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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BURNS, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

MJD 2/8/2008

File Folder SAUDI ARABIA (6)

FOIA

F03-028

Box Number 91843

CARSON

6

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
50427 MEMO	ROBERT OAKLEY TO COLIN POWELL RE ARMS DELIVERIES	1	11/5/1987	B1
50428 MEMO	FOR WILLIAM TAFT RE ARMS	1	ND	B1
50429 MEMO	JAMES MCGOVERN TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RE ARMS	2	9/22/1987	B1
50430 MEMO	EDWARD DJEREJIAN TO AMB OAKLEY ET AL	1	11/16/1987	B1 B3
50431 CABLE	151535Z NOV 87	1	11/15/1987	B1
50432 MEMO	BOB OAKLEY TO THE VICE PRESIDENT RE ABDULLAH'S VISIT	1	11/20/1987	B1
50433 CABLE	171516Z NOV 87	3	11/17/1987	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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50428	MEMO FOR WILLIAM TAFT RE ARMS	1	ND	B1

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50429	MEMO JAMES MCGOVERN TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RE ARMS	2	9/22/1987	B1

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50431	CABLE 151535Z NOV 87	1	11/15/1987	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 18, 1987

35

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

Mark C. ...

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *ROO*

SUBJECT: Letters to Key Senators

Attached are letters which Dennis, Alison and I recommend you sign and send to Senators Metzenbaum, Dole, Packwood, Cranston, Boschwitz, and Helms, and Representatives Fascell and Broomfield. Their purpose is three-fold:

- to show that we are keeping the faith on the last deal and that it has been a better deal than they and we realized (by encouraging strong Saudi leadership at the Amman Arab Summit)
- to prepare the way for their future collaboration with Colin as well as you and Secretary Shultz (we also propose that Colin meet with them sometime in the next two weeks to discuss future arms issues such as the STINGER for Bahrain and PHALANX for Kuwait)
- to indirectly encourage Metzenbaum not to proceed with his F-15 legislation (which has irritated the Saudis) or to conform it to the Pell letter so it will not be overly restrictive. (We're prepared to go along with it since we said we would as part of the deal, but we're hoping this may obviate the need for the legislation.)

We are also preparing a letter on the STINGER issue for you to send to Senator Byrd which will place it in the broader context described in the attached letters and explain the advantages of and safeguards for STINGER sales, and imply that a revised DeConcini amendment might be acceptable (i.e. restrict STINGER sales to governments which really need them, cooperate with us, and agree with us on safeguards).

This would be another step to try to head off what we understand will be a major push by DeConcini hooked to the DOD appropriations. It could be used with a number of other key Senators and Congressmen.

~~Bob Dean~~ *AF*
Bob Dean and Alison Fortier concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attached

- Tab A Letter to Senator Metzenbaum
- Tab B Letter to Senator Dole
- Tab C Letter to Senator Packwood
- Tab D Letter to Senator Cranston
- Tab E Letter to Senator Boschwitz
- Tab F Letter to Senator Helms
- Tab G Letter to Representative Fascell
- Tab H Letter to Representative Broomfield

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1987

Dear Howard:

Attached is the letter to Chairman Pell that outlines the assurances I told you we would make on the F-15 attrition aircraft. Principally, these assurances relate to maintaining the current Saudi inventory of F-15 aircraft at a level of 60. The replacement aircraft are precisely that, provided only on a one-for-one basis as the Saudis lose F-15s to attrition. With respect to the MSIP upgrading of the F-15, the letter states clearly that we will not transform the Saudi F-15s into a ground attack aircraft.

We offer these assurances in accordance with the good faith and frank dialogue developed during our discussions and the eventual understanding with you and other Senators. This understanding on the Saudi arms package may not have fully satisfied us, you, or the Saudis, but it met all of our respective minimal needs. Most importantly, it served the national security interests of the United States at a critical moment.

It showed the Iranians and the Arab Gulf states that the Administration and the Congress are united in standing by American friends that are resisting Iranian threats. In that way, it also helped to demonstrate that the U.S. will live up to its responsibilities in the Middle East as a whole and that we will do what is necessary to support the forces of moderation as they are challenged by radical efforts to export or exploit Khomeini's Islamic revolution. The need to take a strong stand against this threat was stressed by Israeli President Herzog during his visit here last week.

The Saudis are in the frontlines resisting Iran. They are demonstrating that they are prepared to take steps to defend themselves, and to assist and cooperate closely with us in efforts to help preserve stability and moderation in the area. The character and scope of their security cooperation with us is unprecedented and is critical to our ability to operate and protect the forces we have in the Gulf.

Apart from growing cooperation on security matters we are also seeing Saudi policies that played perhaps the key behind-the-scene role in the outcome of the Amman Arab Summit,

particularly the decision to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world on Egypt's terms and with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty completely intact. We had a great deal of quiet high-level advance discussion on this with the Saudis, who have since the Summit joined seven other moderate Arab governments in restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt. On top of this, we have reports that there was agreement at Amman on reducing support for the PLO. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states, strengthened politically by U.S. political support and by our military presence in the Gulf, took a firm stand at the Summit on Iran and succeeded in rejecting radical efforts to place the blame on the U.S. Instead the Summit strongly supported our position on the need for Iran to end the war with Iraq immediately by implementing Security Council Resolution 598.

Saudi Arabia's willingness to move in directions we have long sought reflects greater Saudi confidence in U.S. reliability and staying power. The quiet understandings reached between the Administration and the Congress on the current arms sales package -- in marked contrast to earlier public disputes over such issues -- helped reassure the Saudis of our dependability. This new, positive approach came just before the Amman Summit and we know that it had a very favorable impact upon Saudi attitudes.

It is my hope that you and your colleagues will continue cooperation with Colin Powell as he succeeds me, as well as with Secretary of State Shultz and myself. This will enable both Congress and the Administration better to protect the long-term security of the United States and Israel and our mutual interests in the Middle East.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Letter to Senator Pell
of November 12, 1987

The Honorable Howard M. Metzenbaum
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During discussions with you and members of your committee, as well as other Senate leaders, a number of questions were raised regarding the conditions under which the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 attrition aircraft and the Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP) for existing F-15 aircraft would be made. I would like to reiterate the assurances which we agreed would condition this sale.

As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

I wish to confirm my assurance that the in-Kingdom strength of F-15 aircraft will not exceed sixty, as authorized by the Congress in the original sale. Delivery of two aircraft will be made as soon as possible to replace two F-15s which have already been lost. The Government of Saudi Arabia has agreed that the remaining ten aircraft will be retained in the United States, at their expense, until needed for actual replacement on a one-for-one basis.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

to comply with assurances provided at the time of the original F-15 sale. Since the Saudi F-15s are not used in the same multiple roles as those of the USAF, the Saudi MSIP will not include some upgrades planned for U.S. Air Force F-15s, such as the state-of-the-art AN/APG-70 radar, which is designed for the ground attack mission.

While MSIP modifications would provide hardware changes necessary to accommodate more advanced, "smart" weapons, the sale of such weapons would remain subject to Congressional review. In addition, Saudi F-15s will not be able to utilize such weapons until separate software changes are made to the onboard computer systems. The security of these systems is such that the software changes can only be performed by the USAF. Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

In sum, I believe these sales serve and protect the national security interests of the United States at a time when Saudi Arabia faces very real threats and is actively helping us in the Gulf. I can assure you that these sales will not alter the military balance in the region, nor will they introduce a fundamentally new military capability. On the contrary, we seek only to maintain current levels of Saudi weaponry and make routine upgrades or provide replacements of existing systems as necessary.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful and that you and the members of your committee will join in support of the Administration's current proposals as we seek to maintain and strengthen security cooperation for the future.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1987

Dear Bob:

Attached is the letter to Amman Fell that outlines the assurances I told you we would make on the F-15 attrition aircraft. Principally, these assurances relate to maintaining the current Saudi inventory of F-15 aircraft at a level of 60. The replacement aircraft are precisely that, provided only on a one-for-one basis as the Saudis lose F-15s to attrition. With respect to the MSIP upgrading of the F-15, the letter states clearly that we will not transform the Saudi F-15s into a ground attack aircraft.

We offer these assurances in accordance with the good faith and frank dialogue developed during our discussions and the eventual understanding with you and other Senators. This understanding on the Saudi arms package may not have fully satisfied us, you, or the Saudis, but it met all of our respective minimal needs. Most importantly, it served the national security interests of the United States at a critical moment.

It showed the Iranians and the Arab Gulf states that the Administration and the Congress are united in standing by American friends that are resisting Iranian threats. In that way, it also helped to demonstrate that the U.S. will live up to its responsibilities in the Middle East as a whole and that we will do what is necessary to support the forces of moderation as they are challenged by radical efforts to export or exploit Khomeini's Islamic revolution. The need to take a strong stand against this threat was stressed by Israeli President Herzog during his visit here last week.

The Saudis are in the frontlines resisting Iran. They are demonstrating that they are prepared to take steps to defend themselves, and to assist and cooperate closely with us in efforts to help preserve stability and moderation in the area. The character and scope of their security cooperation with us is unprecedented and is critical to our ability to operate and protect the forces we have in the Gulf.


Apart from growing cooperation on security matters we are also seeing Saudi policies that played perhaps the key behind-the-scene role in the outcome of the Amman Arab Summit,

particularly the decision to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world on Egypt's terms and with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty completely intact. We had a great deal of quiet high-level advance discussion on this with the Saudis, who have since the Summit trained seven other moderate Arab governments in restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt. In top of this, we have reports that there was agreement at Amman on reducing support for the PLO. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states, strengthened politically by U.S. political support and by our military presence in the Gulf, took a firm stand at the Summit on Iran and succeeded in rejecting radical efforts to place the blame on the U.S. Instead the Summit strongly supported our position on the need for Iran to end the war with Iraq immediately by implementing Security Council Resolution 598.

Saudi Arabia's willingness to move in directions we have long sought reflects greater Saudi confidence in U.S. reliability and staying power. The quiet understandings reached between the Administration and the Congress on the current arms sales package -- in marked contrast to earlier public disputes over such issues -- helped reassure the Saudis of our dependability. This new, positive approach came just before the Amman Summit and we know that it had a very favorable impact upon Saudi attitudes.

It is my hope that you and your colleagues will continue cooperation with Colin Powell as he succeeds me, as well as with Secretary of State Shultz and myself. This will enable both Congress and the Administration better to protect the long-term security of the United States and Israel and our mutual interests in the Middle East.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Letter to Senator Pell
of November 12, 1987

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During discussions with you and members of your committee, as well as other Senate leaders, a number of questions were raised regarding the conditions under which the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 attrition aircraft and the Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP) for existing F-15 aircraft would be made. I would like to reiterate the assurances which we agreed would condition this sale.

As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

I wish to confirm my assurance that the in-Kingdom strength of F-15 aircraft will not exceed sixty, as authorized by the Congress in the original sale. Delivery of two aircraft will be made as soon as possible to replace two F-15s which have already been lost. The Government of Saudi Arabia has agreed that the remaining ten aircraft will be retained in the United States, at their expense, until needed for actual replacement on a one-for-one basis.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

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I hope the foregoing information will be helpful and that you and the members of your committee will join in support of the Administration's current proposals as we seek to maintain and strengthen security cooperation for the future.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1987

Dear Bob:

Attached is the letter to Sheikran Pelli that outlines the assurances I told you we would make on the F-15 attrition aircraft. Principally, these assurances relate to maintaining the current Saudi inventory of F-15 aircraft at a level of 60. The replacement aircraft are precisely that, provided only on a one-for-one basis as the Saudis lose F-15s to attrition. With respect to the MSIP upgrading of the F-15, the letter states clearly that we will not transform the Saudi F-15s into a ground attack aircraft.

We offer these assurances in accordance with the good faith and frank dialogue developed during our discussions and the eventual understanding with you and other Senators. This understanding on the Saudi arms package may not have fully satisfied us, you, or the Saudis, but it met all of our respective minimal needs. Most importantly, it served the national security interests of the United States at a critical moment.

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Frank C. Carlucci

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The Honorable Bob Packwood
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

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As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

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The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

to comply with assurances provided at the time of the original F-15 sale. Since the Saudi F-15s are not used in the same multiple roles as those of the USAF, the Saudi MSIP will not include some upgrades planned for U.S. Air Force F-15s, such as the state-of-the-art AN/APG-70 radar, which is designed for the ground attack mission.

While MSIP modifications would provide hardware changes necessary to accommodate more advanced, "smart" weapons, the sale of such weapons would remain subject to Congressional review. In addition, Saudi F-15s will not be able to utilize such weapons until separate software changes are made to the onboard computer systems. The security of these systems is such that the software changes can only be performed by the USAF. Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

In sum, I believe these sales serve and protect the national security interests of the United States at a time when Saudi Arabia faces very real threats and is actively helping us in the Gulf. I can assure you that these sales will not alter the military balance in the region, nor will they introduce a fundamentally new military capability. On the contrary, we seek only to maintain current levels of Saudi weaponry and make routine upgrades or provide replacements of existing systems as necessary.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful and that you and the members of your committee will join in support of the Administration's current proposals as we seek to maintain and strengthen security cooperation for the future.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1987

Dear Alan:

Attached is the letter to Chairman Bell that outlines the assurances I told you we would make on the F-15 attrition aircraft. Principally, these assurances relate to maintaining the current Saudi inventory of F-15 aircraft at a level of 60. The replacement aircraft are precisely that, provided only on a one-for-one basis as the Saudis lose F-15s to attrition. With respect to the MSIP upgrading of the F-15, the letter stated clearly that we will not transform the Saudi F-15s into a ground attack aircraft.

We offer these assurances in accordance with the good faith and frank dialogue developed during our discussions and the eventual understanding with you and other Senators. This understanding on the Saudi arms package may not have fully satisfied us, you, or the Saudis, but it met all of our respective minimal needs. Most importantly, it served the national security interests of the United States at a critical moment.

It showed the Iranians and the Arab Gulf states that the Administration and the Congress are united in standing by American friends that are resisting Iranian threats. In that way, it also helped to demonstrate that the U.S. will live up to its responsibilities in the Middle East as a whole and that we will do what is necessary to support the forces of moderation as they are challenged by radical efforts to export or exploit Khomeini's Islamic revolution. The need to take a strong stand against this threat was stressed by Israeli President Herzog during his visit here last week.

The Saudis are in the frontlines resisting Iran. They are demonstrating that they are prepared to take steps to defend themselves, and to assist and cooperate closely with us in efforts to help preserve stability and moderation in the area. The character and scope of their security cooperation with us is unprecedented and is critical to our ability to operate and protect the forces we have in the Gulf.

Apart from growing cooperation on security matters we are also seeing Saudi policies that played perhaps the key behind-the-scene role in the outcome of the Amman Arab Summit,

particularly the decision to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world on Egypt's terms and with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty completely intact. We had a great deal of quiet high-level advance discussion on this with the Saudis, who have since the Summit joined seven other moderate Arab governments in reestablishing diplomatic relations with Egypt. On top of this, we have reports that there was agreement at Amman to reducing support for the PLO. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states, strengthened politically by U.S. political support and by our military presence in the Gulf, took a firm stand at the Summit on Iran's provocative reporting of nuclear activities and place the blame on the U.S. Instead the Summit strongly supported our position on the need for Iran to end the war with Iraq immediately by implementing Security Council Resolution 598.

Saudi Arabia's willingness to move in directions we have long sought reflects greater Saudi confidence in U.S. reliability and staying power. The quiet understandings reached between the Administration and the Congress on the current arms sales package -- in marked contrast to earlier public disputes over such issues -- helped reassure the Saudis of our dependability. This new, positive approach came just before the Amman Summit and we know that it had a very favorable impact upon Saudi attitudes.

It is my hope that you and your colleagues will continue cooperation with Colin Powell as he succeeds me, as well as with Secretary of State Shultz and myself. This will enable both Congress and the Administration better to protect the long-term security of the United States and Israel and our mutual interests in the Middle East.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Letter to Senator Pell
of November 12, 1987

The Honorable Alan Craston
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During discussions with you and members of your committee, as well as other Senate leaders, a number of questions were raised regarding the conditions under which the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 attrition aircraft and the Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP) for existing F-15 aircraft would be made. I would like to reiterate the assurances which we agreed would condition this sale.

As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

I wish to confirm my assurance that the in-Kingdom strength of F-15 aircraft will not exceed sixty, as authorized by the Congress in the original sale. Delivery of two aircraft will be made as soon as possible to replace two F-15s which have already been lost. The Government of Saudi Arabia has agreed that the remaining ten aircraft will be retained in the United States, at their expense, until needed for actual replacement on a one-for-one basis.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

to comply with assurances provided at the time of the original F-15 sale. Since the Saudi F-15s are not used in the same multiple roles as those of the USAF, the Saudi MSIP will not include some upgrades planned for U.S. Air Force F-15s, such as the state-of-the-art AN/APG-70 radar, which is designed for the ground attack mission.

While MSIP modifications would provide hardware changes necessary to accommodate more advanced, "smart" weapons, the sale of such weapons would remain subject to Congressional review. In addition, Saudi F-15s will not be able to utilize such weapons until separate software changes are made to the onboard computer systems. The security of these systems is such that the software changes can only be performed by the USAF. Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

In sum, I believe these sales serve and protect the national security interests of the United States at a time when Saudi Arabia faces very real threats and is actively helping us in the Gulf. I can assure you that these sales will not alter the military balance in the region, nor will they introduce a fundamentally new military capability. On the contrary, we seek only to maintain current levels of Saudi weaponry and make routine upgrades or provide replacements of existing systems as necessary.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful and that you and the members of your committee will join in support of the Administration's current proposals as we seek to maintain and strengthen security cooperation for the future.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1987

Dear Rudy:

Attached is the letter to Chairman Pall that outlines the assurances I told you we would make on the F-15 attrition aircraft. Principally, these assurances relate to maintaining the current Saudi inventory of F-15 aircraft at a level of 60. The replacement aircraft are precisely that, provided only on a one-for-one basis as the Saudis lose F-15s to attrition. With respect to the MSIP upgrading of the F-15, the letter states clearly that we will not transform the Saudi F-15s into a ground attack aircraft.

We offer these assurances in accordance with the good faith and frank dialogue developed during our discussions and the eventual understanding with you and other Senators. This understanding on the Saudi arms package may not have fully satisfied us, you, or the Saudis, but it met all of our respective minimal needs. Most importantly, it served the national security interests of the United States at a critical moment.

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The Saudis are in the frontlines resisting Iran. They are demonstrating that they are prepared to take steps to defend themselves, and to assist and cooperate closely with us in efforts to help preserve stability and moderation in the area. The character and scope of their security cooperation with us is unprecedented and is critical to our ability to operate and protect the forces we have in the Gulf.

Apart from growing cooperation on security matters we are also seeing Saudi policies that played perhaps the key behind-the-scene role in the outcome of the Amman Arab Summit,

particularly the decision to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world on Egypt's terms and with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty completely intact. We had a great deal of quiet high-level advance discussion on this with the Saudis, who have since the Summit joined seven other moderate Arab governments in restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt. On top of this, we have reported that there was agreement at Amman on reducing support for the PLO. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states, strengthened politically by U.S. political support and by our military presence in the Gulf, took a firm stand at the Summit on Iraq and succeeded in preventing several efforts to place the blame on the U.S. Instead the Summit strongly supported our position on the need for Iraq to end the war with Iraq immediately by implementing Security Council Resolution 699.

Saudi Arabia's willingness to move in directions we have long sought reflects greater Saudi confidence in U.S. reliability and staying power. The quiet understandings reached between the Administration and the Congress on the current arms sales package -- in marked contrast to earlier public disputes over such issues -- helped reassure the Saudis of our dependability. This new, positive approach came just before the Amman Summit and we know that it had a very favorable impact upon Saudi attitudes.

It is my hope that you and your colleagues will continue cooperation with Colin Powell as he succeeds me, as well as with Secretary of State Shultz and myself. This will enable both Congress and the Administration better to protect the long-term security of the United States and Israel and our mutual interests in the Middle East.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Letter to Senator Pell
of November 12, 1987

The Honorable Rudy Boschwitz
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During discussions with you and members of your committee, as well as other Senate leaders, a number of questions were raised regarding the conditions under which the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 attrition aircraft and the Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP) for existing F-15 aircraft would be made. I would like to reiterate the assurances which we agreed would condition this sale.

As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

I wish to confirm my assurance that the in-Kingdom strength of F-15 aircraft will not exceed sixty, as authorized by the Congress in the original sale. Delivery of two aircraft will be made as soon as possible to replace two F-15s which have already been lost. The Government of Saudi Arabia has agreed that the remaining ten aircraft will be retained in the United States, at their expense, until needed for actual replacement on a one-for-one basis.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

-2-

to comply with assurances provided at the time of the original F-15 sale. Since the Saudi F-15s are not used in the same multiple roles as those of the USAF, the Saudi MSIP will not include some upgrades planned for U.S. Air Force F-15s, such as the state-of-the-art AN/APG-70 radar, which is designed for the ground attack mission.

While MSIP modifications would provide hardware changes necessary to accommodate more advanced, "smart" weapons, the sale of such weapons would remain subject to Congressional review. In addition, Saudi F-15s will not be able to utilize such weapons until separate software changes are made to the onboard computer systems. The security of these systems is such that the software changes can only be performed by the USAF. Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

In sum, I believe these sales serve and protect the national security interests of the United States at a time when Saudi Arabia faces very real threats and is actively helping us in the Gulf. I can assure you that these sales will not alter the military balance in the region, nor will they introduce a fundamentally new military capability. On the contrary, we seek only to maintain current levels of Saudi weaponry and make routine upgrades or provide replacements of existing systems as necessary.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful and that you and the members of your committee will join in support of the Administration's current proposals as we seek to maintain and strengthen security cooperation for the future.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci


The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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Saudi Arabia's willingness to move in directions we have long sought reflects greater Saudi confidence in U.S. reliability and staying power. The quiet understandings reached between the Administration and the Congress on the current arms sales package -- in marked contrast to earlier public disputes over such issues -- helped reassure the Saudis of our dependability. This new, positive approach came just before the Amman Summit and we know that it had a very favorable impact upon Saudi attitudes.

It is my hope that you and your colleagues will continue cooperation with Colin Powell as he succeeds me, as well as with Secretary of State Shultz and myself. This will enable both Congress and the Administration better to protect the long-term security of the United States and Israel and our mutual interests in the Middle East.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Letter to Senator Pell
of November 12, 1987

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During discussions with you and members of your committee, as well as other Senate leaders, a number of questions were raised regarding the conditions under which the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 attrition aircraft and the Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP) for existing F-15 aircraft would be made. I would like to reiterate the assurances which we agreed would condition this sale.

As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

I wish to confirm my assurance that the in-Kingdom strength of F-15 aircraft will not exceed sixty, as authorized by the Congress in the original sale. Delivery of two aircraft will be made as soon as possible to replace two F-15s which have already been lost. The Government of Saudi Arabia has agreed that the remaining ten aircraft will be retained in the United States, at their expense, until needed for actual replacement on a one-for-one basis.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

to comply with assurances provided at the time of the original F-15 sale. Since the Saudi F-15s are not used in the same multiple roles as those of the USAF, the Saudi MSIP will not include some upgrades planned for U.S. Air Force F-15s, such as the state-of-the-art AN/APG-70 radar, which is designed for the ground attack mission.

While MSIP modifications would provide hardware changes necessary to accommodate more advanced, "smart" weapons, the sale of such weapons would remain subject to Congressional review. In addition, Saudi F-15s will not be able to utilize such weapons until separate software changes are made to the onboard computer systems. The security of these systems is such that the software changes can only be performed by the USAF. Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

In sum, I believe these sales serve and protect the national security interests of the United States at a time when Saudi Arabia faces very real threats and is actively helping us in the Gulf. I can assure you that these sales will not alter the military balance in the region, nor will they introduce a fundamentally new military capability. On the contrary, we seek only to maintain current levels of Saudi weaponry and make routine upgrades or provide replacements of existing systems as necessary.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful and that you and the members of your committee will join in support of the Administration's current proposals as we seek to maintain and strengthen security cooperation for the future.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1987

Dear Dante:

Attached is the letter to Chairman Pell that outlined our assurances on F-15 attrition aircraft for Saudi Arabia. Principally, these assurances relate to maintaining the current Saudi inventory of F-15 aircraft at a level of 60. The replacement aircraft are precisely that, provided only on a one-for-one basis as the Saudis lose F-15s to attrition. With respect to the MSIP upgrading of the F-15, the letter states clearly that we will not transform the Saudi F-15s into a ground attack aircraft.

We offer these assurances in accordance with the good faith and frank dialogue developed during our discussions and the eventual understanding with Senate leaders. This understanding on the Saudi arms package may not have fully satisfied us, you, or the Saudis, but it met all of our respective minimal needs. Most importantly, it served the national security interests of the United States at a critical moment.

It showed the Iranians and the Arab Gulf states that the Administration and the Congress are united in standing by American friends that are resisting Iranian threats. In that way, it also helped to demonstrate that the U.S. will live up to its responsibilities in the Middle East as a whole and that we will do what is necessary to support the forces of moderation as they are challenged by radical efforts to export or exploit Khomeini's Islamic revolution. The need to take a strong stand against this threat was stressed by Israeli President Herzog during his visit here last week.

The Saudis are in the frontlines resisting Iran. They are demonstrating that they are prepared to take steps to defend themselves, and to assist and cooperate closely with us in efforts to help preserve stability and moderation in the area. The character and scope of their security cooperation with us is unprecedented and is critical to our ability to operate and protect the forces we have in the Gulf.

Apart from growing cooperation on security matters we are also seeing Saudi policies that played perhaps the key behind-the-scene role in the outcome of the Amman Arab Summit,

particularly the decision to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world on Egypt's terms and with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty completely intact. We had a great deal of quiet high-level advance discussion on this with the Saudis, who have since the Summit called seven other major Arab governments to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt. On top of this, we have reports that there was agreement at Amman on reducing support for the PLO. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states, strengthened politically by U.S. political support and by our military presence in the Gulf, took a firm stand at the Summit on Iraq and succeeded in directing official efforts to place the blame on Iraq. Instead, the Summit normally supported our position on the need for Iraq to end the war with Iraq immediately by implementing Security Council Resolution 598.

Saudi Arabia's willingness to move in directions we have long sought reflects greater Saudi confidence in U.S. reliability and staying power. The quiet understandings reached between the Administration and the Congress on the current arms sales package -- in marked contrast to earlier public disputes over such issues -- helped reassure the Saudis of our dependability. This new, positive approach came just before the Amman Summit and we know that it had a very favorable impact upon Saudi attitudes.

It is my hope that you and your colleagues will continue cooperation with Colin Powell as he succeeds me, as well as with Secretary of State Shultz and myself. This will enable both Congress and the Administration better to protect the long-term security of the United States and Israel and our mutual interests in the Middle East.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Letter to Senator Pell
of November 12, 1987

The Honorable Dante Fascell
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During discussions with you and members of your committee, as well as other Senate leaders, a number of questions were raised regarding the conditions under which the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 attrition aircraft and the Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP) for existing F-15 aircraft would be made. I would like to reiterate the assurances which we agreed would condition this sale.

As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

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The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

to comply with assurances provided at the time of the original F-15 sale. Since the Saudi F-15s are not used in the same multiple roles as those of the USAF, the Saudi MSIP will not include some upgrades planned for U.S. Air Force F-15s, such as the state-of-the-art AN/APG-70 radar, which is designed for the ground attack mission.

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Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1987

Dear Bill:

Attached is the letter to Chairman Pell that outlines our assurances on F-15 attrition aircraft for Saudi Arabia. Principally, these assurances relate to maintaining the current Saudi inventory of F-15 aircraft at a level of 60. The replacement aircraft are precisely that, provided only on a one-for-one basis as the Saudis lose F-15s to attrition. With respect to the MSIP upgrading of the F-15, the letter states clearly that we will not transform the Saudi F-15s into a ground attack aircraft.

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
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Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment:

Letter to Senator Pell
of November 12, 1987

The Honorable William S. Broomfield
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1987

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During discussions with you and members of your committee, as well as other Senate leaders, a number of questions were raised regarding the conditions under which the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 attrition aircraft and the Multi-Stage Improvement Program (MSIP) for existing F-15 aircraft would be made. I would like to reiterate the assurances which we agreed would condition this sale.

As you know, the Saudis have used the F-15 in a responsible and capable manner, providing the principal element in the defensive shield against Iranian air incursions against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. The Administration has now notified the Congress of its intent to sell twelve additional F-15C/D aircraft to Saudi Arabia, two to replace planes lost to date and an additional ten aircraft in anticipation of future attrition replacement requirements. The estimated value of this sale is \$502 million.

I wish to confirm my assurance that the in-Kingdom strength of F-15 aircraft will not exceed sixty, as authorized by the Congress in the original sale. Delivery of two aircraft will be made as soon as possible to replace two F-15s which have already been lost. The Government of Saudi Arabia has agreed that the remaining ten aircraft will be retained in the United States, at their expense, until needed for actual replacement on a one-for-one basis.

The Government of Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed that it has no aggressive intentions against any state, that it will use the F-15 aircraft only in furtherance of its legitimate self-defense, and that it will not employ the aircraft offensively. The Saudi Arabian Government has similarly assured us that it will not transfer the F-15 aircraft to any third country or permit the nationals of such country to train on the F-15 aircraft, serve as pilots, or otherwise to have access to the aircraft without the authorization of the United States. The assurances regarding the basing of F-15s within the Kingdom will remain in effect.

Questions were also raised on whether MSIP would provide Saudi Arabia with an increased ground attack capability. I want to assure you that MSIP will not in itself markedly increase F-15 combat capability. The Saudi MSIP will be specifically tailored

to comply with assurances provided at the time of the original F-15 sale. Since the Saudi F-15s are not used in the same multiple roles as those of the USAF, the Saudi MSIP will not include some upgrades planned for U.S. Air Force F-15s, such as the state-of-the-art AN/APG-70 radar, which is designed for the ground attack mission.

While MSIP modifications would provide hardware changes necessary to accommodate more advanced, "smart" weapons, the sale of such weapons would remain subject to Congressional review. In addition, Saudi F-15s will not be able to utilize such weapons until separate software changes are made to the onboard computer systems. The security of these systems is such that the software changes can only be performed by the USAF. Saudi Arabia has not requested nor do we intend to sell any other systems or armaments that would enhance the ground attack capability of the F-15.

In sum, I believe these sales serve and protect the national security interests of the United States at a time when Saudi Arabia faces very real threats and is actively helping us in the Gulf. I can assure you that these sales will not alter the military balance in the region, nor will they introduce a fundamentally new military capability. On the contrary, we seek only to maintain current levels of Saudi weaponry and make routine upgrades or provide replacements of existing systems as necessary.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful and that you and the members of your committee will join in support of the Administration's current proposals as we seek to maintain and strengthen security cooperation for the future.

Sincerely,



Frank C. Carlucci

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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The President has seen 12/14

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

37

DEC 10 1987

OAKLEY

December 10, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL *Jan for*

SUBJECT: King Fahd Letter

RR

King Fahd has written a single, identical letter to you and General Secretary Gorbachev stressing the importance of the Summit to international peace and security and pinpointing three specific issues for particular consideration: the Palestinian problem, the Iran-Iraq war and Afghanistan. There are no proposals for action, other than implementing UNSC Resolution 598 on the Iran-Iraq war. The latter closes with the King's "wishes for the success of your historic summit."

Attachment

Tab A Letter from King Fahd

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff (2)



His Excellency
Mr. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America.

His Excellency
Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev
Secretary-General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Gentlemen:

It is a pleasure, on the occasion of the American-Soviet Summit to convey to you my best regards. It is my wish and hope that your conference succeed in serving international peace and security, issues which your friendly nations have great responsibilities towards.

On this occasion, I would like to state that the issue of international peace and security is one of importance to all nations of this world, whether large or small, regardless of their orientations or systems. This is particularly true in this day and age where increased contacts and interdependence have become a reality. It is for this reason that the people of all nations are looking to your historic summit with confidence and hope that security and stability will prevail through-out the world.

I would like to take this opportunity to point to the many problems and difficulties from which the Middle East is suffering. I am confident that you are aware of them and will give them the consideration they deserve. One of those problems is the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian people, a people which has suffered for many years due to the denial of its basic rights as guaranteed it by all international resolutions, foremost of which are the United Nations resolutions, is placing a lot of hope in your wisdom and appreciation for its just human cause.

Allow me to also take this opportunity to point to the Iran-Iraq war. Many years have passed which left behind destruction and suffering for the people of both countries exceeding all bonds of conflict between two nations. In fact, this war threatens the security and stability of the region. It also poses a threat to world peace due to its international impact. There is an urgent need to bring it to an end.



-2-

It is our hope that you succeed in your great attempts to assure implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution to end this war and deter any current and future dangers emanating from it.

Finally, I would like to point to the cause of the people of Afghanistan, a just human cause involving its national rights and dignity. I am confident that you will give this cause the attention it deserves.

There is great hope in the establishment of a new international system under your auspicious based on cooperation and solidarity among all nations and people which would guarantee this world security, stability and prosperity.

I would like to reiterate my wishes for the success of your historic summit and convey to you personally my best personal regards.

Sincerely

Fahad bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud



الجامعة العربية

دوران رئاسة مجلس الوزراء

برقيه

الرقم = ٥٩١١٢
التاريخ ١١٨ / ٤ / ١٩٤٤ هـ
البرقيات

صاحب الفخامة الرئيس روزالد ريجان
رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية
مالي السيد ميخائيل غورباتشوف
السكرتير العام للحزب الشيوعي في الاتحاد السوفيتي
تحية طيبة وبعد،

فيسرني بمناسبة انعقاد مؤتمر القمة الأمريكية السوفيتية ان ابعث
لكم بالغ تحياتي وتعبيراتي راجيا لمؤتمركم كل التوفيق في خدمه
السلام والامن الدوليين الذين تتحمل بلادكمما الصديقه مسؤوليه عظمي
تجاههما.

وفي هذه المناسبه اود ان اقول ان السلام والامن الدوليين امر يهم
كل دول العالم كبيرا وصغيرها وعلى اختلاف منامجها ونظمها وذلك
بعد ان اصبح الترابط والاتصال الدولي حقيقه هذا العصر وسمت البارزه
ولها فان الشعوب في مختلف دول العالم تتطلع الي مؤتمركم التاريخي
بثقه وامل كبيرين راجيه ان يسود الامن والاستقرار في ارجاء العالم.
وفي هذه المناسبه اود ان اشير الى ماتعانيه منطقه الشرق الاوسط من
مشكلات ومصاعب عديده اثن ان سيادتكمما تموزونها وتقدرونها حق
قدرها ومن هذه المشكلات قضيه الشعب العربي الفلسطيني فقد مضت
سنوات عديده وهذا الشعب يقاسي ويحاني من حرمانه من حقوقه التي
كفالتها له جميع القواعد والقرارات الدوليه وفي طلبيتها قرارات الامم
المتحده .. ان هذا الشعب يتطلع بامل كبير الي حكمتكمما وتقديركمما
لحقوقه وتفضيته الانسانيه العادله.

ولا يفتوتني في هذه المناسبه ان اشير الي مشكله الحرب المراقبه
الايرائيه فلتقد مضى على هذه الحرب سنوات طويله خلفت الدمار وعانى



منها الانسان في البلدين واصبحت تتجاوز كل ابعاد الصراع بين دولتين بل تهدد أمن المنطقة وسلامتها واستقرارها كما تهدد امن العالم كله بسبب انعكاساتها الدولية مما يقتضي وضع حد لها ولهذا فان املنا كبير في مساعيكم العظيمة بما يكفل تنفيذ قرار مجلس الامن لايقاف هذه الحرب ودرء مخاطرها الحالية والمنظورة.

ولايفوتني ايضا ان اشير الى ان قضية الشعب الافغاني قضية انسانية عادلة تتعلق بحقه الطبيعي وكرامته واني واثق بان سيادتكمما ستولون هذه القضية ماتستحقه من رعاية.

ياصاحبي السيادة:

ان الامل كبير في اقامة نظام عالمي جديد يقوم بواسطتكم على مبادئ التكافل والتعاون مع جميع الامم والشعوب بما يكفل لهذا العالم الامن والاستقرار والرخاء.

وفي الختام اكرر تمنياتي لمؤتمركم التاريخي بالتوفيق ولسيادتكمما بدوام الصحة والسعادة...،،،

فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود