCRAFT IN ASIA. SOVIET SS-20S THREATEN THE
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT, THE MIDDLE EAST AND MUCH OF
AFRICA, AS WELL AS ASIA AND EUROPE. WE HAVE
DEPLOYED NO RPT NO COMPARABLE MISSILES. WE ARE
NOT ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF MAJOR MILITARY BUILD
UP IN ASIA, AND THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR
RESPECT FOR JAPAN'S POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

MAGAZINE REPRINT

This article, drawn from a contemporary U S. periodical, presents significant views on a subject of interest not only in the United States but abroad. Editors are cautioned to comply explicitly with terms specified below regarding republication rights and credits.

AVAIL. LIST 10/82, #6

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE
By Sidney Hook
From Freedom at Issue

SUMMARY: Dr. Hook, a distinguished philosophy professor, says of a proposed nuclear freeze, "I should have no hesitation in supporting such an initiative if there were any realistic prospect of the Soviet Union allowing the rest of the world to see, openly and freely, that it is abiding by such an agreement." This, he says, is not likely.

LENGTH: 900 words

PHOTOS: None

NOTE: This article has been cleared for republication, abridgment and in translation by USIA and the press outside the United States. On title page of any reprint, credit author and carry:

Abridged by permission from FREEDOM AT ISSUE, July/August 1982.
Copyright © 1982 by Freedom House, Inc.

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE

By Sidney Hook

I have been receiving letters requesting me to support an initiative to press upon the U.S. Congress and the president the urgent need "to propose to the Soviet Union an immediate mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of all nuclear weapons, missiles, and delivery systems."

I should have no hesitation in supporting such an initiative if there were any realistic prospect of the Soviet Union allowing the rest of the world to see, openly and freely, that it is abiding by such an agreement. With respect to the United States, we know that in our free culture any violations of such an agreement would be immediately reported by a whole corps of whistle-blowers to the press and other public media. But in view of the absolute control of public opinion and the absence of a free press or any other independent means of communication in the USSR, how would Soviet violations of such an agreement become known?

It is often maintained that such a freeze can be monitored and verified by existing national means. But this is demonstrably false. Our satellites cannot reveal what is hidden underground or even in large warehouses that, despite their announced purposes, can conceal large-scale accumulation of weapons. Only unhampered on-site inspections can provide reliable means of verification. The United States has often expressed its willingness to open all its territory to on-site inspections. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to do so.

We have evidence that the Soviet Union has violated previous agreements into which it has entered, the most recent and outrageous of which has been the systematic violations of the Helsinki Final Act. At the present time all members

of the Helsinki Watch Group in the USSR are in jails or concentration camps. Their sole offense, declared a crime, was their readiness to issue reports on their government's abuse of the human-rights provision of the Helsinki Accords. It is also noteworthy that the Soviet Union did not abide by the agreement on the testing of nuclear weapons during Khrushchev's regime. Even more recently, the Soviet Union has violated the 1972 Geneva Convention, of which it is a signatory, on the prohibition of manufacture, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons. The use of "Yellow Rain" in Afghanistan and other areas where the Soviet Union and its satellite troops have been active is now well known. There was also evidence that in 1979 the massive anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk was a consequence of the secret and illegal manufacture of biological warfare agents. During the 1980 review conference of the Convention, the Soviet Union refused to comply with the request of other signatories to the Convention for relevant information on the Sverdlovsk catastrophe. This constituted another violation of the Convention.

Proponents of a nuclear freeze maintain that they are not challenging our country's need for a strong defense. But in the absence of adequate procedures of verification, that is precisely what they are doing. Even worse, they are lulling their fellow citizens into a false sense of security, despite the historical record.

When the United States enjoyed a monopoly of atomic weapons, it offered to surrender it to an international authority -- a proposal accepted by all nations at the time except the Soviet Union and its satellites. Since that time, peace between the United States and the USSR has been achieved, in Churchill's phrase, by "a balance of terror." By making a proposal for a freeze that cannot be verified, its advocates are urging a policy that would encourage the enemies of a free society to entertain the idea of a nuclear Pearl Harbor.

Those urging a freeze say, "If we have learned anything from history, it is that too often misguided leaders have taken their nations down the path to destruction." But they fail to apply that lesson relevantly. It was the Chamberlains and other self-deceived leaders of the Western world who, in the face of Hitler's rearmament,

sought to appease him and imagined that they had won peace in their time on the eve of the greatest war in human history -- precipitated by the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the union of totalitarian powers. If Hitler had had atomic or nuclear weapons, it is doubtful that anyone interested in peace and freedom -- a kind of peace can always be attained by surrender and enslavement -- would have advocated an unverified weapons freeze. The only thing that deterred Hitler from using poison gas was the Western powers' capacity to retaliate in kind.

Instead of a nuclear freeze which would still leave enough weapons in place that are still capable of destroying every person on earth, would it not be more logical to propose a reduction, gradual and then massive, of nuclear weapons on both sides, under verifiable controls? If the Soviet Union refuses on-site inspection, the nuclear freeze is a snare and delusion. If it accepts on-site inspection, then the United States should press for progressive multilateral reduction of nuclear arms.

Logic, history, and common sense reinforce the wisdom of this proposal and at the same time reveal the unwisdom of an immediate nuclear freeze without reliable means of verification.

The distinguished scholar Sidney Hook is emeritus professor of philosophy, New York University, and a senior research fellow at California's Hoover Institution. He is a lifelong student of Marx, Trotsky, and Stalin, and the author of many volumes in this subject area. Professor Hook is a board member of the privately funded New York-based Freedom House.

* * * *

Foreign Opinion Note

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

November 30, 1982

WEST EUROPEANS TEND TO APPROVE OF THE "PEACE MOVEMENT," BUT DOUBT IT WILL HELP ACHIEVE PEACE

FILE ✓
PUBLIC
DIPLO-
MACY

This is the third report presenting results from USIA-commissioned national public opinion surveys conducted between October 8 and 30 in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. Personal interviews with about 1000 adults were conducted in each country by reputable firms--mostly Gallup affiliates. They were completed before the death of Leonid Brezhnev and after the change of government in West Germany.

Anti-Nuclear Movement is Widely Known and Generally Approved

Large majorities of West European publics (from 61% in France to 89% in the Netherlands) have heard or read about the "anti-nuclear weapons movement" in their country or "elsewhere in Western Europe." This is in sharp contrast to the low level of public awareness of START and INF talks.

Among the informed, opinion toward the movement is by and large approving, with a majority in Italy (61%) and pluralities elsewhere (40%-50% range) "generally in favor." Opposition ranges between one-fourth and one-third and about 15 percent are "generally indifferent."

From a list of adjectives, informed Europeans are more likely to perceive the movement as "sincere," but no clear overall image emerges.

PERCEPTION OF ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT October 1982

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>
Sincere	33%	29%	39%	29%	29%
Misguided	32	3	17	13	16
Dedicated	21	14	10	24	11
Utopian	7	16	20	16	10
Communist- Dominated	10	5	17	7	6
Don't Know	9	33	4	11	31

Movement Generally Seen As Not Affecting Nuclear War Chances

Despite these broadly favorable views, prevailing opinion (43%-53%) everywhere except Italy is that the anti-nuclear weapons movement is having no effect on the chances of a nuclear war breaking out. Italians see it differently: half believe it "helps to reduce the chances of a nuclear war." Only about one-third hold this view in the other countries.

Prepared by:
Stephen M. Shaffer (P/REU)
724-9140

N-11/30/82

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC :
RECORDS

Withdrawer

CAS 8/8/2012

File Folder

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1983 (1 OF 19)

FOIA

M11-443
HAENNI

Box Number

12

87

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
140980	PAPER	21	12/3/1982	B1
	RE WESTERN EUROPE (ANNOTATED)			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

1233 JAN 15 PM 6 30

83 JAN 15 P 8: 08

B

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 930 CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE No. Pages 1

FROM: C. E. McManaway S/S 23126 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE RE AMB. DAILEY

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>ADMIRAL POINDEXTER</u>	<u>456-2224</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: _____

S/S Officer: C. E. McManaway

APPROVED CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE
AMBASSADOR DAILEY

Q. We understand that Ambassador Dailey has been asked to assume special duties in Washington. What precisely is his role? Will he remain Ambassador to Ireland?

Advisor
Clark

A. At the suggestion of Secretary Shultz, the President has asked Ambassador Peter Dailey to review and suggest means to strengthen U.S. communications with Europe. Ambassador Dailey has an extensive professional background in communications and public affairs. He is particularly well-qualified to undertake such an examination.

As the President's personal representative, he will over the next several weeks chair an interagency working group on this issue. He will work closely with Secretary Shultz, USIA Director Wick, and the National Security Council, and will keep the President personally advised of his progress and recommendations.

He will remain our Ambassador to Ireland, and will return to his post at the conclusion of this review.

Secretary Weinberger

ACDA Director-Designate
Adelman



as 2/6/12

APPROVED CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE
AMBASSADOR DAILEY

Drafted: EUR/RPM: JHHawes

Cleared: EUR: JFDobbins
P: LSEagleburger
S/S: CEMcManaway
NSC: Adm. JPoindexter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

During George Shultz's recent visit to Europe he met with our Ambassadors and a wide cross-section of European leaders in several countries. He has expressed to me his concern that the highly complex economic and political issues with which we are dealing are not fully understood by a substantial number of Europeans.

At the suggestion of Secretary Schultz, I have asked Ambassador Peter Dailey to review our communications with and throughout Europe.

As my personal representative he will chair an ad hoc interagency working group that will examine the spectrum of official and private contacts and relationships in the fields of security, economics and politics. He will remain as Ambassador to Ireland.

He will work closely with Secretary Shultz and the NSC and will keep me personally advised of his progress and recommendations.

For Immediate Release

January 13, 1983