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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 5/21/2012

**File Folder** PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (09/08/1981-09/21/1981)

**FOIA**

M11-442

**Box Number** 4

HAENNI

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137011	CABLE	STATE 239685 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	2	9/8/1981	B1
137012	DISTRIBUTION LIST	<i>PAR 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	1	ND	B1
137013	CABLE	STATE 242163	3	9/11/1981	B1
137014	CABLE	STATE 243254 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	5	9/12/1981	B1
137015	CABLE	USNATO 05667 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	6	9/17/1981	B1
137016	CABLE	USNATO 05677 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	2	9/17/1981	B1
137017	CABLE	BRUSSELS 12145 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	3	9/15/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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137011

ROB544

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~~SECRET~~

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IN

OP IMMED /PRIORITY  
DE RUEHC #9685 2520118  
O P 082349Z SEP 81 ZEX  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5841

~~SECRET~~ STATE 239685

E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 9/8/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: SOPN, XG

SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE

*Return for file*

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

DECLASSIFIED  
BY RW NLRR M4421#137011  
NARA DATE 8/23/16

2. YOU ARE AWARE (PER SEPTELS) OF MAJOR POLITICAL OFFENSIVE WE ARE LAUNCHING. WE NOW WANT TO COMPLEMENT THE BROAD APPROACH TO NATO AT REINFORCED NAC BY ESTABLISHING ON-GOING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. THEREFORE, YOU ARE TO APPROACH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR OTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- SECRETARY HAIG HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY PERSONALLY TO YOU THE GREAT IMPORTANCE PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HE ATTACH TO SEIZING THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE FROM THE USSR BY DEFINING OUR OWN AGENDA.

-- THE TWO ELEMENTS OF THIS POLITICAL OFFENSIVE ARE 1) TO INSPIRE WESTERN PUBLICS INTO A NEW PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENT TOWARD DEFENDING OUR FREEDOMS; AND 2) TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT -- BOTH ITS MILITARY ASPECTS AND ITS COVERT AND DECEPTIVE POLITICAL ASPECTS.

-- NATO EXISTS TO PROVIDE A STRONG DEFENSE. YET NO AMOUNT OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS CAN SUCCEED IN PROVIDING A CREDIBLE DETERRENT UNLESS THERE IS MORAL

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SIT:  
EOB: PIPES, RENT  
WESR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 9685

DTG: 082349Z SEP 81  
TOR: 252/0123Z

PSN: 040483  
CSN: HCE646

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FORCE AND PUBLIC SUPPORT BEHIND IT. GIVEN THE CURRENT STRENGTH OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION, AS WELL AS PUBLIC APATHY, THESE KINDS OF SUPPORT ARE AT A LOW EBB.

— THIS IS WHY WE BELIEVE THAT THE SPECIAL REINFORCED NAC ON THESE PROBLEMS IS SO IMPORTANT. BUT COORDINATED NATO EFFORTS WILL NOT BE ENOUGH. MOST OF THE WORK MUST BE DONE BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS. IN THIS REGARD, THE USG WANTS TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS. SPECIFICALLY WE HOPE TO ESTABLISH SOME REGULAR MECHANISM TO SHARE INFORMATION AND IDEAS.

— YOU ARE AWARE OF THE BROAD RANGE OF INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS AND POLICY INITIATIVES WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN (PER SEPTELS)

— WE NEED MANY SUCH NEW INITIATIVES IN ORDER TO REMAIN ON THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE, AND MUCH OF THIS MUST COME FROM INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WORKING WITH THEIR OWN PUBLICS. THE U.S. CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT DO IT ALONE.

— WE HOPE WE CAN HAVE A FRUITFUL MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP. THE RESOURCES OF MY MISSION, PARTICULARLY USICA, AND OF THE WHOLE USG, ARE AVAILABLE TO HELP IN THIS CRITICAL ENDEAVOR. I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON HOW WE MIGHT ESTABLISH AN ON-GOING RELATIONSHIP AT BOTH THE POLITICAL AND WORKING LEVELS TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED GOAL: A REINVIGORATED COMMITMENT OF OUR GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OUR VALUES, OUR SECURITY AND THE PEACE. IN PARTICULAR, WE WANT TO REESTABLISH A RENEWED APPRECIATION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AS THE BEST GUARANTOR OF CONTINUED PEACE IN EUROPE. HAIG  
BT

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~~SECRET~~

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

65133

NISC COMMENTS

September 10, 1981

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution

FROM: EUR/RPM - John H. King *JH* 632-1135

SUBJECT: Shaping European Attitudes - Clearance of Covering Memorandum for Threat Materials Package

Attached for your review and clearance by COB Friday, September 11, is the draft of the Covering Memorandum for the package of unclassified threat materials which we plan to turn over to the Allies shortly after DOD releases SecDef's booklet on Soviet Military Power. We now expect the turnover of the materials package to occur very early in October, although pieces of the package will have been released separately before then.

For your information, the current status of the various items in the threat materials package is as follows:

SecDef booklet: will be released publicly and to MOD's on September 29. Copies available for package after then.

Balance Materials: fully cleared and ready for distribution.

Supplementary Graphics: fully cleared and ready for distribution, after printing and reproduction.

Deterrence Pamphlet: is being revised based on comments received. If revisions are major, pamphlet will be recleared.

TNF Materials: TNF threat assessment and supplementary graphics still being held in DOD. Qs & As, data sheet have been cleared by the appropriate agencies and are ready for distribution.

Distribution List  
See attached list

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CW 5/21/12

Distribution

EUR: Messrs. Palmer, Ward and Lenczowski

EUR/RPM: Ms. Bohlen, Messrs. Caldwell and Pifer

S/P: Col. Pappageorge

INR: Mr. Martin

DOD/ISP: Mr. Huff (to clear with JCS and DIA)

ICA/PGM: Mr. Gilbert (please clear with other ICA elements)

CIA:  (please clear with other CIA elements)

NSC: Mr. Blair

PM/TMP: Col. Harris

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M442# 137012

BY RW NARA DATE 3/2/17

CS 5/21/12

MATERIALS ON THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE SOVIET THREAT

Covering Memorandum

Introduction

The United States Government is pleased to attach herewith a large number of recently declassified materials dealing with the East-West military balance and the global Soviet threat. These materials consist of information concerning the world-wide status of Soviet forces and the threat these represent to Western interests, especially in Europe.

This memorandum is intended to provide some suggestions for using these materials to gain support for Allied positions on a number of important defense issues. We all have seen how skillful and timely Soviet propaganda has encouraged and exploited political movements in opposition to TNF. These materials may help you in conducting your own national efforts to counter Soviet propaganda and strengthen support for Allied defense measures within your countries. Additionally, this memorandum suggests how our Embassies might be of assistance to your governments in this effort.

*the importance of public support for a strong defense*

Our concern over ~~trends of opinion in Europe~~ is, we believe, fully shared by all the Allies. National programs to counter these trends will almost certainly be more effective than any public affairs effort led by NATO or by the U.S.\* Furthermore, ~~these national programs should not be perceived to be NATO-directed or U.S.-influenced. For this reason, any further support which we provide should be discreet and limited to advice and further information if needed. Ultimately, the success or failure of this entire effort depends on the commitment of Allied governments to conduct their own public affairs programs in their countries.~~

Description of Materials Provided

The materials provided in this package contain much newly declassified information obtained from intelligence and other sources. You will have seen some of these materials in other fora at different times; our purpose here is to draw them together into one package so that they can be properly coordinated for use in national programs. A list of these materials along with a brief description of their contents is as follows:

*of erosion in This support*

*The U.S. does not intend to, and should not be perceived to be directing the effort. Our support for your programs will be limited to information and advice. We*

U.S. Secretary of Defense's booklet on Soviet Military Power

This booklet was released publicly by the United States in late September and transmitted to Ministers of Defense. It describes the Soviet global military threat, both conventional and nuclear. It includes graphics and photographs which can be easily reproduced. This threat assessment is the most complete and detailed analysis of Soviet military power to have yet appeared.

Materials on the NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance

This brochure contains charts, graphs and texts describing the details of the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance. It is purely factual and can be used in whole or in part to supplement materials on the Soviet threat.

Supplementary Graphics

This packet contains photographs, charts, and other visual materials which can be drawn upon to supplement textual descriptions of the Soviet threat. The materials can be easily reproduced. Of special interest is a sub-package of materials on the SS-20.

Pamphlet on Nuclear Deterrence Theory

This pamphlet explains in plain language the theory and philosophy of nuclear deterrence, and describes the reasons for its success in maintaining the peace. The pamphlet is suitable for publication and distribution as an integral document.

Unclassified TNF Materials Sub-package

This group of materials contains newly declassified information on the TNF threat to Europe as well as data and graphics to supplement the assessment. Also included are a set of questions and answers which summarize key arguments for LRTNF modernization and other aspects of the TNF issue. The UK has already circulated an unclassified paper concerning Soviet assertions on the TNF balance; this paper should be used in conjunction with the materials in this sub-package.



Additional Materials

Further materials on the Soviet threat may become available at a later date. We intend to circulate them in the same manner as this package, and with the same purpose in mind.

Possible Objectives of Allied Public Affairs Programs

In our view, Allied governments should consider a number of objectives for achievement in their public affairs programs. Although each country's specific objectives will depend on its own assessment of internal situations and national interests, several common objectives seem valid. These objectives are:

- To reduce the strength and influence of movements opposed to a strong and effective Alliance defense posture;
- To counter the effects of Soviet disinformation and propaganda on Western security issues;
- To educate the general public on the nature and extent of the Soviet threat to Western security. This general objective has two sub-themes:
  - To encourage support for the December 1979 TNF decision on deployment/arms control negotiations.  
*agreed by NATO governments*
  - To lay the political base of support for *the* increased commitment to the common defense, so as to enhance NATO's ability to deter and, if necessary, to repel aggression.

Role of NATO

*centralized NATO direction of*

Although a "~~NATO label~~" on these public affairs programs could detract from their effectiveness with some publics, we do think that NATO can act as a "clearing house" for the exchange of information and program techniques so that all Allies can benefit from the efforts made by the various governments. Several NATO fora might be appropriate to achieve this end. POLADS, for example, could discuss some of the substantive elements of the various national programs with a view to enhancing argumentation and assessment logic. The Conference of NATO Information Officers could serve as a forum for discussing techniques and for coordinating, if desired, national activities on a multilateral basis. Permreps could exchange assessments of the various national programs and review overall progress toward achieving general goals.

The materials contained in this package constitute the United States Government's primary contribution to this effort. Should the occasion arise for any Allied government to require additional materials for use in its program, we would be glad to do what we can to fill the request. Similarly, we hope that other Allies will undertake to make declassified intelligence information available to other Allied governments for use in national programs.

Suggested Utilization of Public Affairs Materials  
on the Soviet Threat

The enclosed materials would be most effective if these form part of a sustained national information effort that is responsive to the concerns of different sectors of public opinion in each Alliance member state.

The materials will undoubtedly be best received by those who already support NATO Force modernization, and gain the attention of editors, editorial writers, radio-TV commentators, security and political analysts in the media, government, research, public affairs and academic institutions. *provide facts and figures and ideas for*  
*They will undoubtedly be effectively used by those who already support NATO force modernization*

The materials and their information may not necessarily change the views of those who are strongly opposed toward TNF or <sup>increased</sup> large defense ~~and~~ the Alliance perspective on East-West issues. Activists in the peace movement, those who object to any defense preparedness for religious and ethical reasons, those who seek political neutralism in Europe may discredit or reject the information. Some people will view the facts of the Soviet military buildup as justification for their positions against Western defense measures.

For those groups it is essential that several broader points stress:

-- The deep desire of all nations in the West to preserve peace and the values of Western society;

-- The Western view of TNF as a deterrent and the concept of effective deterrence as the only realistic alternative to conflict;

-- The facts of the Soviet unabated military buildup of the past 15 years despite professions of peaceful intent and exaggerated expectations for detente.

These are among the themes the United States Government will seek to explain in its public presentations regarding TNF and the Soviet threat.

While clear and forceful governmental presentations are necessary, it is important, in our view, that prestigious, respected public figures ~~be enlisted~~ in an ongoing effort to discuss the issues, especially with those groups that are critical of or oppose TNF. Some ways must be found to engage critics in a reasonably <sup>and</sup> constructive public dialogue on East-West relations and TNF. The purpose should be to ~~win~~ *win the* away those who are ~~only skeptical~~ and do not hold totally entrenched views.

A presentation of NATO's strengths and improvements will also be an essential complement to the detailing of the Soviet military buildup, lest key groups become demoralized by a one-sided picture of Soviet strengths.

Publics should be better informed of Soviet strategy for fighting a war in Europe. Too often the view prevails that it is Western -- primarily American -- forces that have targeted Europe for destruction rather than the USSR. Our aim is the continuation of peace.

*activities*  
We envision the materials being selectively released and applied in planned activities by European governments and others beginning in September. ~~After the initial use by European sources,~~ *Subsequently,* the USG will begin a quiet effort to support these efforts and provide background briefings and interviews for the press. ~~In this way we hope that attention will not be focused on the U.S. but on the behavior of the USSR.~~

Support from United States International Communication Agency (USICA) and Public Affairs Support from U.S. Embassies

USICA and our Embassies are prepared to offer support to national public affairs efforts, as follows:

-- Embassy (USICA) Public Affairs Officers, with other ranking officers of each U.S. Mission, could participate in informal coordination groups with host country counterparts where strategy could be discussed, activities coordinated, and planning done.

-- In addition to seeking clarification or further information regarding Soviet forces and strategies, each Embassy is prepared to provide full texts of major statements and speeches by U.S. officials, background statements and other papers on U.S. policies and East-West relations. In this regard, we hope your governments will advise us of needed public statements.

-- The Voice of America and the USICA wireless file can replay abroad news-setting public pronouncements by European officials and prominent individuals.

-- USICA can cooperate in the commissioning and analysis of public opinion research on TNF, East-West relations, the Soviet challenge and other issues.

-- USICA can seek U.S. officials or prominent private Americans to participate in conferences, seminars, or more informal meetings sponsored by host country institutions. These include individuals who are able to communicate well with and gain the respect of peace, church, labor or youth groups.

-- USICA can cooperate in the sponsorship of tours of NATO facilities in Europe.

-- USICA-arranged "Electronic Dialogues" -- with trans-Atlantic satellite video and phone hookups can allow press conferences with leading U.S. figures, or two-way discussions between specialists or small groups.

-- The U.S. can invite a limited number of foreign visitors to meet with American officials and private citizens in the U.S. to discuss TNF, security and political issues affecting Europe and the United States and East-West relations.

We hope you will wish to avail yourselves ~~discreetly~~ of the support from our Embassies and the USICA. We feel this can provide a very helpful supplement to the activities of your governments in this public information campaign. You should feel free to request other support services, and we will do our best to provide them. ~~Ultimately, however, the main effort for these national campaigns would have to come from the governments themselves if the campaign is not to be prejudiced by a "Made in U.S.A." label.~~

*as you see fit*

0913A

*We recognize that the main effort of these campaigns are the responsibilities of the individual governments.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FR JR - FYI ||  
FILE: SHARPING  
5400 EUROPEAN  
ATTITUDES

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 11, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Cultivating Foreign Correspondents in Washington

A few months ago I sent you a memo emphasizing the importance of using foreign correspondents in Washington to get our message abroad. We are now working out an information campaign for Europe; therefore, I am raising this matter again with the specific recommendation that the President give a reception for the foreign correspondents.

A Presidential reception for these correspondents would include a wide variety of senior US officials, including cabinet members, both to enable correspondents to develop useful contacts and to signal to our own bureaucracy the President's interest in such contacts. As I pointed out before, most foreign correspondents here have little or no contact with US officials and simply rewrite NY Times and Washington Post pieces. For years we have badly neglected opportunities to influence foreign coverage of the US through cultivating foreign correspondents, being available to them, and providing them with useful (to both sides) information. A Presidential reception could initiate an effort to change this situation. I need not tell you that these newsmen are the best potential vehicle for getting our views to foreign audiences.

If you approve my suggestion, I will prepare a memo from you to the President recommending a reception. (There is one small hitch in my scheme: US correspondents are going to want a reception too if the President gives one for the foreigners.)

RECOMMENDATION

That I prepare a memorandum from you to the President recommending a reception for the Washington-based foreign correspondents.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Dennis Blair  
Carnes Lord

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on September 11, 1981

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *CR*, DATE *5/21/12*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11 September 1981

0900

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD PIPES  
JIM RENTSCHLER  
PAULA DOBRIANSKY  
BILL STEARMAN  
CARRY LORD  
SVEN KRAEMER  
GENERAL SCHWEITZER

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR

SUBJECT: Shaping European Attitudes & Clearance of  
Covering Memorandum for Threat Materials Package

Attached for clearance is the cover memo for transmission of the unclassified threat materials package to the Allies. The State memo explains the contents of the package and the process for its release to the Allies.

Please give me any comments on the memo by COB today so that I can consolidate and call in to State.

cc: Adm. Poindexter  
Allen Lenz

Memo to RUA  
per Poindexter note

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*Collection Name*  
BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

*Withdrawer*  
CAS 5/21/2012

*File Folder*  
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (09/08/1981-09/21/1981)

*FOIA*  
M11-442  
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*Box Number*  
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
137013	CABLE STATE 242163	3	9/11/1981	B1

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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IN

OP IMMEDIATE /PRIORITY  
DE RUEHC #3254 2560934  
O P 120012Z SEP 81 ZEX  
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*New File:  
SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES;  
\* WESTERN POLITICAL  
OFFENSIVE*

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE  
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6007-09

~~SECRET~~ STATE 243254

CORRECTED COPY (PARA 4 SUBPARA 22 TEXT OMITTED)  
E.O. 12065: GDS 9/11/87(PALMER, MARK)

TAGS: SOPN, XG

SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: TALKING POINTS FOR  
SEPTEMBER 22 NAC

REF: STATE 23043

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MH421 #137014

BY RW NARA DATE 8/23/16

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. REPTTEL DESCRIBED GENERAL APPROACH TO BE TAKEN BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AT REINFORCED NAC SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 15. THIS CABLE PROVIDES TALKING POINTS FOR USE BY MISSION AT SEPTEMBER 22 NAC WHICH WILL CONSIDER IN DETAIL OUR PROGRAM TO PROMOTE GREATER RECIPROCITY IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND TO COUNTER SOVIET COVERT INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

3. REQUEST USNATO TO CONFIRM SCHEDULEING RECIPROCITY AND SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AS SUBJECTS FOR NAC ON SEPTEMBER 22. EMBASSIES ARE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS OF GENERAL POINTS WE INTEND TO MAKE AT THAT NAC. HOST GOVERNMENTS MAY WISH TO REINFORCE THEIR DELEGATIONS AS WE PLAN TO DO WITH INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS.

4. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

--ONE OF THE MOST BASIC CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL

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SIT:  
EOB: PIPES, RENT  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 3254  
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TOR: 256/1128Z

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POLITICS IS THAT THE ONLY APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES IS RECIPROCITY. RECIPROCITY IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH HIGHLY CENTRALIZED, AUTHORITARIAN STATES LIKE THE USSR. HOWEVER, IN THE PAST, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, MANY WESTERN AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE U.S., DID NOT INSIST ON RECIPROCITY IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

—THIS LACK OF EFFECTIVE RECIPROCITY HAS HAD A NUMBER OF ADVERSE RESULTS, INCLUDING:

PSOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER REPRESENTATION IN MANY COUNTRIES IS SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAT THE LEVEL REQUIRED FOR NORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS AND FAR EXCEEDS THE SIZE OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S COMPARABLE REPRESENTATION IN MOSCOW.

PSOVIET OFFICIALS REGULARLY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FREE ACCESS TO PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA IN THE WEST AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD TO GET ACROSS THEIR PROPAGANDA MESSAGES TO PUBLIC OPINION WHILE DENYING COMPARABLE MEDIA ACCESS TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN THE USSR. THEY HAVE MISLED OUR PUBLICS ON CRITICAL SECURITY AND OTHER ISSUES AND HARMED THEIR AND OUR ABILITY TO MAKE TO MAKE SOUND POLITICAL DECISIONS.

,SOVIET OFFICIALS TRAVEL RELATIVELY FREELY IN MANY COUNTRIES WHILE THE USSR IMPOSES TIGHT TRAVEL CONTROLS ON FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN THE USSR. WE HAVE JUST PREPARED A NEW COMPILATION OF THESE SOVIET TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS WHICH WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SHARE WITH YOU.

IN PART BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO ENFORCE RECIPROCITY, SOVIET COVERT PROPAGANDA/INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE HEADWAY IN MANY WESTERN AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AT THE REINFORCED NAC ONE WEEK AGO, WE DISTRIBUTED BOTH A CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON SUCH ACTIVITIES. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE UNCLASSIFIED PAPER IN PARTICULAR. WE CAN INCORPORATE ANY COMMENTS RECEIVED BY SEPTEMBER 30. WE PLAN TO RELEASE IT AROUND OCTOBER 7.

PRESENT TODAY IS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHO IS PREPARED TO BRIEF YOU MORE FULLY ON ASPECTS OF THE DANGER WE ALL FACE CURRENTLY FROM THESE ACTIVITIES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS AND BELIEVE ONLY SUSTAINED DISCUSSION AMONG US CAN BRING ABOUT RESULTS IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA OF EAST-WEST

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~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

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RELATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, WE THINK WE NEED TO GET OUT A STEADY FLOW OF INFORMATION TO OUR PUBLICS ABOUT SPECIFIC ACTS OF SOVIET DISINFORMATION, ETC, AS THEY OCCUR. THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS EFFORT WILL BE HEIGHTENED TO THE EXTENT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES PROVIDING IT.

—TURNING TO RECIPROCITY, WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS AN AREA WHERE BILATERAL, NATIONAL POLICY WILL DETERMINE EFFECTIVENESS. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE DETERMINED TO TAKE NEW STEPS TO ENFORCE GREATER RECIPROCITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE ARRIVED AT THE CONCLUSION THAT WE MUST ACT IN THIS FASHION ONLY AFTER REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WE HOPED WOULD LEAD TO MUTUALLY AGREED STEPS TOWARD GREATER RECIPROCITY. AMONG THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE ARE:

.MUTUAL RELAXATION OF TRAVEL CONTROLS ON U.S. AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

.INCREASED ACCESS TO SOVIET BROADCAST MEDIA FOR U.S. OFFICIALS IN RECIPROCITY FOR THE RELATIVELY EASY ACCESS WHICH SOVIET OFFICIALS ENJOY TO U.S. PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA. OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SOVIETS IN THIS CONNECTION HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY IGNORED.

—IN THESE AND OTHER CASES THE SOVIETS HAVE TURNED ASIDE OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN MUTUALLY AGREED MOVEMENT TOWARD GREATER RECIPROCITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THUS, WE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT WE MUST MOVE UNILATERALLY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE. AMONG THE STEPS WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN OR ARE CONTEMPLATING ARE THE FOLLOWING:

.CONGRESSIONAL PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR RECIPROCITY OF TREATMENT GIVEN TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT MISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, IN RELATION TO TREATMENT RECEIVED BY UNITED STATES OFFICIALS ABROAD. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION, WHICH IS NOW BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, PROVIDES SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO ENFORCE

RECIPROCITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING OPTIONAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE ALL GOODS AND SERVICES OBTAINED BY FOREIGN MISSIONS, WHEN THE SECRETARY DECIDES SUCH ACTION IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. PASSAGE OF THIS LEGISLATION WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY STATUTORY FOUNDATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF GREATER RECIPROCITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE

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,TIGHTENED TRAVEL CONTROLS ON RESIDENT SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL PERSONNEL.

,MORE AGGRESSIVE RETALIATION FOR SOVIET DELAYS AND DENIALS OF DIPLOMATIC VISAS.

,CLOSER MONITORING OF SOVIET EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH ALL BRANCHES AND OFFICES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THIS MONITORING WILL PROVIDE US WITH A DATA BASE TO ASSESS WHETHER U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW ARE RECEIVING ROUGHLY COMPARABLE ACCESS TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

,GREATER RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL WITHIN THE U.S. BY SOVIET VISITORS. VISITORS COMING UNDER PRIVATE AUSPICES ARE GENERALLY BEING DENIED PERMISSION TO DIVERGE FROM THE ITINERARY LISTED IN THEIR VISA REQUEST. COMMERCIAL VISITOR VISAS ARE APPROVED ONLY AFTER U.S. COMMERCIAL INTEREST AND SPONSORSHIP HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. TRAVEL IN THE U.S. BY SOVIET BUSINESS VISITORS IS CLOSELY MONITORED.

—WE HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION OTHER STEPS:

,CUSTOMS: WE ARE EXPLORING WAYS TO FIND A RECIPROCAL BALANCE FOR OUR EMBASSY'S TREATMENT BY SOVIET CUSTOMS OFFICIALS. WE ARE LOOKING AT RECIPROCITY IN HANDLING CHARGES, FREIGHT AND BAGGAGE INSPECTION.

,VISAS: WE HAVE BEGUN CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS AIMED AT SECURING LEGISLATIVE CHANGES THAT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO TURN DOWN VISA REQUESTS ON RECIPROVITY OR OTHER GROUNDS.

TRAVEL CONTROL: IN RESPONSE TO THE GREATER DIFFICULTIES OUR PERSONNEL IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING IN TRAVELLING TO OSTENSIBLY OPEN AREAS OF THE USSR, WE ARE TIGHTENING OUR OWN RULES ON TRAVEL TO AREAS IN THE U.S. DESIGNATED AS "OPEN" OR "CLOSED".

—WE ARE FULLY AWARE AS WE PROCEED IN THIS PROGRAM THAT THE SOVIETS, BECAUSE OF THEIR CLOSED AND TIGHTLY CONTROLLED SOCIETY, HAVZ AN INHERENT ADVANTAGE IN THEIR ONGOING EFFORT TO PREVENT US FROM ENFORCING STRICT RECIPROCITY IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WHILE ENSURING THAT OUR OWN SOCIETY RETAINS ITS OPEN AND FREE CHARACTER, WE CANNOT PERMIT UNLIMITED SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF THIS ADVANTAGE TO DENY US RECIPROCAL TREATMENT.

—WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THAT EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES MOST ADOPT A UNIFORM SET OF MZASURES, NOR ARE WE CALLING

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FOR A FRUITLESSLY CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH TO OUR RESPECTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. INDEED, WE BELIEVE THAT A COORDINATED EFFORT ALONG THESE LINES WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN INFLUENCING SOVIET POLICIES AND POSSIBLY IN OPENING THE USSR TO A GREATER DEGREE OF INFLUENCE FROM OUR RESPECTIVE SOCIETIES.

--THUS, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF RECIPROCITY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE CAN ALL LEARN FROM EACH OTHER IN THIS COMPLEX FIELD. FROM THIS LEARNING PROCESS, WE HOPE THE LESSON WILL EMERGE THAT RECIPROCITY IS BOTH ATTAINABLE AND WORTHWHILE IN DEALING WITH THE USSR.

--LOOKING BEYOND EUROPE, WE ALSO WANT TO CONSIDER HOW TO ENGAGE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THIS PROCESS OF ENFORCING GREATER RECIPROCITY AND MORE EFFECTIVELY COUNTERING SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES. WE KNOW THAT A NUMBER OF THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED, SOME HAVE ALREADY TAKEN STEPS OF THEIR OWN, AND OTHERS WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO TAKE SUCH STEPS IF THEY KNEW THEY WERE NOT ALONE. IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE THERE IS SCOPE FOR A DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG US. THIS REQUIRES FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

--WE BELIEVE THIS ENTIRE SUBJECT SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY FOR PERM REPS. TO ENSURE PROGRESS, WE SUGGEST THAT A REPORT BE PREPARED FOR MINISTERS TO CONSIDER IN DECEMBER ON THE KINDS OF ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN AND FURTHER STEPS. TO ORGANIZE THIS EFFORT, WE BELIEVE A MEETING OF EXPERTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN OCTOBER. OUR DIRECTOR OF SOVIET AFFAIRS TOGETHER WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS COULD BE AVAILABLE FOR SUCH A MEETING ON OCTOBER

26. THIS WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY BOTH FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT OUR OWN PROGRAMS AND HOW TO EXTEND THIS EFFORT TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD. THIS TIMING WOULD FIT WELL WITH THE FACT THAT THE NATO SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN EXPERTS MEETING WILL BE HELD OCTOBER 24-25. CLARK  
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OR FORCE EVERYONE TO TALK FROM THE SAME SCRIPT. HOWEVER, IT WAS USEFUL TO COORDINATE OUR WORK, AND TO DEVELOP NEW EFFORTS. HE THEN REVIEWED THE THREE SPECIFIC AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION AND EFFORT:

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- WESTERN VALUES;
- PUBLIC EDUCATION ON THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP;
- THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITIES AND DISINFORMATION AND MEANS TO RESTRAIN AND COUNTER THEM.

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6. WITH REGARD TO WESTERN VALUES, EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT IDEAS REMAIN OUR MOST POWERFUL WEAPON, BUT OUR PUBLICS ARE LARGELY UNINFORMED, SOME ARE APATHETIC, SOME ALIENATED. MORAL LEADERSHIP IS REQUIRED, DRAWING ON SEVERAL ELEMENTS, INCLUDING THE SPIRITUAL BENEFITS OF THE WESTERN CONCEPTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS; THE MATERIAL SUPERIORITY OF THE WESTERN ECONOMIC SYSTEM; THE ENTRANCE OF SPAIN INTO NATO, OBVIOUSLY A SENSITIVE TOPIC, BUT WHICH EMPHASIZES THE ATTRACTIONS OF DEMOCRACY. HE PROPOSED THAT THIS AREA BE EXAMINED BY THE COUNCIL, WITH A VIEW TO PREPARING INITIATIVES FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE MINISTERIALS.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 09-17-91 (BENNETT, W. TAPLEY, JR.) OR-M  
TAGS: NATO  
SUBJECT: SEPT. 16 NAC: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE

7. ON THE SOVIET THREAT, EAGLEBURGER NOTED THE NEED FOR CONTINUING EFFORTS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, ALLIANCE AND NATIONAL; HE CALLED FOR A NATO WHITE PAPER, DEVELOPED FROM WORK CURRENTLY BEING DONE BY THE DRC, TO BE RELEASED ON THE EVE OF THE DEC. 1981 MINISTERIALS, AND TO BE ENDORSED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTERS. HE NOTED THE REPORT WHICH SECDEF WEINBERGER WOULD BE RELEASING ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, AND INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD IN ADDITION BE MAKING AVAILABLE OTHER INFORMATION ON THE GENERAL MILITARY BALANCE, TNF, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUCLEAR FORCES AND PEACE. HE SUGGESTED THAT A SEPARATE MEETING OF THE NAC CONSIDER THE SPECIFICS OF THE NATO FORCE COMPARISON PAPER IN EARLY OCTOBER.

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS SUMMED UP BY SYG LUNS, REINFORCED NAC SEPT. 16 AGREED THAT:

- THERE WAS A NEED TO MAKE GREATER PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT; NATO AND NATIONS MUST TAKE THE OFFENSIVE;
- PUBLIC AWARENESS OF COMMON WESTERN VALUES HAD TO BE INCREASED;
- THE PUBLIC SHOULD BE BETTER EDUCATED ON THE SOVIET THREAT, FOR WHICH TWO STEPS WERE THE US PAPER TO BE RELEASED BY SECDEF AND A NATO FORCE COMPARISON STUDY, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL AS CONVENTIONAL, BUT EXCLUDING REFERENCE TO FRENCH FORCES, TO BE MADE PUBLIC ON THE EVE OF THE DECEMBER DPC MINISTERIAL;
- MORE SHOULD BE DONE TO COUNTER SOVIET DISINFORMATION, WITH NEXT STEPS TO BE SEPT. 22 NAC, AN EXPERTS MEETING IN OCTOBER, AND, AS SUGGESTED BY FRENCH AND FRG, CONSIDERATION BY THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE, ALL LOOKING TO A REPORT TO MINISTERS.

3. DISCUSSION OF FOLLOW-UP IN THE AREA OF WESTERN VALUES AND EXPLANATION OF WESTERN STRATEGY WAS INCONCLUSIVE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SPC WOULD CONSIDER THE OVERALL SUBJECT, ALONG WITH ITS CURRENT WORK ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION. RECURRENT THEMES IN ALLIED STATEMENTS WERE: NEED TO TAILOR APPROACHES TO PARTICULAR NATIONAL SITUATIONS AND AUDIENCES, AND THUS TO LEAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO NATIONS; AND NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN GENUINE INDIGENOUS CRITICISM AND SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT WESTERN OPINION.

4. THIS MESSAGE REPORTS DISCUSSION. MISSION COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CERTAIN SPECIFIC POINTS FOR WASHINGTON ACTION, NEEDED BEFORE SEPT. 22 NAC, BEING SENT SEPT. END SUMMARY.

5. ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER OPENED DISCUSSION BY NOTING SECRETARY HAIG'S INCREASING CONCERN WITH THE INADEQUACIES OF THE WESTERN PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT AND THE NEED FOR A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH. HE STRESSED THAT WHAT THE US HAD IN MIND WOULD IN NO WAY LIMIT NATIONAL EFFORTS,

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8. ON SOVIET DISINFORMATION, HE NOTED THE INFLUENCE WHICH SOVIET ACTION HAS ON THE WESTERN SECURITY DEBATE, THE ADVANTAGES WHICH THE SOVIETS DERIVE FROM THE OPENNESS OF WESTERN SOCIETY, AND THE DOUBLE STANDARD WHICH EXISTS, IN THAT THE WEST HAS NOWHERE NEAR THE SAME DEGREE OF ACCESS TO SOVIET POLICY MAKING OR MEDIA. HE DISTRIBUTED A CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED STUDY OF SOVIET ACTIVITY, NOTING THAT THE US PLANNED TO MAKE THE UNCLASSIFIED VERSION PUBLIC IN EARLY OCTOBER AND WOULD HOPE ALLIES WOULD PUBLISH IT OR SIMILAR INFORMATION. HE REFERRED TO THE NAC SCHEDULED FOR SEPT. 22, AT WHICH THE US WOULD OFFER AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, AND SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE A FURTHER MEETING OF EXPERTS IN OCTOBER, LOOKING TO A REPORT TO THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL.

9. IN CONCLUSION, EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE NAC WAS TO UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR INITIATIVES, NOT TO SUGGEST THAT THE US HAD ALL THE ANSWERS. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS SENDING A LETTER TO BREZHNEV; IT WOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC BUT THE GENERAL THEMES WOULD BE RELEASED.

10. FRG POLITICAL DIRECTOR PFEFFER WELCOMED THE US INITIATIVE IN CALLING FOR THE MEETING, AND AGREED ALLIES NEEDED TO STEP UP THEIR PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORT, IN THE PRESENT TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND IN THE FACE OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO SPLIT THE WEST. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PLEASURE THAT SECRETARY HAIG HAD CHOSEN TO MAKE HIS SPEECH UNDERLINING BASIS WESTERN VALUES IN BERLIN. HE NOTED THAT THE RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AT RAMSTEIN AND AGAINST GENERAL KROESSEN FURTHER UNDERSCORED THE NEED FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION. PFEFFER NOTED THAT THE "SO-CALLED PEACE MOVEMENT" IN THE FRG AND EUROPE HAD A GREAT VARIETY OF MOTIVES AND MANIFESTATIONS. ITS PRINCIPAL TARGETS WERE LRNF AND ERV, BUILDING ON AN EMOTIONALISM ABOUT THINGS NUCLEAR WHICH STARTED WITH THE NUCLEAR POWER SECTOR. THE MOVEMENT USES ONE-SIDED ARGUMENTS DOWNPLAYING SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND ACCUSING THE US OF SEEKING SUPERIORITY. THEY ALSO FOCUS ON THE RISING COST OF ARMS AND THE NEEDS OF THE ILDCS, MAKING MORALISTIC ARGUMENTS WHICH IGNORE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL REALITIES.

11. PFEFFER SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THE "PEACE MOVEMENT" WAS TO SOME DEGREE FINANCED AND ORGANIZED BY THE SOVIETS, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF DRIVING WEDGES IN THE WEST. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE WRONG TO DISMISS THE ENTIRE MOVEMENT AS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA. THERE IS A VAGUE UNEASINESS, ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUTH, ABOUT DEFENSE, WHICH MUST BE COUNTERED BY EDUCATION. NUCLEAR FEARS MUST BE MET BY CREDIBLE AND DIFFERENTIATED ARGUMENTS. PFEFFER

NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE THIRD STORM OF THIS KIND, TWO EARLIER ONES HAVING OCCURRED IN THE 1950'S AND 1960'S. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEMS SHOULD NEITHER BE EXAGGERATED OR UNDERESTIMATED. HE NOTED THAT THE FRG WAS UNDERTAKING MAJOR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS, INCLUDING PUBLICATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF BROCHURES TARGETED TO PARTICULAR AUDIENCES (E.G. 400,000 COPIES OF A SECURITY PAMPHLET FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS, 200,000 COPIES OF ANOTHER PAMPHLET FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC), PUBLIC SPEECHES, AND OTHER INFORMATION ACTIVITIES. WHAT WAS ESSENTIAL WAS THAT THE EFFORT BE CAREFULLY TAILORED TO THE AUDIENCE, AND THAT THE ARGUMENTS BE BASED ON FACTS AND FIGURES. THERE WAS A COMMON TASK IN PREPARING MATERIAL, AND A SPECIFIC TASK FOR EACH ALLIANCE MEMBER IN CARRYING OUT SPECIFIC INFORMATION PROGRAMS. COUNTRIES MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF THE EFFECT IN OTHER ALLIANCE COUNTRIES OF GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS WHICH MAY BE MADE IN THEIR OWN DOMESTIC CONTEXT.

12. AS TO SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, PFEFFER FAVORED THE PREPARATION OF A JOINT DATA BASE ON MILITARY COMPARISON. SOMETHING SIMILAR MIGHT ALSO BE DONE IN THE FIELD OF SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND COVERT ACTION, WHICH WAS A SUBJECT WHICH THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE MIGHT ADDRESS. FINALLY, HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT NATO COMMUNIQUE BE DRAFTED WITH MORE ATTENTION TO PUBLIC RELATIONS REQUIREMENTS WITH MORE EMPHASIS ON WESTERN VALUES, MORAL ALERTNESS, SELF-ASSURANCE AND DECISIVENESS.

13. UK POLITICAL DIRECTOR BULLARD ALSO WELCOMED THE MEETING AND SAID UK WAS PLEASED WITH THE LINE WHICH THE US WAS TAKING. UK HAD ALWAYS REGARDED EAST-WEST COMPETITION AS A FIELD IN WHICH THE WEST DID BETTER IN A WAR OF MOVEMENT THAN IN TRENCH WARFARE. BULLARD SAID THAT CRITICAL UK PUBLIC OPINION WAS NOT NEUTRALIST (THERE WAS NO PRESSURE TO LEAVE NATO, IN CONTRAST TO PRESSURE TO LEAVE THE EC) AND WAS NOT PACIFIST, SINCE IT DID NOT BELIEVE IN NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE. RATHER, IT WAS ANTI-NUCLEAR, AND TO A DEGREE ANTI-AMERICAN. HE NOTED THAT HMG HAD

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BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN COUNTERING THESE ATTITUDES, REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO THE ESSAY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE DEFENSE WHITE PAPERS.

14. BULLARD SAID THAT FIRST PRIORITY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS WAS MATERIAL ON THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE NEED FOR STRONG WESTERN DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON EXISTING WORK. THERE COULD BE TWO PRODUCTS: FIRST, A PAPER OF FACTS AND FIGURES, WITH PERHAPS SOME EXPLANATORY INFORMATION BUT NO VALUE JUDGEMENTS. THIS COULD BE DEVELOPED FROM THE CURRENT DRC EFFORT, AND SHOULD INCLUDE NUCLEAR FORCES AS WELL AS CONVENTIONAL, AND WOULD BE RELEASED IN DECEMBER. THE SECOND COULD BE A PAPER OF ARGUMENTS AND EXPLANATION OF DETERRENCE, WHICH THE SPC MIGHT CONSIDER, AS AN EXTENSION OF ITS PRESENT WORK.

15. AS TO THE CONTRAST BETWEEN WESTERN AND SOVIET SYSTEMS, BULLARD NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ADDRESSED THIS IN BERLIN AND THAT PM THATCHER HAD ALSO SPOKEN ON IT. PERHAPS THE NAC COULD EXAMINE THIS QUESTION AT A FUTURE MEETING. ON THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITIES, BULLARD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE HAD DONE USEFUL WORK IN THE FIELD. ON ONE SPECIFIC POINT, HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER SEEKING RECIPROCITY IN ACCESS TO THE MEDIA BY RESTRICTING SOVIET ACCESS TO UK MEDIA, IN THE WAY THAT THE SOVIETS RESTRICTED WESTERN ACCESS TO THEIR MEDIA.

16. BULLARD NOTED THAT PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS SHOULD NOT FORGET THE THIRD WORLD AUDIENCE, WHICH SHOULD BE REMINDED OF SOVIET INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES. MOREOVER, PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES ALONE ARE NOT ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE RIGHT POLICIES, WHICH MUST EMBRACE THE WHOLE GAMUT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE EUROPE, COVERING EVERYTHING FROM DEFENSE TO GRAIN AND GAS PIPELINES TO ARMS CONTR L. IN THIS REGARD HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT LRTNF TALKS WERE IMMINENT; AND THAT SALT MIGHT ALSO START IN SOME MONTHS, SUGGESTING THAT PERHAPS SOMETHING LIKE THE SCG WOULD ALSO BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE SALT CONTEXT. HE ALSO FLAGGED THE CDE AS AN ISSUE THE WEST COULD EXPLOIT IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT, AND TO DIFFERENTIATE THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES FROM THE SOVIETS. THE UK BELIEVES A BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IS STILL POSSIBLE IN MADRID, AND WOULD FIND IT TRAGIC IF THE CHANCE SHOULD SLIP AWAY, NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE EXTENSION TO THE URALS. AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER REGIONAL QUESTIONS PROVIDE ANOTHER AREA ON WHICH TO PRESS THE

SOVIETS. THE KEY TO ALL EFFORTS IS COORDINATION. HE ARGUED, AS AN EXAMPLE, THAT ALLIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ABLE TO SUPPORT THE US ON THE CV ISSUE IF THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE MATERIAL ON WHICH THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH HAD BEEN BASED.

17. IN THE INTEREST OF COORDINATING WESTERN APPROACHES IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE UNGA, BULLARD CIRCULATED A LIST OF SUGGESTED THEMES, WHICH HE SAID MIGHT SERVE AS A QUARRY FOR OTHERS. UK THEMES BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.

18. LUXEMBOURG PERMREP WURTH WELCOMED US CALL FOR THE MEETING AND SAID LUXEMBOURG AGREED WITH BROAD LINES OF US APPROACH. THE WEST NEEDS A CAMPAIGN OF EXPLANATION, AIMED PARTICULARLY AT YOUTH, TO EXPLAIN THAT THE ALLIANCE MEMBERS ARE THE REAL PACIFISTS. WE NEED TO EXPLAIN THE REQUIREMENT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WE NEED TO EXPLAIN THE REAL DIFFICULTIES OF ARMS CONTROL. THE WEST MUST ALSO OVERCOME THE EXISTING FEAR OF AFFIRMING ITS OWN VALUES. IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PRESS THE ECONOMIC VALUES OF THE WEST IN A SITUATION OF ECONOMIC CRISIS. OVERALL, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT POLITICIANS TAKE THE LEAD IN COUNTERING SOVIET ARGUMENTS, RATHER THAN ALLOWING THEMSELVES ALWAYS TO BE LED BY PUBLIC OPINION. HE SUGGESTED THAT BETTER USE BE MADE OF THE PRESENCE OF JOURNALISTS AT MINISTERIALS, AND THAT MINISTERS DISCUSS THE PUBLIC RELATIONS QUESTION IN THE SUPER RESTRICTED SESSION AT THE MINISTERIAL.

19. NORWEGIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR VRAALSEN AGREED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO ASSERT WESTERN VALUES, AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY MEET THE NEEDS OF THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, IF THIS EFFORT IS TO SUCCEED, WE MUST FIRST CAREFULLY STUDY THE PUBLIC OPINION WE WANT TO INFLUENCE. WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT CRITICISM IS NOT ONLY A RESULT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PROPAGANDA, BUT THAT THERE ARE GENUINE CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE, ABOUT THE COURSE OF

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND ABOUT WAR, WHICH THE SOVIETS CAN EXPLOIT. PEOPLE MUST BE GIVEN A POSITIVE PERSPECTIVE, SHOWING HOW IT IS POSSIBLE TO ENSURE PEACE, STABILITY, AND A REDUCTION OF ARMS. HE ARGUED THAT A POSITIVE, REALISTIC ARMS CONTROL POLICY IS IMPORTANT TO THIS EFFORT, CITING LRTNF TALKS AND THE NEED FOR A RESUMPTION OF SALT.

20. VRAALSEN SAID THAT COHESION ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS ALSO REQUIRED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WESTERN POSITIONS ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES, AND COULD NOT BE CONFINED TO EAST-WEST ISSUES. FURTHER, THE STYLE OF WESTERN STATEMENTS WAS IMPORTANT; THEY MUST EXPRESS POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE GOALS, AND A WILLINGNESS TO TALK AND NEGOTIATE. VRAALSEN SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO US INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORTED PREPARATION OF A PAPER ON THE MILITARY BALANCE. HOWEVER, HE CAUTIONED THAT EACH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ABLE TO DECIDE ITS OWN PRESENTATION, AND THUS QUESTIONED WHETHER NATO SHOULD ACTUALLY PUBLISH ANYTHING, OR MERELY COMPILE MATERIALS FOR GOVERNMENTS TO DRAW UPON.

21. BELGIAN POLITICAL DIRECTOR CAHEN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US INITIATIVE IN CALLING MEETING, NOTING THAT ALMOST ALL ALLIED COUNTRIES FACE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROBLEMS, HE SAID THESE STEM FROM TWO SOURCES: FIRST, OF COURSE, SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS. SECOND, THE FACT THAT PUBLIC OPINION HAS EVOLVED. MOST OF THE PUBLIC HAS NO MEMORY OF THE PRE-WAR PERIOD, MUCH HAS NO MEMORY OF THE WAR OR IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD. THIS CONTEXT MUST BE CONVEYED TO THE PUBLIC, ESPECIALLY TO YOUTH. HE ASSERTED THAT YOUTH WAS MORE RECEPTIVE TO SERIOUS EXPLANATION THAN WAS COMMONLY BELIEVED, BASED ON HIS TEACHING EXPERIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS. THE WEST NEEDS TO TIE THE POSTWAR CONTEXT TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, WHEN THE SOVIET THREAT HAS SHIFTED TO AREAS OUTSIDE EUROPE, PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE SUCCESS OF NATO. WE MUST ALSO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF ANTI-AMERICANISM, BY DISCUSSING THE REAL VALUE OF RELATIONS WITH THE US. CAHEN OBSERVED THAT THE IMAGE OF NATO WAS OF A SECRETIVE, WARLIKE ORGANIZATION, WHICH CONDUCTED TECHNICAL AND IN-COMPREHENSIBLE DISCUSSIONS EXPRESSED IN UNCLEAR COMMUNIQUE. NATO NEEDS TO PROJECT INTEREST AND TRANSPARENCY. HE AGREED WITH BULLARD THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE THIRD WORLD IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITY, AND THAT THE PUBLIC PROGRAM HAD TO BE FOUNDED ON GOOD POLICIES. CAHEN ENDORSED THE SEQUENCE OF WORK SET FORTH BY EAGLEBURGER.

22. FRENCH PERHREP ARNAUD STATED HE HAD LISTENED WITH

GREAT ATTENTION TO EAGLEBURGER'S STATEMENT AND TO THE REMARKS OF PRECEEDING SPEAKERS PARTICULARLY THAT OF AMBASSADOR WURTH. ON THE THEME OF SOVIET COVERT ACTIVITY AND DISINFORMATION, ARNAUD SAID THAT HE WOULD EXAMINE CLOSELY THE TWO DOCUMENTS THAT THE US HAD JUST DISTRIBUTED AND WOULD PARTICIPATE WITH PLEASURE IN THE COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON SEPTEMBER 22. AS FOR FURTHER ACTION, HE CONSIDERED THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO BE THE PROPER FORUM FOR DETERMINING WHAT WAS NEEDED.

23. THE NATO WHITE PAPER/FORCE COMPARISON RAISED SOME PROBLEMS, HOWEVER. ARNAUD WELCOMED THE FORTHCOMING US PAPER, BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER THE NATO PAPER SHOULD GIVE DATA ON NATO FORCES. ONCE NATO HAD GIVEN OFFICIAL DATA, THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE CONSEQUENCES. THE DANGER WAS THAT IF THE PAPER SHOWED TOO LARGE AN IMBALANCE, PUBLICS WOULD CONSIDER ANY ATTAINABLE INCREASED DEFENSE EFFORT AS FUTILE, WHEREAS IF THE PAPER SHOWED THAT NATO WAS NOT DOING TOO BADLY, PUBLICS WOULD BE INDIFFERENT TO REQUESTS FOR MORE MONEY FOR DEFENSE. CONSEQUENTLY, FRANCE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A PAPER LIMITED TO THE THREAT, WITH EACH GOVERNMENT DRAWING ON THE PAPER AS IT SAW FIT. HOWEVER, FRANCE RECOGNIZED THAT THE DRC PAPER WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY. PARIS DID NOT WISH THE DRC PAPER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF FRENCH FORCES, EXCEPT IN A FOOTNOTE. THIS WAS HIS GOVERNMENT'S FIRM POSITION. FRANCE WANTED TO AVOID FRENCH FORCES BEING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS.

24. AS FOR A PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN, ARNAUD SAID HE AGREED WITH REMARKS ALREADY MADE AROUND THE TABLE. HE CITED THE RECENT ADDRESS BY PM MAUROY, STRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE. HE NOTED, TOO, THAT THE SOVIETS HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT FRANCE'S PUBLIC STANCE IN FAVOR OF NATO'S LRTNF PLANS. ARNAUD STRESSED THAT ANY POSITION MUST BE TAILORED TO NATIONAL NEEDS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, HE WELCOMED AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THEMES AND PROPOSED THAT AT THE NEXT NAC MINISTERIAL, MINISTERS USE THE SUPER RESTRICTED SESSION TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE,



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WITH MINISTERS EXPLAINING THEIR PARTICULAR NATIONAL SITUATIONS.

25. ITALIAN DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR TRAXLER THANKED EAGLEBURGER FOR INITIATIVE ON CALLING THE MEETING. TRAXLER NOTED A CONSENSUS THAT THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM CONCERNED THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, BUT THAT PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS SHOULD BE LEFT, IN GREAT PART, TO NATIONS. NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS WERE THE BEST JUDGE OF THE APPROACH NEEDED. IN ITALY, THE GOVERNMENT HAD FOUND THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH WAS TO STIMULATE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES BEFORE THE OPPOSITION COULD AGITATE FOR THEM. THE GOI HAD ADOPTED THIS COURSE WITH DEBATES ON THE LRTNF TWO-TRACK DECISION AND ON LRTNF SITE SELECTION. THESE DEBATES HAD FOCUSED THE LARGEST OPPOSITION PARTY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF A MILITARY IMBALANCE AND THE DANGERS THIS POSED FOR THE WEST. HOWEVER, THE GOI COULD DO MORE IN PUBLIC RELATIONS.

26. TRAXLER AGREED THAT WESTERN VALUES WERE A VALID THEME. THIS THEME WAS BEING DEBATED CONSTANTLY IN ITALY, BECAUSE ITALY HAD THE LARGEST COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE WESTERN WORLD, AND BECAUSE OF THE FREQUENCY OF ELECTIONS IN ITALY. HE SAW, HOWEVER, A NEED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ALSO ON THE THIRD WORLD. TRAXLER RECOMMENDED THAT PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS CONCENTRATE ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC POINTS IN ATTEMPTING TO INFORM PUBLIC, AND ESPECIALLY YOUTH, ABOUT THE DANGERS OF THE CURRENT INTERACTION. ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE EASILY ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT BEING SIMPLISTIC; THE DEFENSIVE ROLE OF NATO, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL THREAT, THE NEED TO BALANCE THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ESTABLISHING THE BALANCE -- AT THE LOWEST LEVEL, BUT INCLUDING DEPLOYMENT IF NECESSARY -- AND EACH NATION'S NUCLEAR ROLE, THE LOGIC OF NATO'S NEGOTIATING POSITION. TRAXLER WELCOMED THE DRC FORCE COMPARISON STUDY AND AGREED IT SHOULD INCLUDE NUCLEAR FORCES. HE SUPPORTED PFEFFER'S COMMENTS ON THE NEED FOR COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION, NOT ONLY ON WHAT A NATION IS DOING BUT ALSO ON WHAT IT IS GOING TO DO. THE LRTNF NEGOTIATIONS (AND, LATER, STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS) WILL HAVE A GREAT PUBLIC FOLLOWING IN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IN ITALY. HE RECOMMENDED CONSULTATIONS ON THE PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

27. CANADIAN DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY CAMERON NOTED THAT THE SCG MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE

HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE STRIDES. HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO STRESS WESTERN VALUES, ESPECIALLY WHEN ADDRESSING YOUTH. THE CHOICE OF THEMES AND HOW TO PRESENT THEM WAS BEST LEFT TO INDIVIDUAL CAPITALS. CAMERON EXPRESSED DOUBT ABOUT THE UTILITY OF A NATO BROCHURE. HE WOULD PREFER AN EXCHANGE OF IDEAS AND THE PRODUCTION OF A CONFIDENTIAL PAPER FOR THE COUNCIL. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS CONCERNS THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE BEST COURSE WOULD BE A PAPER FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. SUCH A PAPER SHOULD BE FACTUAL, DOWN-TO-EARTH, AND STRAIGHT FORWARD. THE PAPER SHOULD INCLUDE NATO DATA, SINCE WESTERN PUBLICS WOULD NOT SUPPORT INCREASED MILITARY EFFORTS UNLESS THEY SAW THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE DRC FORCE COMPARISON PAPER, FOR RELEASE IN DECEMBER. RE SOVIET DISINFORMATION, CAMERON CALLED FOR PRESENTATION OF FACTS AND A COMMON APPROACH. THE SOVIETS WERE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A LACK OF ALLIANCE COMMONALITY.

28. DANISH DEPUTY PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY DYVIG ECHOED A POINT MADE BY BULLARD -- MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS NOT AN ISSUE IN PUBLIC DEBATE. IN DENMARK, SUPPORT FOR NATO WAS AS STRONG AS EVER. THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC RELATIONS WAS NOT NEW; IT STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT WESTERN SOCIETIES WERE OPEN, EASTERN SOCIETIES CLOSED. IN DENMARK, THE PUBLIC WAS UNDERSTANDABLY CONCERNED BY THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE PUBLIC WAS DEMANDING DIALOGUE, DETENTE, AND LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS. HE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH VRAALSEN'S REMARK THAT THESE PUBLIC REACTIONS WERE GENUINE, NOT JUST THE RESULT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA, THOUGH THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE REACTIONS. DYVIG STRESSED THE NEED FOR EACH CAPITAL TO TAILOR THEMES TO ITS OWN REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS REGARD, HE WAS SKEPTICAL OF THE BROCHURE IDEA, BUT WOULD SUPPORT FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE TOPIC. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, AGREE ON THE USEFULNESS OF A FORCE COMPARISON PAPER, AND HE LOOKED FORWARD, AS WELL, TO THE US PAPER ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT. DYVIG CAUTIONED THAT THE PRESS WAS AWARE OF THE PRESENT MEETING AND THE SUBJECT MATTER BEING DISCUSSED. IN HIS

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THE UNDERLYING PURPOSES OF THE ALLIANCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, PORTUGUESE APPRECIATION OF DEVELOPMENTS WAS CONDITIONED BY THE FACT OF PORTUGAL'S NON-INVOLVEMENT IN WORLD WAR II AND IN ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATHS.

32. FARIA NOTED THAT PORTUGUESE POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE EXTREME LEFT WERE VERY ACTIVE IN PROPAGANDA. FURTHER, THE PRESS WAS INDEPENDENT AND ACTIVE, AND IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE GOV TO COUNTER ITS INFLUENCE. FARIA STRESSED THE NEED FOR EACH ALLIANCE MEMBER TO ADOPT THEMES FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION, AND AGREED THAT CAPITALS MUST KEEP IN MIND NOT ONLY THEIR OWN PUBLICS BUT THIRD WORLD AUDIENCES. HE SUPPORTED USE OF THE THEME OF WESTERN VALUES, BUT CAUTIONED THAT SOME IN THE THIRD WORLD MIGHT CONSIDER THAT THESE VALUES HAD A PARTICULAR APPLICATION LIMITED TO THE WESTERN WORLD AND LITTLE APPLICATION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR OWN COUNTRIES. BENNETT

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VIEW, IT WOULD BE WELL NOT TO "OVER DRAMATIZE" THE MEETING IN ANY CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS.

29. NETHERLANDS DIRECTOR OF ATLANTIC COOPERATION AND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VAN VLOTEN STRESSED THE NEED (A) FOR EACH CAPITAL TO TAILOR THEMES ACCORDING TO NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND CONDITIONS AND (B) FOR NATO TO AVOID GIVING THE APPEARANCE OF UNLEASHING A BLATANT PROPAGANDA EXERCISE. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT MORE SHOULD BE DONE IN PUBLIC RELATIONS, WHILE CAUTIONING THAT IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO ATTRIBUTE THE CURRENT PUBLIC RELATIONS SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS SOLELY TO THE SUCCESS OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS. THE CURRENT CLIMATE IN THE NETHERLANDS REFLECTED GENUINE CONCERNS. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE CONCERNS PROVIDED FERTILE GROUND FOR DISPARATE EXTREMIST GROUPS, SOME OF WHICH WERE TINGED WITH ANTI-AMERICANISM. IN CLOSING, HE STATED THAT NATO NEEDED TO PRESENT A CLEAR AND CONVINCING CASE FOR ITS ARMS CONTROL APPROACH AND TO RELEASE FORCE COMPARISON DATA. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIPT OF THE US PAPER ON THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT.

30. GREEK DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS STEPHANOU POINTED OUT THAT NATO HAD TO MAKE UP FOR 20 YEARS OF NEGLECT IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC INFORMATION. HE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR COORDINATING EFFORTS, AND, SPECIFICALLY, ON THE NEED FOR AN AGREED FORCE COMPARISON PAPER. HOWEVER, IN OTHER INFORMATION AREAS THE GOV WOULD PREFER TO USE ITS OWN MEANS, RATHER THAN ACCEPT NATO PRODUCED MATERIAL. SPECIFICALLY, HE QUESTIONED WHETHER NATO COULD PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE BROCHURE OR SPECIAL EDITION OF THE NATO REVIEW. STEPHANOU COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON TRAXLER'S DESCRIPTION OF THE GOI EXPERIENCE IN STIMULATING A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON NATO'S DECEMBER 1979 LRTNF DECISION AND ON LRTNF BASE SITING IN ITALY, GETTING OUT IN ADVANCE OF THE OPPOSITION. IN CLOSING, HE ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH BULLARD'S REMARK THAT IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS -- THEY MUST HAVE THE RIGHT POLICIES AS WELL.

31. PORTUGUESE DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR FARIA RECALLED PORTUGAL'S RECENT INTERNAL STRUGGLES AGAINST THE EXTREME LEFT, WHICH HEIGHTENED ITS AWARENESS OF THE NEEDS WHICH PROMPTED THE COUNCIL'S PRESENT DISCUSSIONS. AS EXAMPLES OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS TO COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA, HE CITED (A) THE GOV'S FIRM REACTION TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND (B) THE DISCUSSION WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE PORTUGUESE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES ON DEFENSE AND ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE US ERW DECISION. FARIA NOTED THAT PUBLIC OPINION POLLS SHOWED THAT THE PORTUGUESE WERE VERY FAVORABLE TO NATO AND UNDERSTOOD AND SUPPORTED

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THE US SUGGESTION THAT A REPORT BE PREPARED FOR MINISTERS ON POSSIBLE INITIATIVES IN THIS AREA. LUNS, HOWEVER, REFERRED THE OVERALL TOPIC OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS TO THE SPC FOR CONSIDERATION. LUNS INITIALLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SPC'S CONSIDERING THE PREPARATION OF AN EXPLANATORY NATO BROCHURE, BUT FRENCH PERMREP ARNAUD QUESTIONED THE ROLE OF THE SPC IN THE ISSUE, APPEARING TO HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT THE SPC WAS ALREADY ENGAGED IN CONSIDERING PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR QUESTIONS. AFTER EXPLANATIONS, ARNAUD AGREED THAT SPC COULD CONSIDER PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUESTIONS MORE BROADLY THAN IT HAD HERETOFORE.

*Handwritten initials: JLG, GW*

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 09-17-91 (GLITMAN, HAYNARD W.) OR-M

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: SEPT. 16 NAC: MISSION COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. IC - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: SEPTEL TRANSMITS REPORT OF SEPT. 16 REINFORCED NAC ON WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP ACTION ON EACH OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL. THE FORCE-COMPARISON WHITE PAPER WAS THE MOST EASILY AGREED, ALBEIT WITHOUT FRENCH PARTICIPATION, AND SHOULD MOVE FORWARD TO RELEASE AT THE TIME OF THE DPC MINISTERIAL. THE ISSUE OF SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND COVERT ACTIVITY AWAITS FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION AT THE SEPT. 22 NAC; A POTENTIAL PROBLEM IS AN ALLIED SUGGESTION TO REFER THE QUESTION TO THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE. THE ISSUE OF THE PRESENTATION OF WESTERN VALUES AND THE OVERALL EXPLANATION OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND RATIONALE WAS LEFT UNRESOLVED; THE NEXT OCCASION TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION WILL COME WHEN THE SPC MEETS IN EARLY OCTOBER TO CONSIDER PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

3. FORCE COMPARISON WHITE PAPER:

- THE DEFENSE COMPARISON ASPECT OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN IS WELL LAUNCHED. DRC EFFORT UNDER ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL NICHOLLS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PRODUCE A GOOD PRODUCT FOR APPROVAL BY DPC PERMREPS AND RELEASE IN WHITE PAPER FORMAT ON THE EVE OF THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS. IN VIEW OF FIRM FRENCH POSITION THAT FRENCH FORCES NOT BE TREATED EXCEPT BY FOOTNOTE AND THAT THIS BE A DPC EFFORT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO SECURE THEIR PARTICIPATION OR ENDORSEMENT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE. RATHER, A LIKELY PROCEDURAL FIGHT COULD RESULT IN DERAILING THE PROJECT ALTOGETHER. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD NOW BE BEST TO CONCENTRATE ON PROVIDING MATERIAL TO NICHOLLS AND THEN EVALUATING (SOMETIME IN OCTOBER) WHETHER A MEETING OF DPC PERMREPS IS NEEDED TO GIVE IT IMPETUS. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, IF THE REPORT IS RELEASED ON THE EVE OF THE MINISTERIALS, ITS PUBLIC EXPOSURE WILL FAR OUTWEIGH WHATEVER DISTINCTION THE PRESS MAY MAKE CONCERNING ENDORSEMENT BY DEFENSE OR FOREIGN MINISTERS. ACTION REQUESTED: INPUTS FOR WHITE PAPER EFFORT.

4. WESTERN VALUES:

- LUNS' SUMMING UP DID NOT INCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO

- WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD USE THE MEETING OF THE SPC ALREADY PLANNED FOR EARLY OCTOBER TO CONSIDER PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION TO ADDRESS AS WELL THE NEED FOR CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ALL COUNTRIES OF IDEAS FOR INITIATIVES ON WESTERN VALUES, AND TO SUGGEST THAT A REPORT CONTAINING THESE IDEAS BE PREPARED FOR MINISTERS. GIVEN THE STRONG MARKERS PUT DOWN BY MOST ALLIES THAT NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONTROL PRESENTATION OF MATERIAL TO THEIR OWN PUBLICS, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A REPORT (IF IT IS EVENTUALLY AGREED TO) IS UNLIKELY TO GO BEYOND A FAIRLY INNOCUOUS AND SELF-EVIDENT CATALOGUE OF ISSUES AND AREAS FOR STRESSING BY ALLIES, RATHER THAN SPECIFIC PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS.

- AS TO THE SPECIFIC IDEA OF A NATO EXPLANATORY BROCHURE WHICH WOULD SET FORTH ARGUMENTS ON WESTERN VALUES, NATO STRATEGY, AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY THREAT, THE SKEPTICAL REACTION OF CANADIANS, DANES, AND GREEKS AT THE MEETING SUGGEST THAT SUCH A PROJECT WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING FORMAL ALLIED SUPPORT. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TALKED WITH UK DEL, AND HMG IS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF PROJECT AND ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT DEVELOPING IT, AS BULLARD HINTED IN HIS REMARKS AT THE MEETING. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO LET UK TAKE THE LEAD IN NEXT STEPS ON THIS PROJECT, RECOGNIZING THAT THE BEST OUTCOME WE ARE LIKELY TO BE

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ABLE TO ACHIEVE WOULD BE A SPECIAL EDITION OF THE NATO REVIEW, RATHER THAN A BROCHURE PRODUCED AS AN INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE.

5. SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND COVERT ACTIVITY:

- SEPTEMBER 22 NAC MEETING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED AND IS SLATED TO BEGIN AT 10:15 A.M. WITH REGARD TO TALKING POINTS CONTAINED STATE 243254, WE RECOMMEND THAT FINAL POINT PROPOSING EXPERTS MEETING IN OCTOBER BE REVISED AND THAT FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23 (VICE MONDAY, OCTOBER 26) BE PROPOSED AS DATE FOR MEETING. NATO EXPERTS MEETING ON SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE IS SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER 20-22 (USNATO 3306), WITH OPTION OF CONTINUING ON OCTOBER 23 IF DEEMED NECESSARY. (FYI: OCTOBER 26 DATE WAS NOT MENTIONED AT SEPTEMBER 16 NAC.) PICKING UP OPTIONAL DAY FOR EXPERTS DISCUSSION ON SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" WOULD EASILY FIT INTO PLANS OTHER EXPERTS HAVE ALREADY MADE. ON OTHER HAND, ASKING THAT OTHERS STAY THROUGH WEEKEND FOR A MONDAY MEETING COULD RUN INTO RESISTANCE. EVEN IF ACCEPTED, THERE IS LIABLE TO BE SOME ATTRITION OF PARTICIPANTS FROM CAPITALS SINCE MANY ATTENDEES FOR REGIONAL EXPERTS MEETING WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FEEL THEY CANNOT REMAIN AWAY FROM CAPITALS FOR THE ENTIRE WEEK.-

6. BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMANS PROPOSED AT SEPTEMBER 16 NAC THAT QUESTION OF SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" BE ADDRESSED IN NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE. FOR SEPTEMBER 22 NAC, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PARRY THIS SUGGESTION AND TO ADVANCE SOLID ARGUMENTS FOR HOLDING A SPECIAL EXPERTS MEETING ON THE SUBJECT. WHILE THE COMPETENCE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE COINCIDES WITH THE SUBJECT OF THE PROPOSED EXPERTS MEETING, THE TRADITIONALLY PUBLICITY SHY APPROACH OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE TAILORED TO OUR GOALS. SINCE FOR TACTICAL OR SUBSTANTIVE REASONS MANY WOULD PROBABLY STRONGLY OBJECT TO ENCRDACHING ON THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S MANDATE, WE BELIEVE OUR BEST APPROACH TO PARRYING THE UK-FRENCH-FRG SUGGESTION WOULD BE TO CAST THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN A SUPPORTIVE ROLE AND TO HAVE OTHER EXPERTS DRAW AS APPROPRIATE UPON THE WORK IT CURRENTLY HAS IN TRAIN. (FYI: WE UNDERSTAND THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE IS CURRENTLY PREPARING A REPORT FOR SUBMISSION IN JANUARY TO THE COUNCIL ON THE CURRENT ANTI-NATO CAMPAIGN IN VARIOUS ALLIED COUNTRIES. REPORT WILL BE REVIEWED BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP OCTOBER 13-14 AND BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE DURING ITS NOVEMBER 17-18 MEETING. LATTER WILL ALSO REVIEW REPORT ON ONGOING TRENDS IN SUBVERSIVE, DISINFORMATION AND ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. END FYI.) ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE FOR SEPT. 22 NAC. BENNETT

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 12145

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 09/15/01 (PRICE, CHARLES H.) OR-M  
TAGS: SOPN, XG, MNUC, PARM, BE  
SUBJECT: WESTERN POLITICAL OFFENSIVE: VIEWS OF BELGIAN  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
REF: STATE 239685, DTG 082349Z SEP 81

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: IN A LONG AND FRANK CONVERSATION I HELD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHARLES NOTHOMB LAST WEEK, THE MINISTER AGREED WITH THE GENERAL U.S. POSITION ON THE NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE. WHILE HE REMINDED US AGAIN THAT WESTERN COMMITMENT TO SERIOUS ARMS LIMITATION EFFORTS IS A NECESSARY COMPONENT OF ANY STRATEGY TO GARNER WIDESPREAD BELGIAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS, HE UNDERScoreD HIS OWN FIRM INTENTION TO KEEP BEFORE THE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS THE NEED FOR A STRONG NATO AND FOR A STRONG BELGIAN COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE. HE CITED A NUMBER OF MFA AND MFA/MOD INITIATIVES IN THIS REGARD, AND PROMISED CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE EMBASSY. COMMENT: THE MFA DOES SEEM TO BE GEARING UP FOR MORE ACTIVITY IN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA THAN HAS BEEN ITS PRACTICE IN THE PAST, AND WE THINK THE BELGIANS WILL GIVE GENERAL SUPPORT TO OUR INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

3. I RAISED THE CONCERNS AND OBJECTIVES OUTLINED IN REFTEL WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER NOTHOMB ON SEPTEMBER 10. I STRESSED IN PARTICULAR THAT WE MUST NO LONGER YIELD THE INITIATIVE TO THE SOVIETS, AND THAT WE SHOULD BEGIN A CONCERTED AND COORDINATED EFFORT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO EDUCATE OUR OWN PUBLICS TO THE REALITIES OF SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES AND TO THE NEED TO SPEAK UP FOR AND PROTECT FREE WORLD VALUES AND THE FREE WORLD'S SECURITY.

4. AFTER LISTENING CAREFULLY, NOTHOMB OFFERED HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE WAS IN ESSENTIAL AGREEMENT WITH THE POSITIONS I HAD EXPRESSED. HE MADE A POINT OF SAYING AT THE OUTSET THAT EUROPEAN LEADERS WERE VERY PLEASED WITH THE ACTIVE AND FRANK "TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE" ON THE CHALLENGES FACING THE ALLIANCE WHICH WAS BEING CARRIED OUT WITH THE ALLIES BY SECRETARY HAIG. IN THE

SECRETARY, HE SAID, EUROPEANS FEEL THEY HAVE AN INTERLOCUTOR WHO UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS IN THEIR COUNTRIES. NOTHOMB SAID HE SHARED THE CONVICTION THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO INSTILL IN THE CITIZENRY OF NATO COUNTRIES A GREATER AWARENESS OF THE SOVIET THREAT. FOR THIS REASON, HE CONTINUED, HE AND DEFENSE MINISTER SWAELEN HAD ARRANGED FOR THE SEPTEMBER 7 BRIEFING OF KEY MEMBERS OF THE CABINET BY THE THREE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS: "WE WANTED TO MAKE OUR GOVERNMENT COLLEAGUES CONSCIOUS OF WHAT IS HAPPENING." NOTHOMB BELIEVED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN THIS REGARD.

5. IT IS CLEAR, NOTHOMB WENT ON, THAT THERE MUST BE MODERATION FROM THE SOVIET SIDE AND THAT A BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES MUST BE RESTORED. NATO MUST BE STRONG IN ORDER TO DEFEND ITSELF IF NECESSARY AND IN ORDER TO BEGIN ANY NEGOTIATIONS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. THE POLICY OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, IS TO "REAFFIRM POSITIVELY" BELGIUM'S DEDICATION TO NATO AND ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE AS A "GOOD MEMBER" OF THE ALLIANCE, READY TO TAKE ON ITS SHARE OF ALLIANCE RESPONSIBILITIES. (AS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF BELGIAN COMMITMENT, NOTHOMB NOTED THAT BELGIUM HAS MORE TROOPS IN GERMANY -- IN PROPORTION TO THE COUNTRY'S POPULATION -- THAN THE UNITED STATES HAS.) NOTHOMB BELIEVED THAT APPEALING TO HIS COUNTRYMEN'S NATIONAL PRIDE IN BELGIUM'S ROLE WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO MAINTAIN AND REINFORCE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR NATO AND NATO PROGRAMS.

6. AT THE SAME TIME, NOTHOMB WENT ON, IT IS ALSO A TRADITIONAL AND IMPORTANT POLICY OF BELGIUM TO PURSUE OPENINGS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT. THIS REFLECTS DEEP-ROOTED SENTIMENTS IN THE POPULACE AND INTERNAL POLITICAL REALITIES. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, IT CAN BE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE WHEN A SMALL

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we need proposals in this area

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COUNTRY LIKE BELGIUM, WHICH CLEARLY THREATENS NO ONE AND IS ON RECORD AS A STAUNCH ADVOCATE OF EAST-WEST ACCOMMODATION, SPEAKS OUT STRONGLY ON THE WEST'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS. OFFERING AN EXAMPLE, NOTHOMB CITED BELGIUM'S PUBLIC STATEMENT ON SOVIET FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IN ITS NOTIFICATION OF THE RECENT SOVIET BALTIC EXERCISES, WHICH WAS ISSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. (HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ADVANCE U.S. CONSULTATION ON AMERICAN PLANS WHICH ALLOWED THE GOB TO TIME ITS OWN RELEASE FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS.) HE SAID THE PROMPT BELGIAN ACTION REQUIRED A DEPARTURE FROM THE NORMAL PROCEDURE OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH EC PARTNERS, BUT IN THIS INSTANCE THE MFA JUDGED THAT THE SERIOUS PRINCIPLE INVOLVED DEMANDED A STRONG PUBLIC STANCE WITHOUT DELAY.

7. NOTHOMB RECAPPED THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH, HE SAID, WILL BE REFLECTED IN HIS UPCOMING UNGA SPEECH:

-- BELGIUM WANTS WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY;

-- THAT'S WHY BELGIUM JOINED NATO AND REMAINS A FAITHFUL MEMBER;

-- THAT'S WHY BELGIUM DOES ITS PART TO KEEP NATO STRONG;  
-- AND THAT'S WHY BELGIUM ALSO SUPPORTS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

NOTHOMB, ECHOED BY HIS CHEF DE CABINET JUAN CASSIERS, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING, EXPLAINED THAT THE LAST ELEMENT HAD TO BE INCLUDED TO MAKE THE PACKAGE CREDIBLE AND SUPPORTABLE IN BELGIUM. HE EMPHASIZED THAT EVERY PUBLIC INDICATION FROM U.S. OFFICIALS OF THE CONTINUED U.S. COMMITMENT TO SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS IS OF GREAT HELP HERE.

8. WITH RESPECT TO NEW INITIATIVES TO EDUCATE ALLIANCE PUBLIC OPINION, NOTHOMB AND CASSIERS ASKED IF THE U.S. HAD SOME PARTICULAR MOVES TO SUGGEST FOR BELGIUM. I REPLIED THAT, WHILE WE ARE ENCOURAGING ALL ALLIES TO MAKE INTENSIFIED EFFORTS, SPECIFIC ACTIONS WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE DETERMINED BY EACH GOVERNMENT

ON THE BASIS OF ITS OWN JUDGMENT OF WHAT WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE. WE WOULD WELCOME BELGIAN THINKING IN THIS REGARD AND, AS I HAD MENTIONED EARLIER, WE STAND PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY WE CAN.

9. NOTHOMB REASSURED US THAT HE WOULD PUT OUT AN INFORMATIONAL BOOKLET. THIS WOULD OUTLINE IN LAYMEN'S TERMS THE CHALLENGES POSED BY THE SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP AND THE NEED FOR MAINTAINING ALLIANCE STRENGTH, IN PARALLEL WITH CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO SEEK GENUINE ARMS LIMITATIONS. IN THIS REGARD, HE SAID, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES WHICH THE U.S. IS PLANNING.

MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE U.S. INFORMATION SHOULD BE RELEASED WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS THE EXCHANGE DREW TO A CLOSE, NOTHOMB ASSURED ME THAT THE MFA WOULD CONSULT AND COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE EMBASSY OVER THE COMING MONTHS, AS WELL AS IN NATO FORA.

10. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT THE BELGIANS WILL BE GENERALLY ON BOARD IN THE NEW APPROACH WE ARE URGING, ALTHOUGH ACTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS EFFORTS HAVE NOT BEEN THE MFA'S STRONG SUIT IN RECENT YEARS. PRIOR TO THIS CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER, WE HAD BEEN TOLD OF THE PLANNED MFA INFORMATION BOOKLET BY THE MINISTRY'S NEW PRESS SPOKESMAN (AN OFFICER WELL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN TO EMBASSY OFFICERS FROM A PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT.) FROM THE SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS, IT APPEARED THAT THE BROCHURE WILL BE PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR EVENTUAL PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION OF ANY BELGIAN GOVERN-

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MENT MOVES TO IMPLEMENT NATO'S TNF MODERNIZATION DECISION.  
WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE SAME MFA SOURCE THAT MINISTER  
NOTHOMB HAS ALSO BEEN SEEKING AN APPROPRIATE VENUE  
FOR A MAJOR POLICY SPEECH ON EAST-WEST REALTIONS AND/OR  
THE NEED FOR A STRONG ALLIANCE. IT IS NOT ENTIRELY  
CLEAR FROM NOTHOMB'S OWN COMMENTS TO ME WHETHER HE HAS  
NOW DECIDED TO USE HIS UNGA SPEECH TO DEVELOP THESE  
THEMES AT LENGTH OR STILL PLANS A SEPARATE ADDRESS IN  
THE NEAR FUTURE.  
PRICE

1 good

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