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22

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31592	LETTER	JIMMY CARTER THROUGH HAIG FOR THE PRESIDENT R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1	2	9/9/1981	B1
31605	MEMO	HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1	2	10/28/1981	B1
31606	MEMCON	HAIG'S MEETING WITH HUANG HUA 10/23/81 R 12/18/2007 NLRRF2002-019/1	4	ND	B1
31608	MEMO	JAMES NANCE THROUGH MEESE TO THE PRESIDENT PAR 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: PAR 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	12/17/1981	B1 B3
31610	REPORT	RE CHINA'S POSITION... D 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	5	12/14/1981	B1 B3

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
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SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Subject: Memo from President Carter on China

Former President Carter had the attached memorandum delivered by hand to me September 15. As you will see, it is clearly not an insignificant memo. Indeed, it has been very artfully crafted and is therefore as interesting from a domestic, as it is from an international, point of view.

Attachment:

As stated.

RDS-3 9/18/01

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

NOT NARA, Date 12/29/06

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLRR FOZ-019/1 #31592

BY CU NARADATE 12/18/07



EYES ONLY

JIMMY CARTER

9 September 1981

Memo to Secretary Haig, for delivery to President Reagan

Having just returned from a very enjoyable and informative visit to China and Japan I believe it may be appropriate to relay to you a few brief impressions of China and its leaders. In the absence of an Ambassador in Beijing, I invited our Charge to attend most of my more formal meetings with Premier Zhao Ziyang, Chairman Hu Yaobang, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Trade Minister Bo Yibo and others and suggested that a memorandum of these conversations be forwarded to Secretary of State Haig. I will not attempt to repeat what has already been reported through this means, but would like to add a few comments which may be of interest.

Both Deng and Zhao considered Secretary Haig's visit to be very helpful and satisfactory in every way. There is no doubt that he was able to allay most of their concerns about the future of Sino-American relations. At every opportunity I emphasized the bipartisan nature of our policy toward China.

I was especially impressed at the vehemence with which all the Chinese leaders expressed deep interest in continuing the progress of our friendship but at the same time emphasized that it really depends on how we address the Taiwan issue. For us to sell the province of Taiwan more formidable or advanced weapons than we offer to the leaders of China would be a serious blow to them and to a burgeoning relationship between our two countries. They pointed out that a substantial portion of the military threat against Taiwan has been removed during the last three years, that efforts are being continued to resolve the differences with Taiwan amicably and with patience, and that the United States should not interfere in this progress. I pointed out to Premier Zhao that we had not promised to cease all military sales any time in the near future, but that we had promised to be prudent and that any such sales would include weapons which were defensive in nature and could not be used offensively against the mainland. I might add that neither Deng Xiaoping nor any of the other Chinese leaders have ever agreed that we should sell any weapons at all to Taiwan. I cannot overemphasize how adamant and forceful they were on this point.

I was very pleased to meet with both Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. I am sure that you will find the new Premier highly competent, calm and forceful, knowledgeable about domestic and world affairs, sure of his own position, very frank and self assured, and friendly toward the United States. From my own limited observation of just a few hours, I found him to be one of the most impressive world leaders I have met. When I discussed with him my prospective meeting with Chairman Hu Yaobang, he smiled and said, "He is small in stature, but his spirit soars."



JIMMY CARTER

As you may know, the new Chairman has met with very few foreign leaders and almost never with Westerners. At first he was somewhat ill at ease, perhaps because of relative unfamiliarity with foreign matters, but soon relaxed and became quite eloquent as we turned the conversation to domestic and party affairs in China. Here he is an expert, and was remarkably frank in discussing his own background, the structure of the Party he leads, his relationship with Deng, plans for the future, some problems with budget restraints (this sounded familiar to me), and some of the interrelationships between China's government leaders and party leaders. He is tiny in stature, even smaller than Deng Xiaoping, but very expressive and exuberant when discussing a subject of interest to him. Other Chinese confirmed my impression that he has an extensive political following throughout China, and was not chosen to this very important post just as a favor to Deng.

I enjoyed meeting again with my friend Deng Xiaoping, who is still the most influential man in China. I advised him privately not to put the United States to a test with a long list of military items, but to decide on a few reasonable defensive weapons which they can actually afford, to conduct the negotiations in private with your administration, and if possible to express satisfaction with the ultimate results. He listened attentively, said he understood, and again told me in obvious seriousness how important the Taiwan issue is to all Chinese. [My gratuitous advice: minimize lethal weapons sales to both countries and be sure not to go further with Taiwan than with China.] It may be that anti-tank missiles (TOW or equivalent) and an equally effective anti-aircraft missile would be adequate for China. What they really need in the long run is more access to technology, including such items as miniaturized electronics circuitry. This need not be state-of-the-art advanced information, but we ought to let them approach the Soviet level of knowledge. Now they are woefully behind.

I visited everywhere I asked, with surprising freedom of movement and access to Chinese citizens at all levels. I wanted to see their most modern surface ships and an operating submarine, to visit a shipyard in Shanghai, and to observe some of their scientific research projects involving computers, high voltage, electron microscopy, etc. I also requested that an extensive press interview be telecast nationwide in its entirety and that I have a chance to meet with Christian leaders to discuss the degree of religious freedom which Deng had promised me in 1979 he would address. They complied with all my requests.

I appreciate the offer of assistance and support made to me by Secretary Haig just before my departure. This certainly helped to make my visit successful. You have my best wishes, and a standing offer to help in any way whenever you ask.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter".

MEMORANDUM

6068 addon

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/28 To J. [unclear]
1915 hrs

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Rich*

SUBJECT: Huang Hua Visit

Attached is additional information on the Huang Hua visit which was received after we had submitted the briefing papers to you. I have sent it directly to you without staffing. If we have any comments on it, I will pass them to you before your meeting.

Attachment

cc: The Vice President *via Sit Room folder*
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

*via
class*

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED JPO
OF CONFIDENTIAL

*10/28/81
12/24/81*

RECEIVED THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

81 OCT 28 P 6: 31

31605
~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

SUBJECT: The Huang Hua Visit and Arms Sales

Attached is the memorandum of my conversation with Huang Hua in Cancun, in which he conveyed the message on Taiwan arms sales which Premier Zhao did not have time to deliver to you.

Huang's demarche raised two new conditions, on which the Chinese would premise any future tolerance of US arms sales. These were:

-- that we guarantee that, within a specified time period, the quality and quantity of future sales not exceed levels reached under the Carter Administration; and that

-- we guarantee that the level of sales would decrease, year by year, until, within the same specified timeframe, all sales would cease.

I expressed concern over the uncompromising nature of this and reiterated our firm intention to continue to provide defensive items to Taiwan. I told him I would discuss his message with you and be prepared to respond this week.

We cannot accept Huang's conditions, and I will let him know this. In response, I will restate our views on the Taiwan question and the principles underlying our sale of arms to Taiwan, I will indicate that we do not plan to go beyond Carter levels (because there is no need to) and add that, so long as Beijing pursues its peaceful reunification approach, we expect Taiwan's sense of insecurity, and concomitant need for arms, to diminish over time.

In view of the need to deal with this new Chinese initiative, I do not plan to get into the specifics of the aircraft issue unless Huang raises it. I will let him know, as you authorized in California in August, that we do not contemplate reaching a final decision on this matter until after the Twelfth Party Congress early next year.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

RDS-1 10/27/01

BY DJ NARA DATE 12/18/07

NLRR FOZ-019/1 #31605

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81 OCT 28 P 6: 31

In your meeting with Huang this Thursday, I recommend that you not get into this issue at all. If Huang raises it, you can respond that you know I have discussed it with him and that you fully support the approach I have outlined to him. You should stress the importance of managing this carefully, since a confrontation would do serious harm to US and Chinese interests and benefit only the Soviets and their proxies.

Your main purpose should be to welcome Huang and express pleasure over your exchanges with Premier Zhao in Cancun. It would be useful for you to give your personal endorsement to the broad network of bilateral ties which now exist between our two nations -- trade, tourism, cultural and scientific exchanges, maritime, civil aviation and a host of others. You should also express your determination to see that your policy decisions last June -- to expand technology transfer, to make possible an arms transfer relationship, and to revise past discriminatory legislation -- are fully implemented.

You should reiterate your invitation to Premier Zhao to visit Washington, and express your interest in a visit to China the following year.

Following Huang's visit, we must in a most restricted circle lay out a firm strategy on where we go from here in light of the recent intelligence assessment of Taiwan's military requirements, the key conclusions of which have unfortunately leaked to the press.

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

31606

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang
Hua of China; Friday, October 23, 1981; 8:00 pm; Cancun, Mexico

PARTICIPANTS: Chinese

Vice Premier Huang Hua, Foreign Minister
Vice Foreign Minister Pu Shouchang, Vice Foreign Minister
Zhang Zai, Deputy Director, American and Oceanic Affairs
Mr. Yang (interpreter)

US

Secretary Haig
Michael Klosson
Vivian Chang (interpreter)

The Secretary: We are very honored and pleased to have you visit Washington so I can reciprocate your hospitality. We have three separate working sessions in the Department, all of which can be changed if you prefer. There is a working lunch I will host. I want to give you details on my talks with Gromyko, including the European situation and TNF. I have asked Under Secretary Stoessel and our European experts to lead these talks. Stoessel will be going to China in November and can bring follow-up information then. I will also have further details on several bilateral matters. It is important that we discuss the Middle East, Kampuchea, Southern Africa, Namibia and Afghanistan. Gromyko was anxious to arrive at a solution on Afghanistan which I do not trust. I am sure we will have a meeting with the President. I know the tremendous importance he places on your visit. I am still getting the details on the meeting. You will see Bill Casey on October 30th. I will have the full details on your visit for your Ambassador by Monday. You will also be meeting with Regan and Weinberger; Brock and Baldrige will be out of town during this period. The Vice President hosts a luncheon on the 29th, and I hope to host a dinner that evening. That is our general approach to your schedule. You will see every important official in town.

Huang Hua: I remember when I was in Beijing I raised ideas about the program. I think it would be better to have time for a nap on the 29th.

The Secretary: I will insist that we do not overdo your schedule like mine. I will ensure your schedule provides opportunity for rest. My schedule over the last couple of days has been like medieval torture.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDZ-019/1 #31606

BY CU NARA DATE 12/14/07

Huang Hua: Everybody is very tired, especially those coming from the Far East who had to endure a 12-hour time difference.

The Secretary: It has been terrible. As a result, when people negotiate, tempers are short and people are nervous.

Huang Hua: (Delivering prepared talking points) The day before yesterday Premier Zhao met with President Reagan and during their meeting the Premier talked about the overall world strategic picture and Sino-US relations, which are a question clearly related to the global strategic situation. China always considers and handles Sino-US relations from an overall global perspective. Zhao gave a detailed exposition of our nine-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. He emphasized this was put forward only after careful thought. In putting it forward, we not only have in mind the peaceful unification of China, but also how to serve Sino-US relations and help the strategic pattern of united struggle against hegemonism. Finally, Zhao pointed out that due to our efforts, new circumstances have emerged surrounding the Taiwan question. Now is the best time for the US to remove the danger to Sino-US relations, a danger created by US arms sales to Taiwan. Because he was pressed for time, Zhao said there were several important points he did not manage to tell the President personally. During the meeting the President and Zhao agreed that Huang would convey this to the Secretary and the Secretary was requested to pass it on to the President. The following is what Zhao would have said:

We understand that US arms sales to Taiwan are a problem left over by history and the US needs a certain amount of time to settle such a problem. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, we have been awaiting for three years a solution by the US. However, the problem remains as it used to be. The Chinese have patience. However, the Chinese cannot be expected to tolerate the present state of affairs indefinitely. If the US takes advantage of the present favorable circumstances and clearly displays its determination to remove the obstacles to Sino-US relations created by arms sales to Taiwan from a sincere wish to safeguard relations, we are prepared to give the US some more time. China will not change its position of firm opposition to the sale of any weapons to Taiwan. Any flexibility for our part can only be built on the following premises:

First, the US Government gives clear assurances that within a specified time period the level of arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed that of the Carter Administration, both in quality and quantity.

Second, the US gives clear assurances that in the same time period its arms sales will be reduced year-by-year and completely stop in the end. Then Zhao states very frankly that this is the maximum limit of tolerance we can exercise. If anything exceeds that limit, it will be unacceptable to the Chinese people. Zhao particularly wants me to point out that our position has been framed in the spirit of maintaining and promoting US-Chinese relations. We hope Reagan will completely understand and consider our position. That is what I wish to convey to you and what Zhao would have said during the meeting. I hope to get a response from your side when I visit Washington.

The Secretary: I understand completely the nature of your statement. While we will discuss it in Washington, I would like to say a few words now. First, I want you to know that this was the first time that President Reagan had heard the full nature of your peace initiative addressed to the Taiwan authorities. Since I have spoken to the President about this, I can say on his behalf that we hail your strategic decision. We welcome your declaration that peaceful reunification is now your "steadfast policy." We earnestly hope you and your Taiwan counterparts can overcome past differences and establish a climate of trust through which a peaceful resolution can be achieved. We have always considered this question a matter to be resolved by the parties concerned. Nevertheless, we are sensitive to your concerns that the US do nothing to harm the prospects for a peaceful resolution. Since the Shanghai Communique, we have supported a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.

Tonight, even before assessing the content of your statements, I can assure you we will take no steps contrary to the position I have just outlined. This will apply to all we will do, including arms and airplane sales. On that issue, our discussions have been increasingly specific since my trip to Beijing. We have listened to your concerns and believe our actions more than respond to your concerns. 1981 will show a far, far lower level of arms sales than any other year since normalization began. At the same time, we have never deviated in our discussions from the position that we feel obligated to continue the provision of defensive items to Taiwan. But we have emphasized that such sales will be selective and at all times defensive in nature.

I would be less than frank if I didn't suggest that if one side in a discussion suddenly changes the conditions of long-standing mutual understanding -- not "acceptance," or "agreement," but "understanding" -- it can pose complications. We have received repeated warnings and noted repeated discussions with other nations by our Chinese friends highlighting drastic alternatives. I would be less than frank if I did not state that this is very disturbing to me personally. I spoke with complete frankness

and candor to your Vice Foreign Minister in New York and then found him seeking an appointment with my Deputy in which greater specificity and detail were demanded. This begins to raise doubts that the underlying spirit with which I have always discussed this issue has either come into doubt or circumstances have changed which I must state frankly give me pause. I realize my old friend knows as well as I do that China is faced with internal and external problems. We, too, are faced with similar problems. We have achieved the level of mutual benefit we enjoy today by always maintaining the spirit of mutual respect for each other's imperatives. I say that because I have found each discussion we have had in the short six months has been increasingly strident and uncompromising. This is a source of personal concern for me.

I will discuss this message, which I would call a demarche, very carefully with the President. Only the President and I are familiar with the discussions we have had up until now. And I will be prepared at the time of your visit to address specific points you have raised, to include precise delineation of our current plans carefully worked out in line with my discussions in Beijing and with your Vice Foreign Minister.

Huang Hua: I thank you for agreeing to convey Premier Zhao's message to the President. I think this issue is by no means a new issue to the American side nor should it be surprising. It is entirely normal and logical. Since the negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations, we have always been explicit in our position: we are firmly opposed to any US arms sales to the Taiwan authorities. This represents interference in Chinese internal affairs and is tantamount to an extension of the US/Taiwan Mutual Defense Pact. During the course of the negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the US said it would suspend its arms sales to Taiwan in 1979 and resume sales in 1980. Then Premier Deng Xiaoping pointed out on the spot, "Is the normalization of US/China relations then valid for just one year?" Then, Deng stated that the question of US arms sales to Taiwan needs to be discussed on a continued basis and settled after establishment of diplomatic relations. Thus, I think the Chinese Government has been consistent in its position. We have not changed our position. Since we are going to have detailed discussions in Washington, we should perhaps conclude now.

The Secretary: We will be prepared to discuss frankly and fully in the same spirit we have always conducted our discussions. I am very much looking forward to your visit. I am sure it will be a good and rewarding visit.

Huang Hua: I hope the visit will yield results.

IMPRESSIONS OF CHINA

September-October 1981

TO: The President
FROM: Douglas Morrow

November 30, 1981

I'm certain that you have been kept fully informed by those more expert than I,- State, NSC, Ambassador Hummell, etc. But, for whatever it may be worth, herewith some impressions. I'll start with some condensed versions of exchanges I had on subjects which the Chinese initiated and seemed eager to discuss.

These exchanges were with:

Xie Li, Secretary-General, in Beijing
Wang Chuliang, Deputy Secretary-General, in Beijing
Xu Xinxi, Chief of the North American Division, in Beijing & throughout China
Gu Yiren, North America Division staff, Beijing
Zhao Yujiang, " " " " "
Xin Yu, Vice-Director, Foreign Affairs Office, Chongqing
Zhang Dong Hui, Foreign Affairs Office, Chongqing
Bai Yufong, Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Office, Shaansi Province
Liu Lienlian, Foreign Affairs Office, Shaansi Province
He Kejing, Deputy Chief of Reception, Shaansi Province
Wang Liang, Director of Foreign Affairs, Jiangsu Province
Su Gen-hua, Division Head of Reception, Foreign Affairs Office, Jiangsu
Lei Huanwen, Deputy Mayor, Wuxi
Jin Xun, Chief of Protocol, Foreign Affairs Office, Wuxi
Shen Jinzhi, Foreign Affairs Office, Wuxi
Mr. Shih, Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Office, Shanghai
Mr. Xu, Deputy Division Chief, Foreign Affairs Office, Shanghai
Mr. Xie, Foreign Affairs Office, Shanghai
Jiang Zhi Sin, Chief of Reception, Foreign Affairs Office, Quandong Province
Ho Chi Chuan, Foreign Affairs Office, Quandong Province

And various others throughout the country.

Before getting into it, I want to make clear that, meticulously and carefully, anytime I said anything beyond "hello" and goodbye" I prefaced it with, "I have nothing to do with the government, and cannot speak for it, the President, the State Department, or anybody else. I am only a private American citizen. If you are interested in my personal opinion, I'll try to answer your question. But it is only one man's opinion". They always acknowledged this disclaimer and insisted that they'd like to hear whatever I might have to say.

Throughout China, there was an almost absolute consistency in the Chinese rhetoric. Any differences were in style, not substance. Some were more deft or direct than others, but the basic positions and reactions were uniformly identical. Therefore, I will use a generic "they" in synthesizing their views and reactions.

They are preoccupied with three subjects which constantly recurred in discussion:

TAIWAN AND THE U.S. POSITION WITH RESPECT THERETO

They are absolutely obsessed about Taiwan. Claim that by reason of history, background, tradition, family, etc., Taiwan is Chinese and must rejoin the "motherland" as "one China". They gave me all the arguments and rationale with which you are familiar. They claim that reunion is the immutable wish of the Chinese people, both on the mainland and on the island. But that this inevitable reunion is being thwarted by the obdurate leaders on the island.

I expressed regret that they had this problem, but suggested that it was a "Chinese" problem which should be settled between themselves,- mainland and island.

"But," they said, "the U.S. makes a solution difficult by siding with the island."

"I don't believe we've sided with anybody," I said, "We have a long-standing friendly relationship with Taiwan, which I hope will continue. And we now have a new embryonic friendship with the mainland, which I hope will expand and strengthen. Nothing could please me more than to see the mainland and the island amicably resolve their problem."

"But that is not your government's position."

"Why do you think that?"

"Because you sell them weapons. That is not amicable to us."

I said, "It would not be amicable only if you are expecting the island to attack the mainland. Do you expect that?"

Very firmly, "That is absolutely impossible."

"I agree. Is it also impossible that the mainland would ever attack the island?"

"Ever is a very large word. But why does the President think we might?"

"I don't know whether the President thinks that or not. But many Americans might believe it to be a possibility. After all, you did lob shells into the offshore islands in the past. If something like that happened, I suspect that the sympathies of most Americans would be with the island. Perhaps that affects the government's attitude."

"But all that could easily change. All the President has to do is stop arming Taiwan."

"Not if the American people continue to have a sympathetic concern for Taiwan."

It is interesting that they pretend to believe (gamesmanship) that the President can make such decisions regardless of the sympathies of the American people. I pointed out to them that at that very moment the President was having a very difficult time with the AWACS sale. The vote then was about 57-43 against. And that unless he could persuade the people, through their elected representatives, of the desirability of this sale, there'd probably be no sale. That, I said, is how our system works.

They asked my opinion as to whether the President would succeed in his persuasion. I said that it would be close, but my guess was that the President would succeed.

A little triumphantly, and a bit naively, they said, "Why, then, can't he also persuade them that the U.S. should not sell arms to Taiwan?"

"That might be very difficult as long as there is a perceived possibility of an attack upon Taiwan. It might be easier, however, if the mainland publicly pledged that, however anxious it might be for reunion with the island, it would never use force to achieve that goal."

Shortly thereafter, Chairman Ye's 9-point proposal to Taiwan was announced and they immediately gave me an English translation with the question, "Isn't this reasonable and generous?"

I agreed that it was...as far as it went. And expressed regret that it didn't include a 10th point which unequivocally foreswore the use of force in effecting reunion. That might have had a positive influence on the American public.

They persisted in pretending (more gamesmanship) that they couldn't understand why American public opinion was hostile to them.

I said that it wasn't as much hostility to the mainland as it was sympathy for the island, a subtle but real distinction. "I have referred to the average American's concern for Taiwan. But it may surprise you to learn that the average American knows very little about Taiwan...its background, history, politics, or anything else. He hasn't the faintest idea who Chiang Ching-Kuo is, or who Chiang Kai-shek was. He is not even too sure where Taiwan is..."

They interrupted in surprise, "Then why their concern about Taiwan?"

"Because, by and large, the American people have an instinctive sympathy for the underdog, for the little fellow. Especially if they think his survival is being threatened by a big fellow. And, most particularly, if they are on friendly terms with the little fellow. They may not know much about the background and complexities involved. It is enough that they perceive 16 million people on an island being under possible threat from a billion people. In such a circumstance, predominant American public opinion, historically, is almost instinctive."

There was what I can only describe as an off-balance silence. I had the impression that they had never heard this viewpoint before. I decided to pursue it, but very affably, "In some ways, it is vaguely similar to our relationship with Israel. Again, the average American, though somewhat more knowledgeable, does not really grasp all the complexities involved in the Middle East. And, other than oil, doesn't care much. But when he sees 2½ million people trying to survive and make a life for themselves in the desert, surrounded by 70 million avowed enemies, there is an instinctive sympathy for this embattled underdog. Particularly if these people have been kicked around for centuries, climaxed by a Holocaust. It is so instinctive that you could find people in, say, Four Corners, Iowa, who have never even seen a Jew, who are supportive of Israel."

They were still so off-balance by my rationale for the American viewpoint re: Taiwan that they seemed to welcome a diversion. "That," they replied "is not a good analogy. The American position regarding Israel is dictated by the American Jewish lobby, which, you have to admit, is very powerful."

I shook my head, "It is not powerful, but it is influential. And there is a difference. Power is having the ability to do something. Influence is having an opportunity to try to persuade someone else to do something. They don't have much power, but they do have influence. And their influence is respected because they are pretty smart people. You don't actually believe, do you, that 6 million American Jews have the power to dictate policy to over 200 million non-Jews?"

"But they control the American media which gives them the power to regiment American public opinion."

I could not honestly discern whether they actually believed that the American media was controlled by Jews, or whether this was more gamesmanship.

I had a feeling they might believe this and said, "Whatever gave you the idea that Jews control the American media?"

"Because it is a fact."

"Give me an example."

I would have sworn they would come up with the N.Y. Times. But, you won't believe this, they said, "For example, the Washington Post."

I managed to keep a straight face and remarked that Katherine Graham would be surprised to learn that she was Jewish, to say nothing of Ben Bradlee. I then said, in a friendly and conciliatory manner, that because our two countries had been apart for so long it was only natural that there might be gaps and misunderstandings, on both sides in our perceptions of each other.

I then proceeded to give them a rundown on the principal American media. I named the 6 or 8 most influential American newspapers, TIME and NEWSWEEK, the wire services, and the three networks. I stated that unless a mass conversion had taken place during my absence, policy and editorial control in these diverse media was overwhelmingly in the hands of non-Jews. And I ticked off the names of the key personnel at all these various media, with particular allusion to the network news departments.

On balance, I pointed out, the effective influence of Jews upon the various significant American media is roughly in ratio to their proportion of the population.

Unless they are potential Oscar winners, they seemed genuinely taken aback.

I then switched gears to get them off the hook and remarked that the supportive attitude toward Israel continues despite Begin's often obdurate and sometimes inexplicable behavior.

They jumped at this and expressed amazement that America would countenance this, particularly when continued support of Israel jeopardized America's relations with the Arabs, particularly with respect to needed oil.

That, I said, simply emphasizes the extent of the American sympathetic instinct for an embattled underdog. I suggested that this sympathy might not be as broad if Israel had a population of, say, 50 million. We might not be as patient with some of Begin's inflexibility. But, under the circumstances, our level of tolerance is pretty high.

They regained their balance and challenged me with this, "If the American instinct for the underdog is so strong, why didn't you support us in the forties when we were in conflict with the Nationalists? We were the underdogs then."

"You were also communist. And in that early stage of the Cold War there was automatic antipathy to anything communist. It represented unwelcome intrusion into the affairs of others. Aggressive expansion. Subversion. Etc. Little or no distinction was made between Soviet communism and Chinese communism."

"But there is a distinction. We, too, deplore Soviet hegemony. We are at odds with them on that. And we have not engaged in hegemonism."

"On the whole, that seems to be true, so far. And the distinction you make may be one of the reasons for the renewal of our relationship. With time, conditions and positions change. After all, in the past, you managed two reconciliations with the Nationalists. True, they didn't last. But I am confident that time and changing conditions will resolve your problem with Taiwan through a third and, hopefully, final reconciliation."

"How long are we expected to wait?"

"Until a peaceful reunion with the island would be in the best interests of both you and the island."

"That is the situation now."

"Perhaps not. You acknowledge that your standard of living is significantly lower than that of the island. If, somehow, reunion were effected tomorrow, you might be opening a terrible can of worms. Is it not possible that your people might grow increasingly restive as they learn more and more of the wide gap between their conditions and those on the island? You are making slow but steady progress in providing better conditions for your people. Would you not be well advised to concentrate on that? To devote yourself to raising your standard of living until it reaches a point where your people would not be confronted with such a gap and possibly become dissatisfied? And the Taiwanese would not fear that a reunion would threaten their standards?"

I then expressed the hope that nothing I had said, as a personal opinion, had been offensive.

They smiled and said, "Not at all. It has been a friendly, enlightening and entertaining discussion. We hope you will return soon again for more valuable exchanges."

"I hope it will be possible, and look forward to it."

I thought that was a gracious windup to the discussion. But they initiated an amusing epilogue. The mao tai was raised and they said, smiling, "Perhaps you'll return as Vice-President..."

I frowned and groaned, "I thought we were having an amiable discussion aimed at better understanding and friendship. I feel friendly, but apparently you don't."

Surprise and shock. "My intention was very friendly."

I shook my head, "Anybody who would wish elective office on me is no friend. I'd rather do a term in a state penitentiary..." Laughter. "...why would you wish that on me?"

"Because you have a big muscle in your head."

I took my head in my hands and moaned, "Now you've turned on me again."

"But that was meant as a compliment."

"Perhaps. But couldn't you have said, at least, a "small brain" instead of a big muscle?"

Much laughter. "You have a delightful humor. Apparently, so does your President. Did you get it from him, or did he get it from you?"

"Neither. We both have spent most of our lives in Southern California breathing very "funny" Los Angeles air."

You never heard such yocks. Apparently, our smog is as well known around the world as Coca-Cola!

In summary, I sensed an underlying and troubling (to the Chinese) ambivalence in the Chinese posture re: Taiwan. They are almost as obsessed with their desire for extended U.S. friendship and technical assistance. And I got the feeling that they suspect their preoccupation with Taiwan might affect the development of their relationship with the U.S. When we were discussing the idea of an attack upon Taiwan, I remarked that the whole discussion was probably academic. I commented that the Chinese were too wise and too patient to allow their preoccupation with 16 million islanders prejudice the emergence and progress of 1 billion mainlanders. Of course, I did not mention the U.S. But I believe they are conscious of this. And I have a gut feeling that they dread the possibility of having, at some point, to make a choice between maintaining an expanding relationship with the U.S. and the regaining of Taiwan.

I also have a hunch that, were it not for their renewed relationship with the U.S. and their desire for its expansion, the possibility of a move upon Taiwan would be very real...if, as, and when they had accumulated the wherewithal to mount such a move.

NEED AND DESIRE FOR U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE

The phrase they use is "mutual cooperation". And they are almost as obsessed with this as Taiwan.

I got the impression that the "technology" they need and want is, at this time, not necessarily at the state-of-the-art sophisticated level. The expertise they most immediately need seems to be managerial. To a great extent, they suffer from the inevitable inefficiency and clumsiness of bureaucratic supervision, at both the central state and local project levels. As a result, the country abounds in paradoxes.

Example: One of their largest refineries. On the bank of the Yangtse River. Initial construction in mid-fifties. Initial capacity about one million tons annually. Original equipment still in operation. By our standards, pretty Rube Goldberg. Later expanded to 3 million tons. Slightly better technology. Few years ago expanded to 6 million tons. Still not comparable to ours, but they make it work. Totally Chinese designed, engineered, built and operated.

Until recently, the crude was transported from a field about 300 miles away by ocean-capable tankers, 50-75 thousand tons capacity vessels. Then they built a pipeline from the field to a terminus across the river from the refinery. Pretty impressive achievement, right?

Not quite. They are bringing the oil across the river, about a mile, in these relatively large tankers! There were three at dock when I was there. And I believe there are three more. You can imagine the awkwardness and expense of maneuvering ocean-capable tankers back and forth across a mile of river.

When I inquired why they didn't extend the pipeline across the river or use less expensive and more maneuverable tug-propelled barges, the director of the plant, a little sheepishly, said that the petroleum ministry didn't want the tankers lying idle. I asked if there might be other enterprises,- grain, textiles, machinery, etc.,- which could use these bottoms for coastal or export movement.

"That's possible," he acknowledged, "but these vessels come under the petroleum division."

Bureaucracy is bureaucracy is bureaucracy.

Example: A truck engine plant. Early industrial revolution. Badly lighted and ventilated buildings, poorly maintained. They assemble the engines (not on a line) from some components they manufacture and, mostly, components brought in from other plants around the country. Of course, we do this also. But we have excellent transport. Theirs is barely 20th century. No highways as we know them. No large trucks or trailer-rigs as we know them. And a railroad system that is limited and still in transition from steam engines. So production flow, slow at best, is dependent on consistency of supply of components from other plants and reliability of delivery. If either one fouls up, things grind to a halt. They had little or no capacity for storage to stock-pile components.

We visited a variety of manufacturing facilities,- heavy, medium and light industry,- and everywhere there is an archaic feeling. The work gets done by sheer mass of plentiful dogged labor. But the various facets of planning, production and distribution reflect a lack of imaginative and expert managerial capability.

They are quite candid in admitting their weakness at the higher planning and managerial levels. And your mouth waters at the potential mutual benefits to be gained if we supplied that expertise in some sort of joint venture arrangement. But, at the present time, as much as they want and need that from us, there are several factors working against any easily arrived at accommodation.

First, their basic ideological dilemma. How do they justify adapting key elements of their communist system to capitalist management techniques?

Second, even if they could rationalize that, there is strong resistance at the various bureaucratic levels which presently dominate management. They want to protect their turf.

And third, even if the above two factors could be overcome, negotiating such arrangements with them would be very difficult and aggravating. Even in areas where they have had some experience, they are very tedious and wary bargainers. Hard to pin down unless and until, after exhaustive back-and-forthing, they believe they have squeezed out the best bargain possible. You can imagine what it would be like negotiating in an area where their experience and awareness is very limited.

Notwithstanding all of the above, there are visible indications that their approach to industrial development and modernization is undergoing significant change. I'll touch on this later. And also suggest why, however difficult it may presently be, we should pursue various business arrangements with them.

THE SOVIET UNION

This is their third major obsession. And there is an uneasy underlying ambivalence. There are several areas in which they are very critical of the Soviets. But their rhetoric is somewhat muted because, uncomfortably, they realize that they are talking about another major communist state. And their analysis becomes quite convoluted in their effort to dissociate Soviet "communism" from their version. To give the impression that their's is the real thing and the Soviet's an aberration.

They point proudly, and to a great extent deservedly, to their accomplishments on behalf of their people. They feel that in 22 years, deducting the 10 year Cultural Revolution, they have made more "people progress" than the Russians have in 67 years. They attribute this to their emphasis on investment for people rather than for the military. They heatedly condemn Soviet "hegemony" because it threatens Soviet neighbors and the rest of the world and, concurrently, deprives their own people.

With casual humor, I suggested that this was the basis for the long-standing American aversion to communism. I joked that "we were critical of the Soviets before you were."

A bit uneasily, they attempt to distinguish between their communism and that of the Soviets, "We are different. We reject hegemony."

"Now," I said, "But what about later? When you have brought your people to an acceptable standard of living? When you have modernized your technology and economy? When you have developed a modern military capability? What then?"

They shrug, "Why would hegemony interest us? What do our neighbors have that we need or want? People? We have enough. Territory? We have enough. Raw materials and resources? We have enough. We are only interested in what will benefit the Chinese people. Imitating Soviet hegemony is not in our best interest."

I nodded and said, "I understand." But I refrained from saying that I would not want to bet my life on it. "After all, in recent years most of your reforms and changes, both in agriculture and industry, however first-stage and experimental, seem to be borrowed more from our system than from the Soviets."

They smile and say, "We have much to learn from you."

Almost casually, when discussing the Soviets, they suggest that a Soviet attack upon them is, at some point, a real possibility. And then, casually and confidently, they add, "Of course, we are not afraid of that."

"Why not?"

Very matter-of-factly, "Because of the Chinese people."

They pretend to believe that they could hold off the Soviets by sheer numbers.

Their posture on this subject is so casual and matter-of-fact that it leads me to believe that they are a hell of a lot more concerned about it than they want to reveal.

SHANGHAI

I make special reference to Shanghai not because of its failure but because of its success and, paradoxically, because its success illustrates the underlying Chinese planning and managerial ineptness.

Shanghai is the largest city in China. And in a country of 1 billion people, this city with a population of about 11½ million people accounts for 1/8th of China's total industrial output, 1/6th of China's gross revenue, and 1/4 of China's total exports!!!

Although this may reflect favorably on the industriousness of this very busy city, this colossal imbalance is but another example of inexpert planning. When the tail wags such an enormous dog, obviously something is fundamentally wrong.

It is almost a catch-22 situation, graphically illustrated by the Baoshan Steel Mill disaster. The project, initiated in 1977, was designed to build one of the most modern mills in the world. It was located on the Yangtze, on the outskirts of Shanghai despite the fact that the land is marshy and won't hold steel pilings, despite the fact that a sandbar at the mouth of the Yangtze prevents passage by loaded bulk carriers, and despite a variety of other major problems too numerous and complicated to go into here.

Why did they pick this location? Because there is an abnormal concentration of skilled labor in the area, and because there is an abnormal concentration of markets for its products in the area. So the imbalance of Shanghai vis-a-vis the rest of the country compounds itself.

The basic technology and equipment for this project was to be provided by Japan, with major sub-contracting by West Germany and the U.S. It was to initiate production, 6 million tons a year, in 1981, aimed at 60 million tons a year by 1985. The initial stage is less than half completed and almost at a halt. The most optimistic projections place initial production at least four years away, if ever. The second stage has been indefinitely postponed. They would like to just walk away from the whole thing, but there are too many billions of dollars already invested that they are trying to salvage.

Aside from the initial Japanese technology and equipment, I understand that most of the other foreign contracts have been cancelled.

There is a lot more to this whole situation, but the above should at least give you an idea.

THE PEOPLE

Approximately 850 million peasants, and 150 million urban and non-agricultural.

By and large, they may be the best-conditioned people I've ever seen. Both male and female. Lean and strong. A minimum of flab, and not a pot-belly to be seen. Reasons:

Constant physical exercise, aside from work. Bicycles are the principal means of transportation, and long distances. In mountain cities, like Chongqing, no bicycles. Too hilly. They walk, long distances. Up and down hills, often carrying very heavy loads. It is common to see a 100 pound lady, long pole across

her shoulders, carrying at least her own weight, quick-stepping up or down a long hill. In the cities, they are big on informal calisthenics. You can see them on rooftops, at dawn, doing their exercises. Even on the boat, each day at dawn, even old ladies were out on the deck, twisting and bending.

The diet. Very few fats. Much vegetables and fruits. Lean meats, fowl and fish. Greaseless cooking. And, as I will touch on later, there is a surprising abundance of food. This is a well-nourished people.

Except in remote areas, it is, as you might expect, teeming with people. But as much as you expect it, you don't really grasp it until you see it. And even then it is almost unreal. Streets crammed with tens of thousands of bicycle riders, pedestrians and buses stuffed with bodies. This congestion of people is compounded by a fact that few foreigners fully understand. The Soviet Union, with its much smaller population, is approximately twice as large as China, which is approximately the same size as the U.S. But about 95% of the population is crammed into the eastern half of the country. It is almost as if we had 900 million people east of the Mississippi.

Once you have adjusted to these hordes, you are forcefully impressed by their demeanor, attitude, mien. Their expressions do not reflect stress or tension. Brows unfurrowed. Even carrying heavy loads or other difficult physical circumstances, they seem benign and serene. You wonder if it might be simply weary and resigned acceptance of their lot in life. Or, perhaps, Oriental inscrutability.

But it is neither. As hard and sparse as their standard of living is, it is dramatically (to them) better than it was pre-1949, and especially since the end of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-seventies. They seem to feel that they are, at long last, on the road to joining the rest of the developed world in the 20th century. And, although they are still in a very early stage, this perception of being on the way sustains them, and they patiently put up with whatever they have to put up with. It is all in startling contrast with the tense, stressful, almost neurotic expressions and attitudes which are so common on the main drags of any American city, or most developed western countries. Even Hong Kong. Amazing thing. Many Hong Kong Chinese visit the PRC. Even aside from their attire, you can pick them out of a crowd of Chinese immediately. Their expressions are about as benign and their demeanor as unstressful as a used car dealer or a Hollywood agent. There is an almost indigenous tension.

But not the Chinese. Example: buses built to accommodate about 50 passengers are commonly stuffed with over a hundred people. I mean stuffed. Like sardines. Saw a fellow squeeze his way through this solid mass to get off at a stop. Asked him how often he did that. Several times a day. Pretty rough, I sympathized. He smiled, "But better than walking, or not getting there."

Example: Visited the Summer Palace on October 1st, which is their major national holiday. In addition to the palace, it is an enormous park and recreation area. They estimated that close to 1 million people would visit it on a family outing. Simply teemed with a cross-section of the populace. Many came on bicycles. Some walked. And those from far distances, very many, came in buses. Late in the day, at one of the bus stops, there was a line that must have been a quarter of a mile long. Keep in mind that this was at the end of a tiring day, and with many children. In this country there would have been pandemonium. I could only think of our "privileged" people, at Sun Valley, waiting for the ski buses back to the lodge at the end of the day and, in complete disorder, practically engaging in hand-to-hand combat to get on a bus. But this long line of Chinese waited in orderly fashion, talking and laughing about the good time they had had, the kids eating ice cream sticks, and when their time came

calmly getting on the bus with no hassle. Instead of being upset and all stressed up, they accepted this as a small price to pay for a day's recreation. Better than not getting there.

Another odd thing, which I simply can't explain. All over China we encountered thousands and thousands of babies. Little ones. In arms of parents or grandparents. (One of the major preoccupations of grandparents is to take care of grandbabies while the parents work). Margot first called this strange thing to my attention. We saw these babies on the streets, in the parks, on the boat, everywhere. And never, - I don't mean hardly ever, I mean never did we hear or see a baby cry! Even at the end of a long, tiring day they were either alertly awake or asleep in someone's arms, but never crying. I cannot even speculate on the explanation for this. Asked one of the officials why. He just shrugged and smiled, "I guess they're happy". Pretty simplistic and I'm sure there's more to it than that. But all I can say is that there is nothing wrong with these kids. They are very alert and curious about what is going on around them. And, this is the topper, they are entranced with white foreigners. You smile and wave to one of these babies and nine times out of ten he'll smile and wave back! I'm talking about babies less than a year old. Unbelievable.

One of our most meaningful experiences with the Chinese people took place on the boat. We spent several days going down the Yangtse from Chongqing to Wuhan. We were not on a boat that accommodates tourists (at my request). We were on a "native" boat, and Margot and I were the only foreigners among about 700 Chinese, who represented a cross-section of the various Chinese social and economic strata. We had two very small cabins. I won't attempt to describe them. Strictly African Queen. But that was the high-rent district.

A few Chinese who could afford the few yuan, bunked four together in a cabin that would be cramped for one. Most were in long cabins, about 6 feet wide that contained 12 double bunks, all crammed together. 24 people, men, women, and children, and some live chickens! Incredible. Made the Mayflower look like the Queen Mary. And a large percentage of the passengers, who couldn't afford these elegant accommodations, simply came aboard, staked out a small space in the passageways, and slept there. You stepped over and around them on your way to meals. Sounds awful, right?

Wrong. Wouldn't have missed it for anything. Because of the people. Not a hint of a hassle of any kind. Quiet, well-behaved and serene. You'd think there'd have been a hell of a ruckus at the few wash basins and WCs. Nope. Everybody got along just fine.

And particularly with us. As in the rest of China, you think at first that they might be hostile or at least neutral, because their expressions are impassive and their manner reserved. Not at all. It is, I imagine, simply shyness. Particularly with Americans, who represent fantasy to them. All you have to do is nod or smile, and they light up. And they are delighted if you talk to them and show an interest in them. We did, and were rewarded with extraordinary politeness and solicitude, and abundant manifestations of what I can only describe as affection. On the last day, out of the blue and spontaneously, we were given some personal trinkets as remembrances of our trip together.

I can only put it this way: If a total stranger was dropped in the middle of these people, knowing nothing of their background, history or system, his immediate impression would be - "A contented people".

On the Yangtse, two paradoxes worth noting. Between Chongqing and Wuhan, you go through some very wild and primitive mountains, particularly through the Three Gorges. Scattered throughout this desolate area are "houses" that can only be described as hovels, lower-scale 18th century. They are perched on the side of these steep mountains. Somehow, they manage to cultivate these precipitous slopes. Some of these "farms" are damn near vertical. Interestingly, these most primitive and isolated houses, hardly more than roofed sheds, have electricity. You can follow the power poles for miles along the river or through the mountains, leading to a single, small house, with a bulb hanging inside from the ceiling. They are pretty proud of this "progress".

After the river comes out of the mountains, and you are still digesting the primitiveness of what you've observed, the river widens dramatically, perhaps a mile or mile and a half across, and you come upon the damndest dam (how do you like that choice of words?) you ever saw. Not a high dam, (Coulee, Boulder, etc.) but a long, medium high, heavily massed, sturdy structure stretching across this wide expanse of river to control lower river flooding and generate electricity. There is a quite large lock, which we went through with three other boats, and dropped about 75 feet to the lower river. In the context of everything else in the country it is a quite stunning achievement. And it was conceived, designed and constructed entirely by the Chinese without, they assured me, any foreign assistance.

At Nanjing, another paradox. The river is about 1600 meters wide. But the eye-popping bridge, recently constructed, is about 4600 meters long. You wonder why the broad on-ramps at each end are so long and straight. Until it is explained that the approaches were constructed long and gradual to accommodate, in addition to trucks and buses, the tens (perhaps hundreds) of thousands of bicycles, many heavily loaded, which are pedaled across each day. Interesting. Modern technology and construction expensively modified to conform to primitive transportation.

THE PEASANTS

About 85% of the population, they have benefited most in recent years.

A 3-tier system, which is a bit complicated. But, in brief, this is roughly how it works:

The state sets production quotas for the state-controlled communal acreage. Quota is deliberately set at modest level to encourage over-quota production. About 45% of over-quota production retained by the commune for benefit of the communal members,- supplies, machinery, health care, child care, etc., including cash bonuses.

In addition, each family is allowed private acreage and any other "sideline" enterprise they are able to perform,- carpentry, seamstress, fishing, repair work, whatever. They can farm the private plots, or manufacture things, as they see fit.

Whatever they raise or manufacture is brought by the peasants into the nearest town or city where areas have been allocated for them to "free market" their produce or goods without any state control or involvement.

This system was inaugurated in 1978 and there are presently about 40,000 "free markets" throughout China. And the number is constantly growing. As a result, the incomes of peasant families have risen, by Chinese standards, astronomically.

The wage scale generally in China runs from about \$18 to \$50 a month. But with these "free enterprise" incentives, many industrious peasant families are now generating incomes in the range of \$1500 to as high as \$4000 annually. Such figures would have been sheer lunatic fantasy even five years ago.

This is not yet true all over China. But it is quite common and spreading rapidly.

What has been happening in recent years is simply this: The Chinese have consciously, though primitively, borrowed from "capitalism" to stimulate incentive and entrepreneurial ingenuity.

When I good-humoredly teased them about dipping into the "capitalist" bag of tricks, they reacted in similar good humor and said, "We have much to learn from you," and then they added, "Much of what we copied from the Soviets did not work." Astonishing admission.

They now encourage peasants to save from their greatly increased incomes and buy their own houses. Many are doing so. The homes, when bought, are owned free and clear, and are inheritable.

In one commune we visited, a man and wife with two married sons had just completed the purchase of the third of three adjoining small houses. They all pitched in the past few years, pooled their bonuses and sideline income and were able to make these purchases. Total cost of the three homes, about \$4500.

THE NON-PEASANTS & INDUSTRIAL REFORM

Although only about 15% of the population, this still means about 150 million people. Their income and standard of living is not as good as the peasants. Particularly those in "service" work. "Sideline" enterprises are not as accessible to them as to the peasants.

But those working in light, medium and heavy industry are beginning to do a little better by reason of a still-fuzzy capitalist "tilt" that is, almost sub-consciously, influencing the Chinese industrial system.

Under this still-early-stage reformation and reorganization, the companies no longer merely transmit the company's profits to the state. Instead, the state levies a tax on profits and the company retains the balance. So there is, in this communist country, a growing preoccupation with "profit".

Previous to this reform, when all "profits" went to the state, there was no incentive to produce anything beyond the state quota.

Under the reformed system, the workers are motivated to produce more, the sales forces are motivated to sell more, and management is motivated to try to control costs and upgrade efficiency. Reason: they keep about 1/3 of increased gross profits (after taxes), perhaps 1/2 of the savings from increased efficient production, and practically all of what is saved from unneeded working capital.

All of these new retained funds go toward expanding production, workers' benefits (child and health care, new housing, recreation facilities, reduced cost in company stores, etc.), plus monthly bonuses to the workers.

Under this new system, as the company retains more profits and the workers receive more benefits and higher bonuses, the state is also receiving

more in taxes than it received previously when it got everything off the top. Beginning to sound familiar?

The initial success of this reformation has motivated the state to apply these reforms to some 400,000 enterprises throughout China.

In essence, the plan is to decentralize industry and grant increasing control and autonomy to local companies. And, in an effort to get more efficiency and get industry out from under state bureaucracy, they are actually combining small companies into large corporations, - like some of our conglomerates!

This is an on-going experiment. But two things are keeping it from moving at a faster pace.

First is the scarcity of modern management personnel. They are keenly aware of this and are working on it, training younger executives.

Second is, understandably, the resistance of certain entrenched government bureaus that see their "turf" being whittled away. (And doesn't that sound familiar?) This seems to be particularly true of the petroleum bureaus.

In the approximately 10,000 major businesses that have come under these reforms so far, they give the company almost total control in basing production on demand, profits on production, and pay on profits. Previously, this simply did not exist. Production was based on a centrally (state) devised plan, regardless of demand. All profits went to the state. So nobody in the local enterprise, especially the workers, gave a damn whether a profit was made or not.

They tell you candidly that they borrowed the previous system from the Soviets, not realizing that it really wasn't working there. And that, unlike the Soviets, when they saw it wasn't working in China, particularly after the Cultural Revolution, they didn't hesitate to try to reform it.

All this is not to suggest that, in the short term, China will become a vast Hong Kong, Taipei or Singapore. It is going to be a long tedious process, if it continues. Nor is it suggested that China, in the long term, will become a "capitalist" country, commercially and economically. Not likely.

But I have a hunch we may be seeing the beginning of a strange trend for a communist country. It is, perhaps, possible that somewhere down the road, as younger, educated and modernly trained generations move up, we may see a country that retains its communist dogma, politically and sociologically, but gradually moves into a quasi-capitalist mode in its economy and world trade.

There are still many bugs to be cured, such as a centrally-fixed pricing system, but they are conscious of the bugs and seem determined to iron them out. Constantly, in discussions, you hear "profits", "decentralization", "incentives", etc. Even the government-encouraged "free market" is a euphemism for a rudimentary "free enterprise". Where there is so much rhetorical smoke.....

YOUNG PEOPLE

During the anarchic nihilism of the Cultural Revolution, education at all levels was practically abandoned. Schools and universities were, to a great extent, shut down. Education, rules, discipline, even what we'd call law and order, were deemed bourgeois ploys to control the proletariat. Since the Cultural Revolution, they have embarked on a very impressive educational resurgence.

English, by the way, is widely taught as a routine matter.

Visited kindergartens, lower, middle and higher grades. One of the most significant experiences we had. Particularly at the lower levels.

These kids are not to be believed. Neatly, even colorfully, dressed. Utterly well-behaved in their classroom decorum. Alertly attentive and interested. Hands clasped. Then raised in response to questions. Stand erect to answer. No idle chatter or squirming. The bell rings. They stand in their aisles and file out in silent, orderly fashion. You begin to suspect they are robots. And then they hit the corridor or playground and you never heard such laughing, chatter and high spirits. And they love school.

It was really something to see, in a science class, 8 year olds making rudimentary radios from scratch. 10 year olds in a music class gave a smashing performance. Some little kids, not over 8, put on a play for us in perfect, unaccented English. And in math class they lost me. Some 8 year olds in an art class, spontaneously in our presence and in about 15 minutes, did some paintings that are so remarkable we are having them framed.

In some places we visited foreigners, particularly Americans, were completely strange to them. They clustered around, eager to try their English. But so polite and well-mannered. I am ashamed to think that I would have trouble showing a visiting Chinese anything quite comparable.

These kids were extraordinary. And in 10 years or so, China will have a great natural resource and national asset in them. At present, there is still something of a gap caused by the klutzy non-entities who emerged from the Cultural Revolution.

STORES AND SHOPS

Throughout the country,- large and small cities, villages, etc.,- you are astonished by the volume and even variety of the available goods and food-stuffs. Again, not necessarily by our standards. But when you know of the empty shelves in the shops of Moscow, Warsaw, etc., and the long lines for the few things that are available, the stores and shops of China are astounding.

Between the free-markets and state-shops, food is abundant and varied. Funny incident. Were in a downtown area with some government officials at midday, intending to return to the hotel for lunch. I suggested that we save time and eat around there. I pointed to a small native eating shop.

They said, "All right. But not there. That's a state store." They pointed to another place, "That's a free-market place. Better to eat there."

"Why?"

"Better products. Cooked more carefully. And they'll be more anxious to please the customer because they own the business. State-shop workers on fixed wages don't care as much." Interesting?

The department stores are open day and night. An abundant supply of necessities and wide-ranging incidentals. Clothing, textiles, watches, sewing machines, radios, thermos jugs, bicycles, etc., and a surprising display of what are to them luxuries,- TVs, stereos, etc. Much traffic in the stores. Not just gawking. Much buying. The prices for necessities are very low. As

is witnessed by the fact that a large percentage of the populace has achieved what was unattainable just a few years ago,- a watch, bicycle, sewing machine, radio. And now, out of free-market income and bonuses, they are able to save for luxuries like TV, stereo, calculators, desk lamps, fans, etc. In some cities, one in 2, 3, or 4 families now have TV. Incidentally, in every city there are two channels,- one centrally transmitted from Beijing, and one locally from the city.

Refrigerators still almost unknown. Except in "better" hotels and restaurants. So the people can't store perishables. They buy and consume them daily. Washing and drying machines practically non-existent. So you see laundry hanging everywhere. Literally, in every window, all the time.

Incidentally, many necessary utensils,- china, pottery, etc.,- are sold at or below actual cost. Two-tier pricing. At or below cost for domestic purchase. Profitably priced for export, at a level to compensate for non-profitable domestic purchase. This isn't true of everything, but fairly common.

CONSTRUCTION

At no place, at any time, even in Europe after World War II, have I ever seen so much ongoing construction. Within cities, on the outskirts, in the countryside. Everywhere. Mind-boggling.

It is predominantly residential. And most of it is high-rise apartments. Seldom under 6 stories, often 8-10 stories, occasionally higher. Very small units, 200-300 sq. feet common. Except for the highest structures, many have no elevators. Some have elevator wells, but no elevators installed. "That will come later, when we have made more progress. Now, we must concentrate on living space, on essentials."

Each small apartment usually has a small balcony. But not for plants or sunning. It is a necessity...for hanging laundry. A block-long 10 story apartment building with laundry hanging from every balcony is a sight to behold. And you see it everywhere, as the buildings rise up like mushrooms.

You've seen "projects" in this country. They pale beside some of these. There was a stupefying development on an area larger than Century City on the outskirts of Wuxi. One enormous high-rise immediately adjacent to another, one after another. No squares or esplanades separating them. Nobody knew the exact occupancy. I'd guess close to 100,000!

Although the apartments everywhere are small, no unessential amenities, spare and stark, and usually walk-ups, the people love them. Because they are so vastly better than what they had (or didn't have) pre-New China. And the rents are ridiculous. 7 or 8% of earnings. No set figure. Merely this small % of earnings. At the average wage, about \$40 a month, the rent would be a little over \$3 a month.

HEALTH

Great strides. In 1949, average life expectancy in China was about 35. Infant mortality over 20%. Today, life expectancy is 68. Infant mortality barely 2%. Incredible achievement in 32 years.

Hospitals and clinics have proliferated everywhere. Very backward by our standards. But so much better than what was available pre-1949 that they proudly exhibit facilities that we'd condemn on sight. They are almost

child-like about it. In a hospital at one commune they insisted on showing us everything,- patient rooms (cells right out of Snake Pit), operating room, dental facility, laboratory, etc. Each quite awful. But they show it to you proudly and then say, with a little smile, "Of course, this is all backward compared to yours, but it is a big advancement for us." Maybe. But pretty bad.

I think the people probably exercise, eat sensibly and take care of themselves to stay out of these clinics. Just to look at them is a form of preventive medicine! But they are proud and grateful.

POPULATION CONTROL

Best estimate is that the current population is about 1 billion. They want to stabilize it at around 1,200,000,000. And the ingenious method they're using seems to be working. Birth control devices are available to all at either no cost or, literally, for pennies.

A system is in effect that provides bonuses for those with no children. Smaller bonuses for those with one child. And smaller still for 2 children. Then it goes into reverse and there is an ascending scale of penalties for those with 3 or more children.

The bonuses take the form of discounts on food, clothes, etc., at the communal stores, rent discounts, medical care, etc.

A paradox. A couple with no children might get a larger, more desirable apartment than a couple with children.

Men can retire at 55, women at 50. At 75% of their last earnings. If they had no children they get practically free, or at enormous discount, food, clothing, medical care, etc., for the rest of their lives.

Those with more than 2 children have a hard way to go compared with less or none.

Although only instituted in recent years, there are indications that this system will significantly control population growth.

They will institute their first real national census within the next year.

CRIME

Crime, as we know it, is just about non-existent. And you don't have to rely on their assurances or statistics. You can see that this is true.

Example: Bicycles are a cherished, necessary and valuable possession. All over China,- in the inner cities, outskirts, countryside,- people park their bicycles right out on the street while they shop, go to work or whatever. You'll see hundreds of bicycles parked everywhere. Unlocked and unguarded. And they simply are not stolen. When you tell them that we have to lock our cars, put security devices and burglar alarms on them, etc., they just stare at you.

Example: Much of the free-market produce is exhibited and sold out on the streets or other open areas. Coming home late at night, we often saw the produce on the streets, untended, the owner having gone home to sleep. Won't it be stolen? They look at you in dismay. Of course not. Then they point

to a basket or box beside the produce. Explanation: Because of the enormous population in the cities, all people do not work a normal day shift. If they did, the streets would be impassable at morning and afternoon rush hour. So there are three work shifts, - 8AM-4PM, 4PM-12M, 12M-8AM. The people moving by at midnight might purchase some produce and leave money in the box.

Most of the time, your hotel rooms are unlocked. You can leave anything lying around, - money, cigarettes, lighters, pens, radios, - things that would be very tempting to the young hotel workers who make about \$20 a month. Safe as in a vault.

Accustomed as I am to our jungle, I have no explanation for this. Other than that it is a traditional ethic.

We wanted to take a walk rather late one night. I asked if it would be safe. Answer: Of course. The rainy season is over and this is not earthquake country. The thought of a mugging would be absurd.

Whatever is behind it, it is delightful.

TOURISM

They are very anxious to develop this industry. Both for the hard currency to be gained and because they seem honestly to want the exchanges and communication that tourism engenders. They especially want Americans. But they just don't have a clue how to go about it.

In the last few years they have built quite a few high-rise hotels in many of the major cities. When you first see them from the outside you wonder why people decry the accommodations in China. They look great. But inside is another matter. As you might expect, we had the very best accommodations wherever we went. And nothing ever rose above 3rd rate. I'm not referring to lack of expensive facilities or amenities. That you would expect and understand. It is that their concept of a hotel and ours are miles apart.

Despite the fact that they have plentiful workers all of whom are eager to please, the service is terrible. Because they don't know what to do, and nobody knows what to tell them to do. A few expert American hotel people could help them invaluable in structuring their operation. I'll touch on this at the end of this report.

THE ARMY

We did not, of course, visit any military installations. And I have nothing beyond a couple of cursory observations.

There are soldiers everywhere. Not armed or on duty. Just wandering around in twos and threes, sightseeing or goofing off. Some of the uniforms are patched like quilts, and threadbare. Some are extremely young. I'm told that these are some of the flotsam and jetsam that emerged from the Cultural Revolution, unable to function productively anywhere else, so they stuck them in the army. Others are very old. The explanations for this are vague and evasive. I don't know what the hell they do in the army, but they sure don't fight.

The army trucks they ride around in are vintage vehicles. They'd be more of a threat to the Soviets on bicycles.

CHAIRMAN MAO

His pictures are still on display. And when they discuss him, there is a strange ambivalence. They are very complimentary when they discuss his efforts and accomplishments (their term) pre-Cultural Revolution. They acknowledge that he might have made a few mistakes but are, on the whole, quite approving of him during this period. And they are very reverential about the fact that he initiated the New China.

But when they discuss the Cultural Revolution, their tone changes drastically. They abhor that whole episode, and speak very bitterly about it. When you ask them about Mao's part in it, they admit that he was still the leader. But they suggest that perhaps he might not have realized what was taking place. They suggest that it really was instigated by his wife and the other three of the Gang of Four. That she realized that he was getting senile and that it was a good opportunity to seize power. And that although much of the changes in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution were issued in his name, she was really taking advantage of his condition and having things ordered in his name without his really understanding what was happening.

I asked a very loaded question...many changes have occurred and much progress for the people has taken place since the Cultural Revolution, I said, but would these things have occurred if the Cultural Revolution had not happened and Chairman Mao were still around and in charge?

A little sadly, they reply, "Perhaps not." And change the subject.

They acknowledge his contributions in the creation of and in the first stages of the New China, and then, almost overtly, and regretfully, admit that China had reached a stage which was beyond his ability to cope or, perhaps, understand.

THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY

Production is archaic. For the most part, they shoot silent footage and dub in the dialogue and rudimentary sound effects later.

Distribution, state-controlled, very inept. The box-office gross potential of pictures is severely dissipated by their dogmatic practice of moving a limited number of prints from one theatre to another on a predetermined schedule, regardless of the business generated by the picture. It can be playing to full houses, but out it goes at the end of a week. They make about 85 films a year. With smarter distribution policy, they could make 50 films, saving considerable production expense, and gross more with 50 pictures than they now do with 85.

Exhibition: About 2000 theatres in China. Supplemented by portable 35mm and 16mm projection for outlying villages and communes. In the cities, the films run from early morning to late at night. To full houses. About 10 cents a ticket. Visited one theatre at 7:45AM. Packed. They are ahead of us in one respect. There is a 20 minute gap between screenings, and they sweep out and clean the place!

Now, an important point to consider:

They love and are desperately hungry for American films. Just recently, a festival of 5 American films played in 5 cities for a week,- SHANE, BLACK STALLION, SNOW WHITE, SINGING IN THE RAIN and (can you believe?) GUESS WHO'S

COMING TO DINNER. Terrific reaction from full houses at every showing.

They have been trying to get more American pictures for regular exhibition. They feel, and I agree, that it would help expand mutual understanding and friendship. They have very little hard money and have been unable to get Jack Valenti to give them terms more favorable than what is normal in foreign markets.

I feel that making some films available to them would be a worthwhile diplomatic move. We have substantive differences with them on various matters, (Taiwan, tax treaties, etc.). And we'll probably hang tough on these. Wouldn't it, therefore, be helpful to us if we could at least make some cosmetic gestures, while we are at odds on more weighty issues?

I discussed this with Jack. His position is that if he makes concessions to the Chinese he'd be opening the door for the same treatment with other under-developed countries in the world.

I suggested that, in the interest of far-sighted American statesmanship, this might not be a bad idea. But Jack is reluctant to go to bat on this with the foreign-department managers of the MPAA.

So, I suggested to Jack that we forget about current or recent films. The Chinese are anxious to get any American films, even from the 30s, 40, and 50s, which would still be new to their audiences. These are films which, except for a few classics, are completely played out and just sitting in vaults. I proposed a formula which would set a date, perhaps 1960, and make some of these pre-1960 films, appropriately themed, available to the Chinese on a basis where they pay for the prints, shipping and handling, dubbing or sub-titling, etc., and we get a modest (to be negotiated) percentage of the gross. Anything we get back would be more than these films are generating on the shelf now, and we would at least make a gesture toward the Chinese. And if other under-developed countries ask for the same deal, what have we got to lose? We could generate diplomatic mileage and some revenue.

I persuaded Jack to present this formula to a meeting he is having with all the foreign department heads in January or February. He said he'd report back to me.

If you agree with me on this, a little nudge from you with Jack might help.

CHINA/U.S. - CHINA/JAPAN

One thought increasingly kept gnawing at me throughout China.

The Chinese are hungry for technological and managerial assistance. And it occurred to me that, somewhere down the road, we might find ourselves facing a sticky situation.

There is a strange, almost love-hate, ambivalence in many Chinese re: Japan. They remember the Sino-Japanese conflict and, particularly, a very unhappy Japanese occupation. But they are also fascinated by the enormous technological and managerial progress the Japanese have made. They make much of the fact that they have more Japanese visitors than any others. And they hasten to call your attention to the many Japanese products, machinery, etc., in China.

And despite past frictions, and ideological differences, there is an Oriental affinity between them.

But, more significantly, they were made for each other. Japan has the technology, the managerial expertise, the highly-developed international marketing experience, etc. But they don't have what China has. Vast, inexpensive man-power, plentiful resources and raw materials, much land for industrial expansion, etc. And they are in close proximity.

If the Chinese and Japanese ever really dedicated themselves to drawing together in a close working relationship, they could become the dominant economic power in the world. Having in mind the needs of China and the pragmatic commercial acuity of the Japanese, I think this is a real possibility, despite their political and sociological disparity.

And, heaven forbid, if after establishing such a relationship they ever got ambitious and expansive, they could also become the dominant military alliance.

I'm not talking about the immediately foreseeable future. I'm looking way down the road. Twenty or more years, perhaps. It might never develop that way. But it sure as hell is a possibility.

This is but another reason why, prudently and cautiously, we should explore wherever possible "mutual cooperation" with the Chinese. China is an enormous potential market and this could be advantageous to us in the normal course of things. And it might also finesse a Sino-Japanese relationship that could give us migraines in the future.

This should be carefully thought out and factored into our planning vis-a-vis China. In these early stages, until it is clearer in which direction China is headed, we should concentrate on non-strategic areas and deftly avoid giving them technology, hardware or other assistance that might come back to haunt us. In lieu of that, we should be very generous in the many non-strategic areas where they desperately need help. I referred previously to tourism and motion pictures. These are but two of very many areas where we could, by proffering generous cooperation, generate mutual commercial benefit without risking a boomerang if they go in the wrong direction down the line.

I sure as hell don't know where they are going. I don't think they know. But they are going. It may be a constructive progress and development. And it might develop into a gigantic can of worms. But we should, aggressively and imaginatively, position ourselves so as to benefit or be protected whichever way they go.

And it would be advisable not to be too paranoid, at this stage, about their being a communist state. There are hints that they might develop into some kind of unprecedented hybrid. And unless and until they give signs of intrusion, expansion, subversion, etc., we should position ourselves favorably in the event that, by some historic miracle, they evolve constructively.

It is a dilemma. They have diverted from and disavowed much of the Soviet version of communism. But I can't foresee them embracing democracy, as we know it, or even come close. I think they'll bend, twist and adjust to whatever seems to abet their progress. And perhaps come up, eventually, with a mutant system which neither they or the world has yet experienced.

I see the potential for some very beneficial prospects for us. But I also see some very scary possibilities.

But, however they go, they are a potential to be reckoned with. And whether it is for good or bad might depend, to a great extent, on how we conduct our end of this renewed relationship.

D. O. J.

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31608	MEMO JAMES NANCE THROUGH MEESE TO THE PRESIDENT	1	12/17/1981	B1 B3

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31608

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 17, 1981

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M381 # 31608

BY KML NARA DATE 11/8/12

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE *Bud*

SUBJECT: The Chinese Position on Fighter Aircraft Sales to Taiwan

13526
E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

Attached is a [redacted] report outlining the current Chinese position on fighter aircraft sales to Taiwan. Key elements of the report are:

- The Chinese know that there is continued support within the United States for US arms sales to Taiwan.

- They believe that a debate is going on within the United States Government, that the decision will be made by you alone and that all indicators are that the ultimate decision will not be acceptable to China.

- The Chinese are now opposed to any upgrading of Taiwan's fighter capability and this now includes a modified F5E.

- The Chinese appear to want to negotiate on the issue but threaten a downgrading of relations if our fighter decision is unacceptable.

COMMENT: If this report is correct, it would indicate that the Chinese, having in their own terms "ruled out" sales of the F5G, the F16/79 and the F16, are now zeroing in on an enhanced F5E. To our way of thinking, further detail will only harden the Chinese position and raise the level of their rhetoric. We, thus, believe that discussion of this issue should be placed on an NSC agenda as soon as is possible. Key intelligence analysis is due on December 18 and we will place this item on an NSC agenda as quickly as possible after that date.

Attachment

Tab A [redacted]

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Review on December 15, 2001

cc: The Vice President
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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A

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31610	REPORT RE CHINA'S POSITION...	5	12/14/1981	B1 B3

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