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CAS 8/29/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1982 (SEPTEMBER 1981 - FEBRUARY 1982)

FOIA

M11-443

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HAENNI

105

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
142560	CABLE	THE HAGUE 06482 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	9/25/1981	B1
142561	CABLE	USNATO 07784 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	2	12/12/1981	B1
142562	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE SHAPING ATTITUDES	4	2/4/1982	B1
142563	CABLE	012314Z FEB 82 (ANNOTATED)	3	2/1/1982	B1
142564	CABLE	ROME 03973 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	3	2/6/1982	B1
142565	CABLE	MOSCOW 01603 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	6	2/9/1982	B1
142566	CABLE	STATE 037863 <i>R 9/5/17 M443/5</i>	6	2/11/1982	B1
142567	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE SHAPING ATTITUDES	5	ND	B1
142568	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES RE SHAPING ATTITUDES	5	2/18/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
142569	LIST	RE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	1	ND	B3
142576	CABLE	STATE 043766 R 7/10/2017 M443/5	3	2/18/1982	B1
142570	LIST	RE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	2	ND	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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H-01 NSC-05 NSAE-00 SY-05 HA-06 L-03 CSCE-04
TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 MCT-02 SMS-01 SAL-01 ACDA-12
SYE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /103 W

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P 251522Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2870
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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E.O. 12065 RDS-3 9/25/01 (HABIB, MICHAEL J.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, MNUC, TNF, PINS, PINR, NL
SUBJECT: THE FALL ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN IN THE
NETHERLANDS

REF: (A) THE HAGUE 5352 (NOTAL), (B) THE HAGUE 4905
(NOTAL)

1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: THE FALL ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CAMPAIGN IS IN HIGH GEAR. IT WILL CULMINATE IN A MASS
DEMONSTRATION IN AMSTERDAM ON NOVEMBER 21, WHICH
ORGANIZERS HOPE WILL BE THE LARGEST DEMONSTRATION EVER
IN THE NETHERLANDS. SOME DUTCH NATO SUPPORTERS ARE
TRYING TO BE HEARD AMIDST THE ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
OFFENSIVE AND HAVE COUNTER-ATTACKED WITH ALLEGATIONS
OF SOVIET FUNDING OF PEACE GROUPS. NEVERTHELESS, THE
DUTCH POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE CONTINUES TO BE A DIFFICULT
ONE FOR A WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, THERE
REMAINS A SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF PUBLIC OPINION FAVORABLE
OR OPEN TO OUR POINT OF VIEW ON WHOM WE CAN HAVE A LONG-
TERM IMPACT. END SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) THE FALL ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN IS IN
HIGH GEAR. "PEACE WEEK," ORGANIZED BY A COALITION OF
GROUPS HEADED BY THE INTERCHURCH PEACE COUNCIL (IKV) AND
THE "STOP THE NEUTRON BOMB" MOVEMENT, LED OFF WITH
DEMONSTRATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 19 AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE BASE
AT SOESTERBERG AND THE DUTCH AIR FORCE BASES AT VOLKEL
AND GILZE-RIJEN. COLLECTIONS WERE HELD NATION-WIDE ON
"PEACE SUNDAY" IN MOST PROTESTANT CHURCHES ON BEHALF OF
THE IKV (ONE CHURCH GAVE ITS COLLECTION TO THE HUNGRY IN
POLAND, RATHER THAN TO THE IKV). ACTIVITIES DURING "PEACE
WEEK" INCLUDE CHURCH SERVICES, LECTURES, POLITICAL CABARET
AND MUSIC AT COMMUNITY-LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
DEMONSTRATORS CARRYING A MOCK NUCLEAR WEAPON WILL WIND
UP "PEACE WEEK" ON SEPTEMBER 26 IN THE HAGUE BY MARCHING
PAST EMBASSY ROW, PARLIAMENT AND THE PEACE PALACE.

3. (LOU) ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACTIONS WILL CONTINUE
OVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. THE IKV HAS PUBLICIZED THE
VISIT (9/29 - 10/3) OF A DDR THEOLOGICAL STUDY GROUP AND
WILL USE THE OCCASION TO "PROVE" ITS THESIS THAT CHURCH
GROUPS IN EAST AND WEST BOTH REJECT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
CAN EQUALLY MOVE THEIR GOVERNMENTS TOWARD DISARMAMENT.
THE DEFENSE TAX REFUSAL MOVEMENT WILL HOLD A NATIONAL
WORKDAY ON OCTOBER 3. "CHURCH AND PEACE" WILL HOLD A
STUDY WEEKEND (10/23-24) ON THE THEME OF "SOCIAL DEFENSE"
AND ANOTHER STUDY WEEKEND (11/20-21) ON THE THEME
"PROTEST ... DEMONSTRATE." THESE ACTIVITIES -- THERE

WILL BE OTHERS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL -- WILL CULMINATE IN
A MASS DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER 21 IN AMSTERDAM WHICH WILL
DEMAND REJECTION OF LRTNF DEPLOYMENT AND RECONSIDERATION
OF GON ADHERENCE TO MODERNIZATION. THE DEMONSTRATION'S
SPONSORS -- THE LABOR PARTY, D'66, THE SMALL LEFT
PARTIES, IKV, "STOP THE N-BOMB," PAX CHRISTI AND SEVERAL
LABOR UNIONS -- HOPE TO MAKE IT THE LARGEST DEMONSTRATION
EVER HELD HERE. THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A MEETING
(11/23-27) OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, ALSO IN
AMSTERDAM, WHOSE AGENDA WILL INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE,
LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR, DETERRENCE, PROSPECTS FOR ARMS
CONTROL, UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT AND THE EFFECT OF THE
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE ON THE THIRD WORLD.

4. (LOU) DUTCH PEACE GROUPS EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR
EFFORTS ARE PART OF A EUROPEAN-WIDE ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CAMPAIGN. THEY ALSO STRESS THAT PEACE ACTIONS WILL
TAKE PLACE ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE (IN BONN, 10/10; LONDON,
10/24; BRUSSELS AND PARIS, 10/25 AND PEACE WEEK IN THE
FRG, 11/15-22), CULMINATING IN MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN
BRUSSELS DURING THE NATO MINISTERIAL (12/6-11).

5. (LOU) THE CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BRED A (ALSO THE
CHAIRMAN OF PAX CHRISTI), HAS OPPOSED GLCM DEPLOYMENT IN
THE NETHERLANDS. HIS ACTION FOLLOWS PUBLICATION OF THE
RESULTS OF A TELEPHONE SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE CATHOLIC
BROADCASTING SERVICE (KRO), ASSERTING THAT OVER 61
PERCENT OF DUTCH ROMAN CATHOLICS FAVOR UNILATERAL STEPS
TO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE NETHERLANDS; 32
PERCENT ARE OPPOSED TO SUCH MOVES. WHILE THE SURVEY'S
TECHNIQUES AND CONCLUSIONS MAY BE QUESTIONABLE, ITS
APPEARANCE WAS NONETHELESS ONE MORE PUBLIC RELATIONS
GAIN FOR THE DUTCH ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT. THE

FILE: SHAPING
EUROPEAN
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BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 ICA-11 DODE-00
H-01 NSC-05 NSAE-00 SY-05 HA-06 L-03 CSCE-04
TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 MCT-02 SMS-01 SAL-01 ACDA-12
SYE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /103 W

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P 251522Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRI 2871
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USNATO
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THE NOVEMBER 21 DEMONSTRATION. A D'66 M.P. HAS EXPLAINED TO US THAT HIS PARTY ALSO DOES NOT WANT TO LEAVE THE FIELD TO THE ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS MOVEMENT AND SEEKS A DIALOGUE WITH IT TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE PUBLIC THAT THE QUESTION IS TOO COMPLEX TO BE SOLVED BY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS SUCH AS UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT. THE CDA HAS REFUSED TO CO-SPONSOR THE AMSTERDAM DEMONSTRATION, BUT CONTINUES TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS WITH IKV SYMPATHIZERS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND REMAINS SPLIT ON ITS PUBLIC HANDLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES. THE DUTCH POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WILL BE A DIFFICULT ONE FOR A WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE. THERE REMAINS, HOWEVER, A SUBSTANTIAL SHARE OF DUTCH PUBLIC OPINION FAVORABLE OR OPEN TO OUR POINT OF VIEW ON WHOM WE CAN HAVE AN IMPACT OVER THE LONG-TERM. DYESS

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POLL NOTED, THOUGH, THAT ONE-THIRD OF THOSE FAVORING UNILATERAL STEPS BELIEVE SUCH INITIATIVES SHOULD TAKE NATIONAL SECURITY INTO CONSIDERATION.

6. (U) MEANWHILE, THE IKV HAS ANNOUNCED A NEW STRATEGY. IKV SECRETARY FABER SAID TOO MUCH EMPHASIS HAD BEEN PLACED ON LOBBYING WITH M.P.S. IN THE HAGUE AND THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT SHOULD SHIFT TO "A SHOW OF POWER" THROUGH MASS ACTION. THE IKV WILL ALSO DEVOTE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LOCAL ELECTIONS NEXT SPRING AND WILL PRESS CANDIDATES AND PARTIES TO ADVOCATE THAT MUNICIPAL COUNCILS PROHIBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELATED ACTIVITIES (TRANSPORT, STORAGE, SHELTERS) WITHIN THEIR BORDERS IN ORDER TO CREATE "NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE MUNICIPALITIES." FABER RECOGNIZED THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COULD OVER-RIDE SUCH MUNICIPAL DECISIONS BUT POINTED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF YET ANOTHER SYMBOLIC REJECTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. (U) HOWEVER, THE IKV AND OTHER PEACE GROUPS HAVE NOT HAD THE FIELD ENTIRELY TO THEMSELVES. FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER DE GEUS (CDA) HAS BEEN SPEAKING OUT IN SUPPORT OF LRTNF DEPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS. GAINING MORE ATTENTION WERE ASSERTIONS BY TILBURG UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR ALTING VAN GESAU, A RESPECTED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, AND SEVERAL LIBERAL PARTY M.P.S. REGARDING FINANCING -- POSSIBLY BY THE SOVIETS -- OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN OF THE IKV AND "STOP THE NEUTRON BOMB" GROUP. STUNG BY THE ACCUSATIONS AND CONCERNED THAT THEY COULD UNDERCUT THEIR FALL ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAMPAIGN, THE IKV AND "STOP THE NEUTRON-BOMB" GROUP FLATLY REJECTED THE CHARGES (SEE SEPTTEL).

8. (C) COMMENT: THE PEACE GROUPS INTEND TO KEEP PUBLIC ATTENTION FOCUSED THROUGH THE FALL ON LRTNF DEPLOYMENT, THE "NEUTRON BOMB" AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY SEEK TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT THE STRENGTH OF ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS SENTIMENTS IN THE COUNTRY. THE PROSPECTS FOR DUTCH NATO SUPPORTERS TRYING TO UNDERCUT THEIR EFFORTS ARE NOT GOOD. THE COALITION PARTIES, EACH WITH ITS OWN SUBSTANTIAL ANTI-NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACTION, HOPE TO GET BY THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WITH A MINIMUM OF TROUBLE. THE LABOR PARTY TELLS US IT IS SUPPORTING THE NOVEMBER 21 DEMONSTRATION TO AVOID HAVING IT DIRECTED BY THE RADICAL, LEFT PARTIES. LABOR'S INVOLVEMENT, HOWEVER, WILL BE HALF-HEARTED IN ORDER NOT TO EMBARRASS PVDA MINISTERS. D'66, WHICH DISAGREES WITH THE PEACE GROUPS' EFFORT TO REVERSE THE GON POSITION ON MODERNIZATION, HAS NEVERTHELESS ALSO AGREED TO SPONSOR

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ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY.

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ACTION OFFICE PMS-02
INFO PMP-01 EUR-03 PMA-01 PA-01 PMS-01 PM-01 PP-01
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INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 N-01 NSC-05
NSAE-00 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 ACDA-12 SP-02
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USICA WASHDC 0135

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STATE FOR EUR, GOMPERT AND PALMER; USICA FOR EU GILBERT;
OSD/TSP FOR MG BOVARIE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/07/81 (BENNETT, W. TAPLEY) OR-M
TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: MAINTAINING AND/OR INCREASING EUROPEAN
DEFENSE RESOURCES IN A RECESSION

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: ALLIED DEFENSE SPENDING IS FREQUENTLY THE TARGET OF BUDGET-CUTTERS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT RECESSION. WE QUESTION, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE BASIC ECONOMIC PREMISES OF THE EUROPEAN DEBATE, WHICH PORTRAYS DEFENSE EXPENDITURE SOLELY AS A "BURDEN", COMPETING WITH ALLEGEDLY MORE URGENT "SOCIAL" OBJECTIVES, ARE IN FACT ANALYTICALLY CORRECT. MARKET ECONOMICS IS NOT A "ZERO SUM GAME", AND PARTICULARLY IN A RECESSION WITH HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND INDUSTRIAL UNDERUTILIZATION, MAINTAINING OR EVEN ENHANCING DEFENSE OUTLAYS SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON ALLIED "SOCIAL" OBJECTIVES, IN ADDITION TO ADVANCING SECURITY.

3. COMMUNICATING THIS PERSPECTIVE IS TRICKY IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL CLIMATE, BUT TO THE DEGREE IT COULD BE DONE IT COULD HELP SUSTAIN ALLIED GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND LABOR SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS IN THE CURRENT RECESSION, AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO A MORE SERIOUS ANALYSIS OF THE LONG-TERM ROLE OF THE DEFENSE SECTOR. THIS MESSAGE RECOMMENDS THAT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS BE UNDERTAKEN ON THE TOPIC, EITHER IN-HOUSE OR BY CONTRACT, AS A BASIS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLICY ACTION WITH NATO ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

4. FREQUENTLY, WHEN WE HAVE PRESSED ALLIES FOR INCREASES IN DEFENSE SPENDING, OR THE MAINTENANCE OF PRESENT LEVELS, WE HAVE RECEIVED THE RESPONSE THAT WHILE SECURITY IS IMPORTANT, IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE DOMESTIC SOCIAL PEACE AND WELFARE, AND THAT THEREFORE PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN TO SOCIAL PROGRAMS. THIS ARGUMENT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY STRONG FROM SOME QUARTERS IN THE FRG, WHERE THE BUDGET DEBATE HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT AND THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE SPD-FDP COALITION ARE GROWING. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ITS BASIC PREMISE, I.E., THAT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE "LOST" TO THE ECONOMY AND ARE THE ENEMY OF SOCIAL OBJECTIVES, IS INCORRECT, AND THAT CAREFUL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS COULD POSITIVELY AFFECT GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN EUROPE TOWARDS DEFENSE SPENDING IN A PERIOD OF

5. OUR REASONS FOR SKEPTICISM ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ALLIED ARGUMENTS INCLUDE THE SHARPLY FALLING OPPORTUNITY COST FOR MILITARY OR CIVILIAN LABOR IN A SITUATION OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, THE HIGH COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, AND THE DAMAGE TO INDUSTRY AND THE TECHNOLOGY BASE AS WELL AS THE DEFENSE POSTURE CAUSED BY BUDGET-DETERMINED PROCUREMENT STRETCH-OUTS AND CANCELLATIONS. AN ANALYSIS OF THESE AND OTHER FACTORS WOULD BE REQUIRED BY NATION AND SECTOR TO DETERMINE WHERE ALLIED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES PRESENTLY HELP TO SUPPORT "SOCIAL" OBJECTIVES, OR COULD DO SO IF INCREASED, AND AREAS WHERE THEY ARE OR WOULD BE SIMPLY INFLATIONARY, BECAUSE MANPOWER OR RESOURCES ARE ALREADY FULLY COMMITTED. WE SUSPECT THERE IS IN FACT CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

6. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO ARGUE THAT DEFENSE IS AN ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL PANACEA; THIS IS BOTH ANALYTICALLY SIMPLISTIC AND POLITICALLY UNTENABLE. BUT WE CAN ARGUE THAT DEFENSE IS NOT A DIRECT ENEMY OF SOCIAL OBJECTIVES; THAT FREE MARKET ECONOMICS IS NOT A "ZERO SUM GAME"; THAT IN THE COURSE OF MEETING OBJECTIVELY DETERMINED DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS, NATIONS MAY ALSO BE ACCOMPLISHING SOCIAL PURPOSES WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE TO BE FUNDED SEPARATELY; AND THAT IT SHOULD THUS BE POSSIBLE TO VIEW DEFENSE EXPENDITURES MORE POSITIVELY IN THE PRESENT RECESSION.

7. RECOMMENDATION: THIS QUESTION COULD BE OF IMPORTANCE TO OUR PUBLIC INFORMATION EFFORTS, AS WELL AS TO PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIED GOVERN-

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NLRRM 443/5 #142561
BY: RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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INFO CCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 H-01 NSC-05
NSAL-00 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 ACDA-12 SP-02
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USICA WASHDC 0136

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MENTS. AS A BASIS FOR POSSIBLE EFFORTS, WE RECOMMEND
THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO EXPLORATORY ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, EITHER IN-HOUSE OR BY EXTERNAL CONTRACT,
INTO THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL
FUTURE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF ALLIED DEFENSE EXPENDITURE
ON EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ACTIVITY. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE IS
CONTAINED IN PAPER WE ARE POUCHING TO EUR/RPM.

BENNETT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Phi Lam: u

V Vietnam

Mister Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary General
United Nations
New York 10017
U.S.A.

January 28, 1982

NVT/jdl 0131

Dear Sir,

Subject : Vietnamese workers in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The World Confederation of Labour (WCL) is deeply worried by persistent information from various sources with regard to the sending of thousands Vietnamese workers to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe. For the time being, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of workers concerned, but according to information we received, this number may rise up to 500,000 between 1981 and 1985.

The World Confederation of Labour is mainly concerned by the recruiting and employment conditions, and particularly by the payment of the Vietnamese workers' salaries in the wastelands and mines of Siberia (Soviet Union), East Germany and Bulgaria. Anxious about this situation, we would like to request your good offices to solicit from the governments concerned fuller particularities on the recruiting and employment, living and working conditions, as well as the communication of the texts of the agreements concluded between the host countries and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Other sources of information indicate that these Vietnamese workers are being forced to go or that their work can be considered as slavery; however, it is certain that they will live in segregated communities with little or no contact with the local population.

Information from other sources make us fear that the sending of the Vietnamese workers to Eastern Europe and especially to the Soviet Union has been planned in order to offset Vietnam's foreign military and economic indebtedness with the soviet bloc. The arrangements made indicate that the Vietnamese government and workers share 40% of the wages, whereas the remaining 60% would be credited against Vietnam's debt with the Comecon countries. Under these conditions, we have serious doubts on the application of the international standards

- n° 29 (Forced Labour, 1930)
 - n° 95 (Protection of Wages, 1949)
 - n° 111 (Discrimination in matters of Employment and Occupation, 1958)
- put forward by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and ratified by the countries concerned.

b

As the agenda of the next ILO Conference contains the revision of the said conventions, it will be urgent to obtain from the governments concerned the texts of the agreements - provided they exist - on this matter as well as all pertinent information in order to allow the Conference to examine if the Vietnamese workers are being well treated in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and East Germany, in accordance with the ILO standards and especially with the provisions contained in the said conventions.

It will be highly appreciated if you would kindly invite the countries concerned to ratify the conventions n° 97 and 143 on Migrant Workers as well as to secure their effective observance for the benefit of the migrant workers employed in their countries.

Confident that you will give special attention to the observations contained in this letter, we remain

Yours faithfully

Nguyen Van Tanh
Deputy Secretary General

Confidential

Foreign Report

Published by The Economist Newspaper Limited
25 St James's Street, London SW1A 1HG
1695 September 17, 1981

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The effect of a nuclear holocaust

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"Guest workers" in the Soviet Union

The secretary-general of Vietnam's Communist party, **Le Duan**, and the deputy prime minister, **To Huu**, visited Moscow last week. They met **President Brezhnev** and other Soviet leaders and discussed their growing economic difficulties, including the high cost of supporting an army of over 1m men, one fifth of them based in Cambodia. Vietnam is increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union.

Le Duan informed the Russians that the monthly food ration has dropped from 13 kilos of rice to eight kilos of rice, sweet potatoes or maize. For meat, 100 grams is the monthly norm. One kilo of meat of the black market costs about two weeks' wages.

Brezhnev promised Le Duan to increase Soviet economic support as well as military aid to Vietnam. Within the next five years the Russians will support 40 more industrial projects and will intensify oil exploration. The leaders may also have talked about a new means by which the Vietnamese government is planning to offset its massive debts to the Soviet block: the provision of large numbers of Vietnamese "guest workers".

Estimates of numbers vary, but authoritative east European sources say that up to 500,000 Vietnamese may work in eastern Europe between 1981 and 1985. Most are destined for the Soviet Union, where they will live in segregated communities with little contact with the local population. This scheme, quite separate from the training of party cadres, was hatched at the 34th session of the Communist world's trade grouping Comecon in Prague last year. The Vietnamese workers are due to receive 40% of their wages in local currency and the remaining 60% would be credited against Vietnam's trading debts with the Comecon countries.

Since the Vietnamese cannot afford to send skilled labour or technicians, the "guest workers" are unskilled labourers who are expected to work in remote development projects in Siberia and elsewhere. According to official Soviet statements, there were around 2m unfilled job vacancies in the Soviet Union last November and Brezhnev has said that up to 400,000 additional workers will be needed in the next few years to

develop new oil and gas fields in western Siberia.

This is the background for the Soviet and Vietnamese decision in July to sign an agreement "on the movement of citizens of Vietnam and the Soviet Union between the two countries". Scheduled air services from Hanoi to Prague began in June. A regular service from Hanoi to Sofia will start in October. Since some 15,000 Vietnamese are expected to travel to Bulgaria for periods of between three and five years from 1981 to 1985, the new air service can expect to be busy. There are already regular flights between Hanoi and Moscow.

The Comecon countries have struck a hard bargain but the Vietnamese had little choice. Indentured labour will help to offset the country's debts and reduce unemployment, which the chairman of the state planning commission, **Nguyen Lam**, admitted in February was around 1m. The total external debt, according to previously unpublished Vietnamese government figures, is now \$3 billion of which some \$1.4 billion is in convertible currencies and \$1.6 billion is in non-convertible currencies like roubles. Debt servicing cost \$25m in 1976 and has grown to about \$240m this year. In 1980, debt servicing amounted to 57% of Vietnamese exports.

The Soviet Union pumps the equivalent of \$6m a day into Vietnam's economy but it is tied to the provision of Soviet goods and services. Soviet wool arrives in Hanoi for the manufacture of carpets which are exported back to the Soviet Union. Russian influence over the Vietnamese economy is growing steadily.

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It is well known that Western Europeans are unhappy when the US appears too weak but also when our leadership looks too strong. The Carter administration was "vacillating" and the Reagan Administration verges on "belligerency." These are slogans, however, and do not express the deeper concerns of European elites as they view American policy-making. What Europeans see at stake in debates between "Defense" and "State" (to use the shorthand that has become common) is whether Western Europe remains central or has become peripheral to US concerns.

What troubles Europeans is that they see a "logic" to such evolution deriving from more than the influence of "Californians" in the present Administration; it cannot simply be shrugged off as electoral accident. The logic is a function of America's global interests; the growing ability of the Soviet Union to project its power; the relative power vacuums in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific; and Western Europe's apparent "failure of will."

At the same time, Europeans do not believe that the US can afford to write off Western Europe. This does not, generally, produce the cynical reaction that Europeans can ignore American demands for toughness towards the USSR because, after all, the US needs Europe. It does not lead to this response because the Europeans see what has come to be called "global unilateralism" as also a real force in the US. The net result, at least among the more sophisticated, is neither exasperation with vacillation nor genuine fear of belligerency, but rather concern over an eventual paralysis of decision-making in Washington.

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The danger of such a perception is that it seems to hold out little promise of support to those--and they exist in all the European countries--prone to argue the necessity of indefinite reliance on the US and the Alliance. Put simply, the Europeans are not sure what they are relying on.

This suggests that bringing coherence to our relations with Western Europe may depend as much on how coherent a view of Europe's role in the world emerges in Washington as on European responses to whatever is the latest US campaign. "Coherent relations" does not equate to frictionless relations. But it does imply some commonality between European and American views of the extent to which, for the US, Western Europe is, on the one hand, ends, and on the other hand, means.

Unless the US--not, one day, "State," and the next day, "Defense"--attempts such a clarification of Europe's role (and not just in an American-directed, but preferably a jointly produced, opera), the prospects are good that Western Europe's internal debate will evolve in directions that will entail alienation from the US.

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EXDIS
FROM VATICAN OFFICE
E. O. 12065: RDS-4 2/16/2012 (HORN BLOW, MICHAEL)
TAGS: PEPR, PROP, SCUL, UR, VT, US
SUBJECT: BILLY GRAHAM PARTICIPATION IN MOSCOW "WORLD
PEACE CONFERENCE"
REF: BUDAPEST 0754

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DR. ALEXANDER HARASZTI (BILLY GRAHAM'S SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ADVISOR) MET WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS FEBRUARY 12 TO DISCUSS WITH THEM THE MOSCOW "PEACE CONFERENCE". DURING HIS MEETING AT THE VATICAN HE CONVEYED AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM METROPOLITAN FILARET TO CARDINAL CASAROLI URGING HIGH LEVEL VATICAN ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE. HE ALSO ADVISED HIS VATICAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT DR. GRAHAM WOULD BE ATTENDING THE PEACE CONFERENCE. THE VATICAN'S REACTION TO HIS REMARKS WAS COOL AND NON-COMMITTAL. DURING HIS ROME STOPOVER, HARASZTI ALSO VISITED THIS OFFICE AND TRIED TO EXPLAIN WHY GRAHAM WILL BE ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE. WE TOLD HIM QUITE BLUNTLY WHY WE THOUGHT THIS WAS A MISTAKE. END SUMMARY.

3. DR. HARASZTI ACCOMPANIED BY AN OFFICIAL FROM THE SECRETARIAT FOR CHRISTIAN UNITY MET WITH MONSIGNOR AUDRYS BACKIS (DE FACTO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER) ON FEBRUARY 12. HARASZTI CONVEYED AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM METROPOLITAN FILARET TO CARDINAL CASAROLI URGING THAT THE VATICAN SEND AN OFFICIAL HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE. HARASZTI HAD MEMORIZED THIS MESSAGE WORD FOR WORD AND REPEATED IT TWICE. HARASZTI ALSO MENTIONED THAT FILARET HAD CONVEYED AN ALMOST IDENTICAL MESSAGE TO CARDINAL WILLEBRANDS WHO IS THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECRETARIAT FOR CHRISTIAN UNITY.

4. HARASZTI THEN EXPLAINED WHY DR. GRAHAM HAD DECIDED TO ATTEND THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE. HE NOTED THAT DR. GRAHAM WOULD BE ATTENDING WITHOUT THE BLESSINGS OF THE U. S. STATE DEPARTMENT BUT WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN. MONSIGNOR BACKIS' REACTION TO ALL THIS WAS COOL AND NON-COMMITTAL. BACKIS MENTIONED THE POLISH SITUATION AND SUGGESTED THAT THE VATICAN WOULD NOT DECIDE UNTIL LATER ABOUT ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE AND ITS DECISION WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY WHAT

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HAPPENS DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

5. BEFORE GOING TO THE VATICAN HARASZTI STOPPED BY THIS OFFICE AND WENT OVER MUCH THE SAME GROUND AS HE DID IN BUDAPEST (REFTEL). HE EXPLAINED TO US IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THAT IN RETURN FOR GRAHAM'S ATTENDANCE THE SOVIETS HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING CONCESSIONS:

- (A) DR. GRAHAM WILL BE ALLOWED TO SPEAK FOR 30 MINUTES INSTEAD OF THE TEN MINUTES BEING ALLQCATED TO OTHER SPEAKERS
- (B) DR. GRAHAM WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PREACH (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SPEAKING) AT BOTH THE ORTHODOX AND BAPTIST CHURCHES IN MOSCOW
- (C) DR. GRAHAM'S THREE AIDES WOULD BE INCLUDED AS OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION RATHER THAN THE DELEGATE PLUS ONE LIMIT IMPOSED ON THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS
- (D) DR. GRAHAM WOULD BE ALLOWED TO BRING IN A REPORTER AND A TV CAMERAMAN TO RECORD HIS SPEECH AND SERMONS. THIS, ACCORDING TO HARASZTI, WILL MAKE THE SOVIETS LESS INCLINED TO TAKE DR. GRAHAM'S REMARKS OUT OF CONTEXT FOR PROPOGANDA PURPOSES.

6. DR. HARASZTI WENT TO CONSIDERABLE PAINS TO TELL ME THAT DR. GRAHAM HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE PRESIDENT HAD STATED THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO DR. GRAHAM'S GOING TO THE SOVIET UNION TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. I TOLD HARASZTI THAT I WAS NOT AT ALL IMPRESSED WITH THIS BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAD PROBABLY NOT BEEN BRIEFED ABOUT THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" BEFORE HIS DISCUSSION WITH DR. GRAHAM.

7. I TOLD HARASZTI THAT WE HAD BEEN WELL INFORMED ABOUT HIS TRAVELS AND HIS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE USSR. I SAID

THAT DR. GRAHAM'S APPEARANCE WOULD ONLY LEND CREDIBILITY AND LEGITIMACY TO THE CONFERENCE. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO THE POLICY OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT. IT WAS OUR UNDER-
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FROM VATICAN OFFICE
STANDING THAT BOTH THE VATICAN AND THE ANGLICAN CHURCHES
WERE NOT PLANNING ON SENDING DELEGATES. IF THEY SENT
ANYONE IT WOULD BE A LOW LEVEL OBSERVER. IF ANY ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOPS COME FROM WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, IT WOULD
ONLY BE BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO GO BY THEIR
GOVERNMENTS.

8. I REMINDED HARASZTI OF THE RECENT PEACE DEMONSTRATIONS IN MAJOR WESTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE ANTI-U. S. AND ANTI-NATO DEMONSTRATIONS WERE PLANNED BY THE SOVIET UNION. FOR DR. GRAHAM TO ATTEND THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" ADDS CREDIBILITY TO SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS AND SUBVERTS THE EFFORTS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT.

9. DR. HARASZTI DID NOT SEEM IMPRESSED BY THESE ARGUMENTS. HE IN FACT DISREGARDED THEM AND WENT ON TO TELL ME THAT HE HAD SOUGHT ADVICE FROM METROPOLITAN FILARET ON WHAT SUBJECTS DR. GRAHAM MIGHT COVER IN HIS SPEECH TO THE PLENARY SESSION AND IN HIS TWO SERMONS. FILARET SUGGESTED THAT IN HIS SPEECH GRAHAM COULD MENTION THE DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AND THE NEED TO REDUCE ARMS IN BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE. REGARDING THE SERMONS, FILARET SUGGESTED THAT GRAHAM STICK STRICTLY TO THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF PEACE, BROTHERHOOD AND LOVE.

10. FINALLY, DR. HARASZTI EXPLAINED THAT DR. GRAHAM WOULD DEPART FROM THE CONFERENCE BEFORE IT OFFICIALLY ENDS BECAUSE OF A SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND. ONCE THIS BECAME KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS, THEY HAD OFFERED TO LET HIM PREACH TWO MORE SERMONS AT LATER DATES PROVIDED THAT HE STAY ON FOR THE ENTIRE CONFERENCE. DR. HARASZTI HAD REFUSED THIS OFFER BECAUSE HE FELT THAT DR. GRAHAM SHOULD LEAVE BEFORE THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDES.
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TAGS: COE, PEPR, PORG, ST

SUBJECT: THE POLITICAL REAWAKENING OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1. THE FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM AMCONGEN STRASBOURG:

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE (COE) IS UNDER-
GOING A POLITICAL REVIVAL. MADE UP OF THE 10 EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY COUNTRIES PLUS 11 OTHER EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES.

THE COE IS INTENSIFYING THE SCOPE AND DEPTH OF ITS
INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND IS
PROMOTING ITSELF AS A FORUM FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN
THE WORLD'S PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACIES WHILE THESE
OBJECTIVES HAVE YET TO BE FULLY REALIZED. THERE IS
GROWING EVIDENCE THAT BOTH ITS MEMBER STATES AND
PARLIAMENTARIANS WISH TO SEE THE COE PLAY A MORE
POLITICALLY ACTIVE AND OUTWARD LOOKING ROLE IN

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EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. END SUMMARY.
2. A COMBINATION OF EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND INTERNAL DYNAMICS APPEAR TO HAVE AWAKENED INTEREST IN THE LATENT POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. CRIGINALLY ENVISIONED BY ITS FOUNDERS (IN 1949) AS THE DRIVING FORCE FOR EUROPEAN UNITY AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, THE STRASBOURG-BASED COE HAD LAPSED INTO A CONCENTRATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (FOR WHICH IT IS JUSTLY RENOWNED) AND "CREEPING EUROPEANIZATION" (THROUGH MORE THAN 100 INTRAGOVERNMENTAL CONVENTIONS). NOW, WITH NEW INTERNAL LEADERSHIP AND MORE INTERESTED MEMBER STATES, THIS LOW PROFILE APPEARS TO BE CHANGING. THIS IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN TWO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE OF POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.

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3. INCREASED POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS. OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. SEVERAL PERM REPS FROM EC MEMBER STATES HAVE BEEN TELLING US OF AN EC-10 INTEREST IN A CLOSER DIALOGUE WITH OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS-- AND OF THE GROWING VIEW THAT THE COE WAS, AS A "FLEET-IN-BEING", THE BEST PLACE TO PURSUE IT. WE WERE ALSO HEARING, ESPECIALLY FROM THE SWISS AND AUSTRIAN, THAT THE NEUTRALS IN THE COE WOULD WELCOME SUCH CONSULTATIONS. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE, INITIALLY LACKING, HAS BEGUN TO ACCUMULATE:

-- AT ITS NOVEMBER 1981 SESSION, THE COMMITTEE OF

MINISTERS (AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL AND WITH THE SWISS IN THE CHAIR) AFFIRMED ITS RESOLVE TO INTENSIFY POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE COE CONTEXT.

-- ON JANUARY 22, THE FRG PERM REP PAID A SPECIAL CALL TO TELL US THAT BONN HAD EXPRESSED ITS EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR A WIDER POLITICAL ROLE FOR THE COE DURING THE JUST CONCLUDED VISIT OF ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT AREILZA.

-- FINALLY, AND MOST RECENTLY, US MINISTER OF STATE DOUGLAS HURD, ADDRESSING THE ASSEMBLY'S PLENARY JANUARY 26 AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, CPENED HIS SPEECH BY STRESSING THAT, "THE IMPROVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLITICAL COOPERATION AMONG THE TEN APPROVED DURING OUR PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MAKE IT EVEN MORE DESIRABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN INCREASE IN THE CONSULTATION ON PCLITICAL QUESTIONS BETWEEN ALL OF THE 21. DURING THE UK CHAIRMANSHIP WE HOPE TO SEE SOME FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL EXCHANGES IN THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS. BOTH AT THE MINISTERIAL

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LEVEL AND AT THE LEVEL OF DEPUTIES. AS A SPECIFIC
EXAMPLE, HURD NOTED THAT IN ADDITION TO ONGOING
CONSULTATIONS, AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PROBLEMS
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OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WITH PARTICIPATION OF
SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, WOULD TAKE PLACE IN
THE NEAR FUTURE.

WHILE ALL THIS IS A LONG WAY FROM THE EC-10'S POLITICAL
COOPERATION SYSTEM, IT DOES SEEM TO BE AN EXPRESSION
OF COMMON INTEREST IN A BROADER WESTERN EUROPEAN
POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

4. "WORLD DEMOCRATIC FORUM" INITIATIVE. IN ITS
VIEW, THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY HAS TO SOME EXTENT
ALREADY BECOME A WORLDWIDE DEMOCRATIC FORUM, FOR
AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR THE DEBATE ON THE CECD'S
ACTIVITIES IS ATTENDED BY PARLIAMENTARIANS FROM SUCH
OTHER OECD COUNTRIES AS THE US, CANADA, JAPAN,

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AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND FINLAND. SHORTLY AFTER HIS ELECTION IN MAY 1981 THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, JOSE MARIA DE AREILZA (FORMER SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER AND DIPLOMAT), BEGAN TO ACTIVELY CHAMPION THE IDEA OF BRINGING TOGETHER IN STRASBOURG, EVERY YEAR OR TWO BEGINNING IN 1983, PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE WORLD'S PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACIES. WHILE IT IS EXPLAINED THAT THE "STRASBOURG CONFERENCES" WOULD NOT SEEK TO COMPETE WITH THE UN, IT IS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT DEMOCRACIES ACCOUNT ONLY FOR 30 OR SO STATES OUT OF A UN MEMBERSHIP OF 156. AREILZA'S VIEW, WIDELY SUPPORTED BY HIS ASSEMBLY, IS THAT THE NEED FOR THIS DISTINCT MINORITY TO STICK TOGETHER--AND PROJECT A POSITIVE IMAGE--IS A MATTER OF POLITICAL COMMON SENSE.

5. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, WHOSE OWN PARLIAMENTARIANS REPRESENT 21 OF THE WORLD'S DEMOCRACIES, IS IN EFFECT OFFERING ITSELF AS A FORUM FOR THIS PURPOSE. FORMALLY LAUNCHED QUIETLY LAST OCTOBER, THE "STRASBOURG

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CONFERENCE" PROPOSAL HAS REPORTEDLY RECEIVED GENERALLY FAVORABLE INITIAL RESPONSES, AND OUR COE SOURCES BELIEVE THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO GATHER MOMENTUM. IN ANY EVENT, THE COE IS LEADING UP TO THE FALL 1983 TARGET DATE BY HOSTING A SERIES OF PANELS-- FOLLOWED BY ASSEMBLY DEBATES--ON EUROPE'S RELATIONS WITH ITS PRINCIPAL PARTNERS. THE FIRST, ON NORTH

AMERICAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS, WAS HELD IN 1981; THIS YEAR WILL FEATURE RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND JAPAN; AND THERE IS TALK THAT EUROPEAN-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL BE NEXT.

6. IT SHOULD BE ADDED THAT, AFTER MANY YEARS ON THE FRINGE OF THE MAIN EUROPEAN POLITICAL ACTION, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRINCIPALS (PARLIAMENTARIANS, PERM REPS AND SENIOR SECRETARIAT) ALL APPEAR TO SHARE A SENSE OF RESTRAINED, BUT NOTICEABLE, ANTICIPATION THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED DEVELOPMENTS WILL PROSPER. AS EUROPE'S OLDEST AND GEOGRAPHICALLY MOST EXTENSIVE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION--AND BOASTING HISTORY'S FIRST INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY BODY--THE COE BELIEVES IT IS WELL-PLACED TO FACILITATE AND PROMOTE BOTH INCREASED MEMBER STATE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND MORE SYSTEMATIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE WORLD'S MINORITY OF DEMOCRACIES. IF IT IS EVEN MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE WILL ASSUME ENHANCED RELEVANCE FOR U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. GALBRAITH

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PEACE CONFERENCE" IN MAY ARE MOVING INTO HIGH GEAR, INDICATING THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN MOSCOW'S "PEACE OFFENSIVE" DESIGNED TO DISTORT AND FRUSTRATE U.S. DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES. ON THE SAME DAY THAT METROPOLITAN FILARET RECEIVED BILLY GRAHAM'S ACCEPTANCE, HE USED THE FACT OF GRAHAM'S ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE TO TRY TO CONVINCE ANOTHER RELUCTANT INVITEE TO ATTEND. FILARET THEN DEPARTED FOR THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE TO SEEK HIGH-LEVEL ROMAN CATHOLIC ATTENDANCE. WE HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT SOME STATE LEADERS, SUCH AS INDIRA GANDHI, WILL BE INVITED TO ATTEND. THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE FOR THE CONFERENCE IS REPORTEDLY ALREADY IN DRAFT; IT (1) ENCOURAGES WESTERN PEACE MOVEMENTS, (2) CONDEMNS NEW WEAPONS SUCH AS THE NEUTRON BOMB, (3) URGES PROGRESS IN INF AND THE BEGINNING OF START, AND (4) CALLS FOR FOREIGN AID INSTEAD OF ARMS. THIS ALL TRACKS CLOSELY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS AND SPEECHES OF THE PREPARATORY SESSION HELD IN MOSCOW IN LATE JANUARY WHICH WERE DIRECTED SOLELY AT CRITICIZING THE UNITED STATES BY NAME OR IMPLICATION. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE ADOPTED AT THE PREPARATORY SESSION WILL GUARANTEE THE EXCLUSION OF MOST WESTERN PRESS AND WILL PREVENT ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. THE ORGANIZERS ARE SAID TO BE CONSIDERING WHETHER THE CONFERENCE SHOULD MAKE SOME KIND OF AWARD TO BREZHNEV FOR HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE. ACTION SUGGESTED: THAT RECIPIENT POSTS MAKE THE OBVIOUS PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES OF THIS CONFERENCE CLEAR TO POTENTIAL ATTENDEES IN THEIR COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

142565

3. PREPARATIONS FOR THE "WORLD CONFERENCE: RELIGIOUS WORKERS FOR SAVING THE SACRED GIFT OF LIFE FROM NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE" TO BE HELD IN MOSCOW IN MAY ARE MOVING AHEAD BRISKLY. A PREPARATORY SESSION WAS HELD IN MOSCOW JANUARY 26-28 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF METROPOLITAN FILARET, FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPUTY AND HEIR APPARENT TO PATRIARCH PIMEN. THIS SESSION DETERMINED THE AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE AND ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE (DISCUSSED BELOW). FILARET IS NOW BUSILY SEEKING AS WIDE ATTENDANCE AS POSSIBLE AT THE CONFERENCE BY WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURES. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT OVER FOUR HUNDRED INVITATIONS HAVE GONE OUT FOR THE CONFERENCE: HOWEVER, THE BT

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TAGS: PEPR, PROP, SCUL, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET "WORLD PEACE CONFERENCE" SHIFTS
INTO HIGH GEAR

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 1500 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS,
(B) ROME 0024 (NOTAL), (C) STATE 17037 (NOTAL),
(D) 81 MOSCOW 16883, (E) ROME 3206 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: PREPARATIONS FOR THE MOSCOW "WORLD

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M443/5 #142565

BY RW NARA DATE 9/5/17

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ON SUNDAY, MAY 9, WHICH JUST HAPPENS TO BE SOVIET VICTORY DAY.

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4. THE MOST IMPORTANT WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURE TO ACCEPT FILARET'S INVITATION SO FAR IS **BILLY GRAHAM** (REPORTED REF A). LITERALLY WITHIN MINUTES OF LEARNING OF GRAHAM'S ACCEPTANCE FROM A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GRAHAM ORGANIZATION, FILARET ATTEMPTED TO USE THE FACT OF GRAHAM'S ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE TO PERSUADE ARCHIMANDRITE NIPHON SIKALI TO CONVINCE HIS OWN PATRIARCH, IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH, TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE. IGNATIUS HAS BEEN UNDER INCREASING SOVIET/RUSSIAN PATRIARCHATE PRESSURE TO ATTEND; THE REFERENCE TO BILLY GRAHAM IS NOT THE FIRST NOR THE LAST PLOY WHICH FILARET WILL USE TO GET HIM TO COME. HOWEVER, NIPHON (PROTECT) HAS TOLD ACTING DCM THAT HE REMAINS OPPOSED TO PARTICIPATION BY HIS PATRIARCH AND DURING HIS CURRENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS WILL CONTINUE TO ARGUE AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF FILARET'S INVITATION. WE ANTICIPATE THAT FILARET WILL USE GRAHAM'S NAME AND STATURE IN ALL HIS FUTURE DISCUSSIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH OTHER WESTERN RELIGIOUS GROUPS TO ENTICE THEM TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE AS WELL.

5. FILARET HAS DEPARTED FOR A TRIP TO THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE WHERE WE BELIEVE HE WILL BE SEEKING HIGH-LEVEL ATTENDANCE BY ROMAN CATHOLIC FIGURES. THE INTENTION OF THE VATICAN TO SEND ONLY A GROUP OF LOW-LEVEL OBSERVERS TO THE CONFERENCE IS CLEARLY UNSATISFACTORY TO FILARET. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT HE WILL BE APPROACHING CARDINAL BRAND OF THE NETHERLANDS AS A LIKELY ATTENDEE. WE BELIEVE THAT FILARET HAS SELECTED THE TWO MOST INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCHES TO CULTIVATE DURING HIS CURRENT TRIP AS THE MOST PROMISING AVENUES TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE HOLY SEE TO UPGRADE ITS DELEGATION. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT THE ORTHODOX PATRIARCHS OF POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL NOT BE INVITED IN ORDER TO ASSURE ATTENDANCE OF (AND PROMINENCE FOR) DELEGATIONS FROM THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCHES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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SEVENTY ATTENDEES AT THE PREPARATORY SESSION WERE HEAVILY DOMINATED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF SOVIET RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND RELIGIOUS FIGURES FROM COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH OR FRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN MAY WILL FIND THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE CONFERENCE (AND INDEED, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE) PRESENTED TO THEM AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI, AS IS TO BE EXPECTED FROM A RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH HIERARCHY WHICH IS SQUARELY UNDER THE THUMB OF THE SOVIET REGIME AND ADEPT AT USING TYPICAL REGIME TACTICS. EVEN THE SCHEDULING OF THE CONFERENCE IS LOADED TO SERVE SOVIET PURPOSES: THE SESSIONS WILL TAKE PLACE MAY 10-14. HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPANTS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN A SERIES OF RELIGIOUS SERVICES AND OTHER FESTIVITIES

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6. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT A NUMBER OF STATE LEADERS MAY BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. SPECIFIC NAMES MENTIONED ARE INDIRA GANDHI AND JULIUS NYERERE. THE SOVIETS/PATRIARCHATE ARE EVIDENTLY ALSO LOOKING FOR FIGURES OF BOTH RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR STATURE WHO MAY BE INVITED OR ASKED TO BE "HONORARY PATRONS" OF THE CONFERENCE. ATTENDANCE BY FOREIGN POLITICAL FIGURES OF IMPORTANCE WOULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES FOR THE SOVIETS. FIRST, IT WOULD LEND PRESTIGE TO THE EVENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND AMONG NEUTRALS. SECOND, IT WOULD THEN BE EASIER FOR THE HOST COUNTRY CHIEF OF STATE TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE PROCEEDINGS IN SOME WAY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT

THE ORGANIZERS OF THE CONFERENCE HAVE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING SOME KIND OF AWARD TO BREZHNEV FOR HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE. THIS COULD BE EITHER IN THE FORM OF A RESOLUTION BY THE CONFERENCE PRAISING SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES OR DECORATIONS GIVEN TO BREZHNEV BY VARIOUS CHURCH GROUPS. THE IDEA OF LEONID BREZHNEV BEING DECORATED WITH A RELIGIOUS ORDER MAY STRIKE SOME OBSERVERS AS PECULIAR (AND IN POOR TASTE), BUT IT WOULD NOT BE OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE HOOPLA WHICH RECENTLY SURROUNDED THE SOVIET LEADER'S 75TH BIRTHDAY. MORE IMPORTANT, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE ENTIRELY IN KEEPING WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH IS TO COVER SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES AND PROPAGANDA WITH THE GLOSS OF A BROADLY ECUMENICAL GATHERING OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES.

7. ACCORDING TO REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE IS ALREADY IN DRAFT AND HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CERTAIN SELECTED PARTICIPANTS OF THE STEERING GROUP. THE MAIN THEMES WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD IT WILL CONTAIN TRACK CLOSELY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS AND COMMUNIQUE OF THE JANUARY PREPARATORY SESSION AND OF EARLIER SESSIONS HELD OCTOBER 1-2 AND DECEMBER 7-8, AS WELL AS WITH THE SPEECHES OF PIMEN AND FILARET TO THESE SESSIONS. THE MAIN POINTS WE EXPECT TO SEE IN THE CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE (WITH SAMPLE LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY SESSIONS) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) WEST EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED AS A MATTER OF RELIGIOUS DUTY. "PROFOUND SATISFACTION WAS ALSO EXPRESSED AT THE GROWING MASS MOVEMENT AGAINST THE CONTINUED ESCALATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOR THEIR IMMEDIATE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL PROHIBITION AND ELIMINATION... AS IS KNOWN, BROAD RELIGIOUS CIRCLES HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THIS MOVEMENT, WHICH DESERVES APPROVAL AND EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT." "THE PARTICIPANTS NOTED WITH PROFOUND SATISFACTION THE GROWING STRENGTH OF MASS MOVEMENTS PROTESTING AGAINST THE ARMS RACE; LARGE CIRCLES OF RELIGIOUS PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN THE INITIATION AND PARTICIPATION

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OF THESE MOVEMENTS." "NOWADAYS THE DEATH
CLOUDS ARE THICKENING AGAIN. THEY ARE THE
EFFECT OF THE OVER-ACCUMULATION OF SOPHISTI-
CATED WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE WORLD,
OF THE CRIMINAL PROPAGANDA OF THE PERMISSI-
BILITY TO USE THE NUCLEAR MEANS OF WARFARE,
THE PERFIDIOUS FORCING OF THE POLITICAL TENSIONS
WHICH ARE STIMULATED BY THE IMMORAL ALLEGATION
ABOUT THE 'SOVIET MILITARY THREAT'." "WE FULLY
SHARE MR. LEONID ILYICH BREZHNEV'S CALL THAT
THERE COULD BE NEITHER STRANGERS NOR INDIFFERENT
PERSONS IN THE CAUSE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
HUMAN RIGHT TO LIFE." "WE NOTE AT THE SAME
TIME WITH DEEP ANXIETY THE FACT THAT OTHER
LEADERS, INSTEAD OF PROMOTING PEACE AND

DETENTE, GUIDE THE WORLD CLOSER TO THE BRINK
BY ADOPTING A POLICY OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY
OVER OTHER NATIONS AND BY ADVOCATING DANGEROUS
NOTIONS LIKE THE WINNABILITY OF A 'LIMITED'
NUCLEAR WAR, OR THE INEVITABILITY OF A THIRD
WORLD WAR." "IN RESPONSE TO THE PEACEFUL
INITIATIVES OF OUR FATHERLAND FOR OVERCOMING
NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE THERE ARE PUT FORWARD PLANS
FOR A STILL MORE ACCELERATED ARMS RACE, AND
SHOULD THESE PLANS BE REALIZED, OUR PLANET
WOULD TURN INTO A STOREHOUSE OF MORTAL WEAPONS...
IN MANY COUNTRIES OF EUROPE NOW WE CAN WITNESS
IMPRESSIVE MASS MANIFESTATIONS FOR THE PRESERVA-
TION OF PEACE, FOR THE RESTORATION OF TRUST
AND FOR THE RETURN TO THE WAY OF DETENTE
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. IT IS NOT A MINOR
ROLE THAT WE, PEOPLE OF RELIGION, PLAY IN THIS
GENERAL MOVEMENT FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE WORLD
AND FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE SACRED GIFT OF
LIFE."

-- (2) CONDEMNATION OF "NEW WEAPONS" (E.G. NEUTRON
BOMB) AND DANGEROUS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE. "THE
DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MANUFACTURE OF
THE NEUTRON BOMB BRINGS US NEARER TO THE
THRESHOLD OF A NUCLEAR WAR." "WE DECISIVELY
RENOUNCE ANY STRATEGY BASED ON NUCLEAR WAR.
A 'LIMITED' NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT REMAIN LIMITED."
"POWERFUL POLITICAL AND MILITARY CIRCLES STAND
IN THE OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF PEACEFUL
COEXISTENCE AND...SEEK TO ACCELERATE THE GROWTH
OF ARMAMENTS AND IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO MAIN-
TAIN THE SO-CALLED 'BALANCE OF FEAR'... AND
IN CREATING THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY OPEN TO THE IDEA OF THE
PROBABILITY OR EVEN INEVITABILITY OF A NEW
WORLD WAR." "THE PROFOUND CONCERN OF THE

PARTICIPANTS EXTENDED NOT ONLY TO THE PERIL
OF WAR IN EUROPE, BUT TO THE WHOLE WORLD,
THREATENED BY AN ARMS RACE THE LIKE OF WHICH
WAS NEVER SEEN BEFORE, BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF

NEW TYPES OF WEAPONRY (LASER, OUTER SPACE,
ANTI-BALLISTIC), BY THE RISE OF SENSELESS

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MILITARY DOCTRINES LIKE 'LIMITED NUCLEAR
WAR', WITH THEIR POTENTIAL TO CAUSE THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE WHOLE OF CIVILIZATION, BY
THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF QUALITA-
TIVELY NEW WEAPONS BY CERTAIN NATIONS AND THE
MILITARY ALLIANCES LED BY THEM. THIS DANGER
GROWS DAILY AS A RESULT OF THE POLICY OF THESE
NATIONS AND THEIR ALLIANCES -- A POLICY
DESIGNED TO STRAIN FURTHER THE TENSION BETWEEN
NATIONS AND TO IGNORE OR ESCAPE THE NEED TO
SEARCH FOR DIFFICULT BUT NECESSARY WAYS TO
UNIVERSAL PEACE AND FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE
HUMAN RACE."

-- (3) THE NEED FOR PROGRESS AT THE GENEVA TALKS

AND FOR NEW STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS, TAILORED TO
THE SOVIET POSITIONS ON BOTH. "THE SALT
PROCESS MUST BE RE-OPENED. AS CHRISTIANS,
WE PRAY THAT NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RESTRICTION
OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE MAY BE A
SUCCESS... WE COME OUT IN SUPPORT FOR
PROPOSALS IN REGARD TO THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR-
FREE ZONES." THE BREZHNEV "PROPOSALS" IN
BONN ARE CITED AS THE LINE TO FOLLOW IN THE
GENEVA TALKS.

-- (4) MONEY SHOULD BE SPENT ON AID TO DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES RATHER THAN ON ARMS. "GIGANTIC
UNPRODUCTIVE EXPENDITURES ON ARMAMENTS ARE ONE
OF THE MAIN CAUSES OF THE FURTHER SPEEDING DOWN
OF THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHICH IS A
TENDENCY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EARLY EIGHTIES."
"UNIVERSAL PEACE, IN ORDER TO BE STABLE, HAD
TO BE BASED ON A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER."

8. THE PREPARATORY SESSIONS HAVE ARRANGED THE MAY
CONFERENCE TO BE ALMOST FOOLPROOF FOR THE ACHIEVE-
MENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND PROPAGANDA AIMS.
THE TIGHTLY ORGANIZED AGENDA CAREFULLY FILLS ALL
THE TIME OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND CHANNELS DIS-
CUSSIONS INTO THREE CATEGORIES: "CATASTROPHIC CON-
SEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR WAR," "NEW
DOCTRINES OF NUCLEAR WAR," AND "URGENT TASKS OF
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT." EACH PLENARY SESSION WILL
BE CHAIRED BY A MEMBER OF THE STEERING GROUP WITH
A PREPARED LIST OF SUB-TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION.
TOTAL ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE IS LIMITED TO
350 PERSONS IN FIVE CATEGORIES (HONORARY PATRONS,
DELEGATES, OBSERVERS, EXPERTS AND GUESTS) BUT WITH
A LOOPHOLE FOR AN INCREASE OF TEN PERCENT IN

INVITATIONS. THESE CATEGORIES ARE EVIDENTLY
DESIGNED TO CONTROL THE NUMBER OF VOTING FULL
DELEGATES IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT FILARET AND HIS
STEERING GROUP CAN MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE CON-
FERENCE AND OF THE COMMUNIQUE. THE "RULES OF
PROCEDURE" STATE THAT DECISIONS WILL BE MADE ON
THE "BASIS OF WIDE AGREEMENT" EXCEPT IN CASES OF
"NECESSITY" WHEN VOTES MAY BE TAKEN. THIS
OBVIOUSLY ALLOWS GREAT DISCRETION TO THE CHAIR.

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IN VOTING ON THE COMMUNIQUE, PARTICIPANTS CAN ONLY PROPOSE CHANGES, "IF THEY FIND IT NECESSARY," IN WRITING THROUGH THE CHAIRMAN TO THE DRAFTING COMMISSION. IN OTHER WORDS, NO ALTERATIONS FROM THE FLOOR. FINALLY, "AT THE PLENARY SESSION WHICH IS TO ADOPT THE FINAL DOCUMENTS, PROPOSALS FOR THEIR BASIC CHANGING SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED."

9. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL, ACCORDING TO THE "RULES," BE OPEN ONLY TO JOURNALISTS "OFFICIALLY REGISTERED AT IT." THE OCTOBER PREPARATORY SESSION DECIDED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS TO TWENTY. EVEN THESE WILL HAVE TO WORK THROUGH AN OFFICIAL PRESS CENTER.

10. COMMENT: AS REPORTED EARLIER, THE "PEACE CONFERENCE" IS A TOOL OF SOVIET PEACE PROPAGANDA PURE AND SIMPLE. THE PREPARATIONS WE HAVE OBSERVED INDICATE THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE MORE BLATANTLY CONTROLLED AND TAILORED TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AIMS THAN EVEN WE HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT. THE ADVANCE PREPARATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE, THE LIMITED AGENDA, RULES RESTRICTING CHANGES TO THE FINAL DOCUMENTS AND LIMITED PRESS ACCESS ALL CONFIRM THAT WESTERN RELIGIOUS FIGURES WILL BE COMING TO GIVE A SHEEN OF RESPECTABILITY TO SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVES. END COMMENT.

11. ACTION REQUESTED: WE SUGGEST THAT ADDRESSEES DRAW ON THIS CABLE, PARTICULARLY PARAS 7 - 9, FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS AND RELIGIOUS FIGURES.
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14 Feb
Rebuttals to
Threat to Europe

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TAGS: PARM, MPOL, NATO, UR

SUBJECT: INF: REBUTTALS TO "THREAT TO EUROPE"

REF: (A) 81 STATE 323125
(B) USNATO 207

1. PAPER WHICH FOLLOWS IN PARA 3 PRESENTS THIRTY-EIGHT
ASSERTIONS TAKEN FROM THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THREAT TO
EUROPE" AND APPROPRIATE COUNTERARGUMENTS. USNATO
SHOULD PROVIDE COPIES TO ALLIES FOR TRANSMISSION TO
GOVERNMENTS. WE SHARE VIEW THAT "THREAT TO EUROPE" HAS
RECEIVED LITTLE PUBLIC NOTICE -- MISSION SHOULD NOTE
THAT THIS IS A BACKGROUND PAPER, AND THAT WE DO NOT
WANT TO DRAW ANY ADDITIONAL ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET
PAMPHLET.

2. OTHER ADDRESSEES MAY USE PAPER AND ITS
COUNTERARGUMENTS AS APPROPRIATE.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

REBUTTING THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE THREAT TO EUROPE"

WHILE "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" APPEARS TO HAVE RECEIVED
LITTLE ATTENTION OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS, THIS PAPER
HAS BEEN PREPARED AS A BACKGROUND PIECE TO REBUT A
NUMBER OF CLAIMS IN THE SOVIET PAMPHLET. IT PROVIDES
COUNTERARGUMENTS TO SPECIFIC ASSERTIONS THAT APPEAR IN
THE PAMPHLET (THE ASSERTIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS
APPEAR IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY APPEAR IN "THE THREAT
TO EUROPE").

SECTION I

1. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS THE
PREVAILING MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM ... ONE OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL
STABILITY."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THERE IS NO "PREVAILING MILITARY
EQUILIBRIUM." THE SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY IN
STRATEGIC FORCES, AND HAVE SUBSTANTIAL AND GROWING
ADVANTAGES IN CONVENTIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCES. DEPLOYMENTS OF ON AVERAGE ONE SS-20
PER WEEK, FOR EXAMPLE, DO NOT CONSTITUTE EFFORTS TO
MAINTAIN AN EQUILIBRIUM, BUT RATHER TO INCREASE THE
SIZE OF THE CURRENT SOVIET MONOPOLY IN LONGER-RANGE INF
MISSILES. THE SOVIET FORMULATION THAT THEY DO NOT SEEK
SUPERIORITY, BUT WILL NOT ALLOW THEIR OPPONENTS TO
ACHIEVE IT, IS ALSO CONTRADICTED BY STATEMENTS BY SOME
SOVIET MILITARY WRITERS AS RECENTLY AS 1979 ON THE
IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING MILITARY-TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY.

2. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE SOVIET UNION REJECTS THE
IDEA THAT A NUCLEAR WAR COULD BE WINNABLE; IT WOULD BE
"A UNIVERSAL DISASTER."

COUNTERARGUMENT: AS RECENTLY AS 1979, MARSHAL N.V.
ORGARKOV, CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, CITED THE
REQUISITES FOR VICTORY IN GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR. SUCH
STATEMENTS RAISE CONCERNS THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE
NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE WON, THAT IS, A POLITICALLY
MEANINGFUL OUTCOME IS POSSIBLE. BUT MOST IMPORTANTLY,
THE SOVIETS HAVE STRUCTURED THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES IN A
WAY WHICH INDICATES THEY ARE INDEED PREPARED TO WAGE A
LIMITED AND/OR PROTRACTED NUCLEAR WAR CONFINED TO

EUROPE. THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THE SOVIET
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE PROGRAMS -- THE
ACQUISITION OF SUBSTANTIAL COUNTERFORCE AND
DAMAGE-LIMITING CAPABILITIES -- IS CONSISTENT WITH SUCH
A VIEW.

3. SOVIET ASSERTION: "SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS OF
A PURELY DEFENSIVE NATURE."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE ADVANTAGES IN MILITARY FORCES THE
SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED CAN HARDLY BE CONSTRUED AS
DEFENSIVE. SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE AND DOCTRINE
EMPHASIZE THE OFFENSIVE IN WAR. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET
THEORY OF "JUST" AND "UNJUST" WARS PROVIDES THEM WITH A
RATIONALE FOR THE DIRECT USE OF FORCE AS THEY DEEM
NECESSARY. THEIR MOST RECENT USE OF ARMED FORCE WAS IN
AFGHANISTAN. BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE CAPITALISM IS THE
SOURCE OF ALL WARS, THE SOVIET UNION, BY DEFINITION,
COULD NEVER BE THE INITIATOR OF WAR, AND THUS, IN
SOVIET EYES, ALL WARS ARE RATIONALIZED AS BEING
"DEFENSIVE."

4. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET
ARMED FORCES IS NOT GREATER THAN NEEDED FOR DEFENSE."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF SOVIET
STRATEGIC COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES AND THEIR BUILD-UP
IN EUROPE IN THE LAST DECADE APPEAR TO BE FAR BEYOND
THEIR DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS. THEY NOW HAVE, IN THEIR
ICBM FORCE ALONE, ENOUGH NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO TARGET US
ICBM SILOS WITH SIX WARHEADS EACH, ALTHOUGH THESE
FORCES WOULD HAVE OTHER MISSIONS AS WELL. THE SOVIETS
ALSO HAVE SOUGHT SUBSTANTIAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE

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ADVANTAGES IN EUROPE WHICH ARE UNMATCHED BY THE WEST. FOR EXAMPLE, IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS, THE WARSAW PACT OUTNUMBERS NATO BY A FACTOR OF OVER 2 TO 1. THE SIZE OF SOVIET INF TARGETED ON EUROPE FAR EXCEEDS ANY OBJECTIVE MEASURE OF WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET HOMELAND.

5. SOVIET ASSERTION: "... SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A FIRST OR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE BY THE USSR."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE CONCEPT OF A PRE-EMPTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKE IS CONSISTENT WITH LONG-STANDING TENETS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE WHICH EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING SURPRISE, SEIZING THE INITIATIVE, AND, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, LIMITING DAMAGE TO THEIR OWN MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN POPULATION. MOREOVER, THEIR ENTIRE FORCE IS STRUCTURED WITH PRE-EMPTION AS A CLEAR OPTION.

6. SOVIET ASSERTION: "... AT THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR ERA THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED THAT NUCLEAR ARMS SHOULD BE OUTLAWED AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT STOPPED."

COUNTERARGUMENT: IN FACT, THE BARUCH PLAN PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES WAS THE FIRST PROPOSAL FOR CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. SOVIET ASSERTION: "REMEMBER, TOO, THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS INVARIABLY OFFERED TO MUTUALLY RENOUNCE DEVELOPMENT EVERY TIME THE PROSPECT OF NEW STILL MORE DANGEROUS TYPES OF WEAPONS APPEARED."

COUNTERARGUMENT: SOVIET OFFERS OF MUTUAL DISARMAMENT HISTORICALLY HAVE BEEN BASED ON FAITH, WITH NO MEASURES PROVIDED FOR INSPECTION OR VERIFICATION, THEREBY MAKING THEM EMPTY AND CYNICAL.

SECTION II

8. SOVIET ASSERTION: "DURING THE FIRST ROUGHLY TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE WAR, THE UNITED STATES HAD A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ADVANTAGE OVER THE USSR. AT THE TURN OF THE 70S, THE DEFENSIVE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION ENDED THIS SUPERIORITY. SINCE THEN, THERE HAS BEEN MILITARY STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE ACHIEVEMENT OF "ROUGH PARITY" IN STRATEGIC FORCES WHICH WAS FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE SALT I TREATY HAS NOT SLOWED THE SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILD-UP. IT IS DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET TRENDS IN SOVIET FORCES SINCE 1974 AS OTHER THAN A DRIVE FOR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY. THEY HAVE REPLACED OLDER LAND-BASED MISSILES WITH LARGER AND MORE ACCURATE VERSIONS, SUITABLE FOR PRE-EMPTIVE COUNTERFORCE STRIKES. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE REPLACED THEIR OLDER LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES WITH THE SS-20, WHICH IS MOBILE, MORE ACCURATE AND CARRIES MULTIPLE WARHEADS.

9. SOVIET ASSERTION: "... THE US ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT PARITY. IT WANTS THE WORLD TO IDENTIFY PARITY WITH US MILITARY SUPERIORITY."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE UNITED STATES AND NATO ARE NOT TRYING TO ESTABLISH MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE

SOVIET UNION. RATHER, THROUGH DEPLOYMENT OF THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) AND PERSHING II, THE ALLIANCE IS ATTEMPTING TO REDRESS A GROWING IMBALANCE IN THE SOVIETS' FAVOR IN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, AN IMBALANCE WHICH WAS CREATED BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS. NOR DOES THE ALLIANCE PLAN TO MATCH THE SOVIETS SYSTEM FOR SYSTEM. THE PLANNED PROGRAM CALLS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF 464 GLCMS AND 108 PERSHING II'S FOR A TOTAL OF 572 WARHEADS -- THIS IS ONLY ABOUT ONE-HALF OF THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS THE SOVIETS PRESENTLY DEPLOY ON THEIR SS-4/SS-5/SS-20 FORCE (1140 WARHEADS ON 580 MISSILES).

10. SOVIET ASSERTION: "YOU MUST LOOK BELOW THE SURFACE OF THINGS. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT INITIATE NEW WEAPONS. IT DEVELOPS THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEARANCE OF SUCH WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE FIRST TO DEPLOY AN OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEM, THE FIRST TO DEVELOP A MOBILE ICBM, AND THE FIRST TO DEVELOP A FRACTIONAL ORBITAL BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM. IT HAS THE LARGEST ICBM -- THE SS-L8 -- AND HAS JUST BUILT THE WORLD'S LARGEST SUBMARINE. IT ALSO HAS EXTENSIVE MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UNDERWAY IN SUCH EXOTIC FIELDS AS LASER AND CHARGED PARTICLE BEAM WEAPONS.

11. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THERE HAS BEEN ROUGH NUCLEAR MEDIUM-RANGE ARMS PARITY IN EUROPE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS -- WITH THE USSR AND THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVING APPROXIMATELY 1000 DELIVERY VEHICLES EACH."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THIS CLAIM IS BASED ON A MANIPULATIVE SELECTION OF DATA WHICH MAXIMIZES THE NUMBER OF NATO SYSTEMS COUNTED WHILE OMITTING LARGE NUMBERS OF COMPARABLE SOVIET SYSTEMS. IT IS INTENDED TO HIDE A LARGE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN "MEDIUM-RANGE" ARMS. FOR EXAMPLE:

-- NATO FIGHTER-BOMBERS SUCH AS THE F-4 ARE COUNTED. BUT THE SOVIETS MAKE NO MENTION OF THE MANY HUNDREDS OF SOVIET FENCERS, FLOGGERS OR FITTERS WHICH ARE BASED IN EAST EUROPE OR THE WESTERN USSR AND WHICH HAVE RANGES AND CAPABILITIES SIMILAR TO -- AND IN SOME CASES SUPERIOR TO -- THOSE OF THE F-4.

-- INDEPENDENT FRENCH AND UK STRATEGIC DETERRENT SYSTEMS ARE INCORRECTLY INCLUDED IN THE NATO "MEDIUM-RANGE" TOTAL.

-- US FB-111'S ARE INCLUDED, THOUGH THEY ARE BASED IN THE US, NOT IN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS DO NOT COUNT ANY SOVIET AIRCRAFT BASED OUTSIDE OF THE EUROPEAN USSR, AND APPEAR TO INCLUDE ONLY A PORTION OF THE BOMBERS BASED IN THE EUROPEAN USSR.

-- THE SOVIETS DO NOT COUNT SS-20'S BASED EAST OF THE URALS, THOUGH MANY, BECAUSE OF THEIR LONG RANGE, CAN STRIKE WEST EUROPEAN TARGETS, AND EVEN THOSE IN THE FAR EASTERN PORTIONS OF THE USSR, BECAUSE OF THEIR MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTABILITY, COULD READILY BE MOVED TO WITHIN RANGE OF NATO EUROPE.

AN OBJECTIVE COMPARISON OF TRULY EQUIVALENT NATO AND SOVIET "MEDIUM-RANGE" SYSTEMS WOULD SHOW A VERY LARGE SOVIET ADVANTAGE OVER NATO. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE A MONOPOLY IN THE MOST DESTABILIZING CATEGORY: LAND-BASED LONGER-RANGE MISSILES, DEPLOYING 1140

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WARHEADS ON 500 SS-4'S, SS-5'S AND SS-20'S WHILE NATO CURRENTLY HAS NO COMPARABLE MISSILE.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE NET INCREASE IN SOVIET SS-20/SS-4/SS-5 WARHEADS SINCE DECEMBER 1979 (WHEN NATO MADE THE "DUAL-TRACK" DECISION) IS WELL OVER 300. DURING THAT PERIOD, NATO MADE NO QUANTITATIVE NOR QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN ITS "MEDIUM-RANGE" FORCES. IF A "ROUGH NUCLEAR MEDIUM-RANGE ARMS PARITY IN EUROPE" EXISTED IN 1979, AS THE SOVIETS CLAIMED, HOW CAN THERE STILL BE A BALANCE NOW?

12. SOVIET ASSERTION: "NATO'S MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS CAN ALREADY NOW CARRY 50 PERCENT MORE WARHEADS THAN THE EQUIVALENT SOVIET VEHICLES."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THIS ASSERTION IS BASED ON THE MANIPULATIVE LIST OF AIRCRAFT USED BY THE SOVIETS IN THEIR "BALANCE" ARGUMENT. IT IS ALSO BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NATO AIRCRAFT CARRY UNREALISTICALLY HIGH WEAPONS LOADINGS. A COMPARISON OF REASONABLY

EQUIVALENT SYSTEMS (AND MAKING REALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT AIRCRAFT LOADINGS) YIELDS A VERY LARGE SOVIET ADVANTAGE OVER NATO.

13. SOVIET ASSERTION: "BUT THEIR (THE SS-20) COMBAT CAPACITY HAS, IN THE MAIN, REMAINED THE SAME; THE RANGE IS THE SAME AS THAT OF THE OLD SS-5, WHILE THE AGGREGATE PAYLOAD IS EVEN LESS. AS FOR THE NUMBER OF DELIVERY VEHICLES (AND THIS HAS BEEN SAID TIME AND AGAIN), THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF STRENGTH IN EUROPE BY SUBSTITUTING NEW FOR OLD MISSILES."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE SS-20 CARRIES THREE WARHEADS RATHER THAN ONE, HAS SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER ACCURACY, AND A QUICKER REACTION TIME THAN THE SS-4'S AND SS-5'S. WHILE THE AGGREGATE PAYLOAD OF THE SS-20 IS LESS THAN THAT OF THE SS-4 AND SS-5, GREATER ACCURACY ENABLES IT TO ACHIEVE A HIGHER KILL PROBABILITY AGAINST HARDENED TARGETS WITH SMALLER YIELD WARHEADS. ITS THREE WARHEADS ARE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETTABLE, GIVING THE SOVIETS MUCH GREATER TARGETTING FLEXIBILITY. AND WHILE THE SOVIET SS-4/SS-5 FORCE OF 1976 DEPLOYED ABOUT 600 MISSILES WITH 600 WARHEADS, THE PRESENT FORCE OF 500 SS-4'S, SS-5'S AND SS-20'S CARRIES 1140 WARHEADS.

14. SOVIET ASSERTION: "FOR EACH NEW SS-20 MISSILE DEPLOYED, ONE AND SOMETIMES TWO OLD MISSILES ARE REMOVED."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE DEACTIVATION RATE OF SS-4'S AND SS-5'S BARELY EQUALS THE DEPLOYMENT RATE OF THE SS-20 (ON AVERAGE, ONE PER WEEK). AND WHILE DEACTIVATION OF AN SS-4 OR SS-5 REMOVES ONE WARHEAD FROM THE SOVIET ARSENAL, DEPLOYMENT OF AN SS-20 ADDS THREE.

15. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN COMPELLED, IN THE INTERESTS OF ITS OWN AND ITS ALLIES' SECURITY, TO BEGIN THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS, IT HAD IN 1979 ALONE THRICE PROPOSED TO THE WEST (IN LEONID BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF 2 MARCH, AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING IN VIENNA IN JUNE, AND IN LEONID BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF 6 OCTOBER) TO NEGOTIATE MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE SOVIETS AT NO TIME MADE A FORMAL

OFFER TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND INSTEAD CONTINUED TO DEPLOY THE SS-20 AT OPERATIONAL SITES WHILE BEGINNING NEW SITES. IN FACT, 1979 SAW A GREATER NUMBER OF SS-20 BASES STARTED THAN IN ANY PREVIOUS YEAR. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS FORMALLY REJECTED NATO'S INITIAL OFFER TO NEGOTIATE, AS STATED IN THE DECEMBER 1979 COMMUNIQUE

16. SOVIET ASSERTION: "IF WE TAKE THE ENTIRE NATO ARSENAL OF MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE US FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, THE ADDITION OF 572 NEW MISSILES, AS ENVISAGED IN THE NATO DECISION, WILL DRASTICALLY UNBALANCE THE EXISTING PARITY IN FAVOR OF THE WEST. THE WEST WOULD GAIN A MORE THAN 50 PERCENT ADVANTAGE IN MEDIUM-RANGE VEHICLES OVER THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE SOVIETS CAN ONLY MAKE THIS CLAIM BY A CONTRIVED JUGGLING OF THE FACTS. THEY TAKE AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE THE SOVIET "PARITY" (AGAIN, A DECEPTIVE AND MISLEADING CREATION) AND THEY ASSUME NO FURTHER SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS TAKE PLACE BETWEEN NOW AND 1988, WHEN THE NATO PROGRAM IS SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED. AN OBJECTIVE COMPARISON OF NATO AND SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (WHICH YIELDS A VERY LARGE SOVIET ADVANTAGE OVER NATO), MAKES CLEAR THAT THE PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS WILL NOT BRING NATO EVEN CLOSE TO PARITY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. INDEED, IT HAS NEVER BEEN NATO'S INTENTION TO MATCH THE SOVIETS ONE FOR ONE.

17. SOVIET ASSERTION: THE US AND NATO "HAVE BEGUN CONDITIONING PUBLIC OPINION TO A 'TRANSFORMATION' OF THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DECISION WITH A VIEW TO RAISING THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF THE US MISSILES SLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE SOVIETS CITE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY WESTERN OFFICIALS THAT THE SOVIET THREAT MAY NOW BE GREATER THAN PROJECTED IN 1979, AND THEN USE THIS TO ASSERT THAT NATO IS PREPARING TO REVISE ITS DECISION. THIS IS TOTALLY INCORRECT. THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCUSSION WHATSOEVER OF AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBERS OR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MISSILES TO BE DEPLOYED UNDER THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION. MOREOVER, THE US HAS OFFERED TO CANCEL DEPLOYMENT OF THE GLCM AND PERSHING II IF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE TO DISMANTLE ITS

SS-20'S AND RETIRE ITS SS-4'S AND SS-5'S.

18. SOVIET ASSERTION: THE PERSHING II AND THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) ARE "IN EFFECT, EQUIVALENT TO THE EXISTING STRATEGIC WEAPONS BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO REACH SOVIET TERRITORY."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THIS STATEMENT REVEALS THE CALLOUS ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS THE SECURITY AND TERRITORY OF THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE. NATO SYSTEMS WHICH CAN REACH SOVIET TERRITORY ARE "STRATEGIC" WEAPONS AND ARE A THREAT OF A HIGHER ORDER OF MAGNITUDE THAN SOVIET SYSTEMS WHICH CANNOT STRIKE THE UNITED STATES, BUT ONLY TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE. WHILE THE SOVIETS IMPLY THAT THE TERRITORY OF THEIR ALLIES IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THEIR OWN, THE NATO

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ALLIANCE MAKES NO SUCH DISTINCTION -- AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE NATO MEMBER WOULD BE AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL MEMBERS. IN FACT, THE PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE ARE INTENDED TO CORRECT THE IMBALANCE IN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, AND HAVE DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES THAN US INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

19. SOVIET ASSERTION: WASHINGTON WANTS THE PERSHING II AND THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) FOR "PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST SOVIET ICBMS AND OTHER VITALLY IMPORTANT TARGETS IN WESTERN REGIONS OF THE USSR."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE PURPOSE OF PERSHING II AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS IS TO ENHANCE NATO'S DETERRENT. A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS IN THE USSR PRESUPPOSES A COMBINATION OF NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY, SPEED AND RANGE, AND WOULD REQUIRE THE CAPABILITY TO DESTROY, AMONG OTHER TARGETS, ALL SOVIET ICBMS IN A VERY SHORT TIME PERIOD. GLCM AND THE PERSHING II CLEARLY DO NOT PROVIDE THIS CAPABILITY. GLCM IS MUCH TOO SLOW AS IT TRAVELS AT SUBSONIC SPEEDS AND COULD TAKE OVER TWO HOURS TO REACH ITS TARGET. AND THE LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSHING II'S WILL BE FAR TOO SMALL TO POSE A THREAT TO THE 1400 SOVIET ICBMS AND THE HUNDREDS OF OTHER TARGETS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE DESTROYED IN A FIRST STRIKE. MOREOVER, THE MAJORITY OF THOSE ICBMS AND INSTALLATIONS ARE BEYOND THE RANGE OF THE PERSHING II AND GLCM.

20. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE RANGE OF THE PERSHING-2 MISSILES TO BE DEPLOYED FROM 1983 ON IS 2500 KILOMETERS."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE MAXIMUM RANGE OF THE PERSHING II IS 1800 KILOMETERS.

21. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE NEW PERSHING-2 MISSILES CAN HIT THEIR TARGET WITHIN FIVE OR SIX MINUTES OF LAUNCHING."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE FLIGHT-TIME OF THE PERSHING II AT ITS MAXIMUM RANGE IS FOURTEEN MINUTES, THE SAME AS THE FLIGHT-TIME OF A SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHED AGAINST A TARGET IN WESTERN EUROPE AT THE SAME RANGE.

22. SOVIET ASSERTION: "BY ALL EVIDENCE, THE UNITED STATES IS DESIGNING A VARIANT OF NUCLEAR WAR THAT WOULD GIVE IT ITS GLOBAL AIMS WITHOUT THE RISK OF ITS BEING DESTROYED. ONE SUCH VARIANT IS A LIMITED OR EUROSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR, WITH US STRATEGIC FORCES NOT BEING USED IN THE HOSTILITIES, SO THAT HOLOCAUST DOES NOT SPREAD TO THE AMERICAN CONTINENT. IN OTHER WORDS, WESTERN EUROPE IS CAST IN THE ROLE OF A LIGHTNING ROD THAT WOULD ABSORB THE STRIKE AND DIVERT IT FROM AMERICA."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE DEPLOYMENTS OF PERSHING II AND THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE ARE DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED ON OCTOBER 21, 1981 "THE SUGGESTION THAT THE US COULD EVEN CONSIDER FIGHTING A NUCLEAR WAR AT EUROPE'S EXPENSE IS AN OUTRIGHT DECEPTION. THE ESSENCE OF US NUCLEAR STRATEGY IS THAT NO AGGRESSOR SHOULD BELIEVE

THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE COULD REASONABLY BE LIMITED TO EUROPE." THE PRINCIPLE THAT AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE IS THE SAME AS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL MEMBERS IS FUNDAMENTAL TO NATO. MOREOVER, IMPLIED IN THIS SOVIET ASSERTION IS THE INCREDIBLE ASSUMPTION THAT THE US SOMEHOW BELIEVES IT COULD STRIKE THE USSR WITH THE PERSHING II OR GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES INSTEAD OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND ESCAPE RETALIATION AGAINST AMERICAN TERRITORY.

23. SOVIET ASSERTION: "SEEN FROM THIS ANGLE,

AMERICA'S CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' ATTEMPTS TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF SITING THE NEW US MISSILES ON SEABORNE FACILITIES, RATHER THAN ON THE TERRITORY OF NATO MEMBERS, ACQUIRES A MOST SINISTER COMPLEXION."

COUNTERARGUMENT: IN THE WIDE-RANGING ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS THAT LEAD TO THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION, SEA-BASED MISSILES WERE CONSIDERED. THIS OPTION WAS REJECTED BY THE ALLIES PARTICIPATING IN THE DECISION FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS:

- . -- LAND-BASED FORCES OFFER THE BEST MEANS FOR
- . VISIBLE, WIDE AND DIRECT ALLIANCE PARTICIPATION IN
- . NATO'S DETERRENT FORCES AND
- . -- AS A SHIP CANNOT ALWAYS BE ON STATION,
- . ADEQUATE DETERRENCE BY SEA-BASED SYSTEMS WOULD
- . REQUIRE MANY MORE ASSETS THAN BY PERSHING II AND
- . THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE.

SECTION III

24. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE 'DOUBLE DECISION' SAYS CATEGORICALLY THAT THE 'IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS.' WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT ONLY SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, ON THE ONE HAND, AND PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES, ON THE OTHER, ARE NEGOTIABLE."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THIS DISTORTS THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DECISION AND THE US NEGOTIATING APPROACH, WHICH CALL ONLY FOR A PRIORITY FOCUS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON LAND-BASED MISSILES. THIS APPROACH IS REASONABLE AND ENTIRELY LOGICAL. THE US AND ITS NATO ALLIES ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES SUCH AS THE SS-20. ON THEIR SIDE, THE SOVIETS -- INCLUDING PRESIDENT BREZHNEV -- HAVE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERNS REGARDING THE PERSHING II AND THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE. IT THEREFORE MAKES GOOD SENSE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE SYSTEMS OF MOST CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES. THIS WILL SIMPLIFY NEGOTIATIONS, AND CREATE A CONSTRUCTIVE FRAMEWORK AND GENERATE MOMENTUM FOR PROGRESS IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

25. SOVIET ASSERTION: "ALL US FORWARD-BASED

MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, THE VERY WEAPONS THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE MEANT TO COUNTER TODAY, ARE THUS TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE OFFERED NEGOTIATIONS."

COUNTERARGUMENT: AGAIN, THE US NEGOTIATING APPROACH IS THAT THE TALKS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE SYSTEMS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES: LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE

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MISSILES. THE SOVIET TERM "FORWARD-BASED" SYSTEMS IS BASED ON AN INHERENTLY ONE-SIDED CONCEPT WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT ONLY OF SYSTEMS THAT CAN STRIKE THE SOVIET UNION (AS WELL AS SOME THAT CANNOT) WHILE DISREGARDING SOVIET SYSTEMS THAT THREATEN NATO EUROPE. THE AIRCRAFT THE SOVIETS CALL "FORWARD-BASED" SYSTEMS DO NOT HAVE SOLELY NUCLEAR ROLES -- THEY ALSO HAVE CONVENTIONAL USES AND ENHANCE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE. MOREOVER, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIET FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT (SUCH AS THE FENCER, FLOGGER AND FITTER) DEPLOYED IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WESTERN USSR WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO THE US AIRCRAFT TERMED BY THE SOVIETS "FORWARD-BASED MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS." THE SOVIETS NEVER MENTION THESE AIRCRAFT BUT, OBJECTIVELY, THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY COMPARISON WHICH INCLUDES US "FORWARD-BASED" AIRCRAFT.

26. SOVIET ASSERTION: "SECOND, THE 'EQUALITY' OF LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN MISSILES PROVIDED FOR IN NATO'S DECISION REQUIRES, IN EFFECT, THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD FORGET ABOUT FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR POTENTIALS, ..."

COUNTERARGUMENT: IN WHAT ARE EXPLICITLY BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, IT WOULD BE TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE TO NEGOTIATE OVER THE SYSTEMS OF ANY THIRD COUNTRY, OR FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO SEEK COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS. IT ALSO VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, SINCE SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD AMOUNT TO AN ATTEMPT TO CODIFY A SOVIET RIGHT TO HAVE MORE SYSTEMS THAN THE US.

27. SOVIET ASSERTION: THE US "POSITION IS THAT REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN MISSILES PLANNED FOR DEPLOYMENT, LET ALONE THEIR COMPLETE RENUNCIATION, CANNOT BE THE AIM OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT REAL NEGOTIATIONS CAN BEGIN ONLY AFTER THE AMERICAN MISSILES TAKE THEIR STATIONS ON LAUNCHING PADS IN WESTERN EUROPE."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THIS IS INCORRECT. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CANCEL THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE AND PERSHING II -- BEFORE A SINGLE MISSILE IS DEPLOYED -- IF THE SOVIET UNION WILL DISMANTLE ITS SS-20'S AND RETIRE ITS SS-4'S AND SS-5'S. INDEED, THIS IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE US NEGOTIATING APPROACH.

28. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE US ADMINISTRATION IS REJECTING MORE THAN JUST THE IDEA OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ITS SPOKESMEN SAY OPENLY THEY DO NOT INTEND TO RECKON WITH THE OPINION OF AMERICA'S NATO ALLIES BECAUSE IF IT DIVERGES FROM THAT OF WASHINGTON, BOWING TO IT WOULD ALSO BE LIKE BOWING TO A VETO."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION WAS PRECEDED BY AN INTENSIVE PROCESS OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS, AND THIS PROCESS HAS CONTINUED SINCE DECEMBER 1979. FOR EXAMPLE, NATO'S SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP DISCUSSED THE US NEGOTIATING APPROACH IN FIVE SEPARATE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE MAY 1981 MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN ROME AND THE NOVEMBER 30 OPENING OF US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE ALLIES IN THESE MEETINGS HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEGOTIATING POSITION THE US TOOK TO GENEVA, AND

THAT POSITION HAS THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE ALLIES. ONE MIGHT ALSO NOTE THAT THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF SUCH A DIALOGUE HAVING TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES.

29. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE STANCE OF THE US ADMINISTRATION ON THE LINK BETWEEN THE SALT PROCESS AND MEDIUM-RANGE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IS ENTIRELY INDEFINITE (OR, MORE PRECISELY, NEGATIVE) AS CONCERNS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SALT PROCESS OR THE TIME IT WILL BE RESUMED. ESSENTIALLY, IT IS RELUCTANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY OBJECTIVE LINK."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING INTENSIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE BEGINNING OF START NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THE BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE ISOLATED FROM THE OVERALL EAST-WEST CLIMATE. THE US AND ITS NATO ALLIES SEE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF US-SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS.

30. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE US ADMINISTRATION IS DELIBERATELY COMPLICATING THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THEY HAVE EVER BEGUN" BY SEEKING "SUCH LIMITATION OF SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AS WILL COVER ALL SS-20 MISSILES, INCLUDING THOSE STATIONED IN EASTERN PORTIONS OF THE USSR AND TRAINED ON CHINA AND JAPAN."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE UNITED STATES IS TAKING A GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES. THIS IS BECAUSE THE LONG RANGE, MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTABILITY OF MISSILES SUCH AS THE SS-20 MAKE REGIONAL CONSTRAINTS ALONE PRACTICALLY MEANINGLESS. THE SOVIET APPROACH -- TO TALK ONLY ABOUT SYSTEMS BASED IN EUROPE (THOUGH THEY ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THEIR TREATMENT OF THE US-BASED FB-111) -- WOULD NOT EFFECTIVELY CONSTRAIN THE THREAT TO NATO EUROPE. MANY SS-20'S BASED EAST OF THE URALS (THUS, NOT SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION IN THE SOVIET VIEW) CAN STRIKE TARGETS IN WESTERN EUROPE; EVEN THOSE IN THE FAR EASTERN AREAS OF THE USSR COULD READILY BE MOVED TO WITHIN RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE. EFFECTIVE AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS REQUIRE A GLOBAL APPROACH.

31. SOVIET ASSERTION: "ANOTHER MOST SERIOUS MOVE TO TRIP UP THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION IN EUROPE WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH THE FULL-SCALE MANUFACTURE OF NEUTRON WEAPONS."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE AUGUST 1981 DECISION REGARDING ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS INVOLVED ONLY THEIR PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING IN THE UNITED STATES. ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS AND THE PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE ARE VERY DIFFERENT SYSTEMS WITH VERY DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS. THERE IS NO CONNECTION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN THE AUGUST DECISION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES.

32. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE ONLY SERIOUS INTENTION THE UNITED STATES HAS IS TO UNDERMINE THE NEGOTIATIONS."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE A SIMPLE, FAIR AND REASONABLE PROPOSAL FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS: CANCELLATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE IN RETURN FOR

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DISMANTLING OF THE SS-20'S AND RETIREMENT OF THE SS-4'S AND SS-5'S. THE US IS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A

SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.
SECTION IV

33. SOVIET ASSERTION: "AT THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID: "WE SUGGEST COMING TO TERMS THAT ALREADY NOW A MORATORIUM SHOULD BE SET ON THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE WEAPONS OF NATO COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS, TO FREEZE THE EXISTING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LEVEL OF THESE WEAPONS." THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE "BECAUSE IT WOULD MAKE US FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE MORATORIUM AND CONSEQUENTLY, TO THE TALKS."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE MORATORIUM OFFER HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY REJECTED BY THE MEMBERS OF NATO FOR TWO BASIC REASONS. FIRST, IT WOULD FREEZE THE PRESENT IMBALANCE, ONE WHICH WAS CREATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE 1140 WARHEADS ON 580 SS-4/SS-5/SS-20 MISSILES WHILE NATO COULD DEPLOY NO COMPARABLE MISSILE OF ITS OWN. SECOND, THE OFFER IS LIMITED TO SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FREE TO CONTINUE DEPLOYMENT OF THE TRIPLE-WARHEAD SS-20 EAST OF THE URALS, WHERE SS-20'S COULD STILL STRIKE TARGETS THROUGHOUT NATO EUROPE. AS SUCH, THE OFFER WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN THE THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE AND IS NOT MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL.

34. SOVIET ASSERTION: "THE OBJECTION TO THE MORATORIUM ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT BLOCKS THE NATO MODERNIZATION PROGRAMME IS ACTUALLY NOT AN OBJECTION TO THE IDEA OF A MORATORIUM BUT A REJECTION OF THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF A ZERO VERSION OR OF ANY NUMERICAL REDUCTIONS OF US MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE ENVISAGED IN THE DOUBLE DECISION."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE UNITED STATES, ALONG WITH OTHER NATO COUNTRIES, REJECTS THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL AS IT WOULD FREEZE THE IMBALANCE CREATED BY THE SOVIETS AND WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN MISSILES BASED OUTSIDE OF EUROPE. THE US IS PREPARED TO CANCEL DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE IF THE SOVIET UNION AGREES TO THE DISMANTLING OF ITS SS-20'S AND RETIREMENT OF THE SS-4 AND SS-5.

35. SOVIET ASSERTION: "AS TO THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN

SUCH AN IMPORTANT AREA AS CENTRAL EUROPE, BOTH SIDES EXCHANGED OFFICIAL FIGURES AT THE VIENNA TALKS AS EARLY AS 1976. ACCORDING TO THOSE FIGURES, NATO STRENGTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS 981,000 (INCLUDING 791,000 GROUND TROOPS) AND THAT OF THE WARSAW TREATY WAS 987,300 (INCLUDING 805,000 GROUND TROOPS).

"IN 1980, THE NEW EXCHANGE OF UPDATED FIGURES SHOWED THAT NATO STRENGTH WAS 991,000 AND THAT OF THE WARSAW TREATY, 979,000 - MEANING THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD NOT INCREASED BUT EVEN REDUCED THEIR TROOPS STRENGTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE NUMBERS CITED IN THIS ASSERTION ARE THE FIGURES PROVIDED BY THE EAST. IN FACT, WESTERN

DATA SHOWS AT LEAST 150,000 MORE WARSAW PACT PERSONNEL IN THE AREA THAN ARE INCLUDED IN THE EASTERN NUMBERS. AT THE OPENING OF THE VIENNA TALKS IN NOVEMBER 1973, THE WEST PRESENTED ITS FIGURES FOR NATO AND PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, AS WELL AS FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES, AND CALLED UPON THE EAST TO DO THE SAME. IT WAS NOT UNTIL JUNE 1979 THAT THE EAST PRESENTED SOME DATA ON EASTERN GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THAT DATA, AND THE UPDATED SUPPLEMENTS PRESENTED BY THE EAST, TO BE INCOMPLETE AND NOT TO INCLUDE ALL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL OF THE WARSAW TREATY GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE WEST HAS CONTINUED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO CLARIFY THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY IN EASTERN FIGURES. WHILE CLAIMING THAT WESTERN DATA WAS INCORRECT, THE EAST HAS FAILED TO COOPERATE IN AN EFFORT TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON DATA.

36. SOVIET ASSERTION: "IT IS A FAVORITE CLAIM OF THE WESTERN PRESS THAT, JUDGING BY THE SOVIET NAVAL EFFORT, THE USSR IS STRIVING TO SECURE NAVAL SUPERIORITY. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION IS OFTEN VIEWED AS A LAND POWER, ITS 40,000 KILOMETERS OF SEA FRONTIER AND ITS ACCESS TO THREE OCEANS PROVE THAT IT IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT SEA POWER WHICH LEGITIMATELY NEEDS AN OCEAN-GOING NAVY OF ITS OWN."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE SOVIET UNION IS GEOGRAPHICALLY CONTIGUOUS TO MOST OF ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES, WHILE THE UNITED STATES IS SEPARATED FROM ITS ALLIES BY THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS.

37. SOVIET ASSERTION: "BESIDES, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S ALLIES DO NOT POSSESS NAVIES OF ANY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE, WHILE MANY OF THE US ALLIES CONTRIBUTE PERCEPTIBLY TO THE OVERALL WESTERN NAVAL POTENTIAL."

COUNTERARGUMENT: THE NON-SOVIET MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT ARE GEOGRAPHICALLY CONTIGUOUS AND HAVE LITTLE NEED FOR SEA TRANSPORT. THE US MUST RELY ON SEA TRANSPORT FOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO ITS ALLIES ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

38. SOVIET ASSERTION: "BESIDES, THE SOVIET UNION NEITHER POSSESSES NOR SEEKS NAVAL BASES ABROAD, WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS OVER TEN LARGE NAVAL BASES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES."

COUNTERARGUMENT: PAST SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN NAVAL BASES IN EGYPT AND SOMALIA ARE WELL KNOWN. THEY ARE PRESENTLY SEEKING NAVAL BASES IN ETHIOPIA AND VIETNAM.

END TEXT.

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POLAND AND CENTRAL AMERICA

The question has been raised as to whether there are similarities between the situation in El Salvador and the imposition of martial law in Poland. An examination of these situations reveals several very fundamental differences:

1. There was no violence in Poland during the period of national renewal which began in August 1980 and was crushed by the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981. In El Salvador, on the other hand, both the extreme left Marxist-Leninist guerrillas and forces on the extreme right have resorted to violence.

2. The West has never sent arms to Poland, either directly or indirectly, and has not encouraged violence in any manner. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been the originating source for a massive flow of arms to Cuba and Nicaragua, from which arms are transshipped to El Salvador for use in the violent effort to overthrow the established government of that country.

3. Fueled by this flow of arms and encouragement of insurrection from the outside, an armed minority of guerillas in El Salvador is attempting to take over that country by force in disregard to the will of the Salvadoran people. In Poland, however, it was the unarmed majority of the Polish people which was harshly suppressed on December 13 by a Polish military regime acting under the pressure and encouragement of the Soviet Union. The public record shows that from August 1980 on, the Soviet Union tried incessantly -- and ultimately successfully -- to reverse the process of national renewal in Poland.

4. El Salvador has just held free elections, and the population turned out in great numbers despite the violent actions by the guerrillas to prevent any elections at all. Free elections have not been permitted in Poland or any other Warsaw Pact country. The danger of this Marxist-Leninist model being exported to Central America is illustrated by the fact that elections have been postponed repeatedly, most recently until 1985, by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

5. El Salvador permits free trade unions and peasant associations. It was the effort to form a truly representative trade union movement which eventually brought the massive repression in Poland.

6. El Salvador has a pluralistic political system, and six parties competed in the just-completed national elections. The

record in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe shows that any attempt to form an alternative political party or movement -- which is far more than the Polish workers tried to do -- has brought massive repression.

7. El Salvador has a privately based economy. The private sector is severely limited in Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries.

There is one basic similarity in the situations in Poland and El Salvador: the Soviets and their allies are opposing through military means popular political processes and trying to dictate a solution along the lines of their own totalitarian systems. This differs markedly from the Western approach to Poland and U.S. policy toward Central America. In Poland, the West has not tried to dictate a political formula but has simply stated that the only way out of that country's deep crisis is to: (a) end the repression; (b) release the political prisoners; and (c) begin a genuine internal dialogue between the three main forces in Polish society -- the authorities, the Catholic Church, and the Solidarity trade union movement.

Similarly, in Central America, rather than advocating any particular political formula, the United States is simply trying to find a peaceful solution which preserves the possibility for the people of those countries to determine their own future. A Marxist-Leninist solution would deny them any such choice. The Marxist-Leninist systems of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and Soviet satellites such as Cuba, in fact, have brought neither freedom nor bread to their peoples. Furthermore, the heavy influx of Soviet arms to the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador is consistent with the pattern of Soviet "assistance" throughout the third World -- overwhelmingly weighed toward weapons and largely unforthcoming on economic development.

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CANADIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is only dimly perceived and poorly understood by most Canadians. This report will briefly examine the state of Canadian attitudes towards national security in general, and NATO in particular, and will explore the reasons for the vacuum of public interest regarding both.

Like the United States, Canada can trace its linguistic, political, cultural and sociological roots to Europe. Canada's relations with Europe have been such that on two occasions in this century Canadians readily entered into European conflicts, in which over one hundred thousand lost their lives. Canada was not only one of the first signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, but was in fact one of the motive forces behind its inception. Government resolve and public opinion were united in sending to Europe an air division of three hundred modern aircraft as well as a full brigade which, in NATO's early years, went very far in constituting the deterrent against Soviet aggression. In the first post-war decade, Canada and Canadians embraced the concept of collective security with considerable enthusiasm.

From the late 1950's on, however, Canada's importance declined relative to the revitalized nations of Europe, and so too did Canadian interest in national security issues. By the time of the late sixties, and the trauma induced by the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War, most Canadians felt defence to be of very low priority. As the external threat was perceived to have diminished, Canada's armed forces and its commitment to NATO came to be viewed in some circles as purely symbolic, if not a waste of resources. A popular view was that a defence effort was unnecessary because, owing to geography, Canada was bound to be protected by the United States. Canada could, in effect, have a "free ride". Such opinions were reinforced in the 1970's, when the benefits of détente appeared to outweigh the costs of military preparedness. The new Liberal Government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau helped shape this mood by giving foreign policy a nationalistic slant. Though the government reiterated its support of NATO, it reduced Canada's forces on the European continent by fifty percent.

The Government's position has shifted somewhat over the course of Mr. Trudeau's administration. In 1975, the Canadian Forces embarked on a relatively unambitious rearmament program, one which was arguably more a response to Allied pressure than to a revised perception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. At the same time, it should be noted that the Government is presently sticking to its promise to maintain an average growth of three percent in real terms in the defence budget, in line with NATO guidelines.

As far as the great majority of Canadians are concerned,

however, national security is a "non-issue". Any public debate which has occurred has tended to involve only polarized elite interest groups, such as disarmament advocates and retired military officers. We can examine this phenomenon more closely by looking at the views of elite groups that could potentially shape public opinion on security issues.

None of the three political parties at the Federal level devotes much attention to national security and certainly none encourages debate at the grass roots. The socialist New Democratic Party (NDP) attracts that segment of the electorate which ranges from pacifist/neutralist to moderates favouring a somewhat greater emphasis on disarmament and development. The NDP's official platform proposes Canada's withdrawal from NATO and NORAD (the North American Air Defence Agreement), as well as declaring Canada a nuclear weapon-free zone and advocating the adoption of a neutralist foreign policy. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Conservative Party, the official opposition, has traditionally supported a strong military capability and a strong and effective Canadian presence in NATO.

In the middle stands the Liberal Party, the governing party, which is less inclined to give high priority to defence but presently shows signs of internal disagreement on national security issues. In recent years, several parliamentary committees, dominated by Liberals, have released reports indicating strong displeasure with manpower and equipment deficiencies in the Canadian Forces. For example, a Senate defence committee recently recommended that the number of regular troops in the Armed Forces be increased by twelve thousand to ninety-two thousand over the next five years. At this time, the Prime Minister's noted lack of interest in issues of national security probably precludes a major shift in government policy.

National security issues do not figure significantly in provincial or municipal politics, though there is presently an effort being undertaken to include a referendum on disarmament in municipal elections. It is interesting to note that the separatist Parti Québécois, the governing party in Quebec, came into office with a platform that included withdrawal from NATO but has since affirmed its intention that an independent Quebec should belong to the Alliance. Its turn-about has not, however, provoked much public interest.

The foreign policy bureaucracy, from which came many of the ideas for the negotiation of the Treaty in the 1947-49 period, is now a lukewarm supporter of NATO. Its attention is, for the most part, focused on other issues and areas of the world, where it is believed that Canada can play a more productive role. On the positive side, the bureaucrats view participation in NATO as a means of gaining admission to important policy-making discussions. On the negative side, they resent not having more attention paid to their views within NATO. They

are not, in short, about to beat the drums for the Alliance in public as they did, with some discretion, in the late forties. Their tepid attitude is communicated to and, to some extent, adopted by the attentive public.

The anti-NATO pressure groups outside government represent a well educated, well motivated, middle-class elite. Their numbers are not very great. They derive support from the universities and the trade unions, and from small but hard-working disarmament groups. Contrary to the European claim that Canadians "don't know what its like" to be a potential nuclear battlefield, most Canadians, sandwiched as they are between the two superpowers, are concerned by the prospect of nuclear war. At the same time, in sharp contrast to the massive peace marches in West European countries, only about two hundred people held a peaceful demonstration on Parliament Hill in Ottawa last October 31st in support of disarmament.

One factor that complicates public perceptions of security issues is the overwhelming influence of the United States media. Many observers have noted that there is an increasing tendency for Canadians to confuse United States issues with Canadian. The tabloid newspapers have tended to reinforce this identification. This has a two-fold effect. Members of the public who are inclined to be pro-NATO assume Canadian interests to be synonymous with interests of the United States, the result being that Canada's distinctive national security problems, particularly in the North, are not sufficiently appreciated. Secondly, those who are inclined to be anti-NATO identify the Alliance, and Canada's involvement therein, as an extension of policies of the United States that are repugnant and/or controversial, such as its Latin American policies. Moreover, the Canadian media have shown little, if any, interest in opening a serious and informed public debate on national security issues.

Public opinion polls on this subject are taken infrequently in Canada, and the findings are open to varying interpretations. However, when Canadians are surveyed, they express general, though vaguely defined, support for the Alliance and the military services. In a national poll conducted in 1980, fifty-four percent of those questioned indicated that defence spending should be a "top priority" of the Government. This was a twelve percent increase over the figure in 1977. A rather striking finding from a similar poll was that fifty-six percent of Canadians think that the likelihood of a third world war occurring before 1990 is better than fifty-fifty.

It is generally believed that the public's pro-NATO and pro-defence views are not held with enormous intensity. The state of the economy, the problem of Quebec, regional development and many other issues rank higher on the national agenda as far as both the public and the Government are concerned. Indeed, most of the time, the Government is unlikely to risk serious

punishment at the polls by ignoring public opinion on national security matters. In day-to-day affairs there is no powerful constituency of support for increasing Canada's efforts in this field. When a critical and clear-cut issue arises, however, there is no doubt that the vast majority of Canadians want to side with the Western Alliance.

Thus, in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland, it is possible to see a resurgence of interest in security questions. This is reflected in a perceptible increase in media coverage. The relevant non-governmental organizations are somewhat stronger than they were a few years ago. There is now, for example, a fairly active Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Among the attentive public, the most encouraging development has been the appearance of a body of opinion in favour of broadening the concept of security policy to encompass both military preparedness and the active pursuit of significant arms control measures. This view generally gets a sympathetic hearing but if its supporters hope to effect a major shift in policy through mobilizing Canadian public opinion, then they have a hard and uphill struggle ahead.

They would be held in the fall, assuming that Parliament enacts the enabling bill this summer as intended.

James Prior, Britain's secretary of state for Northern Ireland, deserves great credit for persisting in bringing matters this far. It is he who has established the aforementioned constructive attitudes. They recognize the need for moving Northern Ireland away from Britain's direct rule of the past decade — but only so far and in such a manner as the Northern Irish can agree upon. His approach is not to impose the future on them but to help them forge it for themselves through "rolling devolution" of power. He talks of small steps of acceptance rather than instant broad agreement. He seeks to provide the conditions in which progress can be made through consensus between the Protestant majority and growing Roman Catholic minority in Ulster's sectarian political scene. The goal is to elicit the skills and energies of Northern Ireland's

agreement by 70 percent of assembly members. However, proposals with less than 70 percent approval could be passed on to Parliament by the secretary of state for Northern Ireland if he judged them to command both Protestant and Roman Catholic support.

Indeed, at every stage Mr. Prior looks for flexibility allowing the emergence of fair solutions and responsible leadership. As he has said, the parties in Northern Ireland have enormous power to block and wreck. He is challenging them to "apply their undoubted power and undoubted ability in a more positive and constructive way."

Parliament and Northern Ireland's people now have a new opportunity to go in this direction and away from Ulster's tragic history. As Mr. Prior also said, "We have to give those many men and women in Northern Ireland who reject extremism and violence much more solid ground to work on. They can never win while effective power and responsibility is denied them."

Don't forget the Poles

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, 1/18/82

What ever happened to Poland?

It seems that the world has a short memory, forgetting one crisis as another comes along. So it is that El Salvador, the Falkland Islands, the nuclear peace movement have relegated the Polish events to the back pages of newspapers. Many people seem to have concluded that the military government has the upper hand, that martial law will remain indefinitely, and that all hope of democratic reform is lost. Perhaps so, but it would be a pity if the West wrote off Poland and gave up all diplomatic effort to press the regime toward a compromise with the Polish people.

We say the Polish people because it is clear that martial law has won no converts. Poles have submitted to force and returned to the factories and mines. But their hearts and minds are with Solidarity, and there is no question they want the "suspended" independent trade union restored. If food distribution has improved somewhat, conditions generally are dire. Prices are out of reach of most citizens' pocketbooks. Widespread joblessness threatens as factories work at low capacity. Living standards are hurting.

From the standpoint of the Jaruzelski government, martial law is a success in the sense that law and order (communist style) are restored and Solidarity has been suppressed. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact allies have been reassured of Poland's loyalties and commitment to the communist system. Now an agreement has been reached with Western bankers deferring repayment of some \$2.4 billion owed in 1981, giving Poland a breathing space during which to try to put its economic house in order.

Yet if the regime is trying to convince the West and opposition forces within Poland that time is on its side, it may be gravely miscalculating. How much economic adversity will the Polish people, especially the young peo-

ple, tolerate before coming to the conclusion that there is nothing to be gained by restraint? Even if active resistance is weak and disorganized — and Solidarity leaders and the Roman Catholic Church have cautioned against resort to violence — how can General Jaruzelski hope to lift the nation out of bankruptcy in the face of bitter popular hostility and passive resistance? Or build a party and government which can command the respect and support of the Polish people?

He and the party Central Committee are still on record as favoring an accommodation with the church and an independent, self-governing, but nonpolitical union. With the party still in shambles, and hard-line detractors struggling to gain control, it may be difficult for him to be seen dealing with an unreconstructed Solidarity leadership. But surely the release of union leader Lech Walesa from detention could begin a process of dialogue. Otherwise the nation risks an eventual social breakdown.

While contending forces in Poland play a waiting game, may the rest of the world not forget the Poles. Because of the West's economic resources, it is still in a position to try to influence events. The sanctions imposed on Poland, however limited, are having an impact. And, as it becomes clear that the Soviet Union and its allies are hard pressed to give Poland all the help it needs, a generous Western offer of aid — tied to a relaxation of martial law and progress toward a "social contract" — could turn the tide in constructive directions. A spelling out of such aid ought to be an ingredient of quiet diplomacy.

It is hard to suppress pangs of sorrow as one scans the Polish scene under martial law. But it would be even sadder if the West — after all the expressions of outrage — gave up all effort to support the Polish people's struggle. They need it now more than ever.

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THE MEXICAN DOMINO

El Salvador is a small, far away country of which we know little. It is barely 8,000 square miles large, with a population of four and a half million. It is not a place which is used to the clash of great issues. It has not lived much in the eye of history. On the contrary, it has muddled along with its neighbours — tinpot little dictatorships ruled by one junta or another in that part of the world which deservedly gave us the expression "banana republics".

Why therefore has its election yesterday caused such widespread interest across the world? The choice before the Salvadorean electors is a choice between the extreme right and the less extreme right. In a Central American context the only thing noteworthy about that is that there is any choice at all.

It would seem inconsiderate, therefore, of United States policy makers to expose their global power and reputation to the whims of Salvadorean ballots and the bullets which accompany them. Yet that is what seems to have happened. The American obsession with El Salvador has been portrayed as a spasmodic reaction against any apparent threat of communism by a President from the West who is used to firing from the hip. There is clearly more to it than that.

Rightly or wrongly the United States view of the Salvador election, and all developments in Central America, has global consequences for us all. The key to it ultimately lies in Washington's relationship with Mexico. It is a complicated, difficult relationship, covering energy, water, frontier disputes, uncontrollable immigration and a whole history of missed opportunities and misunderstandings. It is, in a sense, a domestic relationship

though a prickly one on both sides. So many Mexican immigrants have come to the United States — legally and illegally — that there are large areas of the West and South West which contain local Mexican majorities. Mexico is thus crucially important to the United States both for domestic reasons and for geopolitical ones. In a geopolitical sense it is truly Washington's backyard.

So there is in the United States a general and understandable strategic preoccupation with Mexico. There is a concern at the dreadful consequences should the relationship sour to the point where Mexico could be considered permanently hostile to the United States as Cuba is. For any president — not just a man of President Reagan's hue — those circumstances would mean that the enemy was truly at the gate. It has been the Administration's view that the subversion of Central America by the Soviet Union out of Cuba has this long-term objective in mind. And why not? Any sensible strategist in the Kremlin, beset by the problems of China, Afghanistan, Iran and Poland, would be tempted to ease the burden by applying some of the same medicine to the United States in its own most sensitive sphere of interest.

However, the danger for the United States lies in its reluctance to accept that the Mexicans are not just part of the process to detoxify Central America of these elements. They are central to it. The initial American reaction to Mexican involvement in peace-making diplomacy was cool, but it has improved since then in spite of a basic lack of conviction in Washington that the Mexicans really see the danger as vividly as they should. That must surely be left to the Mexicans

themselves, since their own contribution to the stability of the Caribbean basin must, to be successful, be a spontaneous one and not just resentful and reluctant acquiescence to pressure from the United States.

The strategic danger of a fallen Mexico should be obvious to all Europeans. Washington's preoccupation with such circumstances would gravely weaken the American will and ability to maintain its commitment to European defence. The connexion between El Salvador and Mexico may well be arguable within the United States and between the United States and Mexico. The domino theory always is arguable. It was argued forcefully throughout the Vietnam war, and discounted. Yet history has vindicated it there. It is argued again now in Central America, and can only be seriously discounted if the Mexican relationship with Washington remains strong enough to withstand any domino effect from their less reputable neighbours in the south.

From Europe it is not munitions which are needed, but moral support, and a greater measure of understanding of the fears which drive American policy makers to defend what are apparently indefensible regimes in their own backyard. West Europe should show that understanding by taking the initiative to share the burden of Western defence elsewhere in the world outside the Nato area as well as within it. The United States might then feel less isolated in its concern about Central America; and therefore less jumpy. There is no point in criticising Mr. Reagan for being a man who fires from the hip, if that criticism itself is just another shot from another hip.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 16, 1982

TO: Members of Interagency Group
on European Public Diplomacy

FROM: State/EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

1. Attached is a cleaned-up list of group members. Please let us know of omissions/commissions, etc. Call Julia Moore at 632-1288.
2. Note change in name of group, formerly "Shaping."
3. Agreed actions from last meeting, 2/11:
 - Afghanistan Day:
 - a) Cable to European posts once National Coordinator named in US, encouraging Europeans and others to do same and to advance public and private preparations for March 21.
ACTION: NEA and EUR
 - b) Release up-dated report on situation on ground in Afghanistan 1-2 weeks before Afghanistan Day, with appropriate statement by Department Spokesman
ACTION: INR and PA
 - Poland/Solidarity Day:
 - a) Wrap-up cable to field for group's consideration, to include key themes for keeping Polish crisis before public eye. ACTION: ICA and EUR
 - b) Examine feasibility of special publication on Poland, along lines of ICA booklet on Afghanistan, holding in reserve question of how to release. ACTION: ICA
 - Countering "World Peace Conference:"
Cable to Moscow and other posts. ACTION: EUR/SOV
 - Unclassified release on Soviet diplomatic practices, expulsions, etc. ACTION: INR, with EUR/SOV
 - Marshall Plan anniversary
 - a) Release special publication: ACTION: PA/HO
 - b) Other activities: EUR/P to examine
 - Visiting NATO defense ministers -- program for speaking appearances. ACTION: DOD/ISA

Please let us know of any problems in connection with these projects.

4. Agenda for next meeting, 2/18:
 - Europe and Central America: State/ARA to brief group
 - Follow-up on above items
 - Status of NATO White Paper (EUR/RPM)
 - Status of US/NATO responses to Soviet publications (EUR/RPM)
 - Suggestions for other items?

Attachment

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142569	LIST RE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON EUROPEAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	1	ND	B3

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JR — SX

BY FW

NARA DATE 7/10/17

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FILE: STAPLING
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

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TAGS: CU, ES, NU

SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON CUBA, NICARAGUA, AND EL SALVADOR

1. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS YOU COULD USEFULLY MAKE
IN YOUR CONTACTS WITH ITALIAN POLITICAL LEADERS, PARTICULARLY
SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC OFFICIALS.

2. THE OVERALL IMPORTANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN TO WESTERN
EUROPE CAN BE GAUGED BY THE FACT THAT ROUGHLY HALF OF
NATO'S SUPPLIES WOULD COME OUT OF GULF PORTS IN TIME OF
WAR. WE ARE CONSEQUENTLY NOT SURPRISED BY THE EXTENT OF
THE SOVIET-SPONSORED MILITARY BUILDUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

3. THE MILITARY PROGRAMS OF CUBA AND NICARAGUA ARE FAR IN
EXCESS OF ANY CONCEIVABLE DEFENSIVE NEED, WITH THE EXCEPTION
OF AN ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES. IN THAT CASE,
NEITHER COUNTRY COULD EXPECT TO HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DETER-
RENT.

4. CUBA NOW HAS 225,000 MEN IN THE ARMY (NINE ACTIVE AND
18 RESERVE DIVISIONS); 11,000 MEN IN THE NAVY AND 16,000
IN THEIR FORCES. THIS MEANS THAT 2.3 PERCENT OF THE
POPULATION OF CUBA IS IN THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES, AND ONE
OF EVERY 20 CUBANS PARTICIPATES IN SOME KIND OF SECURITY
MISSION. COMPARE THIS WITH MEXICO, WHERE THE DEFENSE
FORCES ARE HALF THE SIZE OF CUBA'S DESPITE SEVEN TIMES
THE NATIONAL POPULATION. IN MEXICO, LESS THAN TWO-
TENTHS OF ONE PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IS IN THE
REGULAR ARMED FORCES. IN THE U.S., LESS THAN ONE
PERCENT IS IN THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES.

5. TO USE ANOTHER BENCHMARK, CASTRO'S MILITARY EFFORT
IS BETWEEN TEN AND TWENTY TIMES GREATER THAN ANY OTHER
MAJOR NATION IN THE HEMISPHERE.

6. NICARAGUA IS FOLLOWING A SIMILAR PATTERN. THE
SANDINISTAS INTEND TO BUILD AN ARMY OF SOME 50,000
MEN, AND A MILITIA OF SOME 200,000. THIS WOULD PLACE
ONE OUT OF EVERY TEN NICARAGUANS UNDER ARMS. BUT
ALREADY, NICARAGUA HAS BUILT THE LARGEST ARMY IN THE
HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICA. AT THE MOMENT, SCORES
OF NICARAGUAN PILOTS ARE UNDERGOING TRAINING IN EASTERN
EUROPE, LANDING STRIPS IN NICARAGUA ARE BEING LENGTHENED
AND WILL BE ABLE TO RECEIVE ADVANCED JET AIRCRAFT,
AND BETWEEN TWENTY AND THIRTY SOVIET TANKS HAVE ARRIVED.
IN CUBA, THERE ARE SOME 2,000 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS
AND BETWEEN SIX AND EIGHT THOUSAND CIVILIAN ADVISERS.
SOVIET AID TO CUBA AMOUNTS TO TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT
OF THE GNP, RUNNING AROUND THREE BILLION DOLLARS A
YEAR. AND MILITARY AID IS INCREASING: LAST YEAR,
THE SOVIETS SENT THREE TIMES MORE MILITARY EQUIPMENT
TO CUBA (63,000 METRIC TONS) THAN IN 1980. SOME OF
THIS MATERIAL WAS THEN SENT TO COUNTRIES LIKE NICARAGUA,
AND IS ULTIMATELY USED AGAINST EL SALVADOR.

7. CUBAN PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA: CUBAN ADVISERS ARE
SERVING IN KEY POSTS THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT (ONE
OF THEM WHO WAS HIGHLY INSTRUMENTAL IN RUNNING THE
SANDINISTA WAR AGAINST SOMOZA IS A TOP INTELLIGENCE
OFFICIAL). THERE ARE CURRENTLY APPROXIMATELY 6,000
CUBANS IN NICARAGUA, OF WHICH 1,800 TO 2,000 ARE MILITARY
OR SECURITY ADVISERS.

8. IN ADDITION TO CUBANS, THERE ARE ADVISORS IN NICARAGUA
FROM EAST GERMANY, BULGARIA, NORTH KOREA AND THE SOVIET
UNION.

9. CUBAN ACTIVITIES ELSEWHERE: IN EL SALVADOR, THE
COMBINED MILITARY COMMAND WAS ORGANIZED BY CUBANS,
AND THE STRATEGY AND INITIAL WAR PLANS OF THE GUERRILLAS
(THE SO-CALLED "FINAL OFFENSIVE" OF EARLY 1981) WERE
DESIGNED BY CUBANS. CUBANS HAVE BEEN HIGHLY INSTRUMENTAL
IN PROVIDING FOR THE ARRIVAL OF WEAPONS TO THE GUERRILLAS
FROM VIETNAM, ETHIOPIA AND EASTERN EUROPE... VIA NICARAGUA.
GUERRILLA RECRUITS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN CUBA, AND
SOME GUERRILLA UNITS HAVE REPORTEDLY TRAINED IN CUBA.

10. THE SAME PATTERN IS SEEN ELSEWHERE IN THE CARIBBEAN.
CUBA HAS COORDINATED CLANDESTINE SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLA
MOVEMENTS IN HONDURAS, COSTA RICA AND GUATEMALA.
HARDLY A COUNTRY IN THE CARIBBEAN IS FREE OF CUBAN-
SUPPORTED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY. IN GRENADA, THE CUBANS
ARE BUILDING AN AIRBASE THAT WILL ACCOMMODATE ADVANCED
JET AIRCRAFT. THEY ARE ALSO BUILDING A MAJOR NAVAL
FACILITY.

11. IMPORTANT HISTORICAL FACTS GENERALLY UNKNOWN OR
IGNORED: THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR (FARABUNDO MARTI
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT) WAS FORMED, AND WAS UNLEASHED
UPON EL SALVADOR, AFTER ALL, REPEAT ALL, OF THE FOLLOWING
HAD TAKEN PLACE:

- THE ARMY HAD ALREADY BROUGHT A MODERATE DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTION TO EL SALVADOR;
- TWO MAJOR LAND REFORM PROGRAMS HAD BEEN ENACTED;
- THE ESTATES OF ALL THE GREAT LANDOWNING FAMILIES
HAD BEEN SEIZED AND TURNED OVER TO PEASANT COOPERA-

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TIVES;

- THE BANKS AND THE COFFEE, SUGAR, AND COTTON EXPORT BUSINESSES HAD BEEN NATIONALIZED;

- ORDEN, THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION THAT HAD TRADITIONALLY TERRORIZED PEASANT OPPOSITION, HAD BEEN DISSOLVED;

- THE POLITICAL PRISONERS HELD BY THE OLD REGIME HAD BEEN-FREED;

- THE HEADS AND MANY KEY OFFICERS OF THE OLD SECURITY SERVICE HAD BEEN FIRED;

- THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT JUNTA (JRG) HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO FREE ELECTIONS;

- EIGHTY SENIOR OFFICERS IN THE OLD ARMY OF THE OLIGARCHY HAD LEFT OR BEEN RETIRED.

12. THEREFORE, THE FMLN EMERGED AT A TIME WHEN THE COUNTRY WAS MAKING PALPABLE PROGRESS ON ALL FRONTS.

13. ATROCITIES BY SANDINISTAS IN NICARAGUA: THERE IS NOW SOME REPORTING, NOTABLY IN FIGARO MAGAZINE TWO SUNDAYS AGO (FEB 16) OF THE GENOCIDE OF THE MISKITO INDIANS IN THE ATLANTIC COAST REGION OF THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE REPORTS OF ARRESTS AND DETENTION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS; BURNING OF VILLAGES AND CHURCHES; EXECUTIONS OF COLLABORATORS WITH COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES; AND STRAFING OF VILLAGES BY THE SANDINISTA AIRFORCE. THE GRN HAS PUBLICLY ADMITTED TO THE RELOCATION OF AS MANY AS 10,000 MISKITOS FROM THEIR VILLAGES NEAR THE HONDURAN BORDER. THERE IS SPECULATION THAT THE SANDINISTAS HAVE DECIDED TO ELIMINATE RELIGION AND FREEDOM IN THE ATLANTIC COAST COMMUNITIES AND REPLACE THEM WITH COMMUNISM.

14. CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL MOVES BY SANDINISTA LEADERSHIP SINCE THE REVOLUTION:

- JUNE 12, 1979: NICARAGUA'S GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION ISSUES A COMMUNIQUE FROM SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA PROMISING TO OBSERVE HUMAN RIGHTS, TO RESPECT CIVIL JUSTICE, AND TO HOLD NICARAGUA'S FIRST FREE ELECTION IN A HUNDRED YEARS.

- JULY 19, 1979: THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION -- A FIVE-MEMBER CIVILIAN JUNTA AND A NINE-MEMBER DIRECTORATE OF SANDINISTA COMMANDERS -- ASSUMES POWER.

- AUGUST 1979: THE SANDINISTAS BEGIN A MILITARY BUILDUP FAR EXCEEDING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSIVE NEEDS, INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION OF NEW BASES AND AIRFIELDS.

- SEPTEMBER 1979: LEADING SANDINISTAS PREPARE A BLUEPRINT COMMONLY CALLED THE 72 HR. DOCUMENT FOR EVENTUAL SANDINISTA CONTROL OF NICARAGUA. CENTRAL TO THE SANDINISTA STRATEGY IS THE SYSTEMATIC, GRADUAL REMOVAL OF NICARAGUA'S BOURGEOISIE.

- SEPTEMBER 1979: THE SANDINISTAS BEGIN TO AID THE SALVADORAN INSURGENTS BY FACILITATING SHIPMENTS

OF ARMS AND SUPPLIES AND BY PROVIDING TRAINING FACILITIES.

- AUGUST - OCTOBER 1979: THE SANDINISTAS MOVE AGGRESSIVELY TO CONSOLIDATE ALL LABOR UNIONS UNDER THE TWO SANDINISTA UMBRELLA ORGANIZATIONS. BY

THE END OF 1979, TWO-THIRDS OF NICARAGUA'S ORGANIZED WORKERS ARE AFFILIATED WITH SANDINISTA ORGANIZATIONS.

- APRIL 1980: THE SANDINISTAS MOVE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL.

- THE FSLN PACKS THE COUNCIL OF STATE WITH ITS SUPPORTERS BY ENLARGING THE MEMBERSHIP FROM 33 TO 47. THE COUNCIL IS CHARGED WITH DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION AND ELECTION LAWS.

- POLITICAL INDEPENDENT ALFONSO ROBELO RESIGNS APRIL 22 FROM THE JUNTA IN PROTEST, AND HIS PARTY REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COUNCIL. THE OTHER MODERATE ON THE JUNTA, MRS. VIOLETA CHAMORRO, ALSO RESIGNS, CITING ILL HEALTH.

- A SANDINISTA-BACKED STRIKE AGAINST NICARAGUA'S ONLY INDEPENDENT DAILY, LA PRENSA, FORCES THE CHAMORRO FAMILY TO CLOSE THE PAPER FOR SEVERAL DAYS. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FORCES THE SANDINISTAS TO ALLOW A SETTLEMENT. DISSIDENT ELEMENTS FROM THE PAPER FORM A NEW, PRO-GOVERNMENT DAILY.

- MAY 1980: THE SANDINISTAS APPOINT BANKER ARTURO CRUZ AND JURIST RAFAEL CORDOVA-RIVAS TO REPLACE MRS. CHAMORRO AND ROBELO ON THE GOVERNING JUNTA.

- MAY 1980: THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT REPEATS ITS COMMITMENT TO ELECTIONS IN THREE SEPARATE STATEMENTS BY SERGIO RAMIREZ, BAYARDO ARCE, AND TOMAS BORGE.

- JULY 1980: SANDINISTA DEFENSE MINISTER HUMBERTO

ORTEGA ANNOUNCES THERE IS NO NEED FOR ELECTIONS SINCE THE PEOPLE "VOTED" DURING THE REVOLUTION. ON JULY 19, 1979, A GROUP OF SANDINISTA COMMANDERS INFORMS A U.S. DELEGATION THAT NICARAGUA MUST DEAL WITH ITS PRESSING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BEFORE HOLDING ELECTIONS. SERGIO RAMIREZ ANNOUNCES THAT ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD ONLY AFTER WIDESPREAD LITERACY IS ACHIEVED.

- SEPTEMBER 1980: THE SANDINISTAS IMPOSE PRESS RESTRICTIONS DESIGNED TO INHIBIT REPORTING OF INTERNAL DISSENSION.

- NOVEMBER 8, 1980: THE SANDINISTAS DENY A RALLY PERMIT TO INDEPENDENT POLITICAL LEADER ALFONSO

ROBELO. SANDINISTA MOBS VANDALIZE HIS MANAGUA HEADQUARTERS. THE GOVERNMENT ORDERS A NEWS BLACKOUT OF THE INCIDENT.

- NOVEMBER 1980: SANDINISTA SECURITY FORCES MURDER PRIVATE SECTOR LEADER JORGE SALAZAR ON A HIGHWAY NEAR MANAGUA IN MID-AFTERNOON. SALAZAR, WHO BY THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN ADMISSION WAS UNARMED, WAS ACCUSED OF PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. COSEP AND INDEPENDENT POLITICAL PARTIES WITHDRAW FROM THE COUNCIL OF STATE.

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- DECEMBER - JANUARY 1981: SANDINISTA COMMANDERS FACILITATE A LARGE, CLANDESTINE ARMS AIRLIFT TO THE SALVADORAN INSURGENTS.

- FEBRUARY 1981: THE SANDINISTAS TAKE OVER THE NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TEMPORARILY IMPRISON ITS DIRECTOR, AND ROUND UP HIS SUPPORTERS.

- MARCH 4, 1981: THE FSLN ANNOUNCES THAT THE FIVE MEMBER GOVERNING JUNTA WILL BE REDUCED TO THREE MEMBERS. SANDINISTA DIRECTORATE MEMBER DANIEL ORTEGA BECOMES "COORDINATOR" OF THE JUNTA.

- MARCH 14, 1981: THE SANDINISTAS BLOCK ALFONSO ROBELO'S RALLY NEAR MANAGUA AND GOVERNMENT-BACKED MOBS SACK THE HOMES OF SEVERAL SUPPORTERS.

- JUNE 1981: THE SANDINISTAS TAKE DELIVERY OF 22 SOVIET T-55 TANKS, SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCING THE ARMY'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.

- JULY 1981: THE GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO ALLOW ARCH-BISHOP OBANDO Y BRAVO TO HOLD HIS TELEVISED MASSES.

- SEPTEMBER 1981: THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES NEW EMERGENCY LAWS WITH NO RIGHT OF APPEAL WHICH PROHIBIT STRIKES AND PUTTING FORTH "FALSE ECONOMIC NEWS" AND CARRY SENTENCES OF ONE-THREE YEARS.

- SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1981: THE SANDINISTAS CLOSE DOWN NICARAGUA'S ONLY INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER, LA PRENSA, FIVE TIMES IN THREE MONTHS AND SHUT INDEPENDENT RADIO STATION CORPORACION FOR FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.

- EARLY JANUARY 1982: NEWS PROGRAMS EL MOMENTO OF RADIO MUNDIAL AND LA OPINION OF RADIO MIL WERE

FORCED OFF THE AIR "INDEFINITELY," CHARGED WITH BEING "ANTI-PATRIOTIC" AND WITH VIOLATING THE LAW BY BROADCASTING "MISINFORMATION AND LIES."

- EARLY JANUARY 1982: THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU) LODGED A COMPLAINT WITH THE ILO AGAINST NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF ITS NICARAGUAN AFFILIATE (CONFEDERACION DE UNIFICACION SINDICAL - CUS) FOR VIOLATION OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS AS EMBODIED IN ILO CONVENTION 87 WHICH HAS BEEN RATIFIED BY NICARAGUA.

- JANUARY 13, 1982: GRN MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR ORDERED INDEFINITE SUSPENSION OF TWO INDEPENDENT RADIO NEWS PROGRAMS, THE "FREE PRESS" ON RADIO CATOLICA AND THE "FOURTH POWER" ON RADIO MIL.

- JANUARY 13, 1982: A MOB OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS ATTACKED THE OFFICES OF THE OPPOSITION INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER LA PRENSA AND THREE PEOPLE WERE SHOT. THERE IS SOME DISPUTE AS TO THE SOURCE OF THE GUNFIRE. GRN SHUT DOWN LA PRENSA FOR TWO DAYS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT, THE SIXTH SHUTDOWN SINCE THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT TOOK POWER IN JULY 1979. THE DEMONSTRATORS ALSO ATTACKED THE HOMES OF LA PRENSA'S JAIME CHAMORRO BARRIOS AND PEDRO JOAQUIN CHAMORRO. GRN STATE SECURITY TROOPS OCCUPIED LA PRENSA FOR TWO DAYS BEFORE ALLOWING IT TO RESUME PUBLICAITON.

- JANUARY 13, 1982: THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT

CHARGED THAT EMPLOYEES OF THE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY WERE INVOLVED IN A PLOT TO SABOTAGE TWO INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.

- JANUARY 17, 1982: THE GRN CLOSED INDEFINITELY RADIO AMOR FORBROADCASTING THAT ITS OWNER WAS BEATEN FOR BROADCASTING THE TEXT OF A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE DENYING THE CHARGES MADE BY THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT. THE GRN SAID THE BROADCAST WAS AN "ATTEMPT TO DAMAGE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES."

- JANUARY 25, 1982: THE GRN ANNOUNCED TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS TO THE EAST COAST AREA OF NICARAGUA, EFFECTIVELY BANNING MILITARY ZONE. REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE MISKTO INDIANS HAD BEEN FORCIBLY RESETTLED AWAY FROM THE BORDER. MANY HUNDREDS HAVE FLED INTO HONDURAS TO ESCAPE GOVERNMENT REPRESSION.

- JANUARY 28, 1982: A LAST-MINUTE POLICE INTERVENTION FORCED CANCELLATION OF A PLANNED CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PCD) RALLY IN MASATEPE ON JANUARY 31.

- JANUARY 31, 1982: TWO SOLIDARITY LEADERS IN EXILE WERE DENIED ENTRY VISAS TO NICARAGUA. THEY HAD EARLIER MET WITH HEADS OF STATE OF VENEZUELA, PANAMA AND COSTA RICA.

- FEBRUARY 14, 1982: THE LEADERS OF PRIVATE BUSINESS COUNCIL (CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE LA EMPRESA, PRIVADA - CESOP) ARRESTED IN OCTOBER 1981 WERE FINALLY RELEASED FROM PRISON AFTER HAVING BEEN ACCUSED OF AND TRIED FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES (MORE SPECIFICALLY, PUBLICATION OF DOCUMENTS CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT POLICY). THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN SUBSTANTIAL PRISON SENTENCES DESPITE PROTESTS FROM A WIDE SPECTRUM OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

*Can Cay
Cover next
meeting?*

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February 22, 1982

To: Members of Interagency Group
on European Public Diplomacy

From: State/EUR/P - Steve Steiner *SES*

1. Attached is the revised list of group members, incorporating your suggestions.

2. Agreed actions pending from meetings of 2/18 and 2/11:

-- Afghanistan Day:

a) Cable to European posts once National Coordinator named in US, encouraging Europeans and others to do same and to advance public and private preparations for March 21.
ACTION: NEA and EUR

b) Consider up-dated report on situation on ground in Afghanistan. For release 1-2 weeks before Afghanistan Day, with appropriate statement by Department Spokesman (depending on whether there is sufficient new info to make this worthwhile).
ACTION: INR

-- Poland/Solidarity Day:

a) Wrap-up cable to field, including key themes for keeping Polish crisis before public eye, has been circulated for clearance.
ACTION: ICA and EUR

b) Preparation of special publication on Poland, along lines of ICA booklet on Afghanistan, holding in reserve question of how to release.
ACTION: ICA

c) Themes to counter Poland/El Salvador comparison.
ACTION: EUR

d) Request to Assistant Secretary Enders to brief selected European journalists on Central America -- including dismantling of pluralism in Nicaragua.
ACTION: PA and EUR

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Dept of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY CN NARA, DATE 8/29/12

-- Marshall Plan Anniversary

- a) Special publication to commemorate. ACTION: PA/HO - drafting.
- b) Other activities: EUR/P to examine.

-- Visiting NATO Defense Ministers

- a) Program for speaking appearances. ACTION: DOD, with Department to assist as appropriate.

3. Agenda for Next Meeting, 2/25

- Briefing on countering "World Peace Conference" (EUR/SOW - Schumaker)
- Briefing on coverage of "Let Poland be Poland" (ICA/PGM - Kallas)
- Discussing of Marshall Plan anniv. activities (EUR/P - Moore)
- Status of NATO White Paper, and US/NATO responses to Soviet papers (EUR/RPM - Halgus)
- Follow up on items in #2 above
- Suggestions for other initiatives

cc:Members of Interagency Group

Attachment:

As stated.

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- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 25, 1982

To: Members of Interagency Group
on European Public Diplomacy

From: State/EUR/P - Steve Steiner ~~45~~

Agreed actions pending from today's meeting:

1. Afghanistan Day:

- Cable announcing National Coordinator -- EUR/P to coordinate with NEA.

- Updated release on situation on ground -- will examine to see whether there are sufficient new developments to justify. Will at least provide Department Spokesman with a good statement prior to March 21.

2. Poland:

- Special publication -- ICA agrees to start project for consideration in group, with question of how or who to publish left open for now.

- Film on Soviet post WW II conduct -- ICA (Chikas) to look into possibility of putting this together. Hold in reserve any decision on how/when to use.

- Themes on Poland/Central America, including European stake in Caribbean security -- EUR (Lenczowski, Lemmon, Lehovich, etc.) to draft, working with ARA.

- Favorable European coverage on Central America -- ICA (Raday) to seek authorization to run Die Presse series in Wireless.

3. Marshall Plan Anniversary:

- Special publication -- PA to check status of Historical Office draft. OECD tie to be included -- EUR/RPE.

- Other activities -- arrange State/ICA meeting with German Marshall Fund.

4. "World Peace Conference"

- Continue to follow developments, per briefing given today.

5. Agenda For Next Meeting, 3/4

- ICA to brief on Director Wick's European trip (Baldyga).

- Follow up on above.

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Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997 /

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