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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
142578	CABLE	STATE 064896 <i>R 2/5/17 M443/5</i>	5	3/11/1982	B1
142579	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	5	3/18/1982	B1
142580	FAX COVER SHEET		1	3/22/1982	B1
142581	MEMO	STEVEN STEINER TO MEMBERS OF INTERAGENCY GROUP ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON REVERSE)	4	3/22/1982	B1

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USSR
SHAPING EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

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THAT "FROM THE DAY THE SOVIET STATE WAS BORN, IT PUT
PEACE IN THE FIRST PLACE ON ITS PROGRAM."

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E.O. 12065: GDS 3/11/88 (BOHLEN, A.)
TAGS: NATO, PEPR, US
SUBJECT: POLADS FOLLOW-UP ON SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES:
INFORMATION ON WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC)

REF: (A) USNATO 1615 (B) STATE 63102 (C) USNATO 1675

1. (C) IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL A, FOLLOWING IN PARA 2 IS
THE UNCLASSIFIED TEXT OF A SOON-TO-BE RELEASED FOREIGN
AFFAIRS NOTE ON THE WPC (SEE REFTEL B FOR MORE DETAILS
ON THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOTE SERIES). DEPARTMENT IS ALSO
REPEATING FOR MISSION TO DRAW UPON IN POLADS VIENNA 1848
WHICH PROVIDES UNCLASSIFIED REVIEW OF PRESS REPORTS ON
RESULTS OF WPC-SPONSORED JANUARY 29-FEBRUARY 1 VIENNA
CONFERENCE. IN ADDITION, DEPARTMENT IS POUCHING UNDER
REGISTRY NUMBER 1546198 COPIES OF THE FIRST FOREIGN AFFAIRS
NOTE DETAILING EXPULSION OF SOVIET OFFICIALS WORLDWIDE
FROM 1970 THROUGH 1981, WHICH MAY BE USED IN POLADS AS
WELL AS INR REPORTS ON THE RECENT WFTU HAVANA CONGRESS
(IR 317-CA) AND THE RESULTS OF THE WPC VIENNA CONFERENCE
(FOLLOW-UP IR 324-CA) FOR BACKGROUND. INR IS PLANNING TO
DO A HISTORY OF CPSU CC INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT. PER REFTEL C, COMMENTS ON THE UK PAPER ON
THE ID WILL BE FORTHCOMING BY TUESDAY, MARCH 16.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF WPC FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOTE:

- THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL: INSTRUMENT
- OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC) HAS AN UNBLEMISHED RECORD OF
SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY. ITS
PRESIDENT, ROMESH CHANDRA, STATED IN MOSCOW'S
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE FOREIGN AFFAIRS WEEKLY NEW TIMES IN
JULY 1975: 'THE SOVIET UNION INVARIABLY SUPPORTS THE
PEACE MOVEMENT. THE WPC IN ITS TURN POSITIVELY REACTS TO
ALL SOVIET INITIATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS., TWO
YEARS EARLIER, AT THE 1973 WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE
FORCES IN MOSCOW, CHANDRA IN HIS OPENING SPEECH CLAIMED
THAT "MILLIONS OF PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION (HAD) TAKEN
PART IN THE PREPARATIONS OF (THE) CONGRESS" AND ASSERTED

3. WHILE OFFICIALLY COMMITTED TO PROMOTING THE CAUSE
OF "PEACE," WPC ACTIVITIES CONSISTENTLY MESH WITH SOVIET
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND GOALS AND THUS ENDEAVOR TO
CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUTSIDE THE USSR. ON CONTROVERSIAL
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY ON QUESTIONS SUCH AS
DISARMAMENT WHERE THE US AND USSR FREQUENTLY DISAGREE,
THE WPC IS UNDEVIATING IN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET
POSITION.

4. THE WPC AND ITS AFFILIATES ARE A MAJOR CONDUIT FOR
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST-BLOC FINANCIAL, PROPAGANDA AND
ORGANIZATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO "PEACE" AND ANTI-NUCLEAR
GROUPS IN EUROPE. AS SUCH, IT IS CURRENTLY SUPPORTING
A WELL-COORDINATED DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO
PROMOTE BREZHNEV'S 26TH CPSU CONGRESS "PEACE"
PROPOSALS AND RALLY WEST EUROPEAN SENTIMENT AGAINST NATO
INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND INCREASED
DEFENSE SPENDING. THE CAMPAIGN HAS INJECTED NEW LIFE
INTO AN ORGANIZATION WHOSE INFLUENCE IN EUROPE HAD BEEN
ERODING BECAUSE OF TOO OBVIOUS SOVIET LINKS.

BACKGROUND

5. THE USSR HAS SINCE ITS INCEPTION UNDERWRITTEN A NET-
WORK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH, WHILE PURPORTING
TO BE INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL, SERVE

IN FACT AS FACADES FOR SOVIET POLICY. FINANCING AND
CONTROL FROM MOSCOW TO THESE FRONTS ARE CHanneled THROUGH

SOMETIMES MURKY CONDUITS, BUT HAVE BEEN WELL DOCUMENTED
OVER THE YEARS.

6. HISTORICALLY, IT HAS BEEN THE FUNCTION OF THESE
ORGANIZATIONS TO PROMOTE SUPPORT OF SOVIET POLICY AMONG
THOSE ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY NOT NORMALLY REACHED BY LOCAL,
MOSCOW-LINKED COMMUNIST PARTIES, E.G., SYMPATHIZERS NOT
WISHING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ENTIRELY TO PARTY DIS-
CIPLINE, INTERESTED ONLY IN PARTICULAR ISSUES, OR MOVED
BY CERTAIN EMOTIONAL APPEALS. LENIN SAW THE POTENTIAL
OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS AS "TRANSMISSION BELTS" FOR CON-
VEYING SOVIET PARTY DIRECTIVES TO SUCH GROUPS AND
"EDUCATING" THEM IN THE TENETS OF COMMUNISM. REFERRING
TO TRADE UNIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, LENIN IN 1901-02 WROTE:

QUOTE"...IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO DEMAND THAT ONLY
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS BE ELIGIBLE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE
TRADE UNIONS, FOR THIS WOULD ONLY RESTRICT OUR
INFLUENCE OVER THE MASSES...THE VERY OBJECTS OF THE
TRADE UNIONS WOULD BE UNATTAINABLE UNLESS THEY WERE
EXTREMELY WIDE ORGANIZATIONS. THE WIDER THESE
ORGANIZATIONS ARE, THE WIDER OUR INFLUENCE OVER THEM
WILL BE..." (SELECTED WORKS, VOL. II, "WHAT IS TO BE
DONE?") END QUOTE

AND IN 1920:

QUOTE"...IT IS NECESSARY...TO AGREE TO ANY AND EVERY
SACRIFICE, AND EVEN--IF NEED BE--TO RESORT TO ALL
SORTS OF STRATAGEMS, MANEUVERS AND ILLEGAL
METHODS, TO EVASION AND SUBTERFUGES IN ORDER TO PENE-
TRADE THE TRADE UNIONS, TO REMAIN IN THEM, AND TO

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CARRY ON COMMUNIST WORK IN THEM AT ALL COSTS."
(SELECTED WORKS, VOL. 10, "'LEFT-WING' COMMUNISM,
AN INFANTILE DISORDER") "END QUOTE

7. THIS CONCEPT WAS DEVELOPED PARTICULARLY INTENSIVELY DURING THE "POPULAR FRONT" PERIOD OF THE 1930S, WHEN FOR EXAMPLE, WILLI MUNZENBERG, A VETERAN GERMAN COMMUNIST WORKING FOR THE COMINTERN, SPOKE OF SUCH BODIES AS "INNOCENTS' CLUBS." THE USSR CREATED MANY OF THE CURRENTLY OPERATING FRONT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE LATE 1940S, EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY SECURING CONTROL OF EXISTING MOVEMENTS.

8. FROM THE LATE 1940'S THROUGH THE MID-1960'S, SUCH FACADES FOR SOVIET POLICY WERE USED AGGRESSIVELY AS COLD-WAR PROPAGANDA FORUMS. IN RECENT YEARS THEY HAVE BECOME LESS STRIDENT AND SOMEWHAT MORE SOPHISTICATED, SHAPING THEIR PROGRAMS TO APPEAL TO AS WIDE A RANGE AS POSSIBLE OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS.

9. THE WPC WAS FOUNDED IN 1949 AS THE WORLD COMMITTEE OF PARTISANS FOR PEACE, AND ADOPTED ITS PRESENT TITLE IN 1950. IT WAS BASED IN PARIS UNTIL 1951 WHEN IT WAS EXPELLED FOR WHAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TERMED "FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES." IT MOVED FIRST TO PRAGUE, AND THEN IN 1954 TO VIENNA, WHERE IT REMAINED UNTIL BANNED IN 1957 BY THE AUSTRIAN INTERIOR MINISTER FOR "ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE AUSTRIAN STATE." HOWEVER, IT CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN VIENNA UNDER THE LEGAL COVER OF THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE (IIP) UNTIL ITS MOVE TO HELSINKI IN SEPTEMBER 1968. THE IIP SUBSEQUENTLY EMERGED AS A SEPARATE FRONT WITH STRONG LINKS TO BOTH THE WPC AND THE SOVIET UNION.

10. IN RECENT YEARS THE WPC HAS EXPANDED ITS ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD. ALWAYS IN TUNE WITH THE SOVIET LINE, IT HAS NEVERTHELESS BEEN ABLE TO ATTRACT CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT BY POSING AS AN INDEPENDENT BODY IDENTIFYING WITH SUCH POPULAR CAUSES AS OPPOSITION TO US "AGGRESSION" IN VIETNAM, ANTI-COLONIALISM AND ASSISTANCE TO "LIBERATION MOVEMENTS". IN NATO COUNTRIES, IT HAS EXPLOITED FEARS OF NUCLEAR WAR BY STIMULATING AND/OR SPONSORING ANTI-NUCLEAR RALLIES AND ADVOCATING DISARMAMENT ALBEIT ON SOVIET TERMS.

11. THE WPC AND SIMILAR FRONT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE PERIODICALLY FACED MAJOR INTERNAL PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THEIR SOVIET AFFILIATION. IN 1949, FOLLOWING THE EXPULSION OF YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE COMINFORM, THE WPC EXPELLED ITS YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVES. SIMILARLY, THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE LED TO THE OSTRACISM OF CHINA, WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME A MAJOR CRITIC OF ALL SOVIET FRONTS. NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S REVELATIONS OF THE EXCESSES OF THE STALIN ERA, AT THE 20TH SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY 1956, AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING BY SOVIET TROOPS THE FOLLOWING NOVEMBER COST THE FRONTS HEAVILY IN TERMS OF POPULAR SUPPORT. AFTER THE SOVIET-LED INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN AUGUST 1968,

MOSCOW WAS FORCED TO REPLACE NEARLY ALL MAJOR COMMUNIST-FRONT OFFICIALS IN ORDER TO RESTORE DISCIPLINE. EVEN SO, THE ORGANIZATIONS HELD NO PUBLIC MEETINGS FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. BY THE EARLY 1970S, A LARGE INJECTION OF SOVIET FUNDS AND GREATER CARE IN THE SELECTION OF PERSONNEL HAD RESTORED SOME OF THEIR CREDIBILITY. MORE

RECENTLY, THE DECEMBER 1979 SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS SOVIET PRESSURE IN POLAND, HAS APPARENTLY ONCE AGAIN GENERATED DISSENSION AND DIVISIVENESS, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE WPC.

12. OPPOSITION TO SOVIET DOMINATION ERUPTS WITHIN THE WPC ON OCCASION, BUT THE PROCEDURES OF THE ORGANIZATION USUALLY ENABLE THE KEY LEADERS TO CONFINE DISSENT TO PRIVATE MEETINGS OF COMMISSIONS OR SUB-COMMISSIONS. AT A NUMBER OF 1977 MEETINGS, NON-COMMUNIST PARTICIPANTS EMBARRASSED SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY ASKING POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE USSR, BUT THIS MARKED THE EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE.

13. OPPOSITION VIEWS SELDOM FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE LARGE-SCALE WPC-SPONSORED PUBLIC GATHERINGS. DISSENTING VIEWS, IF PUT FORWARD, ARE IGNORED AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL. WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST ANDREI SAKHAROV SENT A MESSAGE IN 1976 TO A WPC-SPONSORED FORUM ON DISARMAMENT IN YORK, BRITAIN, IT WAS NOT READ TO DELEGATES AS SAKHAROV HAD REQUESTED. (THE ORGANIZERS EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS TOO LONG, TOO LATE AND OF A "DIFFERENT NATURE" FROM OTHER MESSAGES. BESIDES, TWO SOVIET DELEGATES THREATENED TO WALK OUT OF THE FORUM IF THE MESSAGE WAS READ.)

MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

14. THE WPC HAS NEVER PUBLISHED COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP FIGURES, BUT IT CLAIMS TO HAVE AFFILIATES (IN THE FORM OF "NATIONAL PEACE COMMITTEES" AND VARIOUS "PEACE" ORGANIZATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL) IN MORE THAN 135 COUNTRIES. THE COUNCIL THUS APPEARS TO REPRESENT A BROAD POLITICAL SPECTRUM, DESPITE THE PREPONDERANCE OF SOVIET AND PRO-SOVIET PERSONNEL IN KEY LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS. INDEED, THE WPC HAS ALWAYS ATTRACTED THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF PRESTIGIOUS NONCOMMUNIST FIGURES--LITERARY, HUMANITARIAN, SCIENTIFIC, RELIGIOUS AND

OTHERS WHO ARE MOTIVATED BY A GENUINE CONCERN FOR

PEACE--BUT IT USES THESE FIGURES PRIMARILY TO REINFORCE ITS FACADE OF INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT AND ENHANCE ITS CREDIBILITY AS AN OSTENSIBLY NON-POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.

15. THE WPC IS COMPOSED OF FOUR PRINCIPAL BODIES:

--THE "COUNCIL", WHICH MEETS EVERY THREE YEARS, IS THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND COMPRISES REPRESENTATIVES OF COOPERATING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NATIONAL "PEACE" COMMITTEES. COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP IS NOW ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 1,600.

--THE "PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE" IS ELECTED BY THE COUNCIL AND IS NOMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR RUNNING THE WPC BETWEEN COUNCIL SESSIONS. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE HAS 26 VICE-PRESIDENTS AND 146 MEMBERS. IT HOLDS REGULAR ANNUAL AND OCCASIONAL EMERGENCY MEETINGS. WPC PRESIDENT ROMESH CHANDRA CHAIRS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE.

--A BUREAU OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS AND PLANS FUTURE ACTIVITIES AND "PROGRAMS OF ACTION." IT MEETS THREE OR FOUR TIMES A YEAR AND CONSISTS OF THE WPC PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF A SELECTED NUMBER OF NATIONAL "PEACE"

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MOVEMENTS.

--THE "SECRETARIAT" IS A FULL-TIME EXECUTIVE STAFF APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE. IT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTING COUNCIL, PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE AND BUREAU DECISIONS, AS WELL AS FOR PROPOSING NEW ACTIVITIES.

FUNDING

16. THE WPC CLAIMS TO BE FUNDED BY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NATIONAL PEACE COMMITTEES, DONATIONS TO ITS "WORLD PEACE FUND," AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS. THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THE BULK OF ITS EXPENSES ARE ACTUALLY MET BY THE SOVIET UNION:

--ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET ENGLISH-LANGUAGE WEEKLY MOSCOW NEWS (NO. 19, 1981), THE SOVIET PEACE

FUND (FOOTNOTE) HELPS TO FINANCE "SOME" OF THE WPC'S "LARGE PUBLIC INITIATIVES." WRITING IN THE APRIL 1980 EDITION OF 20TH CENTURY AND PEACE, SOVIET PEACE FUND CHAIRMAN BORIS POLEVOI ASSERTED THAT AMONG HIS CLIENTS ARE "THE LEADERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS WORKING FOR PEACE: THE FUND REGULARLY GIVES THEM ASSISTANCE IN ORGANIZING THEIR UNDERTAKINGS." POLEVOI ALSO REVEALED THAT THE FUND WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE WHICH AIMS "TO RENDER FINANCIAL AID TO THE ORGANIZATIONS, MOVEMENTS AND PERSONALITIES FIGHTING FOR STRONGER PEACE, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM." REFERRING TO THE OCTOBER 1973 WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES IN MOSCOW, THE NOVEMBER 1973 ISSUE OF PEACE COURIER (A WPC PUBLICATION) REPORTED THAT "SOVIET PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS...COVERED ALL THE DELEGATES' MAINTENANCE EXPENSES IN MOSCOW. SOVIET CITIZENS DONATED TO THE SOVIET PEACE FUND - WHICH COVERED

BEGIN FOOTNOTE:

THE SOVIET PEACE FUND IS A NATIONWIDE ORGANIZATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES SCATTERED THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE USSR'S CITIES, TOWNS, AND VILLAGES. A COMMON METHOD BY WHICH MONEY IS COLLECTED FOR THE SOVIET PEACE FUND IS FOR INDIVIDUAL FACTORIES, PLANTS AND COLLECTIVE FARMS TO HOLD A ONE-DAY "WORK-SHIFT FOR PEACE." VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS ARE ANOTHER SOURCE FOR THE FUND. ACCORDING TO THE AUGUST 1981 EDITION OF THE SOVIET PUBLICATION 20TH CENTURY AND PEACE, THE "WORKING PEOPLE" OF THE SHUSHENSKOYE DISTRICT ANNUALLY DONATE UPWARDS OF 35,000 RUBLES TO THE SOVIET PEACE FUND "IN THE NAME OF HAPPINESS ON EARTH, THE HAPPINESS OF OUR CHILDREN, GRANDCHILDREN AND THE COMING GENERATIONS." ACCORDING TO THE DECEMBER

1981 EDITION OF 20TH CENTURY AND PEACE, THE KRASNOYARSK PEACE COMMITTEE RECEIVED 2 MILLION RUBLES IN DONATIONS FOR THE SOVIET PEACE FUND DURING 1981. FOR THEIR EFFORTS, THE COMMITTEE EXECUTIVES WERE DECORATED WITH WORLD PEACE COUNCIL "JUBILEE MEDALS."

END FOOTNOTE

THE DELEGATES' MAINTENANCE EXPENSES--ABOUT 200,000 DOLLARS. MOSCOW'S PATRIARCHATE ALSO DONATED 3 MILLION RUBLES."

--IN A LETTER PUBLISHED IN THE OCTOBER 17, 1980 EDITION OF THE BRITISH NEW STATESMAN, A CORRESPONDENT IDENTIFIED AS RUTH TOSEK, A "FORMER SENIOR INTERPRETER FOR SEVERAL OF THE MOSCOW-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATIONS" STATED THAT "ALL

THE FUNDS OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS, IN LOCAL AND IN HARD CURRENCY, ARE PROVIDED ABOVE ALL BY THE SOVIET UNION, BUT ALSO BY OTHER EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE COUNTRIES ON

THE BASIS OF SET CONTRIBUTION RATES, PAID BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THESE COUNTRIES THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS."

--AT A FEBRUARY 9-19, 1981 SESSION OF THE UN COMMITTEE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE WPC WAS FORCED TO WITHDRAW ITS APPLICATION FOR AN UPGRADING OF ITS CONSULTATIVE STATUS WITH THE UN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC) IN THE FACE OF ADVERSE CRITICISM FROM ECOSOC MEMBERS. UNDER QUESTIONING, WPC PRESIDENT CHANDRA ADMITTED THAT THE WPC'S ACCOUNTS WERE NOT INDEPENDENTLY AUDITED BUT RATHER WERE "AUDITED" BY THE WPC ITSELF. IN ADDITION, CHANDRA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED TO ECOSOC REPRESENTED ONLY A FRACTION OF THE WPC'S ACTUAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE. THESE ADMISSIONS WERE MADE WHILE CHANDRA CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANSWERING COMMITTEE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SOURCE OF WPC FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS. ACCORDING TO THE MARCH 16, 1981 ECOSOC REPORT, ECOSOC MEMBERS CONCLUDED THAT THE WPC "HAD RECEIVED LARGE-SCALE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT SOURCES, AND HAD GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO CONCEAL THAT FACT FROM THE COMMITTEE."

17. IN ADDITION TO THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF, EAST GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, POLAND AND CUBA, AMONG OTHERS, PROVIDE MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE WPC, USUALLY IN THE FORM OF AIRLINE SERVICE AND HOTEL EXPENSES.

EXTENT OF SOVIET CONTROL

18. IN JUNE 1981, AT A KREMLIN CEREMONY, SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV PRESENTED WPC PRESIDENT CHANDRA WITH THE ORDER OF LENIN, TOPPING ALL THE MANY SOVIET BLOC AWARDS HE HAS ALREADY RECEIVED. CITING CHANDRA'S SERVICE TO THE "IDEALS OF PEACE, HIS SELFLESSNESS IN THE BITTER STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FORCES OF

MILITARISM AND AGGRESSION," BREZHNEV EXPRESSED GARTIFICATION THAT THE SOVIET "PEACE PROGRAM" FOR THE 1980S MET WITH "FULL UNDERSTANDING" FROM SUCH AN "AUTHORITATIVE MOVEMENT AS THE MOVEMENT OF PEACE CHAMPIONS." (20TH CENTURY AND PEACE, AUGUST 1981) CHANDRA, PRESIDENT OF THE WPC SINCE 1977, IS MEMBER OF THE MOSCOW-LINE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND POLITBURO.

19. THIS SYMBOLIC ACT ONLY SERVES TO HIGHLIGHT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT (ID) AND THE WPC. THE ID, HEADED BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY AND CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER BORIS PONOMAREV, INCLUDES A SPECIAL BRANCH RESPONSIBLE EXCLUSIVELY FOR FRONT ORGANIZATIONS. KNOWN AS THE "INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS SECTOR," IT FALLS UNDER THE GENERAL RESPONSIBILITY OF VITALY SHAPOSHNIKOV, A DEPUTY HEAD OF THE ID WHO IS SIMULTANEOUSLY A MEMBER OF THE WPC PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE. THROUGH SUCH DIRECT LINES FROM THE ID TO KEY WPC OFFICIALS, THE CPSU CAN DICTATE THE CONTENT OF COMMUNIQUEs, RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS STEMMING FROM WPC EVENTS AND FINAL DECISIONS ON WPC PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES.

20. THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE OF SOVIET CONTROL OF THE WPC

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THROUGH THE YEARS, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THE VERY FAITHFULNESS OF ITS ADHERENCE TO THE SOVIET PARTY LINE. SINCE ITS ORIGINAL "STOCKHOLM APPEAL" FOR "BANNING THE BOMB" IN

1950, THE WPC HAS PERIODICALLY SPEARHEADED AND ORCHESTRATED DRIVES AGAINST WESTERN NUCLEAR ARMING IN ANY FORM; IT HAS BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF EAST-WEST DETENTE PROMOTION; AND IT HAS CONSISTENTLY ADVANCED SOVIET POSITIONS ON CONTROVERSIAL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE US AND ITS ALLIES:

--IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, IT SET UP THE "STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM," WHICH WAS ACTIVE FROM 1967-68 UNTIL THE WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM INDOCHINA IN 1973. IT SUPPORTED THE "INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO US WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM," ESTABLISHED IN 1970 AS A SUBSIDIARY TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THROUGHOUT THE VIETNAM WAR, THE WPC SENT NUMEROUS "PEACE" DELEGATIONS TO NORTH VIETNAM AND REGULARLY ISSUED STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF SOVIET POLICY ON THE WAR. MORE RECENTLY, IN MARCH 1979, THE WPC STAGED

AN "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM" TO CONDEMN THE CHINESE AND IN MAY 1980 ORGANIZED A "SPECIAL CONFERENCE" IN HANOI TO MARK THE 90TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF HO CHI MINH.

--IN TANDEM WITH MOSCOW, THE WPC SINCE 1974 HAS ESPOUSED THE "ELIMINATION OF WAR BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN" (MEANING US AND BRITISH BASES ONLY) AND CAMPAIGNED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT REGION AS A "ZONE OF PEACE."

--THE ANTI-"NEUTRON BOMB" CAMPAIGN INITIATED BY THE SOVIETS IN MID-1977 PROVIDED THE WPC AND ITS AFFILIATES WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIVE THEIR BAN-THE-BOMB EFFORTS AND TO CLAIM THAT THE US WAS PURSUING MILITARY POLICIES THAT DISREGARDED OF THE INTERESTS OF ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. THE WPC PROCLAIMED AUGUST 6-13, 1977 A "WEEK OF ACTION" AGAINST THE BOMB, AND ORGANIZED AND ASSISTED IN THE ORCHESTRATION OF SEVERAL PEACE AND ANTI-BOMB DEMONSTRATIONS IN EUROPE, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA AND THE NEAR EAST. PRESIDENT CARTER'S ULTIMATE DECISION TO POSTPONE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD AS THEN TOUTED AS A VICTORY FOR "PEACE FORCES" THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

THE SUCCESS OF THE ANTI-NEUTRON BOMB CAMPAIGN PROMPTED JANOS BEREZ, CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, TO WRITE IN THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF TARSADALMI SZEMLE (THE THEORETICAL JOURNAL OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE) THAT "THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NEUTRON BOMB WAS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND MOST SUCCESSFUL SINCE WORLD WAR II."

--IN CONJUNCTION WITH SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, THE WPC HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH AFRICAN "LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" EVEN WHEN THEY ARE ENGAGED IN ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST RIVAL AFRICAN MOVEMENTS AND HAS MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO CURRY FAVOR WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU).

21. THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DECISION TO RESPOND TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES TARGETED AT EUROPE WITH THE MODERNIZATION OF ITS INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) NOW SERVES THE WPC AS THE FOCUS FOR A VIGOROUSLY CONDUCTED CAMPAIGN FOR "PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND DETENTE" DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST NATO INTENTIONS. (IN THIS EFFORT, THE SOVIETS,

THROUGH THE WPC, HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CHANNEL MUCH OF THE ANTI-"NEUTRON BOMB" SENTIMENT GENERATED DURING 1977-78 INTO

THEIR CURRENT ANTI-INF CAMPAIGN.) MEANWHILE, THE WPC CONSISTENTLY AVOIDS CRITICIZING OR DISCUSSING SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS. INSTEAD, D'RING THE PAST YEAR, IT HAS ACTIVELY PROMOTED BREZHNEV'S PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, ORGANIZED "PEACE" RALLIES, AND ISSUED FORMAL CONDEMNATIONS OF NATO DEFENSE POLICIES:

--SOME 200 REPRESENTATIVES OF 85 ORGANIZATIONS FROM 30 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE US AND CANADA, AND FROM 13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ATTENDED A WPC-ORGANIZED "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AGAINST THE ARMS RACE" IN STOCKHOLM, JUNE 6-8, 1981. DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE MODERNIZATION OF MEDIUM-RANGE US MISSILES IN EUROPE, THE "NEUTRON BOMB", AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR. SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES WERE NOT MENTIONED IN THE REPORT OF THE MEETING. CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS PROPOSED SENDING A DELEGATION TO THE US TO "REPORT THE MOOD OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION" REGARDING US NUCLEAR POLICIES; A COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED CONDEMNING NATO AND INF PLANS.

--FIVE FORMER SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS OF NATO COUNTRIES--THREE OF THEM WPC MEMBERS--ISSUED AN APPEAL IN LATE JUNE 1981 TO THE SIGNATORIES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) FINAL ACT URGING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE. THE FIVE FORMER OFFICERS ARE MEMBERS OF A GROUP CALLED "GENERALS FOR PEACE." ON NOVEMBER 25, THE GROUP ISSUED A MEMORANDUM TO NATO FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS DEMANDING AN END TO THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION, POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS, "SECURITY" WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND "GOOD NEIGHBORLY" RELATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

--SPEAKING AT AN AUGUST 1981 PRESS CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI, WPC PRESIDENT ROMESH CHANDRA DENOUNCED THE US DECISION TO PROCEED WITH PRODUCTION OF THE "NEUTRON BOMB" AND ANNOUNCED THAT A "MASS INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN OF PROTEST" WOULD OCCUR FROM OCTOBER 24 TO 31, 1981, "AT THE WPC'S INITIATIVE." AUGUST 27, TASS BROADCAST A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE WPC TO MARK "WORLD PEACE DAY" SEPTEMBER 1, 1981, AND DEPLORED THE US DECISION TO RESUME "NEUTRON BOMB" PRODUCTION. A SERIES OF "PEACE MARCHES" THROUGHOUT WESTERN EUROPE, IN WHICH NUMEROUS COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST PEACE AND ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUPS

PARTICIPATED, SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK PLACE DURING THE LAST WEEK OF OCTOBER AS CHANDRA HAD PREDICTED.

--ROMESH CHANDRA AND REPRESENTATIVES OF A NUMBER OF OTHER SOVIET-CONTROLLED INTERNATIONAL FRONTS STAGED A SEPTEMBER 12-13, 1981 "INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MEETING" IN PRAGUE ON "WAYS OF AVERTING NUCLEAR WAR."

--SOME 60 PARTICIPANTS ATTENDED AN OCTOBER 2-4, 1981 "EUROPEAN PEACE COMMITTEES' MEETING" IN KOSICE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AT WHICH PEACE COMMITTEES FROM 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE REPRESENTED. HELD UNDER THE SLOGAN "FOR A EUROPEAN OF PEACE AND WITHOUT NUCLEAR ARMS," THE MEETING WAS ORGANIZED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEACE COMMITTEE (A LOCAL AFFILIATE OF THE WPC) AS A CONTINUATION OF THE JUNE 1981 STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE.

--ROMESH CHANDRA TOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI NOVEMBER 30 THAT THE WPC WAS SEEKING A "WINTER OFFENSIVE" IN SUPPORT OF THE "MASS MOVEMENT FOR DISARMA-

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 05 OF 05 SECSTATE WASHDC 4896 DTG: 112135Z MAR 82 PSN: 050483

MENT" IN EUROPE.

THE INF MODERNIZATION ISSUE IN WESTERN EUROPE IS THE CURRENT PRIORITY OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA PRESSURE AND THE WPC WILL CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS THERE. NEVERTHELESS, IN LINE WITH ITS PAST RECORD, THE WPC WILL SEEK TO OPERATE WHEREVER SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS ARE CONCERNED. END TEXT

22. IN ADDITION, YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS REGARDING THE WPC:

--A WPC-SPONSORED "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOLIDARITY WITH CYPRUS" IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN SWEDEN SOMETIME IN APRIL. (THE WPC GIVES UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE ISLAND; NATO AND OTHER "IMPERIALIST FORCES" ARE CONSISTENTLY BLAMED FOR THE SITUATION THERE. THE WPC HAS DURING THE PAST 7 YEARS ORGANIZED VARIOUS CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS DEVOTED TO THE CYPRUS ISSUE. AN "INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH CYPRUS" WAS SET UP BY THE WPC IN JULY 1975 AND REMAINS IN OPERATION TODAY, MAINTAINING ITS CLOSE TIES TO THE WPC.) (U)

--THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND HAS WREAKED HAVOC WITH THE WPC'S CREDIBILITY IN EUROPE. THE ORGANIZATION MAY, AS A RESULT, SCALE DOWN OR SUSPEND SOME OF ITS

FUTURE ACTIVITY UNTIL THE CLIMATE IN EUROPE BECOMES SOMEWHAT MORE RECEPTIVE TO COMMUNIST-INSPIRED INITIATIVES. NEVERTHELESS, THE WPC CAN STILL RELY ON BASIC THEMES SUCH AS THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR POWER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ETC., TO RALLY SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS FOR "PEACE"-RELATED CAUSES. A WPC-SPONSORED "WORLD CONGRESS OF INTELLECTUALS FOR CULTURE", SLATED TO TAKE PLACE IN GREECE IN MAY, APPEARS ORIENTED IN THAT DIRECTION. (C)

--ACCORDING TO AN UNCLASSIFIED BRITISH PUBLICATION, RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH PATRIARCH PIMEN, INITIATOR OF THE MAY 10-14 "WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE" IN MOSCOW, IS A MEMBER OF THE WPC. (U)

--THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT MOSCOW IS REDUCING ITS FINANCIAL AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION. NEITHER IS THERE ANY FIRM EVIDENCE THAT WPC PRESIDENT CHANDRA, WHO RECEIVED THE ORDER OF LENIN FROM SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV LAST JUNE 1981, IS ON THE WAY OUT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS 30-YEAR IDENTIFICATION WITH MOSCOW OCCASIONALLY TENDS TO UNDERMINE THE WPC'S FACADE OF INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT. (C) HAIG
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STATEMENT BY
THOMAS O. ENDERS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
MARCH 12, 1982

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Mr. Chairman, the Administration shares your concern about the growth of terrorism and violence in today's world. I welcome this opportunity to address the issue of Cuban terrorism and promotion of violent revolution in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I.

For some 10 years following the death of Che Guevara on an Andean hillside, Cuba attempted to portray itself as a member of the international community not unlike others, carrying on state-to-state relations through embassies, emphasizing trade and cultural contacts.

Cuba, however, never stopped glorifying violent revolution. During an entire generation, Cuba carefully nurtured agents and contacts with groups committed to violence, often providing ideological and military training to several groups in the same country. Then, in 1978, almost without notice, Castro began to implement a strategy of uniting the left in the countries of the hemisphere, with the purpose of using it as a tool for the violent overthrow of existing governments and the establishment of more Marxist-Leninist regimes in this hemisphere.

In 1978, Cuba helped unite three Sandinista factions, then committed itself militarily to the rebellion in Nicaragua. At first it was not apparent to many that a new Cuban strategy was in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like a unique case. But then Cuba began to try the same thing in El Salvador, in Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is repeating the pattern in Honduras. Even Costa Rica is now exposed to the threat of externally-backed terrorism.

Cuban intervention is, of course, not the only source of terrorism in the hemisphere. Violent conflict in Latin America has many origins, including historical social and economic inequities which have generated frustrations. Especially in the Caribbean Basin,

The clear evidence of Cuba's role led Colombia to suspend relations with Cuba on March 23. President Turbay commented in an August 13 New York Times interview: "...when we found that Cuba, a country with which we had diplomatic relations, was using those relations to prepare a group of guerrillas, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for us. It was like sending ministers to Washington at the same time you are about to bomb ships in Hawaii." In an interview published in September 1981, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the Cuban Vice President, told the German news magazine, Der Spiegel, "we did not deny" that we trained the M-19 guerrillas. This, he said, "holds true for the Salvadorans as well."

Neither the anger of President Turbay nor the M-19's failure has deterred Cuba. A new and sizeable group of M-19 guerrillas are today in Cuba receiving military training. We don't know that they will go back to Colombia to attempt new acts of terrorism, perhaps directed against the presidential elections this coming May, but such a pattern seems a reasonable speculation. The M-19 has already gone on record -- in a declaration distributed to the media in January -- condemning the elections and claiming that "civil resistance, popular combat, and armed warfare are the only roads left open to the people..." This document, which was distributed under the signatures of the M-19's national directorate, pledged that the M-19 would oppose the elections "with all our force." This statement was repeated in late February when M-19 leaders rejected the government's latest amnesty proposal.

For the first time, we now also have detailed and reliable information linking Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug-trafficker now in custody in Mexico. He has admitted to working for Havana in purchasing arms for the M-19. We have information that Guillot travelled twice to Cuba since October 1981 and that on the second visit he received \$700,000 from the Cuban government to purchase arms for the M-19 guerrillas. Last October he played a principal role in transferring the arms he purchased from a ship to a Colombian plane hijacked by the M-19. In addition to arms, Guillot reportedly also transferred funds to the guerrillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank. He maintained contact with the Cuban diplomatic

Later last fall, the leadership of the four Guatemalan guerrilla organizations were called to Havana to work further on developing effective unity. In January 1982, they issued a public statement to the people of Guatemala and world opinion, calling for a broad National Patriotic Unity Front. They laid out a deceptively moderate program for a new revolutionary government which would be non-aligned, guarantee freedoms of expression, and respect the people's right to elect their own representatives. But the front, they made clear, would be under their leadership as the Revolutionary Vanguard.

The Marxist-Leninist parameters of the Guatemalan revolution laid out in the secret accords are not mentioned in this declaration. Nor is the intention of the Revolutionary Vanguard to control decisive political and military power. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see why the class struggle and Marxist-Leninist ideas so prominent in secret agreements were deleted from the public declaration.

A similar process appears underway in Honduras. The Cubans currently are using Honduran leftists to transport arms and provide support to insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nevertheless, the Cubans are looking to the day when guerrilla warfare can be initiated in Honduras itself. Honduran authorities raided several guerrilla safehouses in late November 1981. Captured documents and declarations from detained guerrillas, including several Nicaraguans, revealed that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders, its chief of operations resided in Managua, and members of the group had received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba. Among the captured documents were classroom note-books from a one-year training course held in Cuba in 1980. The documents also revealed that one of the three guerrilla bases discovered was responsible for transporting arms and munitions from Esteli, Nicaragua into Honduras. We can expect to see the familiar ritual repeated in an effort to bring down the new democratic government which was inaugurated barely two months ago.

In Costa Rica, terrorism had been virtually unknown until March 1981 when a vehicle bearing three U.S. Embassy guards was blown apart. In June three Costa Rican policemen were shot down. This year an investigation by the police uncovered at least twenty terrorist cells of the Central American Party of Revolutionary Workers, one of which was involved in an attempted

equivalent to a quarter of Cuba's GNP, enables Cuba to maintain the second largest and the best equipped military force in Latin America and to channel significant resources to insurgencies and terrorism abroad. Cuba's new offensive since 1978, has been accompanied by ever increasing Soviet arms buildup in Cuba including MiG 23 Floggers and 65,000 tons of supplies in 1981 alone. Having such a sophisticated military establishment enhances Cuba's ability to foster and export revolution.

V.

We must be clear about Cuba. It is a Soviet surrogate. But it is not simply a Soviet surrogate. Its support for subversion derives from its own deeply based ideological conviction. It is a fundamental tenet of the Cuban revolution.

The Cuban leadership today is made up largely of the veterans who 23 years ago came to power through violent revolution. They have developed "armed struggle" into an ideological precept and way of life. Promoting "armed struggle" is not just a tactic of foreign policy, it is what reassures them that they are still revolutionaries.

This deep-seated drive to recreate their own guerrilla experience elsewhere is strengthened by hopes of creating allies and keeping Washington's attention focused away from Havana. Hoping that the U.S. will be domestically and internationally hamstrung on El Salvador, Cuba seeks to compound our problems by creating new ones -- for example, in Guatemala or Colombia. This drive, however, makes Cuba increasingly prone to rash decisions and tactical mistakes, and more willing to sacrifice the lives and resources of foreign guerrilla groups in operations that may prove disastrous to the guerrillas but advantageous to Havana.

Make no mistake: the Castro regime has made a business of violent revolution. Our response is also clear. We will not accept, we do not believe the countries of the region will accept, that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. It must be determined by the countries themselves.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

~~FOR WOLFSON~~
~~STAFF ASSISTANT~~ 10
~~EUR~~
DEPT OF STATE RM 6226

S/S March 12, 1982

1. ~~CHT~~
2. ~~APP~~
3. ~~EUR/P~~

TO: D - Ambassador Stoessel
FROM: PA - Dean E. Fischer
SUBJECT: Public Views European Allies as Not Supportive,
But Remains Committed to Their Defense

Three recent national polls have inquired about public support of U.S. defense commitments and the public's perceptions of allied support of U.S. policies. These polls found:

(1) Most Americans believe our West European allies have not adequately supported U.S. foreign policies. Specifically, a 3-to-2 plurality feel our NATO allies actually "have worked against the United States during the Polish crisis."

(2) Nevertheless, support for the U.S. defense commitment to Western Europe has weakened only slightly during the past year.

(3) The public continues to be selective regarding the situations to which it would commit U.S. troops. Sending U.S. troops to help defend Western Europe against a Soviet invasion is favored by about 50 percent; sending troops to thwart a Cuban-led military takeover of a Central American country is favored by about 40 percent; sending U.S. troops to counter a Soviet invasion of Poland or an Arab invasion of Israel is favored by about 30 percent.

(4) Less than one-fifth of the public is basically interventionist -- that is, disposed to send U.S. troops to defend any friendly country. About one fourth is basically opposed to U.S. military intervention -- that is, disinclined to defend any other country.

Attached are additional details about the three polls on which these conclusions are based.

Drafted: PA/OAP: ^{ajc}ARichman:BRoshco:sch
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Public Believes NATO Allies Hampering U.S. Policy

Polls taken in January by NBC and ABC/Washington Post found the vast majority of Americans believe our European allies have not given sufficient support to recent U.S. foreign policies. Regarding Poland specifically, the public tends to see our allies as actually undercutting U.S. policies to reverse the military crackdown. NBC asked:

"Do you think the United States' allies in Western Europe are providing the right amount of support for American foreign policies or don't you think the allies are supporting the United States as much as they should?"

Allies not supporting U.S. enough	80%
Allies providing enough support	11
Not sure	9

NBC's question used a fairly "soft" criterion to determine whether respondents were dissatisfied with allies' support, and found that 80 percent believed our allies were not supporting the U.S. "as much as they should." ABC/Washington Post applied a much more demanding test, asking respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that: "The United States' allies, the NATO countries of Western Europe, have worked against the United States during the Polish crisis." (Underline added). The level of disapproval declined, but it was again the predominant sentiment:

Agree - allies have worked against U.S. on Poland	48%
Disagree	32
Don't know	20

Opposition to Defending Western Europe Increased Slightly

A January Roper poll found that opposition to sending U.S. troops to defend Western Europe against a Soviet invasion rose slightly during the past year -- from 35 percent in February 1981 to 41 percent in January. The level of support hardly changed during this period (from 51 percent to 49 percent).

Previous polls show public support for committing U.S. troops to Western Europe had gone up substantially during the late 1970's, and reached a high point in early 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has declined since early 1980 (particularly between early 1980 and early 1981), but still is higher than the 1978 level. These results come from four Roper polls:

"There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops, if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe?"

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
<u>Using U.S. Troops if Soviet Troops Invaded Western Europe</u>			
January 1982	49%	41%	10%
February 1981	51	35	14
February 1980	60	27	13
July 1978	43	43	14

Public Selective Regarding Where to Use U.S. Troops

Roper's January 1982 poll asked respondents about situations that might justify deploying U.S. troops. The results show the public discriminates sharply:

<u>Sending U.S. Troops</u>	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
If Soviet troops invaded Western Europe	49%	41%	10%
If Cuban troops were involved in a Communist takeover of a Central American country	42	46	12
If Soviet troops invaded Poland	31	58	11
If Israel is overrun by an Arab country	28	59	13
If Qaddafi continues his international terrorist activities	27	57	16

Attitudes Toward Defense Commitments in General

Roper's January poll reveals that a segment of the public is rather consistently interventionist and a somewhat larger segment is consistently non-interventionist. That is, 18 percent favored using U.S. troops to defend Western Europe (against Soviet attack); Poland (against Soviet attack); and "a Central American country" (against a Cuban-led military takeover). At the opposite pole, 27 percent opposed all three commitments.

These results are nearly identical to those obtained by Roper in February 1981. Since then, support for using U.S. troops to defend Poland has risen somewhat -- from 23 percent in early 1981 to 31 percent on Roper's latest survey, taken one month after the declaration of martial law. However, as

noted above, support for using troops to defend Western Europe has declined slightly during the past year. Support for using U.S. troops to thwart a Cuban-led "communist takeover" in Central America is similar to what it was last year.

Certain population groups were more likely to be interventionist: Men more than women; whites more than blacks; those earning more than \$30,000 annually more than those earning less than \$10,000; Westerners more than Easterners; and Republicans more than Democrats. There was little difference between liberals and conservatives, except that the latter were more likely to favor intervention against Cuban expansionism.

THE U.S. AND EUROPE: A POLL

For all the talk of mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic, Western Europeans and Americans still agree more than they disagree on the major questions facing their troubled alliance. That is the key result of a Newsweek Poll taken thirteen months after Ronald Reagan's Presidential Inauguration. Europeans do have significant doubts about the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. But they still admire the United States and are confident of American help if they are attacked. For their part, 52 percent of the Americans polled had significant doubts about allied support, but 1 percent still want U.S. troops to protect Western Europe. And Europeans agree overwhelmingly with Americans that it would be better to fight than to accept Soviet domination.

Surprisingly, of all the allies, people in the country thought to have the closest ties with the United States—Britain—voiced the strongest doubts about American leadership abilities in foreign affairs. About 60 percent of the Britons polled said they had little or no confidence in the wisdom of U.S. foreign policy. Equally surprising, in West Germany, where the pacifist movement has apparently reflected serious concerns about Reagan's hard-line views on dealings with the Soviet Union, the

highest share of respondents, 57 percent, said they had confidence in U.S. foreign policy.

"The most significant difference in attitude between Europeans and Americans is how people on the two continents regard the presence of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe," says Andrew Kohut, president of The Gallup Organization, which conducted the poll. Americans tend to believe these missiles protect Europe. West Germans largely agree, but Britons mainly think these weapons increase the danger of a Soviet attack, and opinion in the other European countries surveyed is about equally divided.

The poll by Gallup International was co-sponsored by Newsweek and leading newspapers and periodicals in Europe. More than 6,000 European adults participated in personal interviews in February 1982 in Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland. A separate U.S. poll was based on 2,062 interviews done between Feb. 12 and 21. Not all questions were asked in every country. Sampling errors were plus or minus 3 percentage points in the United States and 4 to 5 percentage points in Europe. Highlights from the results:

What is your over-all opinion of the United States?

	Great Britain	France	West Germany	Italy	Belgium
Favorable	46%	55%	73%	63%	49%
Unfavorable	44%	32%	24%	21%	22%
Don't know	10%	13%	3%	16%	29%

What is your over-all opinion of the Soviet Union?

	Great Britain	France	West Germany	Italy	Belgium
Favorable	14%	13%	20%	13%	11%
Unfavorable	74%	73%	77%	68%	61%
Don't know	12%	14%	3%	19%	28%

In general, how much confidence do you have in the United States to deal wisely with world problems?

	Great Britain	France	West Germany	Italy	Belgium
A great deal	6%	4%	15%	17%	7%
A fair amount	35 29%	36%	57 41%	36%	45 38%
Not very much	39%	35%	33%	18%	20%
None at all	60 21%	12%	40 7%	11%	30 10%
Don't know	5%	13%	3%	18%	25%

If your country's security was threatened by a Russian attack, how much confidence do you have in the United States to do whatever is necessary to defend your country, even if this risked a direct attack against the United States itself?

	Great Britain	West Germany	Belgium	Denmark	Switzerland
A great deal	20%	17%	12%	17%	7%
A fair amount	36%	45%	34%	32%	26%
Not very much	28%	27%	23%	25%	39%
None at all	12%	8%	10%	11%	22%
Don't know	4%	3%	21%	15%	6%

How much confidence do you have in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe against an attack?

	Great Britain	France	West Germany	Italy	Belgium
A great deal	12%	5%	16%	16%	7%
A fair amount	44%	34%	45%	33%	36%
Not very much	25%	29%	29%	19%	24%
None at all	10%	9%	6%	9%	9%
Don't know	9%	23%	4%	23%	24%

How likely do you think it is that the Soviet Union will attack Western Europe within the next five years?

	Great Britain	West Germany	Belgium	Denmark	Switzerland
Likely	21%	15%	23%	15%	25%
Not likely	72%	81%	53%	67%	71%
Don't know	7%	4%	24%	18%	4%

How likely do you think it is that the United States will attack Eastern Europe within the next five years?

	Great Britain	West Germany	Belgium	Switzerland
Likely	21%	11%	12%	10%
Not likely	72%	86%	63%	85%
Don't know	7%	3%	25%	5%

What is the effect of having American nuclear missiles stationed in Western Europe?

	Great Britain	France	West Germany	Belgium	United States
Increases chances of an attack	42%	24%	27%	24%	14%
Provides greater protection	29%	31%	41%	25%	55%
No effect	24%	23%	28%	21%	19%
Don't know	5%	22%	4%	30%	12%

What is the effect of having American troops stationed in Western Europe?

	Great Britain	West Germany	Denmark	United States
Increases chances of an attack	25%	15%	16%	10%
Provides greater protection	24%	40%	33%	61%
No effect	46%	33%	26%	19%
Don't know	5%	4%	25%	10%

*This question was asked only of those countries shown.

Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?

	Great Britain	France	West Germany	Italy	United States
Better to accept domination	12%	13%	19%	17%	6%
Better to fight	75%	57%	74%	48%	83%
Don't know	13%	30%	7%	35%	11%

March 15, 1982

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TO: Members of Interagency Group on European Public
Diplomacy

FROM: EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

1. At meeting on 3/11, the following actions were agreed:

- European Attitudes: ICA is to try to obtain full results of recent Gallup International poll in UK, FRG, France, Belgium, Switzerland, etc. (Chikas).
- Response to "Whence the Threat to Peace": Col. Halgus asked for comments by C.O.B. Friday 3/12.
- Showing of ICA film on Afghanistan: ICA to examine feasibility of showings at Foreign Press Center and/or State for press, diplomatic corps, etc. (Chikas)
- Publication on Poland: ICA reported that layout has been blocked out. ICA will examine legal and budgetary questions regarding production. State will be provided with draft text for comment. (Chikas)
- "Crime and Punishment": Text to be returned to State by ICA (Chikas). SOV (Vershbow) and PA (Pernick) to cooperate on any further editing and in determining how to release this.
- Central America: It was agreed that much needs to be done to try to gain greater understanding in Europe of our Central American policy. It was suggested that, as a first step, we should ascertain the feasibility of sending the Inman/Hughes briefing team to Europe. It was decided that this suggestion would be included as part of an overall strategy recommending how to play Central American issues in Europe. (Steiner)

2. Agenda for next meeting, Thursday, 3/18, 10:00 a.m., Rm. 6226
NS:

- Status report on above issues.
- Discussion of Marshall Plan anniversary activities (ICA and EUR/P)
- Discussion of "World Peace Congress" (SOV)

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142579	NOTES HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	5	3/18/1982	B1

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- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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McFarlane	
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142581 MEMO

4 3/22/1982 B1

STEVEN STEINER TO MEMBERS OF
INTERAGENCY GROUP ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY (HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON
REVERSE)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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