

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual  
collections.

---

**Collection:** Duberstein, Kenneth M.: Files  
**Folder Title:** [Moscow Summit:] Background, Book  
for the Meetings of President Reagan and General  
Secretary Gorbachev, Moscow, 05/29/1988-06/02/1988 [2  
of 2]  
**Box:** 2

---

To see more digitized collections visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
inventories visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at:  
[reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Duberstein, Kenneth M.: Files:  
Office of the Chief of Staff

**Archivist:** kdb

**OA/Box:** Box 2

**FOIA ID:** F1997-066/7, D. Cohen

**File Folder:** [Moscow Summit:] Background Book for the  
Meetings of President Reagan and General  
Secretary Gorbachev, Moscow, 05/29/1988-  
06/02/1988 (2)

**Date:** 08/24/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. report</del>	<del>re political dissent in Soviet Union, 1p R 10/29/10 F97-066/7 #16</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>2. report</del>	<del>Religious Rights in the Millennial Year, 2p R " " #17</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>3. report</del>	<del>re CSCE/Moscow human rights meeting, 2p R " " #18</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>4. report</del>	<del>re Soviet human rights agenda, 1p R " " #19</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>5. report</del>	<del>re regional dialogue, 1p R " " #20</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>6. report</del>	<del>re Afghanistan, 1p R " " #21</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>7. report</del>	<del>re Iran/Iraq War, 1p R " " #22</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>8. report</del>	<del>re Middle East peace process, 2p R " " #23</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>9. report</del>	<del>re Central America, 2p R " " #24</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>10. report</del>	<del>re Africa, 2p R " " #25</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>11. report</del>	<del>re terrorism, 1p R " " #26</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>12. report</del>	<del>re Berlin initiative, 1p R " " #27</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>13. report</del>	<del>re East Asia and Pacific, 1p R " " #28</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
14. report	re South Asian nuclear issue, 1p Part. 10/29/10 F97-066/7 #29	n.d.	B1
<del>15. report</del>	<del>Summit Bilateral Checklist, 2p R " " #30</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Duberstein, Kenneth M.: Files:  
Office of the Chief of Staff

**Archivist:** kdb

**OA/Box:** Box 2

**FOIA ID:** F1997-066/7, D. Cohen

**File Folder:** [Moscow Summit:] Background Book for the  
Meetings of President Reagan and General  
Secretary Gorbachev, Moscow, 05/29/1988-  
06/02/1988 (2)

**Date:** 08/24/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>16. report</del>	<del>re cultural and people-to-people exchanges, 1p</del> R 10/29/10 F97-066/7#31	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

- I. EASING UNDER GORBACHEV OF TRADITIONAL REPRESSION OF DISSENT
- o Repression of dissent has been a traditional feature of Soviet system.
  - o Under Gorbachev, there has been a liberalization, albeit one that is tightly controlled.
    - Some tolerance of demonstrations and unofficial publications, which include articles on controversial topics.
    - Tolerance of "unofficial" groups. Soviet officials estimate that 30,000 groups meeting around the country on issues ranging from environment to nationalism.
    - Release of more than 350 political prisoners. Releases seem to have ended, however, and most had to sign statements of guilt or repudiate their activities.
    - Announced Criminal Code review that may include repeal of articles used against political dissenters. Thus far, no changes announced.
- II. HARDENING OF APPROACH ON DISSENT SINCE LAST SUMMER
- o Most active dissidents consistently harassed - detained, phones are disconnected etc.
  - o In March, first arrest (of Paruyr Ayrikyah) on a political charge ("anti-Soviet slander") in almost 2 years.
  - o Demonstrations have been forcibly broken up and the participants subsequently harassed. Several organizers of new Democratic Union party arrested in May.
- III. US AGENDA
- o We should press the Soviets to release all remaining political prisoners, known to be at least 350, especially the 14 Helsinki monitors who remain incarcerated. We should also continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of last year's reported review of his case.
  - o We should express our concern about the March arrest of Paruyr Ayrikyan on political charges.
  - o We should press the Soviets to repeal the laws that facilitate the suppression of political dissent.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F97-016017#16  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN THE MILLENNIAL YEAR

I. SOVIET REGIME HOSTILE TO RELIGION

- o The Soviet Union is an atheist state which has long subjected religious believers to the harshest forms of persecution.
- o The Soviet Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice one's religion, but religious groups are required by law to register with the state and teaching is forbidden.
- o Repression continues against religious groups which have not been allowed to register, such as Ukrainian Catholics, and denominations that consider it against their beliefs to register with the state.
- o Believers suffer discrimination in employment and education.

II. SOFTENING OF RHETORIC IN MILLENNIAL YEAR

- o In April, Gorbachev said that past Soviet regimes had mistaken policies on religion and promised new laws.
- o Soviet officials suggest opportunities for adult religious education will be expanded and that laws on import of religious books will be more flexible.
- o Reports of recent encouragement of "charitable" church activities, such as hospital service, or building homes for the aged.

III. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA IS MIXED

- o More than 100 religious prisoners have been released, but at least 150 are still incarcerated.
- o Laws impeding religious practice remain on the books although there have been virtually no arrests on such charges in more than a year.
- o Soviets have given public assurances at home, but they reject further commitments at Vienna CSCE Meeting.

IV. US AGENDA

- o Unconditional release of all remaining religious prisoners and repeal of religious control laws.
- o Legalization of unregistered churches, including the Ukrainian Catholic Church, importation of religious books and materials and increased contacts with West.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-06617#17

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- o Legalization of the teaching of religion to children, including the Hebrew language.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CSCE/Moscow Human Rights Meeting

I. VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING

- o Third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Vienna in Nov. 1986; 35 East, West, and neutral/non-aligned participating states reviewing implementation of 1975 Helsinki Final Act and considering improvements to compliance in human, security, and economic dimensions.
- o Key issues for the US are:
  - keeping the new conventional stability talks among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact autonomous (but within the framework of the CSCE process); some neutral/non-aligned states and France seek unacceptable link to CSCE.
  - balance between security and human rights results, including: improved Eastern human rights practices; strengthening of previous CSCE commitments; and significant human rights follow-on activity.
- o Soviets are stonewalling on human rights.
- o Vital to convince Soviets that West is ready to stay as long as it takes to get satisfactory result.

II. Proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference

- o At opening of Vienna Meeting, Shevardnadze proposed a human rights meeting for Moscow; Soviets seeking Western endorsement of glasnost.
- o NATO has said neither yes nor no; US has made clear that Soviets must meet two criteria:
  - guarantees of openness and access to anyone who wants to attend (e.g., Helsinki Monitors, the media, and non-governmental organizations).
  - Significantly improved human rights situation, including: increased Jewish emigration; release of political/religious prisoners; resolution of bilateral family reunification cases; cessation of all jamming; institutionalization of human rights reforms (e.g., permit religious teaching, regularize emigration procedures, repeal "political/religious" articles in criminal code).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-7667#18

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- o Current Soviet human rights record not sufficient to warrant consideration of their proposal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

I. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR "COOPERATION" IN HUMAN RIGHTS

- o Soviets have urged that we move from "confrontation" to "cooperation" in our human rights dialogue.
- o Their principal goal seems to be to get us to stop raising specific human rights issues and cases with them.
- o We have made it clear that we are not going to stop talking about the specific problems of concern to us. But, in response to their suggestions, we have said we are willing to engage in "cooperative talks" with them in addition.
- o We held such talks in March and April on how we deal with specific issues, such as capital punishment, involuntary commitments to psychiatric hospitals, religious freedom, etc., in our respective countries.

II. SOVIET ALLEGATIONS OF US HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

- o They usually raise a host of US "violations", from persecution of anti-war activists to the plight of the homeless, which do not seem genuinely to concern them.
- o They often raise specific issues, such as war criminal investigations, technology transfer and our human rights activities in the Soviet Union, about which they are genuinely concerned.
- o They frequently raise social and economic problems, such as unemployment, but do not seem serious about seeking resolution.

III. SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE

- o Soviets no longer seem to be pressing us to accept their proposal for a CSCE conference on human rights in Moscow.
- o We have continued to say neither yes or no, linking our consideration of the proposal to improved Soviet performance on human rights and credible guarantees of openness and access.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0166/7#19  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By COB NARA, Date 9/16/04

REGIONAL ISSUES

1. Regional Dialogue
2. Afghanistan
3. Iran-Iraq War
4. Middle East Peace Process
5. Central America
6. Africa
7. Terrorism
8. The President's Initiative on Berlin
9. East Asia and the Pacific
10. South Asian Nuclear Issue

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGIONAL DIALOGUE

I. STATE OF PLAY

- o Improving dialogue since 1985; latest cycle of experts talks completed in March-April. Recent exchanges on Africa, Middle East peace process particularly vigorous.
- o Afghan settlement tangible proof US-Soviet dialogue can contribute to conflict resolution. US plans to push for similar progress in other areas.
- o But key to progress is not dialogue with Soviets. It is firmness in backing freedom fighters and other friends, and creatively securing political solutions.

II. US POSITION

- o President's October, 1985 speech laid out framework based on national reconciliation, direct talks between regional parties, US-Soviet dialogue to contribute to process.
- o Soviets have increasingly borrowed rhetoric of this plan, without acknowledging source.
- o In ongoing regional dialogue with Moscow, US seeks practical solutions to regional conflicts based on withdrawal of foreign troops, genuine self-determination.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Gorbachev and others have pointed to Afghan settlement as "model" for Middle East, southern Africa, Cambodia, Central America.
- o Practical meaning of this analogy still unclear; the Soviets have offered no concrete steps.
- o Four elements in recent Soviet rhetoric about regional conflict resolution:
  - National reconciliation between warring parties;
  - Greater role for UN, international organizations;
  - More involvement by regional organizations, i.e. OAS, OAU, ASEAN, Arab League;
  - US-Soviet cooperation can facilitate conflict resolution by political means.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 997-01007#20  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AFGHANISTAN

I. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

- o Soviets are committed to removing half of their 120,000 troops by August 15 and remainder by February 15, 1989.
  - Soviets hinted they may remove up to 20,000 by Summit; also indications withdrawal would be completed in 1988.
  - Fifty-man UN observer force to be deployed. We will rely primarily on national technical means to monitor withdrawal.
  - Four regime/Soviet garrisons have fallen in recent weeks; may herald beginning of regime's collapse.
- o Soviets agreed to symmetry in military aid; MFA privately repudiated spokesman's allegation of US violation; some indications Moscow may stop arms aid to Kabul after May 15.

II. INTERIM GOVERNMENT

- o UN mediator has agreed to pursue interim arrangements with all Afghan factions; but no initiatives yet.
  - Will be very difficult. Resistance refuses to share power with Kabul regime, criticizes Geneva settlement, but now seems reconciled to it.
  - We estimate Kabul regime will fall within months. Resistance may set up provisional government inside Afghanistan.

III. AFGHAN RELIEF

- o Needs for resettling up to 5 million refugees will be great. UN plans to name relief coordinator.
  - We are urging potential donor countries to contribute generously to multilateral, UN-led effort.
  - To be effective and credible with refugees and to avoid bolstering discredited government, aid must not be channeled through the Kabul regime.
  - Key UN agencies have indicated they will deal with de facto authorities in resistance-controlled areas.

IV. PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

- o Najibullah and Soviet pressure on Pakistan continues -- goal is to stop arms flow to resistance. Includes terrorist bombings in Pakistan, violation of Pak border.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-D66/7#21

BY fw NARA DATE 10/29/10



CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

I. THE UN PROCESS

- o Fundamental US goal is to end the war through diplomacy. Represents major cause of instability in region.
- o United Nations Security Council action on second resolution -- e.g., arms embargo against Iran -- long overdue.
- o US fully supports UN Secretary General's mediation efforts but Iranian intransigence stymies progress.

II. THE US AND IRAN

- o Deliberate mining of the Gulf by Iran, causing damage to US vessel, led to limited, proportionate US response April 18 against Iran.
- o US also extending assistance to some neutral ships in distress in the Persian Gulf; further demonstrates our willingness to uphold freedom of navigation.

III. THE SITUATION FACING IRAN

- o Tehran currently on defensive along several fronts:
  - In Lebanon, Iran's agent, Hizballah, routed in south -- victorious in Beirut.
  - Iraq scored major victory in recovering Faw Peninsula.
  - Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities with modified Soviet missiles; Moscow unwilling/unable to force Iraqis to stop.
  - Evidence of Iranian complicity in Kuwaiti plane hijacking has further blackened Iran's image.

IV. THE SOVIETS AND THE WAR

- o Following support for Resolution 598 last July, Moscow has dragged feet on follow-up action in New York.
- o Soviets reluctant to anger Iran in view of possible Iranian spoiler role in Afghan settlement. Soviets claim cannot support follow-up action so long as troops withdrawing from Afghanistan. Effectively means no action this year.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-01617 #22

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



~~SECRET~~

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

I. US PLAN

- o US goal is comprehensive peace ensuring security of all states in region, legitimate rights of Palestinians.
- o Key elements of plan:
  - International conference gives framework for bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors;
  - Palestinian representation as part of joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation;
  - All parties accept UNSC Resolution 242/338, renounce terrorism and violence.
  - Integrated package; cannot be significantly changed.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Despite some encouraging signs -- e.g., Gorbachev statement to Arafat on need to respect Israeli security concerns -- Soviets remain reluctant to use influence with Syria, PLO to urge constructive approach.
- o Soviet support for Syrian-PLO rapprochement, which required hardening of PLO position and worsened prospects for our initiative.
- o Major differences remain in our approaches to process, e.g., on role of conference, Palestinian representation.
  - Soviets still envision conference with authority to impose solutions; unacceptable to us, Israel.
  - Moscow also argues for PLO role in process as equal partner, but doesn't completely reject Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- o Absence of relations with Israel a further block to increased Soviet role.
- o While interested in dialogue with us, Soviets reluctant to take concrete actions to facilitate our initiative which would damage their interests with Arab radicals.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0666/7 #23

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



III. STATE OF PLAY

- o During Secretary's most recent trip to the region, all parties urged him to continue his efforts.
- o We intend to remain active: the Secretary is going to the region following the Summit.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL AMERICA

I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- o Sandinista/Resistance Cease-Fire Talks: Talks continuing; truce in effect until June 1.
  - Sandinistas hope to divide the Resistance, block humanitarian resupply of Resistance forces in Nicaragua.
  - Resistance outside Nicaragua receiving humanitarian aid through US-administered program, monitored by Honduran Catholic Church.
  - Sandinistas refuse to democratize before Resistance disarms.
  - Central American foreign ministers review compliance monthly.
- o Arms Shipments: Soviets have shipped \$200 million in arms to Nicaragua since peace agreement signed in August. Rate of supply dropped off in March, not clear whether this reflects shift in Soviet policy, or merely availability of transport.
- o US Actions: First shipments of Congressionally-approved humanitarian aid delivered to Resistance in Honduras. US trade embargo against Nicaragua extended through October 1988.

II. CONDITIONS INSIDE NICARAGUA

- o Despite nominal end to state of emergency and reopening of La Prensa, Sandinistas retain firm control over society.
- o Opposition parties subject to continuous harassment.
- o Economy in shambles due to mismanagment, and effects of war.
- o Widespread labor unrest including work stoppages, hunger strike, and two major anti-Sandinista May Day demonstrations.

III. US POSITION

- o US supports regional efforts for peace and democracy.
- o US prepared to engage in regional negotiations -- which could include Sandinistas -- at the appropriate time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0667 #24

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10

- We do not contemplate bilateral talks with Sandinistas. We will do nothing to undermine the Resistance.
- o We have called on the Soviets to end arms shipments to the Sandinistas, as we have done to the Resistance. We have told them their demand that US stop all aid to region in exchange for an end to their military aid to Sandinistas is unacceptable.
- Costa Rican President Arias, other democratic leaders, have joined us in calling for Soviets to halt military aid.



~~SECRET~~

AFRICA

I. ETHIOPIA FAMINE RELIEF EFFORTS

- o Ethiopia's Marxist government engaged in bitter, decades-long war with secessionist groups that are also generally Marxist.
- o War, and misguided government policies have devastated the economy; hindered agricultural activity; displaced millions of people, invited famine and disrupted relief efforts.
- o Government has forced most foreign relief workers out of contested areas; turned their food and equipment (trucks, fuel, etc.) over to local relief agencies.
- o There is no shortage of food. US has donated 271,000 tons; USSR 250,000 tons. Problem is getting the food to the people.
- o We want Soviets to pressure Ethiopian government to help, not hinder, movements of food convoys and to allow relief workers to return to hardest-hit regions.
- o Soviets have said they are sensitive to the humanitarian issue, but claim US is exaggerating the problem. They believe pressure could hurt their relations with Ethiopia.
- o With war going poorly for the regime, Soviets showing more interest in internal Ethiopian settlement. Neighboring Somalia and Sudan (both pro-US) may find opportunities opening to reduce tensions with Ethiopia.

II. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- o US goal is to get South African and Cuban troops (now 46,000) out of Marxist Angola; and while troops are pulling back, begin to implement UN plan for independence of neighboring Namibia (UN Security Council resolution 435) which South Africa now controls in defiance of UN demands.
- o Angolan regime has fought 13-year war with UNITA forces under Jonas Savimbi. His troops control about 40% of territory; receive backing from South Africa, other western sources. Recently, African leaders have quietly urged Angolan regime to come to terms with Savimbi.
- o US has insisted that independence for Namibia be linked to Cuban withdrawal. This has now been accepted by all parties.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-06017 #25

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10

- o On May 3-4, US mediated historic talks involving Cuba, Angola and South Africa. Little substantive progress, but tone was constructive, professional. All agreed to meet again. Soviets not a participant but are meeting with US, Angolans and Cubans separately and claim to want to play a constructive role.
  
- o While praising US diplomacy, Soviets reluctant to take specific measures to advance negotiations.





~~SECRET~~

TERRORISM

I. STATE OF PLAY

- o Recent Soviet performance on terrorism mixed but has shown some improvement in past two years.
- o On the pro side:
  - Moscow has publicly condemned international terrorism since Gorbachev February 1986 speech at party congress.
  - The Soviet Foreign Ministry "strongly and resolutely condemned" the recent hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner.
  - Soviets have supported new legal instruments to facilitate prosecution of terrorists who attack airports or shipping.
- o On the negative side:
  - The Soviets shielded North Korea from UN condemnation over Korean airline bombing, publicly repeated countercharges that US engaged in "state terrorism."
  - Moscow is presumably privy to East European tolerance of Middle East terrorist groups.

II. FUTURE MOVES

- o US will continue to urge Soviet opposition to terrorism by Middle East states, Afghan terrorism in Pakistan.
- o Bilaterally, US would like to focus on practical matters:
  - Restricting movement and activities of known terrorists, especially in Eastern Europe;
  - Exchanging information on specific terrorist threats.
  - The ball, however, is in the Soviet court.
- o Multilaterally, we will work with allies to oppose Soviet attempts to politicize debate on terrorism.
  - We will continue to oppose Soviet bilateral or multilateral proposals requiring mandatory extradition of hijackers. We prefer to "extradite or prosecute."

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0667#26

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON BERLIN

I. ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE

- o During your speech at the Brandenburg Gate on June 12, 1987, you called on General Secretary Gorbachev to back up his talk of "openness" with deeds by working with the US, UK and France to improve the situation in Berlin by:
  - expanding air access to and from Berlin;
  - bringing more international conferences to the city;
  - fostering East/West Berlin youth exchanges;
  - staging more major sports events in both East and West Berlin, including an Olympics.

II. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

- Following your speech, US, British, French and West German experts in the Bonn Group worked out a "Concept Paper" further refining your proposals. This Concept Paper was endorsed by our four Foreign Ministers at their NATO ministerial last December.
- At your December Summit, you urged General Secretary Gorbachev to consider improvements in the Berlin situation. You indicated our specific proposals would be put forward soon.
- US, British and French representatives in Moscow formally presented your proposals to the Soviets on December 29.

III. CURRENT STATUS

- The Soviets consulted the East Germans immediately and continue to consider our Berlin proposals. The Soviets have now publicly stated they hope to respond to your Initiative by summer.
- The US, British, French and West German representatives in the Bonn Group continue their work to refine tactics and Allied positions on specific aspects of the Initiative in advance of possible talks with the Soviets.
- Public and political reaction in West Berlin has been highly favorable; Governing Mayor Diepgen underlined this support during his meeting with you on April 28.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-06617 #27

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



CONFIDENTIAL

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

I. OVERVIEW

- Primary focus of our dialogue with Soviets has been on Cambodia, Korea, Asian security situation.
- Despite Soviet hints that Afghan settlement would facilitate progress in these areas, little new has emerged.
- The Soviets continue to push asymmetrical proposals aimed at limiting US military activity, particularly naval, in Pacific. We're not interested.

II. CAMBODIA

- Vietnamese troop withdrawal, direct negotiations are key to settlement; Moscow should push Vietnam toward these steps.
- Recent Soviet reference to Afghan "model" lacks specifics; Moscow remains unwilling to twist Vietnam's arm to settle.
- Hanoi nervous about Soviet references to Afghan analogy, reluctant to talk directly with Prince Sihanouk.
- Limited convergence of US-Soviet policies: need for political settlement, central role for Prince Sihanouk.

III. KOREAN PENINSULA

- Our concern over possible North Korean disruption of Olympics heightened by Korean airplane bombing.
- Limited indications Soviets too are concerned over their ally's dangerous and unpredictable policies.
- But Moscow determined to maintain good relations with Pyongyang, despite going to Seoul for Olympics.
  - o Both US and Soviets agree on need to resume North-South dialogue. President Roh likely to have new proposals once he settles in; North's proposals continue to be unrealistic.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-0666/7#28

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10



~~SECRET~~

SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

I. CAPABILITIES AND CURRENT ACTIVITY

- o India tested a nuclear device in 1974; has capability for an active nuclear explosives program. Gandhi seems not to want to proceed forward.
  - India has stockpiled unsafeguarded plutonium, has rejected Pakistan's non-proliferation proposals.
  - Opposes equation with Pakistan, citing its concerns about Chinese/superpower nuclear capabilities.
- o Pakistan has an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility.



- US pressure has helped, as has uncertainty about Indian reaction.
- Pakistan has proposed comprehensive non-proliferation measures on a reciprocal basis with India.
- o Under US law (the Symington and Solarz amendments), Pakistan's nuclear activities preclude most US assistance.
  - January 15, 1988 the President waived these sanctions for Pakistan on national security grounds. The Symington waiver runs until mid-1990.

II. US GOALS

- o US-Soviet arms control progress, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan create a positive environment for mutual restraint in nuclear development.
- o We want to urge adoption of confidence-building measures by both India and Pakistan to bolster restraint and stability.
- o US assistance to Pakistan plays a key role in deterring Pakistan from making the decision to produce nuclear arms.
- o We want to explore ways to overcome the regional parties' mutually exclusive preconditions, possibly by creating a negotiating process that includes China and the superpowers.

E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (b) (1),  
(4), (5)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRRF97-0666/T#29  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10





~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By COB NARA, Date 9/16/04

US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES

1. Summit Bilateral Checklist
2. Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges
3. US-USSR Science and Technology Exchanges
4. Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative
5. Embassy Management Issues
6. Kiev-New York Consulate Exchange
7. Information and Media Issues - Disinformation
8. Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMIT BILATERAL CHECKLIST

I. GLOBAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

- o Progress made under Environmental and Space Agreements since December summit announcement. Want to note progress, call for strengthened cooperation at Moscow summit.

II. CULTURAL/PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

- o General Exchanges implementation program for 1989-91 completed May 13. Two problems remain: number of America Illustrated magazines and opening of Cultural Centers. Soviets will "study the idea" of Cultural Centers. We want agreement in principle. May be resolved before summit.

III. BASIC SCIENCES

- o Text initialled May 13. Problem with one phrase. Going back to Soviets to ask for certain changes. Could be ready for signing at summit.

IV. TRANSPORTATION

- o Agreement initialled May 12. Will be signed at summit.

V. ATOMIC ENERGY

- o At April US-USSR Joint Committee Meeting agreed to one year extension to allow for conclusion of needed amendments to Agreement. Exchange of notes to extend planned for summit.

VI. NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY

- o April 26 signing of Nuclear Reactor Safety MOU (under the Atomic Energy Agreement). Will be noted in the Joint Statement.

VII. NEW SPACE COOPERATION INITIATIVE

- o Initiative accepted by Soviets; calls for modest expansion of space exchanges; summit announcement expected.

VIII. MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE

- o Agreement concluded March 25 in Washington: Ready for signature at summit.

IX. RADIONAVIGATION

- o Coast Guard met Soviets in Leningrad in late April and initialled agreement. DOD has raised problem. NSC trying to resolve. If resolved, agreement will probably be signed at summit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-016617 #30

BY fw NARA DATE 10/29/10

X. COMPREHENSIVE FISHERIES AGREEMENT

- o Meeting in Moscow May 19-20 to try to reach final agreement. Could be ready for signature at summit.

XI. MARINE POLLUTION CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR BERING/CHUKCHI SEAS

- o Coast Guard discussing with Soviets May 10-19. Soviets appear reluctant to go ahead at this time



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CULTURAL AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

I. BACKGROUND

- o Negotiations for second 3-year program period (1989-1991) under General Exchange Agreement in Washington May 10-17.
- o Negotiations moved up to test Soviet readiness to accept important US concerns for agreement before Moscow summit.
- o If Soviets agree to key points, USIA hopes to have Program ready for signing.
- o USIA also provided Soviets draft MOU to establish culture and information centers in each national capital; if Soviets agree in principle, summit signing could follow.
- o USIA's "Information USA" exhibit successful; millionth visitor greeted in March in Tashkent; exhibit now in Irkutsk.
- o Plans underway for next US-USSR Chautauqua conference in Tbilisi in September.
- o Steady progress in people-to-people and youth exchanges, but much more needs to be done.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviets reluctant to agree to an American Center in Moscow before they have granted them to other socialist nations. Soviets have agreed with us to study the idea.
- o Some exchanges, particularly youth sports and student language study, threatened by Soviets treating such programs as commercial, currency-earning ventures rather than cultural exchanges.

III. US POSITION

- o Pleased with progress to implement General Exchanges Agreement and hope for agreement on new 1989-1991 Program.
- o Favor agreement at summit to establish reciprocal culture and information centers.
- o Would like to see continued efforts to expand the numbers and diversity of people-to-people exchanges, especially youth exchanges.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-06667#31

BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10