

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Blair, Dennis: Files
Folder Title: Public Diplomacy 1981
(July 1981)
Box: RAC Box 4

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/16/2012

File Folder PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (JULY 1981)

FOIA

M11-442

Box Number 4

HAENNI

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136966	MEMO	BLAIR TO JIM RENTSCHLER ET AL RE INTERAGENCY GROUP MEETING (INCLUDES LIST) <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	5	7/1/1981	B1
136968	MEMO	JOHN KING TO DISTRIBUTION RE THREAT MATERIALS <i>PAR 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	2	6/16/1981	B1
136969	HANDWRITTEN NOTES	RE SHAPING EUROPEAN ATTITUDES <i>R 3/21/2017 M442/1</i>	4	ND	B1
136971	CABLE	020022Z JUL 81 <i>D 11/27/2012 M442/1</i>	2	7/2/1981	B1 B3
136972	CABLE	STATE 176866	3	7/7/1981	B1
136973	CABLE	STATE 196537 <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	2	7/25/1981	B1
136974	HANDWRITTEN NOTES	RE MEETING <i>R 8/23/2016 M442/1</i>	4	7/30/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 1, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM RENTSCHLER
CARNES LORD
RICHARD PIPES
WILLIAM STEARMAN
GEN. SCHWEITZER
SVEN KRAEMER

FROM:

~~DENNIS HAIG~~ *DH*

SUBJECT: Interagency Group Meeting: Shaping European Attitudes

On Friday, 26 June, I attended an IG chaired by State, with reps from DoD, USICA and CIA. This IG is an umbrella organization, attempting to encompass the various efforts aimed at getting our message across to European publics and elites. (U)

A list was passed out (attached) of upcoming seminars at which US officials would be meeting with European foreign affairs/defense analysts and officials. The list was criticised as containing mostly meetings at which members of the choir would be present. The conferences we need to attend are those of the unconverted, or else opponents of our policies. (C)

State reported that Haig intends to give a major East-West speech in early July, followed later in the month by a major arms control policy speech. (C)

Most of the meeting concerned the various efforts underway to provide declassified threat data for use in Europe in order to build support for LRTNF policies in particular, and increased defense efforts in general. Attached is a spread sheet giving the status of the various efforts in progress. The primary issue at present is the declassification of SS-20 pictures. It has been the subject of several informal discussions between Director Casey and DoD/State officials. The group agreed that it is necessary to address the issue more formally. State will therefore address a memo to the Agency formally requesting declassification of specific graphics: photographs, photographs of models, and maps. (S)

Other efforts underway in this general area were mentioned, without further specific discussion: (U)

- A paper on global Soviet subversion;
- A paper on Cuban machinations in the Caribbean;
- A paper countering Soviet criticisms of the LRTNF decisions;
- An essay on NATO nuclear deterrence doctrine.

~~SECRET~~

Review on July 1, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M442/1 # 139660

BY RW

NADA DATE 4/22/11

~~SECRET~~

2

2

In general, this IG is a useful forum for comparing notes on the various efforts underway. The meetings are for exchanges of information, and reach consensus on further steps to be taken. It is a wide-open field, and almost anything helps.

(U)

~~SECRET~~

July, 1981

3-8 Oxford, U.K. Annual Conference of the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders

September, 1981

10-13 Williamsburg International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Conference

21-22 Brussels Arms Control Association of the U.S.
Topic: "Arms Control in the 1980's"

29 - Oct. 2 London Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) Annual Meeting
Topic: "European-American Relations: Divergent Attitudes?"

October, 1981

10-16 Munich North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) Plenary

12-16 Bonn Konrad Adenauer Foundation
Topic: "Changing Patterns of U.S./European Cooperation"

19-20 Nice Centre de Formation Europeene Conference
Topic: "Agreements and Disagreements between the U.S. and Europe"

22-24 Brussels 20th Anniversary of Atlantic Institute
Topic: "Conflict or Cooperation in the 1980's"

Hamburg Haus-Rissen Conference

Tilburg, NL.

J.F. Kennedy Institute,
University of Tilburg
Topic: "U.S./European
Relations"

November, 1981

2-6 Bonn

Friedrich Ebert
Foundation
Topic: "Prospects for
East/West Accord"

9-12 Bonn

Mid-Atlantic Club
Topic: "Future of Arms
Control"

30 - Dec. 2 Paris

Western European Union
(WEU) Assembly Plenary

December, 1981

Sussex, U.K.

British International
Studies Association

Munich

NATO Seminar with German-
Atlantic Society
Topic: Atlantic
Relations"

Brussels

Georgetown Center for
Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (CSIS)
Conference on NATO

January, 1982

Oberammergau, FRG

NATO Defense Planning
Conference

February, 1982

11-12 Brussels

NATO Conference of
National Information
Officers (CONIO)

Munich Wehrkunde Conference
Bonn Friederich Ebert
Foundation
Topic: "Negotiating
Peace from a
Position of
Strength"

April, 1982

London Ditchley Foundation
Conference

Standing Invitations for Senior Officials

Oct. 15 - Dec. 15, 1981

Paris French Institute of
International Relations
(IFRI)
Rome Institute for
International Affairs
(Italy)
Copenhagen The Foreign Policy
Association (Denmark)
Oslo Norwegian Foreign Policy
Institute (NUPI)

TOP SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 16, 1981

~~SECRET~~ (WITH SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT)
MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution
FROM: EUR/RPM - John H. King *JK*
SUBJECT: Threat Materials/Assessment Initiatives -- Spreadsheet

There still seems to be some confusion concerning what various efforts are underway or are contemplated to present better information on the Soviet threat to Allied governments and the public. In an effort to try to bring this problem under control, I have prepared the attached spreadsheet on all the initiatives I know of, and I have attempted where possible to relate them to our own program.

I would plan to update this spreadsheet at regular intervals. Could you please give me information concerning the status of initiatives shown on the spreadsheet, or concerning any efforts in this area not indicated on the spreadsheet.

Attachment: As stated.

Distribution:

EUR - Mr. Gompert	DOD/ISP - Mr. Baer
- Mr. Palmer	- Mr. Huff
- Mr. Ward	- Mr. Morrison
EUR/RPM - Mr. Thomas	- Mr. Tyler
- Mr. Lehovich	JCS/J-5 - Col Einseln
- Mr. Hopper	- Major Banks
- Mr. Pace	ICA/PGM - Mr. Gilbert
ACDA - Mr. Fischer	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px; margin: 5px 0;"></div>
S/P - Col Pappageorge	NSC - Mr. Blair
INR - Mr. Howells..	

~~SECRET~~
(WITH SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT)
GDS 6/16/87

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M442 #130968
BY RW NARA DATE 3/24/17

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

THREAT MATERIALS/ASSESSMENT INITIATIVES

Initiative	Purpose	Action Agency	Due Date	Class./Unclass.	Remarks
DIA Briefing on Soviet Threat to SWA	Brief Allied Capitals	DOD/DIA	Done (1980)	C	No further action.
MNC Balance Briefing (mostly on Europe)	Brief Allied Capitals	NATO (MNCs)	In process	C	Briefed to NE & DE; SYG pushing for capitals to ask for briefing.
TNF Balance/Threat Briefing	Brief DefMins	DOD/DIA	Done at spring 1981 NPG	C	SecDef promised Allies unclassified threat materials (conventional & nuclear)
Global Soviet Threat	Brief DefMins	DOD/DIA (Hughes)	Done at spring 1981 DPC	C	SYG promised better NATO paper on E/W balance.
TNF Threat Assessment	Brief Allies at NATO	State/PM (TNF IG)	Mid-June	C	Req'd. by Rome NAC Min; to be given to HLG in June & NAC (?)
Global Soviet Threat (conventional)	Brief EUR publics	State/PM with DIA	Mid-June (1st review)	U	Material for Allies to disseminate to public; to be presented to NAC in July.
Global Soviet Threat (nuclear)	Brief EUR publics	State/PM	Mid-July	U	Unclass. version of TNF briefing to be given to HLG. To be married up with conventional materials (above).
NATO Nuclear Pamphlet	Brief EUR publics	PM (ISigal)	Mid-July	U	Covers rationale for NATO nuclear strategy & force posture (see USNATO 2871 & State 127341).
MC-161 Declassification	Provide unclassified materials resource for NATO Gov'ts	EUR (strategy) NATO (declass.)	Mid-June Autumn	U	Not for public distribution. Allied Gov'ts to draw on in preparing programs for public use.
NATO White Paper on East/West Balance	Brief EUR publics	EUR (strategy) NATO (paper)	Mid-June Autumn	U	NATO to do (per SYG at DPC-USNATO 3134); Ministers to authorize dissemination in December.

*Part of Hughes
5/10/81
Finkle
5/10/81
it*

136969

Shaping European Attitudes

Frank:

- Wondering if we leave policy in our posture

- 30 views: Zimbabwe vs. El Salvador

- The PAO conference concentrated much more on issues than on procedure, as in the past.

- Monday the announcement of the EC-10 (Brit) initiative on Afghanistan

- Haig to give E-W speech around July 10-14.

- Arms control speech thereafter

The Conference circuit

Frank's point that the seminars are the same folks going from conference to conference.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M442 136969

BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/17

DIA and mail. plus JCS +
ret assessment.

July 8 - First draft of conventional
study.

Agency working on the TNF
assessment.

Pearle - Good chunk of European
Attitudes efforts

Photo Declan - Weinberger -
Casey - Carlucci ~~to~~ left
yesterday a.m.

DCI The ultimate authority on
declass

(McMahon) NIFAC response: "We don't do this
for PR purposes"

CIA account of the crossed
signals leading to NIFAC
digging its heels in.

The technical briefing

CIA man says we need a
high-level memos

Dick-CIA

11

Idea of using briefing boards
for a major speech ~~board~~
Then using the materials from
the speech for the various papers

"Take it out of the breakfast-
meeting category and put it
into the form of a memo
that has to be responded to."

Memo will go from Staig/
Weinberger to Casey

Other materials

- One on global Soviet subversion
- Another on Cuban machinations
- "How to handle Soviet + pr changes
on ZCF"

"NATO nuclear deterrence essay"

- CBS report
- How do responsible European
officials
- Italy / Netherlands

Duke Gilbert 924-9205

11

—————

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer
CAS 5/16/2012

File Folder
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (JULY 1981)

FOIA
M11-442
HAENNI

Box Number

4 2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
136971	CABLE 020022Z JUL 81	2	7/2/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name
BLAIR, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer
CAS 5/16/2012

File Folder
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 1981 (JULY 1981)

FOIA
M11-442
HAENNI

Box Number

4 2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

136972 CABLE

3 7/7/1981 B1

STATE 176866

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Reuschler

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FILE: SHAPING
EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

July 9, 1981

PUBLIC OPINION IN THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ON OTTAWA SUMMIT ISSUES

Summary: USICA commissioned late May-early June opinion surveys in the six countries participating in the Ottawa economic summit. In France, the poll was taken between Mitterand's election and the first round of parliamentary elections. Key findings show:

- o Public opinion in the industrial democracies appears widely unfamiliar with the Reagan Administration's anti-inflation measures, and, therefore, largely uncertain about the effect they will have on their own efforts to combat inflation. But among such efforts, opposition prevails to a spending reduction for social programs.
- o In all participant countries, U.S. economic leadership, as the country "best able" to deal with global problems, is widely recognized. More significantly, large majorities everywhere, except in France, want the U.S. to exercise "strong leadership."
- o Reflecting their country's greater dependence on Soviet trade, views divide on whether or not their own interests and those of the U.S. coincide with regard to this issue. Nonetheless, outside of Italy, more prefer their government coordinate its Soviet trade policy with the U.S. than risk damage to relations by going it alone.
- o Canadians, Britons and West Germans most widely favor using trade as a lever to influence Soviet foreign policy. Only the Italians decisively oppose linkage.
- o Only relatively small proportions fear that increased dependence on Soviet energy products will increase their country's vulnerability to Soviet political pressure. On the other hand, there is limited confidence that Western trade will moderate Soviet behavior.
- o Uncertainty and ignorance characterize public opinion about relations with the poorer, developing countries. Only in France, and to a lesser extent in Italy, is there a prevailing view that their economic assistance policies to the South tend to diverge from U.S. policies.
- o Majorities in Italy and France favor aiding the developing countries without regard to their political orientation. In the other four countries public opinion splits between that option or assisting only ideologically friendly countries. Detering communism has limited appeal as a reason for giving aid.

End Summary

MACROECONOMICS

State of European Economies: Gloom and Doom

Confronting high unemployment and inflation rates, majorities in Western Europe see their countries "in poor economic health." Not surprisingly, this condition is most widely discerned in Britain (73%) and in Italy, where a staggering 91 percent recognize the parlous state of their country's economy.

The opposite sentiment prevails in Japan and, surprisingly, to an even broader extent in recession-ridden Canada, where 44 and 59 percent respectively pronounce their country to be in "good economic health."

Looking a year ahead, only in France, in the post-Mitterand election atmosphere, do optimists about the economy outnumber pessimists. By a two-to-one margin (46 to 23%) they expect the situation to get better.

Inflation: Tough Decisions Opposed

Existing high inflation rates, clearly a main factor in public pessimism about the economies, have not yet persuaded public opinion to support spending cuts for social services as a means of easing inflation.

Opposition to such a trade off is most widespread in Japan (58 to 14%) and in Britain (60 to 28%) where inflation is a lesser evil. In Canada and West Germany, opponents to social service cuts prevail only narrowly over those apparently willing to bite the bullet on this issue.

The Reagan Anti-Inflation Program: Uncertainty About Effects Abroad

As to the success of the Reagan Administration's anti-inflation policies, very large proportions, ranging up to 50 percent in Japan, plead ignorance. Among those who do express an opinion, more credit the new U.S. Government with doing "well" in dealing with inflation than think it is doing "poorly."

Given the seemingly widespread unfamiliarity with the details of the Administration's economic policies, it is not surprising that public opinion abroad is largely unsure about the resulting effect on their own country's ability to deal with inflation.

At the same time, among the roughly half in continental Europe who do expect U.S. policies to affect their own anti-inflation measures, somewhat more, perhaps aware of official and media outcries against U.S. interest rates, predict it will be "harmful" rather than "helpful." In Canada, the reverse is true.

U.S. Economic Leadership: Widely Endorsed

Public opinion widely sees the U.S. as "best able" to lead in solving international economic problems. Significantly, despite the recent furor about voluntary restraints on auto exports, this perception is most widespread in Japan (60%). Canadians are almost as widely persuaded of this U.S. capability. Elsewhere, sizeable pluralities hold the same view, including the French who a year ago most often assigned this leadership role to their own country.

Moreover, led by Canadians (75%) and the British (70%), large majorities everywhere, except in France, think it "desirable" that the U.S. "exert strong leadership" in dealing with global economic problems. And the French go only as far as to divide about evenly on the desirability of the U.S. playing this role.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Soviet Trade: Common Policy Preferred

Public perceptions are mixed on an existing commonality of economic interests between their own country and the U.S. with respect to trade with the Soviet Union.

Canadians (52 to 40%) and Britons (47 to 32%) tend to see those interests in harmony. In "Ostpoliticized" Germany and in Japan, both involved in on-again, off-again massive energy projects, public opinion splits on the issue. And in France and Italy, with large and influential communist parties, the prevailing view is that interests with the U.S. diverge on the issue of Soviet trade.

Despite these disparate views, more people everywhere, except in Italy, prefer their country coordinate its Soviet trade policy with the U.S. They would rather accept a reduction in that trade than risk harming bilateral relations by going it alone.

The sentiment favoring a common policy is particularly widespread in Canada (62 to 27%), Britain (57 to 27%) and Japan (45 to 9%).

Strategic Trade Controls and Linkage: Mixed Views

High-technology sales is one of the touchstones of a coordinated versus a go-it-alone policy in trading with the Soviet Union. Canadians (74%), Britons (65%), and West Germans (50%) clearly favor "tight restrictions" on such sales. But in Italy (47 to 38%) and in France (42 to 37%), the contrary view prevails by slim margins. The Japanese divide evenly on this issue, with the usual high proportion (44%) not expressing an opinion.

Perhaps reflecting the lack of Western cohesion in response to Afghanistan, ambivalence also exists on linking trade with the Soviets to their behavior abroad.

Once again, the Canadians (58 to 33%), the British (49 to 29%) and the West Germans (42 to 23%) tend to be closest to U.S. policy, agreeing that trade should be used "to influence Soviet political and military policy" beyond its borders.

The Japanese, whose government has been most closely aligned with U.S. post-Afghanistan sanctions, lean in the same direction. Again, however, they are least able or willing to express an opinion (53%) on such issues.

The French divide on the utility of trade as a political lever while the Italians, in splendid isolation, decisively reject the principle (53 to 29%).

Dependency on Soviet Energy: Few Perceive a Risk

The overall tendency to support linkage in principle is not accompanied by widespread faith in the benign effect of Western trade on Soviet foreign policy.

In the context of a widely-debated prospective increase in energy product and raw material purchases from the Soviet Union, relatively small proportions, ranging from 15 percent in Italy to 34 percent in France, think such trade would moderate Soviet actions abroad. (In Canada, a 45 percent plurality feel this way.)

Nonetheless, even fewer perceive the potential danger in an increased dependency on Soviet energy supplies resulting in increased vulnerability to Soviet political pressure.

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES

U.S. North-South Policies: Mixed Perceptions

In the face of overriding domestic and international concerns, a good deal of uncertainty and ignorance characterizes public opinion on North-South issues. Prevailing opinion in all countries tends to endorse their government's stance in dealing with the demands of the "poorer, less developed" countries, probably with little detailed knowledge about the issues.

Divided about their own government's responses to Third World economic demands, these publics are understandably even less certain about U.S. policy. But large no opinion blocks aside, the prevailing perception is that the U.S. "attitude is about right."

France, where the Mitterand campaign touched on differences with the U.S. regarding the LDCs, is the conspicuous exception. A plurality (39%) accuse the U.S. of being "too resistant" to the poorer countries' economic demands. In Italy, as many (31%) level that particular charge as credit the U.S. position with being correct.

The French (43 to 33%) and the Italians (47 to 38%) are also the only publics who tend to perceive their own country's economic assistance policies to diverge rather than accord with those of the U.S.

No Consensus or Criteria for Development Assistance

Views are widely divided on the best mechanism for providing assistance to the less developed world. The Italian public particularly, but the French and West Germans as well, prefer giving such aid bilaterally. The British as well as the Japanese, contrary to their government's predominant practice, tend to favor channeling economic assistance through a multilateral organization. Canadian preferences are evenly divided between direct and indirect aid.

Canadians -- together with the British, Japanese and West Germans -- are similarly divided on whether or not aid should be dependent on recipient countries' political orientation. No such division of opinion exists in Italy and France. There clear majorities (71 and 56% respectively) favor economic aid without political strings attached over assistance given only to ideologically friendly countries.

Among a list of reasons judged "most important" in justifying economic aid to the South, "raising people's living standards" has the widest appeal. By contrast, "preventing communist exploitation or possible takeovers" as most important for providing economic assistance has relatively limited support.

Prepared by:
Curt Gorder (PGM/R)
724-9586

M-7/9/81

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

July 9, 1981

CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON OTTAWA SUMMIT ISSUES

Summary

Despite growing economic nationalism and bilateral frictions, a mid-June USICA-commissioned survey shows that most Canadians want the U.S. to assert strong world economic leadership -- at a time when relatively few see the U.S. as the world's strongest economy. Specifically:

- o Canadians are about equally likely to see the Arab oil countries, Japan, or the U.S. as economically strongest in the world.
- o However, by a decisive margin, they see the U.S. as "best able" to lead in solving world economic problems.
- o Moreover, three out of four see it "desirable" that the U.S. exert strong leadership in dealing with world economic problems.

The Canadian public is unsure of the impact of President Reagan's economic policies on Canada's ability to deal with inflation. They have no predominant view of whether U.S. policies will be helpful, harmful, or have no effect. But the majority credit the new U.S. Government with doing at least "fairly well" in coping with inflation.

The public has a fairly widespread sense of shared economic interests with the U.S.:

- o About two-thirds say that U.S. and Canadian interests are at least "fairly well in agreement" on economic assistance policies for developing nations.
- o About half say the same about U.S. and Canadian interests regarding trade with the Soviet Union.
- o And by about a two-to-one margin (62% to 27%). Canadians favor coordinating Soviet trade policies with the U.S., rejecting the idea of making separate trade deals at the risk of harming relations with the U.S.

End Summary

MACROECONOMICS

Canadians Favor U.S. Economic Leadership

Asked who is "strongest economically at the present time," three out of four Canadians pick some country or group of countries other than the U.S. About equal numbers see the Arab OPEC states (25%), the U.S. (23%), or Japan (21%) as strongest.

However, half the Canadian public (54%) say that the U.S. is "best able to take the lead" in trying to solve world economic problems. This is a three-to-one margin over second-ranked Canada. And, on this question of leadership, all other countries -- including Japan -- receive only scant mention (from 2% to 7%).

Additionally, "from the standpoint of Canada's interests," three out of four Canadians think it is desirable that the U.S. exert strong leadership in dealing with world economic problems.

Public Generally Uncertain About Economic Outlook

Although largely sanguine about U.S. economic leadership, the Canadian people are not particularly sure about the impact of U.S. policies on them. Nor are they certain of the economic outlook. More specifically:

- o On the new Administration's performance, most Canadians -- by a margin of more than two to one -- think that the U.S. is doing at least "fairly well" rather than "poorly" in dealing with inflation.
- o Somewhat more say that Mr. Reagan's economic policies will be "helpful" rather than "harmful" (32% to 22%) to Canada's ability to cope with inflation. Another one-third say U.S. policies will have little or no effect.
- o But if inflation gets worse, Canadians, by a narrow margin (52% to 43%), oppose reducing government spending on social services as a weapon against rising prices.
- o Despite their recession, a majority see Canada's "general economic health" as fairly good. But the public is divided over the economic situation expected in the coming year: somewhat more say things will get worse (34%) than will get better (24%), and a somewhat larger group think the economic situation will "remain about the same" (40%).

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Canadians Generally See Accord With U.S. Trade Policies

In marked contrast to public opinion in other industrial democracies, the Canadian public is divided over whether their "economic well-being depends upon trade with the Soviet Union." About half see at least a "fair amount" of dependence (48%) and a similar number see little or none (44%).

Despite the rather widespread feeling of dependence on Soviet trade and the actual lack of U.S. dependence on such trade, the Canadian public is more likely than not (52% to 40%) to see agreement between the U.S. and Canada's economic interests "in regard to trade with the Soviet Union."

The public is more certain of its thinking about conditions that influence bilateral trading with the USSR. By a two to one margin (62% to 27%) Canadians say it is better for Canada to coordinate its trade policies with the U.S. (even if it means trading less with the USSR) than to go it alone making the "best deals" it can, but potentially harming U.S. relations.

On a related issue, Canadians are generally uncertain of their government's trade policy on providing subsidies to encourage Soviet trade. They have a somewhat clearer view of U.S. trade incentives policy toward the USSR:

- o As many say yes (38%) as say no (36%) when asked if the government has a policy that "makes it easy" for the USSR to trade with Canada -- by granting special concessions such as low-cost loans and credits. One-fourth offer no opinion.
- o The public tends to recognize that the U.S. does not grant special concessions in order to promote Soviet trade (34%, yes; 44%, no). Again, one-fourth express no opinion.

Canadians clearly view trade as an important lever in pursuit of political and diplomatic goals. In particular:

- o The majority agree (about half of them strongly) that the West should use trade as "a means to influence Soviet political and military actions" around the world. A sizable group rejects this idea (33%).
- o Additionally, three-fourths agree (most of them strongly) that Western nations should have "tight restrictions on selling highly advanced technology" to the Soviets.
- o And roughly half the public (45%) say that buying raw materials from the USSR will have a "moderating influence on Soviet actions." But, perhaps reflecting geo-political reality, no more than a fourth (27%) fear that buying vital

resources from the Soviets could make Canada "vulnerable to Soviet political pressures."

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES

Canada's Aid to Developing Nations "About Right"

Contrary to official statements, a solid majority of the public (66%) see agreement between the U.S. and Canada's economic assistance policies for developing nations. At the same time, Canadians are somewhat more likely to think that their country's policies, rather than those of the U.S., have been correct in meeting the economic demands of less-developed nations:

- o About half (53%) say Canada's attitude toward Third World demands has been "about right." Among the others, more think Canada has been "too accommodating" (27%) rather than "too resistant" (13%) to such demands.
- o Fewer (39%) say the U.S. attitude has been correct toward assisting poor countries. And, like Canada, more also say that the U.S. has been too soft than too tough (30% to 20%).

Asked to choose among five reasons for aiding developing nations, the Canadian public typically sees such assistance as important to "raise the standard of living" of the recipient nations (53%) as well as to "promote economic and political stability (48%). And a group much larger than in the European countries sees the value of economic aid as strengthening recipients "against communist exploitation and possible take-over" (33%).

On related questions, Canadians are divided on whether ideological agreement should be a consideration in giving aid, and they split as well over which is the best channel for giving aid.

- o About as many think a country's political orientation should (41%) as think it should not (46%) be a consideration in deciding which nations Canada should assist.
- o And about half prefer giving Canadian aid directly to recipients (46%) while a comparable number prefer giving aid through multilateral organizations (44%).

Prepared by:
Gerald Hursh-Cesar (PGM/R)
724-9545

M-7/9/81-B

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

July 9, 1981

21

BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON OTTAWA SUMMIT ISSUES

Summary

An early-June, USICA-commissioned British national opinion survey revealed the following:

- o Most Britons see their economy as ailing and are not particularly optimistic about the coming year. Only a minority, however, favor cuts in social services to deal with rising inflation.
- o About half appear uninformed about the Reagan Administration's anti-inflation measures. Of the rest, slightly more think U.S. economic policies will "help" (19%) rather than "harm" (12%) Britain's inflation fight.
- o About twice as many accord economic supremacy either to Japan or to the Arab oil countries as see the U.S. "strongest economically." Nevertheless, the U.S. stands first, by a wide margin, as the country best able to lead in trying to solve world economic problems. Moreover, a large majority think strong U.S. leadership is "desirable."
- o On trade with the Soviet Union, the predominant view is that U.S. and British economic interests are in accord. Moreover, coordination with the U.S. on Soviet trade policy is widely favored over making separate deals and risk harming Anglo-American relations.
- o In line with U.S. policy, a substantial majority favor "tight restrictions" on high-technology sales to the Soviets and prevailing opinion supports the use of trade as a political lever to influence Soviet foreign policy.
- o Much uncertainty characterizes opinion about North-South economic relations. Views are more or less split on whether economic assistance to the LDCs should be bilateral or distributed through multilateral institutions, and opinion is also evenly divided on whether the political orientation of the recipient nation should be a criterion for giving aid to the poorer, less developed countries.
- o At the same time, only a minority see the U.S. response to the South's economic demands as "too resistant." In fact, a majority perceive U.S. Third World aid policies to be in harmony with Britain's.

End Summary

MACROECONOMICS

The U.S.: Leading Actor in the World Economy

A plurality (38%) of Britons see the U.S. as the country "best able to take the lead in trying to solve international economic problems." More importantly, a substantial majority (70%) think it desirable for Britain's national interest that the U.S. exert "strong leadership" in dealing with global economic problems.

The desire for U.S. leadership is apparently not based on perceptions of U.S. economic strength. In fact, only 14 percent think of the U.S. as the world's strongest economic power, about half as many as accord economic pre-eminence to either Japan or the Arab oil producers.

U.S. Economic Policies: Little Apparent Knowledge

Engrossed in the heated and sustained debate on the controversial British economic policies, about half (47%) of the British public believe that U.S. policies and actions have little or no effect on Britain's ability to deal with inflation. Relatively few, therefore, view U.S. economic policies as either "helpful" (19%) or "harmful" (12%) on that score.

Widespread ignorance exists about the specifics of the Reagan Administration's anti-inflation program. In fact, a plurality (43%) admit their ignorance, but, among the rest, more perceive the U.S. as doing well in combating inflation than think otherwise.

Britain's Economy: Condition Serious

Looking at a 10 percent unemployment rate, plunging industrial production and declining living standards, a very large majority (73%) characterize Britain's "economic health" as poor. As to the coming year, opinion divides evenly between those who predict improvement, forecast things to worsen, and Britons who expect no change from the present "depressed" situation.

Despite this generally pessimistic outlook, a majority (60%) oppose spending cuts for social programs to combat inflation, perhaps because inflation has already dropped from 22 percent a year ago to a single digit rate.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

East-West Trade: Linkage Endorsed; No Fear of Dependency

By and large, British trade with the USSR does not loom large in the minds of most Britons. A majority (57%) think that Britain's economic well-being depends only slightly or not at all on trade with the USSR. A minuscule five percent think Soviet trade is contributing a "great deal" to the British economy.

In light of this widespread perception of the marginal importance Soviet trade has for the British economy, the public, by an appreciable margin (59 to 29%), endorses linking such trade with Soviet behavior. However, expectations on the effect of increasing imports of Soviet energy and other raw materials are modest at best. No more than a third believe it will moderate Soviet foreign policy actions. But even fewer fear a reverse dependency effect. Only 18 percent think such purchases will make oil-producing Britain vulnerable to greater Soviet pressure.

Anglo-American Economic Interests on East West Trade Perceived in Accord

A plurality (47 to 35%) of the British public see their country's economic interests and those of the U.S. to be in accord with regard to trade with the USSR. In keeping with this perception, Britons, by a substantial 57 to 27 percent margin, favor coordinating Soviet trade policy with the U.S. over making separate, if more profitable, deals with Moscow.

More specifically, a two-thirds majority share the Administration's view that there should be "tight restrictions" on the sale of high technology to the USSR. At the same time, only a third seem to know that Britain grants special concessions such as low cost loans and credits to the USSR to stimulate trade, and even fewer (27%) appear aware that the U.S. does not follow a similar practice.

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES

Little Support for Development Assistance

A 1980 survey revealed that about half (45%) the public favored reduced aid to the LDCs. Moreover, three-quarters said they would prefer either decreasing aid or stopping it altogether if living standards in Britain decline.

Having now experienced such a decline, it is not surprising that today very few Britons (11%) say their government is "too resistant" to the LDCs economic demands. Far more (39%) believe it is "too accommodating," as many, in fact, as judge its "attitude" to be "about right" (42%).

Perhaps because of the distance and the somewhat esoteric nature of the issue, the British public tends to be less critical of U.S. policies toward the LDCs than of their own government's. A plurality (39%) consider U.S. policies to be "about right," while equally small proportions see them as "too accommodating" (16%) or "too resistant" (19%). In general, however, twice as many view their country's aid policies and those of the U.S. to be in agreement (54%) as consider them diverging (28%).

Divided Views on Rationale and Mechanism for Aid to LDCs

British opinion splits evenly (38 to 36%) on whether or not the recipient country's political orientation should be a key factor in assisting the poorer, developing nations. And only by a slight margin (44 to 37%) do they favor giving aid directly over channeling it through multilateral organizations.

In approving economic aid to the LDCs, the British are primarily moved by humanitarian considerations to raise living standards (53%). By contrast, only half as many see such aid as a method for deterring communist takeovers. Similar proportions favor "promoting stability to avoid armed conflicts" and "assuring export markets" or "raw material sources" as important reasons for aiding poorer countries.

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

July 9, 1981

91

WEST GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ON OTTAWA SUMMIT ISSUES

Summary: In late May-early June, USICA commissioned a national opinion survey in West Germany on selected issues relevant to the Ottawa Summit:

- o A majority of the West German public think their economy is ailing. And only one in ten expects improvement in the coming year.
- o Prevailing opinion is unwilling to bite the bullet on inflation by opposing reduction in spending for social services to combat rising inflation. But opposition is less widespread than in the other industrial democracies.
- o A plurality perceive the Reagan Administration doing well in dealing with inflation, although many admit ignorance on this score. Accordingly, opinion is much divided on whether U.S. policies will help or harm Bonn's own anti-inflation effort.
- o Unlike a year ago, when equal proportions rated West Germany and the U.S. as pre-eminent in economic strength, the U.S. today clearly ranks first. And the West German public not only continues to look to the U.S. as best able to lead in solving global economic problems, but a large majority desire the U.S. to do so.
- o Opinion splits evenly on whether West German and American economic interests agree with respect to Soviet trade. Nonetheless, the view, that it is better for the FRG to coordinate Soviet trade policy with the U.S., prevails over advocacy of a more profitable go-it-alone policy.
- o The German public also widely endorses the principle of linkage, specifically using trade as a lever to influence Soviet "political and military activities" abroad. As to the potential effect of increased Soviet energy imports, only one in five thinks the Federal Republic would become more vulnerable to Soviet political pressure.
- o Views on North-South economic relations reveal much uncertainty and little attentiveness. But, contrary to the Chancellor's recent statement, a plurality see West German and U.S. economic assistance policies to the poorer, less developed countries to be in accord.
- o Opinion splits evenly on whether development aid should be made dependent on a country's political orientation. In any event, giving aid directly is clearly favored over channeling it through a multilateral institution.

End Summary

MACROECONOMICS

Gloom on Economy; Support Lags for Tough Decisions on Inflation

Reflecting the reality of a stagnant economy, a majority of the West German public (56 to 42%) diagnose the Federal Republic's "economic health" as poor.

And in keeping with predominantly zero growth forecasts, prevailing opinion expects the economic climate to be "about the same" as it is now. Additionally, pessimists, who expect conditions to get even worse during the coming year, outnumber optimists four to one.

While West Germany's inflation rate hovers near an enviable six percent, it is unacceptable by domestic criteria. Nonetheless, by a narrow 40 to 32 percent margin, the German public remains opposed to cuts in social programs as a weapon to control rising inflation.

U.S. Economic Policies Applauded; U.S. Leadership Sought

Perceptions of the Reagan Administration's anti-inflation program appear favorable. While it is not certain to what extent the West German public knows about specific actions taken and proposed by the President, a plurality (41 to 28%) broadly perceive the new government to be doing well in dealing with inflation.

At the same time, against the background of rising West German official attention to high U.S. interest rates, public opinion is very much divided on the potential benefit or harm U.S. economic policies will have on Bonn's "ability to deal with inflation."

In another indication that the West German public no longer views their economy as "the locomotive of the West," only one in ten ranks it as the world's strongest economic power. Before the Venice Summit, fully one-third did so, as many as placed the U.S. first. Today, the U.S. is accorded economic pre-eminence by a clear margin over second place Japan (36 to 21%).

More importantly, a plurality (42%) believe that the U.S. is best able to lead in solving world economic problems. West Germany's ability to do so rates a distant second. Moreover, this widespread perception of U.S. leadership capability is anchored to a mandate from a solid 62 to 26 percent majority who think it "desirable" that the U.S. exert "strong leadership" in attending global economic problems.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Soviet Trade: Divergent Interests with U.S. Recognized but Common Policy Preferred

Possibly because the Federal Republic's trade with the Soviet Union is crucial to certain visible heavy industries, a significant minority (37%) go as far as to agree that West Germany's well-being depends on Soviet trade. However, a clear majority (62%) disagree with that proposition.

Possibly mindful of U.S. unilateral sanctions and the Bonn Government's pursuit of "divisible" detente in the wake of Afghanistan, German public opinion divides about evenly (41 to 37%) on whether or not U.S. and FRG economic interests are in accord with regard to Soviet trade. Nonetheless, prevailing opinion holds it is "better" for Bonn to "coordinate" Soviet trade policies with the U.S., even if it reduces trade with Moscow, than risk harm to bilateral relations by going it alone.

One area in which the West German public appears receptive to such coordination may be the sale of high-technology to the Soviets. Despite the chafings of key industrial leaders, about twice as many (50 to 26%) agree that such sales should be governed by "tight restrictions" than think the opposite.

As to actual trade policy, the public is clearly uncertain whether the Soviets have been granted easy credits or low cost loans by either Bonn or Washington. But slightly more believe the U.S. makes no such special concessions than think otherwise.

Trade as Linkage: Principle Endorsed; Uncertainty about Effects

The German public, unlike powerful industry segments, widely favors using Soviet trade as a lever in pursuit of political and diplomatic objectives. By a decisive 52 to 23 percent margin, they approve using trade as a tool to influence Soviet "political and military activities" abroad.

At the same time, no more than three in ten believe that buying "energy products and other raw materials" from the Soviet Union is likely to moderate Soviet behavior. But fewer still (two in ten) think of the inherent risk that such purchases are likely to make the Federal Republic too dependent on Soviet supplies and as a result "vulnerable" to Soviet pressure. In all, however, the West German public reveals a great deal of uncertainty as to the effects such prospective deals as the natural gas pipeline would produce on relations with the Soviet Union.

34

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES

Economic Aid to LDCs: A Lesser Issue

Preoccupied with a weakened economy, social unrest, and an escalating nuclear debate, North-South economic issues appear to rank very low among West German public concerns. Their views on the subject reflect much uncertainty and little attentiveness.

For example, in vivid contrast to public opinion elsewhere, the German public cannot single out an overriding reason why economic assistance should be given to the "poorer, less developed" countries.

"Raising people's living standards" and "assuring FRG access to needed raw materials," each cited by only three in ten, edge out other reasons given. Significantly, only two in ten consider the prevention of "Communist exploitation or takeovers" as "most important" for providing economic aid to the poorer countries.

Overall, a plurality (45%) endorse the FRG's "attitude" in dealing with LDC economic demands. Among the rest, four times as many think their government has been "too accommodating" on this score than charge it with being "too resistant."

In all, the seemingly widespread indifference of the general public to Third World issues represents a striking contrast with attitudes expressed by West German opinion leaders earlier this year. These involved elites rated the conflict potential inherent in North-South problems to be as great as in East-West issues.

Views on U.S. Positions on LDC Aid: A Mixed Bag

General public views about the U.S. responses to demands by the poorer countries also tend to divide. Still, contrary to official criticism, the prevailing (38%) perception is that the U.S. attitude is "about right" rather than too tough or too easy. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the Chancellor's recent comment, a large plurality (48 to 26%) see U.S. and West German economic assistance policies to be in harmony.

While revealing a high level of uncertainty on the issue, public opinion splits evenly on whether a recipient country's political orientation should be a criterion for providing development assistance or whether ideological considerations should play no role.

As to the preferred mechanism for aid giving to the poorer countries, direct bilateral aid is clearly favored to channeling it through a multilateral financial institution. However, on this question, too, about half are unsure of what method is best for the Federal Republic's interest.

75

-5-

Prepared by:
Curt Gorder (PGM/R)
724-9586

M-7/9/81-C

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

July 13, 1981

ny

FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION ON OTTAWA SUMMIT ISSUES

Summary: In early June, USICA commissioned a national opinion poll to gauge public opinion on issues relevant to the Ottawa Summit. The survey, taken between Mitterrand's Presidential victory and the parliamentary elections, shows:

- o The French look to the U.S. as the country best able to lead in solving global economic problems. They split evenly, however, on the desirability of U.S. leadership in terms of the French national interest.
- o The U.S. is given only a razor-thin edge over Japan as the world's strongest economic power. West Germany, rated a contender a year ago, ranks far behind.
- o By a wide margin, the French perceive the U.S. as doing well in combating inflation. But, alongside much uncertainty about U.S. economic policies, twice as many believe they will cause more harm than good in France's fight against inflation. And opposition prevails to reduce spending for social programs as an anti-inflation weapon.
- o The French public predominantly see their economy as ailing, but optimists, who expect the situation to improve in the coming year, outnumber pessimists two to one. Many predict no change, however.
- o Though only a minority of the French consider their country's economic interests regarding Soviet trade to be in step with those of the U.S., a plurality favor Franco-U.S. coordination on trade policies toward the USSR to go-it-alone deals. The French divide evenly on whether to use trade as a means to influence Soviet behavior abroad. Relatively few are concerned that increased energy imports from the USSR will increase France's vulnerability to Moscow's political pressures.
- o A plurality believe that U.S. and French economic assistance policies toward the South tend to diverge. Similar proportions criticize the U.S. for being too resistant to LDC demands, while expressing apparent satisfaction with their own country's policies.
- o A majority think that aid to the poorer countries should not be dependent on the recipient country's political orientation. And only a small minority approve of aid as a deterrent to communist takeovers.

End Summary

MACROECONOMICS

U.S. Accorded Economic Leadership Role

Unlike a year ago, the French predominantly see the U.S. as the country best able to lead in the resolution of world economic problems. The U.S. outpaces second-ranking France 39 to 16%. Before the Venice Summit, France ranked first on this indicator, with the U.S. and West Germany tied for second place.

While clearly recognizing the U.S. leadership role, the French public divides evenly (41 to 44%) on whether or not a "strong" U.S. role is "desirable" for the French national interest. However, despite this split, there appears to be more widespread support for following the U.S. on international economic matters than French public opinion has shown on military-security issues.

In past years, public perceptions of economic leadership and economic strength have not always coincided. This year, too, the U.S., while given a substantial margin over Japan on leadership capacity, only enjoys a bare edge over Japan (35 to 30%) as the world's strongest economic power. Again, reflecting the marked change in the world economic situation, West Germany is ranked much lower than it was a year ago.

U.S. Anti-Inflation Policies Not Transferable to France

General perceptions of the Reagan Administration's anti-inflation program are widely favorable. A large 46 to 17 percent plurality see the new U.S. Government doing well in dealing with inflation, although many (37%) admit ignorance on this score.

Similar uncertainty exists about the effects of these policies on French efforts to combat its double-digit inflation. However, consistent with the official French view, twice as many (32 to 14%) see this effect as "harmful" rather than "helpful". Moreover, a 54 to 31% majority oppose U.S.-type spending cuts in social programs as an anti-inflation weapon.

Mirroring the reality of a depressed economy and beset by a post-war unemployment high and a rising inflation rate, a 54 to 40 percent majority see France's economic health as "poor." However, unique among the publics in the industrial democracies, optimists expecting things to get better in the coming year outnumber pessimists (44 to 23%). The rest (27%) forecast no change in the economic situation.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

A Common Soviet Trade Policy With the U.S.: A Mixed View

Possibly on account of perceived differences in wake of Afghanistan, the French public, by a substantial margin (51 to 23%), sees a divergence of their own country's and U.S. economic interests on Soviet trade policies. Nonetheless, prevailing opinion (38%) favors France coordinating those policies with the U.S. They would rather accept a reduced volume of trade than risk harm to bilateral relations by making separate deals.

The fact that the French predominantly (51%) think that their country's economic well-being depends only marginally, at best, on Soviet trade may in part account for this willingness. Only five percent see it as "very important" in that context.

The French public, incidentally, seems widely uninformed about specific U.S. trade policy with the USSR, but tend to recognize that Washington does not grant Moscow any special concessions such as low-cost loans and credits. At the same time, on the issue of strategic controls, tight restrictions on high-technology sales to the Soviet Union are opposed by the barest margin (42 to 37%).

Trade Linkage is Approved; No Unease About Dependency

On linkage and Soviet trade, French opinion divides evenly. About as many (42%) feel trade should be used as a lever to influence Soviet political and military activities abroad as do not (38%).

But expectations as to what could be accomplished with the trade weapon are limited. Only a third (34%) think that buying Soviet energy products and other raw materials will moderate Soviet external policies and actions. But, significantly, even fewer (21%) feel uneasy that such purchases will build up economic dependencies to the point of making France "vulnerable" to Soviet political pressures.

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES

French Public Shares Mitterrand's Criticism of U.S. Aid Policies

Foreign Minister Cheysson's recent intimations that France and the U.S. might be at odds on North-South issues at Ottawa is broadly reflected in French public opinion. The view prevails that French and American assistance policies to the LDCs are generally out of step (43 to 33%).

More specifically, a plurality (39%) think the U.S. has been "too resistant" in responding to the demands of the "poorer, less developed" countries. Along with much uncertainty on the issue, only one in five characterizes U.S. aid policies as correct.

By contrast, close to half (46%) think French aid policies toward the South are "about right." Among the critics, however, as many feel these policies have been "too accommodating" as think of them as being too tough.

Aid Without Political Strings Endorsed

The French public also tends to share their government's official stress on the humanitarian over the political aspects of aid. Accordingly, a majority (56%) claim to be primarily motivated by a humanitarian concern for raising living standards in endorsing aid for the LDCs. Almost as many, however, see the promotion of political stability to avoid armed conflicts as a most important reason for LDC aid. Significantly, relatively few (16%) perceive aid to the South in an East-West context, in the sense of thwarting communist influence or takeovers.

This approach to Third World economic assistance is underscored by majority (56%) opposition to making it contingent on the political orientation of the recipient country. About half as many (27%) approve aid only to nations on the same ideological wavelength. And reflecting past government policy of giving economic aid directly to the LDCs, the French public, by a 49 to 37 percent margin, favors bilateral assistance over channeling aid through multilateral institutions.

Prepared by:
Robert S. McLellan (PGM/REU)
Curt Gorder (PGM/R)
724-0794

M-7/13/81-A

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

July 13, 1981

ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON OTTAWA SUMMIT ISSUES

40

Summary

An early-June, USICA-commissioned national survey in Italy to gauge public opinion on selected issues relevant to the Ottawa Summit indicates:

- o Italians rank the United States the world's strongest economic power by a fairly wide margin. More significantly, almost half name the U.S. as best able to lead in solving global economic problems. And a large majority think it desirable for Italy's national interest that the U.S. exert "strong leadership."
- o The Italian public predominantly sees the Reagan Administration doing well in dealing with inflation but tends to think U.S. economic policies will harm rather than help their own efforts to combat inflation. While prevailing opinion opposes spending cuts in social programs to fight inflation, far fewer feel this way now than did a year ago. Perhaps this shift occurred because an astonishing 91 percent describe their country's economic health as poor. Pessimism also prevails about the situation in the coming year.
- o Public opinion tends to perceive a divergence of economic interests with the U.S. regarding trade with the Soviet Union. And, unique among other participant countries, the Italian public leans toward separate deals with the Soviet Union rather than to coordinated trade policies with the U.S., even at the risk of damaging U.S.-Italian relations.
- o Italians, by a wide margin, oppose linkage involving trade with the USSR. But, alone among the publics in the other countries, they are more likely to think that purchases of Soviet energy products and other raw materials will make Italy vulnerable to increased Soviet political pressures.
- o On North-South economic issues, too, prevailing public opinion perceives U.S. and Italian assistance policies as divergent. More specifically, a substantial two-thirds majority approve of aid to the LDCs without political strings rather than selective aid to ideologically friendly countries. And relatively few think of using aid to the poorer countries as a deterrent to communist exploitation and takeovers.

End Summary

MACROECONOMICS

Italians See U.S. in Unchallenged Role in World Economy

A plurality of the Italian public (41%) perceive the U.S. as the world's strongest economic power. Only about half as many assign economic supremacy either to Japan (19%) or the Arab oil producers (17%). These standings differ markedly from a year ago, when the U.S. held only a narrow edge over West Germany.

The U.S. image is even more favorable on economic leadership capacity, perhaps a more significant indicator. About half (46%) consider the U.S. as the country best able to lead in the solution of world economic problems, while second-place West Germany is the choice of only 19 percent. Most encouraging of all, a solid majority (61%) welcome "strong" U.S. leadership in dealing with world economic problems, because they think it is desirable for Italy's national interest.

One factor possibly contributing to this year's more positive image of U.S. economic strength is the widespread perception that the Reagan Administration is successfully fighting inflation. By an impressive 53 to 22 percent margin, Italians think the U.S. anti-inflation measures are working well. At the same time, twice as many Italians think these economic policies, while effective in the U.S., will "harm" rather than "help" (42 to 20%) Italy's own efforts to combat inflation.

Italy's Economy: A Disaster Area

Living with the highest inflation rate among the industrial democracies, declining productivity and high unemployment, Italians virtually unanimously (91%) assess their country to be in ailing economic health -- half of whom describe it as "very poor." Nowhere among the participant countries is gloom as deep or widespread.

Nor, consistent with official no-growth forecasts, is there much optimism for the coming year. In fact, nearly half (45%) expect conditions to worsen, and another 30 percent predict the present, dismal situation will remain about the same.

These overwhelmingly pessimistic views about the economy may have contributed to a somewhat greater receptivity among the public to spending cuts in social programs as a means of fighting inflation. A year ago, no fewer than 84 percent opposed such cuts. Today while about half (52%) remain opposed, those in favor of reductions tripled from 13 to 37 percent.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Italy: The Wild Card on Soviet Trade Issues

The Italian public is generally in accord with those elsewhere in West Europe in attaching little economic importance to their country's trade with the USSR. Only one in four says Italy's economic well-being depends on this trade and only a handful attribute a "great deal" of importance to it.

Apart from this, however, Italians have a decidedly distinctive approach to East-West trade. Their views differ markedly from the other publics, also diverging from those of the French on some of these issues. In part, the large number of communist supporters in Italy may account for these differences.

Limited Accord Seen in Italian and U.S. Soviet Trade Policy

Public opinion, by a good-sized margin (54 to 30%), sees a divergence of Italian and U.S. economic interests on Soviet trade. Consistent with this view -- but in contrast with public opinion elsewhere -- the Italian public is inclined to favor separate deals with the Soviet Union, at the risk of harming U.S.-Italian relations (45 to 35%). In the other industrial democracies, pluralities or majorities prefer their country coordinate its Soviet trade policy with the U.S., even at the expense of losing some trade.

However, relatively few Italians are well-informed about the specifics of Italian or U.S. trade policies toward the USSR. For example, only one in four is aware that Italy, in contrast to the U.S., provides special concessions such as low-cost loans and credits to the USSR as a trade incentive.

Linkage Opposed but Wary of Economic Dependency on Soviet Union

Italians are also the only public which clearly rejects linkage. A majority (53 to 29%) think that trade should not be used as a tool to influence Soviet political and military policy. A narrow plurality (47 to 38%), also oppose "tight restrictions" on high-technology sales to the Soviet Union.

In keeping with the rejection of linkage, Italians, to a greater extent than the other publics, expect it to accomplish little in affecting Soviet behavior. Accordingly, only 15 percent believe that buying energy and other raw materials from the Soviet Union will moderate Soviet actions.

Somewhat paradoxically, however, a plurality (37%) is apprehensive about such purchases creating a dependency that is likely to make Italy "vulnerable" to Soviet political pressures. Everywhere else, only minorities express this concern.

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES

U.S. and Italian Aid Policies Seen at Odds

As with Soviet trade policy, the Italian public also tends to see U.S. and Italian aid policies to the poorer, less-developed countries as discordant. Some 38 percent perceive these policies to be in agreement, but 47 percent do not.

Italians, to a much greater extent than publics elsewhere, oppose making aid to an LDC country dependent on its ideological leanings. Fully 71 percent favor giving economic assistance regardless of the recipient country's political orientation.

Consistent with this widespread rejection of attaching aid to political strings is the view that "raising living standards" is the most important reason for giving aid. A strong majority (66%) express this humanitarian motive, a larger proportion than in the other participant countries.

By contrast, relatively few approve of aid given principally for ideological reasons. Accordingly, only 17 percent endorse economic assistance to LDCs to prevent communist takeovers. And, perhaps surprisingly, the same number (13%) do so to prevent exploitation by the extreme right.

Uncertainty About Aid Levels; Bilateral Aid Preferred

Though obviously not familiar with details of U.S. economic assistance policies to the poorer countries, about twice as many perceive the U.S. as "too resistant" (31%) to their "economic demands" as see the U.S. as "too accommodating" (16%). By contrast, a majority (54%) approve of their own government's aid policies. They say this, most likely unaware that Italy's performance on economic assistance to the Third World is one of the poorest among OECD countries.

In any event, whatever economic assistance is given to the LDCs, a large majority of the Italian public (60 to 30%) think it should be given bilaterally rather than through multilateral institutions.

Research Memorandum

International Communication Agency United States of America
Washington, D. C. 20547



Office of Research

July 9, 1981 44

JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION ON OTTAWA SUMMIT ISSUES

Summary

USICA commissioned an early June national survey in Japan to gauge public opinion on selected issues relevant to the Ottawa Summit. The results of this poll, following a turbulent two months in U.S.-Japanese relations, indicate:

- o Most Japanese look to the U.S. for economic leadership but only half have formed views about the new Administration's anti-inflation policies. Among this group, opinion divides evenly on the success of U.S. efforts. In their own country, they widely oppose the cuts in spending for social services that are part of the U.S. program.
- o Many Japanese seem ignorant or uncertain about North-South issues. Most of those with opinions do not think the U.S. has been too tough in its dealings with the LDCs. However, they split equally on whether U.S. and Japanese aid policies toward the LDCs are in accord, and somewhat more support multilateral rather than bilateral aid.
- o The public supports foreign aid mainly for humanitarian reasons and, to a lesser extent, in recognition of Japan's economic interdependence with the LDCs. Very few look upon aid as a means of stemming communist exploitation of the Third World.
- o Many Japanese are also ignorant or uncertain about East-West trade issues. Among those with views, opinion divides evenly on the congruence of U.S. and Japanese interests in trading with the USSR, but there is sizable agreement that Japan should coordinate its Soviet trade policy with that of the U.S. -- even if it reduces trade with the USSR.
- o There is no consensus on the need for high technology trade controls or on using trade as a political weapon in dealing with the Soviets. However, somewhat more Japanese believe that making deals with the USSR for energy and raw materials will permit them to moderate Soviet behavior than expect they will become vulnerable to Soviet political pressures.

End Summary

45

MACROECONOMICS

U.S. Leadership Desired; Little Knowledge of U.S. Policies

Sixty percent of Japanese see the U.S. as the country best able to take the lead in dealing with international economic problems. Few see other countries having this capacity. Moreover, a similar majority (57%) want the U.S. to exert strong economic leadership; only 14 percent do not.

The desire for U.S. leadership seems only partly based on perceptions of U.S. economic strength. Despite the well-publicized appreciation of the dollar, only 38 percent pick the U.S. as the strongest economic power. (Moreover, an April-May USICA study of Japanese elites found widespread feelings that the U.S. must put its economic house in order if it is to provide strong world leadership.) Nevertheless, far fewer accord economic supremacy to the closest "competitors," the Arab oil producers (13%) and Japan (12%).

In great part, looking to the U.S. for leadership reflects the economic interdependence and close politico-military ties between the U.S. and Japan. Surveys have shown that most Japanese know that the U.S. is Japan's No. 1 trading partner and support the American alliance for both the military and economic benefits they believe it brings to Japan.

In contrast to this consensus, only half the public are willing or able to assess the new Administration's anti-inflation policies or their impact on Japan. Among the half who do:

-- they split evenly in judging the effectiveness of the U.S. anti-inflation fight.

-- four times as many think U.S. policies will be more harmful than helpful to Japan's own anti-inflation efforts. These minority perceptions may or may not reflect a real knowledge of U.S. policies, but they are in keeping with media and official criticisms of what are seen as excessively high U.S. interest rates.

In any event, the public does not wish to fight Japan's relatively limited inflation at the expense of cuts in social services: they widely (58% to 14%) oppose efforts to reduce inflation by such means. Such views are not unique to Japan, but they are perhaps most understandable in a country whose social welfare system lags behind that of most industrialized democracies.

46

Upbeat View of Japan's Economy

Unlike West Europeans, Japanese are fairly optimistic about their economy. Leading all OECD nations in real economic growth and having one of the lower inflation rates, Japanese predominantly (44% to 30%) say their country's current economic health is good. Still, views about next year are mixed: they mostly (41%) expect the economic situation to stay about the same, but somewhat more think it will worsen (25%) than improve (11%).

NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES

Despite the stress given to North-South relations in Japan's "comprehensive security" strategy, sizable proportions of the public seem ignorant or uncertain about North-South issues.

U.S. Not Too Tough on LDCs

Japanese media have recently criticized the U.S. for indifference to the needs of poorer nations, but the public does not seem to share this judgment. Among the 55 percent with an opinion on the basic thrust of U.S. policy toward LDCs:

-- most think the U.S. has been "about right" in its attitude toward LDC demands. And twice as many think the U.S. has been "too accommodating" as believe it has been "too resistant."

Similarly, Japanese tend to think that their own country -- which still ranks fourth in absolute ODA behind the U.S., France, and the FRG -- is striking the right balance in dealing with LDC demands. However, only somewhat more think U.S. and Japanese foreign aid policies agree (34%) than think they differ (28%).

Mixed Views on Modes and Types of LDC Aid

Like most DAC members, Japan has provided considerably more bilateral than multilateral ODA. The public seems inclined to reverse this: more think it better for Japan to channel aid through international organizations (39%) than to recipient nations directly (26%).

They are more divided over linking aid to the politically congenial. About as many believe Japan should provide aid only if the recipient's political orientation generally accords with Japan's (31%) as think it should be given regardless of political leanings (34%).

47

In general, public opinion on the rationale for foreign aid is congruent with Japan's official position that humanitarian concerns and interdependence with LDCs underly the giving of aid. About half (44%) choose raising of living standards as the most important reason to give aid. Smaller but appreciable numbers focus on interdependence: ensuring access to raw materials (20%) and maintaining export markets (10%). A fourth (25%) think in terms of promoting politico-economic stability in LDCs. Only a handful (4%) speak of aid as a weapon to prevent communist exploitation of the Third World.

EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Opinion on East-West trade is also characterized by a large amount of "no opinion" and a frequent lack of consensus.

Desire to Coordinate Trade Policy with U.S.

In contrast to certain segments of industry (e.g., pipeline manufacturers), the public does not see trade with the USSR as crucial for Japan. Far more think Japan's economic well-being is scarcely affected by trade with the USSR (46%) than believe the contrary (17%).

When asked to assess concordance of U.S. and Japanese interests in regard to Soviet trade, about half (45%) express no opinion. Among the remainder, views divide evenly as to whether these interests differ or agree. Nevertheless, the public widely agrees (45% to 9%) that it is better for Japan to coordinate trade policy with the U.S. -- even if it reduces trade with the Soviets -- than to make separate deals that would damage U.S. ties.

Most of the public seem unaware that U.S. and Japanese trade policies toward the USSR after Afghanistan have been generally congruent: two-thirds are unable to say if either the U.S. or Japan give special treatment to the Soviets to promote trade. Among the minority with opinions, most believe that neither country has been granting special concessions to the Soviet Union.

Strategic Trade Controls and Trade as a Weapon: Split Views

About half (44%) express no views on the need for the West to have strategic trade controls with the USSR. But those expressing opinions divide evenly on whether the Free World, including Japan, should have "tight restrictions" on high technology sales to the Soviets.

Consensus was similarly absent on the use -- and dangers -- of trade as a political weapon. Half the public reach no conclusions on this key issue, but among the other half:

-- somewhat more agree than disagree that the West, including Japan, should use trade to influence Soviet "political and military activities" abroad.

-- but they tend to ignore the reverse side of the coin. More believe that making deals with the USSR for energy and raw materials will allow Japan to moderate Soviet behavior than think it will make Japan vulnerable to Soviet political pressures. (According to the April-May elite study, similar views are widespread among Japanese influentials.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 196537
ORIGIN SS-30

5499

STATE 196537

136973A

INFO OCT-88 ADS-88 SSO-88 /038 R

DRAFTED BY EUR - MPALMER:MJT
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
EUR - LSEAGLEBURGER
NEA/PAB - RPECK
S/P - PKAPLAN
IO - MLEVITSKY
USICA - TCATHERMAN
S/S: LPBREMER, III
S/S-O: TSTRICKLER

SECRET

P 250102Z JUL 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY

250237Z /67
5

- 1. LSE
- 2. HAH
- 3. ~~MP/VS~~ DCC

- 1. JDS
- 2. TMTN

- MP/VS

- SOV <

- RPE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 196537

EXDIS - FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12865: GDS 7/16/87

TAGS: AF

SUBJECT: CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS ON AFGHANISTAN

1. WE ARE LAUNCHING A MAJOR PUBLIC AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO CHALLENGE THE SOVIETS TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ON AFGHANISTAN, TO AGREE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION, TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES AND TO RESTORE AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNED STATUS. I WANT YOU TO MOBILIZE ALL THE RESOURCES OF YOUR MISSION TO ATTRACT MAXIMUM ATTENTION TO INITIAL SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE OVER THE EC-10 PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE, AND TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THEM TO ACCEPT THIS SERIOUS AND REALISTIC APPROACH. WE WANT TO USE THIS

AS A TEST OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO OBSERVE ACCEPTABLE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.

2. THE SOVIET UNION HAS HAD SOME RECENT SUCCESS WITH A MAJOR PROPAGANDA DRIVE TO PERSUADE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR AND IS UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT QUESTIONS OF CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. THIS IS OF COURSE A TYPICAL INVERSION OF REALITY, FOR IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO ARE UNWILLING TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ON SUCH

MATTERS OF UNIVERSAL CONCERN AS THEIR CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND VIETNAM'S COLONIZATION OF KAMPUCHEA. IF THERE HAS BEEN HIGHER EAST-WEST TENSION IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, SUCH EVENTS ARE THE BASIC CAUSE. ACCUSATIONS OF AMERICAN "HAWKISHNESS" ARE THUS ATTEMPTS TO DETRACT ATTENTION FROM SOVIET AGGRESSION. EVEN, AS PROPAGANDA, THESE ACCUSATIONS ARE FEEBLE REEDS, GIVEN OUR COMMITMENT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR AND OUR CURRENT PREPARATIONS FOR RESUMPTION OF THE SALT TALKS. NOW IT IS TIME FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO PROVE ITS BONA FIDES.

AFGHANISTAN IS SIMULTANEOUSLY THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEM AND COULD PROVIDE THE GREATEST IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE EC-10 PROPOSAL OFFERS A PROMISING ROUTE TO A SOLUTION AND THEY INTEND TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE IT.

3. SOVIET CAMPAIGNS SUCCEED IN SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE BECAUSE OF THEIR PERSISTENCE AND INSISTENCE ON DEFINING

THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA IN THEIR OWN TERMS. I WANT AMERICAN DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMACY TO BE EQUALLY PERSISTENT IN SHAPING AN AGENDA AGREEABLE TO THE WEST. WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN WE FACE A LONG STRUGGLE, BUT ALSO THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF NATIONS SUPPORTS THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ARE PREPARED TO FIGHT FOR HOWEVER LONG IT TAKES TO REGAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ARE ENCOURAGING. FAR FROM BEING FORGOTTEN, THE EC-10 HAS MADE AFGHANISTAN A CENTERPIECE OF ITS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WITH THEIR CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, AND THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS CONTROL EVEN MORE OF THE COUNTRY THAN A YEAR AGO. WE SHOULD LAY PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE FACT THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM THE SOVIETS ARE HAVING WITH THE ISLAMIC, NON-ALIGNED AND EUROPEAN NATIONS AS MUCH AS WITH THE U.S. WHILE THE U.S. MUST PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THESE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO STAY OUT FRONT WITH THEIR UN, EC-10 AND OTHER INITIATIVES AND STATEMENTS.

4. YOUR EFFORTS WILL BE CONDUCTED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A SERIES OF ACTIONS ELSEWHERE:

-- THE OTTAWA SUMMIT PUBLIC DOCUMENTS CONTAINED A COMMON STAND ON AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE ARE CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES AND WITH THE ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED NATIONS THAT TAKE THE LEAD IN UNGA ACTION ON AFGHANISTAN CONCERNING THE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH AFGHANISTAN IN THE UNGA THIS YEAR.

-- WE ARE MAKING THIS A MAJOR SUBJECT OF ALL OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, INCLUDING MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO AT THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER.

-- AFGHANISTAN WILL FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN OUR STATEMENTS AND COMMENTS TO THE PRESS.

5. WE WILL BE SENDING EMBASSIES MATERIALS FOR MAXIMUM DISTRIBUTION TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, KEY POLICY MAKERS, THE MEDIA AND INFLUENTIAL GROUPS. WE PARTICULARLY WANT TO CHALLENGE THOSE WHO ATTACKED ALLEGED AMERICAN, BRITISH OR FRENCH TRANSGRESSIONS IN THE PAST NOW TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR MORAL COURAGE AND CONSISTENCY BY SPEAKING OUT MUCH MORE VIGOROUSLY ON AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE ARE SENDING BY SEPTEL AN UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON AFGHAN RESISTANCE TO SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. WE WILL SEND PERIODIC UPDATES, AS WELL AS PERIODIC CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

-- WE CAN PROVIDE VISITING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, NEWSMEN, ETC. WITH BRIEFINGS HERE IN WASHINGTON AND YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY.

-- WE ALSO ARE SENDING BY SEPTEL AN EXTENSIVE SET OF POINTS AND KEY ARGUMENTS FOR YOU TO MAKE. THESE SET FORTH OUR BASIC STANCE THAT: THE SOVIET OCCUPATION IS NOT WORKING; THEIR "PROPOSALS" ARE MERELY DESIGNED TO GET OTHERS TO DO WHAT THEY HAVEN'T SUCCEEDED IN DOING FOR THEMSELVES; THE UN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, THE EC-10 AND THE U.S. ALL HAVE OFFERED SERIOUS AND PROMISING ROUTES TO POLITICAL SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT HUMILIATE THE SOVIETS; AND PEACE, WOMEN'S, YOUTH AND OTHER GROUPS AND THE MEDIA MUST BECOME AS ACTIVE AS GOVERNMENTS IF THEY ARE TRUE TO THEIR OWN PROFESSED PRINCIPLES.

6. IN BRIEF, I AM REQUESTING THAT YOU DIRECT MAXIMUM

EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111 EXDIS 111

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT
AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

50

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 196537

ENERGY AND INITIATIVE TO MOUNT A SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE ON A NEGOTIATED WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT COUNTRY. I STRESS THAT THIS IS NOT A QUESTION OF A SINGLE DEMARCHE, BUT RATHER A REQUEST FOR A LONG-TERM CAMPAIGN WITH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT, LOCAL MEDIA, AND OTHER CONTACTS, AIMED AT INCREASING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR A FREE AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET OCCUPATION AND PUPPET GOVERNMENT ARE FAILURES -- WITH CONTINUED AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE THE SOVIETS CAN BE PERSUADED TO AGREE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND TO WITHDRAW. KABUL MINIMIZE APPROVED. HAIG

EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■ EXDIS ■

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

1000 - 7/30/81

Mark Palmer - Churn

36974

John King (RPM)

-- Aris Bohlen summary of info
Q:ts sent already

-- Classified paper on the
Soviet claim of parity
at 1,000. Brits also did
an UNCLAS paper

-- "More info on CRTWF only"

-- "Some unclassified
graphics" given to HLG.
(to be available by SGR
next week)

-- UNCLAS Threat assessment
CIA has prepared an
UNCLAS version

-- UNCLAS pamphlet on
nuclear deterrence

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4421 #136974

BY FW NARA DATE 8/23/16

John K.:

- Conventional Threat: JIA is reviewing 2nd draft - to be ready early next week
- How to release? Big splash here, or to allies for their use.
- Apparently two papers ① Conventional Threat ② White Paper (across The Board Threat)
- Weinberger speaks to JFSS in Williamsburg?
- Give the package to NATO - mid-to-late August? So it could be sent to capitals for use in Sep-Oct.
- The concept is that our info is just for support of allies.

Dick Gilbert

- Proposer working group in allied capitals to coordinate their PA efforts

in How to overcome the interest-
rates perception gap? ¹⁹

with USICA efforts.

Jack Fawcett - Elite polling now
going on, also following up
the general public polls.

^{has been}
Mike (?) Use of Congressmen
and Think-tank folks

Dick hands out declar
materials on Sov. forces in
Europe

Will be incorporated into the
materials

Package handed out on
Afghanistan - to take PR offensive

look for opportunities for other
offensives

*Scheduling People to Europe M
in the Fall

ICA