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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET **Ronald Reagan Library**

## Collection: BURNS, WILLIAM: Files

#### Archivist: ggc

### File Folder: PAKISTAN [2 OF 2] OA 91843

#### Date: 3/1/98

CUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1m <del>cmo (0099)</del> -	Shirin Tahir-Kheli to Carlucci re letter from Pak Foreign Minister, 1p R,5/16/00 NLSF96-106 # 12	1/9/87	<b>P</b> 1
2. letter	Carlucci to Yaqub Khan, 2p R 15 18 00 NISF96 - 106 \$ 13	- <del>n.d.</del>	P1-
3. letter	Yaqub-Khan to Carlucci, 1p	12/9/86	P1
4. memo (90020)	Steve Sestanovich to Colin Powell re PRG meeting, 3p	1/9/87	P5, P1
5. memo	Oakley to Powell re Policy Review Group meeting, $2p P_1 5 18 \sigma_0 NLSF96-106 #25$	1/9/86	P1
6. memo (0109)	Tahir-Kheli to Carlucci re Pakistan, 2p P, 5/18/00 NLSF 96-108 # 24	1/7/87	P1
-7memo	Poindexter to RR re certification, 2p-	-10/23/86	- <u>P1</u> -
<del>-(90716) -</del>	R 5/24/00 NLSF96-108 #27		
8. memo (7298)	John Whitehead to RR, 2p P, 5/18/00 NLSF96-108 #28	10/7/86	P1
9. memo	re Report to Congress 4p D, 5/18/00 NLSF 96-108 #29	n.d.	P1
<del>-10. memo (90743) -</del>	Poindexter to RR re-Annual Report to Congress, 1p- R 5/24/00 NLSF 96-108 #30	11/6/86	<del>- P1-</del>
<del>11. memo</del> <del>(90743)</del>	Burns to Poindexter re Annual Report to Congress, <u>Ip</u> R 5/24/00 NLS F 96-108 #-31	10/28/86	<u>P1</u>
1 <del>2. memo</del>	Nicholas Platt to Poindexter re Draft Report, 1p R 5/18/00 NLSP 96-108 #32	10/25/86	P1
<del>13. memo</del>	Burns to Poindexter re Annual Report to Congress,	10/28/86	
	+ 5/24/00 NLSF-96-108#33		

#### **RESTRICTION CODES**

## Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)] P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].

- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]. P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
- information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors ((a)(5) of the PRA].
   P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ((a)(6) of the PRA].
- С Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

 

 Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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 F-1
 National security classified information ((b)(1) of the FOIA].

 F-2
 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of

 the FOIA].

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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue ((b)(3) of the FOIA). F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information {(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
- the FO(A). F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells {(b)(9) F-9 of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET **Ronald Reagan Library**

# Collection: BURNS, WILLIAM: Files

#### Archivist: ggc

### File Folder: PAKISTAN [2 OF 2] OA 91843

#### Date: 3/1/98

CUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14. memo (90743)	Poindexter to RR re Annual Report to Congress, 1p	n.d.	P1
15. memo	re Report to Congress, 4p D, 5/18/00 NLS F96 -108, # 35	n.d.	P1
1 <del>6. memo</del>	Nicholas Platt to Poindexter re Draft Report, 1p R, 5[18]00 NLSF 96-104 # 36	-10/25/86	-P1
17. report	re the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, 7p D, 51/8/00 ANCSF916-108 #37	n.d.	P1
18. memo (90457)	Poindexter to RR re Report to Congress. 1p $D_{15}/18/00$ NL3F96 708 #38	4/30/85	P1
19. memo (90457)	Donald Fortier and Stephen Rosen to McFarlane re Report to Congress, 1p D, 5/18/00 NLSP96-108 # 39	4/22/85	P1
20. letter (7095)	RR to P.M. Mohammad Khan Junejo, $2p$ , $P$ , $5/18/00$ NLSF $96-108$ $440$	10/3/86	P1
21. letter	RR to General M. Zia-ul-Hag of Pakistan, 2p	10/3/86	P1
22. memo (90903)	Oakley to Powell re PRG meeting, 3p P, 5/18/00 NLSF 96 -108 #42	9/1/87	P1
23. report	re Pakistan, 4p	n.d.	P1
		. i	

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information  $\{(a)(1) \text{ of the PRA}\}$ . P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office  $\{(a)(2) \text{ of the PRA}\}$ . P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute  $\{(a)(3) \text{ of the PRA}\}$ .
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- the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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1

- F-3 Release would violate e Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
   F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

#### January 9, 1987

CONRIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

THROUGH: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Letter from Pak Foreign Minister and Your Response

Yaqub Khan's letter (Tab A) offers an important opportunity of engaging him on Afghanistan prior to the Armacost/Oakley trip to Pakistan (January 16-20). Yaqub has led the Pak delegation to Geneva for the UN-sponsored talks. He is also the chief interlocutor in the private channel that Zia/Junejo have set up with the Soviets. A proposed response to Yaqub's letter is at Tab I.

Peter Rodman, Fritz Ermarth and Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION ST. Char

That you sign the letter to Yaqub (Tab I). -

Approve \_\_\_\_ Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Response to Yaqub Tab A Letter from Yaqub

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR

NLS <u>F96-108</u> #22 BY <u>dlb</u> NANA, DATE 5/18/00

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Minister:

My return to the government at the request of the President enables me to renew my contact with old friends, such as yourself. I recall our past association as we worked to strengthen the relationship between our countries.

The last six years have been critical ones for Pakistan's security. Together, we have helped ensure that Pakistan remains strong as it faces the challenges stemming from the Soviet Union's brutal occupation of Afghanistan. As the President has repeatedly said, Pakistan's security and its territorial integrity are important to the United States. Our recognition that the commitment must be long-term is reflected in the renewed security assistance program which begins next year.

As you know, Bob Oakley of my staff will be going to Pakistan with Mike Armacost in mid-January. They will be discussing the Afghanistan issue in detail with you. However, I did want to use this opportunity to share some thoughts with you on the subject of Afghanistan.

In recent weeks, the Soviets have appeared to quicken the pace of discussions on a settlement in Afghanistan. They and Najibullah have recently made a series of statements and proposals that appear enticing at first glance. However, as you recognize better than anyone else, there is nothing which indicates that the Soviets have yet come to the conclusion that they must find a formula for withdrawal which does not leave in place what would amount to a puppet government. The primary objectives of the recent proposals seem to be sowing doubt and dissension among the resistance and their supporters both inside and outside the country and impressing both Soviet and international audiences with an ostensibly sincere desire for a peaceful settlement.

The reaction of both the Government of Pakistan and the resistance in not being taken in by this gambit has been salutary and has won great admiration in this country. One must expect more maneuvers of this sort. It is our conviction that the Soviets are much more aware of the magnitude of the Afghanistanrelated problems than ever before. Therefore, a continued firm

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and realistic posture on the political front combined with increased military pressure by the resistance will in time oblige them to recognize that a genuine withdrawal and transfer of power to true representatives of the Afghanistan people is their only alternative.

In closing, let me add that the Geneva negotiations have been skillfully handled by Pakistan. Regular consultations between our officials have ensured that there have been no misunderstandings between our two governments on this process. I look forward to further exchanges on Afghanistan in the months ahead.

With warm wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

÷ \_-

His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub Khan Minister of Foreign Affairs of Islamic Republic of Pakistan Islamabad



PAKISTAN

ISLAMABAD

9 December 1986

ber Friend

I have been delighted to hear of your appointment as the National Security Adviser to the President. The trust placed in you by the President in these difficult and trying circumstances is a reflection of your professional excellence and outstanding record of public service. I am confident that the professional qualities and rich and varied experience that you will bring to bear on your new assignment will contribute to the furtherance of America's policies and interests.

We in Pakistan proudly recall your association in 1981 with the process, personally inspired and guided by President Reagan, to rebuild the foundations of a revitalised bilateral relationship which has served the best interests of our two countries in advancing the prospects of peace in our region. I sho rejoice in our earlier forward interestions which I greatly value

I wish you every success in the discharge of your new responsibilities.

lourne regards

Yours sincerely,

مع*صانات المع*نين الم

( Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan )

Mr. Frank Carlucci, National Security Adviser to the President, White House, Washington, D.C.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II 90020 Add-On

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January 9, 1987.

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

SUBJECT: Policy Review Group (PRG) Meeting: Afghanistan and Iran, January 12, 3:00 p.m.

Attached are memoranda on Afghanistan and Iran for your use in Monday's PRG.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you use the attached memoranda in your PRG meeting.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab AMemo on AfghanistanTab BMemo on Iran

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January 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

SUBJECT: Policy Review Group (PRG) Meeting: Iran January 12, 3:00 p.m.

#### Background

There are two items on the current U.S.-Iran agenda which should be briefly reviewed, even though there appears to be no serious interagency disagreement thanks to the good work of Frank Carlucci and Mike Armacost. There are, however, some details which need to be clarified:

-- Return of Iranian Funds: The Hague Tribunal in August ordered the return of \$500 million in Iranian funds held by the New York Federal Reserve Bank.

and needs careful review and final interagency approval.

Two additional issues should be mentioned briefly by you. First is the desirability of holding working-level discussions very soon with several other governments to compare analyses of the political situation in Iran and its likely evolution, as well as to explain where we stand vis-a-vis Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. Dick Murphy has begun this on his current trip, but there are other governments with whom we should talk. Second is the need for an NSDD on our Iran policy. This should probably not be initiated right away, given other studies already underway and the need to obtain a clearer idea of where Iran is headed. However, the process should begin sometime next month.

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#### Talking Points

- -- We have made considerable progress in restoring coherence and interagency cooperation in Iran policy. It is absolutely essential that we continue to work together. Each step in our approach to this issue must be fully cleared by State, DOD, CIA, and NSC.
- -- There are two items on the current U.S.-Iran agenda that we should consider briefly: think there is any serious interagency disagreement over either of them. The President has approved think there is any serious interagency disagreement over either of them. The President has approved the Armacost, who is taking the lead in shaping Iran policy, to review both issues for us.

- Thank you, Mike. Let me make two final points: <u>First</u>, it would be useful in the very near future for State

- working-level discussions with several other friendly governments to compare notes on the internal situation in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. Dick Murphy has begun this process on his current trip, but we need to do more. Mike, will you follow-up on this?
- -- Second, we need to move ahead on a new NSDD on Iran policy. This should probably not be initiated right away, given the other studies already underway and the importance of developing first a clearer idea of where Iran is headed. But we should begin the NSDD process sometime next month.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 7, 1987

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

THROUGH: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI St.

SUBJECT: Pakistan Follow-On Program

Per your request, here is a brief state-of-play memo on the Pak follow-on program.

In March 1986, the President wrote to Zia offering a \$4.02 billion six-year program to follow the current one (\$3.2 billion) which expires this year. The President's letter was carried to Islamabad by Bill Schneider who negotiated the deal with the GOP. Zia telephoned the President on March 23, 1986 to thank him and to say that the GOP was pleased to accept. The \$4.02 billion will be spent at the approximate rate of \$670 million each year for six years, of which \$290 million is for FMS, \$300 million for economic assistance and \$80 million for PL-480 annually.

Following this agreement on the size of the package, we have been working with the GOP to refine the specifics. In particular, we have had difficulty getting the Pakistanis to focus on a prioritized list of the FMS component. Their wish list of desired military equipment exceeds our agreed package and their own capabilities.

The 1988 budget request sent up to the Hill has \$290 million in FMS,\$300 million for economic assistance, and \$80 million for PL-480 for Pakistan. Starting in March, the Administration plans

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to begin open briefings of key committees on the follow-on program. State is already in touch with some individual members of Congress and their aides. Following the Armacost/Oakley visit to Islamabad, we will hold closed hearings with select committees on Pakistan.

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Mike	Armacost wil	1 address th	is as

well as other issues during our trip to Pakistan, January 16-20. Ultimately, it will be this restraint and Congressional recognition of Pakistan's critical role for our Afghanistan policy that will enable us to put the next six-year package in place.

QT	Name and Add	5	Date	Initials	
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SYSTEM II 90716

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

SYSTEM IV 40324

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1986

ACTION

TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE WITH TOR SECRET/SODEWORD ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER SUBJECT: Nuclear Certification for Pakistan

Issue

Whether to certify to the Congress that Pakistan does not now possess a nuclear device.

#### Facts

In order to continue security assistance to Pakistan in FY 87, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 requires you to certify (1) that Pakistan does not now possess a nuclear explosive device and (2) that our assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess such a device. You provided such a certification to the Congress for FY 86 on November 25, 1985.

#### Discussion

Pakistan's efforts to develop the option to manufacture a nuclear explosive device have been apparent for some time. As Deputy Secretary Whitehead's memorandum (Tab D) makes clear, we have repeatedly sought to constrain the nuclear program, while emphasizing that Pakistan's security is better served by a close relationship with us than by a "bomb in the basement." Secretary Weinberger reinforced this message in his discussions with Zia and Junejo last week.

Since last year's certification, we have obtained additional evidence supporting our assessment that Pakistan has overcome the major technical barriers to developing a nuclear explosive device

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(Tab E). This evidence does not indicate, however, that Pakistan has yet acquired all of the nuclear and non-nuclear components needed for such a device. While this remains a very difficult judgment to make, I believe on balance that you should again certify non-possession. A certification that our security assistance program will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device is also warranted. Without our assistance program, Pakistan's incentive to acquire nuclear weapons would be significantly increased and its disincentives for doing so would be sharply reduced.

Recommendation



That you sign the determination and certification at Tab A and the letters to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at Tabs B and C.

Attachments:

Tab	A	Presidential Determination
Tab	В	Presidential Letter to Speaker of the House
Tab	С	Presidential Letter to Chairman of the SFRC
Tab	D	Whitehead Memo to the President dated October 7, 1986
Tab	E	Intelligence on the Pakistani Nuclear Program

Prepared by: William J. Burns



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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90716

Date 27 October 1986

Subject: PD 87-3 / PURSUANT TO SECTION 620E(e) OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

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MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				•	
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 200 independence Avenue, NW, Room 615i		-			
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 451 7th Street SW, Room 10000					
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181					
-					

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 27, 1986

Presidential Determination No. 87-3

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ The Secretary of State

.....

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended

Pursuant to section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2375(e), I hereby certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

You or your delegatee are authorized and directed to publish this determination and certification in the Federal Register.

Rouald Rayon

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NATIONAL SECURITY	Log Number JUILD				
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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 27, 1986

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am writing you with respect to Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which requires an annual certification concerning Pakistan to permit assistance to be furnished and military equipment or technology to be sold or transferred to that country during the fiscal year. I made this certification for FY 1986 on November 25, 1985.

Information on the status of Pakistan's nuclear program is provided to Congress in the annual classified report pursuant to section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. In addition, the Administration has fulfilled its legal obligation to keep the appropriate committees of Congress fully and currently informed of activities in Pakistan which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.

I have made my best judgment based on the information available to the United States Government, taken as a whole. I have also taken into account the fact that the statutory standard is whether Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device, not whether Pakistan is attempting to develop or has developed various relevant capacities. Based on the evidence available, and on the statutory standard, I have concluded that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.

The proposed United States assistance program for Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a device. I am convinced that our security relationship and assistance program are the most effective means available to us for dissuading Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan address its substantial and legitimate security needs, thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives. Pakistan is clearly aware of the inevitable cessation of our security assistance program should it acquire a nuclear explosive device. Thus, I believe the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. A copy of my certification pursuant to Section 620E(e) is enclosed.

Rouald Roogon

Enclosure:

Certification

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. The Speaker U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

.

WASHINGTON

October 27, 1986

Presidential Determination No. <u>87-3</u>

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ The Secretary of State

\*\*

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended

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K Coursed Reagan

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Information on the status of Pakistan's nuclear program is provided to Congress in the annual classified report pursuant to section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. In addition, the Administration has fulfilled its legal obligation to keep the appropriate committees of Congress fully and currently informed of activities in Pakistan which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.

I have made my best judgment based on the information available to the United States Government, taken as a whole. I have also taken into account the fact that the statutory standard is whether Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device, not whether Pakistan is attempting to develop or has developed various relevant capacities. Based on the evidence available, and on the statutory standard, I have concluded that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.

The proposed United States assistance program for Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a device. I am convinced that our security relationship and assistance program are the most effective means available to us for dissuading Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan address its substantial and legitimate security needs, thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives. Pakistan is clearly aware of the inevitable cessation of our security assistance program should it acquire a nuclear explosive device. Thus, I believe the proposed-United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

A copy of my certification pursuant to Section 620E(e) is enclosed.

Round Reagon

Enclosure:

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Certification

. :

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 WASHINGTON

October 27, 1986

Presidential Determination No. 87-3

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ The Secretary of State

. .

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended

Pursuant to section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2375(e), I hereby certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

You or your delegatee are authorized and directed to publish this determination and certification in the Federal Register.

K avald Room

8630986 XR-8631162

#### THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

#### WASHINGTON

7298

October 7, 1986

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT John C. Whitehead

FROM:

SUBJECT: Certification to Permit Continued Assistance to Pakistan, as Required by Section 602E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act

Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, enacted in 1985, prohibits assistance and sales or transfers of military equipment or technology to Pakistan unless you certify in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device." This certification must be provided during the fiscal year in which the assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred. You so certified for FY 86 on November 25, 1985. A new certification for FY 87 is required to continue assistance. (Authority to implement this section had previously been delegated, but it is more appropriate for you to make this determination.)

The issue of whether Pakistan "does not possess a nuclear explosive device" requires a judgment based on sensitive intelligence information which is being provided to you through separate channels.

The law calls upon you to make your best judgment based on the information made available to the Government, taken as a whole. You are not expected to make judgments with certainty, particularly because our information is primarily based on intelligence and is not necessarily complete, and when the activity in question would by its nature be conducted in great secrecy and be very hard to detect.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
l. That you sign the determination at Tab l.
<ol> <li>That you send the letters at Tab 2 to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.</li> </ol>
Attachments:
Mable - Suggested Presidential Determination
Tab 1 - Suggested Presidential Determination Tab 2 - Suggested Letter to the Speaker of the House and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
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Subj: PD for PAKISTAN (TAB E)

# NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT

ONLY EYES

Access limited to following named individuals

Name	Date
1. JOHN POINDEXTER	
2. PRESIDENT	
3.	
4.	
5.	

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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1986

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby submit the classified report on Pakistan's nuclear program as required by Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. Due to the very sensitive nature of its contents, we are providing the report only to the Intelligence Committees.

Sincerely,

med Read

The Honorable Dave Durenberger Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

- • . •

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Round Reagon

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

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WASHINGTON

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_\_

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November 6, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER Leel Jon -

SUBJECT: Annual Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program

### Issue

Transmittal of annual report to Congress on Pakistani nuclear program.

## Facts

You certified on October 27 that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that our aid program significantly reduces the risk that Pakistan will require such a device. Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 also requires you to submit annually a classified report to Congress describing the Pakistani nuclear program. Attached at Tab B is the fully-cleared report prepared by the Department of State.

## Recommendation



No

That you approve transmittal of report (Tab B) and sign letters to Chairmen of Senate and House Intelligence Committees (Tab A).

# Attachments

Tab A Draft Presidential letters of transmittal to the Chairmen of Senate and House Intelligence Committees Tab B Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program

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cc: Vice President

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/20/00

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### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

## October 28, 1986

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS

SUBJECT: Annual Report to Congress on Pakistani Nuclear Program

Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 requires the President to submit annually a classified report to Congress describing the Pakistani nuclear program. Attached at Tab B is the fully-cleared report prepared by the Department of State.

Because of the sensitivity of its contents, State and CIA strongly recommend that the report be transmitted only to the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate.

Dennis Ross, Steve Danzansky, Howard Teicher, Jim Stark, Ron Sable, and Steve Sestanovich concur.

## RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President recommending that he submit this report to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.



Attachments

Tab I Poindexter/President
Tab A Draft Presidential letters for
Transmittal to the Chairmen of
Senate and House Intelligence Committees
Tab B Report to Congress on Pakistan's
Nuclear Program
Tab IIPlatt/Poindexter, October 25, 1986
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October 25, 1986

United States Department of State

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Report by the President to the Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 requires the President to submit annually a classified report to Congress describing the nuclear program and related activities of any country for which a waiver of sections 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act is in effect. The only country for which a waiver of section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act is in effect is Pakistan.

The Department has prepared the attached proposed report to fulfill the statutory requirement. It has been fully cleared by all interested agencies. The Department earlier recommended to the President that he certify to the Congress pursuant to section 620 E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed U.S. assistance program for Pakistan will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. The attached proposed report reflects inter alia the language of the section 620 E(e) certification. If the President decides to make this certification, we recommend that the attached report pursuant to section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act also be transmitted to the Congress as soon as possible thereafter.

CIA has approved the attached report subject to the proviso that if approved by the President it be transmitted only to the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate. The Department recommends that this procedure be followed.

Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

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DECLASSIFIED NLS P96-108 #32 BY OLD NARA, DATE 5/15/00

DECL: OADR

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October 28, 1986

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

WILLIAM J. BURNS

SUBJECT: Annual Report to Congress on Pakistani Nuclear Program

Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 requires the President to submit annually a classified report to Congress describing the Pakistani nuclear program. Attached at Tab B is the fully-cleared report prepared by the Department of State.

Because of the sensitivity of its contents, State and CIA strongly recommend that the report be transmitted only to the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate.

Dennis Ross, Steve Danzansky, Howard Teicher, Jim Stark, Ron Sable, and Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President recommending that he submit this report to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.

Approve\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove\_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Poindexter/President Tab A Draft Presidential letters for Transmittal to the Chairmen of Senate and House Intelligence Committees Tab B Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program Tab II Platt/Poindexter, October 25, 1986

SEGRET Declassify on: OADR

NLS F96-108#33 BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/20/00



WASHINGTON



Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby submit the classified report on Pakistan's nuclear program as required by Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. Due to the very sensitive nature of its contents, we are providing the report only to the Intelligence Committees.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dave Durenberger Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton Chairman Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON April 30, 1985

SAMPLE

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<u>s</u>

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I hereby submit the classified report on Pakistan's nuclear program as required by Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. This report is part of the presentation materials for the foreign assistance programs for Pakistan for Fiscal Year 1986.

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Sincerely,

Rouald Regam

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. Speaker of the House of Representatives House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

April 30, 1985

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Dear Mr. President:

I hereby submit the classified report on Pakistan's nuclear program as required by Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. This report is part of the presentation materials for the foreign assistance programs for Pakistan for Fiscal Year 1986.

Sincerely,

Rouald Regan

The Honorable George Bush President of the Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 25, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Report by the President to the Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 requires the President to submit annually a classified report to Congress describing the nuclear program and related activities of any country for which a waiver of sections 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act is in effect. The only country for which a waiver of section 669 or 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act is in effect is Pakistan.

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Nicholas Plat

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Attachment: As stated.

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United States Department of State



# MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE

January 18, 1985

Subject: Report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Attached is a proposed report by the President to the Congress describing the Pakistani nuclear program. This report is required by section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981.

In view of the statutory requirement that this report be submitted as part of the presentation materials for foreign assistance programs for Pakistan proposed for FY 1986, the Department recommends that it be transmitted to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House as expeditiously as possible.

Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated





WASHINGTON

October 3, 1986

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am delighted to have Secretary Weinberger visiting Pakistan so shortly after you were here in Washington this July.

I take great pride in our strengthened relationship with Pakistan since 1981, supported by our \$3.2 billion program of economic and military assistance. We are proud of our pledge to continue our support with an unprecedented second six-year commitment, for we believe that the maintenance of Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity is the cornerstone of our relationship.

In our private meeting here in July, you told me that you had not yet familiarized yourself with Pakistan's uranium enrichment program. You promised to do so

Mr. Prime Minister, I was greatly encouraged to hear from you personally that Pakistan will continue to support the important goal of peace with India. Despite occasional setbacks, I strongly feel that this goal is worth pursuing because it enhances the security of all South Asian nations.

Pakistan's security has indeed been hampered by the Soviet Union's brutal occupation of Afghanistan. We will continue to urge the Soviet Union to observe recent United Nations resolutions and respect the will of the Afghan people. In the meantime, we share in your effort to lend humanitarian assistance to millions of Afghan refugees made homeless by the war in Afghanistan.



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I look forward to hearing about your discussions with Secretary Weinberger. His visit symbolizes our strong friendship and close cooperation on the key issues of regional stability and genuine peace.

Sincerely, Rouse Bram

His Excellency Mohammad Khan Junejo Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Islamabad

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### WASHINGTON

### October 3, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary of Defense Weinberger's return visit to your country is a signal of his and my commitment to our strong and friendly relations with Pakistan. The United States has profound interest in the security, economic livelihood, and peaceful aspirations of Pakistan in one of the world's continuing turbulent regions.

As you are aware, even during this new era of stringent budget allocations, we have pledged to provide Pakistan with another multiyear assistance program after 1987, an unprecedented signal of our firm resolve to help Pakistan realize its long-term goals of full economic development and military modernization.

So much else depends on true restraint by Pakistan. I have asked Secretary Weinberger to discuss this issue with you in detail and to explore ways in which our concerns can be met and regional peace strengthened.

Peace also requires total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moscow's illusion of accommodation, in the form of a withdrawal of a few unimportant units, leaves much to be desired. We will continue to urge the Soviet Union to respect the clear will of the Afghan people. Like you, we will not desert the struggle to assure a proud people a chance to live free from foreign domination.

We greatly admire the tremendous sacrifices you and your people have made to care for the millions of Afghan refugees who require humanitarian assistance during this long ordeal. No

CY \_\_\_\_\_\_ F96 -108 #



other country has done more for the Afghan people than Pakistan. We commend you for your nation's continued efforts in supporting the millions of Afghan refugees who have been forced to flee their country.

In a few short years you and I have witnessed the rebirth of strong mutual defense ties. I have been gratified to see the positive way in which the Pakistan Armed Forces have responded to our modernization program. We are committed to further strengthening these close and cooperative ties.

I look forward to hearing about your meeting from Secretary Weinberger. We hope the visit will be a harbinger of improved understanding on the key issues of regional stability and genuine peace.

Sincerely, Roudd Ro

His Excellency General M. Zia-ul-Haq President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Islamabad

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

September 1, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

SUBJECT: PRG Meeting on Pakistan/Afghanistan, Wednesday, September 2, 2:00 p.m., Situation Room

### GENERAL

The two major issues for this meeting are more closely interrelated than ever:

- -- Proposals for arrangements with Pakistan and agreement with Congress on managing nuclear problems and continuing economic and military assistance.
- -- Proposals for responding to Soviet/PDPA substantive positions and propaganda campaign on Afghanistan political solution and withdrawal timetable, including coordination of USG position with GOP and Resistance in first instance.

Unless we are in a position to reassure the Government of Pakistan and convince the USSR of continued strong USG support and assistance for Pakistan, despite nuclear problems and Congress, it will be virtually impossible to sustain the close coordination of USG and GOP positions in holding firm on Afghanistan. There will be a major test during the first half of September when the UN-sponsored Geneva talks on Afghanistan resume (September 7); US-Soviet working-level talks on Afghanistan are held on September 10-11, followed by Shultz-Shevardnadze on September 15; Congress reconvenes on September 8, hears the Administration's ideas on Pak nuclear developments, and decides the week of September 21 upon FY 88 aid levels and restrictions for Pakistan.

We are almost certain to see new Soviet initiatives on "peace" in Afghanistan at the Geneva UN talks, in talks with US, and publicly at the UNGA. There will clearly be strong Congressional pressure on continued aid to Pakistan. This was foreseen and discussed at the previous PRG in July and strategy proposals requested.

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Yet as of the time of September 1st there has been no interagency discussion of what policy initiatives the Administration should take on either the Pak nuclear or the Afghan political issues. State is expected to surface some ideas at the meeting. Consideration and decision must follow very quickly. Otherwise, we will be OBE and in danger of a major foreign policy defeat.

### AFGHANISTAN

The Soviets and PDPA have substantially increased the pressure on Pakistan by means of clever propaganda, limited cross-border raids and increasingly effective (and bloody) terrorist attacks on the civilian population, stirring up domestic tribal and political animosities and focussing resentment upon continuation of the Afghanistan conflict, support for the Resistance, and reputed US pressure upon the GOP to do so. The limitations and uncertainities of our assistance relationship (e.g. no AWACS, Obey suspension of aid, possible cut-off for nuclear reasons) plus concern over the situation in the Gulf have weakened the US position with both the GOP and Pak public opinion, although Zia apparently still remains with us.

The military situation has been very favorable for the Resistance this year, and is expected to remain as favorable or even improve during the rest of the year, as the supply pipeline pumps in more and better arms. This is obviously contributing to the urgency of the Soviet efforts seeking a favorable political outcome. Politically, the Resistance is in disarray and the GOP is uncertain on how to proceed. They await strong, clear guidance from us. Specifics are needed on withdrawal (e.g. timetable, front loading, supervision, etc.) and an interim regime (e.g. role of PDPA, guarantees of neutrality, role of Resistance, Zahir Shah, etc. We expect the Soviets to come down to about twelve months for a withdrawal period. The GOP will have to respond.

The EC will undertake its own political initiative on Afghanistan in September-October and is also awaiting our guidance. This needs to be coordinated with what we, the GOP and the Resistance will do. The Saudis and PRC will need to be informed on how we intend to proceed. They and the key EC states (i.e. France, UK, FRG) should also be briefed on talks we and the GOP have with the Soviets (and PDPA).

### PAK NUCLEAR

The several issues we face with pakistan and Congress are noted on the agenda: Solarz amendment;

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Attachment

Tab A SNIE on Pakistan



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