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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** DUBERSTEIN, KENNETH: FILES :  
*Office of the Chief of Staff*

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**File Folder:** Gorbachev Meetings (2002) *Box 2*  
 OA 18344

**Date** 7/27/99

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. letter	<del>Charles Wink to Frank Carlucci re Washington Summit, 2p.</del> <i>R 7/24/00 NLS F99-020 #1</i>	<del>11/4/87</del>	<del>P1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Office of the Director



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington, D C 20547

November 4, 1987

Dear Mr. Secretary, Mr. Carlucci:

We all agree that the upcoming summit, aside from its impact on the future course of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations, should also be remembered as an affirmation of NATO unity and steadfastness. It will have been eight years -- precisely, on December 12 -- since NATO's historic dual-track INF decision was taken in Brussels in 1979.

Should the President decide to attend a NATO summit immediately after the summit in Washington, it would mark a perfect celebration of this anniversary -- more significantly, it would underscore the importance the President attaches to an INF agreement, to America's commitment to European security, and to close allied consultations. As congressional debate heats up over ratification, the President's ability to demonstrate solid European support for an INF accord will be a valuable asset.

There is another factor. Our own polling of European publics continues to show by overwhelming margins that Gorbachev is viewed more favorably than President Reagan (e.g. Britain (83%), Germany (80%), Italy (76%) and France (51%)), and more the advocate of peace and arms control. The Soviets will likely capitalize on these perceptions, maximizing their share of credit for the Washington summit. The President's immediate visit to Brussels would undercut these efforts. It would also affirm the President's take-charge leadership on Western security issues.

Such a visit, underlining the movement toward peace, in a historic setting, would result in wide media coverage of the President. Ronald Reagan's appearances in Europe and on television have always projected an image of leadership and trust. The positive perceptions generated by his activities with other NATO leaders in the summit context would enhance this rare opportunity. Also, the American media would extend wide coverage and pickup of these events, thus coincidentally providing a positive thrust to the President's image at home and on the INF ratification process.

I envision the President's trip as a short two-day affair with a single stop -- Brussels -- and with a single mission in mind -- the affirmation of NATO unity.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(DECL: OADR)

NLS F99-020 #1


BY Amf NARA, DATE 7/24/00

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I hope you will agree with me that such a proposal should be a high priority on our summit planning agenda.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Charlie", is written over a horizontal line.

Charles Z. Wick  
Director

The Honorable  
George P. Shultz  
Secretary of State

The Honorable  
Frank C. Carlucci  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

cc: Kenneth M. Duberstein

CONFIDENTIAL

## WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 12/4/87 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 am 12/7/87

SUBJECT: SUMMIT AGENDA TALKING POINTS

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GRISCOM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HOBBS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HOOLEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAUER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RANGE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<span style="background-color: black; color: black;">██████████</span> POWELL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RISQUE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CRIBB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CRIPPEN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CULVAHOUSE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DAWSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>BLAKEY</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DONATELLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**REMARKS:**

Please provide any comments/recommendations directly to Marion Blakey (x6597), with an info copy to my office, by 10:00 Monday morning, December 7th. Thank you.

**RESPONSE:**

# WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

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## THE SUMMIT AGENDA:

### HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES

"When I meet with General Secretary Gorbachev, I'm going to ask him: Isn't it time that the Soviet Union put an end to these destructive, wasteful conflicts around the world? Otherwise, there can never be a true glasnost, true openness, between his nation and ours."

--- President Reagan  
November 30, 1987

At their third Summit meeting, President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev are pursuing a four-part agenda comprising a thorough review of all aspects of the U.S. - Soviet relationship. In addition to the signing of the INF Treaty and discussion of other arms control initiatives, emphasis is being placed on human rights, and regional and bilateral issues.

President Reagan's goal is progress in each of the areas of the Summit agenda. The President seeks a solid foundation for peace, not a misleading climate of detente. He will urge Mr. Gorbachev to honor Soviet human rights commitments and to join in constructive efforts to solve our regional and bilateral conflicts.

- o The INF treaty and Soviet agreement on our four-part agenda represent a vindication of the policies of this Administration, policies based on realism, strength, and dialogue with our Allies. These policies, and cohesion among the Allies, have already made East-West relations more stable by encouraging caution in the Kremlin and confidence in the West.
- o There are limits to what can be achieved because of the fundamental differences between our systems. The Soviet Union remains a one-party dictatorship. Despite these differences, President Reagan is attempting to achieve progress on vital issues in our own national security interest and that of our allies.

## WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

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### Human Rights

The basic differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems are graphically illustrated in the ways we approach human rights.

- o The U.S. is committed to defend human rights everywhere and believes governments that honor their citizens' human rights are more likely to abide by international agreements and truly respect other nations. A country that represses its population sows mistrust abroad.
- o The Soviet Union has long been guilty of flagrant, systematic violations of the spirit and letter of international human rights covenants. The U.S.S.R. has made limited improvements in its human rights performance over the past two years. But these improvements have yet to be accompanied by changes in laws, institutions, and procedures that would guarantee their permanence.
- o Freedom of emigration, resolution of blocked marriages, reunification of families and divided spouses, and unrestricted visits of family members -- all human contact issues -- remain high on the list of criteria by which we judge Soviet human rights performance.
- o More Soviet Jews have emigrated over the past month than in all of 1986. Yet there are still an estimated 10,000 applicants' cases to be resolved and thousands more who might like to leave. Moreover, a new emigration law passed last year has actually complicated rather than eased the emigration process.
- o Until this fall, there was little progress on resolving cases of divided spouses and blocked marriages. We believe that these cases, as well as all divided family cases, should be promptly resolved.
- o An unknown number of prisoners of conscience remain interned in Soviet prisons, labor camps, and psychiatric institutions. More than one hundred fifty political prisoners were released over the past year and a half -- and we greet this positively.
- o But some were not released because they refused to repudiate their beliefs, and others were threatened with punishment or additional sentences without trial. An amnesty for certain inmates was declared in June, but relatively few prisoners have actually been freed. Abuse of psychiatry for political purposes continues and remains a source of serious concern.

## WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

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- o Despite the fact that General Secretary Gorbachev's glasnost, or openness campaign, has eased some restrictions on literary and artistic expression, narrow limits remain on the right to express dissenting views.

### Regional Issues

Regional issues are also a prominent subject of the Summit. Unlike the other three parts of our agenda with the Soviets, there has been little real progress on regional issues. We have achieved a more frank and less argumentative dialogue. However, now is the time to move to concrete actions.

- o We have made clear to Moscow that Soviet failure to move forward on key regional problems like Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq will affect the climate of U.S.- Soviet relations and could adversely influence the INF ratification process.
- o The Soviets or their surrogates continue to try to impose or maintain repressive Marxist/Leninist regimes in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Africa and Central America.
- o Afghanistan is an ongoing outrage. As the President told the Afghan Resistance on November 12, the key to resolving the Afghan crisis lies in the rapid and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is a major impediment to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.
- o We have made it clear to the Soviets that when they show convincingly their readiness to withdraw and to conclude a genuine political settlement, the United States will play a helpful role. But thus far the Soviets have refused to set a date for withdrawal. Instead we have seen futile efforts by Moscow and its client regime in Kabul to keep this discredited clique in control.
- o We are also deeply concerned about Soviet behavior in the Persian Gulf. After cooperating with us last July to pass UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for an end to the Gulf War, Soviet policy has become uncooperative and a cover for Iranian belligerence.
- o The Iranians have taken an increasingly aggressive posture against us and the Gulf Arabs. The Soviets have offered Iran tacit support, while condemning our responses to Iranian provocations. They have turned a blind eye to weapons deliveries from Soviet allies and clients, and delayed work on a second UNSC Resolution implementing 598.

## WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

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- o It is time for Moscow to prove its good intentions in the Gulf by moving toward enforcement action in response to Iran's refusal to accept 598. Instead, it continues as a course which does nothing to reduce Gulf tensions.
- o A political settlement in Cambodia depends on prompt withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Soviet rhetoric on Cambodia has softened somewhat, but Moscow still supports Vietnam's intransigence and continues to supply Vietnam with massive arms shipments. Moscow has done little to help resolve the stalemated political situation in Cambodia.
- o In Angola, the Soviets continue to support the presence of Cuban troops and massive armament of a repressive regime. The Soviets should persuade the Cubans to withdraw their southern and northern troop contingents, which would make a regional peace settlement possible.
- o The Soviets should help alleviate tensions in and around Ethiopia by pressing the government to cooperate with its neighbors. Moscow continues to support a repressive regime in Ethiopia with substantial military and other assistance. They should urge the Ethiopian authorities to commit more resources to national touring exhibits and other educational and cultural exchanges.
- o In Central America, the Soviets continue to supply over \$500 million a year in military supplies to Nicaragua even as the parties pursue peace under the Guatemala Agreement. This assistance stiffens Sandinista reluctance to take steps toward democratization and real compromise with the Resistance.
- o Moscow should use its influence to halt the flow of arms through Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador.

### Bilateral Issues

In order to foster lasting peace and security, we support efforts to increase knowledge, understanding, and cooperation between our peoples. One way to accomplish this goal is through a broad array of educational, cultural, scientific, commercial, and people-to-people contacts.

- o We favor bilateral exchanges that promote mutual understanding and mutual benefit. We oppose those that are undertaken in the interests of the Soviets alone and those that help the Soviets obtain high technology that would enhance their military capability.



## WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

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- o Among the most successful bilateral activities between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are cultural and educational exchanges. An agreement was signed at the Geneva Summit in 1985, reinstating national touring exhibits and other educational and cultural exchanges.
- o Under the President's Exchange Initiative, a series of people-to-people activities emerged, including school exchanges, citizens' public meetings, and joint television broadcasts.
- o The U.S. encourages expanded media exchange activities based on reciprocity: Soviet spokesmen, for example, appear regularly on U.S. television and have free access to our media. We believe U.S. spokesmen should have the same chance to explain American policies to the Soviet people.
- o Soviet media continue to publish lies about U.S. actions as part of a widespread campaign of disinformation. Lurid stories have alleged that the U.S. created the AIDS virus in a germ warfare laboratory, or that unscrupulous American businessmen are obtaining children in Central America to sell their body organs for transplant operations.
- o We have strongly objected to these disinformation stories, because we know that the Soviet press, unlike ours, is controlled by the regime. The Soviets have taken umbrage at our exposure of this cynical practice, but we won't stop bringing it up until they stop doing it.
- o The U.S. and U.S.S.R. are considering initiating or renewing cooperation in basic sciences, transportation, and other fields. Any such cooperation must be evaluated realistically, in terms of potential gains for this country and the protection of technological innovations that have military applications.
- o Last year, we discovered a massive Soviet espionage program directed against our embassy and personnel in Moscow. The President has decided that we will not occupy the new embassy until it is safe and secure, and that the U.S.S.R. will not be allowed to occupy its new chancery in Washington until a simultaneous move is possible. Our first priority is to make our Moscow embassy safe and secure. Extensive and expansive renovations are underway.



## WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

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- Under Gorbachev, the U.S.S.R. has begun a drive for economic modernization, greater autonomy for the economic and trade bureaucracy, and greater participation in the international economic system. The Kremlin is motivated by a desire to acquire advanced Western technology and capital for economic purposes, to diversify and expand hard currency earnings, and to make the Soviet economy more productive.
- The Soviets want to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). U.S. policy firmly opposes Soviet membership or participation in international economic institutions of primary functional importance, such as the GATT and IMF/World Bank.
- The Soviets are pushing aggressively for joint ventures with Western firms. Progress has been slow and only two joint ventures have been signed with U.S. companies.
- Several U.S. firms are anxious to proceed, but any joint venture must comply with U.S. export controls and regulations. We also have an obligation to our businessmen to give a frank appraisal of the risks and difficulties of operating in the U.S.S.R.
- Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in mid-September to discuss the US/USSR long-term grain agreement early in 1988. The Soviets may raise the issue to set the stage for these discussions.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8692

November 25, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH DUBERSTEIN  
WILLIAM BALL  
GARY BAUER  
JACK COURTEMACHE  
ARTHUR CULVAHOUSE  
RHETT DAWSON  
TONY DOLAN  
FRANK DONATELLI  
MARLIN FITZWATER  
WILLIAM GRAHAM  
CRAIG FULLER  
ANNE HIGGINS  
JIM HOOLEY  
FRANK LAVIN  
REBECCA RANGE  
JOHN TUCK  
SAM WATSON  
CLAYTON YUETTER

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: Summit Themes

Attached are themes for the Dec. 8-10 Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. They were prepared for use by Administration officials in speeches, interviews, and for background information. We also hope the themes will be helpful in your dealings with Administration colleagues and constituents. In addition, the NSC staff is prepared to provide briefings and other assistance as needed.

Attachment

## US-USSR Summit Themes

Basic Message: A Solid Foundation For A Safer World

-- The President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev is the fulfillment of a long-standing promise to build a solid foundation for lasting peace with freedom.

-- The Summit will be an opportunity to press for progress in all areas of our four part agenda, which is essential to lasting improvement in our relationship:

- o to strengthen US and allied security, and reach agreements for stabilizing and effectively verifiable arms reductions;

- o to press for lasting improvements in Soviet human rights practices;

- o to remove the tensions provoked by Soviet expansionism and use of force in regional conflicts;

- o to broaden constructive dialogue between our governments and peoples;

-- Establishing more constructive US-Soviet relations requires a sustained commitment, based on realism, strength and dialogue.

Human Rights

-- Respect for human rights is as important as arms control for genuine peace. Dialogue on this issue is high on the agenda.

-- USSR has made limited improvements in human rights performance, but we urge institutionalization of freedom of emigration, speech, assembly press and conscience. We expect Soviets to abide by the Helsinki Accords and other international agreements.

Regional Issues

-- US-Soviet discussions have intensified, but little real progress has been made. Soviet conduct in regional conflicts impedes substantial improvement in relations.

-- Ending Soviet occupation and war against the people of Afghanistan is the essential basis for a negotiated settlement and normalization. If the Soviets are serious about withdrawal, the U.S. is willing to be helpful. Withdrawal of Soviet military support for repressive regimes or foreign troops in such countries as Ethiopia, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua are necessary in order to reduce tensions.

-- On the Gulf War, it is time for Moscow to back its professed desire for peace by agreeing to substantive UN action, rather than trying to score political gains.

overnight numbers:

--the most important issue is now war/peace

--high approval rating on how the president is doing his job

--sharpest job rating increase wirthlin has ever measured

--highest job rating since Iran

--6-8 point jump in handling foreign affairs

--NOTE: only less than half of respondents knew about INF, so there is room for good growth over the next few nights as it is better known

--with that in mind, approval for INF treaty over 7 out of 10

--most important step since WW II in slowing down arms race

\*\*\*added note: we do not get good marks for handling cuban jail problem

Defense and Space:

-- US objective is eventual Soviet acceptance of a jointly managed transition to a deterrent regime based increasingly on effective defenses, should they prove feasible.

-- US proposed mutual commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from ABM Treaty and to observe Treaty provisions while continuing SDI research, testing and development, which are permitted by ABM Treaty. Cannot accept restrictions on defense beyond those actually agreed upon in ABM Treaty.

-- Soviet proposals designed to cripple SDI, while permitting their own extensive strategic defense programs. Dangerous to leave monopoly to Soviets in this vital area.

Compliance:

-- Effective verification and compliance with agreements are essential elements of arms control.

Other Issues:

-- US-Soviet negotiations on verification of nuclear testing limits opened November 9.

-- Next priorities: chemical weapons ban and redressing imbalances in NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

-- Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in mid-September to discuss the US/USSR long-term grain agreement early in 1988. The Soviets may raise the issue in order to set the stage for these discussions. It is related to Export Enhancement Program sales to the USSR under the current grain agreement.

#### V. ARMS CONTROL

-- We are nearing an historic agreement to eliminate an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. This agreement is part of overall U.S. national security strategy, designed to build a safer peace and ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term through:

- o modernization of our strategic deterrent;
- o negotiations for deep, equitable, and verifiable arms reductions; and
- o seeking through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative a safer and better way to deter war by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance US and Allied security.

#### INF:

-- Treaty will eliminate an entire category of US and Soviet missiles.

-- More than four Soviet warheads to be eliminated for every one the US eliminates.

-- The most stringent verification provisions ever concluded, including several kinds of on-site inspection.

-- Unity and support of the NATO alliance are what led to this success.

#### START:

-- US has proposed reducing US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals by 50%.

-- US draft treaty at Geneva negotiations emphasizes reductions of, and sublimits on, the most destabilizing weapons -- fast flying ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

-- Major difference between US, USSR positions: Soviet insistence on holding START reductions hostage to their efforts to cripple our SDI program. Also, difficult verification issues to work out.

-- Soviet media continue to publish untruths about U.S. actions as part of a widespread campaign of disinformation. Lurid stories have alleged that the U.S. created the AIDS virus in a germ warfare laboratory, or that unscrupulous American businessmen are obtaining children in Central America in order to sell their body organs for transplant operations. We have strongly objected to these disinformation stories, because we know that the Soviet press, unlike ours, is controlled by the regime. The Soviets have taken umbrage at our exposure of this cynical practice, but we won't stop bringing it up until they stop doing it.

-- The U.S. and USSR are considering initiating or renewing cooperation in basic sciences, transportation, and other fields. Any such cooperation must be evaluated realistically, in terms of potential gains for this country and the protection of technological innovations that have military applications.

-- Last year, we discovered a massive Soviet espionage program directed against our embassy and personnel in Moscow. The President has decided that we will not occupy the new embassy until it is safe and secure, and that the USSR will not be allowed to occupy its new chancery in Washington until a simultaneous move is possible. Our first priority is to make our existing Moscow embassy safe and secure. Extensive renovations are underway.

-- Under Gorbachev, the USSR has begun a drive for economic modernization, greater autonomy for the economic and trade bureaucracy, and greater participation in the international economic system. The Kremlin is motivated by a desire to acquire advanced Western technology and capital for economic and military purposes, to diversify and expand hard currency earnings, and to make the Soviet economy more productive.

-- The Soviets want to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). U.S. policy firmly opposes Soviet membership or participation in international economic institutions of primary functional importance, such as the GATT and IMF/World Bank.

-- The Soviets are pushing aggressively for joint ventures with Western firms. Progress has been slow and only two joint ventures have been signed with U.S. companies. Several U.S. firms are anxious to proceed, but any joint venture must comply with U.S. export controls and regulations. We also have an obligation to our businessmen to give a frank appraisal of the risks and difficulties of operating in the USSR.

-- The Soviets should persuade the Cubans to withdraw their southern and northern troop contingents, which would facilitate a regional peace settlement.

-- The Soviets should help alleviate tensions in and around Ethiopia by pressing the government to cooperate with its neighbors. Moscow continues to support a repressive regime in Ethiopia with substantial military and other assistance. They should urge the Ethiopian authorities to commit more resources to the looming famine and to allow the distribution of relief to all areas of the country.

-- In Central America, the Soviets continue to supply over \$500 million a year in military supplies to Nicaragua even as the parties pursue peace under the Guatemala Agreement. This assistance stiffens Sandinista reluctance to take steps toward democratization and real compromise with the Resistance.

-- Moscow should use its influence to halt the flow of arms through Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador.

#### IV. BILATERAL ISSUES

-- In order to foster lasting peace and security, we support efforts to increase knowledge, understanding and cooperation between our peoples. One way to accomplish this goal is through a broad spectrum of educational, cultural, scientific, commercial and people-to-people contacts.

-- We favor bilateral exchanges that promote mutual understanding and mutual benefit. We oppose those that are undertaken in the interests of only one party and those designed to facilitate Soviet acquisition of otherwise proscribed high technology.

-- Among the most successful bilateral activities between the U.S. and USSR are cultural and educational exchanges. An agreement was signed at the Geneva Summit in 1985, reinstating national touring exhibits and other educational/cultural exchanges. Under the President's Exchange Initiative, a series of people-to-people activities emerged, including school exchanges, citizens' public meetings, and joint television broadcasts.

-- The U.S. encourages expanded media exchange activities based on reciprocity: Soviet spokesmen, for example, appear regularly on U.S. television and have free access to our media; we believe U.S. spokesmen should have the same chance to explain American policies to the Soviet people.



-- The Soviets or their surrogates continue to try to impose or maintain repressive Marxist/Leninist regimes in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Africa and Central America.

-- Afghanistan is an ongoing outrage. As the President told the Afghan Resistance on November 12, the key to resolving the Afghan crisis lies in the rapid and complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is a major impediment to improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

-- We have made it clear to the Soviets that, when they show convincingly their readiness to withdraw and to conclude a genuine political settlement, the United States will play a helpful role. But thus far the Soviets have refused to set a date when withdrawal would begin. Instead we have seen futile efforts by Moscow and its client regime in Kabul to keep this discredited clique in control.

-- We are also deeply concerned about Soviet behavior in the Persian Gulf. After cooperating with us last July to pass UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for an end to the Gulf War, Soviet policy has become uncooperative and a cover for Iranian belligerence.

-- The Iranians have taken an increasingly aggressive posture against us and the Gulf Arabs. The Soviets have offered Iran tacit support, while condemning our responses to Iranian provocations, turned a blind eye to weapons deliveries from Soviet allies and clients, and delaying work on a second UNSC Resolution implementing 598.

-- It is time for Moscow to prove its good intentions in the Gulf by moving toward enforcement action in response to Iran's refusal to accept 598, rather than continuing a course which does nothing to reduce Gulf tensions.

-- A political settlement in Cambodia depends on prompt withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Soviet rhetoric on Cambodia has softened somewhat, but Moscow still supports Vietnam's intransigence and continues to supply Vietnam with massive arms shipments. Moscow has done little to help resolve the stalemated political situation in Cambodia.

-- In Angola, the Soviets continue to support the presence of Cuban troops and massive armament of a repressive regime.

-- Long guilty of flagrant, systematic violations of the spirit and letter of international human rights covenants, the USSR has made limited improvements in its human rights performance over the past two years. But these improvements have yet to be accompanied by changes in laws, institutions, and procedures that would guarantee their permanence.

-- Freedom of emigration, resolution of blocked marriages, reunification of families and divided spouses, and unrestricted visits of family members -- all human contact issues -- remain high on the list of criteria by which we judge Soviet human rights performance. More Soviet Jews have emigrated over the past month than the total number last year. Yet there are still an estimated 10,000 applicants' cases to be resolved and thousands more who might like to leave. Moreover, a new emigration law passed last year has actually complicated rather than facilitated the emigration process.

-- Until this fall, there was little progress on resolving cases of divided spouses and blocked marriages. We believe that these cases, as well as all divided family cases, should be promptly resolved.

-- An unknown number of prisoners of conscience remain interned in Soviet prisons, labor camps, and psychiatric institutions. More than one hundred fifty political prisoners were released over the past year and a half -- and we greet this positively. But some were not released because they refused to repudiate their beliefs, and others were threatened with punishment or additional sentences without trial. An amnesty for certain inmates was declared in June, but relatively few prisoners have actually been freed. Abuse of psychiatry for political purposes remains a source of serious concern.

-- Despite the fact that Gorbachev's glasnost, or openness campaign has eased some restrictions on literary and artistic expression, narrow limits remain on the right to express dissenting views.

### III. REGIONAL ISSUES

-- Regional issues will also feature prominently in the summit. Unlike the other three parts of our agenda with the Soviets, there has been little real progress on regional issues. We have achieved a more frank and non-polemical dialogue. However, now is the time to move to concrete actions. We have made clear to Moscow that Soviet failure to move forward on key regional problems like Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq, will affect the climate of U.S. Soviet relations and could adversely influence the INF ratification process.

## SUMMIT THEMES

### I. U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS - GENERAL

-- The third Reagan-Gorbachev Summit, to be held in Washington beginning December 7th, will be highlighted by the signing of an INF agreement and a thorough review of all aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship: human rights, regional and bilateral issues, and arms control.

-- The INF treaty and Soviet engagement with our four-part agenda represent a vindication of the policies of this Administration, policies based on realism, strength, and dialogue with our Allies. These policies, and cohesion among the Allies, have already made East-West relations more stable by encouraging caution in the Kremlin and confidence in the West.

-- Since Gorbachev came to power, considerable ferment has taken place inside the USSR; nevertheless, one-Party dictatorship remains in effect. We welcome any liberalization of Soviet society; but history does not allow us to assume it will occur.

-- While recognizing the limitations to our dialogue imposed by fundamental differences between our systems, we attempt to achieve progress on vital issues in our own national security interest and that of our Allies.

-- In both diplomatic and public initiatives, we continue to urge the Soviet regime to observe its human rights commitments and to join in constructive efforts to solve regional conflicts.

-- The U.S. seeks to build a solid foundation for peace, not a misleading climate of detente. Our goal is to seek progress in each of the four areas of our agenda, moving ahead where we can find common ground but without forgetting that the U.S. Soviet relationship will remain essentially competitive for the foreseeable future.

### II. HUMAN RIGHTS

-- The basic differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems are graphically illustrated in the respective ways we approach human rights. The U.S. is committed to defend human rights everywhere and believes governments that honor their citizens' human rights are more likely to abide by international agreements and truly respect other nations. A country that represses its population sows mistrust abroad.

## Bilateral Issues

-- Increasing knowledge, contacts, trade and cooperation between our peoples help build mutual understanding. The President's Exchange Initiative opened new channels for dialogue.

- o Our exchange programs are based on principles of reciprocity, mutual benefit, and protecting sensitive American technology and information.

-- Continuing Soviet espionage, government-controlled media disinformation campaigns, and lack of reciprocity in media access undermine trust and cooperation.

## Arms Control

-- Arms control is one part of overall US strategy to strengthen security and ensure a safer peace.

-- INF: We are close to agreement to eliminate an entire category of US and Soviet missiles. INF Treaty eliminates four Soviet warheads for one US; most stringent verification ever, including several forms of on-site inspection. Unity and support of NATO alliance contributed to this success.

-- Strategic Arms Reductions: U.S. proposed reducing strategic nuclear arsenals by 50%, emphasizing reductions focusing on the most destabilizing weapons. Difficult verification issues also to be worked out.

-- Defense and Space: US objective is Soviet acceptance of jointly managed transition to safer peace based on increasing reliance on defenses -- should they prove effective -- which threaten no one. SDI is not a bargaining chip. Soviets have extensive strategic defense programs. Soviet monopoly in this vital area would jeopardize Western security.

-- Other Arms Control Initiatives: Verification of nuclear testing limits, chemical weapons ban and redressing disparities in NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

-- Compliance: Effective verification and compliance with agreements are essential to arms control.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

11/3/87

Ken D

lit  
KMD

To the extent a little history is helpful, I have briefly reviewed Geneva & Iceland. I've relied on my memory for accuracy so I may have missed a point or two (for example, I'm not 100% sure RR did an oval office TV address before Iceland, though he definitely did before Geneva).

Next, I'll put some random thoughts on paper for the December 7<sup>th</sup> meeting. You can do with them as you please.

David Chew

- \* This will be first of US/USSR Summits where RR will be acting as host. Geneva and Reykjavik where both on neutral sites, so protocol and circumstances were different.
- \* Assuming RR goes to Moscow for a "return" Summit in '88, precedents may be established in Washington that will carry over to Moscow. For example, length of the visit, number of actual meetings, location of the meetings, social and non-meeting activities, role of wives, etc., are all issues that will have to be addressed for Washington which could affect Moscow activities.
- \* If Washington meeting is viewed as precedent setting, circumstances and activities may want to be viewed also from the perspective of an RR trip to Moscow.

#### Geneva

- \* RR arrived with Mrs. Reagan a few days early to allow for time adjustments. They stayed in a private villa.
- \* Mrs. Gorbachev also attended. Mrs. Gorbachev and Mrs. Reagan had some joint and some separate activities.
- \* Meeting sites of the two leaders alternated between U.S. location (another local villa) and the Russian location, the Soviet Embassy.
- \* Meetings were morning and afternoon sessions. There was a break for lunch when both sides returned to their own "base camps" to caucus. The topics to be covered for each session were set out in advance.
- \* Dinners alternated one night U.S., one night Soviet, with wives and principals included.
- \* Wrap-up event was the reading of statements by the two leaders at a final joint session in a large hall carried live on TV. It was not agreed to until the last minute.
- \* The cultural exchange agreement which provided for more "people-to-people" exchanges was concluded at the Geneva meeting.
- \* Ancillary (non-Soviet), U.S.-only activities at Geneva were considered, including a speech to young people. Most were rejected, primarily for time constraints.

- \* RR did do Worldnet address to Europe from Geneva just before the meetings started.
- \* Swiss hosted U.S./Soviet reception one evening. Courtesy calls were paid on Swiss government officials.
- \* Following the meeting, RR immediately flew to Brussels to brief NATO allies. Some heads of state were present.
- \* Then RR flew to Washington and immediately delivered speech to Joint Session of Congress.

#### Reykjavik

- \* Arrangements for Reykjavik were done on less than 30 days notice.
- \* RR stayed in US Ambassador's residence. Soviets stayed on a ship.
- \* Mrs. Reagan did not attend. After saying she was not coming, Mrs. Gorbachev did show at the last minute. She tried to put on separate media show of her own activities, which did not go well.
- \* RR arrived a few days early to accommodate the time change. Gorbachev arrived closer to the meeting time, but in a time-frame that caused some problems for the Icelandic government.
- \* Meeting site was the neutral Hoffedi House, supplied by Icelandic government. The upstairs was divided into US/Soviet sides allowing for limited staff to be present.
- \* Meetings between the two leaders occurred in morning and afternoon sessions, with breaks for lunch, during which US/Soviet sides regrouped.
- \* Two leaders met mostly alone (with note-takers and interpreters), or with foreign ministers present. Discussions were wide ranging and with no fixed agenda. The conclusion of the meetings was always up in the air. (There was even some discussion of carrying the meetings on for another day, but that was rejected.)
- \* There were no joint dinners. Each side was on its own.



- \* Following the abrupt conclusion of the talks by the two leaders, RR went back to Ambassador's residence for 30 minutes to regroup with US side and fill in the details. Then he went immediately to U.S. military base to greet the troops. Remarks there were carried live on TV.
- \* Shultz followed up with press briefing. Backgrounding the pool on AF1 quickly gave way to on-the-record discussions and the decision to make all of the Reykjavik proposals public.
- \* RR returned to Washington on Sunday pm. Monday was a holiday and RR gave Oval Office address to the Nation Monday evening.
- \* Extensive effort was put into Administration spokesman appearances on morning shows, opeds, etc.
- \* RR going to London to brief NATO allies following Reykjavik before going to Washington was raised, but it was felt to be logistically impossible and therefore not seriously considered.

#### Other Points

- \* After both Geneva and Reykjavik, State dispatched "special envoys," (sometimes Assistant Secretaries) to brief key world leaders on the talks.
- \* For both Geneva and Reykjavik, public diplomacy efforts were conducted before the trips to establish the public's framework and media expectations for the meetings. This effort relied heavily on RR speeches and activities, but did include efforts by the Secretary of State and others. Geneva, agreed to farther in advance, allowed for more planning and buildup. Reykjavik, agreed to quickly, didn't allow for much thematic development or setting of public expectations.
- \* Congressional leaders were brought down for consultations before each trip, and briefed afterward. Briefings of media and columnists were held both before and after each trip. RR spoke to the Nation before the trips. "Send-off" events the day of departure were arranged.
- \* After the trips follow-up events where RR could continue to publicly elaborate his messages were also scheduled.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



TO: KD

FROM RHETT B. DAWSON  
Assistant to the President  
for Operations

FYI - forwarded to  
RR this a.m.

BOB DOLE  
KANSAS

## United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

December 4, 1987

The President  
The White House  
Washington

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased we had the opportunity to discuss my concern over remarks you made last evening on the INF issue.

The INF issue is vital to the security of this country and the American people. The Soviet record of arms control treaty violations is appalling, a fact highlighted again in the report you issued this week. I was pleased to hear you reaffirm today in the Cabinet Room that you share my conviction that these matters deserve the most serious consideration by the Senate, through the process of treaty ratification laid out in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution.

As you know, no Treaty text has yet been made available to the Senate -- for the simple reason that there is as yet no final text. Negotiations are continuing in Geneva between our team and the Soviet team, to agree on final wording. I have been informed by Administration officials that those negotiations may continue through the weekend, in an effort to meet the deadline for signing set in the Summit schedule.


I can assure you that I, and all Republicans Senators, will give the Treaty prompt and thorough consideration, as soon as it is presented to us. But I know you would not disagree with my strong belief that it is not only reasonable, but prudent, that those of us in the Senate -- who have the Constitutional responsibility to vote on the Treaty -- withhold final judgment until the Treaty negotiations are at least completed, and a final text is available. Certainly that kind of responsible, cautious approach has characterized all of your Administration's dealings with the Soviet Union to date.

Mr. President, this issue is not a test of loyalty to our Party or to you, as some have tried to portray it. It is an issue central to the national security of the United States. It must be dealt solely on that basis.

You deserve the appreciation of all Americans for the outstanding leadership you have provided on arms control issues. You deserve the support of all Americans as you enter the vital Summit talks with General Secretary Gorbachev.

I can assure you that all Republican Senators join me in expressing our support, and in pledging that our consideration of the INF Treaty will be constructive and motivated solely by one goal -- to insure that the national security of the United States is protected and enhanced.

Sincerely yours,



BOB DOLE  
United States Senate

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 16, 1987

TALKING POINTS FOR STRATEGY AND COORDINATING GROUP MEETING

Reason for Organization

- \* We need to establish within the White House a high-level group to develop support across the board, including legislative, for the ratification of the INF treaty.
- \* We must all sing off the same sheet of music. Regular strategy sessions of this group and meetings of a similar, but larger group should help us stay together. (Distribute membership list)
- \* In addition, Will would continue to chair the Legislative Working Group which Frank established and has been meeting on a regular basis; A.B. should get into the turnover of documents, and, of course, NSC would provide technical support through a separate working group.

Organization of Effort

- \* Envision this group, with Colin and I co-chairing, meeting at least once a week.
- \* Expanded group meet several additional times a week to make sure that all options are being considered and that actions are on schedule and accomplished.

Thoughts on Ratification

- \* First item of business seems to me is to discuss how each of you think we should approach the task of ratification so that all of us understand each other's point of view. Then as time goes along, we can refine those plans.
- \* Will, how are things shaping on the Hill? ...
- \* Tom, what do you have in store for us as a communications strategy?...
- \* Colin, any thoughts? ...

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 16, 1987

NOTIONAL MEMBERSHIP  
GROUP OF OUTSTANDING AMERICANS  
IN SUPPORT OF THE INF TREATY

John Tower (chair)  
Jeanne Kirkpatric (co-chair)  
Ed Muskie (co-chair)  
Paul Laxalt  
Jim Schlesinger  
Melvin Laird  
Cap Weinberger or Richard Perle  
Harold Brown  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Andrew Goodpaster

Group of Outstanding Americans

- \* I would like for you to consider the idea of developing a group of former senior officials who support the INF Treaty.
- \* A group like the one listed (Distribute the list) could provide a variety of unofficial assistance.
- \* Any thoughts?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 16, 1987

MEMBERSHIP OF STRATEGY AND COORDINATING GROUP

When co-chaired by Senator Baker and Colin Powell:

Ken Duberstein  
Tom Griscom  
Will Ball  
Rhett Dawson  
John Negroponte

When co-chaired by Rhett Dawson and John Negroponte:

Tom Griscom  
Will Ball  
Marlin Fitzwater  
John Tuck  
Rebecca Range  
Bob Linhard

As needed

A.B. Culvahouse  
Nancy Risque  
Frank Donatelli

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 16, 1987

AGENDA FOR STRATEGY AND COORDINATING GROUP MEETING

- I. Reason for setting up structure (5 minutes)
- II. Organization for the effort (5 minutes)
- III. Discussion of ideas on ratification (15 minutes)
- IV. Discussion of Group of Outstanding Americans (5 minutes)



**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Director



December 8, 1987

PERSONAL

Dear Howard:

While neither you nor I need one more lunch or dinner to attend, I believe the reasons I should be included in Thursday's expanded working lunch at the White House are compelling. I understand that the list of luncheon attendees has not yet been finalized.

My official role includes "the principal advisor on foreign attitudes to the President, the Secretary of State and the National Security Council." Further, I have been designated as the principal negotiator for the U.S. Government in the implementation of the cultural exchanges agreement, the Presidential People-to-People initiative, and the critical negotiations on Soviet disinformation and media reciprocity.

I believe my absence at the luncheon would indicate to the Soviets that we have purposely de-emphasized this aspect of our relationship with the Soviet Union.

I hope you agree.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable  
Howard H. Baker, Jr.  
Chief of Staff to the President  
The White House

cc Ken Duberstein

**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Director



December 8, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

At the welcoming ceremonies this morning at the White House, Henry Kissinger went out of his way to say "After supporting your Administration for six years, I have reluctantly differed with you on the INF treaty. However, I want you to know that I will henceforth desist and plan to testify in favor of the treaty."

He went on to say that "my reason is that having reached this stage, it would be too harmful not to ratify it."

I told Henry that in this critical area every point of view can only help the public in its own deliberations. In that context, his support will now be even more valuable.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The President  
The White House



**United States  
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Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

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The President  
The White House

**HOT**

**HOT**




THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 8, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR HOWARD BAKER  
KENNETH DUBERSTEIN  
COLIN POWELL  
TOM GRISCOM  
RHETT DAWSON

FROM: William L. Ball, III 

Attached is Senator Dole's statement issued on formation of a Republican Task Force on INF. The Task Force had its first meeting today in Dole's office.

cc: Max Kampelman  
Ed Fox  
Margo Carlisle  
Alison Fortier  
Bob Linhard  
Pam Turner

# BOB DOLE



(R - Kansas)

SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
DECEMBER 8, 1987

CONTACT: WALT RIKER, DALE TATE  
(202) 224-3135

## DOLE ANNOUNCES REPUBLICAN INF TREATY TASK FORCE


Today I am announcing formation of a Republican Task Force to coordinate expeditious consideration of the INF Treaty. I have asked Assistant Republican Leader Al Simpson to chair the group, which includes: Senators Helms, Lugar and Pressler of the Foreign Relations Committee; Warner, Quayle, and Wilson of Armed Services; Cohen and Specter of Intelligence; and Stevens and Wallop from the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. I will be an ex-officio member of the group.

We would not be where we are -- on the verge of Senate consideration of an important nuclear arms reduction agreement -- without Ronald Reagan's leadership. Every Senate Republican knows that; and we are united in our desire to work cooperatively with the President. The Task Force will be doing just that.

And the President has indicated his desire, as well, that we work closely, constructively together. He has offered to send key advisers like Secretary Shultz and National Security Advisor Powell up to the Hill to work with both Republicans and Democrats. Certainly on the Republican side, we intend to take advantage of that offer.

We have some real, legitimate concerns. And I know from my own talks with the President, Howard Baker, George Shultz and others, that they have a persuasive case to make -- on Alliance matters, and the other issues related to INF. So it will benefit all of us to have exchanges on these points.

The bottom line for most Republicans is that we want to support the President; we will do our Constitutional duty; and we see no reason why the roles must conflict. And I think the President sees it that way, too.



1828 L Street, N.W. • Suite 805  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
(202) 223-9400  
(TDD) (202) 223-9400

TO: Ken Duberstein  
FROM: Senator Brock  
RE: INE Statement  
DATE: 12/7/87

4 Pages to follow

SENT BY: \_\_\_\_\_

T E L E C O P Y



1828 L Street, N.W. • Suite 805  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
(202) 223-9400  
(TDD) (202) 223-9400

REMARKS OF SENATOR BOB DOLE  
GANNETT/USA TODAY YEAR-END MANAGEMENT MEETING

NO DOUBT ABOUT IT, THERE IS AN EPIDEMIC OF "GLASNOST FEVER" IN WASHINGTON. BUT, YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, STANDING OUT ON THE MALL IN FRONT OF A QUARTER OF A MILLION PEOPLE, I GOT A POTENT ANTIDOTE FOR THAT "FEVER" -- IN THE FORM OF A REMINDER ABOUT MR. GORBACHEV AND THE KIND SYSTEM HE RUNS. A SYSTEM THAT STILL DENIES BASIC FREEDOMS TO ITS CITIZENS; AND STILL -- ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT -- BASHES THE HEADS OF DEMONSTRATORS IN MOSCOW WHO SEEK ONLY THEIR RIGHT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY OF THEIR BIRTH, AND THROWS IN JAIL AMERICAN NEWSMEN WHO ARE COVERING THE DEMONSTRATION.

THOSE EVENTS REINFORCE MY STRONG FEELING THAT WE MIGHT ALL BENEFIT BY LOWERING THE EXPECTATION LEVEL A BIT; AND DOING SOME SERIOUS THINKING ABOUT WHAT THIS SUMMIT OUGHT TO BE ALL ABOUT.

THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL BE SIGNING OF THE INF TREATY. IN GETTING THIS AGREEMENT, RONALD REAGAN HAS ACCOMPLISHED SOMETHING THAT HAS ELUDED EVERY OTHER PRESIDENT OF THE NUCLEAR AGE -- AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL REDUCE, NOT JUST LIMIT THE GROWTH OF NUCLEAR STOCKPILES; AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL WIPE OUT AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IT IS A WATERSHED ACCOMPLISHMENT, AND RONALD REAGAN DESERVES EVERY OUNCE OF CREDIT HE IS GETTING. HE DESERVES AN APOLOGY, TOO, FROM HIS LIBERAL CRITICS, WHO HAVE BEEN CASTIGATING HIM FOR SEVEN YEARS FOR BEING "ANTI-ARMS CONTROL." RONALD REAGAN WAS RIGHT ALL ALONG.

AND LET ME ALSO SAY: RONALD REAGAN DESERVES A PERSONAL APOLOGY FROM A FEW GADFLIES ON THE "RIGHT" FRINGE -- WHO OWE WHAT LITTLE POLITICAL PROFILE THEY HAVE TO THIS PRESIDENT; AND WHO OUGHT TO BE PROFOUNDLY ASHAMED OF THEMSELVES FOR THEIR ATTACKS ON A GREAT PRESIDENT.

FOR RONALD REAGAN HAS BEEN A GREAT PRESIDENT; AND A GREAT "ARMS CONTROL PRESIDENT." AND I AM PROUD TO HAVE SUPPORTED HIM EVERY STEP OF THE WAY.

BUT I WOULD ALSO REMIND THIS AUDIENCE THAT TWO OF RONALD REAGAN'S GREATEST STRENGTHS AS PRESIDENT HAVE BEEN, FIRST, HIS PROFOUND RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; AND, SECOND, HIS VERY REALISTIC APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

I HAVE THOSE SAME TWO PRINCIPLES FIRMLY IN MY OWN MIND AS I LOOK AT THE INF AGREEMENT.

## TWO-STAGE PROCESS

TREATY-MAKING IN THIS COUNTRY IS A TWO STAGE PROCESS -- SOMETHING THAT A FEW CHEERLEADERS HAVE FORGOTTEN, IN THEIR SELF-SERVING EFFORT TO TURN THIS IMPORTANT NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE INTO A LITMUS TEST OF POLITICAL LOYALTY.

ARTICLE II, SECTION 2, OF THE CONSTITUTION ASSIGNS TO THE SENATE AN INDEPENDENT ROLE IN TREATY RATIFICATION. THOSE OF US WHO SERVE IN THE SENATE -- REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS ALIKE -- WE TAKE THAT RESPONSIBILITY SERIOUSLY. AND MOST OF US ARE TAKING THE SAME APPROACH TO INF -- LET'S WITHHOLD FINAL JUDGMENT UNTIL WE SEE WHAT WE HAVE. BOB BYRD HAS SAID THAT; SAM NUNN HAS SAID IT; AND BOB DOLE IS GOING TO SAY IT AGAIN, TODAY.

LET US PONDER BEFORE WE PRONOUNCE, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

AND LET US PUT ASIDE THE POLITICKING AND REMEMBER: WHATEVER OTHERS MAY, OR MAY NOT, HAVE READ -- A FINAL DRAFT OF THE TREATY WAS STILL BEING NEGOTIATED LAST NIGHT, AND HAS STILL NOT ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON THIS MORNING. THE ADMINISTRATION -- FOR QUITE GOOD REASON -- DID NOT WANT TO GIVE A TEXT TO THE SENATE, BEFORE IT WAS COMPLETED. AND MOST SENATORS AREN'T GOING TO DECIDE, UNTIL THEY HAVE THE CHANCE TO READ THE TREATY FOR THEMSELVES.

AND LET ME ALSO MAKE THIS POINT: THE SENATE IS NOT LIMITED TO JUST; YES OR NO, UP OR DOWN. ANYONE WHO SAYS, FLAT OUT, THAT A TREATY CRAFTED BY A FEW PEOPLE IN ONE BRANCH OF OUR GOVERNMENT CAN'T BE IMPROVED, NO MATTER WHAT; ANYONE WHO MAKES THAT KIND OF CLAIM BETTER RE-READ THE CONSTITUTION, AND GET HIS COMMON SENSE INTO THE SHOP FOR A 6,000 MILE CHECK-UP.

## SENATE CAN PLAY POSITIVE ROLE

THE SENATE CAN PLAY A VERY POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN TREATY RATIFICATION. LET ME CITE JUST TWO EXAMPLES.

FIRST, THE PANAMA CANAL -- ARGUABLY THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL TREATY TO HIT THE SENATE SINCE THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ACCORD. WHEN THE SENATE CONSIDERED THE TREATY IN 1978, I OFFERED AN AMENDMENT, WHICH IN ALTERED FORM BECAME THE "LEADERSHIP AMENDMENT," RESERVING CERTAIN AMERICAN RIGHTS.. EVEN WITH THAT RESERVATION IN ITS FINAL FORM, I PERSONALLY COULD NOT SUPPORT THE TREATY. BUT -- REMEMBERING THE FINAL VOTE WAS ONLY 68-32 -- IT IS CLEAR THAT, WITHOUT THE RESERVATION, THE TREATY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPROVED AT ALL.

DURING MY TENURE AS MAJORITY LEADER, THE SENATE ALSO RATIFIED ANOTHER TREATY THAT HAD BEEN Languishing FOR 37 YEARS -- THE GENOCIDE TREATY. ONCE AGAIN, RESERVATIONS PROTECTING U.S. RIGHTS WERE THE KEY. WITHOUT THEM, THE RATIFICATION OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION WOULD STILL BE A GOAL, RATHER THAN A REALITY.

THESE WEREN'T "SPOILER" AMENDMENTS, DESIGNED TO THWART THE WILL OF TREATY NEGOTIATORS OR THE PRESIDENT. THEY WERE ESSENTIAL, CONSTRUCTIVE ADDITIONS TO THE TREATIES -- ADDITIONS EMBRACED BY THE PRESIDENT; WHICH REQUIRED NO RENEGOTIATION WITH THE OTHER SIGNATORIES; AND WHICH LED TO AN APPROVAL THE TREATIES OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED.



## MORE THAN JUST A CHECK-OFF

WHAT'S AT STAKE, THOUGH, IS MORE THAN CHECKING OFF ANOTHER RELEVANT BOX IN A CONSTITUTIONAL SCORECARD. WHAT'S FINALLY AT STAKE IS THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. AS ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PEOPLE -- A RESPONSIBILITY NO LESS SOLEMN THAN THAT OF THE PRESIDENT -- TO DO EVERYTHING WE MUST, TO PRESERVE THIS NATION'S SECURITY.

THAT'S WHY TODAY, FOR EXAMPLE, MORE THAN A DECADE AFTER THE NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES WERE SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE, WE HAVE NOT ACTED ON THEM. THEY WERE NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH BY PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS -- JUST AS INF HAS BEEN; BUT THERE IS NOW NEARLY UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT THAT WE DON'T HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO VERIFY THE TESTING TREATIES; SO THE SENATE, SO FAR, HAS "JUST SAID NO."

THAT IS ONE GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHY WE HAVE A TWO STAGE PROCESS. AND EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS ILLUSTRATE AGAIN WHY THE U.S. CAN NEVER BE TOO CAUTIOUS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, OR TAKE ANYTHING ON FAITH, EVEN FROM THIS NEW DISCIPLE OF "GLASNOST."

AT THE VERY HOUR OUR NEGOTIATORS WERE SITTING AT THE TABLE WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS IN GENEVA, TRYING TO FINALIZE THE INF TREATY; AND ONLY HOURS AFTER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, ON AMERICAN TELEVISION, HAD PROPOSED A "SOLUTION" TO THE SDI QUESTION THROUGH STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY -- THE PRESIDENT WAS SUBMITTING TO THE CONGRESS A REPORT ON YET ANOTHER NEW SOVIET VIOLATION OF THAT VERY ABM TREATY.

### I TRUST RONALD REAGAN

IT BOILS DOWN TO THIS: I TRUST RONALD REAGAN. BUT I DON'T TRUST MIKHAIL GORBACHEV.

AND GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH NBC LAST WEEK DID NOTHING TO QUELL MY DISTRUST -- AN INTERVIEW DURING WHICH HE TOLD US THE BERLIN WALL WAS NONE OF OUR BUSINESS; EMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION MERELY TO PROTECT AGAINST A "BRAIN DRAIN;" AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY THE ONLY POLITICAL PARTY THE SOVIET CITIZENRY WILL EVER NEED, IN ORDER TO BE FREE.

AND LET US KEEP IN MIND, TOO, THAT -- AS IMPORTANT AS INF IS -- THIS WILL NOT BE A ONE-ISSUE SUMMIT. ALSO HIGH ON THE AGENDA WILL BE DISCUSSIONS ON START, AIMED AT ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON 50%

CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS; AND, I HOPE, WE WILL ALSO GIVE VERY HIGH PRIORITY TO OUR QUEST FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, TO ACHIEVE LOWER, AND EQUAL, LEVELS BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. CLEARLY, THOSE OUGHT TO BE THE NEXT MAJOR ARMS CONTROL PRIORITIES.

BUT, AS THAT TRAIN MOVES DOWN THE TRACK, LET'S MAKE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT OUR NATO ALLIES ARE FULLY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY ON BOARD. IT MAY SERVE THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS OF SOME TO PRETEND THAT NATO IS JUST WILD ABOUT INF. BUT RESPONSIBLE OBSERVERS -- PEOPLE LIKE RICHARD NIXON, AND HENRY KISSINGER, AND SAM NUHN; AND JEANE KIRKPATRICK, IN TODAY'S POST -- THEY KNOW, JUST AS YOU AND I DO, THAT THE PROCESS OF GETTING THIS INF AGREEMENT HAS LEFT SOME VERY HARD FEELINGS IN THE CAPITOLS OF NATO.

WE FINALLY DID STUFF THE INF AGREEMENT DOWN THE THROAT OF NATO; BUT IT TOOK A DIPLOMATIC "HEIMLICH MANEUVER" TO DO IT. WE CAN'T AFFORD A REPEAT OF WHAT WE HAVE SEEN ON INF.

## ALLIANCE SUMMIT

AND THE BEST WAY TO AVOID IT IS TO COOL THE TALK ABOUT ANOTHER GORBACHEV SUMMIT. LET IT HAPPEN WHEN ARMS CONTROL EVENTS, AND NOT OUR POLITICAL CALENDAR, DICTATES. AND, IN THE MEANTIME, MAKE SURE THAT THE NEXT SUMMIT PRESIDENT REAGAN JOINS IS AN ALLIANCE SUMMIT. A SUMMIT FOCUSED ON THE IMPACT ON NATO AND OUR ASIAN ALLIANCES OF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. AND AIMED AT INSURING THAT AMERICA'S NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ON START, CONVENTIONAL ARMS, CHEMICAL ARMS, AND ALL THE REST -- ARE FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED BY OUR OWN ALLIES; BEFORE THEY ARE PRESENTED TO MR. GORBACHEV.

NOR DOES THE SUMMIT AGENDA END WITH ARMS CONTROL. CLEARLY THERE IS GOING TO BE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS -- NICARAGUA, KAMPUCHEA, AND OTHERS.

PERHAPS THE ONLY TRULY PROMISING REMARKS THAT GORBACHEV MADE TO TOM BROKAW WERE ON AFGHANISTAN. AS ALWAYS, THE PROOF WILL BE IN THE PUDDING. BUT IT SEEMS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE SO ANXIOUS TO CUT THE ENORMOUS COST OF THEIR OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN THAT AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION MAY BE IN THE WORKS.

AND I HOPE ANGOLA IS NOT FORGOTTEN, EITHER. IF MR. GORBACHEV IS SERIOUS ABOUT "NEW SOVIET THINKING," ANGOLA GIVES HIM A CHANCE TO SHOW IT.

HAVING BEATEN BACK THE LATEST MPLA-CUBAN OFFENSIVE, THE UNITA FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAVE LAUNCHED A NEW "PEACE OFFENSIVE" OF THEIR OWN. PATTERNED GENERALLY ON THE ARIAS PLAN IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE UNITA PROPOSAL CALLS FOR BLACK NATIONS IN AFRICA TO OVERSEE DIRECT UNITA-MPLA TALKS; AND FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE FROM THE ARMIES OF THOSE NATIONS TO SUPPLANT THE 50,000 CUBAN MERCENARY TROOPS NOW OCCUPYING ANGOLA.

IT IS AN EXCELLENT PROPOSAL; BUT, REGRETTABLY, ONE WHICH THE CUBANS AND MARXIST MPLA HAVE ALREADY TURNED DOWN. PERHAPS, WITH MR. GORBACHEV'S URGING, THEY WILL RECONSIDER. FOR NOW, THE PROPOSAL AT LEAST HAS HAD THE SALUTARY EFFECT OF REMINDING US WHO WANTS PEACE -- AND WHO JUST WANTS POWER -- IN ANGOLA.

## CONCLUSION

SO THOSE ARE SOME OF THE ISSUES -- THE PROBLEMS, AND THE PROMISE, OF THIS SUMMIT.

BUT, AS WE ALL HOPE FOR THE VERY BEST FROM THIS SUMMIT, LET'S KEEP OUR EXPECTATIONS IN CHECK AND OUR FEET FIRMLY ON THE GROUND. THE WARM SPIRIT THAT ALMOST INEVITABLY ARISES FROM SUMMITS CAN SOMETIMES BE SHORT-LIVED. THE EISENHOWER-BULGANIN SUMMIT OF 1955 WAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY THE INVASION OF HUNGARY; THE KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV SUMMIT OF 1961 BY THE BERLIN WALL; THE JOHNSON-KOSYGIN SUMMIT OF 1967 BY THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA; AND THE CARTER-BREZHNEV SUMMIT OF 1979 BY THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

SUMMITS CAN SOLVE PROBLEMS. BUT THEY CANNOT WIPE OUT THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND SOCIETIES. SOVIET PUBLIC RELATIONS, ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND EVEN POLITICAL OPENNESS CAN IMPROVE A GREAT DEAL; BUT NO ONE OUGHT TO CONFUSE "GLASNOST" FOR DEMOCRACY; OR GORBACHEV FOR THOMAS JEFFERSON.

WE HAVE A TOUGH ADVERSARY, BOTH IN MR. GORBACHEV AND IN THE COUNTRY HE LEADS. WE CANNOT FORGET IT -- OR WE WILL REGRET IT.

AMBASSADOR OF THE  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

*file*

December 2, 1987

Dear General:

I have the pleasure of informing you that Mrs. Gorbacheva would be happy to accept Mrs. Reagan's invitation to tea and a tour of the White House.

We assume that it will take place on December 9 from 11.30 till 12.30.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

  
Yuri V. DUBININ

The Honorable  
Colin POWELL  
The White House

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506  
December 2, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~KEN DUBERSTEIN~~

WILL BALL  
GARY BAUER  
MARION BLAKEY  
JACK COURTEMANCHE  
A.B. CULVAHOUSE  
RHETT DAWSON  
TONY DOLAN  
FRANK DONATELLI  
MARLIN FITZWATER  
WILLIAM GRAHAM  
CRAIG FULLER  
ANNE HIGGINS  
JIM HOOLEY  
FRANK LAVIN  
REBECCA RANGE  
NANCY RISQUE  
JOHN TUCK  
SAM WATSON  
CLAYTON YEUTTER

Hold

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS *PS*  
SUBJECT: Arms Control Themes for USG Officials

I am attaching for your use an up-to-date set of interagency-cleared themes on a wide range of arms control issues. These are for the use of USG officials in their contacts with media, the public and foreign governments, but are not intended for public release. We have distributed them to all agencies with responsibilities related to arms control, and to our overseas diplomatic posts and military commands.

Since the themes do not cover Chemical Weapons, I am attaching our most recent public release on CW; this covers the key policy points US officials should make on CW issues. I am also attaching our most recent publications on SDI and Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These three papers are interagency-cleared and may be used as handouts.

We also have produced and cleared interagency a full set of public releases on arms control issues, which will be in the Summit Press Book. These are available in quantity from the Public Affairs Bureaus of State and ACDA; limited numbers may be obtained from our Arms Control staff, room 389 OEOB, x 5697.

Attachments

Tab A Themes on National Security and Arms Reductions  
Tab B INF Themes  
Tab C START Themes  
Tab D Defense & Space Themes  
Tab E Nuclear Testing Themes  
Tab F Conventional Forces Themes  
Tab G Chemical Weapons - Public Release  
Tab H SDI - Public Release  
Tab I Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers - Public Release

Meeting the Strategic Threat:  
National Security and Arms Reductions

-- The Reagan Administration has had a well defined strategy for countering the threat posed by the Soviet offensive nuclear buildup. Our goal is to build a safer peace and to ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term.

-- This strategy has three key elements:

- Modernizing our strategic deterrent because, to keep the peace, we still rely on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons;
- Pursuing deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arms; and
- Seeking through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) a safer and morally preferable means to deter war, by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance US and Allied security, once we have established the feasibility of effective strategic defenses.

-- Arms reductions negotiations are not an end in themselves, but rather a key element of President Reagan's strategy to ensure our national security. Through arms reductions, we seek to enhance strategic stability at lower levels of military forces, thus reducing the risk of conflict. Such reductions would establish a foundation of mutual restraint and responsibility that would help us build a safer world.

-- Recognizing the potential contribution of arms reductions to building a safer peace, the Administration has engaged the Soviets (and, with our Allies, other Warsaw Pact states) on a wide range of issues, including: nuclear arms, conventional forces, chemical weapons, military confidence-building measures, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear risk reduction centers.

-- It is precisely because the Administration has held steadfastly to all three parts of our strategy that we have been able to set the arms reduction agenda. We have convinced the Soviets to start negotiating seriously and to accept in principle our call for deep nuclear arms reductions and effective verification:

- Strategic Arms Reductions (START): At the 1985 Geneva Summit, Gorbachev agreed with the President to pursue 50% reductions in strategic arms. In Reykjavik last year, the two leaders reached major new areas of agreement on a general framework for strategic reductions. Making progress on START is an important objective for the Summit.

- Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF): The Soviets have accepted the President's zero option proposal eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. We will sign an INF treaty at the summit meeting in December.



- Verification: The United States will not accept any arms control agreement which is not effectively verifiable. As a result, the Soviets have agreed to many of the verification requirements which we have put forth. In INF, for example, they have accepted the most stringent verification regime in the history of arms control.
  - Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs): In September we and the Soviets signed an agreement to establish NRRCs in our respective capitals to reduce the risk of conflict between us resulting from accident, miscalculation or misinterpretation.
  - Inspection of military activities: In August the U.S. conducted the first ever inspection-on-demand of a Soviet military exercise--under the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) Stockholm Document which was adopted last September. This process is designed to increase openness and build confidence.
- The Importance of SDI: That the Soviets have moved so far toward our arms reduction goals is attributable, at least in part, to U.S. determination to press forward with SDI.
- Our commitment to SDI is firm. As the President has stated: "SDI is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990's and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we'll deploy it."
- SDI serves a number of vital purposes:
- Through SDI we seek a safer and more stable means of deterring aggression, based on defenses which protect the U.S. and our Allies against ballistic missile attack while threatening no one.
  - SDI is a prudent hedge against the Soviets' own heavy involvement in strategic defense. Leaving them with a monopoly in defenses would threaten Western security by undermining the credibility of our deterrent forces.
  - Along with NATO counter-deployments in INF, it was SDI that brought the Soviets back to the nuclear arms negotiating table in January 1985, after their December 1983 walkout.
  - In the Defense and Space part of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), we seek Soviet agreement to a jointly managed transition to a deterrent regime based increasingly on effective strategic defenses.
  - SDI provides a strong incentive to the Soviets to agree to deep reductions in strategic arms, and it will continue to be essential if 50% cuts in strategic arsenals are achieved.

- SDI underwrites the integrity of new arms agreements by diminishing Soviet incentive to cheat. The record of Soviet noncompliance with past arms control agreements makes this especially important.

- Finally, SDI is insurance against an accidental missile launch or possible future ballistic missile threats-- nuclear, conventional or chemical--from outlaw countries.

-- The way ahead: Our priorities in arms talks over the next few years.

- Sign an agreement in INF, an historic achievement eliminating an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear arms.

- Press hard for agreement in START. The Soviets must work with us to achieve agreement on sublimits for the most dangerous systems--fast-flying ballistic missiles, drop their tactic of holding strategic reductions hostage to their efforts to cripple the US SDI program, and join us in resolving other remaining issues.

- Following the priorities established by NATO Foreign Ministers in their meeting in Reykjavik in June, we need to take steps at the same time to redress the serious imbalances in conventional and chemical arms which favor the Warsaw Pact. We are doing this by: seeking US and NATO force improvements; pursuing the East/West MBFR negotiations in Vienna; seeking Warsaw Pact agreement on a mandate for new conventional stability negotiations; and, pursuing an effective global ban on chemical weapons.

-- The Bottom Line:

- These broad efforts have followed the strategy on national security and arms reductions laid out in 1981-82.

- We established clear objectives and held to them.

- We will have an historic agreement in INF, the first real reduction of nuclear arms.

- By modernizing our strategic deterrent, keeping our strong commitment to move forward on SDI, and strengthening NATO's posture of deterrence and defense, we provide the basis for significant progress in other areas as well.

- The Soviet leadership must now translate into concrete actions its professed desire to reach stabilizing arms reduction agreements, as well as to move forward in the other three areas of the agenda we have pursued with them: human rights, regional issues and bilateral matters.

November 27, 1987

THEMES ON THE INF TREATY -- A SUCCESS STORY

- In December, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will sign an agreement to eliminate -- for the first time in history -- an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear weapons: intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles.
- Main provisions of the Treaty call for:
  - o Elimination of all US and Soviet ground-launched INF missiles (range 500-5500 kilometers) within three years after the Treaty enters into force.
  - o Ban on all production and flight testing of Treaty-limited systems.
  - o Cessation of all training, repair, storage, or deployment of Treaty-limited items after elimination is completed.
- This Treaty is in the security interests of the US and our Allies.
  - o The Soviet Union will eliminate over 1500 deployed INF nuclear warheads; the US will eliminate about 400.
  - o The Treaty bans any future deployment of Soviet INF missiles, including its newly developed ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). Deployment of Soviet GLCMs would have seriously complicated NATO's air defense situation.
  - o Removal of Soviet INF will enhance NATO's ability to reinforce its conventional forces by eliminating Soviet weapons of choice against key NATO ports and airfields.
  - o The Treaty affirms the principle of asymmetrical reductions, which is an important precedent for future arms control negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional fields.
- The Treaty is not based on trust in the Soviets, but contains the most stringent verification regime negotiated in the history of arms control. Elements of this verification regime include:
  - o Exchange of comprehensive data on Treaty-limited systems.
  - o On-site inspections to confirm data, verify elimination of Treaty-limited systems, and verify that INF-related activity has ceased at declared sites.



- o Short-notice on-site inspection of declared INF facilities suspected of illegal activity during the three-year reductions period and for the ten years afterward.
  - o A prohibition on interference with verification by national technical means (NTM).
  - o For 13 years after the Treaty enters into force, we will continuously monitor the factory where SS-20's have been assembled and where the Soviets now assemble SS-25 ICBMs, which are similar in some ways to SS-20's.
  - o The Soviets must, on short notice, open to satellite photography (NTM) former SS-20 bases used for SS-25's.
- The Treaty is a triumph for President Reagan, who first put forth his idea of eliminating this class of US and Soviet missiles in 1981. At that time, many scoffed at his proposal, claiming it was "unrealistic" and "unnegotiable." This concept now serves as the underlying basis of the INF Treaty.
- The INF Treaty fulfills long held US and NATO objectives in these negotiations:
- o Longer-Range INF Missiles (LRINF). Since the formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November, 1981, we have sought to eliminate all US and Soviet LRINF missile systems. In July, 1987, the Soviets finally agreed to eliminate these systems.
  - o Shorter-Range INF Missiles (SRINF). Since the negotiations began, we have insisted that an INF agreement must constrain shorter-range INF missiles to prevent circumvention of an accord on LRINF missiles by a Soviet buildup of the shorter-range systems. The Treaty satisfies this requirement by eliminating all Soviet SRINF missiles. (The US has no SRINF systems.)
  - o There is equality between the US and USSR on all rights and limits.
  - o Reductions on a Global Basis. We have long insisted that any limitations on INF missiles must be global to prevent the transfer of the threat from one region to another. The Soviets have accepted this in the context of global elimination of both categories of US and Soviet INF missiles.
  - o Bilateral Negotiations to Include Only US and Soviet Systems. Throughout the negotiations, we made clear that bilateral agreements between the US and the Soviet

Union cannot constrain Third Country forces nor affect existing programs of cooperation with our Allies. The INF Treaty is true to this principle.

- o There is no adverse effect on NATO's conventional forces, above all on dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) aircraft.

-- The INF Treaty is a triumph for the NATO Alliance.

- o The success of these negotiations has been made possible by Western determination to adhere to NATO's 1979 "dual track" decision to respond to Soviet SS-20 deployments through deployment of US longer-range INF missiles, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviets to reach an INF balance at the lowest possible level.
- o NATO steadfastness has paid off -- through the INF Treaty we achieve the elimination of the special threat to NATO security posed by Soviet INF missiles.
- o NATO has enhanced the credibility of its deterrence by demonstrating convincingly to the Soviets that it has the political will to make and stand by tough decisions necessary to ensure its security.

November 30, 1987

Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START)

-- Ever since the START negotiations began in 1982, the United States has placed highest priority on efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union for deep and stabilizing reductions in strategic nuclear arms. We have placed particular emphasis on the most dangerous arms--fast-flying ballistic missiles, especially large, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads.

-- As a concrete step toward this end, the U.S. presented a draft treaty at the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva on May 8, 1987. The U.S. draft treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last October at Reykjavik and provides for roughly 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms to equal levels for both sides.

-- The U.S. draft treaty provides a solid basis for the creation of a fair and durable START agreement. Among other things, it provides for:

- o U.S. and Soviet reductions to a maximum of 1,600 deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with no more than 6,000 warheads over a period of seven years after the treaty enters into force.

- o Sublimits on warheads carried by fast-flying ballistic missiles, and particularly those on ICBMs, the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear systems of all. The U.S. has proposed sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads.

- o A 50 percent cut in the current Soviet level of ballistic missile throw-weight to a limit which would apply to both sides.

- o A ban on mobile ICBMs because of the verification and stability concerns they raise.

- o An extensive verification regime designed to ensure with the highest possible confidence that each side is complying with the agreement. As a result of our firmness and patience, we achieved an effective verification regime for INF--the most stringent in arms control history. Because of the even more far-reaching nature of the START

agreement we are pursuing, we will require a different verification regime. We will insist on very high standards just as we have successfully done in INF.

-- After long resisting the concept, the Soviets finally tabled a draft treaty with some areas of similarity to the U.S. proposal. This is a welcome departure from the previous Soviet practice of proposing highly generalized documents containing only basic principles, and has facilitated preparation of a joint, bracketed draft treaty text.

-- However, the Soviet draft offers no movement on the major outstanding issues, including sublimits on the most dangerous missile systems. In addition, it continues to hold strategic offensive arms reductions hostage to restrictions on strategic defense that would go beyond those limitations already in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Thus, the Soviets are continuing their efforts to cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

-- The President has emphasized that we cannot and will not accept measures which would kill or cripple SDI--a research and technology development program that holds such great promise for enhancing the future security of the U.S. and its Allies and for ensuring a stable strategic balance over the long term. We have likewise made clear to the Soviets that we cannot accept any restrictions on defenses which go beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty. Moreover, there is no doubt that strategic reductions are long overdue and should proceed as soon as possible, without any further restrictions on defenses.

-- Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to intensify efforts at the Geneva talks to achieve an agreement on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. Progress also has been made on outstanding issues as a result of the Geneva negotiations and Ministerial meetings. For example, the Soviets have proposed new sublimits as follows:

- o 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs (although this approach fails to constrain development on new, more threatening heavy ICBMs);
- o 3000-3300 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs);
- o 1800-2000 warheads on sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); and
- o 800-900 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

Unfortunately, the Soviet proposal does not provide the necessary freedom to mix towards more stabilizing systems. To the contrary, it would require the U.S. to reduce its SLBMs and ALCMs by far more than fifty percent and build up its ICBMs. If, however, the numbers in the Soviet proposal indicate the structure the Soviets want for their own forces, they should be able to accept the sublimits proposed by the U.S.

-- When General Secretary Gorbachev visits the U.S. in December, President Reagan and he will sign an INF agreement. START will figure prominently among the issues to be addressed during General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to the U.S. in December. It has also been agreed that President Reagan will go to the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988 with the intention, among other things, of signing a START agreement if one has been completed. The two sides agreed to work intensively to try to achieve such a treaty.

-- Nevertheless, fundamental differences remain, including sublimits on certain types of ballistic missile warheads, a codified throw-weight limit, and a ban on mobile ICBMs. Also the Soviets continue to insist that START reductions be linked to further limits on ballistic missile defenses.

-- The U.S. believes that a START Treaty could be completed next year, provided that the Soviets apply themselves with the same seriousness as the U.S., and drop their insistence that we accept measures which would cripple SDI.

November 25, 1987

Defense and Space Themes

-- U.S. seeks a more secure and stable world--one with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against offensive ballistic missiles.

-- In our ongoing research into strategic defense (Strategic Defense Initiative--SDI), the U.S. is seeking to establish the feasibility of comprehensive defenses protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.

-- At the D&S Talks we have endeavored to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offense and defense. We are also seeking to discuss how, if we establish the feasibility of effective defenses, the U.S. and USSR could jointly manage a stable transition to a deterrence based increasingly on defenses--which threaten no one--rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons. We are also expressing our deep concern about Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.

-- In an effort to reach agreement with the Soviets in D&S, the U.S. has made a number of constructive proposals. Our most recent proposal in the D&S Talks includes the following elements:

- o A mutual U.S./Soviet commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses.

- o During this period the U.S. and USSR would observe strictly all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

- o This commitment would be contingent upon implementation of 50 percent reductions to equal levels in strategic offensive arms over seven years from entry into force of a START agreement.

- o Either side shall be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 if it so chooses, unless the parties agree otherwise.

-- In response to expressed Soviet concerns, the U.S. has also offered proposals to enhance confidence and predictability regarding each side's exploration of advanced strategic defense technologies.

- o Our proposals in this regard include annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on our respective strategic defense programs and reciprocal visits to laboratories conducting SDI research, as well as reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

-- On the other hand, the objective of Soviet proposals in D&S Talks has been to kill or cripple the U.S. SDI program. The U.S.

cannot--and will not--accept any measures which would cripple the SDI program, which is being conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty and which is so important to the future security of the U.S. and our allies, as well as to ensuring a safe strategic balance over the long term. The US has made it clear that it will not accept any restrictions on SDI beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty.

-- Despite their rhetoric, the Soviets have been deeply involved for years in extensive programs in strategic defense, investigating many of the same technologies as SDI. In addition, the Soviets have deployed--and are currently upgrading--ABM defenses around Moscow. These are the world's only ABM deployments. Moreover, the Soviets are violating one of the key provisions of the ABM Treaty by construction of a large, phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia. The West simply cannot afford to leave the Soviet Union with a monopoly in strategic defense, as this would undercut the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, which keeps the peace.

-- The Soviets have proposed changes to the ABM Treaty which they claim would "strengthen" it. This is clearly an effort to amend the ABM Treaty, making it more restrictive than the provisions to which the Soviets agreed in 1972. Changing the Treaty won't strengthen it; Soviet compliance with it would.

-- The Soviet argument that it is necessary to "strengthen the ABM Treaty" to achieve reductions of offensive arms is groundless. In 1972 when we signed the Treaty, we agreed that the restrictions it placed on defense were premised on the necessity of achieving significant reductions in offensive strategic nuclear arsenals. Fifteen years have now passed, and the Soviets still have not agreed to offensive reductions. It is time to get on with those reductions without additional conditions.

-- During their Foreign Minister's September visit to Washington, the Soviets proposed that the US and USSR agree on a list of space-based devices which would not be allowed to be put into space if they exceeded certain performance parameters; the list provided by the Soviets would impose limitations beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty. Alternatively, the Soviets proposed agreeing to strict compliance with the ABM Treaty as "signed and ratified in 1972." Although the Soviets have not explained this proposal, previous Soviet statements reflect a view that the ABM Treaty imposes limits on SDI which are far more restrictive than what the parties actually agreed to in the Treaty in 1972. Thus, the Soviets clearly are continuing their efforts to cripple SDI.

-- The basic outline for a treaty to reduce strategic offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent to equal U.S./Soviet levels has already been agreed to by the U.S. and the USSR. We believe that a treaty could be concluded in short order if the Soviets dropped their tactic of holding offensive strategic arms reductions hostage to their efforts to cripple the U.S. SDI program and were willing to negotiate seriously on the other remaining issues.



November 27, 1987

Themes: Nuclear Testing

-- The United States and the Soviet Union held the first round of step-by-step negotiations on nuclear testing in Geneva from November 9-20, 1987. The session was intense, business-like, and productive.

-- The two sides agreed to visit each other's nuclear test sites in early 1988 to familiarize themselves with the conditions and operations at those test sites. The negotiations will resume thereafter.

-- Such reciprocal visits -- which would be a first -- build on an idea the President first proposed in September 1984: that the sides exchange visits to each other's test sites as a step toward achieving effective verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 (PNET).

-- The specific purpose of these familiarization visits is to enhance prospects for designing and subsequently conducting mutually acceptable Joint Verification Experiments (JVE) at each other's test site.

-- The sides agreed that JVEs are necessary to make progress toward our priority goal -- effective verification of the TTBT and PNET. The design and modalities of these JVEs remain to be worked out. Both governments have expressed a desire to complete this process as rapidly as we can. The familiarization visits are intended to expedite this process.

-- For the past four decades a strong nuclear deterrent has ensured the security of the US and helped to preserve the freedom of its allies and friends.

-- This Administration has been forthright in explaining the national security requirements for continued nuclear testing.

-- As long as the US must depend on nuclear weapons for its security, it must ensure that those weapons are safe, reliable, effective, and survivable -- in short, that our deterrent remains credible. This requires underground testing as permitted by existing treaties.

-- At the same time, the President long has taken a constructive and practical approach to nuclear testing limitations; this was the basis for several initiatives over the past several years.



-- The US-Soviet Joint Statement of September 17, 1987 lays the groundwork for negotiations that could address nuclear testing issues in a logical and stabilizing manner, consistent with ensuring US and Allied security.

-- The US position -- to which the Soviets now have agreed -- is that the first step must be agreement on measures that would provide effective verification of the existing, unratified, Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

-- Our longstanding position has been -- and remains -- that the treaties cannot be effectively verified in their present form. It is not in our interest to ratify treaties that cannot be effectively verified.

-- Once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the US will propose that the US and the Soviet Union immediately enter into negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

-- The U.S. has repeatedly made clear that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing (CTB) must be linked to an effective disarmament process which must include, as one part and as its first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination.

-- Our long-standing and continuing position is that a CTB is a long-term objective, which must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces.

-- The Soviets previously had insisted that the sides begin immediate negotiations on a CTB. This was unacceptable to the US, since the US and its allies must rely on a credible nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, and nuclear testing is required to maintain that deterrent.

-- Our negotiators will proceed very carefully, because nuclear testing limitations have such serious implications for our national security and involve very complex technical questions.

-- The progress achieved in the first round of nuclear testing talks is a hopeful sign, demonstrating that the President's policy deserves the support of those who really are interested in practical, stabilizing steps in the nuclear testing area.

November 27, 1987

Themes on Conventional Security Issues

As we approach an INF agreement and attention focuses on conventional security issues, several related themes should be underscored.

-- Eastern conventional superiority: Western security has long been threatened by Warsaw Pact conventional superiority based primarily on massive forward-deployed, offensively-configured Soviet armored forces in Eastern Europe. The conventional imbalance derives not only from Eastern numerical superiority in key categories of combat capability [e.g., manpower and equipment], but also from geographic and other non-quantitative advantages.

o The USSR and its allies have a clear geographic advantage over NATO in terms of their territorial contiguity, depth, uninterrupted transportation routes, and interior lines of communication. NATO is dispersed geographically and must draw reinforcements from across the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel.

o The USSR and its allies have a more integrated command structure for wartime operations than does NATO. This integration reflects the complete subordination in wartime of the armed forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries to Soviet commanders.

o In addition, Soviet dominance of the Warsaw Pact and the Pact members' highly centralized national decision-making processes facilitate the rapid mobilization of war resources and personnel.

o In the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region, the Warsaw Pact maintains a substantial numerical advantage over NATO in virtually every category of force comparison. For example, it enjoys a more than two to one advantage in tanks, artillery, and divisions.

-- Need for credible deterrence: In view of the longstanding Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces, NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response 20 years ago. The primary objective of that strategy, which requires a mix of conventional and nuclear forces, was and remains to deter any form of aggression by threatening an appropriate but unspecified level of response. This strategy remains a sound

and essential basis for alliance security. In light of the continuing growth in Warsaw Pact nuclear, chemical, and conventional capabilities, NATO must strengthen its conventional and nuclear forces necessary to support its strategy.

-- President's address to Europe: The President made clear in his address to Europe on November 4, that even with the achievement of an agreement eliminating U.S. and Soviet ground launched INF missiles, the U.S. will maintain its steadfast commitment to ensuring that the Alliance maintains the nuclear and conventional forces essential for effective deterrence.

-- Different nature of the two alliances: NATO is a voluntary association of free, sovereign, and democratic nations. The Warsaw Pact is thoroughly dominated by the Soviet Union, which imposed Communist regimes on Eastern Europe and has, throughout the post-war period, maintained those regimes through force of arms and political intimidation. Those who tend to equate the positions of the two superpowers in their respective alliances should recall that the USSR has repeatedly invaded or intimidated its "allies."

o The litany of Soviet intimidation and repression in Eastern Europe is long and instructive: East Germany [1953]; Poland [1956]; Hungary [1956]; Czechoslovakia [1968]; and again Poland [1979-1981]. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 is yet another example of Soviet readiness to use its conventional forces to impose its policies and conditions on neighboring states, in this case, a formerly nonaligned country. To this day, a primary mission of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe is to enforce compliance with Soviet wishes.

-- Nature of the East-West conflict: The military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact reflects an intrinsic antagonism between two very different political and social systems -- one is open and democratic, based on liberty and the rule of law; the other is closed and totalitarian. As long as peoples and nations are divided by artificial barriers and human rights are abused in the East, there will be tensions in Europe.

-- Role of arms control: Arms control is not an end in itself, but, together with defense improvements, must be an integral part of Western security policy. At best, carefully crafted, verifiable arms control agreements can help regulate competition, reduce military disparities detrimental to stability and security, and increase openness -- thereby

reducing uncertainties. Inequitable or unverifiable arms control agreements can impart a false and dangerous sense of increased security in the West.

-- Role of conventional force improvements: NATO needs to pursue conventional defense improvements vigorously whether or not we achieve arms reductions. Arms control efforts are no substitute for conventional force improvements required to reduce the serious conventional disparities in Europe. The Soviet Union is unlikely to negotiate seriously to redress disparities if NATO is unwilling to pursue conventional force improvements. NATO must also strengthen its conventional forces in order to prevent undue reliance on the threat of early nuclear use in response to Soviet conventional aggression.

-- Stability is the goal: Increased stability and security, not reductions per se, are the objectives of Western conventional arms control efforts. Given Eastern conventional superiority in certain key areas -- particularly those important for offensive operations -- even modest reductions in Western forces, in the absence of larger steps from the East, would reduce Western security and would not promote stability.

-- Soviet offensive capability: NATO's conventional arms control proposals seek above all to reduce Eastern capability for surprise attack and for initiation of large-scale offensive operations. Existing Warsaw Pact capabilities are characterized by extensive forward deployments of large armored formations together with substantial stockpiles of ammunition and fuel. Such deployments extend far beyond legitimate security needs and serve a military strategy that emphasizes offensive operations and relies heavily on tanks and artillery. Asymmetries in such equipment must be addressed in any negotiation.

-- Redressing imbalances in conventional and chemical arms: Following the priorities established by NATO Foreign Ministers in their meeting in Reykjavik in June, we need to take steps at the same time to redress the serious imbalances in conventional and chemical arms which favor the Warsaw Pact. We are doing this by: seeking U.S. and NATO force improvements; pursuing the East/West MBFR negotiations in Vienna; seeking Warsaw Pact agreement on a mandate for new conventional stability negotiations; and, pursuing an effective global ban on chemical weapons.



# ISSUES BRIEF

US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 647-8714

November 19, 1987

## NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The United States has been an active participant in chemical weapons (CW) arms control efforts for more than a decade. Our primary objective has been the elimination of chemical weapons under a comprehensive, effective, and verifiable global ban.

At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the United States has offered a number of initiatives toward this end. In 1984 Vice President Bush presented a draft treaty that provides for a worldwide ban on the development, acquisition, production, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. This draft remains the primary basis for the continuing negotiations. The US has also undertaken efforts to address the formidable verification problems that would be posed by a ban on such weapons, and to promote the open dissemination of information necessary to achieve a ban. In 1983, for example, the US sponsored a CD workshop on verification of chemical weapons destruction, at Tooele Army Depot in Utah. In 1986, the US presented to the Conference on Disarmament extensive information on US CW stockpiles and urged other nations to follow suit. In August 1987 the USSR, which declined to attend the 1983 Tooele workshop, accepted the long-standing US invitation to visit the Army Depot in November 1987.

The past year has seen significant activity in the CD negotiations. This trend was influenced by greater Soviet willingness to discuss the security concerns underlying the negotiations. The Soviets finally admitted this year that they possess such weapons and claimed to have ceased chemical weapons production. On August 6 Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the USSR now agrees in principle with the long-standing US position in favor of short-notice mandatory challenge inspection as a necessary element of an effective verification regime. In October the USSR hosted a visit by delegations to the Conference on Disarmament to the USSR's chemical weapons facility at Shikhany. While we welcome greater Soviet openness, the Soviet Union has not provided nearly as much information about its chemical capabilities as has the US, and many serious questions remain.

To complement to the multilateral negotiations, the US in 1984 initiated bilateral CW discussions with the USSR. In November 1985 the Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement called for intensifying bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons treaty. We began such talks on the margins of the CD and have held six rounds since then. We anticipate a seventh round in late 1987.

Despite the progress achieved thus far at the Conference on Disarmament, many critical issues remain unresolved. The Conference still must negotiate detailed provisions that will assure reliable verification, provide undiminished security for all parties to the agreement during the period of stockpile destruction, monitor the civil chemical industries to ensure they are not producing chemical weapons, and deal with the risk that some states posing a chemical weapons threat may not become party to a CW convention. Moreover, the structure, operation, staffing, and funding of the international body that would implement and monitor the convention have yet to be developed and agreed upon.

A worldwide ban on chemical weapons would be difficult to verify. Many critical verification problems remain, including:

- o The difficulty of detecting clandestine CW stocks. A militarily significant stockpile could be concealed in a small area.
- o The fact that many chemicals used in weapons are also used for industrial purposes.
- o The ease with which chemical weaponry could be produced clandestinely.

While pursuing negotiations to address these problems, the United States is modernizing its largely obsolete stockpile, both to deter CW attack and to preserve the incentive for the USSR to negotiate seriously toward a ban. The US unilaterally ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969. Since then, however, the Soviet Union not only has produced large quantities of chemical weapons and agents but also has upgraded its CW capabilities.

Today, as a result of the unilateral restraint exercised by the US and the intensive Soviet chemical weapons modernization program, there is a serious East-West imbalance in these weapons. The USSR possesses a formidable, modern CW arsenal including what is by far the world's largest CW stockpile, while the US capability -- largely unusable and dating from the 1940s and 1950s -- has lost much of its deterrent value against first use of chemical weapons. It is essential, therefore, that we restore the credibility of the Western CW deterrent while negotiations continue toward a worldwide ban.

There have been numerous violations of the 1925 Geneva Convention prohibiting the use of CW. Toxins and other chemical warfare agents have been used by the Soviets in Afghanistan, and toxins have been used by Communist forces in Laos and Cambodia.



Chemical weapons also have been used repeatedly in the Iran-Iraq war. Furthermore, the number of states with actual or potential chemical weapons capability is large and growing. The US government condemns any and all illegal use of chemical weapons and supports rapid investigation of reports of CW use, along with diplomatic actions aimed at ensuring respect for the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The US meets periodically with a group of Western nations to discuss and coordinate ways to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons.

An effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban would be a significant achievement. However, a ban that is not comprehensive or verifiable would simply strip the democratic states of the capacity to deter use of chemical weapons by less scrupulous powers. Until a reliable ban is achieved, the West must maintain the capability to deter use of these weapons by other states.

PASTAFF#380

November 23, 1987

THE IMPORTANCE OF SDI

"What is totally unacceptable...is the Soviet tactic of holding...reductions hostage to measure that would cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative.... We won't bargain away SDI."

---President Reagan  
November 4, 1987

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) offers our best hope of a safer world -- where our security and that of our allies would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of mass annihilation.

The Reagan Administration has had a well-defined strategy for countering the threat posed by the Soviet offensive nuclear buildup. Our goal is to build a safer peace and to ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term.

This strategy has three key elements:

- o Modernization of our strategic deterrent because, to keep the peace, we still rely on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons;
- o Pursuit of deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arms; and
- o The search, through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, for a safer and morally preferable means to deter war, by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance our security.

SDI is a research and technology program to demonstrate, by the early 1990s, the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for intercepting an attacker's missiles in all phases of their flight -- boost, mid-course, and terminal.

- o Our commitment to SDI is firm. As the President has stated: "SDI is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990s and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we'll deploy it."



SDI serves a number of vital purposes:

- o Through SDI, we seek a defensive means of deterring aggression based on systems protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.
- o SDI helped to bring the Soviets back to the nuclear arms negotiating table in early 1985, after their late-1983 walkout.
- o SDI underwrites the integrity of any new arms agreements by diminishing Soviet incentives to cheat. The record of Soviet violations of past arms control agreements makes this especially important.
- o SDI provides a strong incentive to the Soviets to agree to the President's proposal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent.
  - Even if 50 percent strategic arms cuts are achieved, SDI will remain essential in persuading the Soviets to reduce further.
- o Finally, SDI is insurance against an accidental missile launch or possible future ballistic threats -- nuclear, conventional, or chemical -- from outlaw countries.
- o The potential benefits of SDI far outweigh the dollar costs. Expenditures for SDI from fiscal years 1984 through 1988 will amount to about \$12 billion, or approximately \$13.00 per year for each American citizen -- a small price to pay for a safer future.

The importance of SDI is underscored by the Soviets' long-standing and extensive strategic defense programs.

- o In contrast to our own far more modest expenditures, the Soviets have spent roughly \$200 billion on their strategic defense programs over the last ten years, roughly the same as they have spent on their strategic offensive forces.

The Soviets' programs include:

- o The world's only anti-ballistic missile defenses, surrounding Moscow, which the Soviets are steadily improving;
- o Construction of a large, phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and
- o Research, development and testing, including a \$1 billion annual program on laser weapons -- employing some 10,000 skilled scientists and engineers.

We cannot let the Soviets have a monopoly on strategic defenses.

- o Possessed by both sides, strategic defense systems can be stabilizing and reduce the threat of war. Possessed by the Soviets alone, such systems would threaten peace by undermining the credibility of our deterrent.

-- This would be devastating to Western security.

## **Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers**

**November 1987**

**Background:** The US has long sought agreements with the Soviet Union that would increase confidence between the two countries, thus making for a more stable and secure world. Since the early 1960s, the US and the USSR have agreed on a number of measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war arising from misunderstanding or miscalculation. For example, in 1963 they established the "hotline," a direct communications link between their leaders. This system has been upgraded on several occasions, most recently in 1986. In addition, in 1971 the US and the USSR concluded an "Accidents Measures" Agreement that requires notifications in the event of certain nuclear-related incidents. Obligations under this agreement were clarified when the two countries signed a "common understanding" in 1985.

As the result of a US initiative based on ideas originally advocated by Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at the November 1985 Geneva summit to have experts study the question of establishing centers to reduce the risk of nuclear war. US and Soviet experts held informal meetings in May and August 1986.

**US-Soviet agreement:** At their October 1986 meeting at Reykjavik, the President and Mr. Gorbachev expressed satisfaction with the progress made at the experts meetings and agreed to begin formal negotiations to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These negotiations--held in January and May 1987--resulted in an agreement to establish centers in Washington and Moscow. Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed this agreement on September 15, 1987, in Washington.

**Purpose:** The purpose of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers is to reduce the risk of a US-USSR conflict--particularly nuclear conflict--that might result from accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. The centers are not intended to supplant existing channels of communication or to have a crisis management role.

The centers will exchange information and notifications required under certain existing--and possible future--arms control and confidence-building measures agreements. Additional functions for the centers could be added later, as agreed by the two sides.

**Operation:** Under the agreement, each side will set up a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in its capital. The US center will be staffed by Americans, the Soviet center by Soviets. Decisions about where the centers will be housed and the composition of the staff will be made at each country's discretion. The centers will communicate at the government-to-government level by means of direct satellite

links similar to, but separate from, the hotline, which is reserved for use by heads of government. The communication links between the centers will be capable of rapid transmission of text and graphics.

11-12-87

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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PROPOSED SUMMARY SCHEDULE

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MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1987

- 4:30 p.m. General Secretary and Mrs. Mikhail Gorbachev arrive Andrews Air Force Base. Met by: Secretary of State George Shultz; Brief arrival ceremony TBD.
- 5:15 p.m. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev arrive at residence.

NO FURTHER EVENTS PLANNED

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1987

- 10:00 a.m. Arrival ceremony at The White House -- South Lawn. Remarks with interpretation. Participants: President and Mrs. Reagan and General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev.
- 10:30 a.m. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meeting (Oval Office).  
  
NOTE: Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Gorbachev have brief coffee in Residence.
- 11:45 a.m. Meeting concludes.  
  
LUNCH -- OPEN
- 1:20 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev arrives Diplomatic Entrance and proceeds to Red Room.
- 1:25 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev is greeted by The President; proceed to East Room.
- 1:45 p.m. Ruffles and Flourishes; Announcement; Arrive East Room for INF signing ceremony.
- 2:15 p.m. Treaty signing ceremony concludes. Proceed to State Dining Room. Arrive State Dining Room and be seated for televised messages.
- 2:25 p.m. Broadcast messages to the American and Soviet people.
- 3:00 p.m. Conclude broadcast and return to Oval Office.

3:15 p.m. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meeting (Oval Office).

4:00 p.m. Meeting concludes.

4:10 p.m. Bid farewell and depart The White House.

NOTE: General Secretary Gorbachev may host private meeting with business group.

7:00 p.m. State Dinner at The White House.

9:00 p.m. Dinner concludes.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1987

(8:00 a.m.) General Secretary Gorbachev arrives at Vice President Bush's Residence for breakfast meeting with American group.

10:00 a.m. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meeting (Oval Office).

12:00 Noon Meeting concludes. General Secretary Gorbachev departs and arrives Department of State for lunch.

12:30 p.m. Luncheon at Department of State, hosted by Secretary of State George Shultz.

NOTE: President Reagan has lunch/staff time at The White House.

2:30 p.m. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meeting (Oval Office).

NOTE: At 3:45 p.m., Mrs. Gorbachev arrives for coffee with Mrs. Reagan in Residence (Photo opportunity).

3:55 p.m. Meeting concludes. President Reagan escorts General Secretary Gorbachev to Residence.

4:15 p.m. Bid farewell and General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev depart the White House for residence.

7:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Reagan arrive Soviet Embassy for reciprocal dinner.

9:00 p.m. The President and Mrs. Reagan depart Soviet Embassy.

8:00 a.m. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev arrive U.S. Capitol for breakfast meeting with Congressional Leaders. (Remarks)

9:00 a.m. President Reagan departs U.S. Capitol for The White House.

NOTE: General Secretary Gorbachev has meeting with members of Senate Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees.

10:00 a.m. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meeting (Oval Office).

1:30 p.m. Departure Ceremony. Program TBD

NOTE: General Secretary Gorbachev is expected to hold a news conference at 3:00 p.m. and brief cocktail reception. Expected departure from Andrews Air Force Base: 6:30 p.m.

9:00 p.m. President Reagan addresses Joint Session of Congress. Address expected to be carried on WorldNet.

United States Department of State  
*The Chief of Protocol*  
*Washington, D.C. 20520*

November 3, 1987

Mr. Kenneth Duberstein  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ken:

As our meeting was postponed, I had planned to give you a copy of the attached for you to study. Also, please see the attached letter from James Billington to me about the Library of Congress.

I look forward to our meeting on Thursday, November 5th at 5:00pm.

Sincerely,



Selwa Roosevelt

Attachments:  
As stated



Suggested outline USSR December Summit Visit:

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1987

- 7:55 am Arrive Andrews AFB.  
(DC arrival must be this early for a WH ceremony. The first Soviets would have to leave the hotel/residence as early as 9:00 am for the WH - there is no margin for weather problems)
- 10:00 am White House Arrival Ceremony.  
(Sen. Baker has apparently agreed with Secy Shultz that we will keep to a normal State visit format).
- 11:30 am White House Meeting with President Reagan.
- 12:30 pm- Lunch hosted by Secretary Shultz at State.  
2:30 pm
- 3:00 pm- White House Meeting with President Reagan.  
5:00 pm
- 7:30 pm- White House State Dinner.  
11:00 pm (recommend that there be a parallel dinner for the rest of the Soviet delegation not accommodated at the State dinner)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1987

- 9:00 am- White House Meeting with President Reagan.  
Noon
- Noon- White House Signing Ceremony.  
1:00 pm
- 1:15 pm- White House Working Lunch with President Reagan.  
2:30 pm
- Afternoon open for continued talks  
or possible trip to Camp David ?
- Evening Possible Soviet return reception or dinner.  
(recommend that the President attend).

WEDESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1987

- am Separate meeting with both sides of the Capitol.
- 12:30 pm Tour and lunch at the Library of Congress.
- pm Soviet press conference.
- pm Departure from Andrews AFB.



THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

*Library  
Armand Hammer  
Collection  
I think this  
is an  
excellent  
idea*

October 9, 1987

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

Recently over lunch with Charles Wick, I discussed with him what I think could be an exciting and important part of the summit hospitality for First Secretary Gorbachev if it comes off later this Fall.

I would suggest that we have a major celebratory dinner in the Great Hall of the Library of Congress that could follow-up and fill in some of the spare time that would be left over from a formal state dinner that the President, no doubt, would have. I made this suggestion for the following reasons.

1) Both Secretary Gorbachev and Mrs. Gorbachev are university graduates who have written theses that are deposited in libraries. Association with a scholarly center would compliment the new professional educated classes which he represents and seeks to speak for. (It is in our interest to encourage this class--and Secretary Gorbachev's association with it.)

2) This would be a perfect occasion to involve the Congress. The Library of Congress is on Capitol Hill--yet a kind of neutral scholarly turf which would provide a good opportunity to bring in the Legislative and the Executive as well as the Judicial branches since the Supreme Court is also right next door.


3) We could arrange a walk-through--showing some of the new information technologies as well as the way in which our free government operates in close cooperation with a wide open library--perhaps subtly illustrating for Secretary Gorbachev some of the implications of the kind of democratization process that he has been talking about.

4) This is a beautiful old fashioned building of a kind that is familiar to the Russians and which they like very much. The fact that it also contains the largest Russian library outside of Russia would be appealing. Moreover, people like Armand Hammer and Averell Harriman who have played an important role in the development of Soviet-American relations have given their papers to the Library, and they or their relatives might be included.

I would like to enlist your support in having such a dinner and I would be happy to discuss this with you at any time. We could do some special things also (or instead) just with Mrs. Gorbachev, since she is on the Board of the Cultural Fund, a new organization over there.

I have also written to Senators Byrd and Dole to enlist Congressional support for such an event.

Sincerely,



James H. Billington  
The Librarian of Congress

The Honorable  
Selwa Roosevelt  
Chief of Protocol  
U.S. Department of State  
Washington, DC 20520

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Summit  
file*

Camp David - Wed

Working breakfast  
Senate & House leaders

limits access  
to state floor

Family  
Room

get

Phil Duerbeck  
lighting & camera  
angles

clean slots

East Room signing  
state dining room  
lincoln portrait

Former Presidents

3 days

NOT  
AC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM ON SUMMIT

FROM: TOM GRISCOM

THEMES

The points that have to be developed are:

- INF Treaty, its importance, illustration of RR leadership, impact on the future and future generations
- Ratification, success rather than failure
- Verification, stick to the agreement, good deal and can make sure stays a good deal
- SDI, sign of strength, toughness in bargaining, look to future, commitment to defend and not to offend
- START, continued look to future, the next step in removing weapons
- \*\* This all leads to the fact that the President was patient, sees the promises he envisioned being fulfilled and looks to the future and future generations

OUTLINE

- Pre-Summit: Focus more on the President setting the tone and direction; support comes primarily from Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, Baker, Adelman (we drive the messages)
- Summit: The Event that sets the tone
- Post-Summit: Focus more on other spokesmen to talk about the positives of the treaty, what it could lead to in the future, eye toward START/SDI

SUGGESTED EVENTS

- November 3: Congressional briefing
- November 5: Lord Carrington (NATO impact)

November 12: Conservatives meeting

November 16: D.C. speech; meeting with political activists

November 17: Republican & Democrat policy lunches

November 20: Pre-Brief at Pentagon/Go to Camp David from Pentagon; news columnists

November 23: Nixon/Ford/Carter meeting; tape Thanksgiving Day message

November 24: Travel day to California  
Go to location where SDI research underway, such as Denver; do tour and then address regular citizen lunch

November 26: Thanksgiving Day message broadcast (offer to Soviets)

November 28: Briefing session at Ranch

November 30: Broad-based meeting: business, labor, etc.

December 1: Travel day to South  
Go to high school audience and talk about future and impact treaty will have on future citizens

December 3: Human rights event

December 4: Network anchors interview

December 7-9: Summit (see attachment)

December 10: Congressional briefing with foreign affairs and armed services members

December 11: South Lawn send-off for President

December 14: Press Conference

December 16: Thatcher & Kohl and follow-up press and congressional meetings

December 17: Presidential candidates (Republican/Democrat) briefing

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1987

MEMORANDUM ON SUMMIT ACTIVITIES

FROM: TOM GRISCOM

This is an overview of events related to the upcoming summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Listed are events that are tied into the summit and a proposed summit schedule.

Those requiring action:

- 1) Presidential session with columnists -- Friday, November 20, 11:30 a.m.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve                      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

- 2) Travel date on November 24 -- en route to California tour SDI research facility and deliver general audience speech on INF

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve                      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

- 3) Travel date on December 1 (previously approved) -- en route speak to high school audience about arms control and its impact on future of this country. Potential location is Jacksonville, Florida.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve                      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

- 4) Presidential session with network anchors -- Friday, December 4, 1:00 p.m.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve                      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

- 5) Presidential press conference -- Monday, December 14

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve                      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove



A

SUMMIT  
December 7 - 9, 1987

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

10:00am Arrival on South Lawn  
11:00am First Session Reagan/Gorbachev (White House Oval)  
12:00noon Working Lunch (East Room) *Family Dining Room*  
3:30pm Reagan/Gorbachev tour residence (social setting)  
Evening State Dinner at White House

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

[Morning Gorbachev breakfast with U.S. academic/cultural/  
business leaders (include small business) hosted by  
Vice President]  
9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev  
[12:00noon Gorbachev lunch with congressional leaders]  
1:30pm Reagan/Gorbachev arrive East Room for signing ceremony  
(Similar to press conference format, the two leaders  
walk down the Cross Hall and enter East Room)  
2:15pm Reagan/Gorbachev televised messages to US/USSR  
Leave East Room together and walk to Blue Room where  
they are seated in chairs for broadcast (just the two)  
3:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev  
Evening Soviet Dinner at Embassy ???

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9

[8:00am Gorbachev breakfast with congressional leaders]  
9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev  
11:15am Depart White House for Mt. Vernon/Dumbarton Oaks  
12:15pm Lunch  
2:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev (at lunch site)  
5:00pm Departure (Vice President at Andrews)  
8:00pm President addresses Joint Session of Congress/Nation

THEMES: The points that have to be developed are:

- INF treaty, its importance, illustration of RR leadership, impact on the future and future generations
- Ratification, success rather than failure
- Verification, stick to the agreement, good deal and can make sure stays a good deal
- SDI, sign of strength, toughness in bargaining, look to future, commitment to defend and not to offend
- START, continued look to future, the next step in removing weapons
- \*\*This all leads to the fact that the President was patient, sees the promises he envisioned being fulfilled and looks to the future and future generations

OUTLINE:

- pre summit: focus more on the President setting the tone and direction; support comes primarily from Shultz, Carlucci, Powell, Baker, Adelman (we drive the messages)
- summit: the event that sets the tone
- post-summit: focus more on other spokesmen to talk about the positives of the treaty, what it could lead to in the future, eye toward START/SDI

SUGGESTED EVENTS:

- November 3 / congressional briefing
- November 5 / Lord Carrington (NATO impact)
- November 12 / conservatives meeting
- November 16 / D.C. speech ; meeting with political activists
- November 17 / Republican & Democrat policy lunches  
Change media from anchors to columnists
- November 20 -- pre-brief at Pentagon/go to Camp David from  
Pentagon ; newsmagazines (rescheduled from 11/13)
- November 23 -- Nixon/Ford/Carter meeting; tape T'day message
- November 24 -- travel day to California  
Go to location where SDI research underway, such  
as Denver; do tour and then address regular  
citizen lunch
- November 26 / T'day message broadcast (offer to Soviets)
- November 30 -- broad-based meeting: business, labor, etc.
- December 1 -- travel day to South  
Go to high school audience and talk about future  
and impact treaty will have on future citizens
- December 3 -- Kissinger, Brezinski etc. mtg.
- December 4 -- Network anchors interview
- December 7 - 9 / summit (see attachment)
- December 10 -- congressional briefing with foreign affairs and  
armed services members

- December 11 -- South lawn send-off for President
- December 14 -- press conference
- December 16 -- Thatcher & Kohl and follow-up press and congressional meetings
- December 17 -- presidential candidates (Republican/Democrat) briefing

SUMMIT (December 7- 9):

DECEMBER 7

10:00 arrival on South Lawn  
11:00 first session RR/MG (White House oval)  
12:00 working lunch (East Room )  
3:30 Reagan/Gorbo tour residence (social setting)  
evening State dinner at White House

DECEMBER 8

MG breakfast with U.S. business leaders (include small business)  
9:30 meeting with RR/MG  
private lunch  
1:30 treaty signing ceremony (Rotunda of Capitol)  
MG holds sessions with congressional leaders  
\*\*rr/mg tape statements to each other country  
3:30 afternoon meeting with RR/MG  
evening Soviet dinner at Embassy ???

DECEMBER 9

MG breakfast with U.S. high school students  
9:30 morning meeting with RR/MG  
11:15 depart White House for Mt. Vernon/Dumbarton Oaks

12:15          lunch  
2:30          afternoon meeting with RR/MG at lunch site  
5:00          departure (VP at Adnrews)  
8:00          RR address Joint Session of Congress/Nation

SUMMIT  
December 7 - 9, 1987

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

10:00am Arrival on South Lawn  
11:00am First Session Reagan/Gorbachev (White House Oval)  
12:00noon Working Lunch (East Room)  
3:30pm Reagan/Gorbachev tour residence (social setting)  
Evening State Dinner at White House

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

Morning [Gorbachev breakfast with U.S. academic/cultural/  
business leaders (include small business) hosted by  
Vice President]  
9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev  
Private Lunch  
1:30pm Treaty Signing Ceremony (Rotunda of Capitol)  
Gorbachev holds sessions with congressional leaders  
\*\* Reagan/Gorbachev tape statements to each others  
country  
3:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev  
Evening Soviet Dinner at Embassy ???

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9

9:30am Morning Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev  
11:15am Depart White House for Mt. Vernon/Dumbarton Oaks  
12:15pm Lunch  
2:30pm Afternoon Meeting Reagan/Gorbachev (at lunch site)  
5:00pm Departure (Vice President at Andrews)  
8:00pm President addresses Joint Session of Congress/Nation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS C. GRISCOM

FROM: JAMES L. HOOLEY *JLH*

SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR GORBACHEV VISIT

This memorandum sets forth various key points related to the possible visit of General Secretary Gorbachev to the United States prior to year-end 1987 and then outlines three basic formats which could be used as the basis for planning and implementation.

Based on extensive discussions between Bill Henkel and me, and augmented by a large body of previous planning documents which were generated in anticipation of earlier Gorbachev visits, there are a few generic concepts which are common to any such visit, regardless of format.

These include the possibility of a travel recuperation period immediately upon the arrival of the Soviet delegation. This could be accomplished through the standard State Department visit process (Langley AFB, Virginia, arrival and a brief stop at Williamsburg); or, the Soviets may wish to proceed directly to their embassy in Washington, D.C. for down time.

In either case, we would need to establish a "White House Day" as the first order of business ("Day 1"). This would render the necessary courtesies to the General Secretary, set a positive tone for the visit and, to put it bluntly, get most of the formalities out of the way for a more flexible sequence of events. Included in that day would be an Arrival Ceremony, an Oval Office meeting, lunch, possibly other expanded meetings (with the Cabinet for example), perhaps an INF Agreement signing ceremony and, finally, a State Dinner.

This package is based on our assumption that the INF agreement will be a fait accompli on arrival, and serve as a jumping-off point for further Summit-style negotiations. That being the case, based on prior Soviet meetings, it would be far better not to conduct actual Summit negotiations in either the White House complex or the State Department. Whether in Washington or elsewhere, we feel there is a substantial benefit to situating negotiations in a more neutral,

09/23/87 5:00 p.m.



physically decompressed environment; optimally one which would provide space for unilateral executive sessions as well as bilateral meetings, exterior space for walks and private conversations, and a generally historic and distinguished atmosphere. In past meetings between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, these "aesthetics" have set the tone for the actual negotiations to a striking degree and must be given every possible consideration.

Another generic issue is the timing and amount of social and public diplomacy activities. In all likelihood, the Soviets will wish to host a reciprocal dinner and participate in some events not related to substantive negotiations. At this early stage, it is enough to say that these activities should be planned so as not to impose arbitrary breaks in the negotiations which in the past have taken on a free-wheeling, open-ended character. We can enhance our flexibility by not mixing meetings and other activities on the same day.

With respect to meeting days themselves, I recommend we adhere to the successful format used both in Geneva and Reykjavik. This included morning bilateral sessions, followed by a break for unilateral luncheons away from the negotiating site and ending with a second afternoon bilateral. Within this framework, it should be agreed that private conversations between the principals, unilateral conferences, bilateral work sessions and rest breaks or walks outdoors would also be acceptable at any time.

#### Option One Summary - Washington Only

Looking more specifically at our three scenarios, the first encompasses the notion (unconfirmed) that the Soviets would favor a visit strictly in the Washington area, with daily access to their embassy facilities. While logistically simpler, it would be somewhat more difficult to fulfill the President's desire to familiarize the General Secretary with a truly broad cross-section of the American experience and value system.

For this reason, while it is indeed possible to stay within the Washington metropolitan area, we feel it is important to push for scheduled day trips outside this area. Using the "White House Day" as the focus, subsequent days' negotiating sessions could be located in a suitable area away from the White House, preferably outside the beltway. For example, Dumbarton Oaks or Georgetown University might be used if we were required to remain in town; while Mt. Vernon or others, such as Williamsburg and Camp David (see expanded list below) could work well if we were able to get away on a daily basis. Meanwhile, if the schedule allows for "non-negotiation" days or periods of time, there are a variety of acceptably diverse locations both in town and within a 30 minute helicopter ride for exposure and public diplomacy purposes.

Option Two Summary - Washington and California

The second scenario is the "bi-coastal" concept in which Washington would still serve as the arrival point with a full "White House Day" and at least one or two days of post treaty-signing negotiations in the Washington area. The scene would then shift to California (probably the Los Angeles area) for a sequence of public diplomacy events followed by wrap-up meetings and a final (reciprocal?) dinner.

This scenario not only expands the General Secretary's scope of experience and enhances the newsworthiness of the visit as a whole, but it also gives the President a broader base to interact on a personal basis with the General Secretary by visiting "Ronald Reagan's" America, be it in the Los Angeles area or even a brief visit to Rancho del Cielo.

On a somewhat more expansive basis, the Washington events could be held to a minimum and any post-treaty negotiations could be conducted in the Los Angeles area under the same format outlined above.

Option Three Summary - The Grand Tour

Finally, the third scenario, and probably the most desirable from the standpoint of the President's stated objectives, would be to have the General Secretary visit one or two locations between his stops in Washington and California. This could prove enlightening to the General Secretary and would allow him a more intimate view of America. Although the scenario currently shows post-treaty negotiations in Washington on Days 2-3, from a strategic standpoint, it might be worthwhile to have the Summit negotiations in California, after the General Secretary has had the opportunity to see America firsthand. At a minimum, this would give both leaders a greater common experience upon which to exchange their personal views.

Attachment (Scenario Options)

OPTION ONE - WASHINGTON ONLY

Day 1 - "White House Day" of Protocol Activities (Option is to arrive one day earlier for rest, preparation and private time)

White House Lawn Arrival Ceremony.

Oval Office Meeting with the President.

East Room/Family Dining Room Working Lunch.

Possible Bilateral Meeting in Cabinet Room.

Possible INF Treaty Signing.

State Dinner.

Days 2-4 - Substantive Meeting/Working Days

Possible private working breakfast.

Morning - Working Meetings (2-3 hours).

Unilateral Working Lunches with Respective Delegations.

Afternoon - Working Meetings (2-3 hours).

Meeting Location Options

I. The White House

- \* West Wing
- \* East Wing
- \* Residence

II. "Inside the Beltway"

- \* Dumbarton Oaks
- \* Georgetown University

III. "Outside the Beltway"

- \* Williamsburg
- \* Mt. Vernon
- \* Camp David
- \* Monticello
- \* Ft. McHenry
- \* Annapolis
- \* Harper's Ferry
- \* Gettysburg
- \* Camp Hoover

OPTION ONE - WASHINGTON ONLY, contd.

Private/Semi-Private Evening Activities.

Options

- I. Private Dinner(s) between Reagans and Gorbachevs
  - \* East Wing
- II. Reciprocal Event hosted by Soviets
- III. Cultural Event in Washington, D.C. Area
  - \* Kennedy Center
  - \* Ford's Theater

Remain Overnight: Washington, D.C.

Day 5 - Special Events/Activities

Options

- I. Address to Joint Session of Congress
- II. Memorial Visits/Events
  - \* Lincoln Memorial
  - \* Washington Monument
  - \* Arlington Cemetery
  - \* Jefferson Memorial
- III. Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. historical events

Day 6 - Wrap-Up/Departure

Formal Departure Ceremony/Event.

OPTION TWO - WASHINGTON AND CALIFORNIA

Day 1 - "White House Day" of Protocol Activities (Option is to arrive one day earlier for rest, preparation and private time)

White House Lawn Arrival Ceremony.

Oval Office Meeting with the President.

East Room/Family Dining Room Working Lunch.

Possible Bilateral Meeting in Cabinet Room.

Possible INF Treaty Signing.

State Dinner.

Days 2-3 - Substantive Meeting/Working Days

Morning - Working Meetings (2-3 hours).

Unilateral Working Lunches with Respective Delegations.

Afternoon - Working Meetings (2-3 hours).

Meeting Location Options

- I. The White House
  - \* West Wing
  - \* East Wing
  - \* Residence
- II. "Inside the Beltway"
  - \* Dumbarton Oaks
  - \* Georgetown University
- III. "Outside the Beltway"
  - \* Williamsburg
  - \* Mt. Vernon
  - \* Camp David
  - \* Monticello
  - \* Ft. McHenry
  - \* Annapolis
  - \* Harper's Ferry
  - \* Gettysburg
  - \* Camp Hoover

NOTE: If the schedule allows during these two days, the following special events/activities could be considered:

09/23/87 5:00 p.m.

OPTION TWO - WASHINGTON AND CALIFORNIA, contd.

Options

- I. Address to Joint Session of Congress
- II. Memorial Visits/Events
  - \* Lincoln Memorial
  - \* Washington Monument
  - \* Arlington Cemetery
  - \* Jefferson Memorial
- III. Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. historical events

Private/Semi-Private Evening Activities.

Options

- I. Private Dinner(s) between Reagans and Gorbachevs
  - \* East Wing
- II. Reciprocal Event hosted by Soviets
- III. Cultural Event in Washington, D.C. Area
  - \* Kennedy Center
  - \* Ford's Theater

Remain Overnight: Washington, D.C.

Day 4 - California Activities begin

Travel to Los Angeles.

Participate in L.A. Area events.

Options

- I. Address to Los Angeles World Affairs Council
- II. Meetings at Century Plaza Hotel
  - \* Suite
  - \* Function Rooms
- III. Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. Symbolic Events
- IV. L.A. Tour
- V. Cultural/Entertainment Industry Events

Remain Overnight: Los Angeles, California

Day 5 - California Activities/Wrap-Up/Departure

Travel to Santa Barbara Area/Rancho del Cielo.

Participate in Activities in S.B. or at Ranch.

OPTION TWO - WASHINGTON AND CALIFORNIA, contd.

Options

- I. Lunch/Dinner at the Ranch
- II. Informal Discussions/Meetings at the Ranch
- III. Helicopter/Jeep Tour

Formal Departure Ceremony/Event and return to White House while G.S. Gorbachev returns to U.S.S.R. or Remain Overnight: Santa Barbara, California.

OPTION THREE - THE GRAND TOUR

Day 1 - "White House Day" of Protocol Activities (Option is to arrive one day earlier for rest, preparation and private time)

White House Lawn Arrival Ceremony.

Oval Office Meeting with the President.

East Room/Family Dining Room Working Lunch.

Possible Bilateral Meeting in Cabinet Room.

Possible INF Treaty Signing.

State Dinner.

Days 2-3 - Substantive Meeting/Working Days

Possible private working breakfast.

Morning - Working Meetings (2-3 hours).

Unilateral Working Lunches with Respective Delegations.

Afternoon - Working Meetings (2-3 hours).

NOTE: If the schedule allows during these two days, the following special events/activities could be considered:

Options

- I. Address to Joint Session of Congress
- II. Memorial Visits/Events
  - \* Lincoln Memorial
  - \* Washington Monument
  - \* Arlington Cemetery
  - \* Jefferson Memorial
- III. Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. historical events

Private/Semi-Private Evening Activities.

Options

- I. Private Dinner(s) between Reagans and Gorbachevs
  - \* East Wing
- II. Reciprocal Event hosted by Soviets

09/23/87 5:00 p.m.



OPTION THREE - THE GRAND TOUR, contd.

- III. Cultural Event in Washington, D.C. Area
  - \* Kennedy Center
  - \* Ford's Theater

Remain Overnight: Washington, D.C.

Days 4-5 - Grand Tour (possibly East to West progression)

Depart Washington, D.C. en route:

Options

- I. New England Area
  - \* Boston
  - \* New Hampshire
  - \* Vermont
- II. "City that Works"
  - \* Pittsburgh
  - \* Atlanta
  - \* St. Louis
- III. Southern Region
  - \* Tennessee
  - \* North Carolina
  - \* Alabama
  - \* Louisiana
- IV. Midwest/West Region
  - \* St. Louis
  - \* Illinois
  - \* Idaho
- V. Farm State
- VI. National Parks/Resources Area

Travel to California.

Days 6-7 - California Activities/Wrap-Up/Departure

Participate in California Events.

Options

- I. Los Angeles Area
  - \* Address to Los Angeles World Affairs Council
  - \* Meetings at Century Plaza Hotel
  - \* L.A. Tour
  - \* Cultural/Entertainment Industry Events

09/23/87 5:00 p.m.

OPTION THREE - THE GRAND TOUR, contd.

- II. San Francisco Area
  - \* Universities (Berkeley, Stanford)
  - \* High Tech Event
  - \* Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. Symbolic Events (Ft. Ross)
- III. Sacramento Area
  - \* State Capitol
  - \* Agriculture Event
- IV. Ranch/Santa Barbara Area
  - \* Lunch/Dinner at the Ranch
  - \* Informal/Private Discussions/Meetings at the Ranch
  - \* Helicopter/Jeep Tour

Formal Departure Ceremony/Event and return to White House while Gen. Sec. Gorbachev returns to U.S.S.R. or Remain Overnight: Santa Barbara, California.