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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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(192)

CUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Shirin Tahjr-Kheli to Powell re Trip Report, 6p <i>P, 5/19/00, NLSF96 108 #6</i>	10/26/88	P1
2. memo (90748)	Burns to John Negroponte re Zia Plane Crash, 1p <i>R, 5/17/00 NLSF96 108 #7</i>	9/23/88	P1
3. memo	Burns to Ambassador Negroponte re message to Armitage, 1p <i>R, 5/17/00 NLSF96 108 #8</i>	10/5/88	P1
4. memo	to Assistant Sec. Armitage from Oakley, 2p <i>R 5/17/00 NLSF96 108 #9</i>	n.d.	P1
5. memo	Don Gregg to VP re meeting, 1p <i>R, 5/17/00 NLSF96 108 #10</i>	10/5/88	P1
6. memo	Frank Carlucci to Mahmoud A. Haroon re: Pakistan, 2p (Partial) <i>R, 5/17/00 NLSF 96-108 #11</i>	9/28/88	P1
7. memo	re: Foreign Minister Yaqub, 1p <i>R, 5/17/00 NLSF96-108 #12</i>	n.d.	P1
8. cable	re 260500Z, 9p <i>P, 5/17/00 NLSF 96-108 #13</i>	9/26/88	P1
9. minutes (90066)	re Policy Review Group Meeting, 2p	8/17/88	P1/P5
10. memo (90696)	Burns to John Negroponte re PRG, Pakistan/Afghanistan, 5p <i>P, 5/18/00 NLSF96 108 #5</i>	9/13/88	P1
11. notes	re Pakistan, 2p <i>R 5/24/00 NLSF96-108 #16</i>	9/14	P1
12. memo (90673)	Paul Schott Stevens to Melvyn Levitsky re Presidential Letter, 1p <i>R, 5/18/00 NLSF96-108 #17</i>	8/22/88	P1
13. letter	RR to Rajiv Gandhi, 1p <i>R, 5/18/00 NLSF96-108 #18</i>	n.d.	P1
14. letter	RR to Rajiv Gandhi, 1p <i>R, 5/18/00 NLSF96-108 #19</i>	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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CUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
15. memo (90669)	Stevens to Levitsky re Presidential Letter, 1p <i>R, 5/18/00 NLSF 96-108 #20</i>	n.d.	P1
16. letter	RR to Mikhail Gorbachev, 3p <i>R, 5/18/00 NLSF 96-108 #21</i>	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 26, 1988

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI

SUBJECT: Trip Report: Pakistan and India,
October 3-2-, 1988

My visit to the subcontinent was in connection with that of the Science Advisor, Bill Graham. As such, I did more work this time which was connected with science and technology matters, in which there is enormous interest in both countries in greater cooperation with the U.S. The GOI wants collaboration in areas which are at the forefront of science where the issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) will have the greatest bearing. Graham sensitized the Indians on the need for an accord on IPR which may be a while in coming. However, the fact that negotiations are due to begin in November indicate a willingness which seemed remote, at best, prior to the Graham visit.

The GOP's concerns were more basic and limited. Despite some expenditure on S&T and a large number of specialized institutes, the Pakistani scientific effort has been largely scattered and ineffective. The help sought by the GOP is in seeking ways to consolidate its program with USG assistance to strengthen targeted areas in science. The Graham visit, which went very well, has created expectations in Islamabad of great follow-up. OSTP is planning to take the lead to see where the U.S. can best be helpful [REDACTED]

While in South Asia, I also followed up on a number of issues which are of direct interest to the NSC. Major ones are cited below.

Pakistan

I went to Pakistan after an eleven month gap. The death of President Zia has changed much in these past few months. Preceding events, e.g., the dismissal of Junejo in late May; signature of the Geneva accords in April; the scheduling of national elections for November; have created a very different political environment. My interlocutors in Pakistan included: the acting President, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister,

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The Foreign Secretary, the Defense Secretary, the Secretary for Defense Production, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of the Air Force, a few army generals and many other official and unofficial Pakistanis.

The Domestic Political Scene

Pakistanis are totally captivated by the upcoming elections on November 16 for the National Assembly and November 19 for the Provincial Assemblies. There is residual suspicion that perhaps the elections may be postponed but this skepticism is limited to a few. Most believe that all key institutions, the military, the action President, the courts, are committed to free and fair elections. There is even acceptance of the view that the military will live by the results of the elections -- which is expected to split power between Benazir Bhutto's PPP (33-45 percent of total votes expected in the National Assembly) and the Muslim League of Junejo (35 percent or so of the votes). A coalition government is the likely result which many believe is not a bad outcome since it will force otherwise recalcitrant politicians to get along with each other. However, party discipline is historically sadly lacking in Pakistan and we may see all kinds of shifts once a particular political party appears to have the upper hand. The general consensus seems to be that winning the election will be a relatively easy task compared to that of governing Pakistan after the polls.

The death of President Zia along with some of his key aides has left large numbers of Pakistanis believing that Pakistan is "finally rid of both Bhuttoism and Ziaism." That means a chance to start again, to do things differently. Most believe it is this recognition which has enabled all sides -- the executive, the military, and, the politicians to act responsibly in the past three months so as to give no reason for the postponement of elections. People are relieved that the elections will not be based on a platform of revenge, by both Benazir and Junejo, who had personal animus against Zia. Instead, "the parties will now have to stand for something" said many, even though politics in Pakistan remains largely based on personalities rather than programs.

Perceptions of the military are largely more positive than has been the case in years. The fact that elections are underway and that the Army is perceived as being willing to abide by the results, even if Benazir wins, is lauded generally. Junejo is considered less favored if the Muslim League emerges victorious because of his anti-military actions as Prime Minister. Mustafa Jatoi, a seasoned politician from the Sind, is the favored choice of the military establishment from the Muslim League.

One trend which is remarkable in that it has emerged so quickly in the few months since President Zia's death, is the decline in the role of the Mullahs. Today's Pakistan is a much more open place where religion has once more become a private affair. None of the political parties -- even the conservative Jamait-e-Islami -- is touting itself as the true repository of Islam.

While no one wants to openly acknowledge the change for fear of being accused of being anti-religion, there is a general sense of relief that the fundamentalist types no longer have the encouragement that Zia provided them. Sectarian violence in the Sind is a growing phenomenon which bodes ill for Pakistan's future, even with a Sundhi Prime Minister (both Bhutto and Junejo and Sundhis). Provincialism and parochialism are on the rise and few expect that the election will create a truly national mandate.

Afghanistan

GOP policy, which was launched by Zia, does have support, particularly as it does seem to be securing Soviet withdrawal. People recognize that only when Soviet troops have left will the nearly 3 million Afghan refugees currently in Pakistan begin to return to their country.

The U.S. is given a great deal of credit in Pakistan today for turning back the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The revival of the security assistance relationship and pressure on the Soviets have won general acceptance as two successful elements of U.S. policy. Because expectations remain high, the possibility of the U.S. being saddled with the blame for failure is also considerable. For example, if conditions within Afghanistan precipitate Soviet refusal to complete withdrawal by February 15, 1989, and thus Afghan refugees stay on in Pakistan, the U.S. could be faulted by Pakistanis generally. Under such conditions, perceptions of U.S. responsibility for the failure may emerge very quickly.

The U.S. is seen as a strong supporter of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and its Director, Hamid Gul because ISI is the conduit for supplying the Mujahedin. People believe that Zia kept control over Gul and the ISI. The new acting President does not exercise a similar role and the Army Chief of Staff, General Beg has his hands full with other matters. Many believe that Gul gets his instructions from Washington even though his support for Hekmatyar runs contrary to American predictions.

Nuclear Issues

The "bomb" still remains a popular issue in Pakistan. Zia's Time magazine interview of last year -- which acknowledged for the first time that Pakistan had the capability -- is taken at face value. Secretary Shultz' reference to non-proliferation in his speech to the SAARC countries at this year's UNGA was taken in Pakistan as clear recognition of Pakistan's view that the nuclear issue was a regional problem which can only be solved with India's help. The parallel with India is drawn uniformly in Pakistan by all segments. Few will focus on the fundamental difference under American law in the security assistance relationship that the U.S. has with Pakistan.

Key members of the Pak elite believe that the delay in this year's nuclear certification is simply a reflection of USG's bureaucratic tardiness. Many pointed out that, after all, last year certification did not occur until December. The message that we have been steadily delivering on the importance of Pakistan subscribing to the nuclear red lines may need strengthening very quickly after the Pak election. Bob Oakley mentioned that it may be appropriate to quietly send in someone like Dick Kennedy to engage in a discussion of our concerns with the GOP in early December. If it is true that given certain Pak nuclear activities, next year's certification is problematic, this is the year we need to press the GOP. Our message: U.S. policy has enabled Pakistan to keep the relationship with the U.S. and its own capability intact. Any further encroachment in the nuclear red lines will cause a rupture in the relationship

[REDACTED]

Narcotics will become a growing issue under a civilian government. Already, politicians in the N.W.F.P., where poppy cultivation is heaviest, are running on the platform that they will protect the farmers from government interference in what crops can be grown. The head of the Narcotics Control Board in Peshawar showed me a recent letter from President Ghulam Isahq Khan pressing law enforcement officials to maintain strict controls on narcotics production and trafficking so that "Pakistan can uphold its international commitment and prevent further drug addiction in the country." Pakistan already has over 600,000 new addicts -many of them from the middle class. There is growing interest in U.S. assistance in drug rehabilitation techniques.

The Military is a considerably sobered institution in the aftermath of the death of President Zia and so many senior officers on August 17. It remains a cohesive force, specially since it still sees itself as the true protector of the nation. There seems to be a genuine desire to have fair elections and a hope that the victorious parties (a week center is expected since no single party may garner a clear majority -- not a bad outcome from the military's point of view) can "get their act together and run things properly." The Services are coordinating closely through the Service Chiefs and the system appears more egalitarian than was the case under Zia -- this includes ISI Director Hamid Gul who has very little oversight today and is not accountable to the current President as he was to President Zia. General Beg, the Army Chief of Staff is well liked but some senior officers do not think he has the political acumen of Zia. The fact that Beg is a Muhajir (emigrant from India) is liked because it denies him a local base in today's parochial Pakistan. Zia was a Punjabi which meant other groups resented him.

The military hierarchy seems comfortable with the current leadership of Acting President Ghulam Isahaq Khan (or GIK, as he is referred to) and Defense Secretary Zaidi. Both are considered honest and tough men. The military wants to acquire U.S.

equipment quickly before any downturn in relations occurs. Thus, the request for 60 additional F-16s [REDACTED]

The conclusion, despite a weak economy, Pakistanis today seem buoyed by the possibility of sorting themselves out through the electoral process, even though many acknowledge that the problems may actually begin after November 16, 1988. The American stake is considered to be high since the U.S. role in pressing for elections and in forcing the Soviets out of Afghanistan is seen as being the primary one. If things go wrong, the U.S. could just as easily be stuck with the blame.

India

My stay in Delhi was considerably shorter, although I did meet with Prime Minister Gandhi, the Foreign Secretary, the Defense Advisor, senior Indians in the Prime Minister's office, the foreign office, and, political leaders. Some of the key impressions gathered from my talks are discussed below.

Domestic Politics.

Prime Minister Gandhi is in considerable trouble politically. The base of his support is shrinking and even his advisors admit that Gandhi has "lost the lower middle and middle class" which he carried in the 1984 elections. Indian intellectuals are also disenchanted so that press reporting is skewered against Gandhi. The basic change is one of political nainete, ineptitude, and toleration of massive corruption around him. Gandhi's name is still magic to the poorer Indians who see little wrong with dynastic rule in India. Therefore, Gandhi is spending a great deal of time outside the capital in mass gatherings where he is best at working the crowd. He is not a very effective public speaker which will become a liability as the elections -- which must be called by the end of 1989 -- draws near.

Former Finance Minister, V.P. Singh, is seen as the "moral" choice for the Prime Ministership. Different groups are coalescing around him and he may be able to mount a real challenge to Gandhi.

Bilateral Relations

India's relations with the U.S. are in good shape and this is better accepted today than I can remember in the recent past. Improved U.S. ties are seen as a definite plus for Gandhi who successfully points to items such as the Supercomputer as proof of India's special status. Increased trade (nearly \$5 billion); better dialogue, including the ability to discuss differences; better access to U.S. senior officials; increased access to U.S. technology are all positive elements in Indo-U.S. relations. These relations are also not without limit -- as the negotiations on an intellectual property accord are likely to show.

The GOI holds the U.S. responsible for not "having controlled Pakistan's nuclear weapons program." Indians say that Dukakis as President would have been expected to be tougher on Pakistan on nuclear matters since his advisors have a record on the issue. However, a Bush victory is welcomed at the top in the hope of continuity of support for India's particular needs from the U.S.

Indo-Pak Relations

Once promising, the pattern has become dismal. At the root is GOI's total and firm belief that Pakistan is fomenting trouble in the Panjab and inciting the Sikhs. (This suspicion is fed by the Indian intelligence service, RAW. On the Pak side, ISI is considerably hawkish on India [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] The Indian's magnify Pakistan's role in their Panjab troubles even though GOI officials will privately concede that India would have a Sikh problem even if there were no Pakistan. In any case, it is politically useful for Gandhi to cite Pak interference in an election year. Thus, it is unlikely that we will see any improvement in the Indo-Pak relationship which was moving well until Junejo stymied it in March, 1986. However, the GOI and the GOP are working to limit further damage and are keeping a number of items under discussion: Siachin glacier problems; trade talks; Interior Minister's discussion on patrolling the border, to name a few. The basic point is that several agreements are nearly in place but no further progress can be expected until there is political will at the top for a break-through.

Gandhi will be going to Islamabad in December for the SAARC Summit. Bilateral meetings could provide the psychological boost which could put the relationship on a better track, particularly since Pakistan will have an elected civilian leader at the time. Gandhi has repeatedly told senior U.S. officials that it is harder to do business with the military leadership in Pakistan, even though the record clearly indicates otherwise. When asked about the apparent contradiction, a close advisor of a Gandhi told me: "It is easier to reach an agreement with a strong military leader in Pakistan, but it is harder to sell such an agreement in India."

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



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dlb
11/6/85

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October 3, 1985

-historical only

TO: L - Judge Sofaer

THROUGH: L - Michael J. Matheson ^{was}

FROM: L/N - Ronald J. Bettauer ^{POB}

SUBJECT: Pakistan Certification Requirement in Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act

Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. 2375(e), added by section 902 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, P.L. 99-83 (August 8, 1985), provides:

No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

Legislative History

Previously, there was no such requirement in the law. In 1984, Senator Cranston had proposed a more stringent provision, including a requirement that the President certify that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear explosive device, or acquiring technology or equipment for that purpose. Informal negotiation resulted in Senator Pressler offering an alternative along the lines set forth above, which the Administration said it could accept. The provision was reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (copy of report language attached), but not enacted.

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In the spring of 1985, an identical provision to the one reported in 1984 was proposed by Senator Mathias. Under Secretary Schneider (upon advice from NEA and H) said at a hearing that it was acceptable (knowing that the Administration had said this the previous year, but not aware of intelligence acquired since then). Strategies for eliminating or modifying the provision were discussed among L, Under Secretary Armacost, NEA and H, but H said that it would be impossible to change this language, and Under Secretary Armacost decided not to press for a change. Thus, subparagraph (e) was added to section 620E.

There is scarcely any legislative history on the meaning of the section. House Report 99-39, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 11, 1985), says, at pp. 98-99:

Section 1104 amends sections 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act by adding a new subsection (e). The new subsection prohibits assistance, and sales or transfers of military equipment or technology, to Pakistan unless the President certifies to the Speaker of the House and the Chairman of the Foreign Relation Committee, that (1) Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that (2) the proposed U.S. assistance will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. The certification is to be made during the fiscal year in which the assistance is to be furnished or the military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred.

In adding this subsection, the Committee wishes to reiterate its continuing concern over Pakistan's attempt to acquire a nuclear explosive capability, recognizing that the motives driving such attempts are regional in nature, and not unique to Pakistan. The Committee also notes that Pakistan is the only country for which waivers of sections 669 and 670 of the [sic] Foreign Assistance Act are currently in force; hence its particular attention to Pakistan.

Senate Report 99-34, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 19, 1985) has a similarly brief comment on this provision on p. 45:

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This section, which was offered by Senator Mathias and co-sponsored by Senators Pressler and Boschwitz, conditions future U.S. assistance and military sales to Pakistan on an annual Presidential certification that (1) Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and (2) the proposed U.S. assistance will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosives device. The amendment is the same as adopted by the Committee last year.

The Committee believes that continued U.S. assistance to the people of Pakistan is currently in the national security interests of both countries. However, the Committee is deeply concerned by the continued development of military capabilities in Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program which jeopardizes future U.S. economic and military assistance.

The Conference Report, (House Report 99-237, filed July 29, 1985) does not mention the provision. The provision was not modified during the conference, as it was identical in both bills under consideration. The provision was not discussed on the floor of either the Senate or the House at any time.

From the foregoing it is clear that both Houses wished to see the assistance program for Pakistan continued, but also wished to state a concern about Pakistan's attempts to acquire nuclear explosive devices. They therefore provided for a termination of the U.S. economic and military assistance program in the event that the certification called for by the statute could not be made. The provision seems to be aimed both at deterring Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear explosive device and at ensuring that if it does so, the United States will not provide assistance, or sell or transfer military equipment or technology, to Pakistan.

Language of the Provision

The scope of assistance covered by section 620E(e) is far broader than any previous sanction legislation adopted in the nuclear field. The provision covers assistance by any agency under any act as well as military equipment or technology sales or transfers pursuant to the authorities contained in any act. By contrast, sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act apply to carefully defined (but major) categories of economic and military assistance.

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To avoid the application of this drastic cut-off, section 620E(e) requires two findings: (1) a finding of fact -- that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, and (2) a judgmental finding -- that the assistance program will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess such a device.

Making the judgment of fact required by section 620E(e) involves difficult interpretive issues concerning what it is to "possess a nuclear explosive device". The term "nuclear explosive device" itself is clear. It is used in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, in all post-1978 U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements, and in IAEA safeguards agreements since the early 1970s, although it is not explicitly defined in any of these documents. ("Atomic weapon" is defined in section 11(e) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2014(e), as a device utilizing atomic energy the principal purpose of which is for use as a weapon; this definition does not provide substantive clarification of what an atomic weapon or nuclear explosive device is.) A nuclear explosive device is a device designed to explode due to the rapid release of energy through nuclear fission or fusion. On the other hand, no previous document uses the term "possess" with respect to a nuclear explosive device, although there are provisions on the "manufacture" or "acquisition" of nuclear explosive device and on research on or development of such a devices.

The meaning of the word "possess" in the statute is thus a matter of first impression, about which there is no legislative history. It is clear that if a country has either manufactured or otherwise obtained an assembled nuclear explosive device, it possesses such a device. Further, it seems clear that if a country has all the necessary components and can assemble them into a functioning device, but they are disassembled and kept either at different rooms of the same building, in different buildings, or in different locations, the country possesses such a device. This latter view is justified because a country may decide to keep a device unassembled for safety reasons, and may be in a position rapidly to assemble it upon a decision to do so. The Congressional intent in enacting the provision would be vitiated if Pakistan could avoid the prohibition by having the disassembled components of a device ready for assembly on short order.

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It would seem equally clear that a country does not possess a nuclear explosive device if one or more of the essential elements required to assemble a device -- non-nuclear parts, nuclear material, technical capabilities, or the ability to integrate them into a functioning device -- are lacking. Such an element may be lacking either because the country has not reached the stage of development technically necessary to achieve completion, or because it has made a policy decision not to proceed with that step. In either event, what the country possesses is not yet a "nuclear explosive device."

Never adopted

There are difficult grey areas between possession and non-possession. If a country has made a policy decision to halt development of its capabilities two days short of having everything in place to possess a nuclear explosive device, it would seem inappropriate to determine that they did not possess such a device. If the country had decided to stop its development program one year short of completion, it would seem inappropriate to determine that it did possess such a device. The longer the amount of time the more significant the policy constraint is and the more uncertainties there are about whether a country would ultimately be in a position to possess such a device. The finder of fact should be alerted to this consideration, but will have to determine, in an ambiguous case, whether the period of time or the remaining tasks until all the capabilities for possession are in place is sufficiently short so that the country should be found to possess the device, or sufficiently long and uncertain so that it should be considered not to possess it.

The second substantive matter required to be certified under section 620E(e) is that the proposed U.S. assistance program will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. Obviously, this certification is only an issue if it is determined that the certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device can be made. Assuming, therefore, that the former certification is warranted, whether the second certification should be made requires a subjective judgment based on the prediction of future events.

The reasoning behind the assertion that the assistance program for fiscal '86 will significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device consistent with past Administration statements, and is set forth both in the action memorandum to the Secretary and the proposed memorandum to the President. Further, the 1984 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report specifically endorsed this rationale

in stating that a termination of assistance to Pakistan: ". . . could convince the Pakistanis that the rapid acquisition of a nuclear device is the only way to provide for their national security. Preservation of our existing program of security assistance to Pakistan is essential for our efforts to discourage that country from obtaining a nuclear capability. Our security assistance is providing an alternative way for Pakistanis to deflect their nuclear ambitions." It must also be borne in mind that the more imminent it appears that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device, the less credible the argument becomes that the assistance program will significantly reduce that risk. Nevertheless, if a significant component of a nuclear explosive capability is lacking, either because of technical or policy constraints, it is clearly possible and justifiable for a policy-maker to make the second certification.

Implementation of the Provision

Under section 620E(e) the President is required to certify in writing both the existence of a fact and a prediction about the future.

With regard to the certification of fact (that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device) a search of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases over the last 20 years has not revealed any discussion that is clearly on point concerning the standards that the President should apply in making this type of certification in the foreign affairs field. In the analogous area of international trade, however, there is some interesting case law. In the key case, the President was charged by statute with approving rates of duty and charges if in his judgment they were shown necessary by the Tariff Commission to equalize differences in costs in production. When the President's decision was challenged, the Supreme Court held:

. . . the judgment of the President that on the facts, adduced in pursuance of the procedure prescribed by Congress, a change of rate is necessary is no more subject to judicial review under this statutory scheme than if Congress itself had exercised that judgment. It has long been held that where Congress has authorized a public officer to take some specified legislative action when in his judgment that action is necessary or appropriate to carry out the policy of Congress, the judgment of the officer as to the existence of the facts calling for that action is not subject to review. [Citations omitted] As stated by Mr.

Justice Story in Martin v. Mott, supra, pp. 31-32: "Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts."

For the judiciary to probe the reasoning which underlies this Proclamation would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative and executive domains. Under the Constitution, it is exclusively for Congress, or those to whom it delegates authority, to determine what tariffs shall be imposed. Here the President acted in full conformity with the statute. No question of law is raised when the exercise of his discretion is challenged.

United States v. Bush, 310 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1940).

Recent cases in the international trade field have taken the same position as in the Bush case. It has been held that the President's motives, his reasoning, his finding of facts, and his judgment, are immune from judicial scrutiny. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795-96 (Fed. Cir. 1984); U.S. Cane Sugar Refiner's Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 404 (C.C.P.A. 1982).

It is doubtful that a court would ever exercise jurisdiction over a challenge to a Presidential finding under 620E(e) of the FAA because of the political question doctrine, lack of standing and other doctrines of abstention. However, if the issue ever found its way into the judiciary, the foregoing line of cases could be relied upon to argue that the judiciary could not review the President's finding of fact or the basis for his finding of fact. In this case, the argument would be especially trenchant because the President's findings would rely heavily on intelligence information.

Even if no court is in a position to review the President's finding of fact under section 620E(e), the Congress will certainly be in a position to question him on it if it wishes. Thus, it will be important to be able to defend the way the President arrived at his finding as being reasonable and in accordance with the statutory intent. It seems clear that we can maintain that the President is called upon to make his best judgment on all the information available to the U.S. Government. Since the statute is written in a manner which will require that the President review intelligence information in reaching his judgment and since the information available in

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such a field will always be incomplete and subject to judgments concerning its reliability, it would be unreasonable to expect any certification to be equivalent to a guarantee of the truth of the facts certified to.

In particular, Congress clearly could not have intended that the President only certify if he could affirmatively establish by concrete evidence that such an event had not occurred; by its very nature, the clandestine possession of a nuclear device would be very hard to detect, and impossible to disprove in the case of any country with significant capabilities. It is much more reasonable to assume that the Congress intended that the President could certify if, after reasonable intelligence efforts, the information available to him does not yield the conclusion that Pakistan does not possess such a device. If it later proves that the certification was in error, the President can explain that the judgment made at the time was made in good faith on the evidence available and relevant to the issue not based on considerations other than as provided by law and consequently was not in violation of law.

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F-1 85 Suborganization

Calendar No. 781

98TH CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT NO.
98-400

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT OF 1984

R E P O R T

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ON

S. 2582

To provide a supplemental authorization of appropriations for the fiscal year 1984 for certain foreign assistance programs; to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and other acts to authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 1985 for international security and development assistance, the Peace Corps and the International Development Association; and for other purposes.



APRIL 18, 1984.—Ordered to be printed

Filed under authority of the order of the Senate of April 13 (legislative day, March 26), 1984

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WASHINGTON : 1984

★(Star print)

CYPRUS

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	Fiscal year—		
	1984 actual	1985 administration request	1985 SFRC recommendation
	138.5	175	175
	130.0	230	215
	0	250	500
		275	
	500.0	500	500
	15.0	3	15

ators Pressler and Biden, and that the Cyprus situation had substantial progress toward a settlement. However, the situation became considerably worse in 1984 when the Cypriots declared independence. The world in its recognition of that and other NATO allies urged the Turkish Cypriots to reverse their position. When the U.S. Administration received the 1985 foreign assistance request for Cyprus, it was less than the previous year. Moreover, the Administration did not increase the assistance for Cyprus to 1984 levels, and in the FY 1985 ratio which has evolved to 1984 levels to these two NATO allies. The amendment argued that the proposed bill provided no incipient steps to resolve the Cyprus situation in fiscal year 1985 foreign assistance. The amendment represented a signal to Turkey that U.S. assistance was necessary. The amendment was designed to provide Turkey with a significant influence with the Turkish Government. The progress on the Cyprus situa-

The Pressler-Biden amendment for fiscal year 1985 Administration request for minimum NATO responsibility situation, amendment opposite to condition U.S. assistance for Cyprus for which Turkey did not have half of the dispute. Additionally to have the opposite effect would be less likely to try to help Cyprus if they were doing so only for their own assistance. After extensive review of the Pressler-Biden amendment says.

Also, during Committee markup of March 28, the Committee adopted by voice vote a proposal by Senators Pell and Percy to increase Economic Support Fund assistance for Cyprus from the \$3 million requested by the Administration for fiscal year 1985 to \$15 million, an amount equal to that authorized by the Committee for fiscal year 1984. These funds are intended to be used for housing, medical assistance, educational scholarships, and refugee resettlement on Cyprus.

I. Assistance to Pakistan

The Committee expressed its deep concern about reports of Pakistan's continued acquisition of unsafeguarded nuclear capabilities. The Committee passed an amendment which would require the Administration to terminate all assistance should the Pakistanis obtain possession of a nuclear explosive device. This amendment extends the current standards for terminating assistance from detonation to possession of a nuclear device.

J. Assistance to the Philippines

The issue of assistance to the Philippines sparked substantial debate at the Committee markup. Senators Cranston, Glenn and Pell introduced an amendment that would have increased the Philippines' grant ESF aid by \$60 million in lieu of \$60 million in FMS guaranteed loans. The amendment also directed that 75 percent of the ESF funds be obligated for development projects instead of debt servicing functions and required the President to make a positive determination that the Philippines were making progress toward ending human rights' abuses.

Senator Murkowski successfully offered a substitute that provided \$30 million additional ESF for the Philippines but reduced the Administration's request for \$60 million in FMS loans to \$30 million. Senator Murkowski's amendment also specified that the FMS loans should be obligated at market rates. In deleting the requirement for a human rights determination, Senator Murkowski argued that his cut in FMS credits provided a clear signal to the Philippine Government that progress on eliminating human rights abuses was an important matter for the Committee. Subsequent to the passage of Senator Murkowski's substitute amendment, Senator Glenn requested that the Committee adopt report language specifically linking the authorization of military assistance to the Philippines with its concern over the brutal assassination of Philippine Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. The Committee unanimously adopted report language indicating that:

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee expects to be consulted by the Administration on the progress or findings of the Agrava Commission before military aid funds authorized in this legislation are initially obligated.

The Committee also adopted an amendment by Senator Pell to incorporate Senator Kennedy's resolution deploring the brutal assassination of Benigno Aquino, registering Congressional interest in the investigation of his murder and urging the Government of the Philippines to take the necessary steps to achieve genuine, free

ment of State. The Committee expects that the Department will endeavor to obtain assurances from the foreign countries concerned that they will negotiate the appropriate measures with the American copyright owners. However, the FCC has never authorized the interception or rebroadcasting of pay-TV signals by anyone in the United States or abroad. Such practices amount to theft of American motion pictures and must be stopped.

The Committee encourages the Jamaican Broadcasting Corporation to negotiate the purchase of films as they become available for TV through normal commercial channels. The Committee urges the Administration to use this amendment to initiate negotiations with Jamaica.

Section 1007—Nuclear nonproliferation conditions for assistance for Pakistan

This section, which was co-sponsored by Senators Pressler, Mathias, and Percy, conditions future U.S. assistance and military sales to Pakistan on an annual Presidential certification that (1) Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and (2) the proposed U.S. assistance will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device. This section is a clear and unmistakable signal to the Government and people of Pakistan that although the United States considers its security relationship with Pakistan of the utmost importance to the national interest of both our nations, the acquisition by Pakistan of a nuclear device would terminate that relationship.

No issue is more important to the interest of the United States and mankind as a whole than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Committee adopted this provision April 4, 1984 on a 9-8 vote as a substitute for a provision, offered by Senators Cranston and Glenn, which the Committee had adopted in its March 28 meeting. Voting for the substitute were Senators Percy, Baker, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Hawkins and Tsongas. Voting to retain the Cranston-Glenn language were Senators Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Cranston, Dodd, and Murkowski.

The Cranston-Glenn amendment imposed alternative non-proliferation conditions on United States assistance to Pakistan. Specifically it required the President to certify, during the year in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment is to be sold, that "Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear explosive device, and is not acquiring, overtly or covertly, technology, material, or equipment for the purpose of manufacturing or detonating a nuclear explosive device."

Senators Cranston and Glenn noted that on December 8, 1982 Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq told the Foreign Policy Association in New York "I would like to state once again, and with all the emphasis at my command that our ongoing nuclear program has an exclusively peaceful dimension and that Pakistan has neither the means or indeed any desire to manufacture a nuclear device."

Senators Cranston and Glenn pointed out that their amendment would do no more than conform the non-proliferation conditions on U.S. assistance to Pakistan to the commitments freely given by President Zia. The amendment would, in the view of the propo-

nents, be an effective tool in our arms control program at its present level. The Glenn amendment argued for a more aggressive approach and would allow for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

While fully supporting the amendment, the Committee believes that the rapid termination of our security assistance to Pakistanis that the rapid way to provide for their existing program of security efforts to discourage our efforts to discourage our security assistance to Pakistanis to deflect their

U.S. Government effort from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Our effort to persuade Pakistanis that nuclear weapons are not in their best interest and that conventional defense is the only relationship with the U.S. that will ensure their national security.

This section underscores the Committee's determination that the possible spread of nuclear weapons to Pakistan would be a serious threat to our national security. If Pakistan fails to meet the goals of the amendment, it would, in the Committee's view, jeopardize our national security. This amendment is intended for other recipients.

Section 1008—Policy on

This provision, offered by Senators Pell and Pressler, "to support the holding of free elections in which all candidates have the right to compete." The amendment "support and promote the rights in Pakistan and the freedom of the press, the right of life, liberty, or

A shared commitment on the basis for the strongest relationship between the United States and other nations that prolonged military assistance to Pakistan could undermine the States-Pakistan relationship.

Senator Cranston noted that he will hold elections announced and cancelled it is widely expected

jects that the Department will en-
force the foreign countries concerned
appropriate measures with the Ameri-
the FCC has never authorized the
pay-TV signals by anyone in the
practices amount to theft of Ameri-
stopped.

Jamaican Broadcasting Corpora-
films as they become available for
channels. The Committee urges
amendment to initiate negotiations

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sponsored by Senators Pressler, Ma-
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nents, be an effective tool in stopping the Pakistan nuclear weap-
ons program at its present level. The proponents of the Cranston-
Glenn amendment argued that the Committee substitute, while an
improvement over existing law, is much weaker than their ap-
proach and would allow Pakistan to come much closer to posses-
sion of a nuclear weapon before jeopardizing United States assist-
ance.

While fully supporting the intent of the Cranston/Glenn amend-
ment, the Committee believed that this amendment if it led to the
termination of our security assistance programs, could convince the
Pakistanis that the rapid acquisition of a nuclear device is the only
way to provide for their national security. Preservation of our ex-
isting program of security assistance to Pakistan is essential for
our efforts to discourage that country from obtaining a nuclear ca-
pability. Our security assistance is providing an alternative way for
Pakistanis to deflect their nuclear ambitions.

U.S. Government efforts to dissuade the Government of Pakistan
from acquiring a nuclear device are making progress. Realistically,
our effort to persuade Pakistan to abandon its nuclear ambitions
will require a sustained, consistent effort to convince the Paki-
stanis that nuclear weapons are not in their own best interests,
and that conventional defense combined with a strong security re-
lationship with the U.S. provides the best guarantee of their na-
tional security.

This section underscores the widespread concern in the Commit-
tee about the possible spread of nuclear weapons to South Asia and
the Committee's determination to assure that provisions of U.S. as-
sistance to Pakistan furthers attaining of U.S. non-proliferation
goals. If Pakistan fails to be responsive, this would, in the Commit-
tee's view, jeopardize Congressional approval of future assistance to
Pakistan. This amendment, of course, would not affect assistance
intended for other recipients in Pakistan, such as the Afghan refu-
gees.

Section 1008—Policy on Pakistan

This provision, offered by Senator Cranston and cosponsored by
Senators Pell and Pressler, makes it the policy of the United States
"to support the holding in Pakistan of fair and impartial elections
in which all candidates and political parties may freely partici-
pate." The amendment also states that the United States shall
"support and promote the observance of fundamental human
rights in Pakistan and other countries including freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom from
denial of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

A shared commitment to human rights and democracy forms the
basis for the strongest and most enduring relations between the
United States and other countries. The Committee is concerned
that prolonged military rule and continued human rights abuses in
Pakistan could undermine support in both countries for the United
States-Pakistan relationship.

Senator Cranston noted, that while President Zia has announced
he will hold elections by March 1985, Zia has twice before an-
nounced and cancelled elections. Senator Cranston also noted that
it is widely expected that in the upcoming elections Zia will dis-

1984 history

THE CRANSTON-GLENN AMENDMENT ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
CONDITIONS ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is further amended by adding the following after Section 620E:

(e) No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, during the year in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear explosive device, and is not acquiring, overtly or covertly, technology, material, or equipment for the purpose of manufacturing or detonating a nuclear explosive device.]

(Adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as an amendment to S. 2582 on March 28, 1984; reconsidered and deleted on April 3, 1984).

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PK, US
SUBJECT: TEXT OF CRANSTON SPEECH ON NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

REF: USINFO 02122392 JUNE 84)

1. FOLLOWING IS AN ADDRESS BY U.S. SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON
(D-CALIF.) DELIVERED JUNE 21 ON THE SENATE FLOOR:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

NOWHERE IN THE WORLD IS WAR RAGING WITH FEWER RESTRAINTS
AND MORE SERIOUS THREATS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.

WE ARE WITNESSING A CONTINUING DEATH STRUGGLE IN THE
PERSIAN GULF BETWEEN THE TWO NEIGHBORING STATES OF IRAN
AND IRAQ. WITHOUT REGARD TO TRADITIONAL RULES OF WAR,
THEY ARE USING EVERY POSSIBLE WEAPON AGAINST EACH OTHER
IN WHAT BEGAN AS A MINOR TERRITORIAL DISPUTE.

WE ARE SEEING AN INTERMINABLE CONFLICT IN LEBANON, WHERE
THE FORCES OF TERRORISTS AND EXTREMIST FACTIONS HAVE YET
TO BE VANQUISHED.

AND WE ARE WITNESSING VICIOUS CIVIL STRIFE ACROSS
RELIGIOUS DIVIDES IN INDIA, AND ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION.

IN CONFLICTS IN THIS REGION, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES HAVE
BEEN NO BAR TO THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TO THE
SEIZURE OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, TO SEVERAL ATTACKS ON
NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, TO ASSAULTS ON RELIGIOUS SITES, TO
THE DEPLOYMENT OF BRIGADES OF CHILDREN AS HUMAN "MINE
SWEEPERS," AND TO NUMEROUS ATTACKS ON NEUTRAL COMMERCIAL
SHIPPING.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS -- AND TO THE
INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE REGION -- IF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE TO PLAY A ROLE IN THESE UNRESTRAINED
WARS. IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE IN THE HANDS OF MANY OF
THESE COMBATANTS, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT
THEY WOULD BE USED. SUPERPOWERS ALLIED WITH ONE OR
ANOTHER NATION MIGHT BE DRAWN DIRECTLY INTO A REGIONAL
CONFLICT AFTER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD WAS CROSSED. THIS
IS PERHAPS THE MOST LIKELY WAY THAT A GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR
COULD BEGIN.

COURSE OF PAST U.S. POLICY

UNITED STATES POLICYMAKERS HAVE LONG RECOGNIZED THE
SPECIAL DANGER OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THIS REGION.

UNDER THE FORD ADMINISTRATION, CONCERTED EFFORTS WERE

MADE TO AVERT A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE ON THE SUBCONTINENT.
UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, STRONG PRESSURES WERE
BROUGHT AGAINST INDIA TO REJECT A DEDICATED MILITARY
NUCLEAR PROGRAM; STRONG SANCTIONS WERE PLACED ON ANY U.S.
ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN SO LONG AS IT HAD A VIGOROUS
PROGRAM TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND SIGNIFICANT
PROGRESS WAS MADE WITH NUCLEAR SUPPLIER NATIONS TO AGREE
ON EXPORT RESTRAINTS.

A FEW RELATED EFFORTS CONTINUED UNDER THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS IN DISCOURAGING OTHER NUCLEAR
SUPPLIER NATIONS FROM GIVING ANY LEGITIMACY TO THE
PAKISTANI "PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM THAT IS SO
CLEARLY DEDICATED TO PRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. UNDER
U.S. PRESSURE, NO WESTERN REACTOR VENDORS HAVE RESPONDED
TO PAKISTANI SOLICITATION OF BIDS FOR THEIR FIRST LARGE

NUCLEAR ENERGY GENERATING REACTOR.

NEVERTHELESS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT
DEMONSTRATED A FIRM COMMITMENT TO COMBATTING NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION. ASKED ABOUT THE DANGER OF PROLIFERATION
IN PAKISTAN AND ELSEWHERE, RONALD REAGAN STATED ON
JANUARY 31, 1980 IN JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA THAT "I JUST
DON'T THINK IT'S ANY OF OUR BUSINESS" IF THEY BUILD
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUBSEQUENTLY, HIS ADMINISTRATION
BROUGHT LITTLE PRESSURE TO BEAR AGAINST SUCH EFFORTS. IN
FACT, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS IN EFFECT SUBSIDIZED THE
PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFORT. PAKISTANI LEADER
GENERAL ZIA HAS RECEIVED MORE THAN HALF OF A DOLS 3.2
BILLION U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
OUTSIDE OF OUR CAMP DAVID TREATY OBLIGATIONS, THIS IS
CURRENTLY THE LARGEST DIRECT U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION STATED
THAT THIS MONEY HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO GIVE PAKISTAN A
SENSE OF SECURITY BY ENABLING IT TO BUILD-UP ITS
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES. THE ADMINISTRATION HOPED
PAKISTANI LEADERS WOULD THEN HONOR THEIR PLEDGES NOT TO
PURSUE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. BUT PAKISTAN HAS
RELENTLESSLY PURSUED THE NUCLEAR PATH NONETHELESS.

ON APRIL 27, 1980, THE EVE OF A CONGRESSIONAL DECISION TO
GIVE AN UNPRECEDENTED COUNTRY-SPECIFIC NONPROLIFERATION
WAIVER FOR AID TO PAKISTAN, I ADDRESSED THE SENATE. I
WARNED THAT CONGRESS WAS BEING KEPT IN THE DARK ABOUT TWO
FACTS GENERALLY KNOWN TO EXPERTS AND ANALYSTS: INDIA AND
PAKISTAN WERE PREPARING NUCLEAR TESTS SITES AND PAKISTAN
WAS NEARING COMPLETION OF A PILOT-SCALE REPROCESSING
PLANT CAPABLE OF EXTRACTING SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF
PLUTONIUM THAT WOULD BE USABLE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SUBSEQUENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THESE
FACTS BUT WENT AHEAD WITH THE PAKISTAN AID PROGRAM.

CONGRESS HAS SINCE BEEN GIVEN REPEATED ASSURANCES BY
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS THAT THIS DOLS 3.2 BILLION AID
PROGRAM -- ALONG WITH THE SALE OF 40 F-16 AIRCRAFT -- HAS
BEEN SERVING THE U.S. INTEREST IN CHECKING PAKISTAN'S
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DRIVE. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES
BUCKLEY TOLD THE SENATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON
JUNE 24, 1981, "I WAS ASSURED BY THE (PAKISTANI)
MINISTERS AND BY THE PRESIDENT (ZIA) HIMSELF THAT IT WAS
NOT THE INTENTION OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP
NUCLEAR WEAPONS." THEN ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1981, UNDER
SECRETARY BUCKLEY DECLARED: "I FULLY ACCEPT THE
STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT ZIA THAT PAKISTAN HAS NO INTENTION
OF MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ACQUIRING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS" AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS PUBLICLY
ACCEPTED GENERAL ZIA'S PLEDGE OF DECEMBER 9, 1982 BEFORE
THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK CITY WHEN HE

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FORCE (SNF) COULD THREATEN NATIONAL SURVIVAL, A FACT THAT WOULD MAKE SNF APPEARANCE IMMENSELY DESTABILIZING. OIL AND OTHER PHYSICAL ASSETS COULD ALSO BE DESTROYED MORE THOROUGHLY AND QUICKLY BY SNFS THAN BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUPPORTED AND ADVANCED AS PROMISING AN "ISLAMIC BOMB." IT IS FAIR TO ASK WHETHER IT IS IN THE PAKISTANIS' EYE -- OR IN THE EYES OF NERVOUS AMERICANS OR ISRAELIS OR HINDUS -- THAT THIS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS SO VIEWED.

ONE SHOULD BE RELUCTANT TO BRAND PEOPLE AND CHARACTERIZE FORCES POORLY UNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST. BUT CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR BOMB IN A "HOLY WAR" SEEM JUSTIFIED BY THE WORDS OF THE PROGRAM'S ARCHITECTS. AT SOME POINT, ONE HAS TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE STATEMENTS OF PAKISTAN'S LEADERS. LET ME QUOTE FROM GENERAL ZIA: "CHINA, INDIA, THE USSR AND ISRAEL POSSESS THE ATOMIC ARMS. NO MUSLIM COUNTRY HAS ANY. IF PAKISTAN HAD SUCH A WEAPON, IT WOULD REINFORCE THE POWER OF THE MUSLIM WORLD." OR AS PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO WROTE IN HIS MEMOIRS: "WE KNOW THAT ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA HAVE FULL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THE CHRISTIAN, JEWISH AND HINDU CIVILIZATION HAVE THIS CAPABILITY. THE COMMUNIST POWERS ALSO POSSESS IT. ONLY THE ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION WAS WITHOUT IT, BUT THAT POSITION WAS ABOUT TO CHANGE" WITH THE ADVENT OF BHUTTO'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

MOST TO THE POINT ARE RECENT STATEMENTS BY DR. A. Q. KHAN, WHOM THE PAKISTANI JOURNAL NAVA-I-WAQF ON MARCH 16 OF THIS YEAR CALLED "THE WORLD RENOWNED AND LEGENDARY-IR-HIS-LIFETIME DR. KHAN."

IN HIS STARTLINGLY FRANK INTERVIEW WITH NAVA-I-WAQF PUBLISHED ON FEBRUARY 18 OF THIS YEAR, THE "FATHER" OF THE PAKISTANI BOMB STATED:

-- ALL THE WESTERN COUNTRIES INCLUDING ISRAEL ARE NOT ONLY PAKISTAN'S ENEMIES BUT ALSO ENEMIES OF ISLAM. IF SOME OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRY HAD ACCOMPLISHED THE SAME THING (AS PAKISTAN'S BREAKTHROUGH ON URANIUM ENRICHMENT), THE SAME VENEROUS AND FALSE PROPAGANDA WOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED AGAINST IT AS WELL. THE EXAMPLES OF IRAQ AND LIBYA ARE BEFORE YOU. EVEN THOUGH THESE COUNTRIES ARE NOT CAPABLE OF MANUFACTURING AN ATOMIC BOMB FOR A LONG TIME YET, WESTERN MEDIA SOURCES ARE CONDUCTING A VIOLENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THEM. ALL THIS IS PART OF THE CRUSADES WHICH THE CHRISTIANS AND JEWS INITIATED AGAINST THE MUSLIMS 1808 YEARS AGO. THEY ARE AFRAID THAT IF PAKISTAN MAKES OBVIOUS PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD THAT THE WHOLE ISLAMIC WORLD WILL STAND TO BENEFIT.

KHAN WENT ON TO CHARGE THAT "THE 'ISLAMIC BOMB' IS A FIGMENT OF THE ZIONIST MIND AND THIS HAS BEEN USED FULL FORCE BY THE ANTI-ISLAMIC WESTERN COUNTRIES." HE INSISTED THAT THE ONLY REASON HE WAS CONVICTED OF STEALING SENSITIVE NUCLEAR DESIGN INFORMATION BY A DUTCH

COURT WAS THAT ALL THESE CHARGES AND COURT CASES WERE IMPOSED AT THE INSISTENCE OF ZIONISTS AND WESTERN ANTI-ISLAM ELEMENTS."

COULD USE THIS PROGRAM IN COMING MONTHS TO ASSERT LEADERSHIP IN THE MUSLEM WORLD AND USE HIS FACILITIES IN PAKISTAN AS A MAGNET FOR TRAINING SCIENTISTS FROM THE SEVERAL NATIONS TO WHICH HE IS IN DEBT (SUCH AS SAUDI

ARABIA AND LIBYA), OR WITH WHOM HE OTHERWISE NEEDS TO CURRY FAVOR, LIKE HIS NEIGHBOR IRAN. DESPITE ZIA'S RADICAL PROGRAM OF ISLAMIZATION IN PAKISTAN -- WHICH INCLUDES JUDICIAL SENTENCES OF PUBLIC FLOGGING, STONING AND AMPUTATION -- GENERAL ZIA IS STILL PRESSED IN PAKISTAN BY EXTREME FUNDAMENTALIST FORCES. GENERAL ZIA HAS REASON TO FEAR THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S FORCES, AS WELL AS THOSE FORCES IN PAKISTAN WHO BELIEVE ZIA HAS NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH TO ADVANCE FUNDAMENTALIST CAUSES. WILL PER LIKE KHAN HELP OTHER FUNDAMENTALIST SCIENTISTS IN IRAN, LIBYA OR THE P.L.O.? WILL THEY EXPORT PLANS, DESIGNS, HARDWARE, TECHNOLOGY, OR WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIALS WITH OR WITHOUT GENERAL ZIA'S APPROVAL? WILL THEY TRAIN SCIENTISTS WHO WILL HELP STILL MORE EXTREMIST NATIONS OR TERRORIST GROUPS? WILL THEY MAKE NUCLEAR THREATS IN SUBSEQUENT REGIONAL WARS? AND NOW RESPONSIBLE WILL GENERAL ZIA'S SUCCESSOR BE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- A SUCCESSOR WHO IS LIKELY TO COME FROM AMONG THE MORE EXTREME FUNDAMENTALISTS? THE ANSWERS COULD HAVE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.

INTELLIGENCE WITHHELD OR IGNORED

BEFORE I MAKE SEVERAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, I WANT TO SAY A WORD ABOUT INFORMED POLICY-MAKING. THERE IS A SYSTEMATIC REAGAN ADMINISTRATION PATTERN OF IGNORING -- OR WITHHOLDING -- THE BAD NEWS ON NONPROLIFERATION.

THE NEW EVIDENCE ON PAKISTAN LEADS ONE TO QUESTION WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A SERIOUS INTELLIGENCE FAILURE OR A DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE FACTS BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION.

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE PENDING NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH CHINA IN LIGHT OF CHINA'S ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. DID THE PRESIDENT KNOW OF THIS ASSISTANCE WHEN HE HASTILY CONCLUDED THE U.S.-P.R.C. NUCLEAR AGREEMENT? IF HE DID, WHY WAS HE WITHHELD OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THESE FACTS TO CONGRESS? IF HE DID NOT, WHY WAS HE OPERATING IN IGNORANCE WHEN THE APRIL, 1984, AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED IN BEIJING? WHICHEVER IS THE CASE, THE RESULT OF THIS SLOPPY DIPLOMACY MAY SERIOUSLY SET BACK BOTH U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS. ALREADY, THE U.S.-CHINA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT, ONCE NAILED AS THE MAJOR DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH OF THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN SIDETRACKED AND WITHHELD FROM CONGRESS.

I HAVE CAREFULLY MONITORED BEFORE THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM SINCE WELL BEFORE THE BEGINNING SCRUTINY U.S. AID PROGRAM IN 1981. CLOSE CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY OF THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN ACUTELY NEEDED UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT CERTAIN REAGAN ADMINISTRATION STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN OBSCURING, WITHHOLDING OR DOWNRIGHT MISREPRESENTING THE FACTS ABOUT PAKISTAN'S PROGRAM. I HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED MY OBJECTION TO THIS PRACTICE; IT CONTRAVENES THE STATUTORY OBLIGATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO KEEP CONGRESS "FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED" ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DEVELOPMENTS RELEVANT TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING.

REAGAN ADMINIS RAA.E.A. SAFEGUARDS DEFICIENCIES IN ABOUT REPEATED I.A.E.A. SAFEGUARDS DEFIC NUCLEAR PAKISTAN. THEY BELITTLED IRAQ'S GROWING NUCLEAR T CE CAPABILITIES. THEY KEPT SILENT ON THE P.R.C.'S ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. AND ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE WITHHELD NEW INFORMATION ON PAKISTAN'S CONTINUING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION EFFORT.

I HAVE THUS FOUND IT NECESSARY TO SHARE WITH MY COLLEAGUES INFORMATION I HAVE RECEIVED INDEPENDENTLY,

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SAID:

EMPHASIS AT MY COMMAND, THAT OUR ONGOING NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS AN EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL DIMENSION AND THAT PAKISTAN HAS NEITHER THE MEANS NOR INDEED ANY DESIRE TO MANUFACTURE A NUCLEAR DEVICE.

SUCH BLANKET ASSURANCES WERE IN NO WAY CONTRADICTED BY SUBSEQUENT REAGAN ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS, INCLUDING THE STATEMENT OF SECRETARY SHULTZ, MADE LAST JULY 4 IN ISLAMABAD, WHEN HE DECLARED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE:

-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT OPPOSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER FOR PEACEFUL USES IN PAKISTAN. IT WAS NOTABLE TO ME THAT PRESIDENT ZIA WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO ASSURE ME THAT THAT, AND ONLY THAT, WAS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN.

MORE RECENTLY, IN SEEING TO CONVINCE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE NOT TO ADOPT NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION RESTRICTIONS ON CONTINUED AID TO PAKISTAN. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE, WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, ASSURED THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 28, 1984: WITH THE FOLLOW-UP WITH RESPECT TO OUR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES WITH PAKISTAN AND HAS HAD CONVERSATIONS DIRECTLY WITH PRESIDENT ZIA ON THIS SUBJECT. I BELIEVE THAT THE MATTER IS BEING EFFECTIVELY ATTENDED TO BY THOSE MEANS, AND HENCE THE GOALS OF STOPPING COUNTRIES FROM ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE FOCUSED ON BY THAT OBJECTIVE.

WHEN PRESSED BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS ON THESE STATEMENTS, IN AN APRIL 3, 1984 MARK-UP; UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER REASSURED SENATORS. "WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL STRIDES WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM," HE ASSERTED.

NEW INFORMATION ON PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFORT

GREAT STRIDES HAVE NOT BEEN MADE IN THE U.S. EFFORT TO STOP THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

I AM TODAY RELEASING SUBSTANTIAL NEW EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN HAS ACQUIRED ALL THE CAPABILITY NECESSARY TO

PRODUCE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I BASE THIS CONCLUSION ON FOUR NEW FACTS: (1) PAKISTAN HAS OPERATED AND EXPANDED ITS CLANDESTINE URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY AT KANUTA; (2) PAKISTAN HAS OPERATED ITS CLANDESTINE PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING FACILITY AT PINSTECH; (3) PAKISTAN HAS EXPANDED ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN TEAM AT WAM AND HAS STEPPED UP IMPORTS OF NUCLEAR WARHEAD COMPONENTS; AND (4) PAKISTAN'S KANUPP REACTOR HAS BEEN SUBJECT TO CONTINUING CHRONIC FAILURES IN ITS SAFEGUARD SYSTEM, MAKING PLUTONIUM DIVERSION HIGHLY FEASIBLE.

THIS EVIDENCE HAS COME TO ME ON A NON-CLASSIFIED BASIS FROM A VARIETY OF GOVERNMENT SOURCES. I HAVE CONFIRMED IT TO MY SATISFACTION WITH U.S. OFFICIALS. NONE OF THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN VOLUNTEERED TO ME IN CLASSIFIED BRIEFINGS BY THE ADMINISTRATION. INASMUCH AS THIS INFORMATION DOES NOT PERTAIN TO ANY ALLEGED U.S. COVERT OPERATIONS, BUT IS REQUIRED FOR INFORMED U.S. POLICYMAKING, I FEEL A RESPONSIBILITY TO REVEAL IT TO CONGRESS.

I HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN HAS ACTUAL NUCLEAR BOMBS IN HAND, OR THAT PAKISTAN HAS ALREADY PRODUCED A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL. THE PAKISTANIS MAY HAVE DONE SO -- AND SIMPLY DECIDED TO WAIT UNTIL 1986,

AFTER DELIVERY OF ALL THE DOLS 3.2 BILLION IN U.S. AID AND THE 40 F-16'S, BEFORE THEY CONDUCT A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TEST ON THEIR OWN SOIL. MANY WELL-INFORMED OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT TEST UNTIL 1986. OTHERS BELIEVE PAKISTAN MAY NOT NEED TO TEST BECAUSE OF WEAPONS DESIGN INFORMATION AND TEST DATA THEY CAN GET FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. AS WITH INDIA AND ISRAEL, WE MAY NEVER BE ABLE TO SAY EXACTLY WHEN IT WAS THAT PAKISTAN CROSSED THE THRESHOLD TO ACHIEVE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY, OR EXACTLY HOW MANY BOMBS THEY MIGHT HAVE IN HAND AT A GIVEN TIME. THE POINT IS THAT THEY NOW HAVE WHAT THEY NEED TO PRODUCE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HENCEFORTH, UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICIES MUST BE PREMISED ON THE FACT THAT PAKISTAN NOW HAS THE DESIGNS, THE HARDWARE, THE PLANTS AND THE PERSONNEL CAPABLE OF PRODUCING SEVERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PER YEAR. ACCORDING TO MY INFORMATION, THIS CAPABILITY WILL GROW TO WHERE PAKISTAN COULD PRODUCE AT LEAST A DOZEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS IF THEIR FACILITIES FUNCTION SMOOTHLY.

PAKISTAN ALSO HAS THE ABILITY, SHOULD IT SO CHOOSE, TO

EXPORT THE NUCLEAR-TRAINED TECHNICIANS, THE HIGHLY ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGNS, -- AND PERHAPS EVEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- TO SUPPORTIVE COLLEAGUES IN OTHER NATIONS. THIS EXPORT CAPABILITY AND THE EXTENT OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY HAVE FAR MORE PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS THAN WERE PRESENTED BY THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM BEFORE THE OSIRAK REACTOR WAS BOMBED IN 1981.

TO ASSESS THE NEW INFORMATION ON THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM, IT IS USEFUL TO SEE HOW THEY NOW STAND ON THE BASIS OF FIVE KEY CRITERIA. THESE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES: DO THEY HAVE THE CADRE OF TRAINED NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS AND AN INDUSTRIAL BASE?
 2. MONEY: DO THEY HAVE THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXTENSIVE NUCLEAR ARSENAL?
 3. HARDWARE AND OPERATIONAL PLANTS FOR PRODUCING THEIR OWN WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIAL USING EITHER (A) URANIUM ENRICHED BY ELABORATE TECHNOLOGY OR (B) UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR FUEL, REACTORS AND ADVANCED SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM?
 4. DESIGN TEAM: DO THEY HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN TEAM CAPABLE OF PRODUCING HIGH-CONFIDENCE WEAPONS AND WEAPON TESTS FOR MILITARY USE?
- CAPABILITY FOR DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN HAS DEVELOPED ALL OF THESE CAPABILITIES INCLUDING BOTH URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND PLUTONIUM RECOVERY. BASED ON NEW INFORMATION I HAVE RECEIVED, HERE IS HOW THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM STANDS ON THE BASIS OF THESE FIVE KEY CRITERIA:
CADRE OF NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS, TECHNICIANS, METALLURGY EXPERTS AND ENGINEERS. PAKISTAN HAS TENACIOUSLY ACCUMULATED ALL NECESSARY COMPONENTS FOR THEIR NUCLEAR BOMB BUILDING PROGRAM. FOR A TIME, THEY BOUGHT PARTS ON THE OPEN MARKET FROM FIRMS IN THE U.S., U.K., FRANCE, SWITZERLAND, ITALY, BELGIUM, SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY.

SUBSEQUENTLY, ELABORATE THIRD COUNTRY DROPS HAVE BEEN DEvised FOR SMUGGLING AND TRANSHIPMENT OF NEEDED COMPONENTS FROM THE WEST. HIGHLY CLASSIFIED DESIGNS AND

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CRITICAL SUBCONTRACTOR LISTS WERE STOLEN FROM THE URENCO ENRICHMENT PLANT IN HOLLAND. PARTS RECENTLY INTERCEPTED BY A BELATED U.S.-INITIATED EXPORT CONTROL EFFORT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY STOLEN FROM A CUSTOMS WAREHOUSE IN EUROPE. EXPORTS OF KEY INVERTER EQUIPMENT WERE FIRST HALTED BY THE BRITISH AND MORE RECENTLY, BY THE CANADIANS.

BUT COMPONENTS NEEDED IN A SPECIALLY DESIGNED SHOP NOW BEING HAND-TOOLED IN A SPECIALLY DESIGNED KANUTA CONSTRUCTED AT THE SITE OF THE CLANDESTINE KANUTA ENRICHMENT FACILITY. THE MAJORITY OF MATERIALS SMUGGLED FROM THE WEST CONTINUE TO MOVE THROUGH TURKEY, PRINCIPALLY FROM WEST GERMAN AND FRENCH COMPANIES. BUT PAKISTAN ALREADY HAS A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF ALL COMPONENTS NECESSARY FOR A SMALL-SCALE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; THEY ARE NOW JUST EXPANDING THEIR CAPABILITIES.

2. MONEY: THOUGH A SINGLE "QUICK AND DIRTY" NUCLEAR BOMB COULD BE PRODUCED QUITE CHEAPLY, PAKISTAN HAS SPENT HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEVELOP AN EXTENSIVE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY SINCE PAKISTAN'S ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO FIRST PROMISED THAT "WE WILL EAT GRASS OR LEAVES ... BUT WE WILL GET ONE OF OUR OWN." THE LIBYANS PROVIDED SOME EARLY CASH ASSISTANCE. MORE RECENTLY THE SAUDIS HAVE TAKEN OVER AS SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR EFFORT. AND SINCE 1981, PAKISTAN HAS ENJOYED THE SUBSIDY OF THE DOLS 3.2 BILLION AID PROGRAM FROM THE U.S.

3. PRODUCTION CAPACITY: (A) URANIUM ENRICHMENT - PAKISTAN IMPORTED SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF URANIUM FROM LIBYA BEFORE DEVELOPING ITS OWN URANIUM MINING CAPABILITY. WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF WEST GERMAN COMPANIES, IT NOW HAS ITS OWN URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION FACILITIES. FOLLOWING DESIGNS WHICH WERE STOLEN IN HOLLAND, THE PAKISTANIS BUILT A LARGE CENTRIFUGE URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT AT KANUTA, NEAR ISLAMABAD. BY 1983, THEY HAD COMPLETED NEARLY 1,000 UNITS -- ENOUGH TO PRODUCE AT LEAST 15 KGS. OF WEAPONS-GRADE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) A YEAR. THE KANUTA PLANT IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE A CURRENT CAPACITY OF 2,000 TO 3,000 SWU (SEPARATIVE WORK UNITS). THIS IS ENOUGH CAPACITY TO PRODUCE 45 KGS. OF HEU, OF WHICH 16 KILOGRAMS IS DEEMED MORE THAN SUFFICIENT FOR FABRICATING ONE NUCLEAR WARHEAD. PAKISTAN HAS HAD NUMEROUS DIFFICULTIES FULLY MASTERING THE INTRICATE CENTRIFUGE TECHNOLOGY. THESE DIFFICULTIES WILL

DOUBTLESS CONTINUE. BUT THOSE WHO ARE ALL TOO READY TO BE REASSURED THAT AFTER TEN YEARS OF RELENTLESS EFFORT, PAKISTAN IS STILL NOT ABLE TO BUILD AND OPERATE A CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY, ARE MISTAKEN. PAKISTAN IS NOW ENRICHING URANIUM AND EXPANDING ITS ENRICHMENT CAPACITY. BOTH GENERAL ZIA AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE PAKISTANI ENRICHMENT EFFORT, A. Q. KHAN, HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED REPORTS OF SUCCESSFUL PRODUCTION AT KANUTA. IN A FEBRUARY 9, 1984 INTERVIEW WITH THE PAKISTANI JOURNAL HAVA-I-WAQT, KHAN WAS ASKED: "CAN PAKISTAN MAKE AN ATOMIC BOMB?" HE ANSWERED:

-- YOU HAVE ME CORNERED. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TO SAY YES OR NO. EITHER WAY, I GET CAUGHT. FIRST OF ALL, I MUST SAY THAT OUR ATOMIC PROGRAM IS PEACEFUL ... THE QUESTION IS NOW ONE OF OUR ABILITIES. WE HAVE MADE MAJOR STRIDES IN THIS DIFFICULT FIELD AND WE HAVE A TEAM OF PATRIOTIC SCIENTISTS AND EXTREMELY BRILLIANT ENGINEERS AND LOCAL EXPERTS IN THE FIELDS OF METALLURGY, ELECTRONICS, MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, ETC. WHICH IS NOT FOUND ELSEWHERE. IN BRIEF, PAKISTAN HAS A PROFICIENT AND PATRIOTIC TEAM CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THE MOST DIFFICULT TASKS. FORTY YEARS AGO NO ONE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE

SECRETS OF THE ATOM BOMB AND EDUCATION WAS NOT SO WIDESPREAD, BUT AMERICAN SCIENTISTS DID THE JOB. TODAY, 40 YEARS LATER, WE HAVE ENDED THEIR MONOPOLY IN THIS MOST DIFFICULT FIELD OF THE ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM IN ONLY 10 YEARS. THIS JOB IS UNDOUBTEDLY NOT BEYOND OUR REACH. INDIA ACHIEVED THIS 10 YEARS AGO, ALTHOUGH OTHER COUNTRIES DEFINITELY ASSISTED IT. WE HAVE THE CAPACITY TO COMPLETE SUCH A TASK. THIS IS A POLITICAL DECISION IN WHICH MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE NO CONCERN EXCEPT FOR THE SAKE OF THE COUNTRY'S SAFETY AND SECURITY. OUR HONORABLE PRESIDENT HAD TO MAKE SUCH A MOMENTOUS DECISION AND WE WERE ENTRUSTED WITH THIS DUTY. WE, MY FRIENDS AND I, WILL STAKE OUR LIVES BUT WE WILL NOT DISAPPOINT THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION, BY THE GRACE OF GOD. IN SHORT, I WISH TO SAY THAT IF INDIA COULD ACCOMPLISH SUCH A FEAT 10 YEARS AGO, WE ARE NOT SO ABNORMAL OR MENTALLY RETARDED THAT WE CANNOT DO THIS, AND GOD WILLING, WE WILL DO IT BETTER AS WE HAVE PROVED IN THE FIELD OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT.

CLANDESTINE PAKISTANI PURCHASES OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND HARDWARE ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THAT USED IN THE KANUTA PLANT HAVE BEEN ACCELERATED OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS AND ARE BEING SENT BOTH TO KANUTA AND TO A NEW UNDERGROUND SITE IN MULTAN. THE LATTER IS NEARBY A LARGE ELECTRIC POWER SOURCE NECESSARY FOR EXTENSIVE URANIUM

ENRICHMENT. THE PAKISTANIS ALREADY HAVE A SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE OF ALUMINUM CENTRIFUGES -- IDEAL FOR PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL, BUT OF LESS UTILITY FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION. AND THEY HAVE STOCKPILES OF BAFFLE CONNECTORS TO DEAL WITH CENTRIFUGE VIBRATION, HIGH VACUUM VALVES, AND GASSIFICATION AND SOLIDIFICATION UNITS. GENERAL ZIA HAS PERMITTED KHAN TO EMERGE AS A NATIONAL HERO IN RECENT PAKISTAN PRESS INTERVIEWS. AND PURCHASES FOR KANUTA EXPANSION HAVE ACCELERATED. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE IF THE KANUTA R AND D PROJECT HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN PRODUCING WEAPONS-USABLE URANIUM. ESTIMATES ARE THAT THESE PURCHASES ARE SUITABLE FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A LARGER HEU PLANT WITH A 6,000 TO 8,000 SWU ANNUAL CAPACITY OR 90 TO 120 KGS. OF HEU (5 TO 7 BOMBS' WORTH) A YEAR. A RECENTLY DECLASSIFIED REPORT, SUBMITTED THIS SPRING TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY, BY THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS OF MORE THAN 90 GOVERNMENT AND ACADEMIC EXPERTS, ESTIMATES PAKISTAN'S MAXIMUM PRODUCTION POTENTIAL AS SIX BOMBS' WORTH OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM EACH YEAR FOR THE LATTER HALF OF THIS DECADE. THIS ESTIMATE WOULD GIVE PAKISTAN AN ACCRUED TOTAL OF THIRTY URANIUM BOMBS BY 1990. (PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION RATE COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER IF SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF SPENT FUEL ARE DIVERTED FROM PAKISTAN'S KANUPP REACTOR TO PLUTONIUM EXTRACTION IN THEIR PINSTECH FACILITY. IF THE KANUPP REACTOR WAS OPERATED SMOOTHLY YEAR ROUND, IT COULD PRODUCE ENOUGH PLUTONIUM FOR AS MUCH AS 10 WEAPONS PER YEAR, THOUGH I BELIEVE SUBSTANTIAL HURDLES REMAIN IN THE PAKISTANI REPROCESSING PROGRAM WHICH BAR EXTRACTION OF MORE THAN A FRACTION OF THIS TOTAL FOR SEVERAL YEARS YET.)

(B) PURSUING BOTH AVENUES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PAKISTAN HAS ALSO PRESSED DEVELOPMENT OF A REPROCESSING CAPABILITY. 95 PERCENT OF THE FRENCH PLANS FOR A REPROCESSING PLANT AT CHASHA WERE DELIVERED BEFORE THE FRENCH CANCELLED THE CONTRACT ON NONPROLIFERATION GROUNDS. THE PAKISTANIS ARE PROCEEDING WITH WORK ON A CHASHA PLANT, COMPLETING CIVIL ENGINEERING AND BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AT THE CHASHA SITE AND CONTINUING PURCHASES OF NEEDED COMPONENTS IN EUROPE. WITH A STEADY SUPPLY OF PLUTONIUM-BEARING SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, CHASHA COULD

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SEPARATE PLUTONIUM SUFFICIENT FOR ITS OWN SUBSTANTIAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL. CLANDESTINE TECHNOLOGY PURCHASES FOR CHASHA HAVE GONE FORWARD FOR MORE THAN NINE YEARS. BUT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE LACKED A STEADY SOURCE OF UNSAFEGUARDED SPENT FUEL. THEIR ONLY POWER REACTOR, THE CANADIAN-SUPPLIED KANUPP REACTOR, PRODUCES PLUTONIUM.

BUT THIS SPENT FUEL IS SUPPOSED TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR UNDER THE ONLY OPERATIVE PAKISTANI AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA). IN 1981, IAEA OFFICIALS EXPRESSED WORRIES THAT POSSIBLE DIVERSIONS OF PLUTONIUM BEARING FUEL FROM KANUPP MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE DUE TO THE COMBINATION OF INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS AND THE OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT BY PAKISTAN OF A CAPABILITY FOR FABRICATING THEIR OWN URANIUM FUEL NOT SUBJECT TO IAEA ACCOUNTING SAFEGUARDS. IN 1982, PAKISTAN RAN COLD TESTS ON AN INDIGENOUS PILOT REPROCESSING FACILITY, BUILT ALONG CHASHA DESIGNS, CALLED PINSTECH. SINCE THESE COLD TESTS, WELL-INFORMED OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THIS FACILITY WAS "GONE HOT" AND HAS BEEN IN OPERATION WITH RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. THIS FACILITY HAS A PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF ABOUT 15 KGS. OF WEAPONS-USABLE PLUTONIUM PER YEAR, OR ENOUGH FOR AT LEAST ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON. SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE PAKISTANIS DIVERTED SPENT FUEL FROM THE KANUPP REACTOR BY MIXING THEIR OWN, UNACCOUNTED-FOR URANIUM FUEL INTO THE REACTOR AND BY-PASSING THE FAULTY IAEA ACCOUNTING SYSTEM. THESE SAFEGUARDS WERE, BY THE ADMISSION OF THE IAEA STAFF, "EASILY DEFEATABLE BETWEEN THE FALL OF 1980 AND THE SPRING OF 1983 BECAUSE OF FAULTY CAMERAS AND INADEQUATE ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES -- AS WELL AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIGENOUS PAKISTANI FUEL FABRICATION CAPABILITY. REASSURANCES WERE SUBSEQUENTLY GIVEN BY IAEA AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS THAT THESE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES HAD BEEN TAKEN CARE OF. BUT NEW INFORMATION INDICATES THAT CONTINUED CHRONIC FAILURES OF MONITORING CAMERAS AND OTHER SUSPICIOUS "IRREGULARITIES" AT KANUPP HAVE MADE ROUTINE DIVERSIONS OF PAKISTANI-PRODUCED FUEL FROM KANUPP TO A WEAPONS PROGRAM HIGHLY FEASIBLE TO THIS DAY.

ADVANCED NUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN WORK SINCE AT LEAST 1980, HAVING RECEIVED DESIGN ASSISTANCE FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BEGINNING IN THE LATE 1970'S; PAKISTAN PREPARED A NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST SITE IN THE BALUCHISTAN MOUNTAINS ABOUT 42 MILES FROM THE AFGHAN BORDER IN EARLY 1981. THESE PREPARATIONS WERE COMPLETED WITH THE INSTALLATION OF EXTENSIVE CABLE SENSORS AND CONSTRUCTION OF A NEARBY TEST MONITORING FACILITY. THIS EFFORT MAY HAVE BEEN A BLUFF, PRESSED BY ZIA IN A CAT-AND-MOUSE GAME WITH THE INDIANS, WHO WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY DIGGING LARGE HOLES AT THEIR POKHRAH TEST SITE AMIDST HIGH SECURITY. OR IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A GENUINE PREPARATION WITH AN ACTUAL, IN-COUNTRY NUCLEAR TEST DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER PAKISTAN GOT ALL OF ITS 40 F-16'S AND THE U.S. DOL'S 3.2 BILLION IN 1986. BUT THE MOUNTAIN TUNNEL IS STILL THERE

AND THE PROSPECTIVE TEST SITE REMAINS INTACT. A NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN TEAM ("THE WAM GROUP") WAS ASSEMBLED AND HAS OPERATED ALONGSIDE KEY COMPONENTS OF THE PAKISTANI ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY AT WAM. IT INCLUDES EXPERTS IN HIGH EXPLOSIVES, METALLURGY AND FAST ELECTRONICS. AFTER THE 1981 TEST SITE PREPARATIONS, ASSERTIONS WERE MADE BY ADMINISTRATION ADVOCATES OF THE PAKISTANI AID PROGRAM THAT THIS PAKISTANI WEAPONS DESIGN TEAM HAD DISPERSED. THAT IS NOT TRUE. TO THE CONTRARY, THERE IS NEW EVIDENCE THAT THIS NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN TEAM HAS BEEN EXPANDED AND HAS ACCELERATED ITS EFFORTS. PAKISTAN HAS STEPPED UP CLANDESTINE IMPORTS OF HIGH SPEED ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT AND PRECISION SPHERICAL CUTTING MACHINERY FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN GROUP AT WAM. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS FOR FABRICATING NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THEY HAVE

NO PLACE WHATSOEVER IN A "PEACEFUL" NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM.

12 F-16'S FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE F-16 IS CURRENTLY THE WORLD'S MOST CAPABLE PENETRATING FIGHTER-BOMBER. PAKISTAN IS SLATED TO RECEIVE ANOTHER 20 IN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS FOR A TOTAL OF 40.

EACH OF THE FOREGOING PAKISTANI EFFORTS ARE ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A NUCLEAR ARSENAL PRODUCTION LINE. NONE ARE APPROPRIATE TO ANY CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM THAT COULD POSSIBLY BE DEVELOPED BY PAKISTAN IN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE ONLY ONE SMALL POWER REACTOR -- WHICH RUNS ON NATURAL URANIUM, NOT ENRICHED FUEL. THEY HAVE NO BREEDER REACTOR PROGRAM, SO HAVE NO "LEGITIMATE" EXCUSE FOR CRASH EFFORTS TO SEPARATE PLUTONIUM. SHOWY PUBLIC EFFORTS SOLICITING BIDS FOR PAKISTAN'S FIRST LARGE POWER REACTOR TO BE BUILT AT CHASHA RECEIVED NO TAKERS.

THE PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN PURSUING NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELENTLESSLY FOR TEN YEARS. THEY HAVE NOW SUCCEEDED IN ATTAINING AN INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE THEM.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY

THIS PATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. WE IMPLICATIONS FOR K OF A FULL-FLEDGED NUCLEAR ARMS RACE STAND ON THE BRINK OF A FULL-FLEDGED NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AMONGST TURBULENT THIRD WORLD POWERS IN THE GLOBE'S MOST UNSTABLE REGIONS.

1. THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM INCREASES THE

DANGER OF THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD BEING BREACHED BY A NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD -- AN INITIALLY "REGIONAL" NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA THAT COULD BRING IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PATRONS, THE U.S.S.R. ON ONE SIDE, AND THE U.S. OR THE P.R.C. ON THE OTHER.

2. IT INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD OF INDIA'S EMBARKING ON A DEDICATED NUCLEAR MILITARY PROGRAM. INDIA IS LIKELY TO RESPOND TO AN OVERT PAKISTANI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BY BUILDING A LARGE NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND POSSIBLY DEVELOPING THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS.

3. IT INCREASES THE DANGER THAT EXTREMIST FORCES MAY EMPLOY NUCLEAR THREATS IN A "HOLY WAR" AGAINST INDIA, ISRAEL, OR SOME OTHER NATION.

4. IT WEAKENS AMERICA IN THE THIRD WORLD; EXTENSIVE U.S. FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR A RIGHT-WING MILITARY DICTATOR HAS UNDERMINED NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS AND HELPED SUBSIDIZE A PAKISTANI BOMB.

5. IT RAISES THE PROSPECT OF A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES. RESPONSIBLE SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO A STRIKE AGAINST PAKISTANI NUCLEAR FACILITIES, WHICH ARE HEAVILY GUARDED (INCLUDING DEPLOYMENTS OF FRENCH CROTALE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES AT KANUPP). MANY INDIANS PERCEIVE THIS TO BE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO A MAJOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM OF THEIR OWN.

6. FINALLY, IT IS EXTREMELY DESTABILIZING. ALONG WITH OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE REGION, IT COULD THREATEN THE VERY SURVIVAL OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES. QUOTE THE STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY:

-- THE SMALL PHYSICAL SIZE OR CONCENTRATION OF POPULATION IN SMALL AREAS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL CITIES FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY MEANS THAT A MINIMAL SMALL NUCLEAR

PAGE 06 OF 06

INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN GENERALLY KNOWN AMONG INFORMED OBSERVERS, BUT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY CONVEYED TO CONGRESS. THIS HAS BEEN A CONSEQUENCE OF THE UNWISE AND UNACCEPTABLE POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE ON THESE ISSUES UNDERTAKEN BY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION -- AND OF THEIR FAILURE TO GIVE US TIMELY AND COMPLETE CLASSIFIED BRIEFINGS.

NEW POLICY INITIATIVES

INTERNET IN CHECKING THE GROWTH OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND AVERTING A MOVE BY PAKISTAN, INDIA AND OTHER REGIONAL POWERS TO THE ANNOUNCED DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE MUST TAKE EVERY PRACTICAL INITIATIVE

TO DISCOURAGE THE CONTINUING PAKISTANI NUCLEAR WEAPONS DRIVE AND TO AVERT ANY POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY PAKISTAN, OR ANY OTHER NATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR CONGRESS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO PUT NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AGAIN AT THE VERY TOP OF OUR LIST OF PRIORITIES. WE MUST DO MORE WITH OUR ALLIES; WE MUST PUSH HARDER ON THE I.A.E.A.; WE MUST PRESS HARDER ON PAKISTAN. AND WE MUST GET SERIOUS ABOUT CURBING THE BLOATED U.S. AND SOVIET ARSENALS -- WHICH MAKE THOSE OF EMERGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES PALE IN COMPARISON.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MUST NO LONGER SUBSIDIZE PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. THEREFORE, WHEN THE SENATE TAKES UP THE FOREIGN AID BILL IN THE DAYS AHEAD, I WILL MOVE TO BAR ALL FURTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN UNTIL ALL OF THAT NATION'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES ARE PLACED UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AND UNTIL PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN CERTIFY THAT THE U.S. HAS ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN HAS HALTED ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS DRIVE. AMERICAN TAX DOLLARS SHOULD NOT BE SUBSIDIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT BY A RIGHT-WING MILITARY DICTATOR. THE ALLEGED JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS \$800 MILLION A YEAR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM -- TO MAKE GENERAL ZIA FEEL MILITARILY SECURE SO HE WOULDN'T PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- CEASED TO EXIST LONG AGO. TO CONTRIBUTE THIS EXPENDITURE IS LIKE PAYING RANSOM MONEY AFTER THE KIDNAP VICTIM HAS BEEN FOUND DEAD.

PROVIDING GENERAL ZIA THE BEST PENETRATING FIGHTER-BOMBER FOR DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS SIMPLY NOT IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST. THEREFORE, I WILL MOVE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO BAR ANY FURTHER TRANSFER OF U.S.-BUILT F-16'S TO PAKISTAN UNTIL ALL OF THAT NATION'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES ARE PLACED UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AND UNTIL PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN CERTIFY THAT THE U.S. HAS ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE ASSURANCES THAT PAKISTAN HAS HALTED ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS DRIVE.

I CALL UPON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO WORK WITH CONGRESS TO MAKE THESE SANCTIONS MEANINGFUL SO THAT THEY MIGHT FURTHER U.S. POLICY INTERESTS.

I CALL UPON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ALSO TO REINVIGORATE ITS EFFORTS TO WORK WITH NATO ALLIES AND NUCLEAR EXPORTERS TO STOP ONCE AND FOR ALL THE FLOW OF ANY MORE DUAL-USE ITEMS THAT ARE BEING USED IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. DESPITE BIPARTISAN EFFORTS UNDER THE FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATION, THESE SALES CONTINUE. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS AN OBLIGATION TO

DEFEND OUR SECURITY INTERESTS BY PRESSING OTHER NATIONS TO HALT THESE EXPORTS.

I CALL UPON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO ADDRESS MORE EFFECTIVELY OUR OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT "TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE

MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT AN EARLY DATE." THE ADMINISTRATION'S REFUSAL TO PURSUE A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN (CTB) HAS BEEN A MAJOR SETBACK TO NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS AND IS INCONSISTENT WITH OUR ARTICLE VI OBLIGATIONS. THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE ANY PROGRESS ON A START, INF, OR ASAT TREATY HAS ALSO WEAKENED THE ENTIRE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORT.

I CALL UPON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TO ADDRESS THE GRAVE THREAT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION POSES TO THE SECURITY OF OUR PEOPLE. FOR NEARLY FOUR YEARS, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICYMAKERS HAVE FAILED TO GIVE THIS ISSUE THE SERIOUSNESS IT DESERVES. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE FAILED TO PRESS THE ISSUE WITH ALLIES IN EUROPE AND TO DISCUSS IT AT ANNUAL SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH THEM. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE FAILED TO HEED THE WARNINGS OF ALLIES MOST THREATENED BY PROLIFERATION DEVELOPMENTS. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE FAILED TO KEEP THE CONGRESS FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ON PROLIFERATION DEVELOPMENTS RELEVANT TO NATIONAL POLICYMAKING. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE SHUNTED ASIDE EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS THREATS TO OUR INTERESTS. AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE FAILURE OF LAVISH U.S. ASSISTANCE TO STOP PAKISTAN'S ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

EVERY STEP THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION CAN NOW TAKE TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WILL WARRANT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT. THE TIME FOR GETTING ON WITH THIS ESSENTIAL TASK HAS LONG PASSED.

END TEXT.
SHULTZ

Cranston Says Pakistan Can Make A-Bomb

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 20 — Senator Cranston plans to tell the Senate Thursday that he has obtained declassified information that China has helped give Pakistan a nuclear ability. "Pakistan has now acquired all the capability necessary to produce nuclear weapons," Mr. Cranston, a California Democrat, said in remarks prepared for delivery on the Senate floor. Mr. Cranston said that "henceforth United States policies must be predicated on the fact that Pakistan now has a design, hardware, plants and per-

sonnel capable of producing several nuclear weapons per year."

Pakistan's nuclear ability "increases the danger of the nuclear threshold being breached by a nuclear conflict in the third world," Senator Cranston said. Although any such conflict between Pakistan and India would at first be regional, he said, "it could bring in their respective patrons," the Soviet Union on one side and the United States or China on the other.

"It increases the danger that extremist forces may employ nuclear threats in a holy war" against India, Is-

rael, or some other nation, the Senator said. "It weakens America in the third world."

The Senator said his information came from a recently declassified study submitted to the Defense Nuclear Agency by a team of more than 90 experts. He accused State Department officials of having "a vested interest in obfuscating, withholding or downright misrepresenting the facts about Pakistan's nuclear program."

Mr. Cranston also accused the Administration of failing to keep Congress "fully and currently informed" on

these developments. He said that President Reagan failed to consider the importance of this information when negotiating the nuclear trade agreement with China.

The State Department had no official comment on Senator Cranston's speech, which it had not seen. But privately, officials said China's nuclear help to Pakistan in the past was known, and led to serious discussions with the Pakistanis urging them not to detonate a nuclear device.

The Chinese Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, and other senior Chinese officials have declared that China is opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. The United States and China negotiated a nuclear coopera-

tion agreement that was initiated while President Reagan was in China in April. But that agreement has not been sent to Congress yet, pending further discussions with the Chinese, to make clearer that China will not help others develop nuclear weapons.

Senator Cranston, who is the ranking Democrat on the Arms Control subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he would move to bar all further United States military assistance to Pakistan when the Senate takes up the foreign aid bill.

China Protests Taiwan Arms Sale

PEKING, June 20 (AP) — China today protested the planned sale of

United States transport planes to Taiwan and rebuked Washington for bringing up the nuclear energy accord talks when President Reagan was in China.

Ye Zhibang, a Government spokesman, said at a news briefing that the planned sale of 12 C-130 transport planes to Taiwan "obviously violates the communiqué issued by China and the United States Aug. 17, 1982, reducing weapons sales to Taiwan."

In Washington, the State Department said the United States considers the aircraft sale "to be entirely within the terms" of the 1982 agreement.

GIVE TO THE FRESH AIR FUN

Sales and Special Purchases...

UNITED STATES Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Page

September 25, 1984

Dear Colleague:

We are writing to ask your support for an amendment we will offer to the foreign aid provisions of the continuing resolution. The amendment is intended to strengthen the non-proliferation conditions on our assistance to Pakistan.

The continuing resolution will contain another major portion of the \$3.2 billion military and economic assistance package for Pakistan, the largest U.S. aid program anywhere in the world except for NATO allies and parties to the Camp David treaty. This aid is offered to the Pakistani government for the express purpose of meeting its legitimate security needs with conventional weapons so that the Pakistani leadership will not feel a need to build nuclear weapons. This linkage between conventional military assistance to Pakistan and our non-proliferation objectives is embodied in existing law which would cut off assistance if Pakistan detonates a nuclear explosive device. Because of an unprecedented Congressional waiver of the Symington and Glenn Amendments, Pakistan is still eligible for such military assistance despite the fact that they are clearly developing a capability to produce nuclear weapons.

In return for our assistance, Pakistan's President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq has provided a public assurance that Pakistan is not developing nuclear weapons. On December 9, 1982, President Zia told the Foreign Policy Association in New York:

"I would like to state once again, and with all the emphasis at my command, that our ongoing nuclear program has an exclusively peaceful dimension and that Pakistan has neither the means nor indeed any desire to manufacture a nuclear device."

Unfortunately, it appears that the government of Pakistan is not keeping its word. Three years of lavish U.S. military and economic assistance have not stopped the Pakistani nuclear weapons drive. In July of this year, Pakistani nationals were arrested in Houston while attempting to export to Pakistan special krytrons, high speed electrical

switches which are on the nuclear export control list because they are used in the triggering mechanism of a nuclear explosive device. This appears to be part of a pattern of Pakistan's acquisition, in violation of our export control laws and the laws of other countries, of the components for a nuclear weapon. According to press reports, Pakistan has developed its own clandestine facilities for enriching weapons-grade uranium and separating plutonium, and is stockpiling volumes of equipment necessary for production of nuclear warheads.

We believe that U.S. national security interests require some exercise of our considerable leverage to place constraints on the unrelenting Pakistani development of a nuclear weapons capability. We do not believe the United States taxpayers should continue subsidizing the Pakistani nuclear program so harmful to our security interests. But we recognize that other interests in our bilateral relationship with Pakistan compete with our all-important nonproliferation objectives.

We have therefore devised what we believe is a responsible middle course for senators who wish to make clear that U.S. national security interests are threatened by the continuing Pakistani nuclear weapons program, but who do not wish to foreclose all U.S. options.

Our amendment would prohibit future military assistance to Pakistan if that country contravenes its assurances to the United States and engages in a program to develop a nuclear explosive device or if it acquires the material, technology and equipment for use in a nuclear explosive device. The amendment would also bar further military assistance to Pakistan if that nation began separating and stockpiling quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The amendment would not affect U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan.

Our amendment would provide for a Presidential waiver of the ban on further military assistance, but this waiver authority could only be used in the extraordinary circumstance that the President found that a suspension of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan would "irrevocably harm the vital national security interests of the United States."

The effect of the amendment is entirely prospective; it does not seek to punish Pakistan for its past conduct. To keep its military assistance, Pakistan need only adhere to the public and private commitments given by President Zia.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by more countries poses a deadly threat to our survival. In the past thirty-seven years Pakistan and India have fought three wars. Unless the United States adopts a more active policy, there is a real danger that development of India's and Pakistan's nuclear programs will trigger a major war. If the present course is maintained, that war could lead to a breach of the nuclear threshold in one of the world's most turbulent regions.

It is particularly significant that the current U.S. military sales program for Pakistan includes the F-16 aircraft, the world's most capable penetrating fighter-bomber. This aircraft could play the key role in a Pakistani nuclear strike force. As a matter of principle we do not think it serves American interests to continue to provide this aircraft to Pakistan if Pakistan pursues a nuclear weapons option.


Our amendment seeks to use the very considerable leverage we have with Pakistan to stop its nuclear weapons program now. Our security relationship with Pakistan is in the vital interest of both countries. The key element of any such relationship must be the willingness of each party to honor its commitments. We think it is entirely reasonable to ask Pakistan to keep its word on an issue as vital to the future of our world as halting the spread of nuclear weapons.


If you have any questions regarding the amendment, a copy of which is attached, please have a member of your staff contact Gerry Warburg of Senator Cranston's staff at (x43553).

Sincerely,



Alan Cranston


Mark Hatfield



John Glenn


Robert Stafford


Claiborne Pell


Daniel Moynihan


Carl Levin


William Proxmire

AMENDMENT NO. _____

Purpose: _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES ——— Cong. ——— Sess.

S. _____
H.R. _____ (or Treaty _____) SHORT TITLE

(title) _____

- Referred to the Committee on _____ and ordered to be printed
- Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

INTENDED to be proposed by Senators Cranston, Hatfield, Glenn, Stafford, Proxmire, Pell,

Viz:

- 1 At an appropriate place in the bill add the following:
- 2 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is further amended
- 3 by adding the following new section:

4 Section 620F. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conditions on Assistance
5 Pakistan

6 (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in
7 accordance with the provisions of subsection (b), no defense arti-
8 or services shall be sold or otherwise provided to Pakistan, and
9 no military credits or assistance shall be furnished, if ninety d-
10 after the enactment of this section, Pakistan engages in a progra-
11 develop or construct a nuclear explosive device, or acquires tech-
12 or equipment for use in a nuclear explosive device, or produces s-
13 nuclear material in a form and concentration suitable for nuclear
14 explosive purposes.

15 (b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) on assistance to Paki-
16 may be waived by the President if, after

17 receiving information requiring termination of such assistance,
18 President determines in writing to the Chairman of the Senate
19 Relations Committee and the Speaker of the House of Representat-
20 such termination would irrevocably harm the urgent national secu-
21 interests of the United States. Such determination by the Pre-
22 shall be accompanied by a comprehensive report of suitable cts.

(i) any acquisitions by Pakistan of material, equipment or technology which can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons together with an assessment of Pakistan's intentions and capabilities for use of such material, equipment, or technology;

(ii) the impact of a halt of U.S. military sales, assistance or credits to Pakistan on U.S. national security interests in the region;

(iii) the impact on international norms against proliferation of ongoing U.S. military assistance in the presence of a continuing Pakistan nuclear explosives development program;

(iv) the prospects for success of any U.S. initiative to mediate the Indo/Pakistan conflict in order to reduce tensions and the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.

cautiously optimistic, that they are making at least a limited effort to undo some of the damage they have done in the international community by their treatment of the State of Israel at the IAEA.

On behalf of the Senator from Hawaii, the ranking member of the subcommittee, and myself, I am prepared to accept this amendment, with the understanding that the Senator from Idaho and I are going to work together to be sure that this international agency operators in a way that is consistent with the view that all of us have throughout the free world of the State of Israel.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I strongly support this measure.

The Soviet Union made a voluntary offer at the U.N. special session on disarmament in 1982 to accept IAEA safeguards on some civil nuclear facilities. This action followed the examples of the United States, United Kingdom, and France in previous years. On Thursday, September 20, the U.S.S.R. announced that they had completed negotiations on an agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the IAEA for the application of safeguards. At this time the U.S.S.R. had limited the list of facilities eligible for safeguards to some civil power reactors. We encouraged the U.S.S.R. to make such an offer and to reach agreement with the IAEA. We believe it would be valuable to have actual inspections conducted before the NPT Review Conference in September 1985.

The significance of IAEA inspections conducted in nuclear weapons states (NWS) is that they demonstrate NWS willingness to accept the same burden on their civil nuclear cycles that we ask the nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) to accept. This is to refute the excuse of non-NPT signatories that the NPT discriminates in favor of NWS's with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Further, we wish the degree of cooperation between the NWS and the IAEA and the completeness of access and measurement in our civil nuclear facilities to be models and set a standard. This standard can then be used to strengthen the IAEA position when applying safeguards to non-NPT states.

The United States welcomed the U.S.S.R. voluntary offer and intends to join an expected consensus of the IAEA Board of Governors approving the U.S.S.R./IAEA Safeguards Agreement. I believe the Soviet action also is important, because the IAEA safeguards agreement will involve the first international onsite inspection in the U.S.S.R. to which the Soviets have agreed. If there ever is to be meaningful arms control progress with the Soviet Union, there must be a mechanism for assured verification, including onsite inspection. This first step with the IAEA by the Soviets heightens the need for our support to the technical programs of the agency.

This is a step forward in the efforts of the nuclear powers in the cause of nonproliferation.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I want to express my thanks to the manager of the bill, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, and the minority floor manager, the Senator from Louisiana, for accepting this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 6987) was agreed to.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. PERCY addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

AMENDMENT NO. 6988

(Purpose: To appropriate \$100,000 to be available only for the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture)

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) proposes an amendment numbered 6988.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed of.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the amendment, add the following:

"Sec. . . In addition to funds otherwise appropriated by this joint resolution for such purposes, there are hereby appropriated to the President to carry out section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, \$100,000 for the fiscal year 1985, which amount shall be available only for the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture."

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the U.N. Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, established by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 36/151 of December 16, 1981, is intended to provide worldwide humanitarian assistance to victims of torture and their relatives. The Fund presently concentrates on medical aid—both physical and psychological—but will include legal and financial help. This is a concrete U.N. response to the needs arising from violations of human rights.

The Fund is genuinely humanitarian and nonpolitical. Because of those qualities, and because Resolution 36/151 states that priority will be given victims of torture in states already marked by the U.N. as human rights violators, the Fund has the potential to exert strong pressure on those states with which the international community has human rights concerns.

The United States supported establishment of the Fund and continues to support it. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved an initial U.S. contribution to the Fund of \$100,000 in the authorizing legislation for foreign assistance. While the Fund has not yet established a budget, this contribution would represent about one-ninth of the total contributed so far. Countries which have contributed: Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Jordan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

This would be an earmark add-on of \$100,000 to the IO&P account specifically for the U.S. contribution to the Fund.

Finally, it should be noted that last week the Congress passed House Joint Resolution 605 which is an important statement of principles and practices that the U.S. Government is bound to undertake in combating the practice of torture by foreign governments. It would indeed be disappointing if the Congress did not support this amendment in light of its action on House Joint Resolution 605.

I believe the manager of the bill is familiar with this \$100,000 request and is sympathetic with it. I hope he is prepared to accept it.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I support this amendment. While the administration has not made a formal request, I know that had the timing been different in the budget cycle this, in fact, would have shown up in their budget request. I believe that it is a worthwhile program, and one that we can support.

We have reviewed this program with the ranking member of the committee. I know of no objection to the amendment.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, on behalf of the subcommittee and Senator INOYE, we accept the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 6988) was agreed to.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. CRANSTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

AMENDMENT NO. 6989

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), for himself, Mr. HARTFIELD, Mr.

GLENN, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. PELL, Mr. LEVIN, and Mr. NOYNIKIN propose an amendment numbered 6959.

Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the committee amendment add the following: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is further amended by adding the following new section:

SEC. 690F. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b), no defense articles or services shall be sold or otherwise provided to Pakistan, and no military credits or assistance shall be furnished, if ninety days after the enactment of this section, Pakistan engages in a program to develop or construct a nuclear explosive device, or acquires technology or equipment for use in a nuclear explosive device, or produces special nuclear material in a form and concentration suitable for nuclear explosive purposes.

(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) on assistance to Pakistan may be waived by the President if, after receiving information requiring termination of such assistance, the President determines in writing to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that such termination would irrevocably harm the urgent national security interests of the United States. Such determination by the President shall be accompanied by a comprehensive report of suitable classification describing:

(i) any acquisitions by Pakistan of material, equipment or technology which can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons together with an assessment of Pakistan's intentions and capabilities for use of such material, equipment, or technology;

(ii) the impact of a halt of U.S. military sales assistance, or credits to Pakistan on U.S. national security interests in that region;

(iii) the impact on international norms against proliferation of ongoing U.S. military assistance in the presence of a continuing Pakistan nuclear explosives development program;

(iv) the prospects for success of any U.S. initiative to mediate the Indo/Pakistan conflict in order to reduce tensions and the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.

Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. President, the amendment before the Senate represents an important compromise effort by Senators on both sides of the aisle to register our concerns about the direction of Pakistan's nuclear program.

Its provisions are quite simple:

The amendment would suspend future U.S. military assistance to Pakistan if, 90 days after enactment, Pakistan:

First, engages in a program to develop or construct a nuclear bomb; second, acquires technology for a nuclear bomb; or third, produces plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

The amendment would not bar U.S. economic assistance, and it would permit Presidential waiver of a military aid suspension if the President certifies termination would "irrevocably harm the urgent national security interests of the United States."

This amendment would tighten conditions in current law which bar aid only if Pakistan is found to possess or test a nuclear explosive device.

I would like to make clear that while this is a political season, this is not a partisan amendment. Its original co-sponsorship is bipartisan and its support is bipartisan.

Indeed, it enjoys the cosponsorship of the distinguished chairmen of the Appropriations and Environment Committees, the vice-chairman of the Intelligence Committee and a number of my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee.

We are all working toward the same goal of averting a nuclear arms race—and the use of nuclear weapons—in South Asia.

Having said that, I want to make clear that the continuing bipartisan efforts of the past four administrations to stop Pakistan's nuclear bomb development program are simply not working.

Pakistan is on the brink of producing nuclear weapons. The Pakistanis have developed virtually all the capabilities necessary to produce them.

The current U.S. "supply-side" non-proliferation effort, providing extensive military and economic aid to Pakistan, has resulted only in an indirect subsidy by U.S. taxpayers of the Pakistani dictatorship's nuclear bomb-building program.

It has not prevented Pakistan from taking all the steps they have made in enrichment, reprocessing, bomb design and technology acquisition.

Much is made of fact that Pakistan has not yet tested a weapon.

The may not need to test—given the extensive design assistance they have received, according to press reports, from other nations.

And they have proceeded with so much nuclear development, that they sit virtually at the brink of testing.

Executive branch officials from the current and previous administrations will concede in private what I want to assure my colleagues in public: responsible actions by Congress in defense of United States concerns on the issue of nonproliferation help the executive branch in its dealings with foreign governments.

As one who views close United States ties with Pakistan as desirable, I feel we must make clear that if the Pakistanis start producing and stockpiling more nuclear bomb components, they will cross a line that will meet with an American response. We have an obligation to let the Pakistanis know how serious the stakes will become.

To those who claim progress is being made I ask simply: Is continuation of the status quo acceptable?

Can we sit idly by while Pakistan stockpiles nuclear bomb parts and tries to import more from the United States?

Will we watch them produce fissile materials for nuclear warheads, but continue to send them the world's

most effective penetrating fighter bomber with which to undertake nuclear missions?

The sponsors of the amendment before us believe the Senate must lay down a clear marker and send a clear signal today.

The continuing resolution will contain another major portion of the \$3.2 billion military and economic assistance package for Pakistan, the largest U.S. aid program anywhere in the world except for NATO allies and parties to the Camp David treaty.

This aid is offered to the Pakistani Government for the express purpose of meeting its legitimate security needs with conventional weapons so that the Pakistani leadership will not feel a need to build nuclear weapons.

This linkage between conventional objectives is embodied in existing law which would cut off assistance if Pakistan detonates a nuclear device.

Because of an unprecedented congressional waiver of the Symington and Glenn Amendments, Pakistan is still eligible for such military assistance despite the fact that they are clearly developing a capability to produce nuclear weapons.

In return for our assistance, Pakistan's President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq has provided a public assurance that Pakistan is not developing nuclear weapons.

On December 9, 1982, President Zia told the Foreign Policy Association in New York:

I would like to state once again, and with all the emphasis at my command, that our ongoing nuclear program has an exclusively peaceful dimension and that Pakistan has neither the means nor indeed any desire to manufacture a nuclear device.

Unfortunately, it appears that the government of Pakistan is not keeping its word.

Three years of lavish U.S. military and economic assistance have not stopped the Pakistani nuclear weapons drive.

Let us take a look at what we know. We cannot get into details in open session.

But let's review what is already in the public domain.

Pakistan has developed the capability to enrich significant quantities of uranium.

Pakistan has completed work on a pilot reprocessing plant, and is completing civil engineering work on a much larger plant.

There have been chronic failures in monitoring cameras at Pakistan's Kanupp reactor, a likely source of spent nuclear fuel for plutonium.

There have been reports in the press and public statements from Pakistan leaders that Pakistan has the capability to produce highly enriched uranium.

Pakistani nationals have been convicted in courts in the United States, Canada, Holland and elsewhere for violating export laws to smuggle ke

ponents for nuclear bombs to Pakistan.

Just this summer, Pakistani nationals were caught in Houston trying to smuggle frytrons to Pakistan—high speed electrical switches whose only use in the Pakistani context is for nuclear warhead triggers.

And as early as 1979, there have been press reports that Pakistan prepared sites for nuclear bomb testing.

I personally know no Member of this body—or of the executive branch, for that matter—who seriously doubts that Pakistan continues to flirt with the development of a nuclear bomb production capability.

Anyone who takes the time to look at the intelligence reports on this issue reaches the same conclusion.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by more countries poses a deadly threat to our survival. In the past 37 years Pakistan and India have fought wars.

Unless the United States adopts a more active policy, there is a real danger that development of India's and Pakistan's nuclear programs will trigger a major war.

If the present course is maintained, a war could lead to a breach of the nuclear threshold in one of the world's most turbulent regions.

It is particularly significant that the current U.S. military sales program for Pakistan includes the F-16 aircraft, the world's most capable penetrating fighter-bomber.

This aircraft could play the key role as a Pakistani nuclear strike force.

As a matter of principle we do not think it serves American interests to continue to provide this aircraft to Pakistan if Pakistan pursues a nuclear weapons option.

Our amendment seeks to use the very considerable leverage we have with Pakistan to stop its nuclear weapons program now.

Our security relationship with Pakistan is in the vital interest of both countries.

The key element of any such relationship must be the willingness of each party to honor its commitments.

We think it is entirely reasonable to ask Pakistan to keep its word on an issue as vital to the future as halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

I would like to address a concern several of my colleagues have expressed and make clear that our amendment will not necessitate an end to United States-Pakistani cooperation in assisting Pakistan's neighbors.

First, our amendment will not affect aid to Afghan refugees or any other programs the United States may have in that region.

Second, our amendment will not curb the generous U.S. economic assistance program for Pakistan—which is providing \$1.6 billion in cash over 5 years.

Third, our amendment would not cancel military aid and F-16 deliveries, but would only suspend deliveries of this

type of aid and only if General Zia violates solemn assurances to our Government that he will not engage in nuclear bomb acquisition and production.

Most importantly, our amendment provides the authority for the President to waive the prohibitions on military aid if this aid suspension promises to harm irrevocably the vital national security interests of the United States.

The reported program of assistance to the Afghan people enjoys great support from Pakistan's friends and patrons in the Islamic world—notably Saudi Arabia.

It also enjoys the aggressive support of the nearly 4 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, many of whom are armed—a force which General Zia could cross only at his great peril.

It would have a strong basis for continuing support even if the United States stood up for its nonproliferation concerns and insisted that Pakistan live up to its commitments.

I would also like to address the suggestion that our amendment would accelerate Pakistan's nuclear effort.

I frankly think this is misleading nonsense.

Our amendment would only trigger a suspension of military aid if Pakistan was already on the verge of producing nuclear weapons.

We are simply saying that if the Pakistani leadership chooses to cross this threshold, it will jeopardize continued U.S. military assistance.

Our amendment would give General Zia every incentive to live up to his word and not cross that threshold.

It is already U.S. policy to bar military aid to Pakistan if it tests a nuclear weapon.

All our amendment says, in effect, is that we cannot wait for such a test if Pakistan is producing, stockpiling, and acquiring the parts for mass production of nuclear bombs—that is the point at which we must reassess our part in Pakistan's military efforts, not after they have deployed and used nuclear weapons with our F-16 aircraft.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues' support for this amendment on its merits. We can no longer delay addressing this issue. And we can ill-afford to signal that the ominous direction of the Pakistani nuclear effort is consistent with requirements for U.S. military support.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

Mr. McClure. Mr. President, Senator Cranston's amendment terminates all security assistance to Pakistan unless the President certifies that Pakistan has ceased all activities related to nuclear weapon development. The administration is strongly opposed to this amendment.

Senator Cranston introduced a similar amendment in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last April. The committee did not accept Senator Cranston's amendment, and voted instead for the Pressler amendment.

It must be clearly understood that terminating security assistance to

Pakistan is tantamount, in Pakistani eyes, to terminating the entire security relationship we have so painstakingly worked out over the past 3 years. This termination would in essence abrogate the 1981, \$3.2 billion, 6-year agreement which we signed with Pakistan with full congressional participation and support. There is nothing new in our knowledge of Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities which could justify such a breach of faith.

The Afghan resistance is based in Pakistan; the support structure that keeps the resistance alive and successful is in Pakistan. All we do for the resistance is and must be done with Pakistan's active assistance. There is no other way for us to support the resistance. In order for Pakistan to play the central and absolutely vital role it plays in the Afghan issue, it needs to feel politically and, to a degree at least, militarily secure. That is a purpose of our assistance package: To ensure that Pakistan will stand tall in the face of Soviet blandishments, such as the offer to acknowledge the disputed Durand line between Afghanistan and Pakistan as the de jure boundary, and Soviet threats and armed attacks. Last month, armed attacks by Communist forces killed between 50 and 100 persons in Pakistan.

The 40 F-16 aircraft which we have agreed to sell the Pakistanis form the centerpiece of our entire assistance package. The F-16's give Pakistan a limited ability to deter Communist aggression against Pakistan, and hence allow it to continue supporting the cause of Afghan independence. Denying F-16's to Pakistan in the end denies the Afghan resistance its only hope of forcing the Soviets out.

I firmly believe that a vote for the Cranston amendment is in fact a vote against the Afghan freedom fighters and for their Soviet oppressors. The Cranston amendment would reinforce the perception among those facing Communist aggression that America is unreliable. Simply put, the Afghan anti-Soviet resistance is doing as well as it is only because of Pakistan's willingness to support it. Without America's strong and steady support, Pakistan cannot continue to confront these increasingly violent and brutal Soviet pressure tactics; without Pakistan, there can be no viable resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Mr. President, in addition to the Soviet aggression to the northwest in Afghanistan, Pakistan is also confronted with the increasingly alarming Soviet role in India. The Soviet Union has a special and clearly unprecedented arms relationship with India. India has special currency and technology licensing arrangements with the Soviets. Arms transactions include the latest Soviet attack aircraft, main battle tanks and personnel carriers, modern ships and advanced missiles. The annual shipments of arms from

from year to year at dramatic rate, perhaps doubling or tripling over a short few years. The advanced nature of the weapons systems and the massive amounts of equipment are unprecedented outside the Soviet bloc and in some cases represent the only transfers of the most advanced Soviet systems outside of the Soviet Union to any country. Coupled with the continuing and aggressive presence in Afghanistan, this potential vise-like pressure from Pakistan's two largest neighbors confronts Pakistan with a clear and present security danger. Recent saber-rattling by India and new border incidents, coupled with the mobilization of the Indian Army in the Punjab, can only serve to remind Pakistan of its dangers. We must be mindful of these facts in considering the Cranston amendment.

We cannot because of well-meaning but misdirected intentions throw away all we have worked for over the past 3 years. In the process betraying the people of Afghanistan. The Cranston amendment, if passed, would simply lead to disaster for American interests in the region. It would throw away a valuable security and political relationship with Pakistan. It would permit the Soviets to consolidate their grip on Afghanistan without opposition and will not achieve its stated nonproliferation goals. We cut off assistance to Pakistan in 1979 over the same issue. It led us nowhere. It only embittered United States-Pakistan relations—a bitterness which we have only now begun to overcome—and did not slow down the Pakistan nuclear program. A strong security relationship with the United States is the only way, over time, to address some of Pakistan's legitimate security concerns—concerns which can lead a nation to seek a nuclear capability. The Cranston amendment could easily lead to the worst of all possible outcomes; that is, a nuclear-armed Pakistan, hostile to the West and unwilling or unable to continue confronting the Soviets.

Mr. President, in summary, let me say that the Senate today is faced with a very clear and straightforward choice in regard to our relations with Pakistan. There are clearly some in Pakistan who are arguing that the only security for Pakistan can come from a nuclear weapons program at some point. There are many others who argue forcefully and persuasively that the nonnuclear security relationship with the United States is the only effective option. Speaking only for myself, I believe our security relationship has, in fact, slowed the movements toward a weapons program. The President personally, Secretary Schultz and the administration, I believe have made a difference and our policy is working as a result with our security assistance. The Cranston amendment, once again, as in 1979 under the Carter administration,

would demonstrate to the leadership and people of Pakistan that the U.S. security relationship is not a viable option. The Senate by such an action would prove the case for the proponents of a nuclear program in Pakistan. It would be a tragedy of unprecedented proportion in our effort to support Pakistan and deter active and harsh Soviet aggression in the subcontinent. Therefore, I urge the defeat of the Cranston amendment.

Let me conclude by reading from Secretary Schultz' letter to Senator BAKER in regard to the amendment. This letter is dated September 29, 1984, and addressed to Senator BAKER.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, DC, September 29, 1984.
Hon. HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr.,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR BAKER: I am writing to you and Senator Byrd to underline the importance of maintaining our strong security relationship with Pakistan, a relationship essential to countering Soviet adventurism in South Asia and Soviet brutality in Afghanistan. I do this in the context of the anticipated introduction of an amendment by Senator Cranston to the Continuing Resolution which would modify existing legislation regarding Pakistan. The Administration opposes this amendment.

I want it clearly understood that the administration shares congressional concerns about the Pakistani nuclear program. We have established over the past four years an unbroken dialogue at the highest levels of the Pakistani government designed to persuade the Pakistanis that their long-term security interests do not rest with developing a nuclear device. The Cranston amendment confuses and complicates our already strong efforts; but more importantly, it undercuts the trust between our two countries so essential to convincing the Pakistanis that our security assistance is both a commitment on which they can rely and a basis for considering non-nuclear defense options.

Let us not forget that December 1984 marks the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the past few months, valiant Afghan resistance fighters, better armed and trained than ever before, have frustrated Soviet attempts to crush them. A new momentum has been achieved, a momentum that must be maintained to pressure the Soviets to negotiate a political settlement. At this critical time, the Cranston amendment would send the wrong signals to the Soviets, the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul, and the Afghan freedom fighters who view our security assistance to Pakistan as vital to continued Pakistani backing for their struggle.

I would like to emphasize also our concern that the Cranston amendment, as currently drafted, comes to the floor without the benefit of hearings on this important change in our policy and its implications. Given the high stakes involved in this issue and the potential for serious harm to U.S. interests in South Asia, the administration believes this is not the most effective or responsible way of considering significant policy changes.

Thank you for consideration of this matter.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE P. SCHULTZ

Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCLURE. I will be happy to yield to the Senator from Texas for a

question without losing my place on the floor.

Mr. TOWER. First I want to mention everything the distinguished Senator from Idaho said. It is a very reasonable and I think irrefutable argument against the Cranston amendment. I wonder if the Senator from Idaho is aware that the Soviet Union is providing India with some \$4 billion in military assistance, which includes MIG-29, a very high-performance craft which has not yet even been fully embodied into the Soviet inventory?

Mr. McCLURE. The Senator from Texas is correct. I made reference to the increasingly close military ties the unprecedented military support for India that is embodied in Soviet actions.

Mr. TOWER. And that there is presently a rather dangerous imbalance in conventional power between India and Pakistan?

Mr. McCLURE. The Senator is correct in that again the threat to Pakistan's security will be met in two minds by one of two options: one, security relationship with the United States, and the other, if they can depend upon that, they will be greatly impelled toward a nuclear program.

Mr. TOWER. In the mind of Senator from Idaho, would not the passage of this amendment make Pakistan more susceptible to increasing pressure from the Soviet Union to reduce their assistance to Afghan resistance?

Mr. McCLURE. There is no doubt that in my mind, I think the Senator is entirely correct.

Mr. TOWER. I thank the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. McCLURE. I thank the Senator for his remarks.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that an article in the Wall Street Journal of October 2, 1984, under the byline of Rosanne Klass, who directs the Afghanistan Information Center at Freedom House in New York, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article is ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

PUSHING AND PULLING APART PAKISTAN
(By Rosanne Klass)

There can no longer be any doubt that Soviet moves in Afghanistan since 1978 have been aimed at creating a strategic base from which to control Iran, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The determined Afghan resistance has been able to slow down Moscow's transformation of Afghanistan into the crucial forward base to complete its power projection, but thus far has not been able to block it.

In Iran, Moscow may need only pattern Ayatollah Khomeini is an old man. As late as two years ago, Johns Hopkins analyst Yossef Bodansky wrote of Soviet troops penetrating Iranian territory with impunity, indicating an ability to reach the Strait of Hormuz within eight days and of Russian East German KGB residentura controlling much of Iranian Baluchistan through local leaders.

But Pakistan, with its renewed ties to the U.S. is openly and intensively targeted right now. Without sanctuary and logistical support via Pakistan, the Afghan resistance could be swiftly decimated, as was the isolated Central Asian resistance 54 years ago. Pakistan's harbors could offer the long-sought Russian foothold on the Indian Ocean: its transport and communications, a direct line from Termez to the sea. And, most important of all, Pakistan is the only remaining potential American ally between Turkey and Thailand through which the U.S. could move to block Soviet hegemony over the Indian Ocean. (India is increasingly tied to Moscow militarily, economically and in foreign policy, and Afghanistan provides an object lesson in the consequences of trying to loosen such ties.)

BOMBINGS AND KILLINGS

If Pakistan can be collapsed, or Finlandized and detached from Washington by threats, the Soviet Union will effectively dominate the vast area from the Horn of Africa to the Strait of Malacca without having fired a shot.

Ten major Soviet air bases have been built in Afghanistan; at least four more are in the works. All can handle fixed-wing combat aircraft. All are sited at Pakistan and beyond. The Shindand base is equipped for the most advanced electronic warfare. In May 1980, Moscow secretly annexed Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor, creating a U.S.S.R.-Pakistan border in Kashmir and threatening the Karakoram Highway, Pakistan's sole link with China. Pakistan's airspace is violated routinely. Afghan communist ground forces have attacked Pakistani villages. Since Aug. 13, more than 80 civilians have been killed inside Pakistan by bombings and cross-border artillery.

Meanwhile the actions of Indira Gandhi's government—which not only recognizes but aids the puppet regime in Kabul—raise the specter of a threat from India. Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov has made several recent visits to India with a high-level military entourage, and Mrs. Gandhi has made return trips to the U.S.S.R. Pakistan's proposal for a peace agreement has been set aside. Mrs. Gandhi has taken to warning of planned Pakistani aggression so shrilly that her own press supporters are dismayed. U.S. aid to Pakistan has been made the excuse for beefing up India's military forces—already the world's fourth largest—with the most advanced Soviet weaponry. (India will get MiG-29 jet fighters before they are fully deployed to Soviet forces.) Most of India's might is deployed along the Pakistan border. Incidents along the cease-fire line in Kashmir have accelerated: Pakistani territory has been seized in the last year.

On the other hand, the Kremlin might prefer to bring Pakistan to heel by manipulation and internal subversion.

Pakistan has always been internally vulnerable. Since its creation in 1947, it has spasmodically been beset by provincial separatist movements—first for "Pushtunistan" in the North West Frontier Province in Baluchistan, in Sind and in Kashmir. These have risen and fallen on shifting tides of Afghan, Soviet and Indian support; the tide is now rising.

In 1955, a member of Mrs. Gandhi's party told a "World Solid" meeting in New Delhi that the time had come for India to annex Sind. In the May 1983 Economic and Political Weekly, Baluchi leader Muzaffar Mengal declared that Pakistan must cease to exist "in its present form" and announced a Baluchistan Liberation Organization to lead the armed struggle. The bureaucratization of Pushtunistan's armed Imbrahim Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who now spends most of his

time in Kabul, Prague and Moscow, has begun with his nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The science and engineering divisions of Kabul University are reliably reported to have been transformed into a terrorist training center similar to Lumumba University in Moscow (whose most notorious alumnus is, of course, Carlos the Jackal). The "student body" is believed to be almost entirely Baluchis from Pakistan, Iranians of various parties and Palestinians, with a sprinkling of Syrians, Libyans and Yemenis. Some of the Baluchis have been battle-hardened against the Afghan resistance.

Pakistani Pushtun tribesmen have been trained and supplied with weapons through a university branch in Jalalabad run by the al-Zulfikar movement, headed by the sons of the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and sworn to destroy the man who seized power from him in Pakistan. President Zia-ul-Haq, Al-Zulfikar, now headquartered in Libya, was first based in Kabul and still has offices there and in New Delhi.

The value to Moscow of a People's Republic of Baluchistan—which would include all territory west of the Indus River, 60% of Pakistan—allied with Kabul and willing to grant the Soviet fleet use of its harbors is obvious. Neighboring Iranian Baluchistan might "choose" to join it. The North West Frontier Province (Pushtunistan) might also be added, or it might be swapped to Kabul in exchange for Baluchi-populated southwest Afghanistan. Baluchi leader Mengal suggested as much in his 1983 interview. This would also return 2.8 million Afghan refugees and resistance sanctuaries to Kabul's control. India would certainly pick up Pakistani Kashmir, which it claims, and perhaps Sind, leaving a nonviable landlocked Punjab as "Pakistan."

Any of a number of scenarios could be used to trigger events, including the currently promised Pakistan elections—whether they are held or canceled.

But first, all possible international support for the present government of Pakistan must be undermined. World opinion must be convinced that President Zia is a uniquely abominable tyrant who cannot be supported by any self-respecting nation, much as the Shah of Iran was transformed from a progressive autocrat into a monster of bloody tyranny and torture who not only lost American support but could hardly find a place to die in peace.

Any military regime is arbitrary and harsh and, by definition, undemocratic. Mr. Zia's is no exception. But the world public knows nothing of the chaotic and often irresponsible politics that have led to repeated military takeovers in Pakistan, or that the country has endured far worse governments than Mr. Zia's (notably under the suave Mr. Bhutto). World opinion will be vulnerable to a great chorus of condemnation, accompanied by demands for the withdrawal of American support, which has already begun. Sen. Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) has tried three times this year to get aid cut off because of Pakistan's nuclear program—though he has not suggested any such cutoff for India, which exploded its first nuclear device 10 years ago.

RUSSIAN STICK AND CARROT

If a campaign to delegitimize Pakistan and force the withdrawal of U.S. and other Western support succeeds, Islamabad will be faced with the choice of acceding to Soviet wishes or facing destruction by one means or another.

So far, Pakistan has withstood both the Russian stick and its not inconsiderable economic carrot. And, although the Afghan resistance—which is a genuine freedom fight—

has thus far lacked the means to interfere with the Soviet plans. It might do a great deal more if it gets the aid it needs. Coordinated operations like the one on Aug. 25, which destroyed 165 pylons providing power to Kabul, suggest that it could create much more trouble for the Soviets there in the future. It has the will. But right now the resistance is in desperate straits, lacking food, clothes and medicine as well as arms and ammunition.

The Afghan resistance cannot be aided without Pakistan, but Pakistan cannot undertake additional risks to its own survival without assurances of long-range support. Those who are reluctant to give that support need to take a hard look at the choices available to use in this imperfect world.

Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, there was once in this country a clear and definite sense of outrage on account of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Under President Jimmy Carter, we canceled the 1980 Olympics on account of what is, indeed, an outrage. We invoked a grain embargo, even though the President and Democrats paid a tremendous political price and I think it may have been the wrong thing to do. But the point is it was a clear sense of outrage. There ought to be and perhaps there still is, Mr. President, that same sense of outrage on account of Afghanistan. Even though it has faded from view to some extent, even though the invasion of Afghanistan, the continued bloody war in Afghanistan does not occupy the front pages, it continues to be an outrage. We have today, Mr. President, in Afghanistan brave freedom fighters, and it is not too much to say that they are, indeed, freedom fighters elsewhere in the world but it is clear they are freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Those freedom fighters survive through one pipeline, and that is through Pakistan. If we want to cut a lifeline to the freedom fighters, the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan, all we have to do is adopt this amendment.

What this amendment would do would be to set adrift the Mujahadeen in Pakistan and let them not even slowly but quickly dry on the vine and be left without any means of support.

Mr. President, Pakistan is sandwiched between India—their implacable enemy, their historic enemy, who has them greatly outnumbered and outgunned and is quite hostile to Pakistan—and Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

If we cut off all help for Pakistan, then naturally it has to require Pakistan to reach some kind of accommodation, some kind of accord, with the Soviet Union.

Pakistan cannot stand there defenseless, without any demonstrable friends in the world, and expect to stand up to the Soviet Union, expect to continue to be the conduit of aid to those who are fighting the Soviet Union in Af-

backs to their implacable, historic enemy, the Indians.

The fact is that they must have continued aid, they must have continued support from the United States, and they must have the moral support which our friendship and our aid and our alliance requires.

Mr. President, no one is oblivious to the effects of nuclear proliferation. No one lacks concern about that issue. But we should have learned that this is not the way to get somebody to knuckle under—to cut off aid. It has not worked anywhere else. We have tried to strongarm Brazil and Argentina and India and other countries. Has it worked? Of course, it has not worked.

If we want to be sure to get some kind of low-grade nuclear device built in Pakistan, the way to do it is to lose all our influence by cutting off all our aid. That will make it for sure that they will build whatever they are capable of building.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSTON. In just a moment I will be happy to yield.

Mr. President, they are not capable of building much.

We see in a "Dear Colleague" letter here a reference to the F-16 playing a key role in the Pakistani nuclear strike force. You would think they are ready to make a sophisticated nuclear weapon capable of being delivered by an F-16. Everybody knows that is not true. First, you have to get the enriched uranium, and once you get the enriched uranium or the plutonium, it is a long way from there to creating a nuclear device, particularly one small enough to be delivered by an F-16.

Surely, Mr. President, nobody seriously thinks that the Pakistanis are ready, willing, or able, or even thinking about, delivering a nuclear device with an F-16. If they are thinking about a low-grade nuclear device at all, it is not one small enough to be delivered by an F-16; and that would be eons, perhaps decades, away.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I endorse everything the Senator has said.

The F-16 is a marvelous aircraft, largely because it is made by Texans, but for other reasons as well. However, it is not suited for a delivery role. It simply is not. I think that anyone who suggests that has let his imagination somewhat run away with him. I do not know of anybody who would use the F-16 in that kind of delivery role. It is not capable of doing that.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, because it is demonstrably true.

Mr. President, in summary, if we want to get the Pakistanis not to build a nuclear device—and surely that is our goal—then let us urge them as

friends, as members of an alliance—as big brothers, in effect—and not as what would then become fickle former friends who have no further influence. That is the way to achieve nuclear nonproliferation.

I yield for a question to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator from Louisiana for yielding.

Mr. President, normally, on issues such as this, involving an amendment by the Senator from California, I would be supportive; because there are few people in recent history who have been as outspoken or determined with respect to reducing nuclear proliferation in the world as he has been. In fact, only a few months ago, the central theme of his traveling around this country had to do with this issue. I strongly support his efforts in that regard.

However, in this particular matter, with respect to the amendment being offered today, he and I disagree, for two reasons—not because I am not concerned about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons in Southwest Asia. That certainly is a legitimate problem, and it is something about which we all should be raising our voices. However, as I understand it, under existing law we have in place, in this particular situation, provisions which almost mirror what the Cranston amendment would ask us to do.

Section 620(3) and section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act set out some rather specific provisions which would require termination of substantial military and economic aid to a country such as Pakistan, when the President has determined that they were involved in receiving or delivering enrichment material or delivering reprogramming equipment. It kind of covers the parameter.

Third, like the Cranston amendment, existing law allows for Presidential waiver. If the President finds, even with these other circumstances being present, that our national security issues are at stake, the President has a right to waive those particular provisions.

I point out that, under existing law, the waiver provisions terminate on September 30, 1987. Under the Cranston amendment as proposed, the waiver provisions never terminate. They are in place for good. One could almost argue that the Cranston provisions are stronger in favor of those who would like to see some termination of military equipment to Pakistan.

The Cranston language is stronger; it mandates a report. Existing legislation says that Congress should be fully informed.

My point—I am not quoting the exact provisions of the law—is that we have pretty good law on the books; so we are not going to be necessarily strengthening existing provisions of

the law by strengthening in redundancy of that law.

What is the effect of doing it here today? Obviously, I do not think any of us would trade the detonation of a nuclear device in Southwest Asia for any issue, but we cannot be unmindful of the fact that Pakistan, over the last several years, has accepted between 3 million and 4 million human beings to whom we have contributed somewhat in terms of their health, safety, and nutrition needs.

The burden of that cost has been assumed by Pakistan, and that is a fact. We cannot just disregard that particular piece of evidence.

While it does not overturn our concern about nuclear proliferation, we should not avoid the fact that that is going on. It occurs, as we all know. The refugees are created directly as a result of the Soviet invasion. Our colleague from Louisiana hit that point very well. It was only a few months ago that that was a major issue.

So I urge my colleagues to reject this amendment.

I say at the conclusion, as I did at the outset, that I have the greatest respect for the author of this amendment in his determination to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Existing law is strong in this area. I think this amendment would send a complicated signal to a nation that is making a significant contribution in the area of refugee assistance, and it would cause us more harm than good. I feel that the existing language protects us and protects the concerns of the Senator from California. So I urge rejection of the amendment.

I thank the Senator from Louisiana for yielding.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I think the learned Senator from Connecticut has added greatly to this debate by pointing out that not only is present law strong, but also, it is flexible and usable. You do not win this war of influence with Pakistan by trying to shoot them in the head.

You win it by trying to urge them and coax them and using the carrot and indeed the stick which is contained in present law.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a question on that point?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, if I still have the floor, I am glad to yield.

Mr. SARBANES. Is it the Senator's view that Pakistan is moving toward the development of a nuclear explosive device?

Mr. JOHNSTON. I do not think our intelligence knows. There is some question that they might be. I do not think there is any clear evidence that they have ordered enrichment equipment. If there is, under present law, we would be required to stop all aid subject to a Presidential waiver. I would hope that they are not, there is no clear and convincing evidence that they are.

Mr. SARBANES. And is it the Senator's view that if this friendly relationship in effect, sidesteps the question of a nuclear capability, the capability will not be developed; is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSTON. I would say that it will make it much more likely that it will not happen. If we cut them off, then we send them into the arms of the Soviets, and we take away whatever reasons there would be not to build a nuclear device.

Mr. SARBANES. Well, we do not do that because, as I understand the Cranston amendment, they would get all the aid that is provided for as long as they did not build a nuclear device.

There is really no problem. If they do not build a nuclear device, they will get all the aid that we want to provide them. It is only if they build a nuclear device, or undertake to build one that, in fact, the aid will be stopped.

It seems to me the argument made by the Senator from Louisiana only makes sense if the Senator is prepared to take the position that he is willing for them to build the nuclear device for all the other reasons that he has advanced.

I think that is a very serious proposition. If that is the one you are advancing, it is a logical one and we can examine it. You can take the position that their importance is such that if they build a nuclear device we want to provide them assistance. But I do not see how it can be argued both ways. Our providing aid does not seem to have moved them off this path. Under the Cranston amendment, as I understand it—and the Senator from California is on his feet and can comment—all the aid would be provided as they did not move to build a nuclear device. I might ask the Senator from California, is that correct?

Mr. CRANSTON. That is exactly correct.

Mr. SARBANES. Therefore it is only if they build a nuclear device, move forward with that endeavor, that the aid will be stopped. It seems to me to argue against the amendment. If you have to be prepared to take the position that for other reasons of which have been advanced here today, you are prepared for Pakistan to go ahead and build a nuclear device. That seems to me to be a very serious proposition. I think the Senator from California has put her on a very important matter.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Maryland has identified why the Cranston amendment provides a more flexible and more useful sanction than does the current law as described by the Senator from Connecticut. The fact of the matter is that the Cranston amendment is, first of all, rather broad because it speaks not just of deterring or constructing a nuclear device but acquiring "technology or equipment for use in a nuclear explosive, or produces special nuclear material in a form and concentration

suitable for nuclear explosive purposes."

Mr. President, you can use all kinds of different material suitable for nuclear explosive devices. Certainly plutonium, which is a byproduct of a nuclear device, is ordinarily suitable for a nuclear explosive purpose. And if it is separated, and I would assume that plutonium would be separated, it can be used for two purposes: It can be either recycled back into a nuclear plant or, of course, if you had the technology you could build a bomb with it. But that is what the IAEA and the safeguards are for, to keep track of things like plutonium and not in very inexact language cut off aid because they are producing special nuclear material whatever that is, in a form and concentration suitable for nuclear explosive devices.

I simply do not know why present law is not sufficient. I do not know why we want to not only embarrass but make it more difficult for our allies to stay in an alliance with us.

Mr. SARBANES. I do not think the Senator from California is trying to do that, either to embarrass anyone or to make it more difficult to maintain an alliance. He is simply trying to get at the fundamental point—whether Pakistan is going to have a nuclear bomb. That is what it finally amounts to. That is a pretty urgent question and I think we ought to recognize it as such.

As I understood the Senator from Connecticut, who cited the prior law, at least one of his criticisms of the Cranston amendment was that the waiver authority for the President contained in the Cranston amendment is more generous to the President than the waiver authority in current law.

That seems to me to be at cross-purposes with the other arguments being advanced. But I understood the learned Senator from Connecticut to make that argument. I gather that, because the current waiver will expire in 1987 and the waiver contained in the Cranston amendment would not, he perceives as an argument against the Cranston amendment that it is easier with respect to the waiver authority for the President than the current law.

Obviously, it seems to me, what the Senator from California is trying to do is to really get at this fact that we continue to provide very significant aid for very good reasons—and those have been advanced here on the floor—for very good reasons. I do not minimize what Pakistan is doing in a number of regards in that area of the world. But the fact remains that we still have the continuing concern of the moving to develop a nuclear weapon. And unless Members are prepared to say that all these things they are doing are so important that it ought to transcend them moving to a nuclear weapon, it seems to me we need to give serious attention to the Cranston amendment.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Louisiana yield the floor?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from California is one of the most dedicated arms control advocates in the entire country. I think there are very few people in the search for peace who surpass ALAN CRANSTON in his sincere and consistent commitment to reducing the danger of a nuclear holocaust. And I certainly, for one, respect his uncompromising approach to the control of nuclear weapons. I think that in offering this amendment, he demonstrates his understanding that an effective nuclear nonproliferation policy is central to an effective arms control program. But, having said that, I would like to refer to something that my colleague from Maryland just said. He said, "What is Pakistan doing?" And I think that is an important question. What is Pakistan doing?

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. MATHIAS. If the Senator will just let me complete my thought, I have not yet developed it to the point that I think it is ripe for comment.

Pakistan is providing a refuge for several Afghans at this moment. And that refuge is provided at enormous economic expense and burden to the people of Pakistan. Pakistan occupies an historic role in the heel of the central Asian heartland, on the borders of revolutionary Iran, at a moment when the political and military balance in Asia is not yet determined. It is a very delicate moment in history.

So I think the question of what Pakistan is doing, and I know my friend from Maryland intended to raise the question only in the nuclear sense, is a crucial one. We have to look comprehensively at what Pakistan is up to.

Turning to the specifics of the amendment before us, as the Senator from Connecticut has commented, it would apply additional restrictions to the Pakistan nuclear energy program which are intended to preclude the development or the construction of a nuclear explosive device. As the Senator from Connecticut has said, this would make a special case out of Pakistan. The United States has worldwide restrictions that deal with nuclear proliferation. Existing law, specifically sections 620(e), 669 and 670—that includes the Symington amendment—of the Foreign Assistance Act already proscribes the receipt of delivery of enrichment equipment, the receipt or delivery of reprogramming equipment, or the receipt or detonation of a nuclear explosive device by Pakistan. That is law.

Moreover, section 602 of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act re-

quires the administration to inform fully the Congress of all significant nonproliferation activity. This is a very serious responsibility on the part of the administration.

The Cranston amendment would supplement those existing provisions of law. And it would bar all military aid and sales to Pakistan if Pakistan is found to be developing or constructing a nuclear weapon. That is a rather vague way to put a very specific and technical question.

There is no question that the Pakistanis are engaged in some nuclear research and some nuclear energy development, but so are a number of other countries who are not necessarily placed within this proscription.

The purpose of that research, of course, is the essential question. And the determination of what that purpose is, what the motivation is, and what the intention is, has to be the heart of this amendment. Whether the President is to make that determination, whether the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is to make it, whether the Secretary of Defense is to make it, or whether the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations is to make it, is not clear. I think that creates a problem.

The fact is that these concerns are technical questions that could be remedied. But the amendment does not apply similar sanctions to any other nation. And there are certainly other nations that the United States would like to steer away from the path of nuclear weapons development. Whatever the facts may be in this case, there are other cases that would warrant careful attention as well.

I would like to propose the following to my friend from California: Let us do a little broader job. Let us join together—I will work with you to do whatever we can—to do something to make the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] the real policeman of proliferation. That is where the problem lies. That is where the difficulties are. The IAEA accounting procedures are inadequate. The IAEA control procedures are inadequate. Let us address the comprehensive problem of nuclear proliferation by providing the International Atomic Energy Agency with the kind of powers and jurisdiction it needs. I believe that is the one area—perhaps the only area at the moment—that might permit cooperation with the Soviet Union. Clearly, the USSR has as much of a stake in nonproliferation as the United States.

As well-intentioned as this amendment may be, it would be counterproductive at the present time. I think adoption of the Cranston amendment would have a destructive and a unpredictable impact on our relations with Pakistan, and would make us less rather than more able to control nuclear proliferation throughout the world.

Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. Surely.

Mr. DODD. The distinguished Senator from Maryland, [Mr. SARBANES], made the point earlier about pointing out some of the distinctive features between the existing law and the proposed amendment. I cite particularly the waiver provision, how long it lasted, and I note in fact existing law is more restrictive. It expires in 1987. In the Cranston amendment, the waiver would exist for all time, if adopted. My point in raising that was not necessarily to try to make the argument that the existing law was stronger than what the Cranston amendment would propose. The point was that the purpose of offering amendments, as I have understood it, is that when there is the absence in existing law or existing law is insufficient in certain areas that we offer an amendment to try to improve that.

All I am suggesting here is that existing law seems to cover the very provisions that the Cranston amendment would make with the exception that in Cranston amendment we are specifically identifying Pakistan. But beyond that, the broad provisions of law which apply under the Foreign Assistance Act, and apply to all countries, really does very adequately—more than adequately—cover the fact situation that could arise in Pakistan.

Let me make one other observation; that is, with the Cranston amendment in addition with the general language which does track the provisions cited by the Senator from Maryland that have rather tight parameters, in the Cranston amendment you also have language "or acquiring technology or equipment for the use in a nuclear explosive device."

I point out that kind of language is pretty broad based and you could include almost anything in that particular provision. It is not tightened up. But I do want to make the case that I felt here that the law was more than adequate and that is the reason for my opposition. If there were no law here, I would be standing in support of the Cranston amendment. But the fact that we do have strong existing law is something that I feel is necessary or is adequate to cover the present situation.

I thank my colleague for yielding.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, given the severe time constraints facing the Senate, I do not wish to prolong this debate. We have had a thoughtful discussion which goes to the heart of the issue. Let me very briefly respond to what has been said.

First, I know that every Member of this body is deeply concerned about the brutal Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. We want to see it terminated; and we have taken every prudent measure to accomplish this result. This brutal military occupation has deeply poisoned our relationship with the Soviet Union.

Every Member of this body I am sure is also deeply concerned about nuclear proliferation. But unfortu-

nately, time after time we let some other issue intrude upon our concern about nuclear proliferation. That has happened in the case of India, as it has happened in the case of other countries.

The fact is that present law is not working. Virtually all experts in this field suspect that if we do not find a better policy, we are not going to have 6 or 7 but 10, 12, or 20 nuclear power within a generation, with widening dangers of their use. The Foreign Relations Committee has recognized this and has proposed that we cut off aid to Pakistan if they possess a bomb.

But that is not enough. One rarely knows when a nation crosses the threshold, witness South Africa, witness Israel.

The amendment that is pending simply recognizes that if Pakistan is producing, manufacturing, and stockpiling nuclear bomb components that is the appropriate time for the United States to make manifest its concern. That is the only realistic threshold short of waiting for Pakistan to test, deploy, and perhaps use nuclear weapons.

Present policy has not prevented Pakistan from taking all of the steps that have been made. The general belief is that they are on their way to a nuclear weapon capacity, all the steps they made in enrichment, processing, bomb design and technology acquisition.

Let me sum up the amendment by stating once again it would not cancel military aid in F-16 deliveries, it would suspend deliveries of this type of aid if—and only if—General Zia violates solemn assurances given to our Government that he will not engage in nuclear bomb acquisition and production.

If Pakistan will halt its relentless drive to develop a nuclear bomb capacity, then our military would continue.

The amendment provides the authority for the President to waive the prohibitions of military aid if this suspension promised to "irrevocably harm the urgent national security interests of the United States." The President would have the authority to set this new prohibition aside.

Let me say finally that if Pakistan continues to develop and proceeds to deploy nuclear weapons, it would make it very difficult for the United States to continue to cooperate with them militarily, as we wish to do. If Pakistan proceeds further down that path, how will we be able to continue to cooperate militarily with them that tense part of the world, on the border of Afghanistan, Iran, India, China and the Soviet Union?

In this sense, it seems to me to be drawing a nonproliferation line in sand now is in the very best interest continued U.S. Pakistan cooperation in other endeavors.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, during my time in the Senate, I have stron-

advanced lighter controls on the export of nuclear materials, and have expressed my support for the principle of nonproliferation. At the same time, I am not adverse to the idea of punishing those countries that thumb their noses at us on this issue, or on any issue for that matter. But this is not the time, the place or the vehicle to punish Pakistan. The aid package including the sale of F-16's to Pakistan that we have worked out in our subcommittee is carefully tailored to meet our strategic interests in Southwest Asia. I hope that the amendment will be defeated.

Mr. President, one last thought and it's been mentioned previously but I want to reemphasize it. A vote for this amendment is clearly a vote against the cause of the Afghan freedom fighters. That resistance continues largely because Pakistan has resisted Soviet pressures and blandishments on Afghanistan. Obviously without Pakistani support the resistance in Afghanistan would collapse. Mr. President, clearly acceptance of this amendment, which strikes at the heart of our security relationship, would badly damage efforts to push the Soviets out of their occupation of Afghanistan.

Mrs. HAWKINS. Mr. President, while I commend the Senator from California for his concern and commitment to the issue of nuclear nonproliferation, I must rise in opposition to his amendment. The issue here is not who is for proliferation and who is against, the issue is how to best structure our relations with Pakistan in such a way so as to advance our multiple goals including blocking the further spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, there are two fundamental questions: First, is this the best way to go about pursuing a nonproliferation policy with the Pakistanis? And second, what impact would this amendment have on our other priorities involving Pakistan?

American concerns about nuclear proliferation on the Indian subcontinent are not new, and did not begin with Pakistan. In 1974 India exploded its so-called peaceful nuclear explosive device. The Indian bomb was developed in response to the Chinese nuclear capability, acquired in 1964, and prestige considerations, but it has had considerable impact on the Pakistani incentive to develop its own nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan and India have engaged in a serious and sometimes bloody rivalry since their separation in 1947. In fact the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan is similar to that of the Israelis and their Arab neighbors, with deep religious and communal divisions that are only slightly moderated by a common history and cultural traditions. Since 1965 the Indians and Pakistanis have fought two wars with one another over issues that have not been resolved to this day. In both cases India prevailed and Pakistan feels threatened by India's superior conventional forces and is tempted to look on a nuclear

weapons program as a sign of their equality with the Indians.

In view of those pressures favoring the development of a Pakistani nuclear device, it is important that we construct a policy that will effectively promote a nonproliferation policy. We have tried simplistic measures before. From September 1977 to April 1978 and again from the spring of 1979 to 1980, the United States suspended aid to Pakistan because of Pakistan's acquisition of sensitive nuclear hardware. This cutoff did not bring the Pakistani civilian nuclear program to a halt, and it is unlikely that it would have had any better success with a weapons program.

In order to redirect Pakistani energies away from a nuclear weapons program we need to address the concerns that give rise to the desire to develop the weapon in the first place—that is, concern about India and prestige in the Third World. In both cases, U.S. aid to Pakistan is a positive force. U.S. military aid in sufficient quantities reinforces the Pakistani view that they have sufficient military might to deter an attack by conventional Indian forces, and U.S. economic and development aid provided the Pakistani economy a helpful boost on the road to economic development, and offers the Pakistanis a positive outlet by which to gain international stature.

In addition to the question of how best to persuade Pakistan to forego the development of a nuclear device, there is the question of the impact that an aid cutoff would have on other U.S. priorities involving Pakistan. In addition to proliferation the United States is concerned about Pakistani efforts to curtail illegal drug production from some of its remote provinces, security concerns resulting from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the humanitarian support offered by the Pakistani Government to over 3 million Afghan refugees. Each of these is an important issue to the United States, and the drug trafficking concern has a direct impact on Americans, as our schools, homes, families, and workplaces are affected by the crime, violence, and disintegration brought on by illegal drugs of which heroin from Pakistan is an important part. I visited Pakistan about 9 months ago in December 1983, and in addition to meeting government officials in Islamabad, visited some of the prime opium cultivation sites along the northwest frontier.

The 1979 opium crop in Pakistan reached 800 metric tons, when farmers were encouraged to produce more opium by the heroin refiners and traffickers. Eight hundred tons is an astronomical figure when you consider that it can be converted into 80 tons of heroin enough to supply the entire U.S. market for nearly 20 years. We knew that something had to be done quickly. Up to that point, growing and selling opium had been legal in Pakistan, but President Zia recognized the

danger and passed laws based on Islamic religious principles that banned production and sale of opium and all other illicit narcotics drugs.

Pakistan appealed to the United States to help their farmers find alternatives to growing opium, and for training and assistance in enforcing their narcotics laws. We responded with a \$5.3 million rural development program that began in 1981, and added another \$20 million project in 1983. An international effort is now developing to address the remaining opium-growing areas not yet covered by assistance, and the United States is playing a major role in this as well. At the same time, we have greatly stepped up our efforts to provide urgently needed equipment and training, particularly to Pakistan's joint narcotics task forces, which are modeled after the task forces that have been so successful in the United States, particularly in my own State of Florida.

These efforts are now beginning to bear fruit. Opium cultivation has been steadily reduced, and the current crop in Pakistan will produce only about 45 tons. Opium is still coming in from Afghanistan, where the Soviet Army of occupation does not view narcotics control as a priority, and there is still a large amount of heroin refined in Pakistan or smuggled through Pakistan from laboratories just across the border in Afghanistan. But seizures of heroin in Pakistan for the first 3 months of 1984 are running at a rate of 600 percent higher than the comparable period of 1983.

While this phenomenal rate may not continue through the entire year, it certainly is an indication of serious intent on the part of Pakistan. Over 2 tons of heroin has been seized in both 1982 and 1983, and every gram seized means just that much less for the U.S. and European markets. We cannot relax this pressure now. New U.S. initiatives for 1985 will include providing DEA officers to work directly with Pakistan's narcotics task forces as advisers, adding a totally new dimension to our ability to help Pakistan develop its own narcotics interdiction capability. Our law enforcement assistance to Pakistan will continue its upward trend in 1985 and 1986 to provide the transportation, communications, and specialized equipment needed to make Pakistan's narcotics law enforcement truly effective.

While we might like to keep narcotics control as a separate and distinct part of our relationship with Pakistan, it is unrealistic to expect that Pakistan will share this view. U.S. actions that seriously affect any area of the relationship will have an impact on the total relationship. During my visit to Pakistan last year President Zia kept his promise to strengthen Pakistan's sentences for convicted narcotics traffickers, and announced that the maximum penalty would be life imprisonment. I am personally convinced that

President Zia is sincere about eliminating narcotics production; in fact I believe it is one of his top priorities. It certainly is one of ours. If we now take an action that would undermine Pakistan's confidence in our reliability as a friend and ally, the relationship in narcotics control that we have so carefully and painfully constructed over the past 3 years could suffer a devastating blow.

Considering the questionable effectiveness of the Cranston amendment as a nonproliferation incentive, I believe it would be a disaster to risk the cooperation of the Pakistanis on this important issue in order to make a useless gesture regarding nonproliferation.

Furthermore, we have received repeated assurances from the Pakistanis that they do not intend to develop a nuclear device. As recently as July 10, 1984, President Zia of Pakistan has said that Pakistan "has absolutely no intention of using nuclear technology for military purposes. We are against nuclear proliferation and have consistently raised our voice against it in international forums."

With these and other assurances, along with the serious policy flaws involved in this amendment, I hope my colleagues will vote to defeat this amendment.

Mr. BAKER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, let me say that the issue here is not related to Pakistan alone, but the general question of nuclear proliferation is one that has attracted my sincere and earnest interest since the first day I came to the Senate, through the days I served on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and throughout my work on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There is no more important issue in the world today than the business of trying to contain nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, I feel that the law as it now stand is appropriate in the circumstances that we deal with at this time. I feel that I simply must urge the Senate to consider that we have to get on with the business at hand.

I just concluded a conversation with the Speaker of the House on the telephone. I wish to say to my colleagues in the Senate there will be no more short continuing resolutions sent us by the House. I would remind Members that the continuing resolution we are now operating under expires at midnight tonight.

I would like to tell the Members of the Senate that beginning tomorrow morning the process for shutting down the Government will begin. I do not see any prospect that we can pass this continuing resolution, get it to conference, and get it on the President's desk in the morning.

Therefore, I am here to say that we have to give up our most cherished interests if they are legislative in charac-

ter, if they do not have a place on this continuing resolution, and get on with the business at hand.

Mr. President, I make the point of order that this amendment is legislative in character and in violation of the rules as legislation on an appropriation bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HECHT). The amendment gives the President discretion and imposes duties on him in the exercise of that discretion and is legislation for that reason. The amendment also makes a proposal that is effective notwithstanding the provisions of existing law. For both those reasons, the amendment is legislation and is out of order. The point of order is sustained.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I know of no further amendments on our side. I have conferred briefly with the ranking member, the Senator from Hawaii. I believe we are now finished with amendments for this section. Therefore, I move the adoption of this committee amendment, committee amendment No. 8, as amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If not, the question is on agreeing to the committee amendment No. 8, as amended.

Committee amendment No. 8, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I see the chairman of the Defense Appropriations subcommittee on the floor now. Apparently, we are not ready to start on the bill, and I would like to relieve myself of some feeling about a part of this bill. Since no amendment is being offered, it is going to impinge on the time.

Does the distinguished floor manager have an objection to that?

I am being nice. I do not have to defer, even. I am just asking out of courtesy, because I have such great respect for the floor manager.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have great respect for the Senator from Arkansas. I am constrained to say if the Senator wants to relieve himself of the matters that are on his mind, perhaps he should do so.

STAR WARS

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I had originally intended to offer an amend-

ment that would cut \$140 million off the strategic defense initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars." I was going to ask that the \$140 million be transferred over to a couple of readiness items where I personally felt it would do a lot more good. But I am not going to offer the amendment. There is \$1.6 billion in the budget, in this bill, for "Star Wars" research and development, and there is \$1.1 billion in the House bill. So the conferees will be conferring between \$1.6 billion and \$1.1 billion, and my taking \$140 million off our bill would not change the complexity of the problem. So I agreed, along with my chief cosponsor (Mr. PROXMIRE) not to offer the amendment.

But I want to serve notice, Mr. President, that I have very strong feelings about how we should proceed with not only the research and development but also the possible ultimate deployment of anti-ballistic missile weapons in space.

I want to say that I obviously am not going to be nearly as charitable next year, when the 1986 appropriation is on the floor, as I am now, because next year, there will be something like \$4 billion in the bill for research and development on "Star Wars."

Mr. President, I just want to make these points for the record: No. 1, we have an Antiballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union, and have since 1972. It is about the only thing we have left that is ratified by both sides that keeps the nuclear threshold, as dangerous as it is now, from getting worse.

Secretary Weinberger was asked 3 weeks ago on "Meet the Press" whether the strategic defense initiative would ultimately abrogate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. His answer was loud and clear, "Yes, it will, but so be it."

That does not sound to me like an administration that is really serious and sincere about negotiating an end to this arms race and especially negotiating a treaty that will prohibit weapons in the only weapons-free area left on this planet, and that is in space.

This whole "Star Wars" thing makes certain assumptions: No. 1, that the Soviet Union is going to sit still and do nothing while we spend years on research and development and the deployment of antiballistic missile killers in space, whether particle beams or lasers.

No. 2, it assumes that it will protect population centers of this Earth, and there is nothing more dangerous to the political mentality of this country than for the people to believe that somehow or other they can be protected from the ultimate nuclear holocaust if it occurs. That is dangerous in the extreme.

No. 3, it assumes at best that if the system works according to its most ardent proponents, the most we can hope for is 90-percent efficiency.

~~SECRET~~

CPAK

WJB

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90748

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

September 23, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS, *WJB*

SUBJECT: Briefing by Zia Plane Crash U.S. Investigative Team Leader

The leader of the U.S. team helping the GOP investigate the cause of the crash of President Zia's plane is returning to the U.S. this weekend. He will be briefing various U.S. Government agencies in Washington the week of October 3, 1988, after first meeting with General Crist at CENTCOM next week. We have requested DOD to make sure that the NSC is also briefed. The discussion will mostly focus on the procedures of the investigation, not its substance. The GOP is sensitive that it maintain control of the report's findings and is not yet ready to brief on these.

The FBI has been upset at the fact that it was not included in the U.S. team. State now believes that the FBI is satisfied with the arrangement that will give it access to the initial briefing and then the completed report.

BK
Barry Kelly concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to a briefing on the investigation during the week of October 3.

Approve

JAN 9/26

Disapprove _____

Prepared by:
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

F96-106 #7

dlb

5/18/00

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 5, 1988

Ambassador Negroponte:

Attached is the back-channel message to Rich Armitage that I mentioned to you. Bob telephoned from Islamabad this morning to flag it for your attention and General Powell's.

Bob correctly emphasizes the stakes involved, but I see no way to accelerate the certification process at this point. All concerned agencies seem to appreciate the sensitivity and urgency of the situation.

In the meantime, DSAA and the Navy are trying to cope as best they can with the immediate problem of the two frigates.

Bill Burns

Attachment

Message from Oakley

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

F96-108 #8

dlb

5/18/02

SECRET

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE ONLY FROM OAKLEY

GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF ARMACOST AND THE TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE TO ADMINISTRATION POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEREST OF RESPECTING MILITARY COMMITMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE SECDEFF AND CNO, (AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS MADE BY SECSTATE) I AM ADDRESSING THIS TO YOU. NATURALLY, YOU WILL SHARE IT AS YOU SEE FIT (E.G., WITH COLIN AND PRG). OBVIOUSLY WE WANT TO GET RAPID AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON CERTIFICATION BEFORE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS HERE, THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, THE SOVIETS AND THE MEDIA CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS A SUDDEN ABOUT-FACE IN OUR POLICY OF STRONG SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD.

THUS FAR OUR STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE SUCCEEDING ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION REMAINS FLUID AND UNCERTAIN. THE EXTRA MILITARY EFFORT HAS BEEN CLEARLY RECOGNIZED IN PAKISTAN AND ABROAD, HAS HELPED CALM PAKISTAN'S FEARS AND STRENGTHENED RESOLVE ON AFGHANISTAN, AND IS GIVING US UNUSUAL LEVERAGE WITH THE MILITARY ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY MATTERS (SEE ISLAMABAD 21202 ON MY MEETING WITH HAROON AND SEPTEL ON MY MEETING YESTERDAY (OCT. 4) WITH BEG.). THIS COULD ALL BLOW UP IF WE ALLOW WEAK KNEES OR TUNNEL VISION TO PREVAIL ON VERIFICATION.

AS WE ANALYZE THE NEW INTELLIGENCE FROM HERE, AND MATCH IT AGAINST WHAT WAS PREVIOUSLY KNOWN, IT SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION OF A BRIEFING SESSION BY CIA'S NIO WITH JUDGE SOFAER, NAMELY THAT THERE IS LESS WRIGGLE ROOM BUT THE BASIC SITUATION HAS NOT CHANGED AS OF OCTOBER 1ST AND THE PRESIDENT CAN IN GOOD CONSCIENCE CERTIFY. THIS WAS AGREED BY ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING GEN. BURNS AND DICK KENNEDY AND CIA AS OF SEPT. 15. SUBSEQUENT REVELATIONS OF EARLIER ACTIVITIES (E.G., K-BLOCK REFINING OF HEU) AND RECENTLY INTENSIFIED ACTIVITIES (E.G., BY A. Q. KHAN) SHOW THAT THE NEGATIVE FUTURE TREND WE HAD ALL PROJECTED AS OF MID-SEPTEMBER HAS ACCELERATED.

THE QUESTIONS TO ANSWER ARE WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT OCT. 1ST CERTIFICATION, HOW DO WE RELATE IT TO FUTURE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT, WHAT DO WE SAY TO THE GOP, WHAT DO WE SAY TO CONGRESS ABOUT WHAT WE ARE DOING WITH (OR TO) THE GOP ABOUT FUTURE TRENDS, AND HOW DO WE RELATE ALL THIS TO OUR OVERALL POLICY. MY MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW IT MIGHT BE HANDLED ARE OUTLINED BELOW.

WE ARE RECEIVING FRANTIC SIGNALS OF WORKING-LEVEL ALARM FROM VARIOUS AGENCIES AS MOMENT OF TRUTH ARRIVES WHEN THEY ARE OBLIGED TO TAKE A POSITION ON PRESSLER CERTIFICATION AND NEW INTELLIGENCE ON PAK NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS HAS SURFACED. AFTER CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THE PAST, PRESENT AND PROBABLE FUTURE, I AM CONVINCED THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION EVEN WITH NEW INTELLIGENCE IS NOT QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH ALL AGENCIES SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD DURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATION. THE PAK NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS CONTINUED TO PRODUCE HEU AT ROUGHLY THE SAME RATE, BUT CAPACITY MAY BE INCREASING; IT HAS THE TECHNOLOGY AND EXPERTISE TO PRODUCE AND ASSEMBLE ALL

F96-108 # 9

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5/18/00

SECRET

COMPONENTS OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ONE HAS BEEN ASSEMBLED NOR THAT THERE IS ANY INTENT TO DO SO. IT IS WORKING TO DEVELOP MORE ADVANCED CAPABILITIES, USING OVERT AND COVERT PROCUREMENT AND COOPERATION (E.G., PRC, TURKEY, ETC.) BUT PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES WITH US REMAIN SUSPENDED; IT HAS NOT ENGAGED IN A NEW HE TEST OVER THE PAST YEAR, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS/RUMORS THAT IT MIGHT; IT HAS NOT TESTED A DEVICE NOR DO WE HAVE ANY GOOD INTELLIGENCE THAT IT INTENDS TO DO SO; AND IT IS NOT ENGAGED IN TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF SPECIAL BUT MURKY TWO-WAY PEACEFUL/MILITARY NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE PRC.

I HAVE DISCUSSED THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE US/GOP RELATIONSHIP OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN, WITH GENERAL BEG AND WITH YAQUB KHAN. IN EACH OF THOSE CONVERSATIONS I HAVE LINKED GOP ACTIONS ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM TO USG ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT. IN OTHER WORDS, I HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR A VERY FORCEFUL DEMARCHE TO MEMBERS OF THE GOP LEADERSHIP ON THIS ISSUE. I ASSUME THIS IS THE NEXT STEP WE SHOULD TAKE TO MOVE ON CERTIFICATION AND RECOMMEND THAT I BE GIVEN TALKING POINTS URGENTLY.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bill Burns

F96-108 #10



5/18/00

DATA DATE

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: DON GREGG *DG*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Iqbal Akhund

I had a very pleasant meeting with former Ambassador Iqbal Akhund on October 3. He conveyed both his personal regards and those of Benazir Bhutto to you.

With a November 16 election scheduled for Pakistan, in which the parties can participate, Akhund predicts that the PPP can win and will have sufficient votes to form a government. He urged that the US support a return to constitutional democracy in Pakistan. I assured him that those were the sentiments of you and of this Administration.

Akhund said that Bhutto is far more moderate than her father and that she is against the imposition of Muslim law (Sharia).

I told Akhund of your strong interest in South Asia and said that we were out of our old "zero sum game" position between India and Pakistan. I said, frankly, that the biggest problem we had with the late President Zia was the issue of the bomb.

Akhund said that Bhutto does not share her father's passion for development of the weapon, but that it will be hard for her to come out against it publicly. I said my hope was that improved relations with India could lessen Pakistan's felt need to develop the weapon. Akhund agreed. He felt that Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi would be able to relate well to each other.

On Wednesday, October 4, I met with the PPP Director of Foreign Relations, a former surgeon, Nasser Shaikh. He conveyed essentially the same message from Bhutto.

From these meetings it is clear that the PPP expects to win and hopes for very cordial relations. Interestingly enough, I have been told that conservative groups on the Hill, including Jesse Helms, view the PPP and Bhutto with considerable sympathy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

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14
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Φ PAKISTAN

88 JUL 30 19:29

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TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTOR

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SUBJECT SEC DEF LTR (U)

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AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
<u>WHIT</u> <u>1/2/83</u>	<u>S. JONES</u>	<u>NX</u>	<u>351</u>	<u>375-3684</u>

REMARKS: Signed copy

ICS 1-3 FORM 6
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

1 - 262 55

28 SEP 1988

His Excellency Mahmoud A. Haroon
Minister of Defense
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dear Colleague:

(U) Please permit me to express my shock and dismay over the tragic death of President Zia and the others who perished with him last month. His loss is deeply felt. He was not only an extraordinary leader for his country but also a pillar of support for a strong U.S.-Pakistani relationship. The only comfort that can be taken is in the knowledge that the relationship did not depend on any one man and will continue in the years ahead. I have noted the courageous and statesmanlike way you and your colleagues have faced these events and looked toward the future. You can be assured of our support and my personal commitment to a close and warm relationship between our two countries.

(S) President Reagan recently indicated to His Excellency Ghulam Ishaq Khan that I would be writing to you concerning details of how the U.S. might be helpful in shoring up Pakistan's defenses during this critical period when your country is facing increased military pressures from both the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime. This is a difficult time which places additional weight on the shoulders of the Pakistani Armed Forces, and we wish to be as supportive as possible in ensuring that Pakistan remains confident it can meet its security needs. Ambassador Oakley spent two weeks in Washington earlier this month meeting with senior officials of the Administration to discuss ways that we can be of greater assistance. As the President noted, we are accelerating delivery of the frigates to be leased to the Pakistan Navy. In addition, we are proceeding with a Letter of Offer for ten night vision systems for your existing AH-1 helicopters and have agreed to notify the sale of ten additional AH-1s, similarly equipped, next year. I believe there are also other fruitful actions which we can take at this time.

(S) Ambassador Oakley spoke to us about the delays that the Pakistan Air Force is experiencing in the receipt of AIM-9L missiles. This situation has developed because of new missile

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NARA, DATE 5/18/00

production problems which we should overcome in a few months. In view of the current high level of crossborder incursions, however, I have directed that an additional 50 AIM-9L missiles be withdrawn from our own inventories for immediate delivery to Pakistan. We are also willing, if you think it helpful, to send a team of experts to Pakistan to determine if there are additional measures that can be taken to assure the effectiveness of this highly sophisticated system.

(S) I was pleased to learn that the Pakistan Army has asked that we expedite a Letter of Offer and Acceptance for 115 M1A1 main battle tanks. I can assure you that this Administration fully supports the sale of the M1A1 to Pakistan. Regrettably, however, there is insufficient time in this session of Congress to proceed with the formal notification required by law. While I cannot commit the next Administration, you can be assured that we will strongly recommend that they maintain our momentum and make this sale a priority issue for the next Congress. I am aware of your Government's concern over possible price increases for the M1A1 tank next year and assure you that we will make every effort to hold down the cost for Pakistan. These savings are most likely to be achieved if we initiate the formal notification procedure early next year.

(S) As I reflect on the security relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan over the course of this Administration, I am particularly struck by the developments that have taken place in our defense planning. Largely through the mechanism of the Consultative Group meetings, we have both been able to gain much improved understanding of Pakistan's defense requirements and how the U.S. can assist in meeting those needs. Central to that process has been the creation and constant refinement of the Integrated Priority List and the commitment of your Ministry to provide central direction in decisionmaking on weapon system procurements. I firmly believe that this has been a highly beneficial development and that it should remain the foundation of our security relationship in the years ahead.

(S) I urge that you and General Beg discuss these matters more fully with Ambassador Oakley and especially with General Vuono during his visit to Pakistan next month. I assure you that I will continue to follow closely our programs with Pakistan and lend my support to strengthening our friendship. I trust that you will feel free to communicate directly to me should you have ideas on ways to strengthen and improve our bilateral relationship.

Sincerely,



SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

Pakistan Foreign Minister Yaqub passed the following to Mike Armacost in New York September 27. It represents the GOP position Yaqub will take with the Sovs when he meets Sheverdnadze.

1. Najib to be replaced as President by a neutral person acceptable to all parties
2. The Alliance to nominate a Prime Minister to head an interim broad-based government. The PM would not be a member of the Alliance
3. The PM's Cabinet would comprise representatives of various groups on an agreed percentage basis. It would be possible for some PDPA personel in their personal capacity to be included in the interim Cabinet.
4. The allocation of portfolios could be discussed at a later stage.
5. The interim broad-based government would appoint an election commission for holding of elections after completion of Soviet withdrawal.
6. Once an acceptable agreed broad-based government was in place, there shuld be no difficulty in persuading the mujahiddin to accept a ceasefire.

NEA: HBSchaffer

Distribution:

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NSC: Mrs. Tahir-Kheli

dlb
E96-108 # 12
5/18/00

PPAWISMAN

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Sep-1988 07:22 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BURNS

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR
(WHSR@VAXE@)

SUBJECT:

Received: From VAXE(WHSR) by VAXC with Jnet id 3304
for BURNS@VAXC; Mon, 26 Sep 88 07:22 EDT
Date: Mon, 26-SEP-1988 07:21 EST
From: <WHSR@VAXE>
To: BURNS@VAXC

<DIST>
SIT: BENKO BURNS SHIRIN VAX BRANSCUM

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

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TO RUEADWD/CSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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<SUBJ>
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO PAKISTAN: THE MAJOR ISSUES

<TEXT>
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 20576
EXDIS; MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CSA FOR GENERAL VUONO FROM AMBASSADOR OAKLEY
CENTCOM FOR BG PFISTER ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PK, US

dlb P96-108 #13
5/18/00

SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO PAKISTAN: THE MAJOR ISSUES

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT,

2. AS WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON, YOUR VISIT TO ISLAMABAD WILL TAKE PLACE AT A PIVOTAL TIME FOR PAKISTAN IN TERMS OF ITS POLITICAL FUTURE, INCLUDING CIVILIAN/MILITARY RELATIONS AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AN IMPORTANT NATIONAL INTEREST IN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN EVEN AFTER THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, YOUR VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSCORE THAT, DESPITE AFGHANISTAN AND THE PASSING OF ZIA, THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF PAKISTAN.

3. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WILL HAVE TO ADJUST TO CHANGING REALITIES. EVEN BEFORE THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF AUGUST 17, OUR SHARED SUCCESS IN OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN HAS CAUSED BOTH OF US TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THAT RELATIONSHIP. AS A RESULT OF THE ANTICIPATED WITHDRAWAL, OUR RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ALMOST A DECADE, MUST STAND ON THEIR OWN MERITS AND NOT BE VIEWED THROUGH THE PRISM OF AFGHANISTAN. JUDGING BY CONGRESS' REDUCTION OF THE FY89 TRANCHE OF THE AGREED SIX-YEAR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM BY SOME 25 PERCENT BELOW THE PROMISED LEVEL (EVEN WHILE PAKISTAN IS BEING PRESSURED MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY BY THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN), THIS ARGUES FOR BOTH OF US TAKING A REALISTIC LOOK AT OUR LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP.

4. WE NEED TO ASSURE THE GOP, AND PARTICULARLY ITS NEW MILITARY COMMAND, OF STRONG U.S. SUPPORT AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR GOP'S AFGHAN POLICY AS WELL AS THE FUTURE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION. REASSURANCES OF STRONG SHORT-TERM SUPPORT SHOULD BE COUPLED WITH OBJECTIVE DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO MAXIMIZE LONG-TERM U.S. SUPPORT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MILITARY SHOULD BE URGED NOT TO FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF BURMA AND INSTEAD TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH AND WITHIN CIVILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, RATHER THAN SUPPLANTING IT.
THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION

5. EVEN BEFORE ZIA'S DEATH, THE POLITICAL SCENE WAS SET ON ITS HEAD ON MAY 29 WHEN ZIA DISMISSED PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO AND HIS CABINET, AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES. ZIA JUSTIFIED JUNEJO'S DISMISSAL ON THE GROUNDS OF THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT'S CORRUPTION AND FAILURE TO SOLVE THE LAW AND ORDER PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY, BUT BASICALLY, THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT ON THE DIVISION OF POWER. JUNEJO SAW POWER BEING TRANSFERRED FROM ZIA TO THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, WITH A SHARP REDUCTION IN THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES POLITICAL POWER OF THE MILITARY. THE PRESIDENT, HOWEVER, SAW THE ARRANGEMENT AS A FAIRLY LIMITED SHARING OF POWER WITH HIMSELF (AND THE MILITARY) AS THE SENIOR PARTNER.

6. THE AUGUST 17 AIR CRASH COULD HAVE PROVOKED A MAJOR

POLITICAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN, AS RECENT INDIAN AND SOVIET THREATS CONVINCED PAKISTANIS THAT A "FOREIGN HAND" HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ZIA'S DEATH. THE MILITARY, FORTUNATELY, CHOSE THE RESPONSIBLE COURSE OF SUPPORTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION OF A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. OUR STRONG STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS AND THE BIPARTISAN DELEGATION TO ZIA'S FUNERAL LED BY SECRETARY SHULTZ DID MUCH TO REASSURE THE PAKISTANIS DURING A PERIOD OF GREAT UNCERTAINTY. IN ADDITION, THE EXCELLENT WORK OF THE U.S. MILITARY CRASH INVESTIGATION TEAM HAS HELPED VENTILATE THE INITIAL NEAR-PANIC BY FOCUSING UPON OBJECTIVE FACTS AND POSTPONING THE NEED FOR AN EARLY REPORT, WHICH WOULD HAVE FUELED THE FLAME OF SUSPICION AND COULD HAVE OVERHEATED THE INTERNAL POLITICAL BALANCE.

BT
#0576
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 20576
EXDIS; MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CSA FOR GENERAL VUONO FROM AMBASSADOR OAKLEY
CENTCOM FOR BG PFISTER ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PK, US

SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO PAKISTAN: THE MAJOR ISSUES

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

7. THE LEADERSHIP TRANSFER FOLLOWING ZIA'S DEATH WAS SURPRISINGLY SMOOTH AND UNTROUBLED. YOU WILL FIND ZIA'S SUCCESSOR, GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN, ACTING AS IF HE IS FIRMLY IN CHARGE AND ON TOP OF THE ISSUES. HIS LONG AND VARIED GOVERNMENT SERVICE IS SERVING HIM AND THE NATION WELL AT A CRITICAL TIME. THE PAKISTANI MILITARY HAS CLOSED RANKS AND IS SUPPORTING HIM AND THE CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH IT CONSULTS AND ADVISES THE ACTING PRESIDENT CONSTANTLY AND MAINTAINS A CLOSE WATCH ON ALL DEVELOPMENTS. GHULAM ISHAQ HAS FORMALLY INVOLVED THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY BY ESTABLISHING AN EMERGENCY COUNCIL IN WHICH THE SERVICE CHIEFS PARTICIPATE, ALTHOUGH THE CIVILIANS HOLD THE MAJORITY AND THE ACTING PRESIDENT IS CHAIRMAN. THE PRESIDENT HAS STRONGLY COMMITTED THE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY THROUGH ON ZIA'S PLEDGE TO HOLD ELECTIONS ON NOVEMBER 16, A DECISION WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY, SPECIFICALLY BY GENERAL BEG. THIS POSTURE HAS BEEN WARMLY WELCOMED. INCLUDING BY THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION.

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

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~~ACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

10. FOR THE LAST DECADE, PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY FOUR FACTORS: THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 100,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN, OVERWHELMING U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHEDIN AND PAKISTAN, THE STEADY BACKING OF CHINA, AND ITS TRADITIONAL FEARS AND SUSPICIONS TOWARD INDIA. WHEN PAKISTAN LOOKS AT THE WORLD TODAY, IT SEES THE SOVIETS LEAVING AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS BEING PLACED UNDER BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS, CHINA INCREASINGLY DIRECTING ITS ATTENTIONS INWARD, AND A GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

11. ZIA'S PLAN TO ADJUST TO THESE CHANGES WAS TO DEVELOP A MORE COHESIVE AND MEANINGFUL ISLAMIC BLOC IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, ANCHORED BY TURKEY ON ONE END AND PAKISTAN ON THE OTHER, AS A BASIS FOR ITS SECURITY (PARTICULARLY AGAINST INDIA). PAKISTAN HAS MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN, BOTH UNDER THE SHAH AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND THE GOP HOPES THAT RECENT CHANGES IN TEHRAN WILL FACILITATE EVEN CLOSER, MORE STABLE TIES. IN ADDITION, THE ANTICIPATED COLLAPSE OF THE PDPA REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL FRIENDLY TO PAKISTAN AND LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INDIA'S INFLUENCE.

12. IN SHORT, THE GOP HOPES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE IMMINENT END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (WHICH THE GOP THINKS

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 20576
EXDIS; MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CSA FOR GENERAL VUONO FROM AMBASSADOR OAKLEY
CENTCOM FOR BG PFISTER ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PK, US

SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO PAKISTAN: THE MAJOR ISSUES
WILL LEAD TO A MORE MODERATE POST-KHOMENEI REGIME) AND
THE ACCESSION OF AN AFGHAN MUJAHEDIN GOVERNMENT

RESPONSIVE TO PAKISTAN TO FORM AN ISLAMIC BLOC
STRETCHING FROM TURKEY TO PAKISTAN. THE PRIMARY
ADVANTAGE OF THIS CONCEPT IS THAT SUCH A BLOC WILL GIVE
PAKISTAN "STRATEGIC DEPTH" AGAINST INDIA.

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

THE INDO-PAKISTANI MILITARY "BALANCE"

15. DESPITE SOVIET THREATS AND AN INCREASED RATE OF AIR
ATTACKS ACROSS THE PAKISTANI BORDER (WHICH HAS LED TO AT
LEAST ONE SOVIET-PILOTED AIRCRAFT BEING SHOT DOWN BY THE
PAKISTAN AIR FORCE), THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT PAKISTAN'S
LONG-TERM SECURITY CONCERNS ARE DIRECTED PRIMARILY
AGAINST INDIA. WHILE THE TWO COUNTRIES CONTINUE AN
ACTIVE DIALOGUE (THEIR DEFENSE SECRETARIES, FOR EXAMPLE,
MET IN NEW DELHI ON SEPT. 23), MILITARY TENSIONS PERSIST.
THERE WAS SHARP FIGHTING IN THE DISPUTED SIACHEN GLACIER
AREA LAST SEPTEMBER, AND THERE IS ALWAYS THE POTENTIAL
FOR A REPEAT OF LAST YEAR'S WAR SCARE GENERATED BY
PAKISTANI CONCERN OVER LARGE-SCALE INDIAN MILITARY
EXERCISES.

16. PAKISTANI INSECURITIES HAVE BEEN SHARPENED BY RECENT
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF INDIA'S ACQUISITION OF SIGNIFICANT NEW
MILITARY EQUIPMENT, USUALLY WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE.
INDIA'S LEASE EARLY THIS YEAR OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR
SUBMARINE IS THE MOST OBVIOUS EXAMPLE. INDIA CURRENTLY
HAS TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND IS PLANNING FOR A THIRD.
IN ADDITION, INDIA IS BUILDING LARGE NUMBERS OF T-72
TANKS UNDER LICENSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND WAS THE

FIRST COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE USSR TO RECEIVE THE MIG-29.
OF EVEN GREATER POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS WAS THE SUCCESSFUL
TEST IN FEBRUARY OF INDIA'S "PRITHVI" BALLISTIC MISSILE,
WHICH IN PAKISTANI MINDS WILL GIVE INDIA AT LEAST A
THEORETICAL FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST PAKISTAN'S
HEARTLAND AND ITS ARMED FORCES. THIS IN TURN INCREASES
PAKISTAN'S INTEREST IN ACQUIRING ITS OWN BALLISTIC
MISSILES, ADDING ANOTHER DIMENSION TO OUR CONCERNS
REGARDING INSTABILITY ON THE SUBCONTINENT.

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~RE~~

~~ACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

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~~REDACTED~~

22. AS THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN, THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE A NEED TO REASSESS WHAT KIND OF SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WE SHOULD HAVE WITH PAKISTAN. WE BELIEVE THAT, JUST AS WE HAD AN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN BEFORE THE SOVIET INVASION, THERE WILL BE A NEED FOR A CONTINUING SECURITY INTEREST IN PAKISTAN AFTER THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW.

23. GEOGRAPHY IS OF COURSE A KEY CONSIDERATION -- THERE IS NO SURPLUS OF STATES CLOSE TO THE GULF AND IRAN THAT ARE FRIENDLY TO THE U.S. IN ADDITION, THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS LIKELY TO BE VERY FLUID IN THE PERIOD

BT
#0576

BT
SECRET SECTION 05 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 20576
EXDIS; MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
CSA FOR GENERAL VUONO FROM AMBASSADOR OAKLEY
CENTCOM FOR BG PFISTER ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PK, US
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO PAKISTAN: THE MAJOR ISSUES WILL LEAD TO A MORE MODERATE POST-KHOMENEI REGIME) AND FOLLOWING A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, AND COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN WILL BE IMPORTANT IF WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO

INFLUENCE EVENTS THERE. TERMINATING OUR AID PROGRAMS
WOULD ALSO END WHATEVER LEVERAGE WE HAVE OVER PAKISTAN'S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM. FINALLY, THERE ARE OTHER KEY INTERESTS
(E.G., REGARDING TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS) THAT CAN ONLY
BE ADVANCED
WITH A COOPERATIVE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT.

~~RED.~~

~~ACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~RED.~~

~~ACTED~~

CONCLUSION

~~REDACTED~~

25. IN SUM, YOU WILL BE ARRIVING IN PAKISTAN AT A TIME
WHEN PAKISTAN'S RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE WORLD, AND
PARTICULARLY WITH THE UNITED STATES, IS UNDERGOING
CHANGE. THE RELATIONSHIP HAS ITS PROBLEMS, BUT WE SHARE
IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN ENSURING A NON-COMMUNIST FUTURE
FOR AFGHANISTAN AND IN PROMOTING STABILITY AND MODERATION
IN THE GULF. CONTINUED SOVIET THREATS AND AIR ATTACKS
ENSURE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN REMAIN POINTED
IN THE SAME ESSENTIAL DIRECTION. YOUR VISIT WILL PROVIDE
AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENFORCE THESE THEMES. I LOOK FORWARD
TO YOUR ARRIVAL, AND WE ARE ALL CONFIDENT THAT YOUR
VISIT WILL BE A SUCCESS.

OAKLEY

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#0576

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 05

<SSN>

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<TOR>

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<SECT>

SECTION: 02 OF 05

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

September 13, 1988

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS *wfb*

SUBJECT: PRG, Pakistan/Afghanistan,
September 14, 1988, 11:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

Bob Oakley's presence in Washington provides an opportunity to review where we are in Pakistan and plan for the months ahead. These are likely to be critical months with Pakistan feeling simultaneous pressure on a number of fronts, as enumerated below.

Pakistan: The Domestic Situation

On the surface, things are likely to remain fairly calm. The shock of Zia's death and the conditions under which it occurred have anesthetized the body politic for the moment. Also, few want to openly challenge the military-civilian council which governs Pakistan today. No one wants to provide an excuse for the postponement of elections.

However, the fundamental difficulties confronting a smooth and permanent transfer of power to a democratically elected government still obtain today. The polarization of Pakistani politics continues. At one end of the spectrum is Benazir Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party (PPP) is probably the most popular party nationwide. The PPP's appeal is not necessarily a mark of its intrinsic strength. It is also a measure of the absence of a viable alternative political party. The favored candidate of recent years, the Muslim League, is badly divided. The Zia-Junejo split continues with Zia loyalists (e.g., the powerful governors of the Punjab and the Northwest Frontiers [N.W.F.] provinces, Nawaz Sharif and Fazle Haq respectively) continuing to challenge Junejo's attempts to head the Muslim League for the next election. Other major political leaders, e.g., Jatoi of Sind, Wali Khan of the N.W.F.P., remain parochially based.

At the other end of the political spectrum is the military, which sees itself as the only truly national institution and is likely to remain the arbiter of the political system. However, the plane crash killed not only Zia but also several

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

dlb F96-108 #315
5/18/00

key members of the Army hierarchy, even though key Corps Commanders remain in place. ~~REF.~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

Keeping inflation in check will be an important task. Investments are likely to decline and there may be a significant amount of capital leaving the country. Even in the last several years when Pakistan's economic performance has been relatively strong, Zia sought relief from the World Bank but was unwilling to institute some key reforms (reductions of subsidies). Today's climate allows for even less latitude on economic reforms. Pakistan likely will be assisted by continued high remittances from Pakistani workers abroad, adding much needed foreign exchange to the country.

Afghanistan

Continued need for a strong relationship with the U.S. will keep Pak policy basically aligned with the U.S. The loss of Zia removed the strongest proponent of Pak assistance to the Mujahidin and a continued Afghan refugee presence in Pakistan. However, given that Soviet forces are due to leave Afghanistan within the next 5-6 months under the Geneva Agreement, few are likely to want to curtail assistance to the Mujahidin or the refugees in the interim.

The proper vehicle for delivering the assistance to Afghans may come under greater discussion. The Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) will want its primary role to remain unchallenged. The Foreign Office, with Yaqub Khan in charge, may want to exert greater influence, which will cause problems with the ISI.

Soviet pressure on Pakistan at this time will be severely felt. The current campaign of air incursions and bombings will keep up the psychological pressure on the GOP. If it is coupled with internal acts of sabotage -- of the variety we saw last spring -- the pressure could become intolerable, particularly if it leads to a law and order situation forcing the postponement of the November elections which then escalates the cycle of violence. Hence, in the period ahead, U.S. pressure on the Soviets urging restraint with regard to Pakistan will be critical. Apart from statements by press spokesmen, Roz Ridgeway called in the Soviet Charge last week and Mike Armacost took a very firm line with Vorontsov in Moscow. The President's meeting with Shevardnadze provides a crucial opportunity to get the message across to the Soviet leadership that Pakistan's security and

stability remain important to the U.S. And, the President should remind the Soviets of their prior private agreement to total withdrawal of troops by December 15, 1988.

Pakistani experience with Sadruddin and the UN on humanitarian assistance is likely to go through growing pains. However, with support for Hekmatyar likely reduced without Zia, the GOP may look for greater collaboration with the UN's special coordinator. Public opinion in Pakistan demands the early return to some normalcy within Afghanistan so that the 2.8 million Afghan refugees present in Pakistan can begin to go home. Sadruddin can help bring that about.

Indo-Pak Relations

Now, more than ever, Pakistan needs good relations with India. Yet, the sense of vulnerability occasioned by Zia's death is likely to produce a great deal of GOP paranoia regarding India. The U.S. can be helpful by urging caution on New Delhi and encouraging movement on some of the pending confidence-building measures (CBMs). The President's meetings with the Indian and Pak Foreign Ministers during UNGA later this month offers a valuable opportunity. The psychological element is important to the process and perhaps a brief joint exchange -- or even a photo-op -- with the President and the two foreign ministers (the meetings are scheduled back-to-back) is worth exploring. Such an event would be important both as a symbolic way of highlighting the U.S. role as a peacemaker in South Asia, and as a practical means of reinforcing the need for restraint in the region.

On the substantive side, pending CBMs include trade, joint patrols against terrorism and signature on non-attack on nuclear facilities. Pakistan's new Foreign Secretary was the recent Ambassador to New Delhi. Yaqub Khan is also an old hand at Indo-Pak relations. The fact remains that Pakistan needs peace with India in order to consolidate the gains accruing from Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. While Rajiv Gandhi may find Pakistan a convenient scape-goat for the genuine problems he faces in the Punjab, India once again faces isolation from its South Asian neighbors and needs to reach out. Also, Indo-Pak normalization is India's best hope of keeping the superpowers out of the subcontinent -- an important goal of Indian foreign policy.

U.S.-Pakistan Bilateral Relations

We are entering our toughest and trickiest period in the months ahead. The GOP's sense of vulnerability will lead it to seek greater assistance from the U.S., but the relationship needs a modicum of restraint if it is to survive the turbulence just ahead.


No matter how dependent Pakistan remains on the U.S., the fact is that Pakistan is an independent and sovereign country. Too great a public identification with the U.S. in many spheres will risk a backlash -- particularly if things go wrong in some areas, as they are bound to. A more sensible approach would be to confine the scope of our involvement to a few key areas: Afghanistan, including Soviet pressure; regional security, including Indo-Pak relations; nuclear proliferation; and, the transition to democracy. A solid record of concern and actions on these issues is sufficient to give the necessary feeling of support to the GOP and steadiness which the relationship needs. From time to time, the GOP, and our own bureaucracy or Congress may seek to make the relationship more visible. If possible, such attempts -- e.g., U.S. observers at Pak elections -- should be avoided.

Arms are a powerful symbol of the U.S.-Pak relationship. Expedited delivery of some items may help boost the Pak Army's morale in the short run. We need to be careful that we: (a) not promise more than we can deliver; (b) prevent Congressional backlash on critical election period by proposing large items such as AWACS; (c) not upset civil-military relations in ways which leave the blame for harsh military actions prior and during elections at the U.S. doorstep.

The message of steadfastness without a dramatic escalation in commitment is the best policy under the current conditions. Given general cautionary note, the following specifics warrant attention:

Military Measures.

-- M1A1 Commitment. This item has become a public symbol particularly because of the plane crash. Some Pakistanis already are saying that Pakistan does not want the tank and that the U.S. is pushing it. We need to gauge GOP commitment to the sale before going to the Hill with unofficial notification, as is being suggested.




-- F-16s. DOD is looking into the possibility of expedited delivery of 11 F-16s. The configuration under current production is different -- and more costly -- than the model ordered by Pakistan.

-- Expedited AIM-9L delivery. This is a symbolic gesture since only 20 additional missiles are available and in-country stocks in Pakistan are adequate.

Economic Measures: Balancing military steps with economic ones is important. There are several AID project loans ready for signature (totaling \$50-60 million), but OMB is holding up action on them as part of its worldwide effort to reduce obligation of funds during the remainder of the fiscal year. The PRG may want to ask OMB to lift its hold. (State now believes that OMB may be prepared to approve the request.)

Annual Nuclear Certification. The Pressler Amendment which prohibits use of funds to countries in possession of nuclear weapons requires the President to certify that Pakistan does not possess such weapons.



Presidential Letter

State is working on a draft Presidential letter to Ghulam Ishaq for Bob Oakley to carry. We understand that Frank Carlucci will also be writing to his Pak counterpart giving details of what additional support (i.e., expected deliveries) might be possible in the weeks ahead.

R/S Rick Saunders concurs.

Prepared by:
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

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WJB

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SYSTEM II
90666 ADD-ON

Greg Canning

2/20/92

September 16, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS ^{WJB}

SUBJECT: Minutes of August 17, 1988 PRG on Pakistan,
Situation Room, 4:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.

Attached are the minutes of the August 17, 1988 PRG on Pakistan.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached memorandum.

Approve WJB

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Minutes

Prepared by:
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

PAKISTAN

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS F96-108 #16

PAK REC, 14 Sept (11:30-12:30)

BY LOJ NARA DATE 7/20/00

38 days beyond dec.
of court needed for
court →

Initial

- Will mil. allow elect. 11/16? (2001 Court by delib. election)
- Benazir likely win either party / or party elect.
- Indo-PAK rel: current Pak just. at least known quantity to GoI.

high
i. likelihood
of delay
in elect.
↓
Matters
needs
response
Cong. for
this.

-- Investg C-130:

-- Myslam: this month, 3 cross border air attacks on

Pan villages. Doubt? Not sure whether from a Myslam pilot's

view. Shev. was, h'ell disputes -- (MIBT) are we on solid ground?

Push Sovs on it -- whether Sovs or Myslam.

→ * CIA to try to develop more complete, solid evaluation ~~of~~ cross border
(all source -- CIA/DIA).

Sov/POPA effort psych more the mil.

Don beggs: Change leadership this country report?

Cross investg: Technical work completed this week. We'll

talk to them on how present. Strch to

press like (Pak investg, etc.). Don't

allow big divergence Pak + US. -- Let

Ent I think take lead on guidance.

→ * CIA / State ref on MPL for Hill (Humphrey / RSO)

-- Sovs were likely prep up them and full coverage search -- full
out winter. Decent interval.

Next Steps

o Dipl

-- GPS visit, RSO enid. → * Pres letter (RSO: build up mil + support
Ghulam Ishaq Khan; civ. it's not at some time solidly mil - (will).

-- IMF / PAK program: US ought to support. Get through with
interim just this.

-- M.2 sovi: useful jet sub: → * acceler F-16 del ing most app ing.

PAK 4-2 - Frigate + re pair ship. ↳ not the cost.

Par haps all this: See Def letter to con gress.

MIAT: Mainly India-related. Don't let PMs on beyond... by limits...
Car'l Vuono's trip will be useful.

RVA → CG/ind Nov: keep focus on long-term. MIATs; more F-16s, etc.
→ * Crossier Board: more cert. work by Oct 1. (Some kind certif.)
→ State will follow up. Timing is important → need more along quickly.
(MIAT)

Pres/PAC For -- reassure Yagub; elect. on travel; see what's up
Ind. side. Maybe equities.
End-Yagub tension.

→ * OMB → appointment done: signed at Friday.

Treasury Dept. → v. strict standards. (PAC - quality; EG-ADDS)

Dr Gugg: some of u. exp. Trip done for PAC as we done
in New Delhi: are we set up do that?

RVA: what could Vuono say to PAC + Indians? babies?

Meeting in NY? Get some pts. for Vuono (Sark)

PAC/India For

- ① Intel → pull together eval cross-border (Stein visit)
- ② Letter RK - Ischay
- ③ Letter FCE (elementary numbers do deal side)
- ④ OMB letter solved.
- ⑤ IMF -- looking into to do.

India ask
is nil.

~~SECRET~~

Pakistan

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90673

Seq. Comming

2/20/78

August 20, 1988

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: WILLIAM J. BURNS ^{WB}

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Rajiv Gandhi on Pakistan

I understand that Ambassador Negroponte has approved transmittal of the attached draft to the Department of State for the Secretary's review. The Gandhi letter would serve as a companion to the draft Gorbachev letter already transmitted to State (System II 90669 Add-On).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Levitsky at Tab I.

Approve *pm*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Levitsky

Tab A Draft Presidential Letter to Gandhi

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SYSTEM II
90673

August 22, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR -MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to
Prime Minister Gandhi on Pakistan (S)

Ambassador Negroponte has asked that the attached draft
Presidential letter be passed to Secretary Shultz for his
review. It would serve as a companion to the draft Gorbachev
letter already transmitted to State. (S)



Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Draft Presidential Letter

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

FILED
NLS 96-108 # 17
NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~SECRET~~

Dear Rajiv:

I am writing to express my concern about recent developments in Pakistan. The violent death of President Zia, of many of his colleagues, and of our own Ambassador and Defense representative brings us to a delicate moment in the entire region. Circumstances surrounding the crash are yet to be determined. However, it is important that all outside powers act constructively at this critical time as I have also written to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Over the past several years, I have followed the attempts that you and President Zia have made to improve relations between your two countries. I was encouraged to learn that this dialogue was to be resumed at the upcoming Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Despite the recent tragedy, I am sure that Pakistan's interest in continued normalization with India will continue. Formalization of some of the proposals pending between India and Pakistan on nuclear and other matters can contribute toward peace. The United States remains ready to assist in the process in whatever ways the Pakistani leadership and yourself deem helpful.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

DECLASSIFIED *Released*
NLS F96-108 # 18
BY dlb NARA, DATE 5/18/02

DRAFT

Dear Rajiv:

I am writing to express my concern about recent developments in Pakistan. The violent death of President Zia, of many of his colleagues, and of our own Ambassador and Defense representative brings us to a delicate moment in the entire region. Circumstances surrounding the crash are yet to be determined. However, it is important that all outside powers act constructively at this critical time as I have also written to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Over the past several years, I have followed the attempts that you and President Zia have made to improve relations between your two countries. I was encouraged to learn that this dialogue was to be resumed at the upcoming Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Despite the recent tragedy, I am sure that Pakistan's interest in continued normalization with India will continue. Formalization of some of the proposals pending between India and Pakistan on nuclear and other matters can contribute toward peace. The United States remains ready to assist in the process in whatever ways the Pakistani leadership and yourself deem helpful.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

CLASSIFIED/Released
NLS 496-108 #19
Y db, R JAE 7/18/02

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Pakistan

SYSTEM II
90669 Add-on

August 19, 1988

6/19/88

2/20/90

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PRM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Pakistan

I understand that Colin has approved transmittal of the attached draft to the Department of State for the Secretary's review.

The attached memo to Mel Levitsky would accomplish this.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memo at Tab I to Levitsky.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Mel Levitsky
Tab A Draft Presidential Letter

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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A
B

I

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90669-Add-on

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on
Pakistan/Afghanistan (S)

General Powell has asked that the attached draft Presidential letter be passed to Secretary Shultz for his review. (S)

In view of the potential for instability in Pakistan and the likely Soviet temptation to exploit it, it would seem highly useful to warn the Soviets firmly of the gravity with which the United States would view any such Soviet efforts. The attached is a draft of a Presidential letter to Gorbachev making clear our long-standing stake in Pakistan and the harm which could be done to U.S.-Soviet relations by any untoward Soviet actions. (S)

The letter also states in positive terms the President's acknowledgment of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the overall progress of U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

It is envisioned that a similar letter might also be sent to Prime Minister Gandhi. (S)

Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Draft Presidential Letter

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E96-108 #20
DATE 5/15/02



SENSITIVE

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The problems of South and Southwest Asia have long been of concern to both of us. I am writing to express my thoughts on the present situation -- the tragic irony that a positive development (the fulfillment of the U.S.S.R.'s promise to withdraw the first half of its forces from Afghanistan) is now accompanied by a serious negative development, namely, the violent death of President Zia, of many of his colleagues, and of our own Ambassador and defense representative.

The cooperation between us that helped produce the Geneva accords on Afghanistan was an historic milestone. The Soviet agreement to withdraw from that troubled country was a dramatic event, which has already given impetus to diplomatic efforts in other areas as you have expressed the hope it would. As co-guarantors of those accords, we are both committed to help bring about a positive and lasting solution.

The tragedy in Pakistan brings us to a delicate moment in the entire region. At such a moment, it is especially important that all outside powers act constructively. In this regard, we could not help but notice the increasingly menacing tone of the Soviet government's communications with Pakistan before this tragic event. I must state honestly that the stability and security of Pakistan are major interests of the United States -- this is a long-standing American commitment -- and I would not want to see developments there become a source of serious damage to our relations.

SENSITIVE

F96 -108 #21

dbb

Released

5/18/00

SENSITIVE

- 2 -

The Geneva accords on Afghanistan, and the associated understandings, remain, as before, the basis for our policy and for that of Pakistan. Both the United States and Pakistan have made clear that the obligations of the parties are symmetrical with respect to assistance to our respective friends in Afghanistan. Our assessment of what assistance is required will be affected significantly by whatever restraint we see on your side. I can assure you that, in the meantime, the United States and Pakistan firmly intend to proceed on the same basis as before. It cannot be otherwise. Without self-determination for the Afghan people, as called for in United Nations General Assembly resolutions, and without Soviet withdrawal as agreed in the Geneva instruments, there is no chance for return of the refugees or for a stable, nonaligned Afghanistan.

I am also writing to President Gandhi along the same lines. This subject, along with others, will, I expect, be discussed more thoroughly when our Under Secretary of State, Ambassador Armacost, meets with your officials in Moscow at the beginning of September.

Mr. General Secretary, please accept these thoughts in the constructive spirit with which they are conveyed. We have accomplished so much in our relations, and my strongest wish is to see this progress become permanent.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

- 3 -

Sincerely

[RR]

His Excellency
Mikhail S. Gorbachev
General Secretary of the
Central Committee,
CPSU
Moscow

SENSITIVE