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Collection Name MEESE, EDWIN: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 12/27/2006

File Folder CHINA-GENERAL MARCH 1981-MAY 1981

FOIA

F02-019/1

Box Number CFOA 160

COHEN, WARREN

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31362	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT R 7/17/2008 F02-019/1	1	3/2/1981	B1 B3
31363	REPORT	RE DENG XIAOPING COMMENTS D 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	3	ND	B1 B3
31366	PAPER	EXPORT CONTROL POLICY TOWARD CHINA D 12/2/2011 F2002-019/1	3	ND	B1
31368	SCOPE PAPER	RE VISIT R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019	7	ND	B1
31369	MEMO	RICHARD V ALLEN TO MEESE, BAKER, AND DEAVER, RE DINNER R 2/1/2008 NLRRF02-019	1	5/27/1981	B1
31370	MEMO	CHINESE RELATIONS WITH THE US PAR 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: PAR UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	5/20/1981	B3
31371	BIO	RE CHINA PAR 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: PAR UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	2/17/1981	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31372	BIO	RE CHINA <i>D</i> 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	7/20/1979	B3
31373	BIO	RE CHINA <i>D</i> 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	2/18/1981	B1 B3 B6
31374	BIO	RE CHINA <i>D</i> 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	11/20/1980	B1 B3 B6
31375	BIO	RE CHINA <i>D</i> 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	3/25/1981	B1 B3 B6
31376	BIO	RE CHINA <i>D</i> 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	2	3/26/1981	B1 B3 B6
31377	BIO	RE CHINA <i>D</i> 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	1	9/28/1979	B1 B3 B6
31378	BIO	RE CHINA <i>D</i> 7/17/2008 F02-019/1: D UPHELD 11/8/2012 M381/1	2	3/23/1981	B1 B3 B6

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31379	MEMO	ALLEN TO MEESE, RE YOUR COMMENTS <i>R</i> <i>2/1/2008</i> <i>NLRRF02-019</i>	1	5/28/1981	B1
31380	REPORT	FBIS RE GUANGMING RIBAO <i>R</i> <i>7/17/2008</i> <i>F02-019/1</i>	5	5/31/1981	B3

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31362

819

MAR 4 1981

EM

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

March 2, 1981

F: China

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: Chinese Guidelines for US-PRC Relations

The CIA has provided us with an interesting sensitive report on recent Chinese guidance regarding our relations with them.

At Tab A are excerpts from the report. I have highlighted portions.

cc: ✓ Ed Meese
James Baker

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NLRR F02-019/1 # 31362

BY HDT NARA DATE 7/17/08

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31363	REPORT RE DENG XIAOPING COMMENTS	3	ND	B1 B3

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MAR 3 1981

March 2, 1981

EM _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENTFROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Richard*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Arthur Burns

Jim Lilley of the National Security Council Staff briefed Dr. Arthur Burns before Dr. Burns went to China.

Jim's memo on his subsequent talk with Dr. Burns (after arriving home) includes the interesting observation that the subject of Taiwan did not even come up. Dr. Burns was prepared to discuss your view of this matter.


Attachment

cc: Ed Meese ✓
Jim Baker




MEMORANDUM

0827



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: JIM LILLEY 
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Arthur Burns

At your request I had spent several hours with Dr. Burns on 16 February before he went to China and at that time gave him some reading material on Taiwan, the Chinese economy and foreign policy. Dr. Burns phoned me today, 27 February, to give me his impressions of the trip (I had also earlier informed the Chinese here in Washington that Arthur Burns was a special friend of the Administration and suggested they convey this to Peking).

Dr. Burns said he had an excellent trip to China and had been treated well. He had met several Chinese leaders including the President of Peoples Bank, the Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, the Director of Research of Foreign Trade and the former Minister of Culture and Ambassador to Washington. Dr. Burns said that in all of his talks in China, which were quite extensive, the issue of Taiwan never came up. Dr. Burns deliberately commented favorably on the Reagan Administration, saying how pleased he and most Americans were with the election results. He told the Chinese that they would be pleased with the Reagan Administration. The Chinese appeared to appreciate hearing this from him. The remainder of Dr. Burn's comments dealt with the Chinese economy and did not contain any new observations.

He expressed his appreciation for our support and wanted me to convey his personal thanks to you.

cc: Don Gregg



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31366	PAPER EXPORT CONTROL POLICY TOWARD CHINA	3	ND	B1

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~~SECRET~~

SCOPE PAPER

F: China

Rev. 3/2/80
(for clearance by Form 3-11-2)

31368

I. SUMMARY:

The objective of your visit is to restore momentum to the U.S.-China relationship and reach a modus vivendi on our dealings with Taiwan, including arms sales. The commitment of China's leaders to the U.S. connection needs to be fortified by clear indications from this Administration of the benefits to China from this connection. You will want to stress our parallel strategic objectives by informing Beijing firsthand how the Reagan Administration conceives its global strategy, and how we wish to see U.S.-China relations evolve to counter Soviet and Soviet-proxy expansionism. By stressing our parallel strategic objectives, our desire to coordinate policies to mutual advantage, our intention to treat China as a friendly, non-allied nation, and our plan to liberalize export controls on dual-use technology, we seek to gain time and tolerance for steps we may later take with Taiwan.

II. OBJECTIVES:

1. To impress upon the Chinese that the United States is now pursuing a comprehensive policy designed to counter expansionism by the Soviet Union and its proxies, and to underscore the permanence of the US presence and involvement in Asia by stressing the cohesive strength of our alliance relationships with Japan and ANZUS and our close ties with the ASEAN countries;
2. To facilitate more effective coordination of US and Chinese policies in third areas, including;
 - Southeast Asia;
 - Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean;
 - the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean/Central America.
3. To narrow differences on issues where our positions diverge, including Southeast Asian insurgencies, Korea, and Chinese exports of arms and nuclear materials.

~~SECRET~~
XDS-1 5/29/11

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-019 #31368
BY CAS NARA DATE 2/1/08

4. To convey a new conceptual basis for a US-Chinese relationship built upon strategic association, under which the US treats China as a friendly non-allied country, and to demonstrate this concretely by modifying restrictive legislation and regulations on export controls.

5. To reach a modus vivendi on the Taiwan issue, including the parameters of our unofficial relationship and arms sales, while seeking China's reaffirmation to use only peaceful methods for resolving the situation.

III. SETTING:

Your visit -- the first to China by a Secretary of State since August, 1977 -- occurs at a time of important transition in China. The Chinese will welcome you warmly; they want your visit to succeed. They regard very favorably the priorities and directions of the Administration's foreign policy. They will be looking for evidence of our resolve to meet the Soviet global challenge and a willingness to consult closely with them and take coordinated action where appropriate. What worries them most is the possibility of an upgrading of our dealings with Taiwan which could undermine our broader strategic cooperation.

Deng Xiaoping and his reformist coalition are trying to build a stable institutional base for continuity of policy and personnel. They have turned sharply away from ideological dogmatism and toward a pragmatic approach to modernization. There is some opposition, particularly in the military, to these reforms and their social consequences. But thus far China remains on a steady course.

The Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 11th Congress may be in progress or about to begin as you arrive. If the results follow Deng's agenda, this meeting will confirm current policy directions, reduce Hua Guofeng's status and produce additional leadership changes favorable to the reformist program. A definitive verdict on Mao Zedong will be publicized shortly afterward.

Deng and the reformers need to be able to point to benefits from the US connection in strategic and economic terms, as well as on the Taiwan issue. They will urge more effective support for Pakistan and the resistance in

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-3-

Afghanistan and Kampuchea. They will welcome evidence of US willingness to treat them as a friendly country and to take concrete actions to bolster China against Soviet pressure. Such evidence would validate their argument that China's most effective path to modernization lies in association with us.

The Chinese do not have a sophisticated understanding of the US political system. They were therefore perplexed by the US decision to lift the Soviet grain embargo, both because they see it as inconsistent with maintaining maximum pressure against Moscow, and because they fear that US domestic political forces may also move the US toward a significant tilt toward Taiwan. Such a tilt could force them to react strongly against their American connection. They seek reassurance that the U.S. will not deal with Taiwan in a way which would undercut their efforts to achieve reunification by peaceful means. They regard US arms sales to Taiwan as having this effect. They also fear that the convergence of US-China strategic views may convince some Americans that the US can afford to neglect Chinese sensitivities over Taiwan. One of their key objectives will be to convince you that the Taiwan issue is an essential thread in bilateral relations which, if mishandled, could unravel the larger fabric.

Despite these dangers, your visit is a significant opportunity for both sides because of our wide areas of agreement and our common interest in achieving a broader cooperative relationship. Your discussions will determine the shape of the US-China relationship for months and years to come.

ANALYSIS:

1. Global Policy. The Chinese strongly approve of the Reagan Administration's tough approach to Moscow and its proxies. They want to hear about specific steps we are taking to build up our defense capabilities, to strengthen our alliance relationships, especially in Europe, and to deprive the Soviets of opportunities for further strategic gains in the Third World. In Asia, the Chinese consider the US-Japan relationship crucial to their own security and to stability in the region. They have built positive ties with nearly all of our Asian friends and allies. In this connection, they would welcome a briefing on the key issues you will be discussing in Manila and Wellington. They would also appreciate a briefing

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-4-

on new US moves with Australia and Thailand and on military assistance to Pakistan. We should seek a similar Chinese overview on global issues, with special attention to Asia.

2. Coordination in Third Areas. Our common concerns have produced parallel policies in many areas, but differences remain in some. There are clear limits to how much China will be prepared to do on our behalf in the Third World. But the chances for close cooperation are directly related to the Soviet posture, and our pitch should stress our shared objective of thwarting Soviet adventurism in the Middle East, Africa and the Caribbean/Central America.

-- On Indochina, Beijing has maintained pressure on Vietnam both directly on their common border and indirectly by vigorously supporting the anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea. You should voice support for their policy of forcing Hanoi to pay an escalating price for its aggression against Kampuchea. You should also indicate that we will do our part in an informal division of labor by maintaining our commitment to Thailand's security, preserving DK seating in the UN, fostering maximum international pressure to deprive Hanoi of outside assistance and support, and continuing our assistance to Khmer on the Thai border. The Chinese will probably make a pitch for direct US support for a broad resistance effort. You should avoid any commitment of materiel support or a direct role in brokering either a coalition or an eventual settlement. But you may offer to be politically helpful to the non-DK resistance groups (e.g. Son Sann) in the context of a broader and more effective effort to achieve a political solution.

-- On South and Southwest Asia, the Chinese have seen in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a confirmation of their long-held view that Moscow will seek targets of opportunity to expand its areas of control, particularly against "soft" targets. For this reason, they have endorsed the steps we have taken to build up our force posture in the region and to strengthen ties with Indian Ocean littoral states. They especially welcome our new approach to Pakistan. They provide military and economic aid to Pakistan and urge us to aid the Afghan resistance fighters through Pakistan. The Chinese remain concerned, however, that our commitment to Pakistan is

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conditioned by our concern not to alienate India. You should seek to draw them out in some detail on their activities regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as on their objectives for Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to India in late June.

3. Areas of Difference: Southeast Asian Insurgencies; Korea; Arms and Nuclear Sales. The Chinese have reduced their support for Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. But this issue remains a genuine irritant to the governments of the region which impedes closer cooperation between China and those governments. You should urge further Chinese steps to phase out such support completely. On Korea, the Chinese have been critical of the stronger US-ROK relationship following President Chun's visit. They endorse North Korea's call for peaceful reunification -- stressing "peaceful." They have also stressed that they favor "stability" on the Korean Peninsula. But their flexibility is limited both by their wish to avoid giving Moscow an opening in Pyongyang, and by the parallel they see to the Taiwan problem. We should note our continued commitment to South Korea's security and our support for North-South talks, and seek their endorsement for stability on the Peninsula.

On PRC exports of arms and nuclear materials, recent intelligence reports suggest that the Chinese, or intermediaries acting on their behalf, are selling weapons to Iran, Iraq, and perhaps others. There are also reports that China is selling certain nuclear materials to South Africa and Argentina. We have raised this matter with the Chinese, who have denied it. But the reports persist, and it seems likely that in their eagerness to earn foreign exchange they have authorized third parties (in Hong Kong and Western Europe) to offer Chinese-origin goods to whomever can pay for them. You should stress the adverse political effects of such sales, and the costs to the US-China relationship should they become known.

4. Export Controls. The Chinese are acutely aware of US restrictions on the export of high technology goods to China. You will want to explain the policy of the Reagan Administration to facilitate technology transfer in support of all four Chinese modernizations -- including defense. You will wish to indicate our intention to seek appropriate remedial action with Congress on legislation mostly dating from the 1950s, which restricts dealings with China and lumps them with the Soviet/Warsaw Pact countries.

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-6-

5. Taiwan. This is the tough one. There are two key points, "officiality" and arms sales. On the first, it will be essential for you to reiterate -- in the President's name -- the US commitment to the Joint Communiqué of January 1, 1979 as the basis for US-China relations. You will also have to deal with Chinese unhappiness over some aspects of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which they regard as incompatible with US commitments under the Joint Communiqué. Our consistent position has been that the TRA can and will be implemented in a manner consistent with the normalization understandings expressed in the Joint Communiqué, and that the two documents are therefore not in conflict.

On Taiwan arms sales, Beijing's position is that they are inconsistent with our recognition of Beijing as the government of one China, including Taiwan, and that they should be halted. The two sides discussed this issue at length in the normalization negotiations but no agreement was reached. The US made it clear that arms sales to Taiwan would continue, but that they would be handled "prudently" and with due regard for Chinese sensitivities. The Chinese objected, but went ahead with normalization, reserving the right to discuss this issue with us later.

Our strategic and bilateral relations have developed exceptionally well despite this fundamental disagreement. We have argued that they can continue to develop provided that each side takes account of the sensitivities of the other. Beijing has urged a moratorium on new arms sales to Taiwan, at least until other aspects of the US-China relationship move forward. Since it is in our interest to keep tensions low -- they are currently the lowest ever -- we should avoid steps which would require Beijing to alter its anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese priorities in order to match major changes in Taiwan's military capabilities. We should agree to keep a low profile, not publicizing new sales and holding off decisions on big-ticket items that widen Taiwan's existing military superiority, such as a new model fighter aircraft, through the balance of this year. At the same time, we should not compromise our interest in selling modest quantities of weapons similar to those already in Taiwan's inventory.

You should note that a complete cutoff of US arms sales would deprive Taipei of the confidence it needs to explore reconciliation with the rest of China, and that it could push

~~SECRET~~

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~~-7-~~

Taipei toward the Soviets or toward a separate nuclear capability. You should point to rapidly growing mainland-Taiwan trade and contacts in third countries as evidence that progress toward reconciliation is occurring in an atmosphere of decreasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. You should state our interest in seeing this progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question continue, while avoiding any implication that we see any direct role for ourselves in brokering a deal between the Chinese parties concerned or in pushing either party into negotiations for which it is unready.

You should ask the Chinese to reaffirm their intention patiently to pursue a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question that respects existing realities on the island. You should also ask that they not overreact to inadvertent and inconsequential actions and statements by US local and state--and, occasionally, even federal--officials, and to Taipei's intentional mischief making. They need to understand that trust works both ways.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

27 May 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE

EVENT: The People's Republic of China
Dinner at the Embassy
28 May 1981
7:30 p.m.

LOCATION: 2300 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

CONTACT: 328-2505

ATTENDEES: Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Meese
Mr. and Mrs. James Baker
Mr. and Mrs. Michael Deaver
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Allen

His Excellency Chai Zemin - "Mr. Ambassador"
and other Chinese individuals:
SEE ATTACHMENT FROM RICHARD ALLEN

LOGISTICS: 7:10 p.m. - Depart West Basement, West Wing
with Mrs. Meese for Chinese
Embassy
7:30 p.m. - Arrive Chinese Embassy for dinner



Accept
Regret

The Ambassador
of the People's Republic of China
and Mrs. Chai Zemin
request the pleasure of the company of
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Allen
at dinner
on Thursday, May 28, 1981 at 7:30 p.m.

R.S.V.P.
Tel. 328-2505

2300 Connecticut Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C.

MEMORANDUM

2943

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 27, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~INFORMATIONMEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III ✓
JAMES A. BAKER III
MICHAEL K. DEAVERFROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Dick*

SUBJECT: Dinner with Chinese on 28 May 1981 (U)

Attached is background for your dinner with the Chinese on 28 May. It contains a briefing sheet on the status of U.S.-Chinese relations (TAB A) plus biographies of the probable Chinese participants (TAB B). (U)

The Chinese put great store on symbolic moves such as this one. The first social exposure to the inner corps of the White House is a key occasion for them. All comments plus nuances from us will be reported to Peking by cable. (C)

If Ambassador Chai makes a toast, then Ed should reply. Let the Chinese take the initiative on the toast. No other toasts are necessary from our side, but each U.S. invitee should feel free to stand up and toast all present. Private toasts between an individual and his dinner partner and the host are always in order. (U)

Suggest our toast emphasize generalities of "friendship, cooperation, common strategic interests, long historic relationship, need for expanded trade and student exchange." Tend to lay it on thick -- the Chinese expect this as part of the ritual. (U)

Suggest we emphasize the positive in our comments to them and avoid controversial subjects such as Taiwan, Korea, Pol Pot's Cambodia, arms sales to China or Taiwan, official visits. This is not the forum for a fight -- that will come later if called for. However, if the Chinese start to lecture or bully us, then we will respond with our clear policy positions but stated in general terms. (C)

We should be very careful with our humor; everything said will be reported.

Attachments

TAB A - U.S.-Chinese relations
TAB B - Biographies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review May 26, 1987

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NLRR FOZ-09 # 31369
BY CJ NARA DATE 2/1/88

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31370 MEMO

1 5/20/1981 B3

CHINESE RELATIONS WITH THE US

PARTIAL

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C1481

31370

(b) (3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

20 May 1981

MEMORANDUM

CHINESE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES (S)

US-Chinese relations have stabilized following recent high level contacts. American actions have reassured Beijing about the firmness of the relationship, and China hopes to expand its contacts with the US, particularly in the security and economic areas, in order to establish a stable basis for a solid, lasting relationship. (S)

Beijing believes that a firm and comprehensive relationship can be built on the basis of shared opposition to Soviet expansion. It has pursued a consistently anti-Soviet policy for over two decades and has undertaken its opening to the West in part to forge joint efforts to contain the USSR. The Chinese also expect Western economic and technological assistance for their ambitious modernization program. (S)

China has assured the US that it will maintain a strongly anti-Soviet stance; it appears likely to do so at least as long as the current leaders are in power. As part of its own diplomatic campaign against the USSR, China has encouraged the US to play a more active role in opposing Vietnamese policy in Indochina and in bolstering Pakistan in South Asia--areas of major Chinese interest. China has provided considerable diplomatic and rhetorical support for US efforts to mobilize the West against the Soviet Union. The Chinese have urged the developing countries to take a firm stance against the USSR. (S)

China's major difference with the US remains Taiwan. The Chinese question US constancy in opposing the USSR when Washington responds to pressures regarding Taiwan. China opposes US arms sales to Taiwan and continues to press the US, at a minimum, to delay such sales and to prevent the development of any form of officiality in US contacts with Taiwan. (S)

This Memorandum was prepared by the China Policy Support Center, Office of Political Analysis, CIA.

PA M 81-10202

~~SECRET~~

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31371	BIO RE CHINA, <i>partial</i>	1	2/17/1981	B1 B3 B6
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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21371

[Redacted]

(b) (1)
(b) (3)
(b) (6)

CHAI Zemin
(Phonetic: chy)
(2693/3419/3046)

CHINA

Ambassador to the United States

Addressed as:
Mr. Ambassador



The March 1978 nomination of Chai Zemin to head the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington ended a five-month period during which the post was vacant. (His predecessor, Huang Zhen, had left the United States in November 1977.)

Chai remained here as Ambassador when the Liaison Office was upgraded to an Embassy in March 1979. A seasoned diplomat, Chai has held several ambassadorial posts--Hungary (1961-64), Guinea (1964-67), Egypt (1970-74), and Thailand (1975-78)--all key overseas missions.

[Redacted]

He spent the few months before his August 1978 arrival in Washington "reading in" on his new duties. He participated in official talks in Beijing with US Presidential Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in May 1978. After arriving in this country, Chai immediately set a brisk diplomatic pace; he called on Cabinet members, other senior government officials, and Congressmen.

[Redacted]

A native of Shanxi Province, Chai held military positions in that area during the Sino-Japanese war (1937-45). From 1949 to 1961 he held relatively minor municipal posts in Beijing. Chai, 64,

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

CR M 81-10509
17 February 1981

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By [Signature], NARA, Date 7/17/08

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31372	BIO RE CHINA	1	7/20/1979	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31373	BIO RE CHINA	1	2/18/1981	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
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31374	BIO RE CHINA	1	11/20/1980	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31375	BIO RE CHINA	1	3/25/1981	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31376	BIO RE CHINA	2	3/26/1981	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31377	BIO RE CHINA	1	9/28/1979	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31378	BIO RE CHINA	2	3/23/1981	B1 B3 B6

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MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F. CHINA
8 8 MAY 1981
2943 add-on 11:25 a.m.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31379

May 28, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: Your Comments to Chinese Tonight, 28 May (U)

Our intelligence on the Chinese tells us that Ambassador Chai will probably make a toast tonight encompassing at least these three points:

-- He will give praise for U.S. worldwide strategy; they like our strong anti-Soviet position and are prepared to say so.

-- In a gentle way he will emphasize the joint communique on normalization as the basis for our expanding relationship.

-- He will express Chinese willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in all areas. (U)

This last point is interesting and somewhat unusual, and I believe we should draw him out on this. (U)

In addition, I suggest that you refer to the joint communique in your return toast as a basis for our relationship. The President has already done this but it would be a good gesture in creating a constructive atmosphere with the Chinese. As I said earlier, after we have set up a creative atmosphere, we can get on with the business of hammering out agreement in areas where we disagree. (U)

One final comment: I have just learned that the Chinese have been especially helpful in Afghanistan. They have helped us with their linguists in special Afghanistan dialects such as Pushto. I think you might mention this in your toast. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review on 5/28/87

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F02-019/1-31379
BY CN NARA DATE 2/1/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JANUARY 1, 1979

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and emphasize once again that:

- Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
- Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
- The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China

and Taiwan is part of China.

--Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

STATEMENT BY RONALD REAGAN
UPON AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH'S RETURN FROM JAPAN AND CHINA
August 25, 1980
Los Angeles, California

Ten days ago George Bush and I met with you here in Los Angeles on the occasion of his departure for Japan and China, a trip he undertook at my request. As we stressed at the time, the purpose of the trip was to provide for a candid exchange of views with leaders in both countries on a wide range of international topics of mutual interest. Ambassador Bush returned last evening, and has reported his findings in detail.

We are both very pleased with the results of his extensive discussions. In a series of meetings with distinguished leaders in Japan, including Prime Minister Suzuki, Former Prime Ministers Fukuda, Kishi and Miki, Foreign Minister Itch and Minister of International Trade and Industry Tanaka, he had the opportunity to hear their views and recommendations concerning the future of U.S.-Japanese relations.

Our Republican Party Platform stresses that Japan will remain a pillar of our policy for Asia, and a Reagan-Bush Administration will work hard to insure that U.S.-Japanese relations are maintained in excellent condition, based on close consultation and mutual understanding.

Japan's role in the process of insuring peace in Asia is a crucial one, and we must reinforce our ties with this close ally. Japan is our second most important trading partner, and we are her first. We have close ties in other fields, too. A most important example is the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty which recently marked its twentieth anniversary.

Understanding the Japanese perspective is important for the success of American policy. As Ambassador Bush will tell you in detail, he found Japanese leaders unanimous in their view that the United States must be a strong, reliable, leading partner.

I appreciate receiving their views, and I am grateful to them for the courtesies extended to Ambassador Bush. I would also like to express my appreciation to, and regard for, U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield, who also extended many courtesies.

Of equal importance was Ambassador Bush's trip to China, where he held a series of high-level meetings. As I said on August 16, "we have an obvious interest in developing our relationship with China, an interest that goes beyond trade and cultural ties. It is an interest that is fundamental to a Reagan-Bush Administration."

The meetings in Beijing provided for extensive exchanges of views. George has reported to me in great detail the points of similarity and agreement, as well as those of dissimilarity and disagreement. Since the objective of the trip was to have just such an exchange without necessarily reaching agreement, I believe that the objective was reached.

We now have received an updated, first-hand of China's views, and the Chinese leaders have heard our point of view.

While in Beijing, Ambassador Bush and Richard Allen met at length with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, Foreign Minister Huang Hua, as well as with other top foreign policy experts and military leaders. I appreciate the courtesies which the Chinese leaders extended to our party, and I also wish to thank U.S. Ambassador Leonard Woodcock for his kind assistance.

We now maintain full and friendly diplomatic relations with China. This relationship began only a few years ago, and it is one which we should develop and strengthen in the years ahead. It is a delicate relationship, and the Reagan-Bush Administration will handle it with care and respect, with due regard for our own vital interests in the world generally, and in the Pacific region specifically.

China and the United States have a common interest in maintaining peace so that our nations can grow and prosper. Our two-way trade has now reached approximately \$3.5 billion annually, and China's program of modernization depends in a major way on Western and U.S. technology.

Along with many other nations, we and China share a deep concern about the pace and scale of the Soviet military buildup. Chinese leaders agree with Japanese leaders that the United States must be a strong and vigorous defender of the peace, and they specifically favor us bolstering our defenses and our alliances.

It is quite clear that we do not see eye to eye on Taiwan. Thus, this is an appropriate time for me to state our position on this subject.

I'm sure that the Chinese leaders would place no value on our relations with them if they thought we would break commitments to them if a stronger power were to demand it. Based on my long-standing conviction that America can provide leadership and command respect only if it keeps its commitments to its friends, large and small, a Reagan-Bush Administration would observe these five principles in dealing with the China situation.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE FAR EAST

First, U.S.-Chinese relations are important to American as well as Chinese interests. Our partnership should be global and strategic. In seeking improved relations with the People's Republic of China, I would extend the hand of friendship to all Chinese. In continuing our relations, which date from the historic opening created by President Nixon, I would continue the process of expanding trade, scientific and cultural ties.

Second, I pledge to work for peace, stability and the economic growth of the Western Pacific area in cooperation with Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.

Third, I will cooperate and consult with all countries of the area in a mutual effort to stand firm against aggression or search for hegemony which threaten the peace and stability of the area.

Fourth, I intend that United States relations with Taiwan will develop in accordance with the law of our land, the Taiwan Relations Act. This legislation is the product of our democratic process, and is designed to remedy the defects of the totally inadequate legislation proposed by Jimmy Carter.

By accepting China's three conditions for "normalization," Jimmy Carter made concessions that Presidents Nixon and Ford had steadfastly refused to make. I was and am critical of his decision because I believe he made concessions that were not necessary and not in our national interest. I felt that a condition of normalization—by itself a sound policy choice—should have been the retention of a liaison office on Taiwan of equivalent status to the one which we had earlier established in Beijing. With a persistent and principled negotiating position, I believe that normalization could ultimately have been achieved on this basis. But that is behind us now. My present concern is to safeguard the interests of the United States and to enforce the law of the land.

It was the timely action of the Congress, reflecting the strong support of the American people for Taiwan, that forced the changes in the inadequate bill which Mr. Carter proposed. Clearly, the Congress was unwilling to buy the Carter plan, which it believed would have jeopardized Taiwan's security.

This Act, designed by the Congress to provide adequate safeguards for Taiwan's security and well-being, also provides the official basis for our relations with our long-time friend and ally. It declares our official policy to be one of maintaining peace and promoting extensive, close, and friendly relations between the United States and the seventeen million people on Taiwan as well as the one billion people on the China mainland. It specifies that our official policy considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to peace and of "grave concern" to the United States.

And, most important, it spells out our policy of providing defensive weapons to Taiwan and mandates the United States to maintain the means to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" which threaten the security or the social or economic system of Taiwan.

This Act further spells out, in great detail, how the President of the United States, our highest elected official, shall conduct relations with Taiwan, leaving to his discretion the specific methods of achieving policy objectives. The Act further details how our official personnel (including diplomats) are to administer United States relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan. It specifies that for that purpose they are to resign for the term of their duty in Taiwan and then be reinstated to their former agencies of the U.S. government with no loss of status, seniority or pension rights.

The intent of the Congress is crystal clear. Our official relations with Taiwan will be funded by Congress with public monies, the expenditure of which will be audited by the Comptroller General of the United States; and Congressional oversight will be performed by two standing Committees of the Congress.

You might ask what I would do differently. I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official.

I am satisfied that this Act provides an official and adequate basis for safeguarding our relationship with Taiwan, and I pledge to enforce it. But I will eliminate petty practices of the Carter Administration which are inappropriate and demanding to our Chinese friends on Taiwan. For example, it is absurd and not required by the Act that our representatives are not

permitted to meet with Taiwanese officials in their offices and ours. I will treat all Chinese officials with fairness and dignity.

I would not impose restrictions which are not required by the Taiwan Relations Act and which contravene its spirit and purpose. Here are other examples of how Carter has gone out of his way to humiliate our friends on Taiwan:

- Taiwanese officials are ignored at senior levels of the U.S. government.
- The Taiwan Relations Act specifically requires that the Taiwanese be permitted to keep the same number of offices in this country as they had before. Previously, Taiwan had 14 such offices. Today there are but nine.
- Taiwanese military officers are no longer permitted to train in the United States or to attend service academies.
- Recently the Carter Administration attempted to ban all imports from Taiwan labeled "Made in the Republic of China," but was forced to rescind the order after opposition began to mount in the Congress.
- The Carter Administration unilaterally imposed a one-year moratorium on arms supplies even though the Act specifies that Taiwan shall be provided with arms of a defense character.
- The Carter Administration abrogated the Civil Aviation Agreement with Taiwan, which had been in effect since 1947, in response to demands from the People's Republic of China.

I recognize that the People's Republic of China is not pleased with the Taiwan Relations Act which the United States Congress insisted on as the official basis for our relations with Taiwan. This was made abundantly clear to Mr. Bush, and, I'm told, is clear to the Carter Administration. But it is the law of our land.

Fifth, as President I will not accept the interference of any foreign power in the process of protecting American interests and carrying out the laws of our land. To do otherwise would be a dereliction of my duty as President.

It is my conclusion that the strict observance of these five principles will be in the best interests of the United States, the People's Republic of China and the people of Taiwan.

The specific implementation of these duties will have to await the results of the election in November, but in deciding what to do I will take into account the views of the People's Republic of China as well as Taiwan. It will be my firm intention to preserve the interests of the United States, and as President I will choose the methods by which this shall best be accomplished.

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