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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137018	REPORT	RE USSR <i>D 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	34	8/1/1981	B1
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 22, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED
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TO: SVEN KRAEMER
DENNIS BLAIR ✓

FROM: KEN deGRAFFENREID *Ken*

Here are the three versions of the Soviet "Active Measures" paper. The plain Secret version goes to NATO and the unclassified version is for public use abroad.

Dick - FYI -

Attachments

*Pls
return
JCB*

UNCLASSIFIED
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~~SECRET~~

✓

Soviet "Active Measures" in the West
and the Developing World

A forgery purporting to be an official U.S. Government document appears in a West European country. In a developing country, false rumors are spread of U.S. involvement in a coup attempt. A clandestine radio station beams anti-Western broadcasts into Iran. A Western firm is warned that its commercial ties with the Soviet Union will suffer if it also sells equipment to China.

What is the thread which links together these seemingly unrelated activities? They are all examples of "active measures" carried out by the Soviet Union in a large scale campaign to complement its traditional diplomacy and weaken governments which are not subservient to direction from Moscow. The Soviets use the term "active measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) to refer to operations intended to provoke a policy effect, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence. Soviet "active measures" include:

- written or oral disinformation;
- efforts to control the media in foreign countries;
- use of foreign communist parties and front organizations;
- clandestine radio broadcasting;
- economic coercion
- political influence operations.

The range of activities included in the Soviet repertoire of "active measures", the sustained nature of Moscow's "active measures" effort, the amount of resources devoted to this activity, and its close integration with Soviet foreign policy distinguish Soviet practices from those of other nations. In particular, Soviet "active measures" should be clearly distinguished from the "public diplomacy" carried out by virtually all nations, including the U.S. "Public diplomacy" includes, inter alia, providing press releases and other information to journalists, open public broadcasting, and a wide variety of academic and cultural exchange programs. By contrast, Soviet "active measures" are often undertaken secretly, in many cases violating the laws of other countries and involving illicit efforts to suborn individuals by exploiting their weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Soviet "active measures" do not always achieve their objectives, but they have had some success and remain a major, if little understood, element of Soviet foreign policy. In

response to requests from governments and individuals concerned about such activities, this paper has been prepared as an introduction to the organization, methods, capabilities, and limitations of Soviet "active measures". A number of case studies of Soviet "active measures" campaigns have been included to demonstrate how these techniques are used to achieve specific Soviet objectives.

The Soviet regime devotes considerable financial, technical, and personnel resources to "active measures" and is willing to run the risk of political embarrassment should such operations in foreign countries be exposed. This effort is well integrated with other Soviet foreign policy initiatives, but the effectiveness of "active measures" varies depending on place and circumstances. In a number of cases, Soviet "active measures" operations have failed, either because of Soviet ineptitude or effective counter-measures by targeted individuals or governments. As with all important decisions in Soviet foreign policy, approval for a program of "active measures" in foreign countries is made at the highest level of authority in the USSR, the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Soviet "active measures" activities are not the work of individual "super-spies", such as the fictional James Bond. Rather, they are designed and executed by a large and complex bureaucracy in which the KGB and the International Department of the Communist Party Central Committee are major elements. The International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee (IID) is also deeply engaged in managing these activities. Actual operations abroad are executed by both official and quasi-official Soviet representatives, including scholars, students, and journalists whose links with official Soviet organizations are not always apparent. The highly centralized structure of the Soviet state and its system of pervasive control and direction over all elements of its society give the Soviet leadership an impressive capability to draw on all segments of party, government and private citizens in orchestrating "active measures".

Industrialized democratic nations and developing countries are the main targets of Soviet "active measures". In many cases, the open nature of these societies and the relatively free access to their news media give the Soviets an opportunity for a wide range of such activities. The Soviet Union, by contrast, denies reciprocal access to its mass media for foreigners who might voice independent criticism of Soviet society or the foreign policies of the USSR. Moreover, there is a tendency in many western and developing countries to

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ignore or downplay Soviet "active measures" activities except when Soviet blunders lead to well-publicized expulsions of diplomats, journalists, or others involved in these activities. The Soviets are also becoming more adept at portraying their policies as compatible or parallel with the interests of a wide variety of peace, environmental, and other special interest groups active in Western and developing societies.

While the primary target of Soviet "active measures" remains the United States and its policies, Moscow has also devoted increasing resources to "active measures" against the governments of other industrialized countries in Europe and Asia and a large number of countries in the developing world. These activities are designed to influence the policies of foreign governments in favor of the Soviet Union; disrupt relations between other states; undermine foreign leaders; institutions and values, and discredit opponents of the USSR. Soviet "active measures" tactics are often adjusted to reflect changes in the international situation, but they continue, and may even be intensified, during periods of reduced tension or detente.

"Active Measures" Techniques

The tactics and emphasis of the Soviet "active measures" effort often change in order to meet new situations. For instance, the Soviet use of Marxist-Leninist ideology as an appeal to foreign groups often has turned out to be an obstacle to the promotion of Soviet goals in some areas and is now being deemphasized, although not completely abandoned. At the same time, some religious themes, such as the claimed favorable situation of the Islamic religion in the USSR, have assumed greater significance, particularly as a result of Moscow's courting of Muslim countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Although Soviet-dominated international front organizations still play an important role in Soviet "active measures" operations, Moscow has in recent years begun to pay greater attention to broadening its base of support by using more "ad hoc" fronts and single-interest groups to promote its goals in particular regions. While seeking to conduct "active measures" operations with greater sophistication, the Soviets continue to rely on a number of traditional techniques, including:

--Efforts to Manipulate the Press in Foreign Countries:
The Soviet "active measures" structure continues to make frequent use of falsely attributed press material which is inserted into the media of foreign countries. In one

developing country, the Soviets are known to have made use of more than two dozen local journalists to plant media items favorable to the USSR. The Indian weekly Blitz has been used by the Soviets to surface forgeries, identify alleged CIA personnel or agents, and disseminate Soviet-inspired documents. In still another country, Soviet overt cultural and information activities were used to establish contacts with local journalists which later enabled Soviet officials to exercise a substantial degree of control over the content of two major daily newspapers.

--Forgeries: Soviet forgeries have increased in frequency and quality in recent years. These forgeries, which may be completely fabricated or altered versions of actual documents, are produced and circulated to mislead foreign governments, media, and public opinion. Among the forgeries which have been produced and distributed by Soviet agents are bogus U.S. military manuals and fabricated war plans designed to create tensions between the U.S. and other countries. In some cases, actual documents passed to the KGB by U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, who was eventually arrested and convicted as a Soviet agent, were used as models for the style and format of Soviet forgeries. In one case, Soviet agents circulated a forged "Top Secret" letter from Secretary of State Vance to another Western foreign minister in an effort to disrupt the NATO TNF modernization effort.

--Disinformation: Soviet agents often use a variety of techniques including rumors, insinuation, and distortion of facts to discredit foreign governments and leaders. In late 1979, Soviet agents spread the false rumor that the United States was behind the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca. In another instance of Soviet disinformation, Soviet officials in a West European country warned host government officials that the CIA had increased its activities in the country and that a coup was being planned. These covert disinformation campaigns are sometimes played back in the foreign media suborned by the Soviets, thus enabling Moscow to cite foreign sources for some of the distortions and mistatements which often appear in the Soviet media. Recent and particularly outrageous examples of this practice were the August 1981 TASS allegations that the U.S. was behind the death of Panamanian General Omar Torrijos.

--International and Local Front Organizations: The Soviet Union exercises control over a number of pro-Soviet international front organizations through the International Organizations Section of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Because they pretend not to profess Communist ideological goals and are designed to attract members from a broad political spectrum, the front organizations are

more effective than openly pro-Soviet groups. Among the most prominent of these organizations are the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation. Soviet "friendship" and cultural societies in many countries are used to establish contact with many people who are reluctant to participate in avowedly pro-Soviet or communist organizations. The function of both the front organizations and the "friendship" and cultural societies is to generate local support for Soviet foreign policy goals and to oppose local policies and leaders whose activities do not serve Soviet interests.

To complement organizations which have a known and often pronounced pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets are making increasing use of ad hoc front groups which do not have a history of close association with the Soviet Union. Although these groups seek to attract members from a wide political spectrum, their leaderships are sometimes dominated by pro-Soviet individuals and they are sometimes covertly funded by the USSR.

--Clandestine Radio Stations: Presently the Soviet Union operates two clandestine radio stations: The National Voice of Iran (NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broadcast on a regular basis from the Soviet Union to Iran and China. Soviet sponsorship of these stations has never been publicly acknowledged by Moscow, and the stations represent themselves as organs of authentic local "progressive" forces. The broadcasts of both stations are illustrative of the use of "active measures" activities in support of Soviet foreign policy goals. For instance, NVOI consistently urged that the American diplomatic hostages not be released, although Soviet official statements supported their claim to diplomatic immunity.

--Economic Coercion: The Soviet Union also uses a variety of covert economic maneuvers in "active measures" operations. For example, a Soviet Ambassador in a West European country warned a local businessman that his sales to the USSR would suffer if he went ahead with plans to provide technical assistance to China. In another industrialized country, Soviet agents were instructed to drive up the price of gold and thus increase local concern over the stability of the dollar. This was to be accomplished by manipulating a flow of both true and false information to local businessmen and government leaders. The gambit failed because the financial aspects of the operation were not fully understood by the Soviet officials who attempted to carry it out.

Political Influence Operations: Political influence operations are the most important but least understood aspect

of Soviet "active measures" activities. These operations seek to exploit contacts with political, economic, and media figures in target countries to secure active collaboration with Moscow. In return for this collaboration, Soviet officials offer inducements tailored to meet the specific requirements or vulnerabilities of the individual involved. In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French journalist, was convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. His articles --all subtly pushing the Soviet line on a wide range of international issues--were published in a number of important newspapers and journals, sometimes under the pseudonym of Charles Morand. The journalist also published a private newsletter which was regularly sent to many newspapers, members of Parliament, and a number of foreign embassies. The Soviets used Pathe over a number of years to try to influence the attitudes of the prominent subscribers to his newsletter and to exploit his broad personal contacts.

In other cases, Soviet officials establish close relationships with political figures in foreign countries and seek to use these contacts in "active measures" operations. Capitalizing on the host government official's ambition, his Soviet contact claims to be a private channel to the Soviet leadership. To play upon his sense of self-importance and to enhance his credibility within his own government, the host government official may be invited to meetings with high-level Soviet leaders. The Soviets then exploit the local official to pass a mixture of true, distorted, and false information--all calculated to serve Soviet objectives--to the host government.

--Use of Academicians and Journalists: Soviet academicians are frequently used in political influence operations because they are often accepted as legitimate counterparts of their non-Soviet colleagues. Unlike their free world counterparts, they must play two roles--their legitimate academic pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and their political activities on behalf of the Kremlin. They are often obliged to act on the basis of instructions from bodies which plan and control Soviet "active measures" activities. Similarly, Soviet journalists often engage in "active measures" operations in addition to serving as representatives of Soviet news agencies. One KGB Officer in an industrialized country used his journalistic cover to pass forgeries, as well as to publish numerous propaganda articles aimed at influencing the media of the host country. In other cases, Soviet journalists have served as conduits for messages from Soviet leaders to prominent politicians and other leaders in Western countries.

Case Studies

The Soviet Anti-TNF Modernization Campaign in Europe: The Soviet campaign in Europe against NATO TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) modernization is a good illustration of Soviet use of "active measures". After a long and unprecedented build-up of Soviet military strength in Europe, including the deployment of new SS-20 nuclear missiles targeted on Western Europe, the NATO Ministers in December 1979 decided to modernize NATO's TNF capabilities. Of course, not all opposition to the TNF modernization decision is inspired by the Soviet Union or its "active measures" activities. However, even before the NATO modernization decision was taken, the Soviets began an intensive campaign to develop a climate of public opinion unfavorable to implementation of the NATO decision. This campaign has been intensified in recent months.

Soviet diplomats in European countries have tried to pressure their host governments in a variety of ways. In one European country, the Soviet Ambassador met privately with the Minister of Commerce to discuss the supply and price of oil sold by the Soviet Union to that country. During the discussion, the Ambassador gave the Minister a copy of Brezhnev's Berlin speech dealing with TNF. He suggested that, if the host government opposed TNF modernization, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be able to persuade the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade to grant more favorable terms.

Moscow has spurred a number of front groups to oppose the TNF decision through well publicized conferences and public demonstrations. To broaden the base of support for the anti-TNF campaign, the front groups have proselytized non-communist participants, including anti-nuclear groups, pacifists, environmentalists and others. In some cases, the activities of these broad front groups have been directed by local communist parties. The Soviets have predictably devoted the greatest resources to these activities in NATO countries where opposition to the TNF modernization decision is strongest.

In the Netherlands, the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) has set up its own front group, Dutch Christians for Socialism. In November 1980, the Dutch "Joint Committee-Stop the Neutron Bomb-Stop the Nuclear Armament Race", which has ties to the CPN, sponsored an international forum against nuclear arms in Amsterdam. The forum succeeded in attracting support from a variety of quarters, which the CPN is exploiting in its campaign to prevent final parliamentary approval of the TNF decision.

The Soviet Campaign Against Enhanced Radiation Weapons
(ERW): The Soviets, throughout 1977 and early 1978, carried out one of their largest, most expensive, and best-orchestrated "active measures" campaigns against the production of enhanced radiation weapons--the "neutron bomb." While not all opposition to enhanced radiation weapons was Soviet-inspired, Moscow's intensive and costly "active measures" campaign undoubtedly had some impact on public opinion in the West.

This Soviet campaign has had two objectives. First was a halt in the planned deployment of enhanced radiation weapons by NATO. The second goal was to divide the NATO Alliance, encourage criticism of the U.S., and divert Western attention from the growing Soviet military build-up and the threat this posed to NATO.

--The first phase took place in the summer of 1977. In addition to an intense anti-neutron bomb and anti-U.S. propaganda blitz, the Soviets staged many demonstrations and protests by various "Peace Councils," and other host groups. This phase culminated in a Soviet-proclaimed international "Week of Action."

--Phase two focused on propaganda exploitation of letters sent by Leonid Brezhnev to Western Heads of Government in January 1978 warning that the production and deployment of the neutron bomb constituted a serious threat to detente. This was not intended as a private diplomatic communication but as a critical element in the Soviet effort to sway Western opinion. A barrage of similar letters from members of the Supreme Soviet were sent to Western parliamentarians. Soviet trade union officials forwarded parallel messages to Western labor counterparts.

--The third phase came in early 1978 with a series of Soviet-planned conferences designed to build up the momentum of anti-neutron bomb pressure for the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) of May-June 1978. These meetings and conferences, held throughout February and March, were either organized by the World Peace Council (under different names and covers) or jointly sponsored with established and recognized independent international groups.

The Soviet campaign succeeded in complicating Allied defense planning and focusing criticism on the U.S. A top Hungarian Communist Party official wrote that "the political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War Two". The propaganda campaign did not end in 1978, but rather was incorporated into anti-TNF efforts. With the recent U.S.

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decision to proceed with ERW production, a new barrage of Soviet propaganda and related "active measures" has already begun.

Soviet "Active Measures" Toward El Salvador: Complementing their overt public support for the leftist insurgency in El Salvador, the Soviets have also engaged in an "active measures" campaign to sway public opinion. These activities have involved a broad range of standard techniques, including forgeries, disinformation, attempted manipulation of the press, and use of front groups. The obvious dual purpose has been to increase support for the insurgency while trying to discredit U.S. efforts to assist the Government of El Salvador.

--In the Spring of 1980, the Salvadoran Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) was established with Soviet and Cuban support to represent the leftist insurgency abroad. In June, Salvadoran leftists meeting in Havana formed the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the central political and military planning organization for the insurgents. The FDR and DRU work closely with the Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans, but their collaboration is often covert in character.

The DRU also supported the establishment of Salvadoran Solidarity Committees in Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Supported by local communist parties and leftist groups, these solidarity committees have served both as propaganda outlets and as organizers of meetings and demonstrations in support of the insurgents. Such committees, in cooperation with local communist parties and leftist groups, organized some 70 demonstrations and protests that took place between mid-January and mid-March 1981 in Western Europe, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand.

The FDR and DRU are careful to conceal the Soviet and Cuban hand in planning and supporting their activities and seek to pass themselves off as a fully independent, indigenous Salvadoran movement. The DRU has had some success in influencing public opinion throughout Latin America and in Western Europe. The effort of the insurgents to gain legitimacy has been buttressed by intense diplomatic activity on their behalf. For example, at the February 1981 Non-Aligned Movement meeting in New Delhi, a 30-man Cuban contingent, cooperating closely with six Soviet diplomats, pressed the conference to condemn U.S. policy in El Salvador.

At another level, the Soviet media have publicized numerous distortions as part of the effort to erode support for U.S. policy. For example, an article in the December 30, 1980 Pravda falsely stated that U.S. military advisors in El

Salvador were involved in punitive actions against non-combatants, including use of napalm and herbicides. In another particularly outrageous distortion, a January 1, 1981 article in the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta falsely stated that the U.S. was preparing to implement the so-called "centaur plan" for "elimination" of thousands of Salvadorans.

Campaign Against U.S.-Egypt Relationship and the Camp David Process: Another target of Soviet "active measures" operations has been the Middle East where the Soviets have sought to weaken the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, undermine the Camp David Peace Process, and generally exacerbate tensions. A special feature of Middle East "active measures" activities has been the use of a series of Soviet forgeries including:

--A purported speech by a member of the U.S. administration which was insulting to Egyptians and called for "a total change of the government and the governmental system in Egypt." This forgery, which surfaced in 1976, was the first of a series of bogus documents produced by the Soviets in an effort to complicate U.S.-Egyptian relations.

--Another forged document, allegedly prepared by the Secretary of State, or one of his close associates, for the President, used language insulting and offensive to President Sadat and other Egyptians and also to other Arab leaders, including King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. This forgery was delivered anonymously to the Egyptian Embassy in Rome in April 1977.

--A series of forged letters and U.S. Government documents, which surfaced in various locations during 1977, criticized Sadat's "lack of leadership" and called for a "change of government" in Egypt.

--A forged dispatch, allegedly prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which was received by mail at the Egyptian Embassy in Belgrade in August 1977. This forgery suggested that the United States had acquiesced in plans by Iran and Saudi Arabia to overthrow Sadat.

--A false CIA report, which surfaced in the January 1979 issue of the Cairo-based magazine Al-Dawa, criticized Islamic groups as a barrier to U.S. goals in the Middle East and suggested tactics to suppress, divide, and eliminate these groups.

--A forged letter from U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Herman F. Eilts which surfaced in the October 1, 1979 edition of the Syrian newspaper Al-Ba'th. The forged letter declared that,

because Sadat was not prepared to serve U.S. interests, "we must repudiate him and get rid of him without hesitation".

Conclusion

The Soviet Union continues to make extensive use of "active measures" to achieve its foreign policy objectives and frustrate those of other countries. While Soviet "active measures" can be exposed, as they have often been in the past, the Soviets are becoming more sophisticated, especially in forgeries and political influence operations. On the basis of the historical record, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet leadership will continue to devote considerable resources to "active measures" operations and that such activities will continue to pose a significant threat to both industrialized and developing countries.

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