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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

CAS 9/5/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1982 (SEPTEMBER 1982) (2/2)

FOIA

M11-443

Box Number 4

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112

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
142789	CABLE	BERLIN 03966 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	1	9/24/1982	B1
142790	CABLE	MOSCOW 11584 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	5	9/24/1982	B1
142791	MEMO	STEVEN STEINER TO INTERAGENCY GROUP RE 9/2 MEETING <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	3	9/7/1982	B1
142792	HANDWRITTEN NOTES	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	10	9/16/1982	B1
142793	CABLE	MOSCOW 11021 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	9/14/1982	B1
142794	MEMO	STEINER TO INTERAGENCY GROUP RE 8/5 MEETING <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	3	8/9/1982	B1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FILE:  
PUBLIC  
DIPLOMACY

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September 18, 1982

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy  
FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner  
SUBJECT: Report on 9/16 Meeting and 9/23 Agenda

Summary of 9/16 Meeting:

1. European Political Developments. Konner and Lemmon of State/EUR/NE briefed on political developments in Denmark and The Netherlands respectively.

2. Repression in USSR. The meeting's main focus was on increasing reports on repression in the USSR. Various ideas were discussed concerning how to make the best case to the European and American publics on this pattern of repression. Based on this discussion, we are considering the following:

-- Developing a chronology of repressive acts -- first cut attached for your URGENT comment and for you to add additional points which you believe should be included. Those calling comment on chronology should call Jim Schumaker (EUR/SOV), x21712.

-- A Department statement to be issued on release of the chronology to gain increased attention for the chronology and to make our point on the pattern of repression;

-- The above to be preceded by informal contacts with selected journalists to get them thinking of this pattern of repression and to build a good context for release of statement and chronology;

-- Above also to be preceded by cable to posts in Allied countries asking them to call this pattern of repression to attention of host governments so that when we make our release here, some of the Allies will hopefully add some supportive comments of their own;

-- Providing to USG speakers in both Europe and US our chronology and statement since most public appearances will likely provide a suitable context to raise these issues at some point in the discussion;

-- Feeding this material to Congressional CSCE Commission for inclusion in their report which is to be made next month; and

-- Passing this information to interested private groups as well, since they may want to organize peaceful demonstrations in connection with Madrid resumption.

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BY U1 NARA DATE 9/21



Needless to say, we will also insure that USIA and VOA have all of this material for transmittal to all posts -- preferably worldwide. We will also provide it to Ambassador Kampelman for his use both in Madrid and his public appearances prior to Madrid resumption. As indicated at 9/16 meeting, Ambassador Kampelman has also agreed to address this group in the near future.

3. Forced Labor in USSR. This issue is being pursued. We are working on possible State Department statement. HA passed out at 9/16 meeting transcript of telephone conversation<sup>s</sup> between FRG and USSR which were turned over to USG by the International Human Rights Association in Frankfurt and can be provided to selected press contacts. On a related project, John Lenczowski, P, agreed to help make ready for public release the piece on "Crime and Punishment in USSR." In the Meantime, draft as it now stands should be provided to NSC (Dennis Blair and Carey Lord), EUR/SOV and EUR/P, as well as HA.

Agenda for 9/23

1. Follow-up on Soviet Repression
2. Follow-up on Forced Labor
3. Update on Public Affairs Opportunities in Europe -- USIA/PA-Lowenkron
4. Follow-up on distribution of NATO Force Comparison paper and response to Soviet rebuttal (EUR/RPM-Halgus)
5. Status of USIA Fall Initiative (USIA/PGM-Chikas or Schaffer)
6. Status report on GDR repression (EUR/CE-O'Donnel, USIA/EU-Jamison)
7. "Crime and Punishment in USSR" - Status Report (P-Lenczowski)

Attachment: As stated

Comments, please,  
to Jim Schumaker  
632-1712  
ASAP

DRAFT

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3

Chronology of Soviet Repressive Activities: May 26-September 14, 1982

May

- May 26 Yuriy Andropov released as KGB chairman, replaced by Vitaliy Fedorchuk, Ukrainian KGB Chief since 1970.
- May 26 Ukrainian human rights activist Petr Sichko rearrested ten days after release from the camps. Charged under Article 187-1 UKSSR Code ("Slandering Soviet State.") Sentenced to 3 years in labor camp.

June

- June Yevhen Antonenko-Davydovych, son of writer Boris Antonenko-Davydovych, arrested on unknown charges.
- June 4 Sergei Batovrin holds unofficial press conference to announce existence of 11-member peace group, entitled "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and USA." Nearly 500 persons throughout USSR sign petitions sponsored by the group during June and August.
- June 5 Amcit tourist detained in Kiev, not permitted to call Embassy, roughed up.
- June 9 Refusenik Yefrem Lyvishchuk arrested in Odessa, charged under Article 187-1 UKSSR Code ("Slandering Soviet State").
- June 12 Batovrin placed under house arrest. Other members of group detained by police. Ostrovsky family told to emigrate. (See June 4).
- June 15 Ukrainian human rights activist Mikhaylo Horyn sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.
- June 17 Soviet dissident Vladimir Gershuni arrested on Article 190-1 RSFSR code ("Slandering the Soviet State"); friends hear he may be put into psychiatric hospital.
- June 17 SMOT activists Valeriy Senderov, Boris Kanevsky and Ilya Geltser arrested and charged under Article 190-1 RSFSR code ("Slandering Soviet State"). All are held at Lefortovo. SMOT stands for the "Interprofessional Union of Free Workers", an independent Union group that was suppressed in the late 1970's.
- June 20 Successful binational marriage hunger striker Andrey Frolov leaves for the United States; reunited in Chicago with Lois Frolova. Frolov, Volobuyev, Jugurtiene, Lozanskaya, Balovlenkov, Kiblitisky, Azure and Petrov all began hunger strikes in April seeking exit permission from Soviet Union to be reunited with their spouses in the

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

BY CU NARA DATE 9/5/12



West. Azure drops out on June 1, Lozanskaya June 11, and Kiblitsky June 16 after receiving oral assurances of exit visa. Jugurtiene drops out on June 1 and returns to Vilnius.

- June 23 Exiled dissident Irina Grivnina threatened with prosecution on charges of "parasitism". Grivnina, a member of the Moscow Group to Monitor Abuse of psychiatry for Political Purposes, was sentenced on July 15, 1981, to five years' internal exile under Article 190-1 RSFSR code ("Slandering Soviet State").
- June 27 Lydia and Vera Vashchenko begin hunger strike in Chernogorsk seeking Soviet permission for Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families to emigrate.
- June 30 Soviet Jewish emigration for June is 182 persons.

July

- July 1 Natalya Lazareva, Leningrad dissident writer, recants and receives reduced sentence -- 4 years' imprisonment and 2 years' internal exile. Was charged under Article 70 ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"). Sentence for first offenders can be as high as seven years' imprisonment and 5 years' internal exile.
- July 1-2 Lilia and Augustina Vashchenko begin hunger strike in Embassy in sympathy with Chernogorsk strikers (see June 27).
- July 2 Three ethnic German dissenters demonstrate in Red Square for 30 seconds before police intervene.
- July 2 Yevgeniy Kozlovskiy, producer, confesses guilt and is released (Kozlovskiy was arrested in December 1981 and charged with 190-1, "Slandering the Soviet State")
- July 4 Wife, son, and stepmother of Soviet defector Viktor Korchnoi permitted to leave USSR for Vienna, Austria
- July 4 Mother and brother of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy prevented from visiting him in Chistopol' prison. Mother appeals to U.S. Congress in open letter to save son's life.
- July 9 At press conference, Sergey Fadayev, chief of foreign section of Moscow OVIR, announces that binational marriage hunger strikers Petrov and Balovlenkov will not receive their exit visas for security reasons. (see June 20)
- July 15 USSR begins to cut back on telephone connections between itself and West. Western countries protest move as violation of Helsinki Final Act. Direct dial from Moscow (only remaining direct-dial city) is terminated.

- July 16 Two Batovrin group members, Yuriy Medvedkov and Yuriy Khronopulo, are charged with hooliganism and receive 15-day sentences. (see June 12)
- July 17 Scandinavian Women's March for Peace begins in USSR. Batovrin group members still at liberty warned to have no contact with peace marchers. Scandinavian march continues until July 29.
- July 20 Amcit tourist subjected to humiliating and unjustified physical search by Leningrad customs.
- July 21 Two Amcit tourists detained by Leningrad customs, not allowed to contact our Consulate General in Leningrad until released.
- July 22 Petrov ends fast (see July 9), no exit permission.
- July 22 Rostislav Borisovich Yevdokimov arrested in Leningrad on unknown charges. Yevdokimov is son of publicist Boris Yevdokimov who spent 1971-79 in a special psychiatric hospital and was released just prior to his death.
- July 23 Amcit tourist detained in Leningrad for unauthorized picture-taking.
- July 25 Scandinavian Peace marchers parade through Moscow.
- July 28 KGB searches homes of a number of Volga Germans in Novosibirsk who are seeking to emigrate to West Germany.
- July 31 Soviet Jewish emigration is 186 for month, trending at under 3,000 for year, or 4% of 1979 figure.

August

- August 2 Peace group leader Sergei Batovrin arrested and put into psychiatric hospital (see June 12).
- August 2 Newsweek correspondent Andrew Nagorski's accreditation lifted by Soviet authorities for alleged abuse of his journalist status in the USSR.
- August 3 Amcit tourists detained in Kiev while attempting to visit refusenik friends. Released without charge.



- August 4 Izvestiya correspondent Melor Sturua's credentials lifted in retaliation for Nagorski expulsion.
- August 4 Department of State protests tourist harassment incidents (see June 5, July 20, 21, 23, August 3), warns of travel advisory if Soviet misbehavior does not stop. Parallel protest made in Moscow and Leningrad.
- August 4 Zoya Krakhmalnikova, editor of religious samizdat journal "Nadezhda", arrested at 3am in the morning and charged with article 190-1 ("slandering Soviet State"). Simultaneous searches are made of homes of friends and relatives. Pre-dawn raid marks a return to Stalin-era police tactics.
- August 6 Ukrainian Helsinki Group member Yuriy Lytvyn arrested in labor camp before August 6 release date. Charged under Article 60 UKSSR code ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"); reportedly sentenced to 6 years strict regime camp.
- August 9 Leader of "Right to Emigrate" group, V. Barats, arrested and beaten in Rovno.
- August 9 Vadim Aleksandrovich Yankov, Dr. of Physics and Mathematics, arrested under Article 70. Yankov contributed several articles to emigré publication Kontinent.
- August 13 Binational hunger striker Yuriy Balovlenkov ends his fast (see July 9), no exit permission.
- August 17 Amcit tourist detained in Kiev after attending church services. Released quickly, but demand to talk with Embassy refused.
- August 17 Astrophysicist Leonid Ozernoy begins ten-day hunger strike seeking permission to join parents in U.S.
- August 18 "Poiski" publisher Pavlovskiy sentenced to 5 years' exile on 190-1 charges ("Slandering Soviet State").
- August 19 Unregistered Baptist A. Shubin in sentenced in Izhevsk to 3 years' ordinary regime camp under Articles 142-2, 190-1 and 227-2 RSFSR code.
- August 25 Amcit tourist strip-searched at Leningrad airport by customs authorities. Personal property confiscated.
- August 25 U.S. issues travel advisory warning Amcits who might hold dual US-Soviet citizenship that they could be prevented from leaving USSR if they exchange their passport for internal travel document (there have been several cases of this sort in recent months). Additional advisories under



- August 27 U.S. diplomats roughed up by KGB and prevented from seeing mother of imprisoned activist Sergei Batovrin.
- August 31 Batovrin, in a tape smuggled out of a psychiatric hospital, claims he is being forced to take brain-killing drugs.
- August 31 USG protests systematic interference by Soviet authorities with official communications between Embassy and Soviet and American citizens in the USSR with whom the Embassy has consular business.

September

- September 1 Volobuyev receives exit permission. Azure reported to have left USSR in August (see June 20).
- September 2 Soviets eliminate public direct-dial service to USSR. Now calls by members of public can only be placed through Soviet operators. Embassies and Trade Missions retain direct-dial links (see July 15).
- September 2-10 Long-time (since 1971) refusenik Dr. Aleksandr Lerner interrogated by KGB and warned to cease meeting with Westerners or face charges. Lerner has decided to cut his contacts with Westerners.
- September 6 Sofia Kalistratova, one of three members of Moscow Helsinki Group remaining at liberty, indicted under article 190-1 ("Slandering the Soviet State"). Could face up to 'three years' incarceration.
- September 7 Soviet peace activist Batovrin reportedly released from psychiatric hospital (see August 2)
- September 8 Elena Bonner announces that Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group will cease work due to unrelenting harassment by Soviet authorities.
- September 9 USG rebukes USSR publicly for human rights abuses
- September 11 Vashchenkos in Embassy give up hunger strike on hearing that Chernogorsk Vashchenkos have quit.
- September 11 Human rights activist Aleksey Smirnov arrested. Smirnov was among 34 persons who signed an appeal on behalf of Kalistratova (see Sept. 6).
- September 12 Two members of Canadian Jewish Congress attacked, beaten and robbed by unknown assailants as they attempt to visit refuseniks.
- September 14 Amcivit subjected to rough body search by Leningrad customs.

\*EUR-513 (9/24/82)

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CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1982 (650)

\*  
PROBE OF SOVIET SLAVE LABOR CHARGES SOUGHT --

\*  
THE U.S. SENATE SEPTEMBER 24 VOTED 80 TO 1 TO APPROVE A RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO CONDUCT AN OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION INTO CHARGES THAT FORCED LABOR HAS BEEN OR WILL BE USED TO BUILD MAJOR SOVIET PROJECTS SUCH AS THE TRANS-SIBERIAN NATURAL GAS PIPELINE.

SENATOR ERNEST HOLLINGS CAST THE DISSENTING VOTE.

THE SENSE-OF-THE-SENATE RESOLUTION ASKS THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO INVESTIGATE "CHARGES THAT SOVIET AND VIETNAMESE FORCED LABORERS WILL BE INVOLVED" IN THE PIPELINE PROJECT WHICH IS TO BRING NATURAL GAS FROM SIBERIA TO WEST GERMANY AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. IT DIRECTS THE DEPARTMENT TO SUBMIT PRELIMINARY FINDINGS IN 30 DAYS AND A COMPLETE REPORT JANUARY 1, 1983.

SENATOR BILL ARMSTRONG, WHO INTRODUCED THE MEASURE, SAID, "ANY WESTERN NATION CONSIDERING PARTICIPATION IN THE SOVIET PIPELINE SHOULD FAVOR THIS INVESTIGATION. IF THE CHARGES PROVE TRUE, THEY TURN SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC GAIN INTO COMPLICITY WITH A PIPELINE HOLOCAUST AND MAKE SUCH NATIONS CO-CONSPIRATORS IN A MASSIVE ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS."

\*  
BAN ON WEAPONS IN SPACE URGED --

(MORE)





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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY UW DATE 9/5/12  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

9

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September 23, 1982

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy  
FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*  
SUBJECT: Report on 9/23 Meeting and 9/30 Agenda

Summary of 9/30 Meeting:

1. Repression in USSR and GDR. We are still examining possibility of making the case publicly on the recent pattern of repression within the USSR. At the 9/23 meeting, comments were received for a possible chronology of Soviet repressive acts in recent months, which we are considering for release. Comments were also received on a possible covering statement. A status report will be provided on 9/30. On the GDR, Ed O'Donnell (EUR/CE) reported that the Department has asked Embassy Berlin for further information on repression of independent peace activists. Berlin 3966 has been received in reply (attached). This issue too will be discussed further on 9/30. (See also Berlin 3974 & Moscow 11584)
2. Speaking opportunities in Europe. It was requested that we try to put together a "tally" of requests for speakers in Europe and commitments made. USIA (EU-Jamison) agreed to help provide requested information. It was also agreed that we should prepare a guidance cable to posts on nuclear arms control issues, encouraging posts to undertake a more concerted effort and to provide more feedback to Washington. As part of this effort, we will work with USIA to pouch to posts a guidance kit for US speakers and a packet of handouts.
3. USIA "Fall Initiative." USIA (Chikas) reported that the centerpiece of USIA's new initiative will be a conference co-hosted with CSIS in January designed to focus on US advocacy of democracy, economic development and peace. It is hoped that the President will keynote the conference. Live satellite coverage to Europe will be arranged. As part of the overall initiative, USIA is arranging for publication of a coherent series of pamphlets on key issues, with Oscar Handlin writing the overview pamphlet and Albert Wohlstetter writing one on security issues. The first pamphlets should start appearing soon. USIA is pulling together a wide range of resources for this initiative and is asking overseas posts to identify key figures to take part in the conference.

Agenda for 9/30:

1. Follow-up on Soviet and GDR repression (Steiner, Schumaker, O'Donnell)
2. Update on speaking opportunities in Europe (Lowenkron, Jamison)
3. Follow-up on forced labor in the Soviet Union (EUR/P-Clear).

NOTE: Ambassador Kampelman, the US Representative to the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid, will address the group on Thursday, October 7.

Attachment: As stated

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Department of State

142789

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01  
ACTION EUR-00

BERLIN 03966 241423Z

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ACTION OFFICE CE-02  
INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 UKB-02 NE-02 GDR-01 FRG-01 SOV-01  
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INFO GDR-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BERLIN 03966

E. O. 12356: DECL: 9/24/82  
TAGS: PINS PINT SCUL SHUM GC GE  
SUBJECT: GDR HARASSMENT OF PEACE MOVEMENT

REF: STATE 264735

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE EMBASSY HAS CONFIRMED THE FACTS OF THE SEPT. 7 FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE. WE HAVE HEARD FROM PEACE ACTIVISTS HERE THAT TEMPORARY IDENTITY CARDS, THE PM-12'S, HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO A FEW OF THOSE PEOPLE MOST ACTIVE IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THAT EPELMANN WROTE A LETTER TO HONECKER COMPLAINING ABOUT THIS MOVE. WE CAN ALSO CONFIRM THAT SOME OF THOSE ACTIVE IN THE JUNE 27 PEACE WORKSHOP, PLUS A NEUBRANDENBURG ACTIVIST, HAVE BEEN ISSUED THE PM-12.

3. WE WERE SHOWN A PM-12. IT IS A FOLDED PIECE OF HARD PAPER WITH ONLY A PICTURE ATTACHED AND BASIC IDENTITY INFORMATION TYPED ON IT. IT DOES NOT HAVE THE HARDENED BOOKLET COVERS OF A REGULAR GDR ID CARD, NOR THE PAGES THEREIN FOR WORK, POLICE AND OTHER ANNOTATIONS.

4. THE PM-12 IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, AS A NORMAL ID CARD WOULD BE, AS A TRAVEL DOCUMENT TO THOSE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES NOT REQUIRING A VISA (IN EFFECT, JUST CZECHOSLOVAKIA). PASSPORTS AND VISAS ARE REQUIRED FOR ALL OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND -- SINCE LATE 1980 -- POLAND.

5. THE PM-12 WAS NOT CREATED JUST FOR PEACE MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS. IT IS GIVEN ALSO TO INDIVIDUALS UNDER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, SOME CLASSES OF MENTAL DEFICIENTS, ETC.; IN OTHER WORDS ALL THOSE THE AUTHORITIES WANT TO KEEP GOOD TRACK OF. AS SUCH, WHENEVER THE ID CARD IS USED TO CASH A CHECK, PAY A BILL, REGISTER AT A HOTEL, ENROLL CHILDREN AT SCHOOL, CHECK-IN AT A HOSPITAL, ETC., ONE IS MARKED IMMEDIATELY AS A MEMBER OF A "SPECIAL" GROUP. OKUN

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NLRR M443/5 #142789

BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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Department of State

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11584 01 OF 05 241602Z MD27 0453 EUR1671

MOSCOW 11564 01 OF 05 241602Z MD27 0493 EUR1671

ACTION EUR-08

EMERGE IN THE SOVIET UNION. EHD SUMMARY.

INFO SECT-01 /001 A2

A NEW, HARSHER TURN IN SOVIET REPRESSION OF DISSENTERS

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EA-10  
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- AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
- AMEMBASSY BERN
- AMEMBASSY BEIJING
- AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 11584

PARIS FOR RL REPS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, SHUM, UR

SUBJECT: THE RECENT ESCALATION OF SOVIET REPRESSION OF DISSENT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. SINCE VITALIY FEDORCHUK REPLACED YURIY ANDROPOV AS HEAD OF THE KGB LAST MAY, SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE INTENSIFIED THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS, INCREASED THEIR HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND TOURISTS, AND REDUCED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. THIS REPRESSION AND INTIMIDATION, AN ESCALATION OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN WHICH BEGAN IN 1978 WITH THE TRIALS, INTER ALIA, OF YURIY ORLOV, IDA MUEDEL, AND ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY, SEEMS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO ISOLATE SOVIET DISSENTERS BY STRIKING AT WHAT HAS BEEN THEIR STRONGEST WEAPON: PUBLICITY ABROAD. BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS PROBABLY PLAYED A ROLE IN THE DECISION TO STEP UP REPRESSION. THE FORMER MAY HAVE INCLUDED THE PERCEPTION THAT THE PROSPECT OF AN INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO IN AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND OFFERED LITTLE HOPE OF PROGRESS IN E-W RELATIONS IN ANY CASE. THE LATTER MAY HAVE INCLUDED THE ROLE OF SOVIET POLICY ON DISSENT AS AN ISSUE IN THE CONTENTION FOR THE SUCCESSION. EVEN IF THE SOVIETS INITIALLY SUCCEEDED IN ELIMINATING VISIBLE DISSENT DURING THIS NEW, HARSHER PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION, SOVIET CONDITIONS AND THE REGIME'S CHOICE NOT TO RESORT TO TERROR A LA STALIN SUGGEST THAT NEW DISSENTERS AND NEW FORMS OF DISSENT WILL CONTINUE TO

3. SINCE VITALIY FEDORCHUK REPLACED YURIY ANDROPOV AS HEAD OF THE KGB LAST MAY, SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE INTENSIFIED THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS, INCREASED THEIR HARASSMENT OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND TOURISTS, AND REDUCED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. SINCE MAY, SOVIET AUTHORITIES:

-- HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THE FLEDGLING SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENT REPRESENTED BY THE "GROUP TO ESTABLISH TRUST BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA." THE REGIME HAS USED A VARIETY OF TACTICS IN THIS EFFORT, INCLUDING THE DISCONNECTION OF TELEPHONES, REPEATED SEARCHES AND INTERROGATIONS, THE FORCED EMIGRATION OF A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, THE SELECTIVE DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THEM BY FOREIGN JOURNALISTS, THREATS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION ON SUCH CHARGES AS CURRENCY SPECULATION, HOUSE ARRESTS, THE DETENTION OF SEVERAL MEMBERS FOR SHORT PERIODS ON "HOOLIGANISM" CHARGES, AND, IN AT LEAST ONE CASE, THE DETENTION OF A MEMBER IN A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL WHERE, HE CLAIMS, HE HAS BEEN GIVEN "MIND-CONTROL" DRUGS. THE SENSITIVITY OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO ANY INDEPENDENT PEACE INITIATIVE IN THE SOVIET UNION UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT HARASSMENT OF THE "PEACE GROUP" HAD IT SURFACED BEFORE LAST MAY. BUT, WE RECENTLY HAVE NOT OBSERVED SUCH A RAPID, COMPREHENSIVE CRACKDOWN ON OTHER DISSIDENT GROUPS. ONLY THE REGIME'S DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE CREDIBILITY OF SOVIET PEACE PROPAGANDA, IN OUR JUDGMENT, HAS PREVENTED THE GROUP'S COMPLETE REPRESSION.

-- HAVE CONTINUED DRASTICALLY TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF JEWS EMIGRATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION. FIGURES FOR THE FIRST

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NARA DATE 9/5/17

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# Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11584 02 OF 05 241603Z 0830 0495 EUR1673  
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MOSCOW 11584 02 OF 05 241603Z 0830 0495 EUR1673

TO OUR RESIDENCES, FEARING THAT THE KGB WILL "FINGER" THEM NEXT. AND WE EXPECT THE REGIME TO DO JUST THAT, SHOULD THEY NOT GET THE "MESSAGE."

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INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EA-10
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-- HAVE FORCED THE MOSCOW HELSINKI GROUP INTO A DECISION TO DISBAND AFTER THE INDICTMENT SEPTEMBER 6 OF 74-YEAR OLD SOFIA KALLISTRATOVA, ONE OF THE THREE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE GROUP. ACCUSED OF HAVING VIOLATED ARTICLE 190-1 OF THE RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE BY HAVING ENGAGED IN "SLANDERING THE SOVIET STATE AND SOCIAL SYSTEM" IN HAVING HELPED TO DRAFT AND TO DISSEMINATE THE GROUP'S DOCUMENTS, SHE IS EXPECTED BY HER ASSOCIATES TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL BY OCTOBER 20. AS A RESULT, THE AUTHORITIES FINALLY APPEAR EFFECTIVELY TO HAVE CRUSHED ALL THE SOVIET HELSINKI GROUPS.

--- HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY MAY BE ABOUT TO DEVOTE MORE ATTENTION TO "SMALLER FRY" NOW THAT THE MORE PROMINENT DISSIDENTS, I.E., MEMBERS OF ORGANIZED GROUPS, HAVE BEEN DECIMATED. FOR EXAMPLE, ON AUGUST 4, ZOYA KRAKMAL'NIKOVA, THE EDITOR OF THE RELIGIOUS SAMIZDAT JOURNAL "NADEZHDA" (HOPE), WAS ARRESTED. AT THE SAME TIME, AUTHORITIES SEARCHED HER SON'S, A FRIEND'S, AND HER APARTMENTS, CONFISCATING A NUMBER OF ITEMS. KRAKMAL'NIKOVA HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH DISSEMINATING ANTI-SOVIET "SLANDER." SHE HAS BEEN CAREFUL IN RECENT YEARS TO DISSOCIATE HERSELF FROM OTHER DISSIDENTS IN THE BELIEF THAT EXCLUSIVE CONCENTRATION ON RELIGIOUS THEMES WOULD WIN HER A GREATER DEGREE OF TOLERANCE, BUT HER ARREST MAY SIGNAL THAT THE REGIME IS NO LONGER WILLING TO RECOGNIZE SUCH DISTINCTIONS AND NOW IS BEGINNING TO FOCUS ON THOSE MINOR NON-CONFORMISTS IT FORMERLY IGNORED.

-- HAVE TREATED WESTERN TOURISTS WHO MET WITH DISSIDENTS, RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS OR REFUSENIKS WITH UNUSUALLY HEAVY-HANDED CRUDENESS AND HAVE DENIED VISAS TO OTHERS WHOM THEY SUSPECTED INTENDED TO DO SO. PARTICULARLY IN Leningrad,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 11584

PARIS FOR RL REPS

8 MONTHS OF 1982, IF PROJECTED TO THE END OF THE YEAR, WOULD RESULT IN THE EMIGRATION OF LESS THAN 3,000 JEWS IN 1982, COMPARED TO 51,300 IN 1979, WHEN EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR REACHED ITS ZENITH. MORE TO THE POINT, WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS FROM A NUMBER OF AREAS IN THE USSR THAT LOCAL OVIR OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN TELLING PROSPECTIVE EMIGRANTS THAT "JEWISH EMIGRATION IS COMING TO AN END." WHATEVER THE ACCURACY OF THESE REPORTS, WE EXPECT JEWISH EMIGRATION TO REMAIN A TRICKLE FOR SOME TIME. GRANTED THAT THE DECLINE IN JEWISH EMIGRATION BEGAN IN 1980, WE INCLUDE IT AS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR OWING TO FEDORCHUK'S HANDLING OF THE ISSUE AS KGB HEAD IN THE UKRAINE, WHERE UNDER HIS STEWARDSHIP JEWISH APPLICANTS TO EMIGRATE WERE TREATED WORSE THAN ELSEWHERE IN THE USSR. THE CONTINUED DECLINE OF EMIGRATION DOVETAILS WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT INCREASE OF REPRESSION OF DISSENT.

-- HAVE BEGUN A CAMPAIGN TO INTIMIDATE REFUSENIKS INTO CEASING THEIR CONTACTS WITH ALL FOREIGNERS. EARLIER THIS MONTH, THE KGB WARNED ALEKSANDR LERNER, THE TITULAR HEAD OF THE MOSCOW REFUSENIK COMMUNITY AND THE TRADITIONAL HOST OF MEETINGS WITH VISITING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS AND OTHER VIP FOREIGN VISITORS, TO CEASE HIS CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, DIPLOMATS, CORRESPONDENTS, AND TOURISTS OR FACE TRIAL AND IMPRISONMENT. LERNER RELUCTANTLY HAS COMPLIED WITH THE KGB'S EDICT AND HAS ASKED US NOT TO CONTACT HIM AGAIN. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE LEARNED, THE KGB ISSUED SIMILAR WARNINGS TO AT LEAST TWO OTHER REFUSENIKS. THE "DEMONSTRATION EFFECT" OF THIS INTIMIDATION ALREADY IS EVIDENT; SEVERAL OTHER REFUSENIKS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY NO LONGER WILL ACCEPT INVITATIONS

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Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11584 03 OF 05 241605Z 0035 0513 EUR1880

MOSCOW 11584 03 OF 05 241605Z 0035 0513 EUR1880

ACTION EUR-00

INFO SECT-01 /001 A2

INFO	OCT-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EA-10
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AMEMBASSY GOMM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 11584

PARIS FOR RL REPS

CUSTOMS OFFICIALS HAVE SUBJECTED SUCH VISITORS UPON THEIR DEPARTURE TO LENGTHY SEARCHES OF THEIR BAGGAGE, RESULTING IN MISSED PLANE CONNECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT EXPENDITURE OF SIGNIFICANT SUMS ON HOTEL ROOMS AND NEW PLANE TICKETS, SOME OF WHICH WERE OBTAINABLE ONLY AT GREAT EXPENSE. OTHER VISITORS HAVE FACED STRIP SEARCHES, INSULTING INTERROGATIONS AND PHYSICAL ABUSE. SOME TOURISTS HAVE FARED EVEN WORSE, SUCH AS THE TWO CANADIANS WHO RECENTLY WERE BEATEN WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED TO VISIT THE APARTMENT OF A WELL-KNOWN LENINGRAD REFUSENIK. SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH LESS SERIOUS, INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED IN MOSCOW AND KIEV. FOR INSTANCE, AN OFFICIAL OF A U.S. JEWISH ORGANIZATION WAS VARNED BY SEVERAL STRANGERS IN HER MOSCOW HOTEL TO "START BEHAVING RESPONSIBLY" BY CEASING TO MEET WITH REFUSENIKs. WE ALSO KNOW OF CASES OF REPEATED DENIALS OF VISAS TO AMERICANS WHO DESIRE TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION PRIMARILY TO MEET WITH REFUSENIKs.

-- HAVE INCREASED THEIR HARASSMENT OF WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS. ANDREW NAGORSKI OF NEWSWEEK SUFFERED DE FACTO EXPULSION. WE KNOW OF SEVERAL CRUDE ATTEMPTS TO INTIMIDATE OTHER CORRESPONDENTS, INCLUDING, IN ONE CASE, THE DROPPING OF EMPTY BOTTLES FROM THE ROOF OF A BUILDING AS THE JOURNALIST LEFT IT TO GO TO HIS CAR. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MEDIA ARTICLES ATTACKING VARIOUS CORRESPONDENTS BY NAME.

-- AND HAVE REDUCED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. SINCE THE END OF AUGUST, EXCEPT FOR LEASED EMBASSY LINES, ONLY OPERATOR-ASSISTED CALLS HAVE BEEN PLACED TO AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE RESULTING,

LENGTHY DELAYS HAVE DISCOURAGED MANY FOREIGN CALLERS FROM PERSISTING IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO REACH A SOVIET NUMBER. OUR CANADIAN COLLEAGUES HAVE TOLD US THAT OFFICIALS OF THE CANADIAN COMPANY TELEGLOBE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT ONLY CALLS TO EMBASSIES AND TO SOVIET "AGENCIES" WILL BE ACCEPTED BY SOVIET OPERATORS. THE SOVIET EXPLANATION FOR THIS REDUCTION OF SERVICE IS "TECHNICAL REASONS" INVOLVING THE INCORPORATION INTO THE SOVIET DOMESTIC TELEPHONE NETWORK OF THE DIRECT-DIAL EQUIPMENT INSTALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL USE DURING THE 1980 MOSCOW OLYMPIC GAMES. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY ADD, IT WILL BE TWO YEARS BEFORE DIRECT-DIAL SERVICE WILL BE RESTORED. YET, WE NOTE THAT SUCH SERVICE STILL EXISTS IN THE CASE OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE USSR'S EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH AT&T AND SIEMENS HAVE ADVISED US THAT, IN THEIR OPINION, THERE ARE NO TECHNICAL REASONS FOR THIS SOVIET ACTION. WE BELIEVE THAT ITS REAL, POLITICAL PURPOSE IS EITHER CLOSER MONITORING OR THE PREVENTION OF UNSANCTIONED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET CITIZENS AND FOREIGNERS.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

4. THESE SOVIET ACTS OF REPRESSION AND INTIMIDATION ARE, IN EFFECT, AN ESCALATION OF THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKs ALREADY WELL INTO ITS FOURTH YEAR. WITH THE DISBANDING OF THE MOSCOW HELSINKI GROUP, ALL ORGANIZED DISSIDENT GROUPS OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE (SAVE THE "PEACE GROUP," AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF WHICH THE KREMLIN IS STEADILY RAISING THE ANTE), ARE EITHER SUPPRESSED OR INACTIVE. LERNER'S INTIMIDATION FOLLOWS THE CONTINUED DECLINE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION, THE CONSTANT HARASSMENT OF APPLICANTS TO EMIGRATE, THE FORCED SUPPRESSION OF JEWISH STUDY GROUPS, AND THE IMPRISONMENT OR EXILE OF A NUMBER OF SOVIET JEWS. TWO FACTORS, IT SEEMS TO US, MAKE THE CURRENT ESCALATION OF THIS REPRESSION

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Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11584 04 OF 05 241626Z 0037 0515 ERF1882

MOSCOW 11584 04 OF 05 241626Z 0037 0515 ERF1882

SECTION 04 OF 05

14

FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS PROBABLY PLAYED A ROLE, IN THAT THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION SEEMINGLY HAS WEAKENED THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO HAVE ARGUED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD GIVE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION A "CHANCE." AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND SHOW NO SIGN OF EARLY RESOLUTION, AND THE KREMLIN PROBABLY EXPECTED FURTHER U.S. EFFORTS AT THE MADRID HELSINKI REVIEW CONFERENCE THIS FALL TO BLOCK AGREEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OR ON THE SOVIETS' CHERISHED CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, DESPITE THE MAINTENANCE OF SANCTIONS ON POLAND AND THE USSR SINCE THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW, MANY OF OUR ALLIES APPEARED WILLING TO CONTINUE TRADE WITH THE SOVIETS ON WHAT AMOUNTED TO A "BUSINESS AS USUAL" BASIS. FACED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF CONTINUING FOREIGN CRITICISM ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, BUT THE COUNTERVAILING UNLIKELIHOOD OF THE INTERRUPTION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN TRADE WITH MANY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE APPARENT DETERMINATION OF MANY OF OUR ALLIES TO MEET THEIR YAMAL GAS PIPELINE COMMITMENTS, SOVIET DECISION-MAKERS MAY WELL HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THIS SUMMER WAS AS GOOD A TIME AS ANY FOR WHAT HOPEFULLY WOULD BE A FINAL SETTling OF ACCOUNTS WITH SOVIET DISSENTERS. TO BE SURE, THE "FINAL SOLUTION" OF THE DISSENT PROBLEM WOULD RESULT IN AN EVEN WORSE PRESS IN THE WEST, BUT CRITICISM OF THE USSR THERE ALREADY WAS SEVERE; AND IF PAST EXPERIENCE WAS A GUIDE, ADDITIONAL CRITICISM WOULD ABATE OVER TIME.

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- FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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6. INTERNAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR. TO THE EXTENT THAT FEDORCHUK IS ANDROPOV'S MAN (AN ASSUMPTION THAT REMAINS UNTESTED DESPITE THAT ANDROPOV WAS FEDORCHUK'S BOSS FOR MANY YEARS) AND/OR THAT ANDROPOV STILL HAS KGB OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES (ALSO UNTESTED), THE NEW TURN IN SOVIET POLICY ON DISSENT MAY BE CONNECTED TO SUCCESSION POLITICS. ANDROPOV'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY AS KGB HEAD WAS TO ENSURE PARTY CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 11584

PARIS FOR P. FEPS

QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT. IT IS SIGNIFICANTLY HARsher, BOTH IN ITS COMPREHENSIVENESS AND IN THE TACTICS EMPLOYED BY THE REGIME. AND ITS FOCUS HAS SOMEWHAT CHANGED. WE PERCEIVE IN THIS NEW, HARsh TURN OF THE SCHEM AN INTENT PRIMARILY TO ISOLATE DISSENTERS BY STRIKING AT WHAT HAS BEEN THEIR STRONGEST WEAPON IN THEIR STRUGGLE WITH THE REGIME: PUBLICITY ABROAD. SOVIETS ACTIVELY OPPOSED TO THEIR GOVERNMENT TRADITIONALLY HAVE SOUGHT TO EMIGRATE ABROAD OR HAVE RELIED ON FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, CORRESPONDENTS, AND TOURISTS TO SPREAD THE NEWS OF THEIR PLIGHT. INCREASINGLY, WITH THE ADVENT OF DIRECT DIALING IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, THESE SOVIET CITIZENS ALSO HAVE USED INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION. IN MANY INSTANCES, WE HAVE NOTED RECEIPT ABROAD OF NEWS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS HERE BEFORE WE HAVE HEARD IT FROM LOCAL CONTACTS. MUCH OF THIS NEWS SUBSEQUENTLY IS BROADCAST OVER THE VOICE OF AMERICA, RADIO LIBERTY, AND OTHER FOREIGN STATIONS. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES CAN ONLY HOPE, WE BELIEVE, TO TIGHTEN UP FURTHER ON CONTACTS BETWEEN SOVIET CITIZENS AT HOME AND THOSE WHO HAVE EMIGRATED BUT CONTINUE TO FIGHT THE REGIME; TO DISCIPLINE CORRESPONDENTS AND TOURISTS FROM CONTACTING SOVIETS; AND TO INTIMIDATE THEM INTO CEASING THEIR CONTACTS WITH DIPLOMATS AND VISITING VIP DELEGATIONS. CRITICS OF SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OBVIOUSLY CANNOT PROTEST WHAT THEY DO NOT KNOW ABOUT.

OFFICERS OF SOVIET MOVES

5. WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING, ADMITTEDLY SPECULATIVE THOUGHTS ABOUT THE CAUSES OF THIS HARsher TURN IN SOVIET POLICY.

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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11584 05 OF 05 241607Z 0400 0518 EUR1804  
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MOSCOW 11584 05 OF 05 241607Z 0400 0518 EUR1804

INFO SECT-C1 /001 A1

15

TERROR ONLY AS A MEMORY, IF AT ALL. KHRUSHCHEV ESSENTIALLY REPUDIATED THIS LEGACY OF TERROR AND SUBORDINATED THE KGB TO PARTY CONTROL. BREZHNEV HAS INSTITUTIONALIZED CADRE STABILITY AND DECISION-MAKING BY CONSENSUS. THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE GROWING COMPLEXITY OF SOVIET SOCIETY MAKE A RETURN TO WHOLESALE TERROR EXTREMELY UNLIKELY, EVEN IF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, AS WE EXPECT, DO DETERIORATE; THERE WOULD BE TOO MUCH OPPOSITION BY VESTED INTERESTS AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE. BUT, THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT A RESORT TO MORE SEVERE SANCTIONS AGAINST SELECTED SMALL GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS. DESPITE THE CURRENT, HARSHER TREATMENT OF DISSENTERS, THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF CONDITIONS EVOKING DISSENT AND THE LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF OFFICIAL TERROR SUGGEST THAT, EVEN SHOULD THE REGIME INITIALLY APPEAR TO SUCCEED IN THIS NEW PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION, ITS SUCCESS LIKELY WILL BE SHORT-LIVED. AS HAS HAPPENED FOR 15 YEARS, NEW DISSENTERS AND NEW FORMS OF DISSENT WILL CONTINUE TO EMERGE IN THE SOVIET UNION.  
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AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 11584

PARIS FOR RL REPS

ORGANS' ACTIVITIES. THIS APPARENTLY INCLUDED RESTRAINING SOMEWHAT THE REPRESSION OF DISSENT, THEREBY PERMITTING HIM TO DEVELOP A REPUTATION AMONG SOME SOVIET DISSIDENTS, A FEW MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENSIA, AND EVEN SOME WESTERN OBSERVERS AS A "MODERATE" (WHATEVER THE ACCURACY OF THIS DESCRIPTION) ON HUMAN RIGHTS. AFTER ANDROPOV'S APPOINTMENT TO THE SECRETARIAT AND DEPARTURE FROM THE KGB JOB, AT LEAST SOME OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS AND HE PROBABLY DECIDED TO "FINISH OFF" DISSENT TO ENSURE THAT NO POSSIBLE DOMESTIC THREAT TO THE REGIME WOULD ARISE DURING THE "DELICATE" SUCCESSION PROCESS. THE ONLY QUESTION WAS TIMING. IN VIEW OF BREZHNEV'S GRADUALLY DECLINING HEALTH OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND THE APPARENT WORSENING OF HIS CONDITION DURING HIS VISIT TO TASHKENT LAST SPRING, ANDROPOV AND HIS COLLEAGUES ON THE POLITBURO MAY HAVE DECIDED TO ACT IMMEDIATELY. IN THIS REGARD, FEDORCHUK WAS AN IDEAL CHOICE FOR THE JOB. HIS PERFORMANCE AS KGB HEAD IN THE UKRAINE SUGGESTED THAT HE COULD BE TRUSTED TO DO IT RELATIVELY QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY, AND HIS ESTABLISHED REPUTATION AS A "HARD-LINER" ON DISSENT ENSURED THAT HE, RATHER THAN ANDROPOV, WOULD RECEIVE MOST OF ANY ENJOING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM: OUR SOUNDINGS SUPPORT THIS ANALYSIS; MOST DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS WITH WHOM WE HAVE MET BLAME FEDORCHUK, NOT ANDROPOV OR ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO, FOR THE RECENT INCREASE OF REPRESSION.

7. DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION DERIVES FROM SOVIET CONDITIONS. THE FEAR ENGENDERED BY TERROR KEPT IT PASSIVE DURING THE STALIN ERA, BUT MANY SOVIETS WHO HAVE BECOME DISSIDENTS IN THE LAST 15 YEARS HAVE KNOWN STALINIST

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11

Soviet Human Rights Developments:  
Repression Increases

Over the past four months, the Soviet campaign of intimidation and repression against human rights activists has intensified. This campaign, which began in 1977-78 with the arrests and trials of Yuriy Orlov, Ida Nudel, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, and others, has resulted in the suppression or decimation of all of the groups founded inside the Soviet Union to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. It has also led to a wave of repression against other groups interested in promoting religious freedom, the peace movement, equitable labor practices, and other matters of concern to human rights activists.

In recent months, the following significant developments have occurred:

-- The Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group has ceased its work as a result of the unrelenting pressure of the Soviet authorities.

-- Soviet Jewish emigration has dropped to new, extremely low levels. In June, Jewish emigration dipped to 182 for the month, the first time in over a decade that the monthly total was below 200. Overall, Soviet Jewish emigration for the year is down 94% from the highs set in 1979, when over 51,000 were allowed to emigrate.

-- The KGB has begun an intensified campaign to frighten refuseniks into ceasing their contacts with foreigners. As part of this campaign, official harassment of American tourists and journalists seeking contacts with Soviet citizens has also increased.

-- The Soviets have attempted to destroy the unofficial Soviet Peace Group, led by Sergey Batovrin, by jailing some of its members, intimidating others, and forcing some to emigrate.

-- Telephone communications with the USSR have been restricted. Public direct-dial service to and from the USSR has been eliminated, and the number of telephone links connecting the USSR and Western countries has been decreased considerably.

All these developments, and others, have resulted in an atmosphere of isolation and repression in the Soviet Union which is unequalled in recent times. The United States Government has expressed its concern to the Government of the Soviet Union on many occasions regarding these developments, and will continue to do so at every appropriate opportunity. The Soviet Union, for its part, while in most cases rejecting our expressions of



17

concern, can be under no misapprehension as to the importance attached by the United States to the quality of Soviet human rights performance, and its effect on the course of our bilateral relations. The most recent period of intensified repression places even greater pressure on those within the Soviet Union who struggle for human rights. But we remain confident that this struggle will go on, and that the Soviet authorities will continue to discover that repression only whets the appetite for freedom.

11

Chronology of Soviet Human Rights Developments June-September 1982

June

- June            Andrei Frolov, Valeriy Volobuyev, Marija Jurgutiene, Tatiana Lozanskaya, Yuriy Balovlenkov, Iosif Kiblitisky and Tatiana Azure continue hunger strikes begun in April seeking exit permission from Soviet Union to be reunited with their spouses in the West.
- Yevhen Antonenko-Davydovych, son of writer Boris Antonenko-Davydovych, arrested on unknown charges.
- June 1        Azure stops hunger strike after receiving assurances she will get her exit visa. Azure emigrates to France in August (see June entry).
- June 1        Sergey Petrov begins hunger strike around June 1, seeking permission to go to U.S. to be reunited with his wife (see July 22).
- June 1        Jurgutiene ends her hunger strike, returns to Vilnius without exit permission (see June entry).
- June 4        Sergei Batovrin holds unofficial press conference to announce formation of 11-member peace group, entitled "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and USA." Nearly 500 persons throughout USSR sign petitions sponsored by the group during June - August.
- June 5        American tourist detained in Kiev, roughed up, and not permitted to call Embassy.
- June 9        Refusenik Yefrem Luvishchuk arrested in Odessa, charged under Article 187-1 UkSSR Code\* ("Slandering Soviet State").
- June 11      Lozanskaya ends hunger strike on receiving exit assurances. As of September 27, had not yet left USSR (see June entry).
- June 12      Batovrin placed under house arrest. Other members of group detained by police. Ostrovsky family told to emigrate (see June 4).
- June 15      Ukrainian human rights activist Mikhaylo Horyn sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.
- June 16      Kiblitisky ends hunger strike on receiving exit assurances (see June entry).

\*UkSSR Code = criminal code of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.



- June 17 Soviet dissident Vladimir Gershuni arrested and charged under Article 190-1 RSFSR code\* ("Slandering the Soviet State"); friends report he may be put into psychiatric hospital.
- June 17 SMOT\*\* activists Valeriy Senderov, Boris Kanevsky and Ilya Geltser arrested and charged under Article 190-1 RSFSR code ("Slandering Soviet State"). All are held at Lefortovo.
- June 20 Andrei Frolov receives exit visa and leaves for United States; reunited in Chicago with Lois Frolova (see June entry).
- June 21 Balovlenkov ends his hunger strike when OVIR appears to promise exit permission. Renews strike on July 5 when OVIR says promise never made (see August 13).
- June 23 Exiled dissident Irina Grivnina threatened with further prosecution on charges of "parasitism". Grivnina, a member of the Moscow Group to Monitor Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, was sentenced on July 15, 1981, to five years' internal exile under Article 190-1 RSFSR code ("Slandering Soviet State"), a sentence she is still serving.
- June 24 Unofficial Moscow Harlequin Theater reportedly raided by militia and shut down.
- June 25 Anatoliy Ivanov (Skuratov) sentenced under Article 70 to one-year strict-regime camp and five years' internal exile. Convicted on the basis of anti-Soviet articles he had written which were found in his apartment by the KGB.
- June 27 Pentecostalists Lydia and Vera Vashchenko begin hunger strike in Chernogorsk seeking Soviet permission for Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families to emigrate. Six members of the two Pentecostalist families remain in refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which they entered in 1978 in an attempt to gain Soviet permission to emigrate.
- June 30 Soviet Jewish emigration for June is 182 persons, first time in decade monthly figures have dipped below 200.

July

- July 1 Natalya Lazareva, Leningrad feminist writer, recants and receives reduced sentence -- 4 years' imprisonment and 2 years' internal exile. Was charged under Article 70 ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"). Sentence for first offenders can be as high as seven years' imprisonment and 5 years' internal exile.

\*RSFSR Code = criminal code of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

\*\*SMOT= "Interprofessional Union of Free Workers." Group was suppressed in the late 1970s.

- July 1-2 Lilia and Augustina Vashchenko begin hunger strike in Embassy in sympathy with Chernogorsk strikers (see June 27).
- July 2 Three ethnic German dissenters demonstrate on Red Square for the right to emigrate. Police intervene after 30 seconds (see Sept. 14).
- July 2 Yevgeniy Kozlovskiy, a writer of fiction and drama, confesses guilt in a letter published in Moskovskaya Pravda and is released (Kozlovskiy was arrested in December 1981 and charged with 190-1, "Slandering the Soviet State").
- July 4 Wife, son, and stepmother of Soviet defector Viktor Korchnoi permitted to leave USSR for Vienna, Austria
- July 4 Mother and brother of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy prevented from visiting him in Chistopol' prison. Mother appeals to U.S. Congress in open letter to save son's life (see September 27).
- July 6 Self-immolation reported on Red Square.
- July 9 At press conference, Sergey Fadayev, chief of foreign section of Moscow OVIR\*, announces that binational marriage hunger strikers Petrov and Balovlenkov will not receive their exit visas for security reasons (see June 20).
- July 15 USSR begins to cut back on telephone connections with West. Western countries protest move as violation of Helsinki Final Act, since the Act is aimed at facilitating, not restricting, the flow of information between signatory countries. Direct dial from Moscow (only remaining direct-dial city in the USSR) is terminated.
- July 16 Two Batovrin peace group members, Yuriy Medvedkov and Yuriy Khronopulo, are charged with hooliganism and receive 15-day sentences (see June 12).
- July 17 Scandinavian Women's March for Peace begins in USSR. Batovrin Peace group members still at liberty warned to have no contact with peace marchers. Scandinavian march continues until July 29.
- July 20 American tourist subjected to humiliating and unjustified physical search by Leningrad customs.
- July 21 Two American tourists detained by Leningrad customs, not allowed to contact our Consulate General in Leningrad until released.
- July 22 Petrov ends fast (see July 9), no exit permission.

\*Office of Visas and Registration.



24

- July 22 Rostislav Borisovich Yevdokimov arrested in Leningrad on unknown charges. Yevdokimov is son of publicist Boris Yevdokimov who spent 1971-79 in a special psychiatric hospital and was released just prior to his death.
- July 23 American tourist detained in Leningrad for unauthorized picture-taking.
- July 25 Scandinavian Peace marchers parade through Moscow.
- July 28 KGB searches homes of a number of Volga Germans in Novosibirsk who are seeking to emigrate to West Germany.
- July 31 Azure receives exit visa (see June 1).
- July 31 Soviet Jewish emigration is 186 for month, trending at under 3,000 for year. Jewish emigration in 1979 totalled over 51,000.

August

- August West-German-based International Association for Human Rights reports that forced labor, including that of political prisoners, is being used to help construct USSR-Europe gas pipeline
- August 2 Peace group leader Sergei Batovrin arrested and put into psychiatric hospital (see June 12).
- August 2 Newsweek correspondent Andrew Nagorski's accreditation lifted by Soviet authorities for alleged abuse of his journalist status in the USSR.
- August 3 American tourists detained in Kiev while attempting to visit refusenik friends. Released without charge.
- August 3 Iosif Kiblitiski leaves USSR to join wife in FRG after prolonged wrangle with customs over books and paintings in his baggage (see June 16).
- August 4 Izvestiya correspondent Melor Sturua's credentials lifted in retaliation for Nagorski expulsion.
- August 4 Zoya Krakhmalnikova, editor of religious samizdat journal "Nadezhda", arrested at 3am in the morning and charged under Article 190-1 ("slandering Soviet State"). Simultaneous searches are made of homes of friends and relatives.

- August 6 Ukrainian Helsinki Group member Yuriy Lytvyn arrested in labor camp before August 6 release date. Charged under Article 60 UkSSR code ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"); reportedly sentenced to 6 years strict regime camp.
- August 8 Albina Yakoreva, founding member of SMOT, expelled and arrives in Vienna.
- August 9 Leader of "Right to Emigrate" group, Vasiliy Barats, arrested and beaten in Rovno (see August 22).
- August 9 Vadim Aleksandrovich Yankov, Dr. of Physics and Mathematics, arrested under Article 70. Yankov contributed several articles to emigré publication Kontinent.
- August 13 Yuriy Balovlenkov ends his second fast (see July 9), no exit permission.
- August 17 American tourist detained in Kiev after attending church services. Released quickly, but demand to talk with Embassy refused.
- August 17 Astrophysicist Leonid Ozernoy begins ten-day hunger strike seeking permission to join parents in U.S.
- August 18 "Poiski" publisher Pavlovskiy sentenced to 5 years' exile on 190-1 charges ("Slandering Soviet State").
- August 19 Unregistered Baptist A. Shubin in sentenced in Izhevsk to 3 years' ordinary regime camp under Articles 142-2, 190-1 and 227-2 RSFSR code.
- August 20 Minister of Oil and Gas Industry Enterprises B. V. Shcherbina denies use of prison labor on gas pipeline during interview with TASS and APN (see August).
- August 22 Barats transferred from Rovno to punishment cell in Rostov-na-Donu, following 13-day hunger strike (see August 9).
- August 25 American tourist strip-searched at Leningrad airport by customs authorities. Personal property confiscated.
- August 25 U.S. issues travel advisory warning Americans who might hold dual US-Soviet citizenship that they could be prevented from leaving USSR if they exchange their passport for internal travel document (there have been several cases of this sort in recent months).



August 28 Tatyana Osipova begins hunger strike in Mordovian Women's Labor Camp. She began her hunger strike to protest refusal by Soviet authorities to allow her to visit or correspond with her husband, Ivan Kovalev, in a neighboring labor camp. Osipova was sentenced in 1981 to 5 years' general regime labor camp, 5 years exile. Kovalev received same sentence in 1982. Both are members of Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group (see Sept. 3).

August 31 Batovrin, in a tape smuggled out of a psychiatric hospital, claims he is being forced to take brain-killing drugs (see August 2).

August 31 Soviet Jewish emigration for month is 238, continuing pattern of past several months of extremely low figures.

September

September Former journalist Ivan Kopysov arrested in Voronezh Oblast' and charged under Article 190-1 (Slandering Soviet State). Kopysov has been in trouble with Soviet authorities ever since 1968, when he wrote several letters to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

September 1 Volobuyev receives exit permission (see June entry).

September 2 Soviets eliminate public direct-dial service to USSR. Now calls by members of public can only be placed through Soviet operators. Embassies and Trade Missions retain direct-dial links (see July 15).

September 2-10 Long-time (since 1971) refusenik Dr. Aleksandr Lerner interrogated by KGB and warned to cease meeting with Westerners or face charges.

September 3 Tatyana Osipova hospitalized. Husband Ivan Kovalev is transferred to Perm Labor Camp Complex (see August 28).

September 4 British schoolboy Garry Phibbs detained at Sheremetyevo Airport, 800 leaflets advocating nuclear disarmament are confiscated. Phibbs sent back to UK after 24 hours. A colleague, Peter Adams, succeeds in getting past customs. Distributes 1,000 leaflets in the Moscow Metro. Departs for UK on September 5.

September 6 Sofia Kalistratova, one of three members of Moscow Helsinki Group remaining at liberty, indicted under article 190-1 ("Slandering the Soviet State"). Could face up to three years' incarceration.

September 7 Chess master Boris Gulko arrested in Moscow where he held up placard demanding the right to emigrate.

- September 7 Soviet peace activist Batovrin released from psychiatric hospital (see August 31).
- September 8 Yelena Bonner (wife of Dr. Andrei Sakharov) announces that Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group will cease work due to unrelenting harassment by Soviet authorities.
- September 9 In State Department press statement, USG rebukes USSR publicly for human rights abuses and for forcing closure of Moscow Helsinki Group.
- September 11 Vashchenkos in Embassy give up hunger strike on hearing that Chernogorsk Vashchenkos have quit (see July 1-2).
- September 11 Human rights activist Aleksey Smirnov arrested. Smirnov was among 34 persons who signed an appeal on behalf of Kalistratova (see Sept. 6).
- September 12 Two members of Canadian Jewish Congress attacked, beaten and robbed by "unknown" assailants as they attempt to visit refuseniks in Leningrad.
- September 13 Jewish Activist Feliks Kochubiyevskiy arrested in Novosibirsk for attempting to found USSR-Israel Friendship Society.
- September 14 American tourist subjected to rough body search by Leningrad customs.
- September 14 Three ethnic Germans demonstrate on Red Square, holding up placards saying "SOS - we want to go back to our homeland." The three (Jakob Goethe, Katarina and Frieda Bitter) are arrested by militiamen (see July 2).
- September 16 Soviet citizen Chingiz Abdulayev seeks asylum in Swedish Embassy.
- September 17 Pentecostal Yakov N. Tarasenko found murdered near his home in Moscow. Tarasenko was father of two women in group that crashed into grounds of British Embassy last April seeking to leave USSR.
- September 20 Refuseniks Lena Dubyanskaya and Judith Ratner are warned by KGB to cease contacts with foreigners (see Sept. 2-10).
- September 21 President Reagan signs proclamation declaring November 9 as a day honoring members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.



- September 27 Anatoliy Shcharanskiy begins hunger strike to protest refusal of Soviet authorities to allow him to correspond or meet with relatives. Shcharanskiy, a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, is in Chistopol' prison. He was sentenced in 1978 to 13 years' incarceration for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and "treason" (see July 4).
- September 27 Moskovskaya Pravda prints "exposé" of U.S. spy activities and warns Soviet citizens not to have contacts with foreign diplomats, exchangees, or tourists (see Sept. 20).
- September 28 Secretary of State Shultz meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the UN General Assembly in New York. Human rights issues discussed.

Drafted: EUR/SOV: JFSchumaker: lcl  
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EUR/SOV: RECombs, Jr. <sup>JS</sup>  
NSC: Dennis Blair (subs)  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 7, 1982

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: 9/2 Meeting and 9/9 Agenda

142791  
26  
DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M443/5 #142791  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/5/17

Summary of 9/2 meeting:

1. Ambassador Goodby briefed the group on our needs in Europe in regard to public opinion on START and on arms control more generally. He sees it as particularly important at this time to make the case to European elites, both government and private. These opinion leaders are willing to give us the benefit of the doubt, but have some doubts themselves about our approach and our commitment. The Soviets have been telling them that our proposals are not serious. Although European elites have not bought the Soviet contention, they are not yet ready to get actively involved in support of our proposals. If we take the right steps with them, there is a good chance they will give us more active support. But we will have to find a rationale that meets some of their questions, for example, how our strategic modernization program fits in with our arms control objectives and how our proposals are in the long-run interest of the Soviet Union, as well as ourselves.

Ambassador Goodby made the following substantive suggestions for our approach to European elites:

-- We need to confront the freeze issue, making clear that a freeze would lock us into an undesirable situation, promote instability and reduce Soviet incentive to negotiate seriously.

-- We need to contrast the potential achievements of START with what was offered by SALT II and what is offered in the Soviet proposal, and to show the impact of our proposal on the actual and potential strategic growth of both superpowers.

-- We need to emphasize that we are seeking not only reductions per se, but also a certain quality of reductions designed to enhance stability, and to show how this will be of benefit to superpower and East-West relations.

-- We need to foster patience in Europe by making clear that such an agreement cannot be implemented overnight, that what is needed is a long-term commitment by the US and USSR to reduce and reshape their strategic forces.

-- And we need to show at the same time that this goal is not at all unrealistic, particularly in the long-term perspective. For example, the fact that the Soviets too are now beginning to talk about survivability is a hopeful sign.

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-2-

In order to make this case in an effective and intensive manner, Goodby recommends that we select a number of senior officers at our posts in Europe and ask for a commitment on their part to spend 10-15% of their time taking the case to European elites -- particularly institutes, universities, think tanks and other public opinion leaders. We should seek the commitment of our Ambassadors that this effort will be made, and should supply better information to the posts to assist them in the effort. We could also consider the possibility of bringing to Washington for consultations those officers who will participate in the effort, so that we may brief them in greater detail. Senior US officials should also include references to START in their speeches, and when traveling to Europe should speak to the subject.

2. In the discussion which followed, several other points for consideration were developed:

-- We should bring a broader arms control focus to our public efforts, bringing in our desire for conventional reductions and the new Western proposal in MBFR.

-- We should consider proposing that the president give a broad address on these subjects in October, and that the Secretary address them as well. It might also be suggested that the President devote one of his coming Saturday radio talks to arms control, although the impact of a radio address would be uncertain in Europe. (USIA agreed to check whether VOA is transmitting these addresses verbatim to Europe.)

-- We should try to get key Europeans, both governmental and private, to speak out on these issues in support of US and Western policies. To this end, it was suggested that the Secretary might wish to take advantage of the opportunities presented by his coming UN bilaterals, the coming meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Canada, and the December NATO Ministerials to urge his European counterparts to do so. Mention was also made of the possibility that the President send a letter to Allied leaders providing a progress report on where the various talks stand and showing how they can be helpful in this public effort.

-- We should write Op-Ed pieces for major newspapers in Europe, above all for the International Herald Tribune, since it is read by Schmidt and other English-speaking European leaders.

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28

-- We should do what we can, in a careful manner, to throw public question upon Soviet seriousness in the INF negotiations, as their unforthcoming position is not very well known. We should point out their unwillingness to compromise and their refusal to reduce their own forces, while trying to stop any NATO deployments. We should also point out that the Soviet effort to put all elements on the negotiating table at one time is not a constructive approach to arms control.

Agenda for 9/9

- 1) Follow-up to 9/2 discussion -- any further thoughts or comments on the above?
- 2) Follow-up on distribution of NATO Force Comparison paper and response to Soviet rebuttal (EUR/RPM-Halgus)
- 3) Information on public affairs opportunities in Europe (USIA/PGM-Lowenkron) and on senior US visitors to Europe (NSC-Blair)
- 4) Status of USIA Fall Initiative (Schaffer?)
- 5) Involuntary labor in USSR (EUR/P-Clear)
- 6) Status report on GDR and Soviet repression of peace movements (EUR/CE-O'Donnell, EUR/SOV-Nesbitt, USIA/EU-Jamison, USIA/PGM-Hengsdon)
- 7) Crime and punishment in USSR - status report (EUR/SOV-Schumaker, P-Lenczowski)



Public Diplomacy 142792 <sup>9/16</sup>

1. Mike Kanner re Denmark
  - Believes we can anticipate certainly less hostility; maybe even some support on some issues.
  - Would not bet on longevity for this gov't - probably an election in next six months

2. How to dramatize the Soviet pattern of repression.

- Don't get some newsmen to write it up

CSCÉ Commission report  
Passed out Moscow  
cable on Aleksandr Lerner

- Need to imprint in European consciousness the pattern of Sov. repression before Madrid

BY BJW NARA DATE 1/15/17

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NIPRR/MHJ/S/#142792

DECLASSIFIED

- Chris Henney

- Can we come up with a 70  
- motive?
  - Keep the chronology dispa-  
-sionate
  - Background briefing on  
motives / reasons to newsmen
- 

John P = Ensure that the  
governments are prepared for  
the "pattern" argument

---

Mike L.

- Results of election in Netherlands
- Statement earlier this week  
by the head of the Dutch  
Liberal Party
- Mike's point is that we  
need to keep the high  
moral ground



31

— # —

Blair's law of European  
elections - don't be an incumbent

— # —

Need to reapproach the  
Dutch media with Mrs  
new government

— # —

Scott T:

34

Two initiatives

- A "pamphlet," "brochure"  
correlation of forces  
document

- Time to say what the  
the true state of the  
superpowers are

- Filipino govt reporter

- A conference

-- Tied to 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary  
of start Marshall Plan

-- Mid-late November

"Pull together" the strands of  
our public affairs strategy



dejar un ?

Basically, we've reached the  
same point of diminishing  
returns as telling Europeans  
how bad the Soviets are!

Other avenues —

- Possible two versions of the  
• brochure

- Dick M.: - Perhaps a slick  
pamphlet on the  
one hand and  
- a conference proceedings  
on the other

Bottom line is to snuff out  
the bad part of the peace  
movement

John P.: Feedback system - how  
do we know it gets out

Dick M.: Gotta put these brochures  
out in other languages



# - Public Diplomacy -

34

- START/INF

- What can Schultz do for Europe - interviews / speech

- Soviet: \* Soviet reactions to our proposal  
A "diaride"

Audience(?) - Informed audiences

Julia

Initiatives are what is needed

Doel

A 1976 pamphlet on verification could be updated

Relationship with nuclear freeze proposals

3/

- TTBT - Could have made it a positive move, but allowed it to come out as a negative issue.

- ? Are we vulnerable on the issue. Joe L - long way to go before we reach that point.

(There may be 14-16 initiatives on ballots this fall in the U.S.)

Cruise missile verification - can we come clean? Are they verifiable?

- Making freeze proposals obsolete

Result: Most people feel the pamphlet will be a good idea - line of argument needs to be careful.



Jack Hech: ICA media <sup>mt</sup> tour  
for the fall?

ICA will check  
Will Clumba will check  
press center

IQA ICDA for working on all  
the arms control items  
on the platter. Working  
on it now

Julia - Distribution effectiveness  
Need to check all our  
groups

- Distro both within US and  
European

- 34
- Speaking opportunities in the fall
  - ICA to produce a list of those lined up for the various platforms
  - late September - media/diplomat seminar
  - Memo to Stultz on European
  - By Sept. 1 we will have basic macro data on economic policies
  - ICA did a "video-dialogue" w. Olmer
  - Romney  
- Flagging of interest in arms control issues





## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

38

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September 13, 1982

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*

SUBJECT: 9/9 Meeting and 9/16 Agenda

Summary of 9/9 Meeting:

1. Soviet Repression of Peace Movement. It was agreed that we want to do everything possible to keep media attention here and in Europe on the repression of the Soviet peace movement, as well as the repression of the remnants of the Helsinki Monitoring Group in the USSR. It was agreed to provide to selected press representatives a status report on the state of the movement, and to do what we can to get continuing Western media coverage of ex-peace activist Ostrovsky (now in New York). HA agreed to help organize this within the US, and USIA agreed to look into the possibility of interviews with Ostrovsky for overseas audiences.

2. Forced Labor in USSR. Jesse Clear (EUR/P) and Hugh Simon (HA) briefed on new developments, including rising interest in the issue on the part of key elements of the Italian labor movement, the articles published by a Frankfurt human rights organization, and increased attention in Scandinavia. Thus far, however, the German DGB has taken a "hands off" attitude, and the AFL-CIO -- although interested -- does not seem to have developed any new information on its own.

It was agreed that we should do everything possible, in a careful manner, to make it part of conventional wisdom that forced labor is indeed widely used on major projects in the USSR -- particularly in Siberia. The following actions were agreed: a) maintain the effort to collect all possible information on the issue; b) ensure that European media coverage to the issue is made available to interested members of the US press; c) distribute to those working on the issue within the USG telephone transcripts between Germany and the USSR on the issue (HA Action); d) look into feasibility of requesting an ILO fact-finding mission; e) prepare for consideration a possible statement for the Department Spokesman, expressing concern over the issue and putting the burden of proof on the Soviets; f) talk to Irving Brown of AFL-CIO on his return to Washington c. 9/20 to see how we can work together on the issue; and g) consider giving a deep backgrounder on the issue, with focus on broad human rights aspects.

3. Soviet Cut-Off of Communication Links. It was agreed to try to keep attention focussed on this question as well and, among other possibilities, to ascertain whether the US/USSR Trade Council might be willing to make an issue of it. (HA Action)

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY CN NARA DATE 9/5/12

85

Agenda for 9/16


1. Briefing on results and effects of Dutch and Danish elections -- EUR/NE Lemmon and Konner.
2. Update on public affairs opportunities in Europe, particularly on nuclear issues -- USIA/PGM Lowenkron.
3. Follow-up on involuntary labor in USSR -- EUR/P-Clear and HA-Simon.
4. Follow-up on distribution of NATO Force Comparison paper and response to Soviet rebuttal (EUR/RPM-Halgus)
5. Status of USIA Fall Initiative (USIA/PGM-Chikas or Schaffer)
6. Status report on GDR and Soviet repression of peace movements (EUR/CE-O'Donnell, EUR/SOV-Nesbitt, USIA/EU-Jamison, USIA/PGM-Hengsdon)
7. "Crime and Punishment in USSR" - Status Report (EUR/SOV-Schumaker, P-Lenczowski/Ledeon)



40

1. VIENNA NEWSPAPERS OF SEPTEMBER 10 REPORT THAT THE HEAD OF THE POLISH TERRORISTS WHO BESIEGED THE POLISH EMBASSY IN BERN THIS WEEK IS KNOWN IN AUSTRIA AS A POLISH SPY AND CRIMINAL NAMED FLORIAN KRUSZYK. IN BERN HE CALLED HIMSELF COL. WISOCKI.

2. ACCORDING TO THE VIENNA PRESS, KRUSZYK CAME TO AUSTRIA IN APRIL 1967. HE CLAIMED TO BE A REFUGEE, BUT AUSTRIAN POLICE UNMASKED HIM AS A SPY WHO COLLECTED INFORMATION ON POLISH REFUGEES IN THE TRAIKIRCHEN CAMP AND PASSED IT ON TO THE VISA SECTION OF THE POLISH EMBASSY IN VIENNA. IN A VIENNA TRIAL IN JUNE 1968, IN WHICH HE CONFESSED TO HAVE ACTED ON ORDERS OF THE POLISH SECURITY SERVICE, KRUSZYK DREW A TEN-MONTH PRISON TERM FOR ESPIONAGE AND FORGERY OF DOCUMENTS.



3. AFTER SERVING THE TERM, KRUSZYK AND THREE OTHER POLES ROBBED A JEWISH-OWNED JEWELRY STORE IN VIENNA OF MONEY AND JEWELS WORTH A HUNDRED THOUSAND AUSTRIAN SCHILLINGS. IN THAT ROBBERY, APRIL 19, 1969, KRUSZYK AND HIS ACCOMPLICES DESCRIBED THEMSELVES AS AL FATAH MEN HAVING COME TO EXACT AMENDS FOR JEWISH CONQUESTS IN PALESTINE. IN THE SUBSEQUENT VIENNA TRIAL, IN WHICH KRUSZYK PASSED HIMSELF OFF AS A LIEUTENANT OF THE POLISH SECURITY SERVICE, HE DREW A NINE-YEAR PRISON TERM WHICH HE SERVED IN AUSTRIAN PENITENTIARIES. AFTER HIS RELEASE IN 1978 KRUSZYK WAS EXPELLED TO THE NETHERLANDS.

*a la Station  
may be he is*

STATE - AID - USIA <b>ROUTING SLIP</b>		CLASSIFICATION		41		
		UNCLASSIFIED				
		DATE		9/14/82		
TO:	Name or Title	Organ. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1-	Mr. Dennis Blair, NSC					
2-						
3-						
4-						
5-						
<input type="checkbox"/>	Approval	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	For Your Information	Note and Return		
<input type="checkbox"/>	As Requested	<input type="checkbox"/>	Initial for Clearance	Per Conversation		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Comment	<input type="checkbox"/>	Investigate	Prepare Reply		
<input type="checkbox"/>	File	<input type="checkbox"/>	Justify	See Me		
<input type="checkbox"/>	For Correction	<input type="checkbox"/>	Necessary Action	Signature		
REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING						
<p>Attached is a copy of the German text and translation regarding the Soviet Pipeline.</p>						
FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)			ROOM NO. & BLDG.			
Hugh V. Simon, HA/PP			7802 New State			
CLASSIFICATION			PHONE			
UNCLASSIFIED			632-1181			



42

LS No. 107429  
BL-GM/AO  
German

#### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In recent months there have been increasing indications in letters and telephone conversations from the Soviet Union that large numbers of prisoners, among them civil rights advocates, prisoners of conscience, and persons persecuted for their religious faith -- including women -- are being used as cheap slave labor in the construction of the Siberian natural gas pipeline to Europe.

As in the case of earlier giant construction projects in the Soviet Union, the working conditions are inhumane: food, clothing, and lodging are bad, medical care and safety measures insufficient, and harsh punishment is meted out for non-fulfillment of work quotas.

With their reports on the humane aspects of the gas pipeline deal, the slave workers in Siberia are sending us signals and are calling for our help!

For this reason the International Human Rights Association issued a press release with the information it has received and requested Federal Chancellor Schmidt in an open letter to drop the project for moral and humanitarian reasons. Surprisingly, the response from the population has been almost exclusively positive, and we are continuing to receive new evidence. But while the Foreign Ministry is still conducting investigations in Moscow, the Federal Chancellor is assuring concerned citizens that these reports "are incorrect."

The Soviet news agency TASS on August 8, 1982 even labelled the reports "dirty lies."

The International Human Rights Association herewith presents a documentation which will allow all readers to draw their own conclusions. And we suggest that the Western European Governments arrange for the working conditions at the Siberian gas pipeline construction sites to be investigated by an international committee of labor union representatives. This should also be in the interest of the Soviet Government.

43

We hope to contribute with this documentation to a re-appraisal of the natural gas project.

Could we become accomplices in the exploitation of forced labor? The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal branded this a crime against humanity.

But we also want to ask everybody to let the victims of the human rights violations documented here have a visible token of our concern. Please send a package to an exile or a prisoner or to their families -- we shall help you in doing this.

Reinhard Gnauck, M.D.  
Chairman of the  
International Human Rights Association

Frankfurt/Main, August 16, 1982



44

THIS IS NOT NEW....

Forced labor has been a fact of life in the Soviet Union from its inception.

Lenin considered forced labor the best means for educating the New Man. It was supposed to awaken man\*s collective consciousness. The founders of the Soviet Union valued the individual exclusively for his usefulness to society and saw in him nothing more than a tool.

The first forced laborers in the Soviet Union were intellectuals and Russian Orthodox priests on the Solovetski Islands in 1918.

Later, millions of people were interned in prison camps on the most varied charges. But for the most part these accusations were nothing but a pretext for gaining cheap labor.

During Stalin's rule in the thirties, hundreds of factories, canals, roads, and entire cities were built with slave labor. All these were called the "great constructions of Communism". They include, among others, the canal from the White Sea to the Baltic, the hydroelectric plant on the Dnieper, the BAM (Baikal-Amur railroad line), the Moscow subway, the Volga-Don Canal, and huge metallurgical combines in the Urals and Kazakhstan.

By the time Khrushchev denounced Stalin's personality cult in 1956, millions of forced laborers had perished in the prison camps. While up to then only inmates of camps and prisons had been used as forced labor, Khrushchev introduced an essential change: from then on, anyone could be forced to perform slave labor even without a court conviction, simply on the basis of an administrative decree.

The tragedy of the millions of forced laborers consists in the fact that they are deprived of all civil rights, live in inhuman conditions, are isolated from their loved ones, suffer from permanent malnutrition, and totally lack medical care.

Our concern should not be confined to the prisoners of conscience but ought to extend to all forced laborers without exception, for every human being has the right to be treated humanely.

It is not the individual forced laborer alone who pays the price, mankind as a whole is becoming brutalized by accustoming itself to this horrible practice and that constitutes a danger for our entire civilization.

Frankfurt/Main, August 16, 1982

signed: Yuri Below  
Chairman of the Working Committee  
on Soviet Affairs of the  
International Human Rights Association



45

SELECTED TESTIMONY FROM THE SOVIET UNION

Written account by Mrs. A.P. from Moscow, July 1982.

"My family, i.e. my husband, myself, and our children, have been trying to emigrate from the Soviet Union for over five years. Our applications are being denied continuously because my uncle is an officer in the Soviet Army and serves in the North in the Hanty-Manssiyskiy Rayon.

Officially, my uncle is a simple engineer in an army engineer unit. Nevertheless, the authorities insist that he has knowledge of "military secrets" and that for that reason we will not be allowed to leave the country even 20 years after the end of his service.

At the end of last year, my uncle arrived unexpectedly in Moscow saying that he had been dismissed from the Army for health reasons. In the course of our conversations I learned the following:

It was true that my uncle had participated as a construction engineer in various projects from the new port on the Yamal peninsula to Perm in the Urals. The officers and soldiers had been told quite openly that the construction of the gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe would greatly contribute to strengthening the defense of the northern U.S.S.R. For one thing, it increases the influx of workers to the North, and secondly, the gas pipeline will facilitate the supply of fuel to the various military installations in the North. In this area we need not build anything ourselves anymore -- all preparatory work is completed by prisoners, and only after that, volunteer labor brigades arrive on the scene.

My uncle is surprised at the lack of foresight of the Western politicians who are contributing to the military buildup of the Soviet Union by supplying modern technology and strategic materials, thus allowing the Soviet defense ministry to save large amounts in this area.

My uncle maintains that branch lines are being provided along the entire length of the pipeline to supply gas to various military installations: military bases, launching sites, and arms factories as well as the entire lighting system for these installations.

I do not think that publishing this information will hurt my uncle any more because he was exposed to massive radiation at a nuclear missile base and is dying. His case is not unique, there are hundreds like him here."



46

Telephone Report by Mr. P.S. from Moscow, July 1982

"I was fired from the Moscow Mining Institute because I had criticized the regime, and now no one in town will hire me.

The KGB told me: 'You can volunteer now to work on the gas pipeline, before we send you there by force. At this point, you still have the chance to work there as a volunteer.'

So I went to Tyumen, where I was ordered by construction headquarters to report to the Urengoy distributing station as an electrician. I worked in Urengoy, a dirty small town of hastily put up primitive shacks, for a year, sharing with three other workers a small room in a dormitory.

On the very first day I was told that there were also prisoners working at this site, and that I was not to speak with them or tell anyone about them if I did not want to be locked up with them.

For eleven months I was able to observe how badly and unfairly the prisoners and deportees were being treated. They were supervised by the volunteers who, of course, only did the easier jobs. The dangerous jobs were done only prisoners; sometimes they were promised that they would be released early.

During the eleven months, I witnessed numerous fatal accidents caused by exploding gas and gas poisoning. During the summer, concrete was delivered by open trucks; en route it had hardened to the point where the prisoners had to hack it out bit by bit so that their hands started bleeding.

The heavy equipment arriving from abroad also had to be unloaded and transported manually by the prisoners. Again and again, there were accidents during the test runs; because of mistakes in the operation of the equipment, it kept breaking down and the prisoners had to move the heavy pipes again and again, without proper mechanical aids; often the ropes, which were not strong enough, would break, causing more lives to be lost. I tried several times to lodge a complain about this with the trade unions, but I was told: "You don't have to feel sorry for these people, they should have been killed long ago. They should be glad to be given the opportunity to reform."

48

The prison camp was not located in Urengoy but two kilometers away, in the taiga, so that the people in the city had no idea that it was there. But I had occasion to talk to the soldiers assigned to the camp, and they not only told me of the high mortality rate among the prisoners, but also of the frequent suicides committed by despairing young soldiers who couldn't take all that misery anymore and killed themselves with their own weapons in their watch towers.

The saddest sight were the many female prisoners who had to do the same work as the men at the construction sites. Completely filthy or soaking wet they returned to their huts in the evening; they weren't able to change or wash their clothes.

During the winter, the MVD guards would be standing around a fire in heavy sheepskin coats, warming their hands, while the prisoners had to work in the cold, dressed in thin work pants and short coats with hardly any lining."

Telephone Report by Mr. I.P. from Tyumen, June 1982

On June 15, 1982, Mr. I.P. telephoned an acquaintance in the West with the following report:

"While I was still at the camp, I heard of the possibility of work on the construction of the gas pipeline for Europe.

Because of the difficult living and working conditions in the camps, many prisoners are willing to exchange life in a camp for the life of forced laborers, who work under minimum security conditions.

Thus I volunteered and, along with approximately 50 minimum-security prisoners from various camps, was taken to the facility for prisoners in transit in Tyumen, where we remained for ten days, until the militia and the MVD had decided where to put us. With several others I was assigned to "special workforce No. 7" in Kirpichny, a small place near Tyumen, where I reported to the commandant for minimum-security prisoners and deportees.

Along with four others, I was housed in an empty freight car which had barely enough room for four cots. We had electricity, but no water. Others lived in huts which dated back to the camps built under Stalin, or in hastily erected dormitories, two-storey buildings without any amenities.



47

These settlements rarely have a name; in most cases they are registered under "special workforce no. ..." along with the designation of the camp administration for the region in question.

Arriving minimum-security prisoners must immediately begin work on the tasks assigned to them by the commandant.

In addition to the minimum-security prisoners, the workforce includes deportees and people sentenced for "parasitism"; in Kirpichny, their numbers totaled approximately 6,000.

For the most part, the work involved preparation of glass wool, wrapping of pipes, excavation, mounting of instruments and pipe supports, laying of electric and telephone cables, and various chores in the petrochemical field.

Some construction areas, where the work involved permafrost, removal of ground water and blasting of rocks are surrounded by wooden fences and barbed wire and guarded by armed soldiers and guard-dogs. This is where the prisoners from camp no. 34/2 are taken by closed cars each day. They keep moving from one site to the next along the route where the gas pipeline is to be laid.

The food is poor, there is no medical care whatsoever, the huts and freight cars are cold, drunkenness is common among the workers. It also happens that minimum-security prisoners are sentenced again, sent back to the prison camps, and have to work behind barbed-wire from then on.

At the present time, the TYUMENLAG complex consists of fourteen camps, located in Nizhnaya Tavda, Ussetsk, Yalutorovsk, Zavodoukovsk Ipim, Malitsa, Tobolsk (2) and Tyumen (2).

The hardest jobs such as excavation of trenches, laying of railroad tracks, mixing of concrete, and construction of railings for scaffolding are done not only by men, but also by deported women and minors from reformatories.

At the present time, more than 100,000 forced laborers are assigned to the construction of the gas pipeline for Europe in various capacities. Their work includes manufacture of work clothes--this is done by female prisoners or inmates of psychiatric hospitals. Nevertheless, there is a shortage of work clothes; for instance, protective gloves are issued only every six months. The workers wrap rags around their hand, but injuries and eczema are a frequent occurrence among

41

the workers handling barbed wire, concrete, glass wool, or asbestos. Accidents are the order of the day, but when people call the emergency station the medics want to know first whether the injured person is a volunteer or a ZEK (that is what they call the camp population, i.e., minimum-security prisoners and deportees). If the injured person is a ZEK, the medics usually take their time arriving."



50

## VORBEMERKUNG

In den letzten Monaten häuften sich in Briefen und Telefongesprächen aus der UdSSR Hinweise darauf, daß beim Bau der Erdgasleitung Sibirien - Europa Strafgefangene in großer Zahl als billige Arbeitsklaven eingesetzt werden. Darunter Bürgerrechtler, Gewissensgefangene, verfolgte Gläubige - auch Frauen.

Wie bei früheren Großbauten in der UdSSR herrschen unmenschliche Arbeitsbedingungen: schlechte Ernährung, Kleidung und Unterbringung, unzureichende medizinische Betreuung und Arbeitsschutzmaßnahmen, harte Strafen bei Nichterfüllung der Arbeitsnorm.

Mit ihren Berichten über diese menschliche Seite des Erdgas-Röhren-Geschäfts wollen uns die Zwangsarbeiter in Sibirien ein Zeichen geben, sie rufen um Hilfe!

Daher hat die IGFM am 23. Juni 1982 ihre Informationen in einer Pressemitteilung der Öffentlichkeit bekannt gemacht und Bundeskanzler Schmidt in einem Offenen Brief (siehe S. ) gebeten, das Projekt aus moralischen, humanitären Gründen fallen zu lassen. Das Echo war überraschend: Die IGFM erhält fast ausschließlich Zustimmung aus der Bevölkerung und es finden sich immer neue Beweise. Doch während das Auswärtige Amt noch in Moskau recherchiert, läßt bereits der Bundeskanzler besorgten Bürgern versichern, diese Meldungen "treffen nicht zu". Die sowjetische Nachrichtenagentur TASS (8.8.1982) spricht sogar von "dreckigen Lügen".

Die IGFM legt hiermit eine Dokumentation vor, die jedem Leser erlaubt, sich ein eigenes Urteil zu bilden. Den westeuropäischen Regierungen schlagen wir vor, die Arbeitsbedingungen an der Erdgasleitung in Sibirien durch eine internationale Kommission von Gewerkschaftlern überprüfen zu lassen - das müßte auch im Interesse der sowjetischen Regierung liegen.

Wir hoffen, mit unserer Dokumentation dazu beizutragen, daß über das Erdgasprojekt neu nachgedacht wird.

Können wir mitschuldig werden an der Ausbeutung von Zwangsarbeitern? Bei den Nürnberger Kriegsverbrecherprozessen wurde das als ein Verbrechen an der Menschheit verurteilt.

Wir möchten aber auch alle Menschen bitten, den Opfern der hier dokumentierten Menschenrechtsverletzungen ein sichtbares Zeichen unserer Anteilnahme zuteil werden zu lassen: Schicken Sie einem Verbannten, Strafgefangenen bzw. seiner notleidenden Familie ein Paket - wir helfen Ihnen dabei (siehe S. ).



Dr. med. Reinhard Gnauck

Vorsitzender

der

Frankfurt/M., 16.8.1982

## NICHT ERST SEIT HEUTE...

Zwangsarbeit gibt es in der Sowjetunion seit den ersten Tagen ihres Bestehens.

Lenin sah die Zwangsarbeit als bestes Mittel zur Erziehung des Neuen Menschen an. Dabei sollte das kollektive Bewußtsein im Menschen geweckt werden. Die Gründer der UdSSR bewerteten den Menschen ausschließlich nach seinem Nutzen für die Gesellschaft, sahen in ihm nur ein Werkzeug.

Die ersten Zwangsarbeiter in der Sowjetunion waren Intellektuelle und russisch-orthodoxe Geistliche auf den Solowetzkijs-Inseln im Weissen Meer im Jahre 1918.

In späteren Jahren kamen Millionen von Menschen in Straflager, der unterschiedlichsten Vergehen angeklagt. Meist waren die Anklagen aber nur Vorwand, um billige Arbeitskräfte zu bekommen.

In den 30 Jahren von Stalins Herrschaft wurden mit den Händen von Zwangsarbeitern Hunderte von Betrieben, Kanälen, Straßen und ganze Städte gebaut. All dies waren sog. "Große Bauten des Kommunismus". Dazu zählen unter anderem der Weissmeer-Ostsee-Kanal, das Wasserkraftwerk am Dnepr, die BAM (Baikal-Amur-Magistrale; Eisenbahnlinie), die Moskauer U-Bahn, der Wolga-Don-Kanal, gewaltige Metallurgie-Kombinate im Ural und in Kasachstan.

Bis zur Entlarvung des Personenkultes um Stalin durch Chruschtschow im Jahre 1956 starben Millionen von Zwangsarbeitern in den Straflagern. Während bis dahin nur Gefangene in Lagern und Zuchthäusern zu Zwangsarbeit herangezogen wurden, führte Chruschtschow eine wesentliche Änderung herbei: in Zukunft sollten Personen auch ohne Gerichtsurteil, nur auf administrative Anweisung hin zu Zwangsarbeiten gezwungen werden können.

Die Tragödie von Millionen von Zwangsarbeitern besteht darin, daß sie aller bürgerlichen Grundrechte beraubt sind, unter menschenunwürdigen Bedingungen leben, von ihren Angehörigen isoliert sind, an ständiger Unterernährung leiden und völlig unzureichend medizinisch versorgt werden.

Die Aufmerksamkeit sollte dabei nicht nur den Gewissensgefangenen gelten, sondern ausnahmslos allen Zwangsarbeitern, denn jeder Mensch hat das Recht auf eine menschenwürdige Behandlung.

Den Schaden trägt nicht nur jeder einzelne Zwangsarbeiter davon, auch die gesamte Menschheit droht durch eine allmähliche Gewöhnung an diese schreckliche Tatsache zu verrohen und dies bedeutet eine Gefahr für unsere Zivilisation.

Yuri Below *Yuri Below*  
Leiter des Arbeits-  
ausschusses UdSSR  
der

Frankfurt/M., 16.8.1982

Int. Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte e.V.



# AUSGEWÄHLTE ZEUGENAUSSAGEN

## - AUS DER SOWJETUNION

Schriftlicher Bericht von Frau A.P. aus Moskau, Juli 1982.

"Meine Familie, d.h. mein Mann, ich und unsere Kinder, bemüht sich schon seit mehr als fünf Jahren um eine Ausreise aus der UdSSR. Immer wieder werden unsere Anträge abgelehnt, weil mein Onkel sowjetischer Offizier ist und im Norden in einer Abteilung des Hanty-Manssiskij-Rayon Dienst leistet.

Offiziell ist mein Onkel ein einfacher Ingenieur in einer Pioniereinheit. Dennoch behaupten die Behörden, er habe Kenntnis von "Militärgeheimnissen", und deshalb könnten wir selbst 20 Jahre nach Beendigung seiner Dienstzeit keine Ausreisegenehmigung erhalten.

Ende vergangenen Jahres traf mein Onkel ganz unerwartet in Moskau ein und sagte, er sei wegen Krankheit aus der Armee entlassen. Im Laufe unserer Gespräche erfuhr ich folgendes:

Mein Onkel hatte tatsächlich als Bauingenieur bei verschiedenen Projekten mitgearbeitet, vom Neuen Hafen auf der Halbinsel von Jamal bis nach Perm im Ural. Den Offizieren und Soldaten war ganz offen mitgeteilt worden, daß mit dem Bau der Gasleitung von Sibirien nach Westeuropa die Festigung der Verteidigung des Nordens der UdSSR große Fortschritte machen wird. Erstens verstärkt sich der Zustrom an Arbeitskräften, und zweitens wird diese Gasleitung die Treibstoffversorgung der verschiedenen Militäreinrichtungen im Norden wesentlich erleichtern. In diesem Gebiet brauchen wir nichts mehr selbst zu bauen - alle Vorarbeiten werden von Häftlingen erledigt, und erst danach treffen freiwillige Arbeitsbrigaden ein.

Mein Onkel staunt über den Leichtsinns der westlichen Politiker, die eigenhändig zur Aufrüstung der Sowjetunion beitragen, indem sie ihre moderne Technologie und strategisches Material liefern, und dem Verteidigungsministerium der UdSSR zu großen Ersparnissen auf diesem Gebiet verhelfen.

Mein Onkel behauptet, entlang der gesamten Leitung seien Abzweigungen für die Gasversorgung verschiedener Militärobjecte vorgesehen:

Militärstützpunkte, Abschußrampen und Waffenfabriken, sowie das gesamte Beleuchtungsnetz für diese Einrichtungen.

Ich denke, das Bekanntwerden dieser Informationen wird meinem Onkel nicht mehr schaden können, denn er ist auf einer Nuklear-Raketenbasis einer starken Strahlung ausgesetzt worden und liegt jetzt im Sterben. Er ist kein Einzelfall, solche wie ihn gibt es Hunderte hier."

53

Telephonischer Bericht von Herrn P. S. aus Moskau, Juli 1982.

"Wegen meiner Kritik am Regime wurde ich aus dem Institut für Bergbau in Moskau entlassen, und in der ganzen Stadt war niemand mehr bereit, mich einzustellen.

Beim KGB sagte man mir: 'Sie können sich zum Bau der Erdgasleitung melden, bevor wir Sie mit Gewalt hinschicken. Noch haben Sie die Chance, als Freiwilliger dort zu arbeiten.'

Also fuhr ich nach Tjumen, wo ich von der Bauleitung den Befehl erhielt, mich als Elektriker bei der Verteilerstation von Urengoj zu melden.

In Urengoj, einer schmutzigen Kleinstadt mit schnell errichteten, primitiven, barackenartigen Gebäuden, arbeitete ich ein Jahr, und mußte mir in einem Wohnheim ein kleines Zimmer mit drei anderen Arbeitern teilen.

Gleich am ersten Tag wurde mitgeteilt, auf der Baustelle seien auch Häftlinge eingesetzt, und ich dürfe weder mit ihnen sprechen noch etwas über sie erzählen, wenn ich nicht zu ihnen gesperrt werden wollte.

Elf Monate konnte ich beobachten, wie schlecht und ungerecht die Häftlinge und Verbannten behandelt wurden. Sie waren den Freiwilligen unterstellt, die natürlich nur die leichteren Arbeiten zu verrichten brauchten. Bei gefährlichen Einsätzen wurden nur Häftlinge eingesetzt, mitunter versprach man ihnen, sie vorzeitig zu entlassen.

In den elf Monaten war ich Zeuge zahlreicher Unfälle mit tödlichem Ausgang, hervorgerufen durch Gasexplosionen oder Gasvergiftungen.

Im Sommer wurde Beton in offenen Lastwagen angeliefert und war unterwegs so hart geworden, daß die Häftlinge es brockenweise herausschlagen mußten und blutige Hände bekamen.

Auch die schwere, aus dem Ausland eintreffende Ausrüstung wurde ohne Hilfsmittel von den Gefangenen ausgepackt und transportiert.

Immer wieder gab es Unfälle bei den Probeläufen, infolge falscher Bedienung gab es viele Pannen und immer wieder mußten die Häftlinge mit unzureichenden Hilfsmitteln die schweren Rohre bewegen, wobei die zu schwachen Seile oft rissen und erneut Menschenleben geopfert wurden.

Ich versuchte mehrmals, mich darüber bei der Gewerkschaft zu beschweren, aber ich bekam zur Antwort:


'Die brauchen Sie nicht zu bedauern, die hätte man sowieso schon lange totschlagen müssen. Die sollen froh sein, wenn man ihnen die Gelegenheit gibt, sich zu 'bessern'.'

Das Gefangenenlager befand sich nicht in Urengoj, sondern zwei Kilometer weiter in der Taiga, so daß die Stadtbewohner von seiner Existenz nichts ahnten. Aber ich hatte Gelegenheit mit den Soldaten zu sprechen, die in diesem Lager Dienst taten, und erfuhr von ihnen nicht nur von der hohen Sterblichkeitsquote der Häftlinge, sondern auch von häufigen Selbstmorden verweifelnder junger Soldaten, die das Elend nicht mehr mit ansehen konnten und in ihren Wachtürmen die Waffe gegen sich selbst richteten.



Am schrecklichsten war der Anblick vieler weiblicher Häftlinge, die auf der Baustelle die gleiche Arbeit wie die Männer verrichten mußten. Völlig verdreckt oder durchnäßt kehrten sie abends in ihre Baracken zurück, und hatten keine Gelegenheit, sich umzuziehen oder ihre Kleider zu waschen.

Im Winter standen die Bewacher des MWD in dicken Schaffelljacken um ein Feuer und wärmten sich die Hände, während die Häftlinge in dünnen Arbeitshosen und kaum gefütterten, kurzen Jacken in der Kälte arbeiten mußten."



Telephonischer Bericht von Herrn I.P. aus Tjumen, Juni 1982.

Am 15. Juni 1982 rief I.P. einen Bekannten im Westen an und erzählte folgendes:

"Schon im Lager habe ich von der Möglichkeit gehört, beim Bau der Erdgasleitung für Europa mitzuarbeiten.

Aufgrund der sehr harten Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingungen im Lager sind viele Häftlinge bereit, das Lagerleben gegen das relativ "freiere" Leben der bedingt geleitfreien Strafgefangenen einzutauschen, die zu Zwangsarbeiten geschickt werden.

Also habe ich mich gemeldet und bin mit ca. 50 anderen bedingt Geleitfreien aus verschiedenen Lagern nach Tjumen gebracht und in das dortige Durchgangsgefängnis eingeliefert worden, wo wir zehn Tage blieben, bis die Miliz und das MWD die verschiedenen Einsatzplätze bestimmt hatten. Mit einigen anderen kam ich zum "Sondereinsatz Nr. 7" nach Kirpitschnyj, einem kleinen Ort in der Nähe von Tjumen und wurde dem Ortskommandanten für bedingt Geleitfreie und Verbannte unterstellt.

Dort bin ich mit vier anderen in einem abgestellten Waggon untergebracht worden, wo gerade Platz für vier Kojen war. Wir hatten zwar Strom, aber keinen Wasseranschluß. Andere wohnten in Baracken, die noch aus der stalinistischen Lagerzeit stammten, oder in schnell errichteten Wohnheimen, gewöhnlich zweistöckigen Gebäuden ohne jeglichen Komfort.

Solche Ansiedlungen haben selten einen Namen, meistens werden sie nur unter "Spezialeinsatz Nr. ..." geführt, mit Angabe der Lagerverwaltung für das betreffende Gebiet.

Die ankommenden bedingt geleitfreien Strafgefangenen müssen sofort die Arbeit aufnehmen, die ihnen vom Kommandanten zugewiesen wird.

Mit den bedingt Geleitfreien arbeiten auch Verbannte oder wegen "Schmarotzertums" Verurteilte, in Kirpitschnyj sind es insgesamt ca. 6.000 Mann.

Die Arbeit besteht im wesentlichen in der Zubereitung von Glaswolle, im Umwickeln der Rohre, im Ausheben von Baugruben, im Anbringen der Armaturen und der Rohrträger, im Verlegen von Elektro- und Telephonkabeln und in verschiedenen Arbeiten im petrochemischen Sektor.

Verschiedene Bauabschnitte, wo der Dauerfrostboden bearbeitet wird, das Grundwasser abgezogen und die Felsen gesprengt werden, sind von Holzzäunen und Stacheldraht umgeben und von bewaffneten Soldaten mit Hunden bewacht. Auf diese Abschnitte werden jeden Tag in geschlossenen Wagen die Häftlinge des Straflagers Nr. 34/2"x" gebracht. Diese Abschnitte werden dauernd verlegt und bewegen sich entlang der Verlegungsstrecke der Erdgasleitung.



Die Lebensmittelversorgung ist schlecht, es fehlt jegliche ärztliche Betreuung, in den Baracken und Waggonen ist es kalt, es gibt häufig Fälle von Trunkenheit unter den Arbeitern.

Auch kommt es oft vor, daß bedingt Geleitfreie erneut verurteilt werden, zurück ins Lager müssen und fortan nur noch hinter Stacheldraht arbeiten.

Zur Zeit gehören allein zur Verwaltung des Lagerkomplexes TJUMENLAG vierzehn Straflager : in Nishnaja Tawda, Ussetsk, Jalutorowsk, Sawodoukowsk Ipim, Malitza, zwei Lager in Tobolsk und zwei Lager in Tjumen selbst.

Alle Schwerstarbeiten wie das Ausheben von Baugruben, die Verlegung von Bahnschienen, die Zubereitung von Beton und die Anfertigung von Gittern für Gerüste usw. werden nicht nur von Männern, sondern auch von verbannten Frauen und von Minderjährigen, die aus Besserungsanstalten kommen, verrichtet.

Zur Zeit werden schätzungsweise mehr als 100.000 Zwangsarbeiter beim Bau der Erdgasleitung nach Europa für die verschiedensten Arbeiten eingesetzt.

Dazu gehört auch die Anfertigung der Arbeitskleidung - dazu werden weibliche Strafgefangene oder die Insassen der psychiatrischen Anstalten herangezogen. Dennoch mangelt es an Arbeitskleidung, zum Beispiel werden nur alle halbe Jahre Schutzhandschuhe herausgegeben. Die Arbeiter wickeln sich Lappen um die Hände, aber beim Hantieren mit Stacheldraht, Beton, Glaswolle oder Asbest gibt es häufig Verletzungen oder Ekzeme. Unfälle sind an der Tagesordnung, aber wenn die Unfallstation gerufen wird, wollen die Sanitäter erst wissen, wer verletzt ist, ein Freiwilliger oder ein SEK (so werden Lagerhäftlinge, bedingt Geleitfreie und Verbannte genannt). Handelt es sich um einen SEK, dann haben es die Sanitäter in der Regel nicht eilig."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Department of State

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 11021 01 OF 02 141331Z -4150 EUR9312  
ACTION EUR-00

MOSCOW 11021 01 OF 02 141331Z -4150 EUR9312

ACTION OFFICE SOBI-02  
INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 RPE-01 EEC-01 SOV-01 PA-01 PMS-01  
PM-01 PP-01 /016 A2

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
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INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 11021

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR  
SUBJECT: ALEKSANDR LERNER BREAKS OFF CONTACT WITH  
FOREIGNERS AFTER WARNING BY THE KGB

REF: Leningrad 02220

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. ALEKSANDR LERNER RELUCTANTLY HAS DECIDED TO  
BREAK-OFF CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, DIPLOMATS  
(INCLUDING US), CORRESPONDENTS AND TOURISTS AFTER BEING  
WARNED BY THE KGB THAT HIS CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN  
THESE MEETINGS WOULD RESULT IN SUCH "VERY SERIOUS  
CONSEQUENCES" AS HIS ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. ON THE  
OTHER HAND, THE KGB TOLD HIM, HIS COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR  
WISHES WOULD RESULT IN HIS RECEIVING PERMISSION TO  
EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL IN THE NEAR FUTURE. LERNER WILL  
RECEIVE FOREIGN VISITORS ONLY IF THEY FIRST HAVE OBTAINED  
PERMISSION FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO MEET WITH HIM.  
HE PLANS TO SPEND HIS TIME ON THEORETICAL RESEARCH INTO  
THE "STABILITY OF ACTIVE SYSTEMS" AND ON HIS HOBBY,  
PAINTING. END SUMMARY.

3. EMBOFF VISITED ALEKSANDR LERNER, THE "TITULAR"  
LEADER OF MOSCOW REFUSENIKS, ON SEPTEMBER 12 AT HIS  
REQUEST. LERNER SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN SUMMONED  
TWICE BY THE KGB FOR "DISCUSSIONS." ON SEPTEMBER 2,  
POLICE UNEXPECTEDLY APPEARED AT LERNER'S APARTMENT AND  
TRIED TO TAKE HIM AWAY. HE RESISTED, ARGUING THAT THEY  
NEEDED AN AFFIDAVIT. THE POLICE FINALLY LEFT BUT RETURNED  
A SHORT TIME LATER WITH THE REQUISITE DOCUMENTATION,  
WHEREUPON LERNER ACCOMPANIED THEM TO A MEETING WITH A  
KGB OFFICIAL. HE COUNSELLED LERNER TO CEASE: A) HOLDING  
MEETINGS WITH SENATORS, CONGRESSMEN, DIPLOMATS, CORRES-  
PONDENTS, AND TOURISTS; B) DRAFTING AND SIGNING COLLECTIVE  
LETTERS; AND C) GIVING INTERVIEWS. IF HE DID NOT, HE  
WAS WARNED, THE "CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE VERY SERIOUS,"  
INCLUDING, HIS INTERLOCUTOR CONTINUED, INDICTMENT FOR  
SERIOUS CRIMES AND SUBSEQUENT TRIAL AND IMPRISONMENT.  
ON THE OTHER HAND, IF LERNER BEHAVED HIMSELF, HE COULD  
EXPECT TO RECEIVE PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE "SOON", WHICH  
LERNER TOOK TO MEAN WITHIN SIX MONTHS OR A YEAR. LERNER  
THEN ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED TIME IN WHICH TO CONSIDER  
THE WARNING HE HAD JUST RECEIVED. ON SEPTEMBER 10, THE  
KGB AGAIN SUMMONED LERNER. HE SAID THAT HE THEN TOLD  
KGB OFFICIALS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE  
INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD RECEIVED THE PREVIOUS WEEK, HE HAD  
NO CHOICE BUT TO COMPLY WITH THEM.

4. LERNER ASKED EMBOFF NOT TO CALL HIM OR TO VISIT HIM  
AT HOME AGAIN. LERNER ADDED THAT, IF HE WERE CONTACTED

BY VISITING FOREIGNERS, HE WOULD INFORM THEM THAT HE  
WOULD BE UNABLE TO MEET WITH THEM UNLESS THEY FIRST  
OBTAINED PERMISSION FROM SOVIET AUTHORITIES FOR SUCH A  
MEETING. IN THIS REGARD, LERNER OBSERVED THAT SOME  
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS HAD ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO  
MEET WITH HIM; IN EACH SUCH CASE, LERNER NOTED, SOVIET  
AUTHORITIES HAD HAD NO OBJECTION. LERNER ADDED THAT HE  
THOUGHT IT WOULD BE "INTERESTING" TO SEE WHAT WOULD  
HAPPEN IF ANOTHER CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION WERE TO  
REQUEST SUCH PERMISSION.

5. LERNER SAID THAT HE PLANS TO SPEND HIS TIME ON HIS  
WORK, THEORETICAL RESEARCH INTO THE STABILITY OF ACTIVE  
SYSTEMS, AND HIS HOBBY, PAINTING. WITH REGARD TO THE  
FORMER, LERNER CLAIMS TO HAVE DEVELOPED A NEW FEDERAL  
STRUCTURE FOR ISRAEL FEATURING DIFFERENT POLITICAL  
FORMS FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS AND AREAS, AND PLANS TO WRITE  
A BOOK ABOUT IT. SO, HE CONCLUDED, HE WILL KEEP BUSY  
EVEN IF HIS CONTACTS WITH FOREIGNERS MUST AT LEAST  
TEMPORARILY END. HE ASSURED EMBOFF THAT HIS DECISION  
TO COMPLY WITH THE KGB'S EDICT IN NO WAY HAD AFFECTED  
HIS STANCE ON ISRAEL OR ON EMIGRATION FROM THE USSR.  
"I AM A ZIONIST," HE SAID, "AND I ALWAYS WILL BE, AND  
I STILL WANT TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."  
ALTHOUGH LERNER BELIEVES THE KGB'S PROMISE TO ALLOW HIM  
TO EMIGRATE IF HE BEHAVES HIMSELF IS WORTHLESS, HE HAS  
NOT GIVEN UP HOPE. LERNER THANKED EMBOFF FOR THE  
EMBASSY'S ATTENTION TO HIM AND ASKED THAT HIS GREETINGS  
BE CONVEYED TO ALL HIS FRIENDS IN THE U.S. AND IN ISRAEL.

6. COMMENT: THE KGB'S INTIMIDATION OF LERNER FOLLOWS  
THE INDICTMENT OF MOSCOW HELSINKI GROUP MEMBER SOFIA  
KALLISTRATOVA; THE CESSATION OF DIRECT-DIAL TELEPHONE  
SERVICE TO AND FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN; THE  
DE JURE EXPULSION OF NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENT ANDREW  
NAGORSKI, THE DE FACTO EXPULSION OF ABC CORRESPONDENT

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BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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ANN GARRELS, AND THE INCREASING HARASSMENT OF SEVERAL OTHER WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS; AND A SUMMER FULL OF EXCEPTIONALLY NASTY HARASSMENT OF SUCH WESTERN VISITORS INTERESTED IN THE PLIGHT OF DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS AS THE CANADIANS WHO WERE ASSAULTED SEPTEMBER 12 IN LENINGRAD EN ROUTE TO THE APARTMENT OF WELL-KNOWN REFUSENIK ABBA TARATUTA (REFTEL). ALL THESE INCIDENTS SUGGEST THAT THE AUTHORITIES SIGNIFICANTLY HAVE INCREASED THE TEMPO OF THEIR EFFORTS TO ISOLATE DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS FROM CONTACTS WITH THE WEST AS YET ANOTHER STEP IN THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION NOW WELL INTO ITS FOURTH YEAR. THE REGIME'S SUCCESS THUS FAR IN ESCALATING THIS CAMPAIGN CAN ONLY WHET ITS APPETITE FOR MORE. ALTHOUGH OUR SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT LERNER HAS BEEN THE ONLY RECIPIENT AMONG REFUSENIKS OF THIS NEW KGB WARNING, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF OTHERS RECEIVE THE SAME TREATMENT.

7. REACTION AMONG THEM TO LERNER'S DECISION VARIES FROM SELF-PROTECTION TO ANGER ABOUT HIS FAILURE TO FIGHT THE KREMLIN. SEVERAL LONG-TIME CONTACTS ALREADY HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY NO LONGER ARE WILLING TO VISIT US IN OUR APARTMENTS; IF WE WANT TO SEE THEM, WE WILL HAVE TO GO TO THEIR APARTMENTS. THEY ALSO HAVE ASKED US TO CALL THEM ONLY FROM PAY PHONES FAR FROM THE EMBASSY AND OUR RESIDENCES. OTHER CONTACTS ARE ANGRY WITH LERNER OWING TO HIS REFUSAL TO FIGHT BACK. THESE PERSONS THINK THAT, AS THE SYMBOL OF THE JEWISH STRUGGLE FOR THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE, LERNER SHOULD, IN EFFECT, "CALL THE AUTHORITIES' BLUFF," AND THAT HIS FAILURE TO DO SO CAN HAVE ONLY A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE FUTURE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

8. LERNER HIMSELF BELIEVES THAT WORD OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO HIM HAS REACHED THE WEST THROUGH PRIVATE CHANNELS, AND HE IS NOT OPPOSED TO PUBLICITY ABOUT IT. OF COURSE, WE WILL RESPECT LERNER'S WISHES AND MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT HIM; WE DO EXPECT TO SEE HIM AT THE SYNAGOGUE ON SATURDAY EVENINGS FROM TIME TO TIME. WE BELIEVE THAT HE WILL REFUSE TO MEET WITH ANY VISITORS, EVEN MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS, UNLESS THEY FIRST OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR SUCH A MEETING. BUT, AS HE SPECULATED, IT MAY BE RELATIVELY EASY FOR SOME OF THEM TO DO SO. END COMMENT.  
HARTMAN



# Text of Sakharov's Letter Assailing Soviet to Pugwash Parley in Warsaw

*Following is a letter sent by Andrei D. Sakharov to the Pugwash Conference. The letter was written for delivery to the anniversary meeting of the group in Canada earlier this year, but was not received in the West until August.*

This is the second time that I am addressing the Pugwash Conference (the first time was in 1975).

Scientists and the international community as a whole can do a great deal to preserve peace in the world and to further international trust and security, disarmament, the progress of humanity and the defense of human rights. I have tried to express my views on these subjects on many occasions (the Nobel Peace Prize lecture, "The Responsibility of Scientists, What the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. Should Do to Preserve Peace," and in my other writings.) Here I would like again to formulate certain theses which, to my mind, are of essential importance.

The problems of peace and security should be discussed with the utmost objectivity and impartiality. The same standards should be applied to both sides while bearing in mind their individual features, the varying degrees of openness in their societies, their differing levels of democracy and their differences in political-strategic doctrine and practice. Unfortunately, many of the public figures and groups in the West who are speaking out on the problems of peace and disarmament are, due to a variety of reasons, (insufficient knowledge of the issues or naïveté, political fashion, the predominance of transient domestic political and economic factors) taking quite a different position, a position that is one-sided and therefore futile and even dangerous. To some degree this might well apply to the Pugwash movement itself. The work of the Pugwash conferences and many other international meetings as well is marked by a negative feature typical of the position taken by the representatives of the Soviet Union. In all discussions of critical problems they always in effect behave like well-disciplined functionaries of one gigantic bureaucratic machine. And this to a considerable degree diminishes the significance of such contacts for resolution of difficult questions especially if this feature is not taken sufficiently into account.

## Beginnings of 'Détente'

Some 10 to 13 years ago when what is called "détente" came into existence, there was an approximate strategic equilibrium in the world (although the West had yielded to the U.S.S.R. and its allies in the field of conventional weapons.) It was then possible to hope that favorable conditions had been created for disarmament, international trade, for the peaceful resolution of conflict and for

joint efforts in solving such global problems as surmounting the backwardness of the underdeveloped countries, in preserving the environment and the course of progress as a whole, in overcoming the closed nature of the socialist countries and the violation of human rights. Unfortunately, the apprehension of those who pointed out

that the U.S.S.R. might try to use détente to shift the equilibrium to its own advantage have proved justified.

In the last decade there has been a very substantial increase in the Soviet Army, Navy, missile arsenal, and Air Force while the countries of the West (Europe especially) have weakened their (defense) efforts. The SS-20 mis-

siles have changed the strategic equilibrium in Europe although those who take part in pacifist demonstrations seem not to notice this fact. The Paris Agreements were followed by North

Vietnam's rush to the South and by the genocidal actions of Pol Pot's followers. Despite the highly important Camp David accords, the situation in the Middle East remains extremely complicated and tragic for both sides. The Soviet Union continues to expand its zone of influence throughout the world — in Africa, Asia, Latin America. All these events culminated in the intervention in Afghanistan which has led into a dead end, a brutal war. Poland's attempt at pluralistic development has been replaced by military rule.

Soviet society remains as closed as ever. The most important decisions are made in antidemocratic fashion. The freedom to exchange information, the freedom of conscience, the freedom to choose one's country of residence are violated. Conditions for monitoring Soviet compliance with the international agreements to which it is a signatory are practically nonexistent. The persecution of dissidents has increased.

## Problems of Peace

All the above does not of course mean that the principle of resolving conflicts peacefully and by compromise is itself flawed. This principle remains the only alternative to global destruction. The problems of peace, international security and disarmament have absolute priority over other problems, including some which are extremely important. Disarmament negotiations must be held constantly and persistently despite all the difficulties entailed. But there is no

question that these principles should be supplemented by a number of other elements. I consider it especially necessary to inform the public about the truth of the world situation, including what has been said above, and to conduct a practical policy which corresponds to these realities.

It is necessary to restore strategic parity in the field of conventional weapons. Both sides have to be confident of their security without relying on atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the other weapons capable of mass destruction which imperil the existence of mankind and civilization. Today, according to widespread opinion, the West would be unable to withstand the forces of the U.S.S.R. and its camp if such weapons were excluded from the balance. For that reason equilibrium in the field of conventional weapons is a necessary condition for a general repudiation of atomic and thermonuclear weaponry and other means of mass destruction. Such a repudiation is an imperative historical necessity but advances in this direction must be careful and gradual.

Steps must be taken to help stop the expansion of the pro-Soviet sphere of influence for otherwise this expansion will threaten the equilibrium of the entire world. Steps must be taken to overcome the backwardness of the underdeveloped countries and the U.S.S.R. has to participate in this process. The world which, in our epoch, is a single entity cannot continue to exist with the great disparity of development so typical of the present. Thus far the U.S.S.R. and the socialist countries have avoided participating in the joint efforts to provide economic aid to underdeveloped countries, preferring to elicit political gains from the military and, to some degree, economic aid it provides solely to those countries within its sphere of influence.

There must be international efforts, efforts made by all honest people to defend human rights, to overcome the closed nature of the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries. These efforts reflect the spirit of the Helsinki Accords and the other international



60

### TEXT...

agreements signed by the U.S.S.R. Soviet propaganda always claims that the international defense of human rights in the U.S.S.R. and the socialist countries constitutes interference with the internal affairs of those countries, but this is hypocrisy.

#### Appeal to Scientists

A détente in which one of the partners hides his face behind a mask is dangerous. I spoke of this as early as 1973. I appeal to the participants of the Pugwash Conference to discuss this letter and the thoughts I have expressed here and I am, at the same time, appealing to the entire community of scientists and to all people of good will. I would like to take this opportunity to request the participants in this important international gathering to speak out in defense of prisoners of conscience. Their number includes the ornithologist Mart Niklus, the philologists Vasil Stus and Victoras Petkus, the lawyers Ivan Kandyba and Levko Lukyanenko, the teacher Oleksa Tikhyi, the writer Anatoly Marchenko, Balis Gayauskas who has been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and 5 years of exile, the computer scientist Anatoly Shcharansky sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment; the corresponding member of the American Academy of Sciences Yuri Orlov, the priest Father Gleb Yakymn, the psychiatrist Anatoly Kariagin, the pharmacist Victor Nekipelov, the Kovalyov family, the Rudenkos and the Manuseviches (both the husband and wife in both cases), the Podrabinek brothers, the recently convicted musicologist Merab Kostava and many others. The defense of your colleagues and all convicted for their beliefs and their nonviolent activity has a most direct bearing on the free exchange of information, on international trust and on international cooperation.



61

September 14, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE/EUR/PA - Mr. Steiner  
FROM: USIA/PGM/DF - Barry Lowenkron  
SUBJECT: UPDATE No. 1 of Speaker Opportunities in Western Europe

Top level speakers are required for the following events:

- I. Belgium Belgian-American Association has requested our Ambassador's assistance in recruiting a top-level administration official to address that group at a dinner or luncheon attended by a large number of that organization's influential membership.

Date: Any time in October or November

Costs: To be borne by the Belgian American Association.

- II. Netherlands Atlantic Commission Roundtable Conference featuring leading personalities from the United States, The Netherlands, France, Germany and the United Kingdom will meet for two days in "Ridderzaal" of the Dutch Parliament to discuss the following:

Day 1

- A. The Soviet threat as perceived in the U.S. and Holland
- B. U.S. and Dutch perceptions of the military balance
- C. U.S. and Dutch perceptions of the strategy of U.S. foreign policy relating to problems of peace and security
- D. Political views common both to the U.S. and the Netherlands.

Day 2

- A. Europe as an independent power
- B. Energy dependence
- C. The role of third world vis-a-vis East-West relations
- D. Eastern Europe.

Date: November 22-23, 1982

Speaker requested: The Atlantic Commission has invited Messrs. Eagleberger and Burt to attend.

Costs: to be borne by USIS The Hague.

drafted: PGM/DF:B.Lowenkron:wew:X49317 clearance: PGM/DF - H.Hughes



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THE SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENT (900)

(BACKGROUND)

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ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENT CLAIMS TO BE INDEPENDENT, SPONTANEOUS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL, A LOOK AT ITS CLOSE TIES TO THE KREMLIN PROVES QUITE THE CONTRARY.

ALL NATIONAL AND LOCAL PEACE ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE COORDINATED BY THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE (SCDP). THIS COMMITTEE WAS FORMED IN 1949 AND IS ONE OF THE 135 NATIONAL AFFILIATES CLAIMED BY THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC), WHICH IS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE MAJOR SOVIET INTERNATIONAL FRONTS.

YURI ZHUKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE SCDP, IS A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY (CPSU) CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE WPC PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE.

APART FROM CLANDESTINE SOVIET FINANCING OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL, ITS LEADERS ARE DIRECTED AND ITS PROPAGANDA CONTROLLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT (ID) OF THE CPSU

PAGE 02 -- SOVIET

CENTRAL COMMITTEE. DEPUTY ID CHIEF VITALI SHAPOSHNIKOV EXERCISES GENERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FRONT ORGANIZATIONS AND SITS ON THE WPC PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE.

IN ADDITION TO ITS CONNECTION WITH THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL, THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE IS STUDDED WITH PROMINENT PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ITS 427 MEMBERS ARE THOSE HEADING THE VARIOUS "WORKING COMMISSIONS," WHICH CONSTITUTE THE ORGANIZATION'S DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS.

ACCORDING TO SCDP CHAIRMAN ZHUKOV, THESE BODIES MEET REGULARLY TO "JOINTLY WORK OUT NEWER AND STILL NEWER PLANS OF MASS ACTIONS DIRECTED TOWARD AVERTING THE THREAT OF WAR." THE SCDP'S DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SUPERVISED BY VITALI ZHURKIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCE'S INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA; PAVEL NAUMOV, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE NOVOSTI STATE PRESS AGENCY, IS IN CHARGE OF THE "COMMISSION FOR TIES WITH MASS MEDIA ORGANS;" AND NIKOLAI INOZEMTSEV, DIRECTOR OF THE SOVIET INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL



PAGE 03 -- SOVIET

RELATIONS, CHAIRS THE "SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH COUNCIL ON PEACE AND DISARMAMENT."

64

· BASED IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE HAS 120 LOCAL CHAPTERS OR COMMITTEES THROUGHOUT THE USSR. THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOBILIZING FACTORIES, COLLECTIVE FARMS, SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTES AND UNIVERSITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET REGIME'S "PEACE INITIATIVES."

THE SUBORDINATION OF THESE BODIES TO PARTY DIRECTIVES, HOWEVER, WAS MADE CLEAR IN A TELEVISED TALK BY ZHUKOV, MAY 22. REFERRING TO THE NATIONWIDE PEACE ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN DURING THE WEEK ENDING MAY 9 -- A WEEK DEDICATED BY THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE -- THE SCDP CHAIRMAN SAID: "ITS ORGANIZERS WERE OUR REPUBLIC, KRAY AND OBLAST COMMITTEES WORKING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS."

IN THE SAME MOSCOW TELEVISION TALK, ZHUKOV ALSO SAID THAT THE AIMS OF HIS COMMITTEE AND THE "PEACE-LOVING" GOALS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WERE IDENTICAL.

THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE DOES NOT

PAGE 04 -- SOVIET

LIMIT ITS DISSEMINATION OF "PEACE" PROPAGANDA TO THE HOME FRONT. ITS MONTHLY PUBLICATION "20TH CENTURY AND PEACE" APPEARS IN ENGLISH, GERMAN, FRENCH AND SPANISH TRANSLATIONS. THE MAGAZINE CONTAINS PHOTOGRAPHS OF WORLDWIDE PROTESTS AGAINST THE PROJECTED MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND ARTICLES DESCRIBING ALLEGED WESTERN EFFORTS TO SEEK NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY.

NO MENTION IS EVER MADE, HOWEVER, OF THE MASSIVE SOVIET BUILDUP OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES, OR OF THE THREAT POSED TO THE SECURITY OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE NATIONS BY THE LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES ALREADY AIMED AT WEST EUROPEAN CITIES.

THE SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE ALSO SERVES MOSCOW'S "PEACE OFFENSIVE" IN ITS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF SOVIET FUNDS COVERTLY TRANSMITTED TO COMMUNIST-DOMINATED WESTERN AFFILIATES OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL.

ACCORDING TO SCDP DEPUTY CHAIRMAN PAVEL NAUMOV, THE SOVIET PEACE FUND WAS "CREATED UNDER" THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE TO COLLECT "VOLUNTARY" DONATIONS



PAGE 05 -- SOVIET

FROM WORKING PEOPLE. AS IN THE CASE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH'S REGULAR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS FUND, HOWEVER, SUCH "DONATIONS" ARE USUALLY MORE AKIN TO LEVIES IMPOSED BY THE FUND'S CENTRAL AUTHORITIES ON ITS LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

A HIGH-RANKING SOVIET OFFICIAL HAS RECENTLY PRESENTED ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET PEACE MOVEMENT'S FINANCIAL TIES TO CERTAIN "NONALIGNED" PEACE GROUPS IN THE WEST. IN A MAY INTERVIEW WITH VIENNA'S "ARBEITER ZEITUNG," VADIM ZAGLADIN -- FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT -- SAID THAT THE SOVIET PEACE FUND NOT ONLY COVERED THE EXPENSES OF RUSSIANS TAKING PART IN ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN CAPITALS, BUT ALSO ASSISTED WESTERN "PEACE COMMITTEES FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY."

THESE COMMITTEES ARE NATIONAL AFFILIATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION (ICESC). THE LATTER WAS SET UP IN BRUSSELS IN 1972 FOLLOWING A MEETING OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL'S

PAGE 06 -- SOVIET

PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE. WITH AFFILIATES IN EAST AND WEST,  
THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE ICESC IS TO PROMOTE THE WORK OF  
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE).

LIKE THE SUPPOSEDLY "NONGOVERNMENTAL" SOVIET COMMITTEE  
FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE, THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IS CONTROLLED BY TOP PARTY  
OFFICIALS. ITS CHAIRMAN, ALEXEI SHITIKOV, FOR EXAMPLE, IS A  
MEMBER OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND MEMBERS ZAGLADIN  
AND VITALI SHAPOSHNIKOV HOLD MAJOR POSTS IN THE CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT.

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\*WF-206 (8/24/82)

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REPRESSION OF ANTI-WAR ACTIVISTS CONTINUES (1,200)

A CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT SOVIET BLOC MEASURES

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REPRESSION OF UNOFFICIAL ANTI-WAR GROUPS IN EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE PAST FIVE MONTHS RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE SOVIET BLOC WOULD EVER TOLERATE A SERIOUS COUNTERPART TO WESTERN PEACE MOVEMENTS.

MOST RECENTLY, THE LEADER OF THE FIRST SOVIET INDEPENDENT PEACE AND DISARMAMENT GROUP WAS CONFINED TO A PSYCHIATRIC WARD.

IN AN EFFORT TO DEFLECT DOUBTS ABOUT SOVIET SERIOUSNESS ON THE PEACE ISSUE, MOSCOW ALLOWED -- FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER -- A TOKEN NORDIC PEACE "MARCH" TO PASS THROUGH ITS TERRITORY BY TRAIN IN JULY. YET THE DANISH, FINNISH, SWEDISH AND NORWEGIAN "WOMEN FOR PEACE" HAD BARELY ARRIVED WHEN THEY LEARNED THAT MEMBERS OF AN INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN PEACE GROUP HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

AFTER A MONTH'S HARD ADVANCE BARGAINING ON THE DETAILS OF

PAGE 02 -- REPRESSION

69

THE MARCH -- INCLUDING A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF MARCHERS AND MESSAGES THAT COULD AND COULD NOT BE DISPLAYED ON SCANDINAVIAN BANNERS -- THE SOVIET UNION NEUTRALIZED THE MARCH.

THE SMALL BAND OF SCANDINAVIAN WOMEN WAS "ESCORTED" ALL THE WAY TO PRE-ARRANGED RALLIES IN A FEW DESIGNATED CITIES FROM LENINGRAD TO MINSK BY MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIALLY CONTROLLED SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE. IT WAS ALSO CONSTANTLY UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY KGB OFFICIALS.

CONTRARY TO MOSCOW'S PRIOR ASSURANCES THAT THE MARCH WOULD NOT BE POLITICIZED, THE SCANDINAVIANS WERE MET BY ANTI-WESTERN PLACARDS AT THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMONSTRATIONS THEY ATTENDED. THE SOVIET PRESS CENSORED ANY SPEECHES BY THEIR GUESTS THAT DEVIATED FROM THE STANDARD KREMLIN PROPAGANDA LINE, WHILE OTHER SCANDINAVIAN STATEMENTS WERE DISTORTED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ONLY THE WEST WAS CALLED UPON TO END THE ARMS RACE.

FOLLOWING IS A CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT SOVIET-BLOC MEASURES AGAINST INDEPENDENT PEACE GROUPS:



70

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MARCH, 1982 -- EAST GERMANY BANS PEACE EMBLEM

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EAST GERMANY DENOUNCED ITS CHURCH-SUPPORTED AUTONOMOUS PEACE GROUP AS AN "ILLEGAL POLITICAL ASSOCIATION."

THE GROUP'S BIBLICAL EMBLEM, DEPICTING THE BEATING OF SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES, WAS BANNED MARCH 22 AS THE "EXPRESSION OF A MENTALITY HOSTILE TO THE STATE."

IN A MOVE TO CONTAIN THE SMALL, LOOSELY ORGANIZED PEACE GROUP, THE EAST GERMAN REGIME MOUNTED AN INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN IN SCHOOLS AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS TO INCULCATE MARTIAL ATTITUDES.

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APRIL, 1982 -- EAST GERMANY EXPLAINS INTOLERANCE OF PEACE ACTIVISTS

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DESPITE THE PUBLIC OPPOSITION OF THE CONFERENCE OF EVANGELICAL CHURCHES TO THE REGIME'S BAN ON THE WEARING OF THE "SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES" PEACE PATCH, THE EAST GERMAN

STATE SECRETARY FOR CHURCH AFFAIRS MAINTAINED THAT THE PEACE SYMBOL HAD BEEN "MISUSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF WEAKENING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE READINESS."

SEVERE HARASSMENT OF YOUTHS BELONGING TO THE GROUP CONTINUED.

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APRIL, 1982 -- WESTERN PEACE PROTESTERS ARRESTED AND ORDERED OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE

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SEVEN WEST EUROPEANS WERE ARRESTED IN MOSCOW'S RED SQUARE APRIL 19 WHILE TRYING TO UNFURL A BANNER PROCLAIMING "BREAD, LIFE AND DISARMAMENT."

THE GROUP WAS SEIZED WITH LEAFLETS CALLING ON THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO DONATE SEVEN-TENTHS OF ONE PERCENT OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TOWARD PROVIDING FOOD FOR IMPOVERISHED THIRD WORLD NATIONS.

IDENTICAL PROTESTS -- COORDINATED BY THE ITALIAN RADICAL PARTY AS PART OF ITS ANTI-HUNGER AND PEACE CAMPAIGN -- MET SIMILAR FATES IN THE CAPITALS OF BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND



PAGE 05 -- REPRESSION

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

MAY, 1982 -- MOSCOW SILENCES REPRESENTATIVE OF WESTERN PEACE  
MOVEMENT

WIM BARTELS, THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE DUTCH  
INTERCHURCH PEACE COUNCIL, WALKED OUT OF THE KREMLIN-  
SPONSORED "WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE" OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO  
"SAVE THE SACRED GIFT OF LIFE FROM NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE," MAY  
12, AFTER BEING DENIED PERMISSION TO ADDRESS AN OPEN PLENARY  
SESSION COVERED BY THE PRESS.

BARTELS WAS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WESTERN PEACE  
MOVEMENT ATTENDING THE MEETING. HE IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE  
LARGEST PEACE ORGANIZATION IN A COUNTRY DISTINGUISHED BY ITS  
CENTRAL ROLE IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND BY ACTIVE CHURCH  
INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-NUCLEAR CAMPAIGNS.

IT WAS NO SECRET AT THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE THAT BARTELS  
INTENDED TO DISCUSS THE NEED FOR MUTUAL AND BALANCED ARMS  
REDUCTIONS IN EAST AND WEST AND TO MENTION BY NAME THREE

97

GROUPS PERSECUTED OR SUPPRESSED IN THE SOVIET BLOC: THE UNOFFICIAL PROTESTANT PEACE ADVOCATES IN EAST GERMANY; THE SOLIDARITY TRADE UNION IN POLAND; AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS "CHARTER 77" GROUP IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

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JUNE, 1982 -- SOVIETS TOW SHIPBORNE WESTERN PROTEST GROUP OUT TO SEA

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AFTER RELEASING 2,000 BALLOONS IN LENINGRAD CARRYING THE MESSAGE "USSR: STOP NUCLEAR TESTING NOW," 28 MEMBERS OF THE WESTERN ENVIRONMENTALIST "GREENPEACE" MOVEMENT ABOARD "THE SIRIUS" WERE TOWED -- AGAINST THEIR WISHES -- OUT OF SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS, JUNE 2.

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JUNE 1982 -- RESULTS OF DOMESTIC CHALLENGE TO KREMLIN'S MONOPOLY OF SOVIET PEACE ACTIVITIES

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MEMBERS OF THE USSR'S FIRST INDEPENDENT PEACE AND DISARMAMENT GROUP -- WHOSE FORMATION WAS ANNOUNCED IN



14  
PAGE 07 -- REPRESSION

MOSCOW, JUNE 4 -- WERE REPEATEDLY HARASSED, INTIMIDATED AND BLACKMAILED.

SERGEI BATOVRIN AND VLADIMIR FLEISHGAKKER -- FOUNGING MEMBERS OF THE "COMMITTEE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR" -- WERE PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS WERE THREATENED WITH LOSS OF JOBS, ACADEMIC POSITIONS AND STUDENT STIPENDS, AND WITH PROSECUTION FOR "UNWARRANTED EXERCISE OF ACTUAL OR PRESUMED RIGHTS." THEY WERE WARNED THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES WERE "ANTI-SOVIET" AND "PROVOCATIVE."

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JULY, 1982 -- MOSCOW CONTINUES TO STIFLE BATOVRIN GROUP

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SOVIET POLICE THREATENED TO BRING CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST SERGEI BATOVRIN JULY 6 IF HE DID NOT RENOUNCE MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMITTEE FOR EAST-WEST UNDERSTANDING AND CONDEMN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

TWO MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE TOLD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY

PAGE 08 -- REPRESSION

BY JULY 10 -- EVEN THOUGH PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE HAD BEEN REFUSED WHEN SOUGHT. OTHER MEMBERS WERE PROMISED EXIT VISAS ON THE CONDITION THAT THEY SEVERED ALL TIES WITH THE PEACE GROUP.

SHORTLY BEFORE THE NORDIC PEACE MARCHERS WERE DUE TO ARRIVE IN MOSCOW, JULY 14, BATOVRIN AND SERGEI ROSENBERG WERE JAILED FOR 15 DAYS ON CHARGES OF "HOOLIGANISM" AND RENDERING ASSISTANCE TO ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA.

THE REMAINING COMMITTEE MEMBERS WERE ORDERED OUT OF MOSCOW OR PLACED UNDER POLICE SURVEILLANCE TO PREVENT THEM FROM MAKING CONTACT WITH THE SCANDINAVIAN "WOMEN FOR PEACE."

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JULY, 1982 -- GDR'S REPLY TO PEACE DISSIDENTS: EXILE AND MILITARY SERVICE

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AT LEAST FOUR OF THE ORGANIZERS OF THE LARGE UNOFFICIAL "PEACE WORKSHOP" HELD IN EAST BERLIN JUNE 27, WERE EXPELLED TO THE WEST. OTHERS WERE ORDERED TO REPORT FOR MILITARY DUTY AND WERE THREATENED WITH PRISON SENTENCES IF THEY



4/6

FAILED TO COMPLY.

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AUGUST, 1982 -- MOSCOW'S ANSWER TO UNREPENTANT PEACE  
DISSIDENT: A PSYCHIATRIC WARD

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THE LEADER OF THE SOVIET INDEPENDENT PEACE COMMITTEE,  
SERGEI BATOVRIN, WAS INCARCERATED AUGUST 6 IN A MOSCOW  
MENTAL HOSPITAL. HOSPITAL OFFICIALS SAID HIS ACTIONS WERE  
SOCIALY DANGEROUS AND INDUCED BY ILLNESS.

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PPE/MCN/PPO/SG (READ-1:50)

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(eu512,u,

\*EUR-512 (5/14/82)

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KREMLIN'S 'PEACE' CAMPAIGN FOR EXPORT ONLY (1,800)  
PART II: SOVIET DOUBLE STANDARDS IN EAST AND WEST  
BY MARIA J.E. COPSON  
USICA STAFF CORRESPONDENT

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JUST BEFORE THE OPENING OF MOSCOW'S "WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE" OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO SAVE THE "SACRED GIFT OF LIFE FROM NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE," SEVERAL WEST EUROPEANS WERE ARRESTED APRIL 19 IN THE CAPITALS OF THE USSR, BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY FOR TRYING TO UNFURL BANNERS PROCLAIMING "BREAD, LIFE AND DISARMAMENT."

THE STIFLING OF THESE MINI-DEMONSTRATIONS -- WHICH WERE COORDINATED BY THE ITALIAN RADICAL PARTY AS PART OF ITS ANTI-HUNGER AND PEACE CAMPAIGN -- WAS ONLY THE MOST RECENT IN A SERIES OF SELF-INFLICTED BLOWS TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE KREMLIN'S PROPAGANDA "PEACE PROGRAM FOR THE 1980'S."

WHILE MOSCOW ENCOURAGES ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENTS IN THE WEST, IT BANS OR PUNISHES ANY MANIFESTATION OF SIMILAR IDEAS IN THE EAST. SOVIET LEADERS PREACH "PEACE" AND MILITARY WEAKNESS TO THE WEST, BUT INSTILL THE VIRTUES OF MILITARISM AT HOME.

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THE "STRUGGLE FOR PEACE" HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN A CORNERSTONE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: "AS AN ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE," LENIN SAID, "PEACE SIMPLY MEANS COMMUNIST WORLD DOMINATION." THIS IS WHY, FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMUNIST FRONT "WORLD PEACE COUNCIL" -- THE VANGUARD OF THE EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT -- OPENLY SUPPORTED THE SOVIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND INVITED A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET PUPPET MILITARY JUNTA IN POLAND TO ITS JANUARY INTERNATIONAL "PEACE" CONFERENCE IN COPENHAGEN.

"PEACE" AND MILITARY MIGHT ARE INDIVISIBLE IN OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENTS INTENDED FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. AT AN ARMY CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW ON MAY 11, MINISTER OF DEFENSE MARSHAL DMITRI USTINOV DECLARED THAT THE PARTY, CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV "ATTACH SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROVISION OF A HIGH LEVEL OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS OF THE ARMED FORCES." INDEED, HE STRESSED, "THE USSR'S CONSISTENT LOVE OF PEACE IS NOT A SIGN OF



27

PAGE 02 -- PEACE II

WEAKNESS. IT IN NO WAY EXCLUDES, BUT ON THE CONTRARY PRESUPPOSES CONSTANT CONCERN FOR THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY."

IN SIMILAR VEIN, CHIEF OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE GENERAL A. A. YEPISHEV ADDRESSED A MILITARY LECTURERS' SEMINAR IN MOSCOW, JANUARY 20: "FIRMLY FOLLOWING LENIN'S COURSE...OUR PARTY IS PERSISTENTLY IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE PROGRAM FOR THE 1980'S ELABORATED BY THE 26TH CONGRESS. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE INTERESTS OF RELIABLY DEFENDING THE GAINS OF SOCIALISM, THE CPSU DEVOTES UNFLAGGING ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING...THE COMBAT MIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES. IN THE PARTY'S POLICY, A LOVE OF PEACE AND READINESS TO DEAL AN IMMEDIATE REBUFF TO ANY AGGRESSOR ARE COMBINED IN A SINGLE WHOLE."

YEPISHEV ALSO EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO FOSTER DISCIPLINE, CLASS VIGILANCE AND A "READINESS TO STAUNCHLY BEAR THE RIGORS OF COMBAT TRAINING AND SERVICE" AMONG THE YOUNG: "THE TRAINING OF A FUTURE SOLDIER AND THE MAKING OF A FIGHTER BEGIN LONG BEFORE HE IS DRAFTED INTO THE ARMY AND NAVY -- IN THE FAMILY, IN SCHOOL AND IN THE COLLECTIVE."

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BECAUSE MARXISM-LENINISM EQUATES "PEACE" WITH SOVIET HEGEMONY AND THE DEFEAT OF CAPITALISM, PACIFISTS AND ADVOCATES OF MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT ARE NOT TOLERATED WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN IMPERIAL DOMAINS. MOSCOW IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN AN OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN TO LINK AND JOINTLY DISCREDIT A GROWING INTEREST IN RELIGION AND NASCENT PACIFIST TENDENCIES AMONG SOVIET YOUTH OF DRAFT AGE.

RELIGION IS BEING DENOUNCED IN THE SOVIET MEDIA AS A SUBVERSIVE, WESTERN-INSPIRED THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT WAR. THE REFUSAL OF MANY YOUNG EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS AND MEMBERS OF OTHER ILLEGAL PROTESTANT SECTS TO BEAR ARMS HAS BEEN MET WITH REPEATED FINES, BEATINGS, LOSS OF JOBS AND TERMS IN LABOR CAMPS. IN A RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOKLET, "ALWAYS READY TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND," FIRST DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER MARSHAL NIKOLAI OGARKOV POINTED TO THE NEED TO RIGOROUSLY COMBAT "ELEMENTS OF PACIFISM," WHICH ERODE THE PATRIOTISM OF SOVIET YOUTH AND THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY.



24

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THE TWO GERMANIES PROVIDE A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THE DUAL NATURE OF SOVIET "PEACE" SLOGANS. WEST GERMAN SUPPORTERS OF PACIFISM, NEUTRALISM, UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS REDUCTIONS ARE HAILED BY THE SOVIET PRESS AS HARBINGERS OF A WORLDWIDE REACTION TO "WARMONGERING IMPERIALISM." THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN EAST GERMANY, HOWEVER, ARE VIRTUALLY ACCUSED OF TREASON.

WHILE PUBLIC CHARGES OF PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF THE WEST GERMAN ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT WERE BEING MADE EARLY IN APRIL BY ONE OF ITS MEMBER GROUPS -- THE ENVIRONMENTALIST "GREEN PARTY" -- THE EAST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT WAS STRUGGLING FOR SURVIVAL.

THE SOVIET CLIENT STATE OF EAST GERMANY DENOUNCED ITS OWN AUTONOMOUS PEACE GROUP IN MARCH AS AN "ILLEGAL POLITICAL ASSOCIATION." EVEN ITS BIBLICAL EMBLEM DEPICTING THE BEATING OF SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES WAS BANNED AS THE "EXPRESSION OF A MENTALITY HOSTILE TO THE STATE." IRONICALLY, THAT SYMBOL AND ISAIAH'S "NATION SHALL NOT LIFT UP SWORD AGAINST NATION, NEITHER SHALL THEY LEARN WAR ANYMORE," HAD INSPIRED A SOVIET SCULPTURE AT THE UNITED NATIONS PURPORTING TO SHOW THE "PEACEFUL NATURE OF WORLD SOCIALISM."

EAST GERMAN STATE SECRETARY FOR CHURCH AFFAIRS KLAUS GYSI EXPLAINED IN APRIL THAT THE PEACE EMBLEM COULD NO LONGER APPEAR IN PUBLIC BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN "MISUSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF WEAKENING DEFENSE READINESS IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC."

IN A LETTER READ FROM THE PULPITS OF PROTESTANT CHURCHES ON EASTER SUNDAY, THE CONFERENCE OF EVANGELICAL CHURCHES DECLARED THAT THE CHURCH WAS NOT "SIMPLY THE AMPLIFIER OF STATE FOREIGN POLICY" OR "PEACE EFFORTS," AND ITS OWN "PEACE IMPULSE" WAS NOT, THEREFORE, SUPERFLUOUS. IT CONDEMNED THE REGIME'S BAN ON THE SYMBOL OF PEACE AS A "CURTAILMENT OF THE...FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE."

ACCORDING TO A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE GDR COMMUNIST "JUNGE WELT," THE "CHOICE OF A MILITARY CAREER IS THE HIGHEST CHOICE FOR PEACE." IN FACT, THE EAST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT,



70

WHICH IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES, EMERGED IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING FOR SECONDARY SCHOOLCHILDREN IN 1978.

THE AUTHORITIES REJECTED AS "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" THE APPEALS OF LUTHERAN PASTORS IN 1981 TO ALLOW CHRISTIAN TEENAGERS TO CLAIM EXEMPTION FROM MILITARY DRILL AND CONSCRIPTION ON THE GROUNDS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION. REQUESTS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF "SOCIAL PEACE" SERVICE WERE DISMISSED WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT THE REGIME CONSIDERED MILITARY STRENGTH TO BE THE COUNTRY'S "GREATEST AND MOST GENUINE CONTRIBUTION" TO EFFORTS TO SECURE WORLD PEACE.

IN A MOVE TO CONTAIN THE SMALL, LOOSELY ORGANIZED AND CHURCH-SUPPORTED PEACE MOVEMENT, THE EAST GERMAN REGIME HAS MOUNTED AN INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN IN SCHOOLS AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS TO INCULCATE MARTIAL ATTITUDES.

WESTERN JOURNALISTS, MOREOVER, ARE NO LONGER ALLOWED TO REPORT ON CHURCH SYNODS -- THE ONLY PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES NOT CONTROLLED BY THE RULING COMMUNIST PARTY. THE SYNOD OF THE MAGDEBURG-SAXON LUTHERAN CHURCH DISTRICT IN HALLE, FOR INSTANCE, PASSED A RESOLUTION IN NOVEMBER 1981 ASKING FOR A REDUCTION NOT ONLY OF NATO ARMS, BUT ALSO OF SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES AND WARSAW PACT TANKS.

IN ADDITION, A GOVERNMENT WHICH PUBLICLY AND VOCIFEROUSLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S "PEACE INITIATIVES" HAD NO QUALMS IN DETAINING THE EAST BERLIN EVANGELICAL MINISTER REINER EPELMANN FOR TWO DAYS AFTER HE LAUNCHED THE FEBRUARY "BERLIN APPEAL." THAT DOCUMENT, CARRYING 200 SIGNATURES, CALLED FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST GERMANY AS A PRELUDE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN EUROPE.

UNLIKE THE TOTALITARIAN SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT REGIMES, GOVERNMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC DEMOCRACIES ARE NOT IMMUNE TO PUBLIC OPINION. THE KREMLIN THEREFORE SEEKS TO EXPLOIT LEGITIMATE AND FREELY EXPRESSED WESTERN PROTESTS AGAINST THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN AN EFFORT TO PARALYZE NATO'S RESOLVE TO COUNTER THE THREAT POSED BY THE UNPRECEDENTED SOVIET ARMS



BUILDUP OF THE PAST DECADE.

MOSCOW'S PRIMARY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE OF UNDERMINING NATO SECURITY IS CONCEALED IN THE SEEMINGLY BENIGN SOVIET RHETORIC OF "PEACE." THE SOVIET "PEACE OFFENSIVE," FOR INSTANCE, HAS REVIVED ITS CAMPAIGN OF THE 1950'S TO PROMOTE A NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE FOR DENMARK, SWEDEN, NORWAY, FINLAND AND ICELAND. YET THE USSR HAS NOT EVEN ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF DEMANDS WITHIN THE SOVIET BALTIC REPUBLICS OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA FOR INCLUSION IN A NORTH EUROPEAN ZONE OF PEACE.

IN AN OPEN LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE SOVIET AND NORDIC GOVERNMENTS AND SMUGGLED TO THE WEST IN FEBRUARY, 38 BALTS PETITIONED FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE NON-NUCLEAR ZONE TO EMBRACE THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND THE BALTIC SEA. "SUCH A STEP," THEY SAID, "WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF AN EQUALLY BALANCED LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS."

WHILE THE SOVIET UNION CHANNELS MONEY INTO SCANDINAVIAN PEACE MOVEMENTS THROUGH ITS DIPLOMATS -- VLADIMIR MERKULOV, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS EXPELLED FROM DENMARK IN NOVEMBER 1981 BECAUSE OF HIS FINANCIAL CONNECTIONS WITH ONE OF THE DANISH PEACE MOVEMENT'S LEADING GROUPS -- IT REFUSES TO INCLUDE ITS OWN TERRITORIAL POSSESSIONS ON THE NORDIC FLANK WITHIN A ZONE OF PEACE. INDEED, CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER GEORGI ARBATOV TOLD THE SWEDISH NEWS AGENCY IN APRIL THAT THE USSR COULD NOT REMOVE IMPORTANT STRATEGIC INSTALLATIONS FROM THE KOLA PENINSULA AND THE SOVIET BALTIC COAST.

IN THE MIDST OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE NORDIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN JUNE 1981 AND AGAIN IN MARCH, KOLA-BASED SOVIET BACKFIRE BOMBERS, EQUIPPED WITH MISSILES DESIGNED TO CARRY NUCLEAR WARHEADS, WERE SIGHTED IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE NORTH AND WEST OF THE LOFOTEN ISLANDS OFF THE NORWEGIAN COAST.

SIMILARLY, MOSCOW'S PROPOSALS FOR A "BALTIC SEA OF PEACE" WERE MOCKED IN OCTOBER 1981 BY THE GROUNDING OF ONE OF ITS OWN SUBMARINES IN RESTRICTED SWEDISH WATERS. ACCORDING TO STOCKHOLM OFFICIALS, THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THE "WHISKEY" SUBMARINE WAS ARMED WITH NUCLEAR-TIPPED WARHEADS.

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72

PAGE 06 -- PEACE II

THE SOVIET UNION'S HARSH REPRESSION OF ANTI-WAR SENTIMENTS IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC CAN ONLY SIGNIFY ITS DETERMINATION NOT TO COOPERATE WITH THE WEST IN NEGOTIATING SUBSTANTIAL, BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. IT IS CLEARLY NOT PREPARED TO ALLOW WESTERN DESIRES FOR PEACE AND DISARMAMENT TO INFECT AN EXPANSIONIST SOVIET EMPIRE.

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# Foreign Opinion Note

International Communication Agency, United States of America  
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

August 16, 1982

## POST-SUMMIT EUROPE: PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY UNCHANGED

This paper reports findings from mid-July public opinion surveys in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, and The Netherlands. The surveys, of about 1000 adults per country, were conducted by reputable national firms -- mostly Gallup-affiliated companies.

### Summary:

In the aftermath of the Versailles and Bonn summits, the public mood in major West European countries seems relatively unchanged from fall 1981 and spring 1982 on key security issues -- with the exception of somewhat wider opposition to INF deployment.

This is the major finding of a mid-July survey of NATO countries, which focused on changes in West European views from before the summits, the President's major policy speeches, the commencement of the INF and, later, START negotiations in Geneva, and the SSOD-II conference at the United Nations.

Counterposed to these events were wars in the Falklands and Lebanon, and disagreements among allies over the U.S. decision on the Soviet gas pipeline.

It is not possible to assess here the impact of any individual event. Rather, this paper presents data on overall changes -- or lack thereof -- in West European views on East/West relations and on key U.S. policy objectives. Views on in-country INF stationing are reported separately.<sup>1</sup>

End Summary

### Europeans Continue to See No Clear Soviet Threat

From half (50% in France) to two-thirds (70%--Italy; 69%--FRG; and 67%--Britain) of the West Europeans surveyed discount the likelihood of a "war in Europe" in the near term.

Those seeing at least a fair likelihood of U.S.-USSR tensions leading to war are no more than three persons in ten (13% in FRG to 29% in France). These findings are comparable to previous soundings on the perceived threat of a Soviet attack.

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<sup>1/</sup> See "Post-Summit Survey Finds Wider INF Opposition; Support for Superpower Nuclear Freeze," N-8/15/82, August 15, 1982.



94

Slight Shift in Perceived Superpower Balance

As before, except in Italy where opinion is divided, the prevailing view is either that the two superpowers are "about equal" or that the Soviets are "ahead" in total military power. In all cases except Italy (32%) no more than one person in five sees the U.S. as militarily strongest -- Table 1.

TABLE 1

SUPERPOWERS' TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Nether- lands</u>
U.S. ahead	14%	18%	18%	32%	12%
U.S.- USSR equal	28	36	30	33	52
USSR ahead	46	24	40	30	20

However, the present pattern differs somewhat from earlier polls: there has been a slight general increase in those seeing superpower parity and a slight decrease in those seeing USSR superiority. The greatest change since last December has been in The Netherlands, with an increase (from 39% to 52%) in those saying "equal" and a decline (from 41% to 20%) in those saying "USSR ahead."

There has been no real change in ratings of U.S. strength. But comparing those who see the USSR as stronger vs. those seeing the two powers as equal, these changes since December 1981 are notable:

- o Britain and Germany: As before, the Soviets are still seen ahead in total military strength, but with a diminished lead: the USSR has dropped from a 36-point lead in Britain and a 20-point lead in Germany to 18 points and 10 points, respectively.
- o France and The Netherlands: From opinions that were about evenly split between parity and Soviet superiority, those seeing parity now lead among the French (36%-to-24%) and the Dutch (52%-to-20%).
- o Italy: While ratings of USSR superiority have not changed, there has been a slight decline in those seeing parity, and a slight increase in those seeing the U.S. as stronger. But the change is only suggestive.

Thus, while more people typically see the USSR, rather than the U.S., as militarily strongest, the general picture indicates some slight movement toward the view that the two powers are about equal in total strength.

#### Europeans Want Parity, Think Superpowers Seek Superiority

Majorities (from 55% in France to 63% in The Netherlands and Britain) think it would be best "for the two superpowers to be about equal in total military strength."

Minorities (from 20% in France to 33% in Italy) think it would be best for the U.S. to be stronger. Almost no one (2% to 4%) wants the USSR to be ahead in military strength.

There is, however, considerable discrepancy between what West European publics want (parity) and what they think the U.S. and USSR each seek (superiority).

- o U.S. Objectives: The Germans are divided (42% to 41%) over whether the U.S. seeks military superiority or parity vis-a-vis the USSR. But by margins of more than two-to-one, people in the other countries see the U.S. seeking superiority (60% range) rather than equality (20% range). The margin in Italy is even greater (75% to 19%).
- o USSR Objectives: Views of Soviet objectives are even more clear cut. In all countries, only a few (10%-15%) think the Soviets' goal is to achieve parity with the U.S. Instead, at least two out of three people (65%-80% range) say the Soviets seek superiority over the U.S.

These findings are virtually unchanged from last fall.

#### Soviets Worse, but Three in Ten Think U.S. Increases War Risk

The U.S. and USSR were also compared on a related question of their contributions to peace. And while the USSR is perceived much more widely as having done more in the last year to "increase the risk of war" than "to promote peace," sizable minorities say the same of the U.S. Specifically:

- o U.S. Policies: Roughly three persons in ten (27% in The Netherlands to 35% in Britain) say that recent U.S. "policies and actions" have contributed more to the risk of war than to peace. On balance, larger proportions (30%-40% range) say the U.S. has done more for peace, but the difference is not great. In fact, opinion is about even in the FRG and The Netherlands. Also, there is an unusually large number of people, particularly in France and Germany, who do not offer an opinion.



- o USSR Policies: Less than one-fifth (12%-18%) in all countries see the USSR as having done more to promote peace in the past year. Rather, by margins of three- and four-to-one, Europeans see Soviet policies and actions as contributing more to the risk of war (from 36% in The Netherlands to 66% in Italy).

These findings represent no real change from previous results in the same countries.

#### Only in Germany Does Majority Know About SSOD-II

At the time of the survey, the second Special Session on Disarmament was underway at the U.N. Only in West Germany do more people know about the SSOD than not (54%-to-31%). In the other countries, only the Dutch are about as likely as not to know about the SSOD (40% level). Lack of awareness is roughly equal in Britain (66%), France (54%) and Italy (59%).

People were then asked about their optimism for the success in the near future of "disarmament efforts in general."

- o By very wide margins, Europeans do not have much hope for the near-term success of disarmament talks. Pessimism prevails in all countries (60%-70% range). No more than one-fifth anywhere sees even a "fairly likely" chance of successful negotiations.

Again, the U.S. and USSR were compared on their motives, in this case, the sincerity of each in seeking arms reduction agreements:

- o U.S. Efforts: Asked whether the "U.S. is or is not making a genuine effort" to get an arms agreement, the Italians and French are divided (43%-to-44% and 34%-to-36%, respectively). The U.S. is seen more favorably in the U.K. (55%-to-30%), West Germany (53%-to-30%), and The Netherlands (59%-to-22%).
- o USSR Efforts: When asked the same about the Soviets, West Europeans' views are more negative. By wide margins, more people say the USSR is not making genuine efforts toward arms reduction (50%-60% range) than say the USSR is (20% range). Only in the Netherlands is opinion divided (39%-to-36%).

All of these findings are consistent with those of previous surveys.

# Foreign Opinion Note

International Communication Agency, United States of America  
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

August 17, 1982

## NATO STILL CORE OF WESTERN SECURITY, BUT ITS EFFECTIVENESS QUESTIONED

This paper reports findings from mid-July public opinion surveys in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Belgium. The surveys, of about 1000 adults per country, were conducted by reputable national firms -- mostly Gallup-affiliated companies.

### Summary:

West Europeans still see NATO as essential to their national security, but are unsure of its capabilities. Sizable minorities oppose NATO's use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances.

End Summary

### NATO Still Essential to Europeans' National Security

NATO is considered "still essential to our country's security" by majorities in the U.K. (65%), West Germany (66%), Italy (55%) and The Netherlands (67%). This finding is consistent with previous survey results in these countries.<sup>1</sup>

No more than one-fifth (13% in The Netherlands to 22% in Italy) feel that NATO is "no longer essential."

### But No Clear Confidence in NATO's Effectiveness

As seen in previous polls, Europeans' judgment of NATO's essentiality does not translate into widespread confidence in NATO's ability to deter an attack or to defend against one.

- o Deterrence: When asked about NATO's "ability to prevent an attack on Western Europe," the Italians (54%-to-35%) and the Dutch (49%-to-37%) are more likely than not to express some measure of confidence. The British and West Germans are divided (at about the 40% level).
- o Defense: Almost the same results are found for Europeans' confidence in NATO's "ability to defend Western Europe against an attack." More confidence than not is expressed by the Italians (57%-to-32%), Dutch (48%-to-38%), and British (52%-to-39%). The Germans are divided (46%-to-41%).

<sup>1</sup>The results in France are inconclusive. A different questioning procedure was inadvertently used, and an unusually large number of people (40%) did not offer their views. Of those who did respond, two-thirds said that NATO is essential to France's national security. Other NATO-related results for France have been omitted from this paper. The question of NATO's essentiality was not asked in Belgium.



88

Belgians Most Likely To Oppose NATO Using Nuclear Weapons

Except for the higher incidence among Belgians (51%), about one-third of the publics in all countries (30% in Britain to 38% in Germany and Italy) see no circumstance in which NATO should use nuclear weapons in Europe -- Table 1.

About as many in each country, including Belgium, think NATO should use nuclear weapons "only if the Soviet Union uses them first in attacking Western Europe" (28% in Belgium to 45% in Britain).

No more than one-fifth in any of the countries surveyed would favor NATO's first use of nuclear weapons if a Soviet conventional attack "threatened to overwhelm NATO forces."

TABLE 1

NATO'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

<u>Circumstances in which NATO should use nuclear weapons:</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>Belgium</u>
Use under no circumstances.....	30%	38%	38%	37%	51%
Use only if Soviets use nuclear weapons first..	45	33	40	32	28
Use if Soviet troops overwhelm NATO forces..	19	16	14	16	14

Altogether, about one-half or more (but 42% in Belgium) in each country see some circumstances in which they would favor NATO's use of nuclear weapons (at the 50%-level in Italy, Germany, and The Netherlands; and at the 60%-level in Britain).

These findings are unchanged from previous surveys, with the exception of a drop in the proportion of the Dutch public opposed to any use of nuclear weapons (from 50% last October to 37% now).

# Foreign Opinion Note

International Communication Agency, United States of America  
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

August 15, 1982

## POST-SUMMIT SURVEY FINDS WIDER INF OPPOSITION; SUPPORT FOR SUPERPOWER NUCLEAR FREEZE

This paper reports findings from mid-July public opinion surveys in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Belgium. The surveys, of about 1000 adults per country, were conducted by reputable national firms -- mostly Gallup-affiliated companies.

### Summary:

The general pattern of West European opinion in the wake of the NATO Summit continues to be one of opposition to in-country ("Western Europe" in France) deployment of intermediate nuclear missiles (INF). At the same time, Europeans tend to support a nuclear freeze by the superpowers.

End Summary

### West European Opposition to INF Deployment Increases

There has been no change in countries where opposition to INF stationing had previously prevailed. However, opposition now prevails or nearly prevails in countries in which views were previously divided or where support predominated:

- o Britain: In April, the British favored INF deployment with a clear plurality (50% favor; 37% oppose). Today, the public is about evenly divided, with a slight tendency toward opposition (41% favor; 47% oppose).
- o France and Germany: In April, these publics were divided at roughly the 40-percent level. Today, opposition prevails (40%-to-30% in France and 43%-to-32% in Germany). In both countries, the number of people not giving an opinion is high, so the findings are not conclusive.
- o Italy, Netherlands and Belgium: Opposition to INF continues to predominate. The margin of opposition vs. support is greatest in Belgium (61%-to-30%), and about the same in Italy (53%-to-38%) and The Netherlands (49%-to-33%).

In sum, when asked their views on in-country INF stationing to counter the Soviet "SS-20s aimed at Western Europe," Europeans are more likely to oppose (40%-60% range) than to favor (30%-40% range) deployment even when told that "NATO has no such missiles."



96

INF Opposition Declines when Linked to Arms Talks

As found in previous surveys, public opposition to INF generally tends to fall off somewhat and support to increase when the question links INF acceptance to arms reduction talks.

As seen above, opposition clearly or nearly prevails in all survey countries. However, when people are offered choices that include making INF deployment contingent on arms negotiations with the Soviets, there are only two countries (Belgium and The Netherlands) with more people arrayed against INF deployment -- Table 1.

TABLE 1

SUPPORT/OPPOSITION FOR INF DEPLOYMENT

	<u>Britain</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>	<u>Belgium</u>
Unconditional Opposition.....	38%	35%	33%	45%	44%	46%
Conditional Acceptance.....	41	33	46	41	35	37
Unconditional Acceptance.....	14	6	7	9	8	7

Unconditional opposition is the group opposed to INF under any conditions. Unconditional acceptance is the group supporting INF regardless of current arms control talks.

Conditional acceptance comprises two groups of people who "would accept" INF deployment only if arms talks fail or if talks are on-going. These two groups differ somewhat, but are combined here as "conditional accepters."

- o West Germany: When INF is linked to talks, West Germans are more likely to support than oppose deployment. About half (46%) "would accept" INF only if talks fail or if talks are carried on simultaneously. An additional small group "would accept" INF regardless of negotiations. Altogether, 53 percent would accept INF with or without negotiations as a condition.
- o Britain, France, and Italy: When INF is linked to talks, these publics are more or less split on whether they "would accept" deployment. Roughly two-fifths in all three coun-

tries remain opposed to INF and a comparable group "would accept" if linked to negotiations. When the unconditional accepters are added, a majority (55%) in the U.K. would favor deployment.

- o Belgium and The Netherlands: People here remain more likely to oppose INF even if linked to negotiations. When those who "would accept" INF regardless of talks are added to the conditional accepters, then public opinion is about evenly divided (at the 45% level) in both countries.

On balance, there is a 5- to 10-point fall off in opposition and a 5- to 10-point increase in support when INF deployment is linked to arms talks. The result is that public opinion is more likely to be divided than to oppose INF when the element of negotiation is introduced.

However, the pattern of divided opinion is itself a bit of a change. Previously, with the condition of arms negotiations, the British, Germans, French, and Belgians were more likely than not to say they "would accept" INF. Today, the latter two are divided in their views. As before, Italian and Dutch opinion remains divided.

As seen in the chart on the next page, only modest changes in opinion have occurred since April in the four major countries. In terms of longer-term trends, however, it appears that the April survey in the U.K., as the Falklands war was intensifying, turned up an unusually high level of support for INF deployment. In the aftermath of that conflict, INF support is again on the wane.

#### No Real Change in Views on INF as Deterrent

Despite a somewhat lower level of INF support, the prevailing view in all countries remains that INF would help "prevent a Soviet attack on Western Europe."

Everywhere but in France -- where an unusually high number did not offer an opinion -- there has been no real change since April in those seeing INF deployment as a deterrent (40%-50% range). And about as many as before say that INF "makes an attack on Western Europe more likely" (30%-40% range).





#### Support for Arms Freeze, but Not Much Confidence in Pledges

Majorities or near-majorities in four countries believe that the threat of nuclear war will be reduced if the U.S. and USSR both "freeze their nuclear forces at existing levels."



PUBLIC OPINION ON  
INF DEPLOYMENT IN 1981-82

92



TIME OF SURVEY

Agreement that the risk of war would be lessened prevails everywhere (48% in Britain to 65% in Italy) except in France, where as many people -- possibly mindful of their nation's independent nuclear force -- offer no opinion (42%) as agree that the war risk would be reduced (41%).

In all countries, roughly one-fifth (but 27% in Britain) think that the freeze will increase the risk of war, because it "would leave the Soviet Union superior to the U.S."

In other questions, the U.S. and USSR were contrasted on whether they would honor their pledges on the use of nuclear weapons:

- o U.S. Pledge: West Europeans were asked "how much confidence" they had in President Reagan's pledge "not to use nuclear weapons in Europe except in response to a Soviet attack." Only in Britain does a majority (56%-to-39%) express at least a fair amount of confidence in the U.S. pledge. These figures are just about the opposite in France and The Netherlands, where about half express little or no confidence. Opinion is evenly divided in West Germany (40%-level) and Italy (50%-level).
- o USSR Pledge: Asked about the Soviet pledge that "the USSR would never be the first to use nuclear weapons," Europeans by margins of two- and three-to-one express little or no confidence that the Soviet's would honor that pledge. About two-thirds (61% to 67%) in all countries are negative, while much smaller groups (23% to 35%) are positive.

People were then asked about the likely effectiveness of a U.S. pledge "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons -- even if Soviet troops attacked Western Europe."

The level of uncertainty -- even among the better-educated -- is so high in all countries that no conclusion can be drawn. Except in Italy (71%), only about half the people in all countries express an opinion or think that the no-first-use pledge makes any difference.

Of those thinking the pledge might influence Soviet behavior, more in Britain, France, Italy, and The Netherlands say that the U.S. pledge "would increase" the likelihood of "Soviet troops overrunning Western Europe." The Germans are evenly divided on the deterrent effect of the pledge.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

*File 142794  
Shaping Bureaucracy  
J. P. ...  
Att. Indee*

August 9, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy  
FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*  
SUBJECT: 8/5 meeting and 8/12 Agenda

It was agreed at the outset of 8/5 meeting that coordinated action will be needed in several areas this fall to try to get onto higher ground with European public opinion.

It was also emphasized, per the NSC memo of 8/2, that the pipeline issue should be presented in the context of the Administration's Polish sanctions and that the four points in the NSC memo should be followed. In discussing the Polish internal situation, the importance of adhering to the NATO-approved guidance was pointed out, as we wish to keep the West together behind a firm public line.

It was agreed that we need to continue to pay close attention to the European anti-nuclear movement. In particular, we should get what mileage we can out of GDR refusal of an entry visa for the leader of the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council (Faber) and we should be alert to what may be the beginning of a pattern of GDR expulsion of East German peace activists.

ACDA indicated that it is working on the following documents for public use:

- a glossy publication summarizing (overview) US arms control positions and the rationale behind them, to be ready by mid-Fall;
- a publication (now in first draft) along the general lines of "In Search of Peace", which will place more emphasis on contemporary issues;
- a possible publication on verification (feasibility is being examined); and
- a possible response to pastoral letter of US Bishops, which now reportedly will be delayed until Spring.

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NLRR M443/5 #142794  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 1/5/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/RPM - Halgus reported on the distribution and impact of NATO's "Force Comparison Paper." While the quality of distribution varied with each Allied country, the paper's overall impact was favorable. There was good, straightforward coverage in the US and European press; translations have been or soon will be released in almost every NATO language; most Allied governments ensured effective dissemination to the media, academics and defense experts for ongoing use as a reference document; and in some cases (most notably Norway and the Netherlands) Allied governments made widespread distribution to libraries, schools and the public. Col. Halgus agreed to prepare a final report on the publication's impact for submission to NATO's CICR Committee. With ICA, we will also look into distribution in non-NATO capitals, particularly in Europe.

ICA/PGM - Lowenkron presented a brief overview of planned speakers and conferences for the Fall focusing on key issues such as East/West relations, arms control, NATO, CBW, Afghanistan and economic questions (E/W trade, GATT, steel, the Soviet pipeline, agriculture, etc.) He also noted the availability of ICA satellite programs (telepress conferences and video-dialogues). ICA/EU - Henze reported on the US tours being arranged for key Western European reporters in Moscow, and for leading Western European defense and economic journalists. ICA will prepare and distribute a list of major Fall programs in Europe, particularly those where senior USG participation would be beneficial.

P - Lowenfeld reported on the special political conferences scheduled for the Fall, including the Conference on Free Elections (Nov. 4-6). Since PA was not represented at the meeting, its presentation of domestic programs will be rescheduled for 8/12 (PA/OAP - Pernick).

Agenda for 8/12

1. US Public Opinion on Nuclear Issues (PA/OAP - Richman)
2. Domestic Publications Distribution (PA/OAP - Roshco)
3. PA Programs for the Fall (PA/OAP - Pernick)

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2

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4. Follow-up on Political Conferences (P - Lowenfeld)
5. Follow-up on Distribution of NATO's "Force Comparison Paper (EUR/RPM - Halgus)
6. Follow-up on ACDA Publications (ACDA/PA)
7. ICA List of Fall Programs (ICA/PGM - Lowenkron)
8. Arms Control Briefings for US Religious Leaders (HA - Simon and ACDA/PA)
9. Vietnamese Workers in USSR (EUR/P - Clear)

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY                      NARA, DATE                      DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FILE:  
SHAMNIN  
ATTITUDE

August 4, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy  
FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*  
SUBJECT: 7/29 Meeting and 8/5 Agenda

ICA/REU-Shaffer opened the meeting with highlights of ICA's recent report on European public attitudes toward key security issues. Most noteworthy findings were that:

- Europe is not anti-American, anti-NATO, pacifist or neutral, but its confidence in America's ability to conduct foreign policy has generally declined.
- Western European publics do not perceive the Soviets as a major threat to their security, and want detente and E/W trade (Note: Europeans are willing to continue trade as long as it "does not subsidize the Soviet economy." They do not believe that hard currency gained by the Soviets in E/W trade is used to strengthen the Soviet military.)
- Lack of secure energy supplies is considered the biggest threat to Europe's security.
- Europeans believe that both the Soviets and US seek military superiority, and see the Soviets as stronger militarily.
- There is little awareness that the INF and START arms control negotiations are in progress. Among those aware, there is great skepticism about their chances for success.

ICA/MGT-Fitz gave a brief description of ICA's distribution network, noting that key decisions re distribution of a publication are made by individual ICA posts. As a result of our discussion, ICA is going to examine their distribution and look for ways to provide posts with more prior guidance on content of publications and target audiences. A similar examination will be made, working with PA, of the Department's public distribution objectives.

Agenda for 8/5

EUR/RPM-Halgus will report on distribution and impact of NATO's "Force Comparison Paper," and we will discuss how to handle the Soviet rebuttal. ICA/PGM-Lowenkron and PA/OAP-Pernick will present plans for key speakers, media and public affairs programs in the fall, and P-Hecklinger will discuss the Department's plans for special political conferences. EUR/RPE-Gadsden will report on progress being made in developing a short speakers package on US-European economic issues.

If time permits, group also should focus on report from Moscow (Moscow 9133) on renewed Soviet "peace" campaign.

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98

Attachment:  
Foreign Travel - US Officials As of 7/28

0462A

COUNTRY TO BE VISTED & DATE	TRAVELER	PURPOSE
<u>AUSTRIA</u>		
Vienna (Aug. 7-12)	Charles Z. Wick (ICA)	UNISPACE '82
Vienna (Aug. 28-30)	Theodore R. Britton, Jr. (State)	Accompany Sec. HUD on urban planning
Vienna (Sept. 11-25)	Nunzio J. Palladino, NRC	Atomic Energy Agency Gen. conf. International Conf. on Nuclear power
Salzburg (Oct. 17-21)	Donald J. Devine, (OPM)	International Personnel Management Association
<u>BENELUX</u>		
Brussels, Belgium (Aug. 27-Sept. 11)	Michael J. Fenello (FAA)	Visit FAA offices & meet key aviation officials
The Netherlands (Sept. 11-25)	Nunzio J. Palladino, (NRC)	Sign renewal of NRC-Dutch NMSA Arrangement for exchange of Reactor Safety Information
<u>CANADA</u>		
Ottawa (Aug. 8-10)	Dominick L. DiCarlo (State)	Drug control initiatives
Halifax, Nova Scotia (Aug. 1-5)	Dr. John V. Byrne (Commerce)	Joint Oceanographic Assembly
<u>FRANCE</u>		
Paris (Aug. 27-Sept. 11)	Michael J. Fenello (FAA)	Visit FAA offices & meet aviation officials
Paris (Sept. 11-25)	Nunzio J. Palladino, (NRC)	Meet govt. nuclear officials
Paris (Sept. 26-Oct. 2)	Dr. Stanley I. Weiss (NASA)	Congress of International Astronautical Federation
<u>FRG</u>		
Frankfurt (Aug. 27-Sept. 11)	Michael J. Fenello (FAA)	Visit FAA offices & meet govt. officials



PROPOSED

FOREIGN TRAVEL - U.S. OFFICIALS

CURRENT AS OF JULY 28, 1982

COUNTRY TO BE VISITED &amp; DATE

TRAVELER

PURPOSE

ITALY

Miland &amp; Rome (Aug. 27-Sept. 11)

Michael J. Fenello (FAA)

Visit FAA offices &amp; meet govt. officials

SCANDINAVIAHelsinki, Copenhagen, Stockholm  
Oslo (July 30-Aug. 5)

Gregory J. Newell (State)

Discuss UNGA issues

Stockholm, Oslo, (Sept. 25-Oct. 7)

Richard D. DeLauer (Defense)

To meet armament directors & NA  
Four Power Armament ConferenceUNITED KINGDOM

Dublin, Ireland (July 30)

Gregory J. Newell (State)

UNGA discussions

London (Aug. 27-Sept. 11)

Michael J. Fenello (FAA)

Farnborough Air Show & Forum at  
Financial Times

London (Sept. 11-25)

Nunzio J. Palladino (NRC)

International Atomic Energy Agency  
Gen. Conference & meet govt.  
nuclear officials



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 26, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Interagency Group on European Public Diplomacy  
FROM: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*  
SUBJECT: 7/22 Meeting and 7/29 Agenda

Most of the meeting focused on a proposed ACDA publication chronicling US and Soviet approaches to arms control negotiations, initiatives and verification. The audience for the booklet would be both US and European publics. ICA will look into translation possibilities. One objective would be to use the publication to explain the realities and difficulties of verification. Hopefully, it could be published and distributed by mid-September, and have some impact on the nuclear freeze debate. (A coming ACDA publication by William Lewis also was briefly mentioned.)

There was agreement on the need to ensure effective distribution of this and other publications. A small sub-group was set up to look into how our publications are currently distributed and what was needed (particularly on the domestic side) to improve distribution. The group will include ICA-Hengsen, EUR/P-Moore, PA/OAP-Kane/Gregory and ACDA/PA-Waters. [RPM-Halgus has begun to receive responses to his request for information on the NATO "Force Comparison Paper" distribution and impact.]

Following up on Scott Thompson's presentation at last week's meeting, the group agreed to examine a Fall public affairs program for Europe and America. PA/PP-Colbert and ICA-Eisenstadt agreed to provide information in the next 1 or 2 weeks on projected European speaking and media programming focused in particular on security and economic issues. (This would consist of scheduled speaking appearances and media engagements for Administration officials, open platforms or invitations we should try to fill, conferences, seminars and tours.) After the group has had an opportunity to look at the information, we can try to help fill openings, propose additional programming and suggest themes and locale for major speeches or media appearances -- particularly for the President, Vice President, and the Secretary or other senior officials.

Since US-European economic problems are now increasingly linked in public perception of our overall relations, EUR/RPE-Gadsden agreed to put together a short speakers package on US-European economic issues.

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DECLASSIFIED  
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
BY *CU* NARA DATE *9/5/12*



184

Agenda for 7/29

1. Follow-up on ICA's Fall Initiative (Speaking & Media Engagements for Fall: ICA-Eisenstadt & PA/PP-Colbert)
2. Publications Distribution (ICA-Hengsen & State-Gregory/Kane)
3. Economic Speakers Package (EUR/RPE-Gadsden)
4. ICA Report on European Attitudes Re Security Issues (ICA/REU-Shaffer)

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