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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MEESE, EDWIN: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 12/29/2006

File Folder CHINESE COMMUNIQUE, AUGUST 1982 (2 OF 3)

FOIA

F02-019/1

Box Number CF0219

COHEN, WARREN

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31651	MEMO	WILLIAM P CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT, RE CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS <i>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</i>	2	8/13/1982	B1
31653	CABLE	140450Z AUG 82 <i>R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1</i>	5	8/14/1982	B1
31654	CABLE	140650Z AUG 82 <i>R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1</i>	12	8/14/1982	B1
31657	MEMO	RC MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT <i>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</i>	1	8/15/1982	B1
31658	CABLE	140450Z AUG 82 (SAME TEXT WITH HASHMARKS AND SOME ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE) <i>R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1</i>	5	8/14/1982	B1
31660	MEMO	L PAUL BREMER TO WILLIAM P CLARK, RE CONTINGENCY PLANNING <i>R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1</i>	3	8/14/1982	B1
31664	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MEESE, RE CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS <i>R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019</i>	1	8/13/1982	B1
31666	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT <i>R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1</i>	3	8/15/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder CHINESE COMMUNIQUE, AUGUST 1982 (2 OF 3)

FOIA

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Box Number CF0219

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31670	NOTES	TYPED RE JOINT COMMUNIQUE <i>R</i> 12/2/2011 <i>F2002-019/1</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 13, 1982

INFORMATION

13 AUG 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *RC/for*

SUBJECT: Current Instructions on the Chinese Communique

This memorandum is in follow up to the point raised by Ed Meese in this morning's discussion of the current instructions to our Ambassador in Beijing. The point concerned the text of draft paragraph 7 in the communique which currently reads as follows:

7. Therefore, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

Ed asked about the use of the words "...intends to reduce gradually..." instead of the words "...expects to reduce gradually..." as called for in the prior draft. Secretary Shultz approved the current version (intends) on Tuesday based upon the following tactical judgement. The Chinese had asked that we use the word "progressively" in place of "gradually." George believes that "progressively" would restrict our flexibility and that "gradually" was therefore better. He decided however that we could offer a tradeoff without substantial loss by agreeing to use "intends" instead of "expects." In this view, Secretary Shultz was reinforced by his legal adviser who cited the following definitions from Webster:

° expect - to anticipate or look forward to the coming or occurrence of; to consider probable or certain.

° intend - to signify, mean; to have in mind as a purpose or goal.

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In short, it is State's view that "intends" implies greater conditionality and flexibility. No action is required at this time. The ball is in the Chinese court. We expect an answer in the next day or so.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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31664

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Current Instructions on the Chinese Communique

You have received the package of materials leading up to our current instructions to Ambassador Hummel on the Communique. As you will have noted, paragraph 7 does include the words, "intends to reduce" as opposed to "expects."

The package also included State's memo to Secretary Shultz outlining its rationale for making this change. Beyond what is said in the memo, State's lawyers expressed the view that "intends" is more conditional than "expects." They based this judgment on the following Webster definitions:

- expect - to anticipate or look forward to the coming or occurrence of; to consider probable or certain.
- intend - to signify, mean; to have in mind as a purpose or goal.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: : OADR
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES: AGREED COMMUNIQUE TEXT AS OF
AUGUST 14
REF: BEIJING 10901

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOR RECORD AND VERIFICATION PURPOSES, THIS TELEGRAM SETS OUT THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS IT NOW STANDS. DOUBLE BRACKETS INDICATE LANGUAGE NOT AGREED TO BY THE TWO SIDES. THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE REFLECTS MODIFICATIONS SUGGESTED BY ME ON AUGUST 14, ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS. (SEE PARA 3, 6 AND 9 OF THE TEXT QUOTED BELOW.)

3. BEGIN TEXT:

(1) IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON JANUARY 1, 1979, ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERN-

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MENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RECOGNIZED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, AND IT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHINESE POSITION THAT THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA AND TAIWAN IS PART OF CHINA. WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CULTURAL, COMMERCIAL, AND OTHER UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN. ON THIS BASIS, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA WERE NORMALIZED.

(2) THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WAS NOT SETTLED IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE TWO SIDES HELD DIFFERING POSITIONS, AND THE CHINESE SIDE STATED THAT IT WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN FOLLOWING NORMALIZATION. RECOGNIZING THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD SERIOUSLY HAMPER THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, THEY HAVE HELD FUTHER DISCUSSIONS ON IT, DURING AND SINCE THE MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN AND PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG AND BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. AND VICE PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA IN OCTOBER 1981.

(3) RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS CONSTITUTE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE CONFIRMED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 28, 1972 AND REAFFIRMED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH CAME INTO EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 1979. BOTH SIDES EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES CONTINUE TO GOVERN ((ALL ASPECTS OF)) THEIR RELATIONS ((AND AGREE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES BEAR DIRECTLY ON THE SETTLEMENT OF UNITED STATES - CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER THE UNITED STATES SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN.))

(4) THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REITERATES THAT THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN IS CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. THE MESSAGE TO COM-

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PATRIOTS IN TAIWAN ISSUED BY CHINA ON JANUARY 1, 1979
PROGMULGATED A FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF STRIVING FOR PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION OF THE MOTHERLAND. THE NINE-POINT PROPOSAL
PUT FORWARD BY CHINA ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1981 REPRESENTED A
FURTHER MAJOR EFFORT UNDER THIS FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TO STRIVE
FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION.
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(5) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND REITERATES THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF INFRINGING ON CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, OR INTERFERING IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, OR PURSUING A POLICY OF "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN." THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS AND APPRECIATES THE CHINESE POLICY OF STRIVING FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION AS INDICATED IN CHINA'S "MESSAGE TO COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN" ISSUED ON JANUARY 1, 1979 AND THE "NINE-POINT PROPOSAL" PUT FORWARD BY CHINA ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1981. THE NEW SITUATION WHICH HAS EMERGED WITH REGARD TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION ALSO PROVIDES FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF UNITED STATES - CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

(6) ((HAVING IN MIND THE FOREGOING STATEMENTS OF BOTH SIDES.)) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATES THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK TO CARRY OUT A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, THAT ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL NOT EXCEED, EITHER IN QUALITATIVE OR IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, THE LEVEL

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OF THOSE SUPPLIED IN RECENT YEARS, SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, AND THAT IT INTENDS GRADUALLY TO REDUCE ITS SALE OF ARMS TO TAIWAN, LEADING, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, TO A FINAL RESOLUTION. IUN SO STATING, THE UNITED STATES ACKNOWLEDGES CHINA'S CONSISTENT POSITION REGARDING THE THOROUGH SETTLEMENT OF THIS ISSUE.

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(7) IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, WHICH IS AN ISSUE ROOTED IN HISTORY, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ADOPT MEASURES AND CREATE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE THOROUGH SETTLEMENT OF THIS ISSUE.

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(8) THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES, BUT IS ALSO CONDUCIVE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD. THE TWO SIDES ARE DETERMINED, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR TIES IN THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND OTHER FIELDS AND MAKE STRONG, JOINT EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

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(9) IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE AND OPPOSE AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLES AGREED ON BY THE TWO SIDES IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE TWO SIDES AGREE TO KEEP IN TOUCH ((AND HOLD CONSULTATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE.)) ON BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST.
END TEXT.

4. REQUEST VERIFICATION THAT THIS TEXT IS IDENTICAL TO THAT MAINTAINED IN WASHINGTON. HUMMEL
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 10901

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, MASS, TW, CH

SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES: MEETING OF AUGUST 14 A.M.

1. (SECRET) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN RESPONSE TO A CHINESE REQUEST LAST NIGHT, HAN XU AND I MET AT 10:00 A.M. THIS MORNING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. THE USUAL COLLEAGUES WERE PRESENT.
3. GIVEN THE DECISION TO DO WITHOUT AN INTRODUCTORY PARA 1, THE NUMBERS OF ALL OF THE SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS IN THE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN ADJUSTED ACCORDINGLY IN THIS AND FURTHER MESSAGES.
4. HAN XU BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY DISTRIBUTING PROPOSED NEW WORDING FOR PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 6.
5. CHINESE PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 3. BEGIN TEXT:
(3) RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS CONSTITUTE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE CONFIRMED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 28, 1972 AND REAFFIRMED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH CAME INTO EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 1979. BOTH SIDES EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES CONTINUE TO GOVERN ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONS AND AGREE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES BEAR DIRECTLY ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN (BING YIZHI RENWEI ZHAXIE YUANZE YU JIEJUE MEIGUO XIANG TAIWAN GONGYING WUOI DE WENTI ZHIJIE XIANGGUAN). END TEXT.

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6. CHINESE PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 6. BEGIN TEXT:

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(6) HAVING IN MIND THE FOREGOING STATEMENTS OF BOTH SIDES (KAOLUDAO SHUANGFANG DE SHANGSHU SHENGMING), THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATES THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK TO CARRY OUT A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, THAT ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL NOT EXCEED, EITHER IN QUALITATIVE OR IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, THE LEVEL OF THOSE SUPPLIED IN RECENT YEARS, SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, AND THAT IT INTENDS GRADUALLY TO REDUCE ITS SALE OF ARMS TO TAIWAN, LEADING, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, TO A FINAL RESOLUTION/ IN SO STATING, THE UNITED STATES ACKNOWLEDGES CHINA'S CONSISTENT POSITION REGARDING THE THOROUGH SETTLEMENT OF THIS ISSUE. END TEXT.

NOOIS

7. IN EXPLAINING NEW CHINESE WORDING FOR PARAGRAPH 6, HAN STATED THAT IF THE U.S. INSISTED ON RETAINING THE WORD "THEREFORE" AT THE BEGINNING OF PARAGRAPH 6, THE CHINESE WOULD INSIST REORDERING THE SENTENCES IN PARAGRAPH 5 SO THAT THE LAST SENTENCE WOULD READ: "THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND REITERATES THAT IS HAS NO INTENTION OF INFRINGING ON

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CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, OR INTERFERING IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, OR PURSUING A POLICY OF "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN." HAN EXPLAINED IF THE U.S. SIDE DECIDED TO KEEP THE NEW CHINESE PARAGRAPH 6 INTRODUCTORY CLAUSE: "HAVING IN MIND THE FOREGOING STATEMENT OF BOTH SIDES," THE WORD ORDERING OF PARAGRAPH 5 COULD REMAIN UNCHANGED.

8. ALSO IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, HAN AGAIN TOOK ISSUE WITH THE U.S. WORDING "AS APPROPRIATE" IN PARAGRAPH 10 AND INSISTED ON RETENTION OF THE CHINESE FORMULATION: "THE TWO SIDES AGREE TO KEEP IN TOUCH AND HOLD CONSULTATIONS WITH EACH OTHER ON BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST." CONCLUDING HIS OPENING PRESENTATION, HAN CLAIMED THAT IN ITS NEW PROPOSALS THE CHINESE SIDE "HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT U.S. DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES," THAT THE NEW CHINESE WORDING FOR PARAGRAPH 3 ROUGHLY FOLLOWED U.S. SENTENCE STRUCTURE WHILE "OMITTING SOME UNNECESSARY WORDS" AND INCLUDING THE U.S. WORDING "BEARS DIRECTLY ON." THE CHINESE PARAGRAPH 3 PROPOSAL, HE CLAIMED, REPRESENTED THE "MAXIMUM LIMIT OF FLEXIBILITY THAT WE CAN MAKE." HE CONTENTED THAT THE NEW CHINESE PROPOSAL FOR PARAGRAPH 3 REALTED TO THE DELETION OF U.S. WORDING "AS APPROPRIATE" IN PARAGRAPH 10, REINFORCING THE CHINESE NEED TO HAVE "AS APPROPRIATE" DROPPED.

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9. AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH COLLEAGUES, I OPENED MY COUNTER-PRESENTATION BY TELLING HAN THAT I WOULD FULLY REPORT THE NEW CHINESE PROPOSALS TO WASHINGTON. I ADDED MY FRANK OPINION THAT THE CHINESE HAD FAILED TO BRIDGE OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE KEY PARAGRAPH 3 IMPASSE, AND FURTHER, IF THE CHINESE INSISTED ON KEEPING "CONSULTATIONS" IN PARAGRAPH 10, WASHINGTON WOULD INSIST ON INCLUDING "AS APPROPRIATE." REGARDING PARAGRAPH 10, I OFFERED THREE ALTERNATIVES WHICH I THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD ACCEPT:

- -- "KEEP IN TOUCH ON BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST."
- -- "KEEP IN TOUCH PERIODICALLY ON MATTERS OF BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST."
- -- "KEEP IN TOUCH AND HOLD CONSULTATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE, ON BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST."

10. THERE THEN FOLLOWED A LENGTHY EXCHANGE ON PARAGRAPH 3 IN WHICH I FRANKLY AND REPEATEDLY SAID THE CHINESE PRO-

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POSED WORDING FAILED TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS. I NOTED THAT THE CHINESE JULY 17 PROPOSAL HAD INCLUDED THE TERMINOLOGY "SINO-U.S. DIFFERENCES." REMINDING HAN THAT I WAS SPEAKING ON AN AN REFERENDUM BASIS, I SAID THAT I THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD AGREE WITH THE NEW PROPOSED CHINESE WORDING IF IT INCORPORATED HIS EARLIER FORMULA TO WHICH THE CHINESE HAD AGREED. THUS, THE PASSAGE COULD BE MADE TO READ "... AND AGREE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES BEAR DIRECTLY ON THE SETTLEMENT OF U.S.-CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER THE UNITED STATES' SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN." HAN REPLIED THAT IF "U.S.-CHINA DIFFERENCES" WERE INSERTED, THEN THE REST OF THE CHINESE JULY 17 WORDING -- "DIFFERENCES OVER THE QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES' SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN SHOULD BE SETTLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE PRINCIPLES" -- SHOULD ALSO BE RETAINED. HE RAISED ONCE MORE THE CHINESE ARGUMENT OF CONSISTENCY, IN DROPPING "U.S.-CHINA DIFFERENCES IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 7, WHICH WERE PARAGRAPHS EXPRESSING THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES, UNLIKE PARAGRAPH 5, WHICH WAS A U.S. UNILATERAL STATEMENT. HE NOTED THAT THAT WAS WHY THE CHINESE HAD AGREED TO THE PARAGRAPH 5 REFERENCE TO "DIFFERENCES." WE REMINDED HAN THAT IN THE ORIGINAL WORDING OF OUR EARLIER PARAGRAPH 3 DRAFTS, THE U.S. FORMULA INCORPORATING "BEAR DIRECTLY ON" HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY ENTIRELY DIFFERENT WORDING FROM THAT PROPOSED BY THE CHINESE: "... AGREE THAT THEY BEAR DIRECTLY ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO SEEK A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF U.S.-CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER THE QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES' SUPPLY OF AMRS TO TAIWAN."

11. IN ONCE MORE REITERATED REFTEL PARAGRAPH 8 ARGUMENTS IN STANDING FIRM ON OUR REQUIREMENT FOR PARAGRAPH 3. AT ONE POINT I DISCOURSED AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE CONSIDERABLE GROUND BOTH SIDES HAVE COVERED OVE THE PAST SIX MONTHS OF TALKS. URGING THE CHINESE NOT TO MISS THE WOODS FOR THE TREES IN THEIR FOCUSING ON PARAGRAPH 3, I UNDERTOOK A PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT, POINTING TO

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THE SERIES OF STEPS THE U.S. HAD TAKEN TO ACCOMMODATE CHINA ON RELATED ASPECTS OF THE TAIWAN ARMS SALES ISSUE IN THE COMMUNIQUE. I CONCLUDED BY URGING THE CHINESE TO RECOGNIZE BOTH THAT THEIR NEEDS HAVE BEEN MET IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE DRAFT, AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF OUR ACCEPTING THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS THAT THEY CONTINUED TO INSIST ON FOR PARAGRAPH 3. WE NOTED THAT, IF WE ACCEPTED IT, THE CHINESE NEW PROPOSED FIRST SENTENCE FOR PARAGRAPH 6 WOULD ALSO RELATE BACK TO THE WORDING IN PARAGRAPH 3, AS WELL AS PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, THUS HELPING TO MEET THE CHINESE NEED FOR SOME KIND OF "LINKAGE." WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE AGREED WORDING IN PARAGRAPH 7 DID NOT CONTAIN THE WORD "DIFFERENCES," AND REPRESENTED A DIRECT U.S. CONCESSION TO CHINESE CONCERNS ON THIS POINT.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 BEIJING 0901
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12. IN RESPONSE TO MY OBSERVATION THAT IT HAS BECOME IN-
CREASINGLY NECESSARY TO MOVE QUICKLY TO WRAP UP OUR TALKS
SO THAT WE CAN BEGIN CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS ON THE
AGREEMENT, HAN READ THE FOLLOWING PREPARED STATEMENT:
"YOUR EXCELLENCY ONCE SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD
ON AUGUST 19 PROBABLY SUBMIT TO CONGRESS THE NOTIFICATION
OF JOINT PRODUCTION WITH TAIWAN OF F-5E AIRCRAFT. I WOULD
LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THE CHINESE SIDE HAS NEVER ACCEPTED
ANY DEADLINE FROM THE U.S. SIDE. JUDGING FROM OUR DIS-
CUSSIONS, WE STILL HAVE MANY PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED IN OUR
TALKS. WE NEED MORE TIME. THE DELAY IS NOT DUE TO THE
CHINESE SIDE. EVEN IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON A JOINT
COMMUNIQUE, IT WILL HAVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENTS
OF BOTH SIDES FOR APPROVAL BEFORE IT CAN BE MADE PUBLIC.
IF THE U.S. SIDE SUBMITS TO CONGRESS THE QUESTION OF F-5E
JOINT PRODUCTION WITH TAIWAN BEFORE ISSUANCE OF THE JOINT
COMMUNIQUE, IT WILL COMPEL THE CHINESE SIDE TO REACT
STRONGLY, THUS COMPLETELY BREAKING DOWN EFFORTS BY THE TWO
SIDES OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS. EVEN IF SHORTLY AFTER THE

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AGREEMENT IS REACHED AND THE COMMUNIQUE IS MADE PUBLIC, THE U.S. SIDE SUBMITS NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS ON CO-PRODUCTION OF THE F-5E, IT WOULD CREATE A BAD ATMOSPHERE AND CAUSE DISSATISFACTION TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS."

13. IN RESPONSE TO HAN'S STATEMENT, I ASSERTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SURPRISE FOR THE CHINESE SIDE ABOUT U.S. GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO NOTIFY CONGRESS FAIRLY SOON ON OUR LONG-POSTPONED INTENTION TO CONTINUE OLD, EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUPPLY OF F-5E AIRCRAFT TO TAIWAN. THE CHINESE SIDE HAD BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THIS LONG AGO. THE CHINESE HAD BEEN TOLD IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK THAT THE AUGUST 19 DATE IS THE FINAL DATE. FURTHER POSTPONEMENTS ARE NO LONGER POSSIBLE. I TOLD HAN THAT I APPRECIATED THE CHINESE EFFORTS TO BRIDGE OUR GAP ON PARAGRAPH 3, BUT WAS CONFIDENT THAT WASHINGTON WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE NEW CHINESE FORMULATION WITHOUT THE AMENDMENT I HAD SUGGESTED. I URGED THE CHINESE SIDE TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THIS DIFFICULT SENTENCE ON WHICH WE CONTINUED TO HAVE NO REMAINING FLEXIBILITY.

14. HAN CLOSED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE U.S. TO ONCE AGAIN REVIEW ITS POSITIONS AND TO COME UP WITH NEW PROPOSALS ON THE KEY ISSUE OF PARAGRAPH 3.

15. COMMENT:

HAN'S REACTION TO MY POSITION ON THE LAST PARAGVVAPH (9) SUGGESTS THAT THE CHINESE MAY BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT OUR FIRM REJECTION OF "CONSULTATIONS" IF THE WORDS "AS APPROPRIATE" ARE OMITTED. SINCE OUR PROPOSED FORMULA OF JULY 27 FOR OPENING NEW PARAGRAPH 6 WITH "HAVING IN MIND... ETC" INSTEAD OF "THEREFORE," THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES IN THE PRECEEDING TWO PARAGRAPHS THAT AFFECT SOMEWHAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FORMER PHRASE. NEVERTHELESS, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THIS PHRASE IN THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CURRENT CONTEXT STILL ESTABLISHES LINKAGE EQUALLY OR MORE CLEARLY THAN WOULD "THEREFORE."

16. IF THE DEPARTMENT CAN ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL AND THE CHINESE, AS I BELIEVE THEY WILL, ACQUIESCE IN OUR WORDING OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH, THE ONLY REMAINING PROBLEM IS THE LAST PHRASE IN NEW PARAGRAPH 3 (OLD PARAGRAPH 4). THE CHINESE ALSO MAY BE WAVERING ON THIS ISSUE. IF WE CAN OFFER SOME FACE-SAVING FRILLS, WE MAY BE ABLE TO RESOLVE IT RATHER QUICKLY.

17. ONE POSSIBILITY IS TO PROPOSE ADDING "FUNDAMENTAL" BEFORE "PRINCIPLES" AND "BILATERAL" BEFORE "RELATIONS," SO THAT THE LAST SENTENCE IN NEW PARAGRAPH 3 READ "BOTH SIDES EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES CONTINUE TO GOVERN ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS." ADDITION OF THESE TWO ADJECTIVES IS OF NO SUBSTANTIVE IMPORT, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, BUT WE COULD ARGUE THAT THEY MAKE THE STATEMENT EVEN MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND ALL-ENCOMPASSING THAN BEFORE. ALTERNATIVELY, COULD WE PROPOSE GOING BACK TO THE CHINESE WORD "APPLY" IN PLACE OF "AGREE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES BEAR DIRECTLY ON>" THE SENTENCE WOULD THEN READ "BOTH SIDES EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES CONTINUE TO GOVERN ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONS AND APPLY TO THE SETTLEMENT OF UNITED STATES-

CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER THE UNITED STATES SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN."

18. PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY WHETHER WE CAN ACCEPT THE CHINESE DRAFT FOR NEW PARAGRAPH 6 PROVIDED THEY ACCEPT ONE OF OUR PROPOSED FORMULAS IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH (9), AND IN NEW PARAGRAPH 3 AGREE TO RETAINING THE LAST PHRASE AS IN THEIR NEW DRAFT BUT REWORDED "AND AGREE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES BEAR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DIRECTLY ON THE SETTLEMENT OF U.S. - CHINA DIFFERENCES
OVER UNITED STATES SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN," OR
TO SOME VERSION OF THE LANGUAGE I PROPOSED ABOVE.
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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 BEIJING 10901

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19. AS NOTED, HAN'S WARNING ABOUT THE IMPENDING NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE F-5E WAS CAREFULLY WORDED. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT NOTIFICATION BEFORE A COMMUNIQUE IS AGREED TO AND ANNOUNCED WOULD PUT DENG XIAOPING IN A VERY DIFFICULT DILEMMA. HE WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO REACT STRONGLY BUT PERHAPS EVEN THEN WOULD NOT WANT TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS SO NEAR TO CONCLUSION. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WOULD CHOSE TO CHARGE US WITH BAD FAITH BUT AVOID AN ACTUAL "DOWNGRADING", AS IN THE NETHERLANDS CASE, UNTIL THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION HAD PASSED AND THE SALE BECAME FINALLY OFFICIAL. IN THE INTERIM WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS AND PERHAPS COME TO AN AGREEMENT.

20. WITH THE PARTY CONGRESS NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 1, DENG WILL BE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED TO AVOID APPEARING TO BACKTRACK ON BEIJING'S PREVIOUS WARNINGS ABOUT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF NEW U. S.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING 0901

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ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WITHOUT A SINO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT ADDRESSING THE SUBJECT. A DELAY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CALAMITOUS AND WE COULD PROBABLY PICK UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF IN A MONTH OR SO. BUT OTHER ACTIONS WE MUST TAKE ON FURTHER SALES TO TAIWAN COULD FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION. THE UNEXPECTED, INCLUDING DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, COULD ALSO INTERVENE.

21. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS ON THE F-5E ONLY A DAY OR TWO AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT OF A U.S.-CHINA COMMUNIQUE WOULD CAUSE A SOMEWHAT LESS SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR DENG, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD BE SHARPLY EMBARRASSED BY SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE AND THAT CHINA'S PUBLIC REACTION TO THE NOTIFICATION WOULD BE MUCH STRONGER THAN IF THERE WERE A BIGGER WINDOW, EVEN OF ONLY TWO WEEKS. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT WHEN WE REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE COMMUNIQUE, THE CHINESE WILL TRY TO STIPULATE THAT THE F-5E NOTIFICATION MUST BE DELAYED FOR A SHORT PERIOD.

22. CONSEQUENTLY, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE I URGE THE DEPARTMENT TO SEEK THE NECESSARY WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL TO DELAY NOTIFICATION UNTIL CONGRESS RECONVENES, CONTINGENT ON OUR REACHING AGREEMENT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IF I COULD INFORM THE CHINESE, ONCE WE REACH AGREEMENT, THAT THIS IS OUR INTENTION. THIS WOULD GREATLY IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS THAT WE CAN GLIDE OVER THE F-5E NOTIFICATION WITH A MINIMUM CHINESE REACTION. OBVIOUSLY, MY PURPOSE IN THIS SUGGESTION IS TO TRY AND MINIMIZE FUTURE PRC WRANGLINGS OVER USG ACTIONS ON A NUMBER OF NEW SALES THAT HAVE TO BE MADE IN THE COMING MONTHS. END COMMENT. HUMMEL
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1982

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DELIVER TO MIKE DEEVER

Mike,

Subject: Ad Referendum Agreement With the Chinese

Given all the other matters on the President's plate today I don't think he needs to see this right away.

The basic message is that the Chinese have accepted all the changes he approved last night and we are headed toward an announcement on Tuesday morning.

The necessary public affairs work and congressional briefings have been prepared. I can coordinate with you Jim and Larry Speakes on that tomorrow.

^{Bud}
Bud

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
by LOS NARA, Date 12/29/06

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: R.C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

Subject: Ad Referendum Agreement on the Text of the U.S.—China
Joint Communiqué

Ambassador Hummel has reported that the Chinese have accepted all of the changes which you approved Saturday night. A draft of the text as it now stands is at Tab A.

Later today Secretary Shultz will forward a memo recommending that you approve the draft and authorize him to so inform the Chinese tomorrow. He will also recommend that you approve an advance message to President Chiang Ching Kuo on Taiwan as well as a pre-briefing for key members of Congress—both of these actions would be taken on Monday.

The formal announcement to include the issuance of a Presidential statement would be made on Tuesday morning at 7:00a.m. EDT (7:00p.m. in China). State would follow with a background briefing at 10:00 a.m. These matters are presented in the scenario at Tab B. A copy of the proposed Presidential statement is at Tab C. In my opinion the statement needs to be strengthened by the addition of a statement to the effect that we intend to continue to provide for Taiwan's defensive needs.

This memo is for your information. We can discuss the details at tomorrow's national security briefing.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-019/1 #31657

BY CL NARA DATE 2/1/08

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31658

Tab A

RECALLED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 BEIJING 0902
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E.O. 12356: DECL: : OADR
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: TAIWAN ARMS SALES: AGREED COMMUNIQUE TEXT AS OF
AUGUST 14
REF: BEIJING 10901

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOR RECORD AND VERIFICATION PURPOSES, THIS TELEGRAM SETS OUT THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS IT NOW STANDS. ~~DOUBLE BRACKETS INDICATE LANGUAGE NOT AGREED TO BY THE TWO SIDES. THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE REFLECTS MODIFICATIONS SUGGESTED BY ME ON AUGUST 14, ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS. (SEE PARA 3, 6 AND 9 OF THE TEXT QUOTED BELOW.)~~

3. BEGIN TEXT:

(1) IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON JANUARY 1, 1979, ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERN-

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MENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RECOGNIZED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA, AND IT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHINESE POSITION THAT THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA AND TAIWAN IS PART OF CHINA. WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CULTURAL, COMMERCIAL, AND OTHER UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN. ON THIS BASIS, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA WERE NORMALIZED.

(2) THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WAS NOT SETTLED IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE TWO SIDES HELD DIFFERING POSITIONS, AND THE CHINESE SIDE STATED THAT IT WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE AGAIN FOLLOWING NORMALIZATION. RECOGNIZING THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD SERIOUSLY HAMPER THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, THEY HAVE HELD FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON IT, DURING AND SINCE THE MEETINGS BETWEEN PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN AND PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG AND BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. AND VICE PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA IN OCTOBER 1981.

(3) RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS CONSTITUTE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE CONFIRMED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 28, 1972 AND REAFFIRMED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH CAME INTO EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 1979. BOTH SIDES EMPHATICALLY STATE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES CONTINUE TO GOVERN ~~ALL ASPECTS OF~~ THEIR RELATIONS. ~~(AND AGREE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES BEAR DIRECTLY ON THE SETTLEMENT OF UNITED STATES-CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER THE UNITED STATES SUPPLY OF ARMS TO TAIWAN.)~~

(4) THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REITERATES THAT THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN IS CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. THE MESSAGE TO COM-

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PATRIOTS IN TAIWAN ISSUED BY CHINA ON JANUARY 1, 1979
PROGMULGATED A FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF STRIVING FOR PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION OF THE MOTHERLAND. THE NINE-POINT PROPOSAL
PUT FORWARD BY CHINA ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1981 REPRESENTED A
FURTHER MAJOR EFFORT UNDER THIS FUNDAMENTAL POLICY TO STRIVE
FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION.

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(5) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA, AND REITERATES THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF INFRINGING ON CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, OR INTERFERING IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, OR PURSUING A POLICY OF "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN." THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS AND APPRECIATES THE CHINESE POLICY OF STRIVING FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION AS INDICATED IN CHINA'S "MESSAGE TO COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN" ISSUED ON JANUARY 1, 1979 AND THE "NINE-POINT PROPOSAL" PUT FORWARD BY CHINA ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1981. THE NEW SITUATION WHICH HAS EMERGED WITH REGARD TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION ALSO PROVIDES FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF UNITED STATES - CHINA DIFFERENCES OVER UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

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(6) ~~H~~HAVING IN MIND THE FOREGOING STATEMENTS OF BOTH SIDES, ~~T~~THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATES THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK TO CARRY OUT A LONG-TERM POLICY OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, THAT ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL NOT EXCEED, EITHER IN QUALITATIVE OR IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, THE LEVEL

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OF THOSE SUPPLIED IN RECENT YEARS, SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, AND THAT IT INTENDS GRADUALLY TO REDUCE ITS SALE OF ARMS TO TAIWAN, LEADING, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, TO A FINAL RESOLUTION. IUN SO STATING, THE UNITED STATES ACKNOWLEDGES CHINA'S CONSISTENT POSITION REGARDING THE THOROUGH SETTLEMENT OF THIS ISSUE.

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(7) IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, WHICH IS AN ISSUE ROOTED IN HISTORY, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ADOPT MEASURES AND CREATE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE THOROUGH SETTLEMENT OF THIS ISSUE.

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(8) THE DEVELOPMENT OF U. S. -CHINA RELATIONS IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO PEOPLES, BUT IS ALSO CONDUCIVE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD. THE TWO SIDES ARE DETERMINED, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR TIES IN THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND OTHER FIELDS AND MAKE STRONG, JOINT EFFORTS FOR THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

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(9) IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT OF U. S. -CHINA RELATIONS, MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE AND OPPOSE AGGRESSION AND EXPANSION, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLES AGREED ON BY THE TWO SIDES IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE AND THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE TWO SIDES ~~AGREE TO KEEP IN TOUCH~~ WILL MAINTAIN ~~AND HOLD CONSULTATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE,~~ CONTACT AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST.
END TEXT.

4. REQUEST VERIFICATION THAT THIS TEXT IS IDENTICAL TO THAT MAINTAINED IN WASHINGTON. HUMMEL

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Tab B



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR: F02-0191/#31660

BY CW NARADATE 12/18/07

August 14, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Contingency Planning for Issuance of U.S.-Chinese
Communique

The following is an outline of what needs to be done in the event the Chinese were to agree, Sunday, on an ad referendum basis, to a joint communique. This plan assumes the Chinese will agree to the release times indicated (i.e. Tuesday August 17 at 7³⁰ a.m. Washington time, 7⁰⁰ p.m. Beijing time). We will be working closely with the National Security Council, the White House Press Office and USICA. The details of press management have already been discussed between Al Romberg and Bob Sims.

-- Sunday: Memorandum to the Secretary and President explaining the communique and outlining final steps leading to a decision, including some or all of those listed below.

--Cable to Beijing confirming that we are proceeding to seek high level approval and instructing the Embassy to begin working out practical details with the Chinese.

--Cable to AIT Taipei instructing AIT Director Lilley to brief CCK confidentially on the likelihood of a communique, and its contents, providing appropriate reassurances on the President's behalf and indicating that we will provide further advance notice before a final document is issued.

--Monday morning: Assistant Secretary Holdridge will go over the final communique text with the SFRC in Executive Session. The briefing is scheduled for 10 a.m. If we have reached agreement with the Chinese on an ad referendum text, he will tell the Senators that he is presenting an agreed text to which the President has not yet given his final approval, and he will go over the text with them paragraph by paragraph. He will also promise to report their views on the text to the President, for the President's consideration before the

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President makes his final decision. (Since this session is already scheduled, if ad referendum agreement has still not been reached, he will go over the existing draft, noting those portions that we consider agreed upon and outlining the remaining sticking points. This will set the stage for a final round of consultations, once agreement is reached, before the communique is issued.) Prior to the briefing, the Department will provide a separate briefing to Senator Goldwater. Holdridge will also be briefing Chairman Zablocki and Congressmen Broomfield, Solarz and Pritchard during the day. (We assume their reaction will be favorable.)

--Cable advance text of communique to Lilley and our planned Presidential statement, if approved by the President, so that these will be in place for quick use once the President gives final approval.

--Early Monday afternoon: Memorandum to the President reporting Congressional comments and giving the recommendation of the Secretary on a final decision.

--Monday afternoon/evening: Assuming Presidential approval, a cable to Hummel instructing him to confirm US agreement to the Chinese and--assuming final agreement on their side as well--instructing him to make confirmed arrangements for release.

--Cable to AIT Taipei instructing Lilley to inform CCK ASAP of the anticipated release time and to deliver the final text.

--Calls to key members of Congress informing them of the President's decision and intention to release the communique on the following morning. We would ask the Secretary to telephone Baker, Byrd, O'Neil, Michel, and Wright. Powell Moore will call on Goldwater as well as talk with Stevens, Thurmond, Kasten, Inouye, Laxalt, Jackson, Stennis, Tower, Lott, Kemp, Long, Price, and Dickinson (Ala.).

--Calls to former Secretaries of State by Secretary Shultz telling them a communique will be issued and eliciting their support. Consideration also should be given to calling former Presidents.

--Early Tuesday morning (i.e. 1 a.m.). Cable to Allies and interested friends (e.g. ASEAN), notifying them confidentially of our plans to issue the communique and providing appropriate background information.

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--Tuesday, 6:40 a.m. White House issues an advance text of the communique and Presidential statement (included in our contingency package which went over to the White House today), embargoed for release at 7:00 a.m. This assures that they make the morning news programs.

--Tuesday, 10 a.m. Assistant Secretary Holdridge will give a background news briefing at the Department.

--Tuesday, noon briefings. Department (and perhaps White House) spokesmen respond to questions only in general terms, stressing President's statements regarding importance of good US-PRC relations and continuation of unofficial relations with Taipei. This gives TV media visual opportunities for their stories. However, the spokesmen will not go beyond generalities and will indicate that the details have been thoroughly covered in Holdridge's backgrounder.

--Tuesday afternoon. Assistant Secretary Holdridge will brief Embassy representatives of allies and interested friendly governments.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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ATTACHMENT

Draft Presidential Statement in Event of Communique

The US-China Joint Communique issued today embodies a mutually satisfactory means of dealing with a very difficult historical issue--the question of US arms sales to Taiwan. This document preserves principles on both sides, and will promote the further development of friendly relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China. It will also contribute to the further reduction of tensions and to lasting peace in the Asia/Pacific region.

Building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. It is my earnest desire to continue to advance this important relationship, and this communique will permit us to do so.

In working toward this successful outcome, we have paid particular attention to the needs and interests of the people of Taiwan. My long-standing personal friendship and deep concern for their well-being is steadfast and unchanged. I am committed to maintaining the full range of contacts between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan--cultural, commercial and people-to-people contacts--which are compatible with our *continuing* unofficial relationship. Such contacts will continue to grow and prosper, and will be conducted with the dignity and honor befitting old friends.

Regarding future US arms sales to Taiwan, the provisions of the new communique are clear; so is the policy we shall seek to carry out. We fully expect that the approach of the Chinese government to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful. US policy has been consistent in this regard. The Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan on this matter. The sole abiding US interest and concern is that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waver from this position.

Cont to provide arms for defense purposes [as provided in TRA]

I am particularly proud, as an American, at the great progress that has been made by the people on Taiwan, over the past three decades, and of the American contribution to that process. I have full faith in the continuation of that process. My Administration, acting through appropriate channels, will continue strongly to foster that development and to contribute to a strong and healthy investment climate.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By 101 NARA, Date 12/29/06

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