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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

May 6, 1982

To: Members of Interagency Group on European Public  
Diplomacy

From: EUR/P - Steven E. Steiner *SES*

Subject: Actions Agreed; Agenda for May 13

At May 6 meeting, following actions were discussed and agreed:

-- NATO Force Comparison Study: DOD delivering all copies to State and others May 6. EUR/P to go over US distribution list with PA. EUR/P and H to work with DOD/LA (Jerry Kennedy) to insure full distribution on Hill. EUR/P to work with Atlantic Council to insure most effective distribution to key private groups and individuals.

On question of inconsistency between NATO study and other materials USG has produced, PM will draw upon NATO graphics for the more sophisticated paper on the nuclear freeze issue which it is now drafting. It was noted that, other than the 6-1 vis a vis 4-1 issue in INF ratios, the press has not picked up ~~to date~~ any discrepancies.

-- Nuclear Issues: PM reported that materials for speakers' packet are now largely ready. Also, fact sheets are being done for White House, with one page unclassified briefing sheets on key nuclear arms and arms control issues. It is expected that White House will distribute these interagency as a compendium.

ICA reported that it is producing a pamphlet describing US arms control initiatives from an historical perspective. This will be a follow up to the US arms control chronology which ICA has already completed. It was stressed by State (EUR, PM, PA) that it is necessary for this project to be coordinated with both the Historical Office of State and ACDA/PA, as both are working on similar efforts. It was also emphasized that it is essential that at least part of this effort be produced as a State or ACDA publication, since most critical and urgent public affairs needs in this area are in the US itself. ICA, State and ACDA to coordinate this.

-- Poland: Further effort to be made to get updated numbers and names of prisoners (HA and EUR/P). ICA is putting together up-to-date films portraying Polish situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1987  
BY (4)  
MARA DATE 6/15/10

- World Peace Congress: HA to sent INR's publication on religion in the USSR to Americans who are going to the Congress. This is to be coordinated with EUR and PM so that selected papers on arms control issues can also be included.
- Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan: HA to submit its draft on public affairs activities to the NEA Afghanistan Focus Committee.
- Official Visitors/Speakers in Europe: ICA agreed to match the information in the NSC list with its own information on opportunities for public appearances in Europe, based on requests from posts and other sources. ICA will then recommend to State and NSC matching selected speakers with these opportunities. Once State and NSC have concurred, a check will be made with posts and with individuals themselves.  
  
At ICA request, State (EUR/P) will provide list of those traveling to Europe with the Secretary. ICA will check this against speaking opportunities in Europe and make recommendations to State concerning the possibility of some of these officials making appearances after the Secretary has completed his visits.
- Marshall Plan Anniversary Activities: ICA and State (EUR/P) are developing video dialogue for participation by the Secretary of State and prominent private Americans.
- Crime and Punishment in USSR: HA has completed work on the draft and submitted to SOV to review concerning whether and how to publish.

Agenda for 5/13 Meeting:

1. Force Comparison Paper -- any further follow-up?
2. Poland -- further actions to keep issue in forefront.
3. Vietnamese Labor in USSR -- [new information (EUR/P)]
4. Official Visitors to Europe -- further development of system to "marry" NSC list with opportunities and with speakers' packets (NSC, ICA and EUR/P).
5. US Arms Control Initiatives -- status report on coordination among ICA, ACDA and PA/HO.
6. Nuclear Issues (PM/SNP).
7. Soviet Record in Third World -- any further materials?
8. Status of:
  - Crime and Punishment (EUR/SOV)
  - World Peace Congress (EUR/SOV)
  - Marshall Plan Activities (EUR/P and ICA/EU)



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BY CU NARA, DATE 8/31/12

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**International  
Communication  
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director



MAY 12 1982

7

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *cmw*  
Director

SUBJECT: West European Public Opinion on  
Security Issues Before the NATO Summit

I thought you might be interested in the attached results of late-April USICA public opinion surveys in Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy. The surveys, done for the President's trip to Europe, show:

- o Support for INF deployment linked to arms talks has increased and now prevails in Britain, France, and West Germany. Such conditional support is back to the same levels as before last fall's anti-nuclear demonstrations.
- o When INF is not linked to negotiations, support prevails only in the U.K. Opposition prevails in Italy and opinion is divided in France and Germany.
- o The belief that INF strengthens Western deterrence is growing and predominates in all four countries.
- o President Reagan's zero-option proposal is widely preferred to the Brezhnev freeze plan.
- o Few favor NATO's first use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, overall opposition to NATO's use of nuclear weapons has declined markedly in recent months.
- o The U.S. is not seen as superior to the Soviets in nuclear strength. Two to three times more see the Soviets as ahead as see the U.S. ahead.
- o West Europeans have little stomach for increasing defense spending. Still, they widely favor NATO membership.



# Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America  
Washington, D. C. 20547



USICA

Office of Research

May 7, 1982

## SUPPORT INCREASES FOR INF LINKED TO ARMS TALKS, BUT FEW FAVOR NUCLEAR FIRST USE

This is a report of USICA public opinion surveys in mid- and late April by the Gallup affiliates in Britain, Germany, and Italy, and by Demoscopie in France. About 1000 adults were interviewed in each country. Interviews in Britain were conducted while the British fleet was en route to the Falkland Islands.

### Summary

West Europeans are divided over INF deployment. However, support generally prevails when stationing is linked to arms talks. In fact, conditional support for INF is back to about the same level as before the anti-nuclear demonstrations last fall. Moreover, the perception is growing that INF will strengthen Western deterrence. Relatively few, however, favor NATO's first use of nuclear weapons in Europe. At the same time, pro-NATO sentiment is widespread and increasing.

### End Summary

### When INF Linked to Talks, Support Prevails

When told of Soviet dominance in European INF missiles, West European publics are divided over INF stationing. Support prevails in Britain (50%-to-37%), while opposition prevails in Italy (41%-to-52%). Opinion is closely split in France (45%-to-40%) and West Germany (38%-to-39%). In the case of the FRG, this is a significant shift since January when opposition outweighed approval by 41-to-32 percent.

However, except in Italy, support for INF stationing when linked to arms talks has widened, apparently reversing declines registered in the wake of last fall's anti-nuclear demonstrations.

More specifically, the proportion favoring INF stationing if arms talks fail or if they are underway at the same time remains the same in Italy (40%), but has increased by nearly ten percent since February to the prevailing view in Britain (53%), France (44%), and West Germany (49%). Conditional supporters now equal or surpass their numbers of last summer. A handful (8% to 12%) in all countries favor INF regardless of arms talks. (See attached chart)

Taken together, conditional and unconditional supporters of INF deployment now constitute majorities in Britain (65%), France (56%), and West Germany (58%).

As the chart shows, unconditional opposition likewise has declined. It stands at about 30 percent in Britain, France, and West Germany, but higher (44%) in Italy. This is a drop of about ten percent in Britain and West Germany, and somewhat less in Italy, since last fall and winter. The decline in opposition leaves Italian opinion closely divided between opposition (44%) and support (48%).

While public views on INF have changed in recent months, there continues to be extensive public unawareness or misinformation about the Soviet monopoly of European INF missiles. While three-quarters or more in all four countries are aware of missiles such as the SS-20 on Soviet soil, about the same number don't know or think NATO has offsetting INF missile capabilities. These figures are substantially unchanged since last summer.

#### View That INF Strengthens Deterrence Fairly Widespread

Steady or increasing public support for INF may reflect the growing perception that INF will strengthen deterrence. Majorities in Britain (56%-to-22%) and France (55%-to-27%) and pluralities in West Germany (47%-to-21%) and Italy (48%-to-33%) think that deploying INF missiles in Europe will help prevent a Soviet attack rather than make one more likely.

In the last six months, the view that INF enhances Western deterrence has grown by about ten percent in the UK, France, and Germany.

At the same time, though, West Europeans tend to see little if any likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe in the next five years. Clear majorities (of 60% to 80%) say an attack is unlikely. And, except in France, not more than one-in-five believes the contrary. In France this figure is 29 percent--double what it was last July.

#### Reagan Proposal Widely Favored Over Brezhnev Plan

Of the public INF arms talks proposals made by both sides, wide majorities in each of the four countries prefer President Reagan's zero-option proposal to the Brezhnev freeze

plan as "more likely to prevent war." At most only one-in-five favors the Kremlin's proposal to freeze INF missiles in European Russia in return for NATO cancelling its plans to deploy U.S. INF.

On credibility too, Mr. Reagan's proposal comes out on top. Majorities in West Germany (58%) and Italy (56%) and pluralities (of about 50%) in Britain and France believe the President's proposal is "a sincere effort to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe." In sharp contrast, Brezhnev's plan is disbelieved by as many or more.

Relatively few West Europeans are confident that INF talks will succeed in the next two years. February surveys showed that pessimism about the success of the talks prevailed in every country except Italy.

#### Relatively Few Favor First Use of Nuclear Weapons

Despite the general belief that INF missiles will help to deter Soviet aggression, most West Europeans oppose NATO's first use of nuclear weapons. Except in the UK, where there is less opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, no more than one-fifth or fewer favor NATO using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Soviet attack that "threatened to overwhelm NATO forces." Another one-third approves only if the Soviets use them first. And roughly one-third rejects any use of nuclear weapons by NATO.

The level of overall opposition has declined markedly in recent months (except in France) and now stands about where it did last summer. Striking reversals of public opinion occurred in Germany and Italy:

- o German opinion went from a plurality (48%-to-42%) opposed to NATO's use of nuclear weapons in January to a majority (55%-to-34%) in support in April.
- o Italian opinion similarly reversed from a majority (55%-to-41%) opposed last October to a nearly similar-sized majority (56%-to-39%) in favor.

#### Few Believe U.S. Has Nuclear Superiority over the USSR

At the same time that West Europeans generally oppose first use, the belief is widespread that the U.S. is no longer superior to the Soviet Union in nuclear strength. By narrow margins, pluralities in France and Italy perceive the U.S.

and USSR as about equal. German opinion splits between parity (38%) and Soviet superiority (35%).

In general, from one-tenth to one-fifth in each of these countries see the U.S. as ahead. Two to three times this many (about a third) see the Soviets as ahead.

The picture five years hence is equally gloomy for the West. No more believe the U.S. will be ahead in five years than believe it to be ahead today. Similarly, about the same number that see a nuclear balance today also see this in five years. However, the proportions seeing the Soviets ahead in five years are about ten percent less than those seeing the Soviets ahead today.

#### No Diminution in Confidence in U.S. Defense Pledge

Despite these views on the superpower nuclear balance, there is, except in Britain, continuing confidence in the U.S. pledge to defend Western Europe "even if this would risk the destruction of U.S. cities." This view prevails in France (56%-to-37%), Italy (56%-to-39%), and West Germany (52%-to-37%).

British results probably are influenced by the Falklands situation. Interviews done before the U.S. sided with Britain show British opinion split on the confidence issue (49%-to-47%). Last summer, confidence was the view of a 56-to-37 percent majority.

#### Increased Defense Spending Widely Unpopular

Although West European publics tend at best only to see the U.S. as Russia's military equal and would hesitate to endorse use of nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional attack, they are reluctant to increase their countries' defense budgets.

Except in Britain, no more than 16 percent favor increasing defense expenditures:

- o The prevailing view in France (55%) and in West Germany (43%) is to hold defense spending at present levels.
- o Over a quarter in West Germany favor a cut in defense spending--double the number in January. A quarter in France also prefer less defense spending. This is the prevailing view (of 46%) in economically-troubled Italy.

Interviewed while their fleet was en route to the Falklands, the British showed the highest level of support for increasing defense spending (44%), with only a few (16%) favoring a decrease. About a third (36%) support no change.

Purely economic considerations do not seem to be at the heart of opposition to increases in defense spending. Except in France, nearly half of those who oppose an increase said they still would be opposed even if more defense spending meant more jobs. Between a quarter and a third, however, would support more spending under these conditions. In France, the opposite holds, with half changing their minds and favoring more defense spending if it means more jobs.

#### Pro-NATO Sentiment Broadens

While there are mixed views on such NATO initiatives as INF and defense spending, the preference for NATO (in France, the Atlantic Alliance) over neutralism is widespread and growing. Everywhere, large majorities--ranging from 59 percent in Italy to 73 percent in Britain--want to stay in the Alliance rather than leave and become neutral.





Pro-Alliance sentiments have increased appreciably since February in Britain and France, and since last July in Italy (when opinion was divided on this issue).

Neutralist views are most widespread in Italy (34%) and France (29%), with one-in-five voicing this preference in Britain and the FRG.

Prepared by:  
Stephen M. Shaffer (PGM/REU)  
724-9140

R-5/7/82

PUBLIC OPINION ON  
INF DEPLOYMENT IN 1981-82





May 7, 1982

14

**PUBLIC OPINION IN THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ON  
VERSAILLES SUMMIT ISSUES**

In mid-April, USICA commissioned national opinion surveys in the six countries participating in the Versailles Summit. Key findings follow:

**MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES**

**Issue: Economic Policy Coordination**

**Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies**

- o Pessimism is pervasive in all participant countries about the current economic situation and for the year ahead.
- o Except in Japan, unemployment is considered the most serious economic problem, by far.
- o There is a widespread preference to combat unemployment -- even at the cost of continuing inflation -- over risking a higher jobless rate by attacking inflation.
- o High unemployment is more widely blamed on domestic policies than on policies and actions from abroad.
- o Publics everywhere see Japan following economic policies harmful to their domestic economies. The Canadians, French, and Japanese also tend to feel this way about the U.S.
- o Only in Italy is the U.S. perceived as the world's strongest economic power. Elsewhere, Japan is accorded first place.

\* \* \* \* \*

Everywhere, very large majorities -- ranging from 67 percent in Japan to 81 percent in Italy -- consider their economy to be in poor health. Since last year, pessimism has spread in France and West Germany. In Canada and Japan, where optimism prevailed in 1981, the number of pessimists has doubled.

Nor does the outlook for the year ahead appear promising to these publics. This is particularly the case in the strongest economies, West Germany and Japan, where no more than about one in ten expects things to improve. Somewhat more have hopeful expectations in France, Italy, and in the U.K., but these too comprise only 25-to-30 percent of the population.

Everywhere, except in Japan, unemployment is seen as the most serious economic problem. Inflation follows well behind. In Japan, inflation and energy are perceived as the key problems in about equal measure. But an appreciable proportion (35%) name "foreign barriers against our exports" in that context.

Given the overriding concern about joblessness, West Europeans and Canadians -- by ratios between two- and three-to-one -- advocate government actions to increase employment, even at the cost of continued inflation. Only minorities are willing to accept more unemployment as the price for deflationary policies. In low-unemployment, low-inflation rate Japan, public opinion splits on these alternatives.

Views are more mixed about the causes of unemployment. In Italy (73%), Canada (56%), Japan (52%), and the U.K. (46%), domestic policies are principally blamed for unemployment. In France and the FRG, pluralities (43% each) attribute an equal amount of blame to domestic developments and "to the policies of other countries." Across the board, though, only small minorities specifically blame external sources for domestic joblessness. Among those relatively few who do, the U.S. is generally named most often.

In a wider context, pluralities in France (48%), Canada (47%), and Japan (40%) feel that U.S. economic policies and actions have been "more harmful" than "helpful" to their domestic economy. In the U.K., the FRG, and Italy, no consensus emerges on this score.

A consensus does exist on the effect of Japanese policies on their country's economy. Majorities in Britain (62%) and France (59%), and substantial pluralities elsewhere, perceive Japanese actions as harmful. The Japanese, for their part, are mostly uncertain and divided about the effects of EEC actions on Japan's economy.

The negative views of Japan's economic policies exist alongside a perception of Japan as the world's strongest economic power. Everywhere, except in Italy, Japan ranks ahead of the U.S. A year ago, Japan ranked first only in the U.K. The Japanese, on the other hand, see the U.S. first by a substantial margin over their own country.



Issue: Exchange Rate Policy

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Outside West Germany and Britain, the strong dollar is generally considered a bad thing for domestic economic conditions.
- o British and Canadian opinion excepted, publics tend to blame the U.S. for deliberately keeping the dollar strong.

\* \* \* \* \*

Public awareness of the dollar's current strength is widespread in all countries, but especially in France, Italy, and Canada, where the dollar has risen to record highs.

In the U.K. and in the FRG, the public does not perceive the strong dollar as harmful to their own economy. Elsewhere, however, particularly in France and Italy, the dollar's strength tends to be seen as a bad rather than a good thing.

The picture is more mixed on whether the dollar rate is the result of deliberate U.S. policy or is caused by circumstances beyond U.S. government control. In France, West Germany, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, Japan, more subscribe to the former view; in Britain and Canada the other position prevails.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Issue: NTB's, etc.

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Free trade principles are widely endorsed, except in Japan. There, almost as many people embrace protectionist sentiments.
- o In France, and to a lesser extent in Canada and Japan, U.S. policies tend to be perceived as hindering their exports. This impression does not prevail in the other countries.
- o Only the West German public does not see foreign imports as primarily harmful. Elsewhere there is wide agreement that imports tend to cause unemployment rather than reduce prices.

\* \* \* \* \*

The principle of fewer restrictions on trade is endorsed by wide margins over protectionist measures in Western Europe and by a lesser margin in Japan. Canadians divide evenly on whether to support or oppose restrictions on trade.

Majorities everywhere, except in Japan, perceive their country adhering to a free trade policy rather than to protectionist practices. In Japan, a large plurality (50-to-32%) see Japan as protectionist.

Perceptions of U.S. trade practices toward their country's exports are mixed and in some cases vague. The French alone have a clearly predominant perception that U.S. policies hinder rather than help efforts to sell French goods in the U.S. In Canada and Japan, this feeling prevails by narrower margins. Elsewhere opinion is very much divided.

Much less uncertainty exists with respect to Japan's trade policies. Majorities everywhere, except in Canada, perceive Japan as putting up barriers against their exports. And, Canadians, too, share this view, but to a somewhat lesser extent.

As to the actual effects of foreign imports, there is wide agreement in four countries that they produce unemployment rather than reduce prices. This view also prevails by a narrow margin among the Japanese, but the more export-dependent Germans are more or less divided on this score.

Issue: U.S.-Japan Trade Issues

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policy

- o The Japanese public mainly sees the problems of the U.S. auto industry as self-inflicted.
- o Opinion is divided over the reasonableness of U.S. demands for market access, but there is substantial willingness to take steps to improve trade relations.
- o Although believing that freer trade in agriculture would lower food costs, Japanese public opinion tends to support limits on imports that might harm Japanese farmers.

\* \* \* \* \*

In March, a majority (59%) saw the auto issue problem caused by the U.S. auto industry itself rather than by increasing Japanese auto exports (27%).

In mid-April, opinion split evenly between those who think that strong U.S. requests for Japan to "open its markets more" to U.S. agricultural and industrial products are mainly reasonable (46%) and those who see them as unreasonable (48%). Nonetheless, a majority (56-to-36%) favored "accepting" the U.S. position.

A majority (59%) also believe that freer trade in agricultural products would tend to lower food costs in Japan. Nevertheless, in March, the public favored (55-to-36%) limiting farm imports which "deal a blow to Japanese agriculture," and only slightly more (50%) thought Japan should "import more American agricultural products such as beef and oranges" than were opposed (41%).

#### EAST/WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

Issue: COCOM/Strategic Trade

##### Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policy

- o Poland notwithstanding, support prevails for continuing trade with the Soviet Union at present levels.
- o There is widespread public opposition to granting low interest loans and credits to the Soviet Union to promote trade.
- o Italy excepted, there is predominant approval for tight restrictions on technology sales to the Soviet Union.
- o Outside of Italy, a wide preference exists for coordinating Soviet trade policy with the U.S. over striking separate deals with the Soviet Union.

\* \* \* \* \*

In Western Europe and Japan, only small minorities believe their country's prosperity is dependent on trade with the Soviet Union. In Canada, the minority thinking this is an appreciable 39 percent.

Nonetheless, a majority (58%) in Italy and pluralities elsewhere feel the level of Soviet trade should not be affected by events in Poland. The widest support for decreasing trade because of Poland appears in the U.K. (39%) and in Canada (39%).

Despite the prevailing unwillingness to see Soviet trade reduced, public opinion in all countries favors restrictions on that trade. Majorities oppose special concessions, such as low interest loans and credits, to the Soviet Union in order to promote trade. This view is most pronounced in Britain (84%) and in Canada (79%), but French and German public opinion (both 66%) does not lag far behind.

Attitudes toward selling high technology to Moscow are somewhat less one-sided. Nonetheless, Italy aside, the predominant feeling is to put tight restrictions on such sales. Italian opinion is split. But a year ago, the prevailing view there -- as in France -- was to oppose such restrictions.

Overall, led by majorities in Canada (62%), Britain (60%), and Japan (57%), the publics in the industrial democracies prefer their country to coordinate its Soviet trade policy with the U.S. -- even at the cost of losing some trade -- to making the best possible separate deal and risk damage to U.S. relations. Again, Italian opinion is no better than evenly split, but, a year ago, Italians preferred going-it-alone to coordinating with the U.S.

Issue: Yamal Pipeline

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policy

- o West Europeans widely approve of the pipeline project.
- o Only minorities accept the argument that buying Soviet energy products will make them vulnerable to Soviet political pressure.

\* \* \* \* \*

Continental Europeans, by large margins, approve of their country's participation in the pipeline project. But most of those who do approve would change their mind if persuaded that Soviet hard-currency earnings from the pipeline would be used to build up Soviet military strength.

26

Prevailing support for the pipeline may in part reflect a fairly widespread disbelief that buying energy from the Soviet Union will make their country vulnerable to Soviet political pressure. Only minorities, on the order of about one third, consider this likely.

#### EAST/WEST POLITICAL ISSUES

Issue: INF (Preliminary to NATO Summit)

##### Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policy

- o West European public support for INF deployment is divided. But if linked to arms talks, there is a clear margin in favor of stationing.
- o Widespread preference exists for the President's zero-option proposal over the Brezhnev freeze plan.

\* \* \* \* \*

When informed of the Soviet missile monopoly in Europe, West Europeans are split on NATO INF deployment. The British approve 50-to-37 percent; in Italy, disapproval prevails by a corresponding margin (52-to-41%). French and German public opinion is closely divided. In the case of the FRG, however, this is a significant shift since January when opposition outweighed approval by 41-to-32 percent.

When linked to arms talks, support for INF deployment predominates decisively, except in Italy. Elsewhere, some three in ten remain unconditionally opposed to INF stationing. This represents appreciable decreases in opposition in the FRG and in the U.K. since last February. In Italy, die-hard opponents (44%) continue to equal supporters (48%).

The decline in unconditional opposition to INF deployment in West Germany and Britain may in part be related to a growing perception that NATO INF missiles would help prevent rather than increase the likelihood of a Soviet attack. Majorities in Britain (56-to-22%) and France (55-to-27%), as well as clear pluralities in West Germany (47-to-21%) and Italy (48-to-33%), subscribe to this view.

Even so, by decisive margins ranging from three-to-one in France to six-to-one in West Germany, West Europeans perceive President Reagan's zero-option proposal "as more likely to prevent war" than the Brezhnev freeze plan.

Similarly, President Reagan's credibility rates far higher than Brezhnev's. Pluralities in Britain (50-to-35%) and France (48-to-35%) and majorities in West Germany (58-to-20%) and Italy (56-to-28%) perceive the zero-option as a sincere effort to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe. In sharp contrast, majorities everywhere feel exactly the opposite about the Brezhnev "freeze."

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M-5/10/82

# Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America  
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

May 11, 1982

20

For Versailles Economic Summit.

## FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT ISSUES

This paper presents results of a USICA-commissioned survey on issues relevant to the Versailles Summit. Interviewing was conducted April 12 to 19 by Demoscopie, a reputable French research firm.

### MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES

Issue: Economic Policy Coordination

#### Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Pessimism is pervasive about the current economic situation and the near-term outlook.
- o Unemployment is seen as the most serious economic problem.
- o There is widespread backing for government measures to reduce unemployment even at the risk of continued inflation.
- o The belief prevails that external sources share the blame with domestic policies for high unemployment.
- o U.S. economic policies are widely perceived as harmful to France.

\* \* \* \* \*

A substantial majority (72%) of the French public diagnose their country's economic health as poor. And only one in four expects the situation to improve over the next year.

This pessimistic outlook is much more widespread than a year ago. Then, 54 percent considered the French economy to be in poor health, while nearly half (49%) had optimistic expectations for 1982.

Unemployment (78%) is most often seen as the most important economic problem facing France, well ahead of inflation (53%).

Consistent with this general perception, two-thirds (67%) of the French public want the government "to take steps" to reduce joblessness, even at the price of continued high inflation.

43

In fact, unemployment looms so large in the public mind that, even though defense spending increases are widely opposed, half the opponents would change their mind if such expenditures would produce more jobs.

As to causes of unemployment, a plurality (43%) think it is due to both domestic policies and the policies and actions of other countries. Among the minority (18%) who blame other countries exclusively, the U.S. and Japan are mentioned most often.

Some scapegoating is also widespread in a more general way. By a 48-to-11 percent margin, the French public considers U.S. economic policies and actions to have been more harmful than helpful to the French economy. And in the case of Japan, a solid majority (59%) feel that way.

Japan is today considered the world's strongest economic power by the French, well ahead of the United States (42-to-22%). This represents a dramatic change in perceptions from last year. In June 1981, 35 percent saw the U.S. number one; 30 percent accorded supremacy to Japan.

Issue: Exchange Rate Policy

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o The strong dollar is overwhelmingly believed to be harmful to France.
- o The prevailing perception is that the U.S. deliberately manipulates exchange rates.

\* \* \* \* \*

Nearly nine French in ten are aware of the current strength of the American dollar. And most (80%) consider a strong dollar bad for France.

Moreover, the prevailing view among the French public is that the strong American dollar results mainly from a deliberate U.S. government policy rather than from economic conditions beyond its control. A 49-to-34 percent plurality perceive this to be the case.



TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Issue: NTBS, etc.

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o U.S., but particularly Japanese, trade policies are widely perceived as hindering French exports.
- o The French public, while anti-protectionist in principle, widely sees foreign imports as causing unemployment.

\* \* \* \* \*

A 58-to-35 percent majority of the French public favor "free trade" over protectionism in principle. And a similar majority (61-to-29%) perceive French policy as supporting free trade.

At the same time, the French public, by a wide 69-to-12 percent margin, believe that foreign imports tend to increase unemployment rather than reduce prices.

However, in the context of the dominant problems of unemployment and inflation, the French public does not view foreign trade as a very serious problem. Only one in ten names foreign barriers against French exports as one of the most important problems facing France, and not many more (17%) mention the "influx" of foreign imports.

Consistent with the predominant view that U.S. economic policies are damaging to France, a clear majority (57-to-17%) see U.S. trade policies as hindering rather than helping French efforts to sell goods in the U.S. And, by a much larger margin (74-to-8%), the French public perceives Japanese trade policies the same way.

EAST/WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

Issue: COCOM/Strategic Trade

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Maintaining the current levels of trade with the Soviet Union is predominantly approved, events in Poland notwithstanding.
- o Wide opposition exists to low interest loans and credits to promote Soviet trade.

- o There is prevailing public sentiment for tight restrictions on selling high technology to the Soviet Union.
- o Coordinating Soviet trade policy with the U.S. is clearly preferred to risking harm to Franco-American relations.

\* \* \* \* \*

A large majority (67-to-22%) believe that French prosperity does not depend on Soviet trade. Nonetheless, 53 percent feel that the current volume of French-Soviet trade should not be affected by events in Poland. Only one-third favor reducing trade in light of Poland.

At the same time, the French public, by a three-to-one margin (66-to-20%), opposes special concessions, such as low interest loans and credits, to further trade with the Soviet Union.

And a plurality (48-to-37%) favor "tight restrictions" on selling highly advanced technology to Moscow. A year ago, the opposite view prevailed.

Finally, only one in five (19%) would be willing to risk harm to U.S.-French relations if that were the consequence of making the best possible trade deal with the Soviet Union. Twice as many (42%) prefer coordinating U.S.-French trade policies toward the Soviet Union, even at the price of reduced trade with Moscow.

Issue: Yamal Pipeline

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o There is fairly extensive support for construction of the pipeline.
- o Widespread disbelief that Soviet energy supplies will make France vulnerable to Soviet pressure accompanies this support.

\* \* \* \* \*

A 57-to-29 percent majority approve of West European help to the Soviet Union to build the Yamal pipeline. Most supporters (64%), however, would be against French participation if persuaded that the money earned by the Soviet Union would be used to build up its military arsenal.

In keeping with the prevailing support for the pipeline construction, only a minority (35%) think buying Soviet energy products is likely to make France vulnerable to Soviet political pressures. Nonetheless, this is a 14 percent increase from a year ago.

EAST/WEST POLITICAL ISSUES

Issue: INF/Arms Control (Preliminary to NATO Summit)

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Sentiment in favor of INF deployment barely outweighs opposition, but rises significantly when linked to arms control talks.
- o The U.S. zero-option proposal is much preferred to Brezhnev's freeze offer.

\* \* \* \* \*

When informed of the INF imbalance between NATO and the Soviet Union, the French public favors INF deployment in Western Europe by a narrow 45-to-40 percent margin. Linked to arms control talks, however, support rises to a majority level (56%).

Unconditional opposition to INF deployment has stabilized over the past year and now stands at 33 percent. But many in the French public, previously undecided on INF, now appear to favor deployment of the new missiles if arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union fail.

The increased support for INF may be based on the growing perception -- now held by a majority of the general public (55%) -- that having the new nuclear missiles in Western Europe helps to prevent a Soviet attack rather than making it more likely.

At the same time, a large majority of the French public also believe that President Reagan's zero-option proposal is more likely to prevent war than Brezhnev's plan for a nuclear freeze in Europe (66-to-22%). Moreover, a 48-to-35 percent plurality credit President Reagan with a sincere effort to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe. On the other hand, a majority (57-to-24%) do not believe in the sincerity of the Brezhnev plan.

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M-5/11/82-B



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For Versailles Economic Summit

ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT ISSUES

This paper presents findings of a USICA-commissioned national opinion survey on issues related to the Versailles Summit. DOXA, the Italian Gallup affiliate, conducted 995 interviews between April 13 and 29.

MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES

Issue: Economic Policy Coordination

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Public pessimism is pervasive about Italy's economic situation and the outlook for the year ahead.
- o Widespread preference is to put the emphasis on dealing with unemployment rather than with inflation.
- o The U.S. is not widely blamed for damaging the Italian economy. Most view domestic policies and developments to be the major cause of joblessness.

\* \* \* \* \*

As they did a year ago, Italians overwhelmingly (81%) say their country is in poor economic health. Moreover, only one-fourth predict the economy will improve over the next year; one-third expect things will get worse.

Unemployment (73%) and inflation (60%) are seen as Italy's most serious economic problems, dwarfing all others.

Facing both high inflation and unemployment rates, Italians, by a clear 60-to-25 margin, prefer to see government measures that decrease unemployment at the cost of continued inflation, rather than attempts to reduce inflation at the risk of more unemployment.

Most (73%) say that unemployment is due primarily to domestic developments and policies rather than to the actions and policies of other countries (8%).

Overall, opinion is divided on the effect of U.S. policies on the Italian economic situation. About as many think that U.S. policies are helpful to Italy's economic situation (37%) as think these policies have been harmful (34%).

By contrast, a clear plurality (42-to-8%) perceive Japanese policies as hurting Italy's economy.

Italians think that the U.S. (33%) and Japan (29%) are the strongest countries economically. A year ago, the U.S. clearly outranked Japan (41-to-19%).

Issue: Exchange Rate Policy

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o The strong dollar is predominantly seen as harmful to Italy and the result of deliberate U.S. policies.

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Not surprisingly given its recent all-time high against the Italian lira, Italians overwhelmingly (92%) view the dollar as a strong currency. Large majorities think this is a bad thing for Italy (74%) and attribute it mainly to deliberate U.S. policies (66%).

Issue: NTB's, etc.

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Free trade principles are widely supported over protectionism, but foreign imports are generally considered to have a harmful effect.
- o Italians are divided on the effects of U.S. trade policy on their economy; Japanese trade practices are generally viewed as harmful.

\* \* \* \* \*

Fewer restrictions on trade (69%) are clearly endorsed over protectionist behavior (21%). And apart from their personal preference, another large majority (73-to-13%) believe their government practices a free trade policy.

The general perception of U.S. trade policy is mixed. As many see the U.S. helping as believe it hinders Italian exports. By contrast, a clear 55-to-15 percent majority view Japanese trade policy as putting barriers in the way of Italy's efforts to sell goods in Japan.

As to foreign imports, Italians see primarily negative effects. A majority (58%) believe that foreign imports tend to cause unemployment rather than reduce prices. Only 20 percent say the opposite.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

Issue: COCOM/Strategic Trade

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Despite the imposition of martial law in Poland, a majority want to continue trade with the Soviet Union at existing levels.
- o Italians widely oppose granting low interest loans and credits to the Soviet Union to promote trade.
- o Opinion is split about restricting high technology sales to the Soviet Union.
- o The Italian public divides over whether it is best to coordinate Soviet trade policy with the U.S. or go it alone.

\* \* \* \* \*

About two-thirds (68%) say that their country's prosperity does not depend on trade with the Soviet Union. Only one in five says it does.

Nonetheless, a clear majority (58%) feel that existing levels of trade should not be affected by events in Poland. Some 25 percent think that trade should be reduced in light of martial law in Poland.

At the same time, Italians, by a 60-to-28 percent margin, believe that Italy should make no special concessions to Moscow, such as low interest loans and credits, in order to further trade.

As was the case last year, opinion is divided -- 46 percent opposing, 42 percent favoring -- over placing tight restrictions on selling highly advanced technology to the Soviet Union.

Italians are also divided over whether they should make the best deal with the Soviet Union even if it harms relations with the U.S. (41%), or should coordinate with the U.S. even if it means losing some Soviet trade (39%). Opinion has changed from a year ago, when a 45-to-35 percent plurality opted for making the best deal.

30

Issue: Yamal Pipeline

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Support prevails for building the Soviet gas pipeline.
- o But many would change their mind if hard currency from gas sales were to enhance Soviet military power.
- o There is only limited concern about the political effects of buying energy products and raw materials from the Soviets.

\* \* \* \* \*

About two-thirds (64-to-28%) approve of helping the Soviets to build the Yamal gas pipeline. But two-thirds of those favoring the pipeline say they would oppose help for the project "if this pipeline earns money for the Soviet Union that would be used to further build up Soviet military strength."

Current support for the pipeline project may partly reflect a prevailing lack of belief that buying energy products from the Soviets will make Italy more vulnerable to Soviet political pressures.

EAST/WEST POLITICAL ISSUES

Issue: INF (Preliminary to NATO Summit)

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Opposition prevails against INF deployment.
- o When deployment is linked to arms control talks, opinion on stationing is divided.
- o Italians clearly prefer the Reagan zero-option proposal to the Brezhnev freeze plan.

\* \* \* \* \*

Even when told of the Soviet monopoly in INF missiles, Italians, by a 52-to-41 percent margin, still oppose INF deployment on Italian soil.

When linked to arms talks, 44 percent remain unconditionally opposed to INF stationing in Italy. However, a like proportion (48%) would then accept deployment, particularly if arms control talks have failed.

Somewhat paradoxically, in light of their overall attitude on INF deployment, a plurality feel that INF deployment helps prevent (48%) rather than makes more likely (33%) a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

A large majority (75-to-20%) believe that President Reagan's zero-option proposal is "more likely to prevent war" than the Brezhnev freeze plan. And, considerably more see the U.S. proposal as genuine. A 56-to-28 percent majority view it as a "sincere effort to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe." In sharp contrast, Brezhnev's sincerity is doubted by a 56-to-22 percent majority.

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M-5/11/82-E





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For Versailles Economic Summit

BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT ISSUES

This paper presents results of a USICA-commissioned national opinion poll on issues relevant to the Versailles Summit. Interviewing was conducted April 14 to 19 by the British Gallup affiliate.

MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES

Issue: Economic Policy Coordination

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Pessimism is widespread about the present and near-future state of the economy.
- o Unemployment is considered the most serious economic problem.
- o Clear unwillingness exists to live with high unemployment as a trade-off for reduced inflation.
- o There is little scapegoating of the U.S. or other countries for British economic problems.

\* \* \* \* \*

A large majority (69%) view the British economy's health as poor. And only 30 percent expect it to get better in the coming year.

All-time high unemployment is seen overwhelmingly (86%) as Britain's most important economic problem, outdistancing inflation (59%) by far. To deal with these problems, a clear majority (59%) prefer an economic program that gives priority to increased employment, even at the price of continued high inflation. Only half as many (29%) favor a strategy which emphasizes reducing inflation at the risk of more short-run unemployment.

As to the causes of unemployment, about half (46%) see it primarily as the result of developments and policies within the U.K. One Briton in four (24%) blames the actions and policies of other countries. Among them, no one country is singled out, with Japan and the EC mentioned about as often as the U.S.

In a wider context, the British public is divided about the effects of U.S. economic policies on their economy. One-third see those policies as not affecting the situation in the U.K.; another third see them as harmful.

No such division exists about the impact of Japan's economic policies on Britain. By an unequivocal 62-to-7 percent margin, Britons perceive Japanese actions and policies as harmful to the U.K.'s economic condition.

Japan (33%), together with the Arab oil countries (28%), is also perceived to be strongest economically at the present time. By comparison, only one in ten regards the U.S. as the world's strongest economic power, about as many as named West Germany. This rank order is roughly the same as a year ago.

Issue: Exchange Rate Policy

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o There is no prevailing sense that the strong U.S. dollar hurts Britain's economy.
- o Only a minority believe the dollar's strength is being manipulated by the USG.

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Despite the British pound's current difficulties, scarcely more than half (56%) perceive the dollar as a strong currency. Among those who do, opinion splits on whether this is a good thing (36%) or a bad thing (35%) for Britain. And, by a 47-to-33 percent margin, the view prevails that the strong U.S. dollar does not result from deliberate U.S. exchange rate policies, but is caused by economic forces beyond U.S. government control.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Issue: NTBS, etc.

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o A substantial, though not prevailing, protectionist sentiment exists.
- o Britons predominantly believe that foreign imports cause unemployment.
- o There is no clear perception of how U.S. trade policies affect Britain's ability to export to the American market.

\* \* \* \* \*

Britons widely believe that their country supports "free trade" (62%) rather than protectionism (26%). But from a personal point of view, the margin in favor of fewer restrictions on trade is much narrower (51-to-38%).

In fact, assessing the net effect of foreign imports, a clear majority believe they tend to increase unemployment (59%) rather than reduce prices (21%). Somewhat paradoxically, however, only about one third (31%) point to the preservation of British jobs as the main argument for restricting imports, while a plurality (44%) cite lower prices as the best reason against keeping them out. Nonetheless, the bottom-line assessment is clear: foreign imports produce more harm than benefits.

Consistent with the majority view that Japanese economic actions damage Britain's economy, the British public, by an equally decisive margin (72-to-11%), believes Japanese trade policies hinder British efforts to sell its goods in Japan.

By contrast, Britons appear to have no clear perception about the effect of U.S. trade policies on British exports. In fact, 40 percent express no opinion on the issue. A third do say U.S. policies are a barrier to British exports to the U.S., but one-fourth say the opposite.

31

EAST/WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

Issue: COCOM/Strategic Trade

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Widespread public opposition is expressed to low interest loans and credits to promote trade with the Soviet Union.
- o Tight restrictions on high technology sales to the Soviet Union are widely endorsed.
- o Britons clearly prefer coordinating Soviet trade policies with the U.S. to making separate deals with Moscow.
- o There is appreciable, but nonetheless minority, sentiment for decreasing trade with the Soviet Union in light of events in Poland.

\* \* \* \* \*

A substantial majority (73-to-19%) say that Britain's economic prosperity is not dependent on trade with the Soviet Union. But whatever that trade may be worth, a plurality (48%) feel that events in Poland should not affect the current level of Soviet trade. A substantial number (39%), however, do think the situation in Poland calls for a decrease in that trade.

Moreover, the British public overwhelmingly (84%) opposes granting special concessions, such as low-cost loans and credit, to further trade with the Soviet Union.

And, as a year ago, a two-thirds majority agree that sales of advanced technology to the Soviet Union should be tightly restricted.

By a similar-sized margin (60-to-19%) the British public prefers for the U.K. to coordinate Soviet trade policy with the U.S., even at the cost of less trade with Moscow, rather than risk harm to relations with the U.S. by going for the best possible, separate deal with the Soviets.

Issue: Yamal Pipeline

The British public is generally divided on whether or not West European nations should help in building the Yamal pipeline: 45 percent disapprove, 39 percent approve.

However, those who approve would be widely opposed (57-to-24%), if persuaded that the Soviet Union were to use the pipeline's hard currency earnings to build up its military strength.

EAST/WEST POLITICAL ISSUES

Issue: INF (Preliminary to NATO Summit)

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Support for INF deployment, if linked with arms talks, has recently risen; diehard opposition appears to have correspondingly declined.
- o President Reagan's zero-option proposal has far wider credibility than the Brezhnev freeze plan.

\* \* \* \* \*

When informed of the Soviet INF superiority, a plurality (50-to-37%) of the British public support INF deployment in their country.

Opposition is reduced further (to 28%) when stationing is linked with arms control talks. Then, some two-thirds would accept deployment, including 53 percent if negotiations are ongoing or have failed. This represents an appreciable increase in "conditional support" since February and a drop in "unconditional opposition."

The growing conditional support for INF deployment appears to correspond with an increased belief that the stationing of INF missiles would deter (56%) rather than invite (22%) a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

Of the arms control proposals offered publicly so far, Britons, by a decisive 58-to-20 percent margin, believe that President Reagan's zero-option proposal is more likely to prevent war than the Brezhnev "freeze" plan. Additionally, the President's proposal enjoys considerable credibility among the British public; Brezhnev's does not. A 50-to-35 percent plurality think the Reagan offer is a sincere effort to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe. By contrast, a majority (56-to-21%) feel that Brezhnev's proposal is not intended to accomplish that.

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27

## For Versailles Economic Summit

### CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT ISSUES

This paper presents results of a USICA-commissioned survey on issues relevant to the Versailles Summit. Interviewing was conducted April 7 to 21 by Canadian Facts, a reputable research firm.

#### MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES

##### Issue: Economic Policy Coordination

###### Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Pessimism is pervasive about the health of the Canadian economy.
- o Unemployment and inflation are seen in almost equal measure as the most serious economic problems.
- o However, there is a widespread preference to do something about unemployment rather than about inflation.
- o U.S. policies are widely blamed for a harmful impact on the Canadian economy.
- o The U.S. is perceived as second to Japan in economic strength.

\* \* \* \* \*

A large majority (74%) of the Canadian public see their country in poor economic health. Pessimism has doubled since a year ago when Canadians predominantly considered Canada's economy sound. Moreover, today about half (46%) think things will get worse in the year ahead; only one in five thinks economic conditions will improve.

By a bare margin, unemployment (81%) is ranked ahead of inflation (74%) as Canada's most important economic problem.

Nonetheless, Canadians, by a three-to-one margin (61-to-23%), accord first priority to government actions that increase jobs, even at the cost of continued inflation, rather than reduce inflation at the risk of more joblessness.

38  
A majority (56%) primarily blame domestic policies, rather than the actions of other countries, for existing unemployment. Of the 19 percent who lay the blame on the actions and policies of other countries, the U.S. is mentioned most often.

More broadly, the public is generally critical on the impact of U.S. policies on their economy. A plurality (47%) perceive U.S. economic actions as harmful to their economic situation. Only 18 percent credit the U.S. with helpful policies.

Japanese policies are viewed in pretty much the same way.

Twice as many Canadians rank Japan ahead of the U.S. (35-to-19%) as the world's economically strongest power. This is a change from a year ago, when about equal numbers ranked the two countries in first place, along with the Arab oil states.

Issue: Exchange Rate Policy

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Many see the strong U.S. dollar as damaging to Canada.

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Canadians are very widely aware of the strength of today's U.S. dollar.

Among those who say the dollar is strong, the view prevails, 47-to-34 percent, that it is a bad thing for Canada. But, by an identical margin, Canadians do not attribute the dollar's strength to deliberate U.S. policy, but rather to conditions beyond U.S. control.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Issue: NTB's, etc.

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o As many support protectionism as favor free trade practices.
- o Foreign imports are widely blamed for causing unemployment.
- o U.S. trade policies, and even more so Japan's, tend to be seen as hindering Canadian exports.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Canadian public is split between those who favor fewer restrictions on trade (44%) and those who support protectionist measures (46%).

Apart from their personal preferences, Canadians are somewhat more likely to view their government as adhering to a free trade policy rather than practicing protectionism (53-to-37%).

The general perception of U.S. policy is somewhat cloudy, but slightly more see U.S. trade policies hindering (41%) rather than helping (32%) Canada's efforts to sell in the U.S. market.

The public is more certain of the effect of Japanese policies. By a two-to-one margin (46% to 20%) Canadians feel that Japanese trade barriers make exporting to that country difficult.

The impact of foreign imports on Canada's economy is perceived as clearly negative. A large majority (63%) say imports are more likely to increase unemployment than to reduce prices; only one in five thinks the opposite.

#### EAST/WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

Issue: COCOM/Strategic Trade

##### Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Canadians tend to favor trade with the Soviet Union at existing levels.
- o Opposition to granting special concessions to the Soviet Union to promote trade is widespread.
- o There is predominant support for tight restrictions on selling highly advanced technology to the Soviet Union.

\* \* \* \* \*

Many Canadians (39%) believe their country's prosperity depends on trade with the USSR; the prevailing view, however, is that it does not (49%). A year ago, they split evenly on this score.

Another significant minority of the Canadian public (39%) favor a reduction of Soviet trade in light of events in Poland, but somewhat more (51%) support at least continuing the present volume.



4

At the same time, Canadians convincingly support certain limitations on that trade. A decisive majority (79-to-12%) believe Canada should make no special concessions to Moscow -- such as low-interest loans and credits -- in order to further trade.

And, by a three-to-one margin (68-to-23%), public opinion wants "tight restrictions" on selling high technology to the USSR.

In all, a large majority (62-to-21%) favor coordinating Canada's Soviet trade policies with the U.S., even at the cost of losing some trade with the Soviet Union. By contrast, only one in five would risk damaging U.S. relations by making the best possible, separate deals with Moscow.

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For Versailles Economic Summit

WEST GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ON VERSAILLES SUMMIT ISSUES

This paper presents results of a USICA-commissioned national public opinion poll on issues bearing on the Versailles Summit. EMNID, the West German Gallup affiliate, conducted the interviewing between April 8 and 23.

MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES

Issue: Economic Policy Coordination

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Gloom prevails about West Germany's present economic situation and the near-term outlook.
- o There is a widespread preference to do something first about unemployment rather than tackling inflation.
- o Generally, unemployment is blamed more on domestic policies than on the economic actions of other countries.
- o The U.S. is not widely blamed for causing unemployment or doing harm to the German economy overall.
- o The U.S. is rated second to Japan as the pre-eminent economic power.

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A large majority (69%) of the West German public say their country is in poor economic health. Pessimism on this score has risen appreciably since a year ago. Moreover, only about one in ten (13%) believes the economy will improve in the year ahead; three in ten (29%) think it will get worse.

Unemployment (78%) is seen as Germany's most serious problem by a wide margin over inflation (50%).

Consistent with this perception, and Germany's relatively low inflation rate, West Germans by a clear 56-to-22 percent margin prefer to see government measures that decrease joblessness, even at the cost of continued inflation, rather than reduce inflation at the risk of more unemployment.

Unemployment is most often attributed to both domestic policies and the actions of other countries. Nearly four times as many, however, assign blame principally to their own government's policies rather than to actions from external sources (36-to-10%). Among the few who do put the blame on policies of others, the U.S. and Japan are pointed to most frequently.

In a broader context, the German public is closely divided on the effect of U.S. economic policies on the West German economic situation. About as many think that U.S. policies do not affect (27%) the state of the German economy as think these policies have been harmful (29%). In fact, almost as many (22%) think U.S. policies have helped Germany.

Perceptions about Japanese policies differ markedly. A clearcut plurality (47%) see them as harming West Germany's economy.

More West Germans (35%) now consider Japan to be strongest economically rather than the U.S. (28%). This represents a reversal of public opinion since last year, when the U.S. was accorded supremacy over Japan by a 36-to-21 percent margin.

Issue: Exchange Rate Policy

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Only few think the strong U.S. dollar is damaging to West Germany. This perception seems to exist amidst a fairly widespread lack of concern or ignorance about current exchange rates.

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The West German public appears somewhat uncertain about the dollar's current standing. About half (48%) are aware of its present strength but not that many fewer (39%) think of it as a weak currency. And of those who do see the dollar as strong, twice as many think it is a good thing rather than a bad thing for the Federal Republic. Yet for better or worse, three times the number think a strong dollar results from deliberate U.S. policy than from conditions beyond U.S. control.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Issue: NTB's, etc.

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Free trade principles are widely supported over protectionism.
- o U.S. trade policy is not perceived as harmful to the German economy; Japanese trade practices are.
- o Foreign imports, about as often as not, are seen as beneficial to West Germany.

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Free trade is widely favored over protectionism. A sizeable 60-to-22 percent majority endorse a policy of fewer restrictions on trade over protectionist measures. Moreover, nearly two-thirds who favor free trade would not change their mind even in economic hard times.

Apart from their personal preference, another large majority (64-to-21%) believe their government actually practices a free trade policy.

The general perception of U.S. trade policy is mixed. As many see U.S. trade policies helping as see them hindering German exports.

A much clearer picture emerges about Japanese practices. By a wide 52-to-15 percent margin the export-minded West German public perceives Japan as placing barriers in the way of German efforts to sell goods there.

On foreign imports, the West German public is more or less divided about their bottom-line effect on their economy. Some 30 percent believe they tend to cause unemployment rather than reduce prices, but almost as many (24%) think the opposite. And one-third sees overall benefit and harm in equal balance. In all, it is clear that foreign imports are not seen as a major cause of rising unemployment.

44

EAST/WEST ECONOMIC ISSUES

Issue: COCOM/Strategic Trade

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Support prevails for continuing trade with the Soviet Union at existing levels.
- o Widespread public opposition exists to granting trade concessions, such as low interest loans and credits, to the Soviet Union to promote trade.
- o Prevailing views favor tight restrictions on selling highly advanced technology to the Soviet Union.

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Some two-thirds (64%) of the German public do not think that their country's prosperity depends on trade with the Soviet Union. Only one in four says it does. Last year, fully one-third felt this way.

Nonetheless, a plurality (48%) feel existing levels of trade with the Soviet Union should not be affected by events in Poland. Only 27 percent think Soviet trade should be reduced in light of what is happening there.

At the same time, a substantial majority (66-to-17%) believes Germany should make no special concessions to Moscow such as low interest loans and credits in order to further trade.

And a 45-to-34 percent plurality agrees that Western nations should have tight restrictions on selling high technology to the Soviet Union. The same view prevailed last year, but by a somewhat wider (50-to-26%) margin.

In all, some 37 percent prefer coordinating West Germany's trade policy with the U.S. even at the cost of losing some trade. By comparison, only one in five (22%) would risk damaging relations with the U.S. by making the best possible separate deal with Moscow.

41

Issue: Yamal Pipeline

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Support prevails for building the Soviet gas pipeline. But many pipeline advocates would change their mind if hard currency from gas sales went to beef-up the Soviet military arsenal.
- o Belief is widespread that buying energy products from the Soviet Union will not make Germany vulnerable to political pressure from Moscow.

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A plurality (50-to-28%) approves of helping the Soviets to build the Yamal pipeline. But nearly half of those favoring the project say they would change their mind "if this pipeline earns money for the Soviet Union that would be used to further build up Soviet military strength."

Consistent with the prevailing support for the pipeline, only one West German in three (32%) agrees that buying energy products from Moscow will make the Federal Republic vulnerable to Soviet political pressure. Nonetheless, this is an increase from a year ago when only 20 percent held this view.

EAST/WEST POLITICAL ISSUES

Issue: INF (Preliminary to NATO Summit)

Public Opinion Climate for U.S. Policies

- o Public support for INF deployment in West Germany prevails only when stationing is linked to arms control talks.
- o The view that INF deployment in Western Europe will strengthen deterrence is now fairly widespread.
- o A decisive preference exists for the Reagan zero-option proposal over the Brezhnev freeze plan.

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46

When told of the Soviet monopoly in INF missiles, German public opinion is evenly divided (38% in favor; 39% opposed) on stationing NATO INF on West German soil. However, this represents a significant shift since January, when a 41-to-32 percent plurality opposed INF deployment. At the same time, better-educated Germans remain opposed by a lopsided 73-to-20 percent margin.

When linked to arms talks, a majority (58%) approve deployment, particularly if such negotiations have failed. Some 29 percent remain unconditionally opposed to stationing, a ten percent drop since February.

While the link with arms talks enhances INF support, the majority (60-to-20%) of West Germans believe any INF talks between the U.S. and USSR will not succeed in the next two years. Pessimism on that score has increased since the Geneva talks started.

The increased public support for INF deployment may reflect, in part, a growing perception that the missiles would strengthen deterrence. A 47-to-21 percent plurality think deployment would prevent a Soviet attack rather than make one more likely. Last winter the German public had only split evenly on this issue.

Concurrently, a substantial majority (61-to-10%) believe that President Reagan's zero-option proposal is "more likely to prevent war" than the Brezhnev "freeze" plan. On credibility too, the President's proposal wins easily. A solid 58-to-20 percent majority perceive the zero-option is a "sincere effort to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe." In sharp contrast, Brezhnev is disbelieved by a similar-sized margin (51-to-14%).

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