

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Paal, Douglas H.: Files
Folder Title: China – Science & Technology –
Missile Proliferation
Box: RAC Box 5

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: PAAL, DOUGLAS H.: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: China - Science & Technology - Missile Proliferation
Box 92243

Date: 1/13/00
Burr/F98-080

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|---|----------|---------------------|
| 1. Draft NSDD | re: Missile Proliferation, 5 p. | n.d. | P1/F1 |
| 2. Memo | <p>R 7/29/10 MO6-053 #1 (39 x R2)</p> <p>Robert Gates to Assit to the Pres. for National Security, re: Response to National Security Decision Directive 315, 1 p.</p> <p>Part. 6/27/01 F98-080 # 40</p> | 10/15/88 | P1/F1 F3 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

China - S&T

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER

A U.S. INITIATIVE ON
MISSILE PROLIFERATION

I. INTRODUCTION (U)

In 1982, the President, in signing NSDD-70, recognized the dangerous trend toward missile proliferation in the developing world and the threat which this development posed to regional instability and ultimately to the security of the United States. NSDD-70, with a few exceptions to friends and allies, established the policy of the United States "to hinder the proliferation of foreign military missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons." Four years later, the U.S. and its Economic Summit partners announced the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime. This was the first multilateral effort to include potential delivery systems and related technologies under nuclear nonproliferation controls. (S)

Despite the timeliness of NSDD-70 and the MTCR, missile proliferation has nearly reached global proportions. Of about twenty non-major military powers, mostly located in the Third World and known to possess ballistic missiles of one range/payload or another, at least ten are located in the Middle East, two in Latin America, two in South Asia, four in East Asia, two in Southern Europe and South Africa. (S)

II. POLICY REVIEW AND KEY JUDGMENTS (U)

An interagency review of the problem identified the following adverse trends which lead to the conclusion that the United States and its Missile Tech partners must expand the strategic equation by reaching out to other concerned countries to stem the proliferation of destabilizing ballistic missiles:

--The number of Third World countries producing or able to produce ballistic and cruise missile is growing at an alarming rate. By the late 1990's, as many as 15 Third World countries will either have produced or be able to produce missiles.

--While most ballistic missiles will be SRBMs, medium or intermediate range ballistic missiles are not far off in the future. Israel is already testing an MRBM and, by the mid-1990's, India and possibly Argentina and Brazil will be able to build MRBM/IRBMs.

reengineering to extend range.

BY RUD
NARRA DATE 7/29/10
NIRR MOle-053 #1

DECLASSIFIED

--The number of potential suppliers of complete missiles will also grow in the next decade making missiles more available. Potential suppliers will grow beyond the Soviet Union, North Korea and the PRC to include Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, and possibly Taiwan. Moreover, some of these countries may transfer production technology to others, spurring further proliferation.

--Proliferation may accelerate even further as incentives grow to procure missiles. Although the current generation of export model ballistic missiles is relatively inaccurate, they have acquired great symbolic importance. This importance will grow as technological advances improve the accuracy and lethality of conventionally armed ballistic missiles.

--While some proliferators will be capable of arming their missiles with nuclear warheads, there is a greater probability that some will arm missiles with chemical/biological weapons.
(S)

U.S. MISSILE PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE AND OBJECTIVES (S)

The dangers posed by uncontrolled ballistic missile proliferation calls for a measured initiative from the U.S. and its allies to expand the strategic equation for stemming missile proliferation. This initiative should augment, hopefully, previous efforts to control the spread of destabilizing ballistic missiles such as NSDD-70, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) and other directives governing the export of conventional missiles and technology. (S)

This directive provides policy guidance with respect to the implementation of specific objectives of this initiative. The NSC, in consultation with all Executive Branch agencies having responsibilities for arms control policy related to missile proliferation, will oversee the implementation and execution of the following objectives:

--In the area of public diplomacy, the issuance of a statement broadly outlining U.S. strategic concerns with missile proliferation.

--Scheduling bilateral and multilateral discussions with the MTCR partners both to show strong continued support for the MTCR and to continue to explore ways and means to make the MTCR more attractive to non-adherents.

--Approaching the Soviet Union and China on ideas for cooperation on missile proliferation. These approaches should develop

information from all sources to provide the Soviets and Chinese with a complete understanding of the missile proliferation problem as we understand it, explore and prepare a range of options for Soviet and Chinese joint actions on missile proliferation, and seek agreement from both to a policy of restraint, outside the context of the MTCR if necessary, in missile transfers and agreement not to undermine the controls established by the U.S. and its MTCR partners.

--Approaching selected non-major military powers to seek their cooperation in preventing the spread of ballistic missiles and related technological know-how. These approaches could also be done within or outside the context of the MTCR as appropriate. Israel, India, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil, with their unsafeguarded facilities and active ballistic missile programs, should head the list of priority countries.

--Consulting and briefing the Congress on the initiative and its objectives. (S)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INITIATIVE (S)

1. The NSC will oversee the implementation of this initiative. However, a missile proliferation interagency working group (MPWG) chaired by the Department of State at no less than a Deputy Assistant Secretary's level, and including representatives from OSD, JCS, ACDA, NASA, OSTP, Commerce and the CIA will be formed to carry out the implementation phase of this initiative. (S)

2. The MPWG will submit to the NSC a coordinated draft statement suitable for a senior Administration official to deliver regarding the Administration's missile proliferation initiative. The statement, due by _____, should include, inter alia, the following:

--A brief historical overview of U.S. recognition of the dangers of missile proliferation dating back to the beginning of the Administration. The statement should also review the Administration's protracted but successful effort to create the Missile Technology Control Regime.

--The global problem and its implications for regional instability and global security.

--A call to MTCR adherents and non-adherents currently producing or capable of producing missiles to review their export control systems with a view to denying, or delaying until proper assurances are received, exports of missile systems or related technologies.

--A reference to a U.S. initiative to place missile proliferation on the agendas of appropriate world fora. (S)

3. The MPWG will prepare a gameplan to notify, brief and consult the Congress on this initiative. The gameplan, due by _____, should identify key congressional figures and should contain background material to distribute among key staffers and congressmen. The background material should include all U.S. bilateral approaches to date to such key countries as the PRC, Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil and Israel, and should include a notional schedule for upcoming demarches. (S)

4. The MPWG shall proceed with the scheduled bilaterals with the Soviet Union on both the MTCR and the broader issue of global missile proliferation, stressing the global problem by means of indigenous development and/or foreign acquisition. Following the meeting, the MPWG will pursue further contacts with an eventual view towards obtaining, at a minimum, Soviet agreement to a policy of restraint in missile transfers and agreement not to undermine the controls established by the U.S. and its MTCR partners. (S)

understanding
5. The Department of State, through the MPWG, will make a demarche to the PRC immediately renewing ACDA Director Burns' offer to debrief China on the U.S.-Soviet Union bilaterals scheduled for Washington on September 26. The demarche should include the offer to debrief the Chinese in as soon as possible after the U.S.-Soviet bilateral. As with the approach to the Soviets, following the meeting, the MPWG will pursue further contacts with an eventual view towards building on Chinese elder statesman Deng Xiaoping's ~~assurances~~ to Secretary Carlucci that China will not provide IRBM's to other countries. The MPWG should continue to explore an understanding with the PRC to a policy of restraint in missile sales so as not to undermine the controls established by the U.S. and its MTCR partners. (S)

6. The Department of State, through the MPWG, will make demarches to the Governments of Israel and Egypt to discuss the problem of missile proliferation in the Middle East. The Department will also accelerate negotiations with the GOI to conclude the U.S.-Israel Strategic Trade MOU, which has provisions for controlling strategic technologies for nuclear as well as ballistic missile programs. The Department of State is also authorized to follow its proposal to the GOE to discuss missile proliferation and to make a demarche to the GOE to discuss negotiations on a strategic trade MOU to control the export of strategic technologies. (S)

7. The Department of State, through the MPWG, will continue discussions with the Governments of Argentina and Brazil on missile proliferation. A central feature of the discussions should include a proposal for negotiating strategic trade MOUs

with Argentina and Brazil to control the export of strategic technologies. (S)

8. The Department of State, through the MPWG, will accelerate its negotiations with Pakistan to conclude finally the U.S.-Pakistan strategic trade MOU, and will make another demarche to the GOI to consider our proposal to initiate bilateral talks on missile proliferation and to negotiate a missile technology side letter to the recently concluded strategic trade MOU between the U.S. and India. (S)

9. The DCI is requested to assess the adequacy of the collection and analysis resources devoted to nuclear and CW capable ballistic missiles. In addition, the DCI should identify a focal point for coordinating and providing intelligence community support to the Missile Proliferation and Missile Technology Interagency Working Groups. (S)

10. Because the initiative will ask adherents to review their export control systems and make improvements where needed, and target key non-adherents to negotiate strategic trade MOUs, the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense will conduct an interagency review of the strengths and weaknesses of our own efforts to control the transfer of technology under the missile tech control regime. The review should include an assessment of the adequacy or inadequacy of the Annex. (S)

TO: POWELL

FROM: ROLLWAGEN, JOHN A

DOC DATE: 06 SEP 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
EXPORT ADMIN ACT

EXPORT CONTROLS
ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ROLLWAGEN OF CRAY RESEARCH INC REQUEST A MTG W/ POWELL RE EXPORT
LICENSE APPLICATION FOR PRC / 28 - 29 SEP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL DUE DATE: 12 SEP 88 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ONATE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ONATE

FOR CONCURRENCE
BATJER
COBB

FOR INFO
DANZANSKY
DEKOK
GANTT
LEDSKY
PAAL

*copy for Kelly, J. ✓
file in China - ~~can~~ SET*

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSJWD CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

~~copy~~
2. Staff
6507

September 6, 1988

SEP 7 1988


Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear General Powell:

11 I am writing regarding two Cray Research export license applications for the People's Republic of China (Department of Commerce case numbers B211822 and B255230). I understand that these were discussed at an Export Administration Review Board meeting which you attended on July 5, but that no decision was reached. Given the complexity of these cases and the national security issues which must be considered, our Washington staff is currently arranging for Mr. Tyrus Cobb and Mr. Andres Onate to visit our facilities for a series of briefings and discussions. However, I would welcome the opportunity to meet personally with you to discuss the security conditions we have proposed and whether these are sufficient to address your concerns. Given that these cases have been pending for nearly two years, I would hope that a resolution is not far off.

I will be in Washington on September 28 and 29 attending the American Business Conference annual meeting. Perhaps we could meet then. My staff will call your office to determine if this is possible.

Sincerely yours,


John A. Rollwagen
Chairman and CEO

JAR/pmr

15 October 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Response to National Security Decision Directive 315

1. As requested in NSDD 315, the DCI will undertake to assess the adequacy of collection and analysis resources devoted to missile proliferation. The National Foreign Intelligence Board recently approved a National Intelligence Estimate which, for the first time, takes a global view of the missile proliferation issue. This NIE includes our initial thoughts on some of the most critical intelligence problems and gaps. As a follow-on to that effort, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, together with the Intelligence Community Staff, will convene a Community-wide seminar to identify key problems and, where possible, to suggest solutions. This seminar will provide the basis for the DCI assessment requested in the NSDD. ~~(S-NF)~~

2. In addition, I have designated the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Lawrence K. Gershwin, as the Intelligence Community's focal point on the issue of missile proliferation. Dr. Gershwin has been overseeing the development and production of our recent NIE on the subject, and has been instrumental in pulling together various disparate elements in the Community to work this important problem. ~~(S-NF)~~



FOIA(b) (3)

Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 798-080 #40

By GA, NARA, Date 10/27/01

All portions ~~SECRET NOFORN~~



**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM II
90815

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

SECRET

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: _____

P 7:45

ACTION OFFICER: COBB

DUE: Oct. 21

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Powell/Negroponete | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo Stevens to Peterson / Murr |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Dawson/Dolan | <input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. x3491

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Addis | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Paal |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Andricos | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Heiser | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Pastorino |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Batjer | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Henhoeffer | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Perina |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Beers | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Jameson | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Popadiuk |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Brintnall | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, B | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Porter |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, J | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Burns | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Kimberling | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Rostow |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Leach | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Ledsky | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Snider |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Cockell | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Levin | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Cohen | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Lewis | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Tice |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Curtin | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Lowenkron | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Tobey |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Dekok | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Wiant |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> McCue | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Ebner | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Melby | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Menan | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Miskel | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Grant | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Onate | <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

*Info corner to
B. Kelly
Burns, Ledsky,
Pastorino.*

*DPaal
Info.*

INFORMATION

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Stevens | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Perito | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Powell (advance) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Negroponete (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Exec. Sec. Desk |

COMMENTS

CRW: 90731
90070

Logged By M.C.

SECRET

Return to Secretariat