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File Folder: [Moscow Summit:] Background Book for the
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06/02/1988 (1)

Date: 08/24/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re INF Treaty, 1p R 10/29/10 F97-066/7 #1	n.d.	B1
2. report	re START 3p Part. 10/29/10 F97-066/7 #2	n.d.	B1
3. report	re defense and space negotiations, 2p R 10/29/10 F97-066/7 #3	n.d.	B1
4. report	re nuclear testing, 1p R " " #4	n.d.	B1
5. report	re compliance, 1p R " " #5	n.d.	B1
6. report	re nuclear nonproliferation, 1p R " " #6	n.d.	B1
7. report	re chemical weapons negotiations, 1p R " " #7	n.d.	B1
8. report	re chemical weapons verification/proliferation, 1p R " " #8	n.d.	B1
9. report	re conventional forces in Europe, 1p R " " #9	n.d.	B1
10. report	re CDE implementation, 1p R # " #10	n.d.	B1
11. report	re Comprehensive System of Peace and Security (CSIS), 1p R " " #11	n.d.	B1
12. report	Overview of US Soviet Human Rights Issues, 1p R " " #12	n.d.	B1
13. report	Lists of Cases of Special Interest, 2p R " " #13	n.d.	B1
14. report	re political prisoners in Soviet Union, 1p R " " #14	n.d.	B1
15. report	re emigration and family visits, 2p R " " #15	n.d.	B1

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FROM: COLIN L. POWELL 

SUBJECT: Sensitive Distribution and Storage of Briefing Books

Attached is the Background Book prepared for the Moscow Summit. Although we have made distribution to each of you, we are asking you be aware of the severe storage limitations for classified material in Helskinski and Moscow. You are strongly encouraged to review your books prior to departure and leave your copy here. We will have two copies available at the NSC area in Helskinski and Moscow for reference.

The Briefing Books will be distributed Monday and will have limited distribution. We hope you will review the books prior to departure and leave them here. There will be copies available at the NSC area in Moscow for reference.

We cannot emphasize enough the damage which could occur should any of the material contained in the books reach the Soviets, nor can we emphasize enough the severe limitation on storage for classified documents in Moscow.

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2/21/04 COB

BACKGROUND BOOK
for
THE MEETINGS
of
PRESIDENT REAGAN
and
GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV

Moscow

May 29 - June 2, 1988

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BACKGROUND BOOK
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BACKGROUND BOOK

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White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By COB NARA, Date 9/6/04

ARMS CONTROL

1. Nuclear and Space Talks: INF Treaty, START, Defense and Space Negotiations
2. Nuclear Testing
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INF TREATY

I. RATIFICATION

- o Senate is considering Treaty thoroughly. Floor debate began May 18.
 - Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings and voted Treaty out of committee by overwhelming majorities (17-2, 18-2, and unanimous, respectively).
 - In addition to testimony, Administration answered over 1300 Senate questions and many letters for the record.
- o Administration worked closely with Senate to clear up questions that arose during ratification process.
 - Quayle and Nunn said Treaty did not clearly ban futuristic weapons (microwaves, lasers, etc.) on INF missiles.
 - o We exchanged diplomatic notes with Soviets to clarify that INF-range missiles carrying futuristic weapons are banned.
 - Some Senators were also concerned about Soviet position on implementation issues.
 - o We pressed Soviets and satisfactorily resolved problems.
 - Some Senators also want a condition preventing Executive Branch reinterpretation of Treaty without prior Senate consent, which we oppose. White House working with key Senators to resolve.

II. IMPLEMENTATION

- o US preparations for implementation almost complete. Three rounds of technical talks held with Soviets to work out implementation details.
- o Soviets visited US resident monitoring site in Utah; US delegation visited comparable Soviet site at Votkinsk.
- o US conducted "mock inspections" of INF facilities in US and basing countries to smooth inspection procedures.

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START

I. WHERE WE STAND

o We have agreed on the outlines of a START agreement:

- Deep (roughly [redacted]) reductions to [redacted] warheads on [redacted] delivery vehicles (bombers, missiles);
- 50% cut in Soviet heavy missiles and throwweight;
- [redacted] limit on ballistic missile warheads.

o But much hard work remains to be done, including:

- Sublimit of [redacted] ICBM warheads to constrain most destabilizing weapon systems;
- Resolving differences over limits on long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles;
- Effective ways to verify limits on mobile missiles should they be permitted; and
- Acceptable counting rules for ALCM-carrying heavy bombers.

II. BASIC CONCEPTS

Destabilizing Weapons:

- o We have tried to convince the Soviets of the need for tight constraints on the most destabilizing weapons -- MIRVed land-based ballistic missiles. In a crisis, there would be incentives for a side to use these fast-flying, non-recallable weapons in a first strike, rather than risk having them destroyed.
- o The Soviets object, in part because they have nearly two-thirds of their warheads on fixed, land-based missiles, and they are deploying new mobile land-based missiles. They assert that mobile land-based missiles are no more dangerous than submarine-based missiles, on which the US relies heavily. They argue that their shift to mobile missiles will make their land-based forces less vulnerable and remove one major source of instability.
- o Mobile land-based missiles pose severe verification problems.
- o The Soviets say that they would accept a sublimit on ICBM warheads only if we accepted an equal sublimit on our SLBM warheads, a condition we cannot accept because it would undermine our efforts to achieve greater strategic stability.

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As Amended
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BY Paul NARA DATE 10/29/10

Verifiability: Numerous unresolved issues, including:

- o Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs): These small, accurate, "slow-flying" missiles are being installed on many US and Soviet naval vessels. For the US, they are carried in several types of launchers that also house weapons not subject to START limits, such as ship-to-ship missiles. Short-range SLCMs threaten US, but not USSR.
 - The Soviets have proposed tight numerical limits designed to constrain US (but not necessarily Soviet) SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional.
 - We will not limit conventional SLCMs. However, we have agreed that if ways can be found to verify ceilings on nuclear SLCMs without constraining our conventional capability, we will do so.
 - After many years of studying the problem, we have not found any way to verify such ceilings so that we could:
 - o Detect with confidence Soviet cheating;
 - o Not compromise sensitive systems; and
 - o Not violate our policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on a particular ship.
 - The Soviets have suggested intrusive verification schemes involving shipboard inspections and technical approaches that they seem unable to explain in any detail, and none of which has been acceptable to us. They realize that, even with unverifiable limits, the US would be compelled to comply with limits, while they would not be so constrained.
 - We have countered with a proposal for unilateral declarations of SLCM acquisition plans.
 - This remains a serious point of disagreement.
- o Mobile Land-Based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): These new weapons are mounted on special rail cars or heavy trailer-truck vehicles that can travel over dirt roads or through fields. Their mobility makes them difficult to target -- which could discourage attack during a crisis. But mobility also makes it difficult to monitor their numbers -- potentially raising questions about compliance with agreed limits. They are extremely costly systems, compared to silo-based missiles.

- The Soviets are deploying two types of mobile missiles: about 100 single-warhead, road-mobile SS-25 missiles and a few 10-warhead SS-24 missiles mounted on rail cars, and they will deploy more of each. We have begun to design two similar types: the single-warhead, road-mobile Midgetman and the 10-warhead, rail-mobile Peacekeeper (MX).

- The Soviets want to allow a number of each type and have proposed a variety of verification measures. Our position calls for a ban on mobile missiles, but we would be willing to reconsider if ways could be found to verify limits effectively and deter Soviet cheating. We are currently studying this problem.

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DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS

I. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LAST SUMMIT

- o January: US tabled separate draft treaty based on Washington Summit Joint Statement.
- o March: US tabled Predictability Protocol to Treaty as a way of building mutual confidence concerning both sides' strategic defense activities.
 - US also suggested removing constraints on space-based sensors.
- o April: Soviets handed over draft agreement preserving key Soviet positions (including blanket ABM Treaty nonwithdrawal pledge).
- o May: After stalling since the Washington Summit, Soviets finally began to participate in drafting a joint treaty text, building on the Summit language, that reflects areas of disagreement as well as agreement.

II. OUR THEMES

- o We have gone the extra mile to meet Soviet concerns:
 - Agreed there can be a period of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty in the context of START and Defense and Space treaties which meet our criteria;
 - Proposed predictability measures;
 - Agreed to discuss stability before end of nonwithdrawal period.
- o We will, however, preserve our rights:
 - To conduct SDI research, development, and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, to establish feasibility of defenses that meet our criteria;
 - To withdraw to protect our supreme interests; and
 - To deploy after the nonwithdrawal period with six months' notice unless the sides agree otherwise.
- o Soviet linkage to START is unacceptable. ABM Treaty was premised on strategic offensive reductions; those reductions should occur without any preconditions.

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- o Ironic that Soviets seek a pledge of US adherence to ABM Treaty which they are clearly violating by construction of their illegal radar at Krasnoyarsk, and radars at Gomel.

- Soviets must resolve their ABM violations before any new US commitment to ABM Treaty nonwithdrawal or new strategic arms agreements are possible.

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NUCLEAR TESTING

I. BACKGROUND

- o Formal negotiations began November, 1987; agreed first priority is improved verification for/ratification of Threshold Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET).
- o Negotiations now proceeding on parallel tracks:
 - Negotiation of verification protocols to Treaties; and
 - Preparation of Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) at US and Soviet test sites.
- o Expect to have ready for signature at summit:
 - Comprehensive JVE plan; and
 - Verification Protocol for PNET.
- o Following conduct of JVE in late summer, will complete TTBT protocol, then submit both Treaties for ratification.

II. US POSITION

- o For effective verification, require right to use CORTEX (hydrodynamic method) on all nuclear tests over 50 kilotons. (Seismic method is too imprecise for effective verification.)
- o We don't need JVE, agreed to it to satisfy Soviet concerns about CORTEX.
- o Following ratification of TTBT/PNET, US is prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of intermediate limitations, in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons.
- o Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains long-term goal, but only when we no longer depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security/stability.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Verification preference is seismic; will accept use of CORTEX with restrictive quota on its use as way to "calibrate" or improve seismic.
- o Insist JVE is necessary to prove effectiveness, non-intrusiveness of CORTEX before completing TTBT.
- o Continue to press for further testing limitations (yield and number per year) and near-term CTB.

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COMPLIANCE

I. ABM TREATY REVIEW

- o Treaty requires a Review at each five-year anniversary of the entry into force, which must begin by October 2, 1988.
- o This will be first review conducted since Soviets charged with ABM Treaty violations.
- o Soviets eager to conduct review. They propose sides limit themselves to reaffirming commitment to the goals and objectives of the Treaty as signed in 1972.
- o Until recently, Soviets denied their violations. At February Ministerial, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said Soviets would be willing to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar, but at subsequent meetings the Soviets showed no willingness to correct their violations.
- o Preparations for the Review have begun; no decisions have been made on the timing, forum, and venue.
- o Key issues for US will be resolution of Soviet violations or appropriate US response if Soviets refuse to correct them.

II. SOVIET ABM TREATY VIOLATIONS

- o President's December 1987 Noncompliance Report reaffirmed previous findings:
 - That the large phased-array radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is a clear violation of ABM Treaty.
 - A new violation this year involved the deployment of ABM radars from a missile test range to an electronics plant at Gomel.

III. COMPLIANCE AND TREATY RATIFICATION

- o In committee hearings on the INF Treaty, key Senators have said that Soviet noncompliance, especially the radar at Krasnoyarsk, will be given careful scrutiny before the Senate will agree to a START or Defense and Space Treaty.

IV. US POLICY

- o Soviet non-compliance with existing treaties must be corrected. In the case of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, the US will not conclude either a START or Defense and Space Treaty unless our concerns about the violations are resolved.

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BY RWJ
NARA DATE 1/29/10
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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

I. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

- o US and USSR interests very similar -- both countries strongly oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- o US and USSR have completed 10 rounds of semiannual consultations since early 1980's.
- o Next round scheduled for June 13-15 in Vienna, Austria.
- o These talks have been increasingly informative.

II. COMMON INTERESTS

- o Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. This is the 20th anniversary of the Treaty's signature.
- o Strong support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as lynchpin of the nonproliferation regime.
- o Maintenance of strong IAEA safeguards on civil nuclear facilities.

III. KEY ISSUE

- o Critical problem remains containing nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan.
- o We want the Soviets to urge India to participate in constructive dialogue with Pakistan and agree not to test nuclear explosive device.
- o US has expressed concern about Soviet agreement to sell nuclear reactors to India without requiring safeguards on all India's nuclear facilities.

IV. NUCLEAR COOPERATION

- o In late April, the US and USSR signed an agreement to exchange technical and safety data on civilian power reactors.

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10

CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS

I. BACKGROUND

- o 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, but does not restrict possession, transfer, or production.
- o In 1984, following Secretary of State's statement at Stockholm Conference, Vice President Bush tabled US draft treaty at 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to be a basis for negotiation of a global ban.
- o US draft Treaty tabled with understanding that we would develop procedures for effective verification; US draft Treaty remains essentially unverifiable.
- o At Geneva summit, agreed to intensify bilateral talks with Soviet Union to facilitate multilateral global ban negotiations.
- o Have conducted exchange of visits to US, Soviet chemical weapons facility, respectively, as confidence-building measure.
- o US modernization program proceeding on schedule; assembly of binary weapons (155 mm artillery) began December 16, 1987. Production would be completed, on present schedule, by 2004.

II. US POSITION

- o Pursue effectively verifiable, truly global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.
- o Prompt, mandatory challenge inspection with no right of refusal essential for all suspect sites.
- o US continues to have verification concerns regarding undeclared stocks/facilities, novel agents; solutions not yet in sight.
- o Will not ratify ban until all CW-capable states are party.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Have publicly acknowledged possession; announced production moratorium, alleged size of stockpile (50,000 tons).
- o Now accept most of US draft treaty in principle, including challenge inspection with no right of refusal and prior data exchange. Details still unknown.
- o Pushing for early signature of treaty; accuse US of stalling to acquire binaries.

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION/PROLIFERATION

I. CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION

- o US recognizes extreme difficulty of verification in CW field.
- o Studying problem, unable to solve.
- o Proliferation compounds difficulties: all CW-capable states not members of 40-nation Conference on Disarmament.

II. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

- o The number of states possessing chemical weapons has grown. At least 15 states now possess CW; several more actively seek capability.
- o Proliferation particularly acute in Middle East and South Asia.

III. US EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION

- o Technical measures, such as export controls, to slow proliferation by drying up supply, raising cost.
- o Direct political action to discourage acquisition.
- o Support for international investigations to deter illegal use.

IV. US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS

- o At Geneva summit, agreed to initiate dialogue with Soviets on problem of chemical weapons proliferation.
- o Three rounds of bilateral discussions have identified considerable common ground: Soviets accept concept of US three-part approach, have imposed export controls, support investigation of use.
- o However, no evidence Soviets have applied political pressure to prevent spread, use of CW. Indeed, Warsaw Pact contributed to CW proliferation.

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10

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CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE/CST

I. BACKGROUND

- o Progress in nuclear arms reductions renews attention to conventional imbalance.
- o NATO Summit statement of March 2 set initial priority for future conventional stability talks (CST) on ground forces.
- o Deliberations with East on CST mandate, and with Allies on CST proposal, continue to show progress.

II. US AND NATO POLICY

- o Objective is to eliminate conventional disparities and Soviet capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.
- o Allies agree to use equal ceilings in much of Europe to force large Eastern reductions.
- o Adoption of a CST mandate must be part of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, including progress on human rights.
- o Continuing Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna until establishment of an acceptable new forum.

III. SOVIET VIEWS

- o Moscow has called for the elimination of military disparities, but denied its overall conventional superiority.
- o In Sofia response to NATO Summit statement, Soviets continued to seek inclusion of dual-capable (read theater nuclear) systems in CST.
- o Soviets also proposed immediate bilateral exchange of conventional force data; we oppose this attempt to leapfrog a measured discussion within the context of established negotiations.

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10

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CDE IMPLEMENTATION

I. BACKGROUND

- o 35-nation Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreed on a set of military measures in September, 1986, which include:
 - Prior notification of military activities (above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks);
 - Exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities;
 - Mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000 troops; and
 - On-site inspection as means of verification.

II. IMPLEMENTATION

- o Soviet and Warsaw Pact implementation in the first 15 months generally encouraging.
- o In general, both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have properly forecast, notified, and invited observers to their exercises.
- o Ten on-site inspections have been conducted; Warsaw Pact countries generally have met requirements for receiving Western inspectors.
- o Five inspections so far this year, including two by the US on a Warsaw Pact exercise in Hungary and a non-notified Soviet exercise in the GDR. The Soviet Union has inspected a NATO exercise in Norway. Compliance appears to date to be satisfactory.

III. NEXT STEPS

- o At the Vienna CSCE meeting, NATO has proposed further negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures among all 35 CSCE states to build on results of Stockholm, provided a balanced outcome can be achieved during Vienna meeting.

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/10

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COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (CSIS)

I. BACKGROUND

- o CSIS has been the centerpiece of Moscow's approach to the UN since 1986. Gorbachev personally associated himself with CSIS in his September, 1987, Pravda article.
- o This initiative signifies new Soviet emphasis on the UN as an instrument for advancing its geopolitical goals and as a propaganda tool for promoting "new political thinking."
- o CSIS is a broad multilateral action program, with many proposals inimical to the West. For example, it seeks to:
 - Undermine SDI through creation of a "world space organization."
 - Erode deterrence through negotiation of a treaty on non-first-use of nuclear weapons and creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.
 - Complicate US-Soviet nuclear testing talks through immediate multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

II. US POSITION

- o US strongly opposes CSIS as long-term threat to UN Charter and system. Its adoption could lead to:
 - Redefinition of UN Charter;
 - Creation of new, redundant international organizations; and
 - Further politicization of UN system.
- o Though prepared to deal with individual proposals on their merits, we do not accept premise that the world community needs a new "comprehensive system" for peace and security.
- o Soviets suffered major setback at last fall's UNGA; over half of UN states withheld support from CSIS resolution.
- o Nonetheless, Soviets seem intent on promoting CSIS and its component elements. US will continue to resist.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CSDB NARA, Date 9/16/04

HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Overview of US-Soviet Human Rights Issues
2. List of Cases of Special Interest
3. Political Prisoners in the Soviet Union
4. Emigration and Family Visits
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6. Religious Rights in the Millennial Year
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OVERVIEW OF US-SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

- o There have been positive developments in Soviet human rights performance under Gorbachev, but much more needs to be done.
- o "Unofficial" organizations have been tolerated, even some devoted to political issues, but their members have often been harassed.
- o Some public demonstrations have been allowed to take place in the past few years, but beginning in the fall of 1987 Soviet policy became more restrictive.
- o Legal and institutional reforms are necessary, if there are to be lasting improvements.
- o A review of the legal system is under way, but it has so far produced little in the way of concrete results.
- o About 350 political prisoners have been released since February 1987.
 - We have the names of over 300 remaining political prisoners, however, and there may be many others whose names we don't know.
- o In this year of the Millennium, it remains difficult for many and almost impossible for some believers to practice their faith.
 - At least half the political prisoners we know of are in prison because they attempted to practice their religion.
 - Religious education outside the home is forbidden.
 - There are not enough places of worship, not enough clergy, not enough religious literature. Importation and dissemination of religious literature remains controlled.
 - The Ukrainian Orthodox Church remains forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church is still banned.
- o Emigration levels began rising in 1987 for the three groups permitted to emigrate: Germans, Armenians, and Jews.
 - But barriers to emigration remain: requirement for an invitation from a close relative, requirement that adult applicants have parental permission, arbitrary use of "state security restriction."

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LISTS OF CASES OF SPECIAL INTEREST

I. US SHORT LIST

- o Almost all the cases on the "short list" of "cases of special interest," first presented in September 1986, were resolved.
 - In February, Secretary Shultz presented a new list of 17 cases to Shevardnadze. You presented the list in March, and the Secretary presented it again in April.
 - To date, there has been little concrete progress on the 17 cases. Refusenik Igor Tufeld arrived in the U.S. May 13, and Baptist Vitaliy Varavin reportedly has received exit permission.
 - Soviet officials have given hints that other cases might be resolved, but these hints have not yet materialized.

II. REPRESENTATION LISTS

- o The Department of State also maintains representation lists of divided spouses, blocked marriages, dual nationals, and divided families (those applying to join close relatives in the US).
- o A significant number of cases have been resolved in the past year, but too many remain.
- o Several marriage cases were resolved last fall, including the 31-year Michelson case and the Braun and Balovlenkov cases.
 - There are currently three divided-spouse cases: Vileshina/Pakenas, Johnson/Petrov, and Goscilo/Kostin. (The last two couples have become divorced; the Soviets may not be aware of this.)
 - There are now 5 blocked marriages: Bohonovsky/Grigorishin, Petrone/Alexandrovich, Nudel/Shteynberg, Guillet/Peregudova, and Gureckas/Paulionis.

III. DUAL NATIONS

- o There are currently 16 "dual-nationals," US citizens who are not allowed to leave the Soviet Union because they are also considered Soviet citizens.
 - The Stolar dual-national case remains unresolved, despite Soviets' December invitation to Abe Stolar's daughter-in-law to reapply; she was since refused again.

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- o Total for divided families list is about 50. Still 6 cases remaining which were promised resolution in 1986 in Washington and Bern.

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POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE SOVIET UNION

I. HOW MANY PRISONERS REMAIN

- o After denying for many years that they held any political prisoners, in 1986 the Soviet Union began to release such prisoners. Since that time, more than 350 people have been released.
- o More than 300 individuals remain incarcerated, however, merely for freely expressing themselves, publishing their views or practising their faith.
- o At the request of Shevardnadze, we presented a detailed list of these cases. Although he committed himself to review each case, he has yet to respond in detail.

II. SIGNIFICANT ISSUE FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND AS SYMBOL

- o We have stressed to Soviets the importance of freeing those who have suffered unjustly and the signal it would send:
 - Soviet people will not speak and write freely until those who have been punished in the past for this are released. Andrei Sakharov has placed the highest priority on this issue.
 - Western observers will remain skeptical of Soviet reform until all prisoners are released. This is one of our conditions for considering the proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference.
 - One activist who helped publicize the demonstrations in Armenia, Paruyr Ayrikyan, was arrested on a political charge on March 25. First such arrest in more than a year and a half.

III. US AGENDA

- o Release of all political prisoners. We express particular concern for the former Helsinki monitors who remain incarcerated. Continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of the reported review of his case in 1986.
- o Rehabilitation of the released prisoners and an end to harassment and discrimination in employment.
- o Repeal of the laws that put these prisoners behind bars merely for exercising their rights.

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EMIGRATION AND FAMILY VISITS

I. EMMIGRATION LEVELS

- o Since early 1987, Soviet emigration levels have been rising.
 - In 1986, 914 Soviet Jews emigrated. Total for 1987 was 8,115. Levels rose slightly at start of 1988; about 1,000 a month now getting exit permission.
 - In 1986, 247 Soviet Armenians emigrated. In 1987, estimated that about 8,000 received exit permission. About 1,000 now emigrating each month.
 - 1987 was a record year for the only other group ever permitted to emigrate in large numbers, ethnic Germans. 14,488 emigrated to the FRG, compared with 783 in 1986.
- o Many long-time refuseniks still denied permission to emigrate. There are still divided families, and US-Soviet dual nationals who cannot leave.

II. LEGAL BARRIERS

- o Legal and procedural barriers to emigration remain:
 - Arbitrary use of "state security" to deny emigration, even when the applicant had no contact with sensitive information, or had contact many years before.
 - Adult applicants must have parents' permission to emigrate.
 - Applicant must have an invitation from an immediate relative who lives abroad. Soviets have been willing to be flexible on this, but it remains on the books and is a deterrent to new applications.

III. TRAVEL

- o Visits by Soviets to relatives in the US have increased five-fold since 1986 to approximately 1,000 per month, and Soviet emigres may now return to the Soviet Union on visits. Problems remain, however:
 - Some Soviets still denied family visits to US
 - US visitors to the Soviet Union cannot stay with relatives, and are barred from "sensitive" cities.
 - Although Soviet regulations provide for visa issuance within 72 hours in case of family illness or death, Soviets frequently fail to comply.

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-- There are also legal and artificial barriers to sending packages and placing phone calls to relatives inside the USSR.

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