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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/26/2005

File Folder USSR-TREATIES/AGREEMENTS 15/24 [EXCHANGES,
NEW CONSULATES]

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 38

YARHI-MILO

3805

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11929	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE RECOMMENDED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A US-USSR EXCHANGES AGREEMENT IN CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AND OTHER FIELDS R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	11	ND	B1
11914	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE STATUS OF NEGOTIATION OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	7/14/1984	B1
11915	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	2	4/9/1984	B1
11916	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK RE CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	4/6/1984	B1
11917	REPORT	NSC CHARGES TO U.S.-USSR EXCHANGES POLICY R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	4	ND	B1
11918	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE U.S.- SOVIET AGREEMENT ON CONTACTS, EXCHANGES, AND COOPERATION (SAME TEXT AS DOC 11858) R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	7	4/4/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11919	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT WITH THE USSR <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11920	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE STATUS OF CONSULATES AND EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS WITH USSR <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	11/30/1983	B1
11921	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE MEMO FROM PERLE	1	11/28/1984	B1
11922	MEMO	PERLE TO POINDEXTER RE OSD PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS ON US- SOVIET EXCHANGE AND CONSULATE MATTERS <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	11/17/1983	B1
11923	MEMO	CLARK TO WICK RE RECIPROCITY IN US- SOVIET CULTURAL EXCHANGES <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11924	MEMO	MATLOCK TO CLARK RE US-SOVIET CULTURAL EXCHANGES <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/25/1983	B1
11925	MEMO	CLARK TO SHULTZ RE US-SOVIET CULTURAL EXCHANGES <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11926	MEMO	CLARK TO WICK RE US-SOVIET CULTURAL EXCHANGES <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11930	MEMO	WICK TO CLARK RE RECIPROCITY IN US-SOVIET CULTURAL EXCHANGES <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/22/1983	B1
11931	MEMO	RECIPROCITY AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES U.S.-USSR <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	5	ND	B1
11933	CABLE	191244Z MAY 83 <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	5/19/1983	B1
11934	CABLE	271408Z MAY 83 <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	5/27/1983	B1
11927	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: DECISIONS ON NEW CONSULATES, CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT AND RECIPROCITY <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	5/21/1983	B1
11928	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: NEW CONSULATES AND CULTURAL AGREEMENT <i>R</i> 4/14/2011 <i>F2006-114/11</i>	2	5/4/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11932	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: KIEV/NEW YORK CONSULATES AND CULTURAL AGREEMENT PAR 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	6	4/7/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

368

*File:
US-USSR-
Cultural
Exchange
Agmt*

11929

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Recommended Instructions for the Second Round of
Negotiations on a US-USSR Exchanges Agreement in
Cultural, Educational, Scientific, Technical and
Other Fields

We have discussed with representatives of the United States
Information Agency (USIA) the positions reached in the
Exchanges Agreement negotiations as of their recess on December
27, 1984.

The talks have been thorough in both directions. Both
sides have suggested various ad referendum changes. We have
reviewed these and recommend that the current US text be
approved as the basis for further negotiation.

It is clear that we have moved well toward our goals in
some areas, in which complete or basic agreement has been
reached. In other cases of importance to each side, though we
have become fully acquainted with each other's views, we are
far from reaching agreement. In some cases compromise will be
easy; in others trade-offs should be explored. On certain
issues, we recommend absolutely no compromise. As certain
Soviet positions seem to be similarly tightly held, the
end-game trade-offs will require an understanding by each of
the other's basic goals and requirements and limitations.

With this in mind, we have made the following
recommendations on the negotiating strategy to follow when the
talks resume in March.

1. The Preamble: (a) We should agree, without comment, to
maintain in the new 6-year General Agreement reference to the
1972 "Statement of Basic Principles," but only to "relevant
portions" of them. Reference to the Helsinki Final Act should
be similarly qualified.

(b) We should oppose without compromise the new Soviet
text pledging the Agreement to "improve the international
situation, in the interests of preserving and strengthening
peace."

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD-114/11 # 11929

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(c) We should argue that the reference to tourism be deleted, as it is sufficiently noted in the body of the Agreement and is in no sense basic to its purposes.

(d) We should, in this connection, reaffirm our opposition to the addition of a mini-Preamble at the top of the 3-year Program of Exchanges. The Soviet text's reference to the Helsinki Final Act is out of place here.

(e) see Tab [A] for the present and suggested Preambular texts.

2. "Safety" or "security" as a translation of the Russian "bezopasnost'": The Soviets have indicated that they will accept "safety" in the English text. They would retain "bezopasnost'" in the Russian. We recommend new language reflecting this change, in the three sections at which the issue arises:

- (a) Article I, para 2 of the General Agreement
- (b) Article III, para 3 of the Program
- (c) Article VII, para 1, sentence 2 of the Program
- (d) See Tab [B] for the suggested new texts.

3. Cultural/Information Centers in both countries. We should not yet withdraw our text, though it was clear from the very start that there is no chance at all that the Soviets will accept it. We may, however, be able to trade its withdrawal at a later date for an acceptable text on television appearances. (FYI: The British and French have insisted in recent negotiations on the reciprocal establishment of information centers. As the Soviets would not agree, British and French bilateral exchanges with the USSR are organized according to "protocols," not formal Agreements and are thus diminished in scope.)

4. Reciprocal Appearances on TV by representatives of the other country: We have been stonewalled. The Soviets have declared as unacceptable any text which specifies any number of appearances. Since our original instructions stated that "assuring access to Soviet television by our representatives, including the President" was one of the highest priorities of the Exchanges Agreement, we should continue to insist on Soviet acceptance on our language on this issue. (Article VII of the General Agreement; Article VI of the Program)

~~SECRET~~

5. Expanded distribution of "America Illustrated" and "Soviet Life": We recommend easing off in the end-game trade-off on our suggested increases of 20,000 in the print runs of these magazines, and returning to the text as contained in earlier Agreements. This should be traded for a return to a full schedule of travelling exhibits (Article VIII of the General Agreement; Article IV of the Program).

6. Travelling exhibits: We should retain our original draft language in the General Agreement regarding "at least four circulating exhibitions during the six-year period of this Agreement, with each exhibition showing in six different cities." This establishes the principle of our desired pace of at least two exhibits in six cities each in a three-year Program. Since it would be well into the first year of a 1985-87 Program when an Agreement is actually signed, we have included the following sentence in Para 1 of Article IX: "There will normally be two exhibits for a full three-year Program." We have also suggested a change in the language in Article V of the Program, which now reads: "up to two circulating exhibitions during the three-year period of this Program. Each Party will accord the other the opportunity to show its exhibit or exhibits in a total of up to 12 cities." (Article IX of the General Agreement; Article V of the Program)

7. Aeroflot landing rights: We should continue to insist that the Exchange Agreement talks are not an acceptable forum, nor the proper forum, for discussion of the issue.

8. Academic Exchanges: We have reached basic agreement on all but one matter, i.e., assurance that there will be adequate housing for the spouses and minor children of IREX and CIES (Fulbright) exchangees. IREX considers satisfactory language in this section basic to their ability to carry on with their programs. Admitting that there may be added costs to the Soviets if they accept a satisfactory version of our text, and in view of the fact that there is pressure to increase IREX stipends for Soviet exchangees, we recommend offering the latter as bait against a favorable decision on our text on housing. This is IREX's position. A solution of the Fulbright housing text should follow once the IREX exchanges text is agreed. (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

9. Balance between disciplines in the academic exchanges: Data covering the past ten years of exchanges administered by IREX (long-term and short term scholars and the ACLS-USSR Academy of Sciences exchanges) show that more than 50% of the Soviet exchangees have been in the social sciences and the humanities. We have suggested revised language committing the two sides to maintaining the practices which have led to this balance. We believe the Soviets will accept our suggested revised text, and we recommend absolutely no compromise or thattext. (The Soviets have been adamant over the years in refusing to sign any agreement which specifies the percentage of exchangees' fields of discipline, such as our original draft text of not more than half of IREX exchanges from either side to be in the natural and physical sciences. In a recent negotiation, the French insisted on such specificity, in result of which the IREX-counterpart Franco-Soviet scholars' exchanges were terminated.) (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

10. Balance between disciplines among Fulbright scholars: Again, we recommend absolutely no compromise with our text, which seeks to maintain balances advantageous to our side. (Article IV of the General Agreement; Article I of the Program)

11. Official persons as members of delegations: We recommend no compromise with our language on this point. The Soviets confidently expect full reports from their participants in exchange programs organized under an Agreement. We can expect to receive such information only from delegations, and even then only if the US sponsoring organization agrees that an official interpreter/Embassy officer be included in it. The Soviets maintain that we should negotiate the inclusion of such a person with the Soviets on each occasion, a position which we have resolutely opposed. (Article VII of the Program)

12. Host-country escort officers on travelling exhibits to be paid for by receiving side: The Soviets do not address this matter at all in their text, but will when we have an agreed text on the basic concept of exhibits. We predict that they will insist that we pay for the Soviet accompanying escorts with our exhibits, or for some of them. We recognize that we could no better get along without them than our Embassy could survive without UPDK (the Soviet organization that is charged with supplying services to the diplomatic missions). However, thus far the host country has always paid for as many escorts as were considered necessary. We should not compromise on this point. (Article V of the Annex)

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~~-5-~~

This memorandum has been cleared by the United States Information Agency.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tab A

US GA

Original U.S. Text:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries;

Referring to the provisions and objectives set forth in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SOV GA

Original Soviet Draft:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Government of the United States of America,

Consistent with the Basic Principles of Relations Between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States
of America, signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to strengthen mutual understanding between the
peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States and to assist
the improvement of relations between the two countries in
general,

Aspiring to improve the international situation, in the
interests of preserving and strengthening peace,

Believing that the further development of mutually
beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will assist in
reaching these goals,

Referring to the principles, provisions and objectives of
the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, signed at Helsinki, August 1, 1975,

Taking into account the positive experience accumulated
within the framework of previous agreements and programs in
exchanges in the cultural, educational, scientific, and
technical fields, in tourism, and in other fields, have agreed
on the following:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

US GA

Suggested New U.S. Text:

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries;

Referring to the relevant provisions and objectives set forth in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

Consistent with the relevant provisions of the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, signed at Moscow on May 29, 1972;

Believing that the further expansion of strictly reciprocal and mutually beneficial contacts, exchanges and cooperation will facilitate the achievement of these aims;

Taking into account the positive experience achieved through previous agreements on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, cultural and other fields;

Have agreed as follows:

~~SECRET~~

91

~~SECRET~~

Tab B

Para 2 of Article I of the General Agreement

Present U.S. Text:

2. This General Agreement and implementation of the contacts, exchanges and cooperation under it shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, the Parties will make every effort to promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of these contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

Soviet Text:

2. These contacts, exchanges and cooperation will be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws and regulations existing in each country. Within this framework, the Parties will take all necessary measures in implementing this Agreement to create appropriate conditions to carry out such cooperation and to ensure safety for the stay and normal work of all persons involved in Soviet-American exchanges.

Suggested new U.S. Text:

2. This General Agreement and implementation of the contacts, exchanges, and cooperation under it shall be subject to the constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries. Within this framework, the parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable circumstances for such cooperation, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in U.S.-Soviet exchanges.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Para 3 of Article III of the Program

Present U.S Text:

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2, above, the Parties will do all within their legal powers to ensure maximum favorable conditions for those performances and tours.

Soviet Text: None on this issue

Suggested new U.S. Text:

3. For the tours of the groups and individuals specified under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Parties will do all within their legal powers to insure maximum favorable circumstances for these performances and tours, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in them.

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Sentence 2 of Para 1 of Article VII of the Program

Present U.S. Text:

Within this framework, both Parties will promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of these exchanges and visits in accordance with the provisions and objectives of the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, signed on _____.

Soviet Text:

Within this framework, while implementing this Program, the Parties will take all necessary measures to create proper conditions for fulfillment of these exchanges and visits and to insure security during the stay and normal work of all persons participating in Soviet-American exchanges.

Suggested new U.S. Text:

Within this framework, both parties will take all appropriate measures to ensure favorable circumstances for such cooperation, to promote the safety of, and normal working conditions for, those participating in U.S.-Soviet exchanges in accordance with the provisions and objectives of this Program and of the General Agreement signed on _____.

~~SECRET~~

File 12
11914

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 14, 1984

*Matlock**Johns*
*HOW HAS ST.*INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Status of Negotiation of Cultural Exchange Agreement with Soviets

Art Hartman presented our draft agreement to Gromyko when they met July 5. Subsequently, the Soviets notified us of their negotiator (one Churlin, a decent type as Soviets go, who has worked on cultural affairs for MFA -- and on the UN Secretariat staff -- for many years). They have indicated that they will be prepared to begin negotiations shortly, but have not yet set a date.

At present, our PAO in Moscow, Ray Benson, is on leave. He will be Hartman's principal deputy for the negotiations, and will do the day-to-day stuff. Benson is prepared to return to Moscow immediately, however, to accommodate any date the Soviets suggest.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR 506-114/11 #11914
 BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

5434

Jack Mallock
Where do
we stand
on the Cultural
Agreement talks?
Bud

7-13-84



National Security Council
The White House

5434

System # I

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Staff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____


I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Action Muttlock
Memo to RCM
due 7/16



SOVIET-U.S. ACCORD TO SPEED HOT LINE IS CLOSE TO SIGNING

Reagan Pressing Other Talks to Show Kremlin Will Work With Him on Key Issues

By **LESLIE H. GELB**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 12 — The Soviet Union and the United States are expected to initial an agreement in the next few days to modernize the existing hot line for crisis communications between the two governments.

Administration officials and foreign diplomats said the accord was part of an expanding agenda of nonpolitical discussions between the two sides.

In coming weeks, the sources said, talks will resume on the Soviet-United States boundary in the Bering Sea, on Soviet fishing rights in American waters and on cultural exchanges.

While Soviet diplomats appear to be playing down the discussions as minor and technical, both sides recognize the broader implications. It is understood on both sides that the Reagan Administration will use the increased activity to argue that the Kremlin is prepared to work with President Reagan, contrary to Democratic accusations.

Hot Line Dates from 1963

The initialing of the pact for modernizing the 21-year-old hot line is said to be planned tentatively for Friday or Monday.

Officials said that, in deference to Soviet wishes, the signing will not be portrayed as a breakthrough in relations. But the Soviet side has acceded to American wishes to have the document signed at a level higher than the heads of delegations.

It is to be signed by Viktor F. Isakov, the senior Soviet diplomat here in the absence of Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, and by Kenneth W. Dam, the Deputy Secretary of State.

The two countries have also worked out new arrangements on consular procedures such as new visa rules and exit and entry points and have agreed on the resumption of a 10-year umbrella accord on economic cooperation.

Administration officials said the Soviet Union has been informed that the plane of Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko will be allowed to land at Kennedy International Airport in New York when he attends the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Last year, permission was refused by the Port Authority of New York and

Hot-Line Agreement Is Near; U.S. Seeks More Soviet Talk

Continued From Page A1

down of a South Korean airliner. Mr. Gromyko declined to use another airport and did not come.

Officials said the Federal Government had been assured by the local authorities that no obstacle would be put in Mr. Gromyko's way this year.

Still in abeyance and considered by both sides to be the most important current matter is the issue of the talks on space weapons proposed by the Soviet Union for Vienna in September.

The United States agreed to such a meeting, but reserved the right to bring up other arms control issues.

The Soviet Union said that this meant the United States was imposing preconditions and that the two sides would first have to agree on what they would talk about. Each side now insists that the ball is in the other's court.

[In Moscow, a statement Thursday by the Government press agency Tass reiterated the Soviet position that no "positive response" had been received from the United States.]

The original hot-line agreement was signed after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as a way of exchanging information to avoid nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

Last year, as part of a package confidence-building measures, President Reagan proposed modernizing the equipment, which can handle on about 60 words a minute. The new equipment allows for almost instantaneous transmission of texts and can transmit graphics and pictures.

Technical differences were resolved in Moscow in April, but completion was delayed because of disagreement over who would sign and what kind of a nouncement would be made.

The Soviet Union remains reluctant to give the appearance of establishing working relationship with the Reagan Administration. But the Russians appear to be responding to specific non-political proposals.

Essentially, American officials said the United States has been trying to revive a number of lesser accords that date from the Nixon Administration but were shelved by President Jimmy Carter after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979.

The United States has also proposed renewing cultural exchanges, but the Soviet Union has responded that existing provisions do not deal adequately with the security of Soviet artists while on tour in the United States.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

April 9, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Cultural Exchange Agreement

I have prepared a memo instructing State to obtain the comments of the IG/CI on the draft Cultural Exchange Agreement by Friday, April 13.

Regarding John Lenczowski's comments, I believe it is inaccurate to view them in the context of government-to-government versus people-to-people exchanges. The basic fact is that any agreement on exchanges with the Soviet Union must be between governments. This may be an unpalatable fact, given the nature of the Soviet regime, but it is nonetheless a fact.

Secondly, I would point out that the State-USIA draft agreement does provide a framework which encompasses a wide variety of people-to-people contacts. The effect of exhibits, for example, is almost entirely people to people: our exhibits draw enormous crowds of Soviet citizens from all walks of life; people have not been prevented from attending in the past, though they often must wait hours in line (a result of the sheer popularity of these exhibits). And, when inside, they have the opportunity to speak with American guides -- and not infrequently strike up friendships with a follow-up outside. Of course the KGB watches the exhibits and attempts to monitor contacts, but has been quite unsuccessful in preventing the contacts which result.

This factor is present, mutatis mutandis, in all the other provisions, though less spectacularly so. We cannot force the Soviets to become a free society in order to have exchanges with us. The regime will try to control the contacts, and they will put ringers and watchdogs in most or all of their groups. But this by no means excludes "real people." If it did, we wouldn't have so many defections. The fact is, to make the exchanges credible at all, they must include real dancers, real musicians, real professors, etc., or else their prestige suffers greatly. And the counterpart organizations in the U.S. (with advice and support from the USG) can act to maximize the inclusion of the people we want by withholding approval of a particular exchange until the Soviets come up with a credible slate of participants.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR E06-114/11 #11915
BY K M1 NARA DATE 5/2/11

In sum, the problem should not be viewed as one of trading off government-to-government contacts for people-to-people contacts. Our aim must be to secure a framework which enables us to maximize people-to-people contacts with Soviet Government acquiescence. Without that acquiescence, there will be no substantial contact at all, given the nature of the Soviet system. And just as the charge of the light brigade was not necessarily the most effective tactical approach in achieving a military objective, confronting the Soviet regime head-on with our desire to exclude it in our contacts with its citizens hardly represents the most effective way to achieve our goal for exchanges. Flanking manoeuvres, deceptive strikes, and other military tactics have their counterparts in diplomacy, and if we exclude them on grounds of ideological purity, then this would be as shattering to an effective diplomacy as a military doctrine which allowed only frontal attacks on the most heavily fortified positions would be to effective military operations.

We must also be mindful of three other factors. First, exchange agreements have a long history in U.S.-Soviet relations, and given the conservative nature of the Soviet bureaucracy, it will be easier to negotiate provisions for which there is a precedent than those for which there is none. There are, therefore, direct trade-offs between innovations and delays in getting an agreement in place. Second, it has been my understanding that a cultural exchange agreement was considered by the President as one of the moves we could take to demonstrate that we can agree on something and to improve the working relationship. Steps on our part which unnecessarily result in delay undermine achieving this objective. Finally, if one subsidiary aim of negotiating this agreement is to convince the Soviets that we are serious about improving the relationship, then including quixotic demands is certain to convince them of precisely the opposite.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Treaties & Agreements 19

re: 90307
Add on

11916

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Cultural Exchange Agreement

As we discussed on the phone I think Ken and John have some points that need to be considered. Before I send the package in to Bud (I have discussed this with him) I think a compromise memo with options needs to be prepared to pull the whole issue together. One thing that must be kept in mind is that the President has two objectives -- improving the people-to-people relationship as well as improving the government-to-government relationship. John's points push too far in the direction of people-to-people while ignoring the government-to-government aspects. Some of John's points could be included in our transmittal memo to State as goals to work toward in actually implementing an agreement. On the intelligence aspects it seems to me that any agreement whatsoever has intelligence advantages and disadvantages. Since the President has already decided to proceed ahead with attempting to negotiate an agreement, as originally stated in NSDD 75, it is only a matter of getting the CI community comments on the proposed negotiating position. I would like to get back within a week the IG/CI comments on the document. This needs to move rapidly to avoid undue delay. We erred in not providing more explicit guidance to State on coordinating this issue even though it is sensitive.

cc: Ken deGraffenreid
John Lenczowski
Diane Dornan

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR EO 11652 #11916

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

419

Jack Matlock -

I have seen JP's
note to you. It seems
that the underlined might
be usable - the rest
is rhetoric & unrealistic.
Gen & I will coordinate

Wattsgard

NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

What follows is a list of changes that should be made in our general negotiating strategy, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges and our overall exchanges policy. (S)

1. Both the General Agreement and the Program of Exchanges should be amended to take into account the exchanges policy as determined by the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations, approved by the NSC on December 5, 1983. Specifically the agreements should be reconstructed so as to maximize contact with non-official Soviet groups and individuals. The principle here is to avoid equating genuine Congressmen, journalists, etc., with ersatz Soviet parliamentarians, "journalists," etc., and thus to ensure that exchanges will be on a genuine people-to-people basis as opposed to a people-to-government basis. (S)
2. Exchanges should be conducted only with non-official groups and individuals except in fields where they do not exist. These include: human rights groups, independent peace groups (such as the Group for the Promotion of Trust between the U.S. and USSR), the Group for the Defense of the Rights of Disabled People, the independent Veterans' rights group, The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of the Monuments of History and Culture, samizdat writers and publishers, etc. (S)
3. To facilitate exchanges with independent groups and individuals, the principle by which exchangees should be nominated should be changed from exclusively "sending-side nominates" to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and "receiving-side invites." (S)
4. The agreements should be modified so as to minimize the degree to which the U.S. aids the Soviet regime in its attempts to enforce political conformity. This means we should minimize exchanges with individuals whose political conformity the regime can reward with exchange trips to the United States. Instead, we should seek out individuals who refuse to participate in such regime-orchestrated efforts as revocation of refuseniks' academic credentials, public letters attacking Sakharov, and the like. (S)
5. We should set up an independent agency entitled the Board of International Exchanges (BIE) (analogous to the Board for International Broadcasting), whose responsibilities would include: identifying independent, non-official Soviet groups and individuals, establishing criteria to measure their independence, putting such independent groups in contact with their U.S. counterparts, and reviewing Soviet

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BY KML NARA DATES 5/2/11

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exchange candidates requested by U.S. private groups. The last of these functions is important because private U.S. parties may have motivations for receiving Soviet visitors that are irrelevant or contrary to the purposes of the exchanges, such as career advancement, justification of monetary claims on universities for return visits to the USSR, etc. (S)

6. Full reciprocity in access to people, mass media, libraries, archives, research facilities, copying machines, and geographic areas should be ensured in the texts. Soviet exchangees should be subject to the same travel restrictions as Soviet diplomats, or American exchangees must be permitted access to those closed areas of the USSR that reciprocate U.S. restricted areas. All publications of articles and other literature, and media appearances by Soviet exchangees must be reported to the BIE, which, in turn, will ensure that analogous media in the USSR will offer reciprocal opportunities for publication and media appearances. The agreements should be modified to contain such a media-access provision. (S)
7. All private exchanges must be subsumed under the framework of these agreements. (S)
8. All Soviet exchanges must be subjected to prior review by the interagency group on Counter-Intelligence and the Interagency Committee on Exchanges. (S)
9. No scientific or technical exchanges will be part of these agreements. (S)
10. All references to joint cooperation in film projects, TV, textbooks and the like should be eliminated from these agreements. (S)
11. The provisions on exchanged TV appearances should incorporate the following points: a) U.S. speakers will have the right to use a U.S. interpreter over Soviet TV and vice versa; b) U.S. representatives must be permitted to monitor the TV signal (while the U.S. speaker is on the air) in locations throughout the USSR and vice versa; c) if the signal is not sufficiently widespread, subsequent TV appearances by the opposite side will be reduced accordingly; d) there will be no prior review or censorship of televised remarks; and e) 50 percent of TV speakers must have no professional affiliation with party or state. The choice of American non-governmental spokesmen will be made by the National Endowment for Democracy. (S)
12. The U.S. will unequivocally reject any Soviet attempt in negotiations to secure the return of defectors. (S)

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13. Before negotiations proceed, the U.S. will change the existing visa-granting process to permit foreign policy controls. This must be done either: a) by final passage of new legislation eliminating the McGovern Amendment; or b) invoking the Baker Amendment until such time as it may be necessary to change existing law. This will immediately enhance our negotiating position and establish immediate control over private exchanges. (S)
14. All "Congressional" and federal (or All-Union) government exchanges should be eliminated from these agreements. If governmental exchanges are to take place, it should be in the category of tourism. (S)
15. No exchanges between journalists or trade union officials should take place unless it can be determined that the Soviet participants are not representatives of the Soviet government. (S)
16. The distribution of publications should be made fully reciprocal. The two sides should be able to distribute copies of America Illustrated and Soviet Life to any citizen of the other country free of charge, not just at exhibits but through kiosks or other vending devices. Diplomatic personnel should be permitted to share these publications with any citizen of the host country. (S)
17. The provisions on exhibits should not include any references to prior diplomatic approval of the exhibits' contents. Instead the agreement will represent the good faith of both parties to conduct exhibit exchanges in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. Access to exhibits must be free and unrestricted. Security both inside and outside the exhibit halls will be provided by the exhibiting country so as to ensure free access. The U.S. will propose as part of the agreement (and will make public the proposal when it is put forward) that both sides should establish permanent exhibits in each other's capitals where the public can have free access to books, films, television programs, and other exhibits. (S)
18. The U.S. shall make proposals for exchanges of workers, farmers, churchmen, seminarians and other non-official, independent groups. Youth exchanges should also be included, however with the definition of "youth" specified as including persons 13-to-25 years old. Our youth strategy -- especially for high schoolers -- should include large numbers of exchangees, include unstructured itineraries (so the youth can engage in independent explorations) and should encompass long periods of time (several months). (S)
19. The treaty language should not contain any politically-oriented homonyms which can be subject to different, ideologically-based interpretations. As an example, the

word "cooperation" should be eliminated from the agreement's title. The purpose here is not only to avoid differing interpretations but to avoid gratuitous legitimation of illegitimate Soviet institutions and concepts. (S)

20. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet TV should be changed to "country-wide" so as to avoid legitimizing Soviet "nationhood." (S)
21. A training program, composed mostly of written briefing materials, must be initiated for all U.S. exchangees and hosts as a mandatory requirement for participation. Materials must explain: the basic nature of the Soviet system, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how the Soviets are trained in propaganda, disinformation, and technology theft techniques. This is to help the process of understanding the USSR. (S)
22. All references to the Russian language as the official Soviet language should be eliminated from the agreements. These only serve to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification. Instead all references to language exchanges must include the possibility of the choice of language so that U.S. exchangees might study Ukrainian, Armenian, etc. (S)
23. The U.S. should establish a debriefing program for all U.S. exchangees travelling to the USSR. This should be done in cooperation with the intelligence community as well as with those agencies working on public diplomacy. (S)
24. All sports exchanges should take place in a single locality to be recommended by the counterintelligence community so as to avoid giving Soviet Spetsnaz personnel the opportunity for reconnaissance operations. (S)
25. U.S. negotiators are instructed not to yield on any question of reciprocal access. (S)

Raymond 25

SYSTEM II
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11918

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 4, 1984

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/11 # 11918

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

I have examined carefully the State Department strategy paper on negotiating a new U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement, the draft General Agreement, the draft Program of Exchanges, and Ambassador Matlock's memorandum recommending approval of these documents as they stand. If, as the Ambassador suggests, our purpose is to achieve full reciprocity with the Soviets, the State Department strategy as presented will not succeed. As it currently stands, it contains so many serious defects and loopholes that the Soviets will be able to exploit it in such a way as to render the arrangement very one-sided and damaging to U.S. interests. As I have learned from Ken de Graffenreid, this strategy was not submitted to the Committee on Exchanges or any properly constituted counterintelligence interagency group for proper scrutiny. Thus, I believe much more work needs to be done to ensure that we do not hastily commit ourselves to a major mistake with considerable national security consequences.

The Lack of Reciprocity in Political Interests

Signing almost any exchange agreement with the USSR is bound to be unreciprocal arrangement no matter how skillfully we craft the treaty language. This is so because of the very nature of the two different political systems. Since the President has made the decision to negotiate such an agreement without, to my knowledge, having had the benefit of any coherent explanation of this point of view, suffice it to review four major points which should be kept in mind when considering the treaty provisions:

1. Soviet objectives in any such agreement are clear and unambiguous. They are to conduct disinformation, propaganda and technology theft against the American people for the purpose of perpetuating false U.S. perceptions of the Soviet system and its intentions, encouraging political change in the United States and to increase Soviet military strength. Soviet exchangees in the educational field are to engage in disseminating political messages and conducting strategic deception. Exchanges in the arts and sports are to conduct "conditioning" propaganda, designed to "soften up" audiences to make them more susceptible to subsequent political

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messages. Sportsmen are often Spetsnaz personnel conducting reconnaissance operations with an eye to future military special operations. Scientific and technical exchangees are sent mostly to acquire U.S. technology for the Soviet military.

2. Our objectives are either not entirely clear or not entirely reciprocal. When Secretary Shultz made his initial pitch for an exchange agreement and opening new consulates a year ago, his memo to the President was entitled "Promoting Political Change in the USSR." This was a clear public diplomacy objective as set forth in NSDD 75. In subsequent strategy memoranda, however, it soon became clear that the Presidentially mandated objective of promoting political change through public diplomacy was taking a distant second place to the higher State Department priority, namely, improved relations between governments as opposed to peoples. In the current strategy there is no reference to promoting political change and the draft agreements are presently constructed entirely to promote government-to-government relations as opposed to public diplomacy.
3. Governmental objectives versus Exchangee objectives. Because of the way the Soviet system works, Soviet exchangees and hosts will almost all be working as Soviet government agents. Most will have been trained to conduct their specific propagandistic or other missions with the result that the Soviet government's objectives will be congruent with those of their exchangees. Because of the nature of our system, the same cannot be the case with our exchangees and American hosts, most of whom will participate, not for purposes of encouraging political change or detente, but for the advancement of culture, knowledge or their own personal careers.
4. Granting Versus Receiving Legitimacy. Almost any exchange agreement of this sort will have the effect of giving the Soviet regime the appearance of having the legitimacy it craves but can never have in reality -- both in international eyes as well as internally. When a genuine American Congressman or journalist exchanges visits with Soviet government propagandists disguised as "Parliamentarians" or "journalists," we are accomplices to a deception. We, of course, gain no reciprocal benefits in legitimacy. And, in addition, we give up one of the only forms of leverage we have in dealing with the Soviets. As Dr. Pipes wrote in his recent article, this leverage "consists in doing nothing that might enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet dictatorship." Thus, if we are to avoid the worst potential pitfalls, the challenge we face is to attempt to have exchanges with real people, and genuine, legitimate organizations and not with fake ones.

Given these realities, most any agreement we sign is likely to be unreciprocal and therefore biased in favor of Soviet interests. The Soviets have many times declared their support of such agreements: they certainly are not going to buy a pig in a poke. The agreement at hand is something the Soviets will sign with alacrity (after trying to squeeze more from us in negotiations), because it gives the appearance of reciprocity in form but is utterly unreciprocal in political substance.

Defects in the State Department Strategy and Draft Agreements

1. The principal defect is that the existing documents are based on the premise of accepting Soviet institutions at face value. This is nothing other than falling for the ruse of Potomkin villages, and transmitting the message to the world that these Potemkin villages are the reality of Soviet life. The draft agreements are constructed so that we will deal with ersatz organizations rather than real ones, with Soviet government agents rather than with real authors, editors, artists and Parliamentarians. These documents were drafted with complete disregard to the Action Plan for Public Diplomacy on U.S.-Soviet Relations (which both you and Under Secretary Eagleburger approved after full interagency clearance). This Action Plan specifically says: "an Exchanges Agreement should attempt to maximize contacts with unofficial society (rather than with ersatz 'Soviet life' as it is displayed by the Soviet regime). Specifically, we should attempt, where possible, to provide for relations with such unofficial groups as exist in the USSR rather than official groups." The State Department documents have no provisions which follow this advice.

2. The existing documents include certain types of exchanges which do not really serve the goals of the Agreement as set forth in its preamble, namely "to promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and to help improve the general state of relations between the two countries." Specifically, scientific and technical exchanges are only of extremely limited value to the achievement of these goals. There is even a tacit admission of this fact in the strategy's expressed desire to limit scientific and technical exchanges to no more than 50 percent of academic exchanges. In fact, this represents recognition that the Soviets are less interested in the stated objectives than in securing technological and military advantages. And, indeed, the aforementioned Action Plan specifically recommends that scientific and technical contacts be reduced. There is consequently no reason why we should not restrict academic exchanges to those which actually promote better understanding between peoples.

3. Insofar as the existing documents would have us deal with official and ersatz Soviet institutions, they put us in the position of being accomplices to Soviet efforts to enforce communist conformity within the USSR. By receiving exchangees that are to be chosen by the Soviet government, we encourage subservience by Soviet citizens to the regime. This occurs

because the exchange agreement enables the regime to reward faithful conformists with one of the most coveted of Soviet luxuries: plum trips abroad and the chance to escape the gray tedium of Soviet daily life. This process, needless to say, can only help to demoralize those Soviet citizens who seek true artistic and scholarly independence from Soviet ideological strictures. It is ironic that these people, who are spiritually the greatest allies America has in Soviet society, will be the very ones denied the fresh breath of air of freedom that an exchange could give them. I seriously doubt that this is the result the President wants to be responsible for.

4. The existing documents contain large loopholes on the question of reciprocity in access to the respective societies. The State Department is forever complaining about lack of access to Soviet officialdom, and in its previous strategy papers, stressed that an exchange agreement would improve this situation. Perhaps the draft Agreements will help this objective a little but they certainly give short shrift to the real access problem, namely, access to people, to libraries, to research facilities, to the mass media, and to different regions of the USSR. The existing documents offer complete lack of reciprocity in travel. Soviet exchangees are not prohibited from entering areas in the U.S. that are closed to Soviet diplomats, whereas U.S. exchangees in the USSR (with very few exceptions) are so restricted. This lack of reciprocity is compounded by the fact that Soviet closed areas are much larger in practice than on the official maps, and total some 99 percent of Soviet territory. U.S. exchangees will thus be restricted to the remaining one percent which Soviet citizens call "Soviet Tourlandia."

5. The State Department documents fail to cover critical features of exchanged TV appearances. The President might appear on Soviet TV, but as things stand, the Soviets might demand prior censorship of his remarks (if the State Department drafters themselves don't try to reduce the speech to the level of self-censored pabulum that appears in America Illustrated). Further, the President's remarks might be translated for Soviet viewers by a Soviet interpreter who, as has happened in the past, will employ a tone of indifference, impatience, exasperation, turgidity, pompousness, ridicule and acid. In addition, State's draft ignores the possibility and desirability of TV appearances by people other than official representatives. U.S. Government officials will always be restrained from telling the blunt truth and conducting optimum public diplomacy because of the exigencies of bilateral governmental relations.

6. The proposal to engage in joint cooperation in film projects, TV, and textbooks is an idea with a very dubious track record that we should avoid at all costs. Such projects will pit trained Soviet professional propagandists against naive American idealists. The net result will inevitably be like previous such endeavors: namely, Soviet propaganda (e.g., the jointly produced propaganda film, The Unknown War, narrated by Burt Lancaster, but with 98 percent Soviet film footage).

29

7. For all its emphasis on exhibits, State has failed to construct sufficient precautions in its draft agreement. There is no assurance of free and unlimited access to U.S. exhibits in the USSR, and no suggested mechanisms, like U.S. responsibility for security inside and outside the exhibits, which could ensure such access. The idea that the subject matter of exhibits should be subject to diplomatic agreement violates the entire purpose of the enterprise. Each side should be free to exhibit whatever it chooses. And if the Soviets object to this, they will be telling us unequivocally that their objectives are not as stated in the agreement's preamble.

8. The regular references in the agreement to the Russian language as the language of the USSR serves only to legitimize Soviet efforts at Russification of the captive nations within the Soviet empire. All references to language study exchanges should include the possibility of studying other Soviet languages, e.g., Ukrainian, Armenian, Uzbek, etc.

9. The reference to "nation-wide" Soviet television is an example of sloppy semantics which gives legitimacy to the idea that the Soviet empire is a real nation. This only has the effect of supporting the grip the Soviets have over real nations which desire the right to self-determination.

10. The State documents omit other categories of possible exchangees such as workers, farmers, churchmen and seminarians, and real youth of the ages 13 to 25 (the kind the Soviets spirited out of Moscow during the 1980 Olympics to isolate them from foreign influences). Any Soviet youth involved in State's proposed exchange agreement will inevitably turn out to be 45-year old Komsomol apparatchiks.

11. Finally, State's strategy utterly fails to address one critical issue which an exchange agreement was supposed to solve (at least according to previous State Department justifications). This is the problem of private exchanges that go on outside the framework of any agreement. If we are to be sensitive about the counterintelligence issues here, the draft agreement should channel all exchanges through the official exchanges framework.

Suggested Remedies to Approach Greater Reciprocity

In addition to those remedies that are suggested by the above defects, there are a variety of other constructive measures we can add to the draft agreements and to our overall exchanges policy to attempt to approach what is in fact unachievable -- namely, full reciprocity. Among others, these measures include:

- Changing the principle by which exchanges are invited from exclusively a "sending side nominates" principle to a 50-50 arrangement between that principle and a "receiving side invites" principle.

- Inviting groups unaffiliated with Party or state except where such groups do not exist. (E.g., there are independent peace groups, veterans' rights groups, handicapped peoples' rights groups, human rights groups, cultural heritage groups, etc.).
- Establishing an independent Board of International Exchanges (BIE), analogous to the Board for International Broadcasting, which would identify non-official groups and uncoopted individuals, establish criteria for measuring their true independence from the regime, and put these people in contact with their U.S. counterparts. This mechanism would enable us to invite scholars who refused to participate in regime-organized revocations of refuseniks' academic degrees, or scholars who refused to sign official letters attacking Sakharov. This process would give moral support and encouragement to conscientious behavior rather than rewarding subservience to the regime and complicity in official violations of human rights.
- Changing the visa granting process so that we can enforce reciprocity and enhance our negotiating position.
- Proposing permanent exhibits in the respective capitals which would distribute literature, show films, etc. These should have unlimited access with Americans and not Soviets providing security on the outside at the Moscow exhibition site.
- Establishing a training program for U.S. exchangees and hosts. All participants would have to read materials explaining: the realities of Soviet life, the types of Potemkin villages they will be shown, what to expect from Soviet exchangees and hosts, and how Soviet personnel are trained in propaganda, disinformation and technology theft techniques.
- Establishing a debriefing program for U.S. exchangees.

These and other, more specific remedies are outlined in Tab A, an attachment with NSC-recommended changes for the draft agreements and our exchanges policy. If you agree with these recommended changes, this attachment would accompany the Kimmitt-Hill memorandum at Tab I.

Conclusion

The State Department documents, as they stand, amount to a windfall for the Soviets in political, technological, propaganda, disinformation and espionage benefits. The lack of reciprocity in these documents can send the Soviets only one message: we are not serious about public diplomacy, but rather, we are so eager for the appearances of good relations between governments that we are willing to be accomplices to Soviet deceptions and willing to sacrifice principle as well as reciprocal political benefits to ourselves.

If better bilateral governmental relations are what we really want here, then there are better ways of doing it than running the many political, intelligence and even military risks to which State's documents will subject us.

If we want to be serious about upholding the first pillar of the President's policy toward the USSR, namely "realism" (in addition to "strength" and "willingness to negotiate"), then we must reconstruct our negotiating position so as to enhance realistic perceptions of the USSR rather than subverting them as the current documents will do.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to send the attached memorandum (Tab I) to the Department of State with the accompanying set of NSC changes (Tab A).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you share this memo with the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum.
- Tab A Attachment to Tab I.

cc: Jack Matlock
Walt Raymond
Steve Steiner
Ken de Graffenreid

~~SECRET~~

11919 32
SYSTEM II
90307

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Exchanges Agreement with the USSR (S)

The strategy paper for negotiations with the USSR on exchanges with accompanying draft agreements transmitted by your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of March 23 has not been approved. (S)

Attached at Tab A is a list of NSC changes to the negotiating strategy, the draft agreements and our overall exchanges policy. These changes should be incorporated into a new strategy paper and new draft agreements and then these should be submitted for full interagency review to the U.S.-Soviet Public Diplomacy Subcommittee of the International Political Committee, the TTIC/Committee on Exchanges, and the IG for Counterintelligence. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A NSC Changes to U.S.-USSR Exchanges Policy (S)

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NLRR F06-114/11 # 11919

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

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USSR - Agreements 8674 33
~~Matlock~~
File
11920

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Status of Consulates and Exchange Agreements
with USSR

According to NSDD-102 (KAL actions), negotiations on these topics were "suspended." This remains our policy. I don't think there is any confusion about this in the bureaucracy. I doubt that we need a clarification unless and until a decision is made to change NSDD-102.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI-114/11 #11920

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

11922 36



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 NOV 1983

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: OSD Participation in Decisions on US-Soviet Exchange
and Consulate Matters

Whether to proceed with new US-Soviet scientific and cultural exchanges and whether to negotiate with the Soviets the opening of new consulates are issues involving political, intelligence, and technology transfer questions in which OSD has great interest. Those issues were discussed in the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Working Group, which produced the recent draft NSDD and in which OSD participated actively.

I have learned, however -- originally from a Hedrick Smith article in The New York Times -- that decisions on exchanges and consulates were taken last summer in a forum which did not include OSD. As those decisions were suspended following the attack on KAL 007, I hope you can assure me that they will not be implemented without further interagency review in which OSD will be invited to participate.

Richard Perle
Richard Perle

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR E06-114/11 #11922
BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

National Security Council The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary _____

John Poindexter _____

Wilma Hall _____

Bud McFarlane _____

John Poindexter _____

Executive Secretary _____

NSC Secretariat _____

Situation Room _____

MATLOCK 3 _____ A

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

*Jack,
It seems to me OSD was
involved in decision. J*

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # _____

03 11 20 24:44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Executive Secretary	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>Action</u>
<u>Put in System I -- formalize ←</u>			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Do we need to get out something clarifying the status of these two issues - Consultation and exchange agreement? J

National Security Council
The White House

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System # I
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I = Information
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Per conversation with Tom Shull
we took this out of system II and put
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COMMENTS

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251

THE WHITE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

National Security Council
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RECEIVED System # IV
Package # 91412
CT

83 NOV 29 A10:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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NLRR Feb-114/11 # 11923

System II

FILE - A1
US-USSR
Rel.
a. Cult. Exchanges

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

11923

Clark to Wick

SUBJECT: Reciprocity in US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of June 22, 1983

The President and I share the concerns you expressed in your memorandum of March 16, 1983, ~~concerning~~ ^{regarding} the ~~imbalance~~ lack of reciprocity in cultural and informational exchanges with the USSR, ~~as well as~~ ^{and appreciate} the advantages which a properly negotiated exchanges agreement might provide.

Accordingly, the President has authorized George Shultz to let the Soviets know that we are prepared to negotiate a new exchanges agreement with them if they are interested. We have no reply from the Soviets yet, but anticipate that they are likely to agree.

Our immediate task, therefore, is to prepare terms of reference for the negotiations, ^{in case the Soviets} ~~which will be undertaken~~ ~~would follow Soviet acceptance~~ We are accordingly tasking the State Department to prepare, on a close-hold basis and in full consultation with USIA and other interested agencies, ~~proposed terms of reference.~~

~~Since I am sure that your staff has given considerable thought to the matter,~~ We hope that the terms of reference can be ready for review in a couple of weeks.

Please caution your staff to confine knowledge of our preparations to those ^{persons} absolutely essential ^{to} the project. ~~staffing~~ It is imperative that we avoid leaks which would damage our negotiating position.

US-Sov 91
agreements

System II
90791

11924

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ACTION

June 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK E. MATLOCK *gm*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges

Charles Wick sent you a memorandum (Tab A) concerning the issue of reciprocity in US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges and the need to develop a draft agreement and negotiating strategy.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Secretary Shultz which forwards the Wick memorandum and requests that the Secretary brief the Director on the results of his recent 60-minute meeting with the President. Also, at Tab II is a memorandum from you to the Director, informing him that you forwarded his memorandum to Secretary Shultz, who will discuss the issue of exchanges with him shortly.

PD
Paula Dobriansky concurs.

Recommendation

That you sign the memoranda at Tabs I and II to Secretary Shultz and Director Wick, respectively.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for SecState
- Tab A Memorandum from Director Wick
- Tab II Memorandum for Director, USIA

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NLRR E06-114/11 #11924
BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

11925 d)

System II
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges (U)

At Tab A is a memorandum from Charlie Wick regarding the issue of US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges and the need to develop a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. I suggest that you brief Charlie on your recent 60-minute meeting with the President and his approval in principle of the desirability of negotiating a US-Soviet Cultural Agreement.

William P. Clark

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum from Director, USIA

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BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM 11
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11926

44

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges (U)

With regard to your memorandum of June 22 on reciprocity in US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, I have forwarded it to George Shultz and asked that he discuss this matter with you shortly.

William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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SENSITIVE

NLRR 606-114/11 #11926
BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547




SYSTEM II
90791

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

03 JUN 83 P.F. 51

June 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.

FROM: Charles Z. Wick 

SUBJECT: Reciprocity in US-Soviet Cultural Exchanges

Following up on the memo George Shultz and I sent to the President on "Promoting Political Change in the USSR" (Tab A), I would like to draw your attention to the attached telegrams from Moscow and Leningrad (Tabs B, C, and D).

In brief, they reflect the fact that American performers are confined to appearing in official U.S. residences in the Soviet Union, while Soviet performers can appear anywhere in the U.S.

I had hoped that the issue of exchanges with the Soviet Union, as outlined in the memo cited above, might be raised at our SPG meeting on June 8. The problem of imbalance and lack of strict reciprocity in exchanges with the Soviets will continue to persist until we deal with the issue. I look forward to your response on this matter.

Attachments

- A. Memorandum: "Promoting Political Change in the USSR"
- B. Moscow 6276 (LOU)
- C. Moscow 6700 (LOU)
- D. Leningrad 1354 (LOU)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT A)

Classified by: Charles Z. Wick
Office Symbol: D
Declassify (or downgrade) on:
"Originating Agency
Determination Required"

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOL - 114/11 #11930
BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

11931

~~SECRET~~/S

MEMORANDUM FOR:

From:

SUBJECT:

NSDD-75 set as a basic task political change within the USSR radio broadcasting, our most important penetration and promotion of exchanges activities and the extent that we should reverse a pattern instead expanding those which are promoting change in the Soviet official framework for handling reciprocity to prevent the Soviet advantage from their activities of our access to the Soviet per

This paper recommends an official framework which would level of reciprocity and ideological Union by the United States.

Problem and Opportunity

Vladimir Bukovsky has written when he visited the US National the one at which Khrushchev kitchen. But, we have had none since 1979. We have allowed aspects of the exchanges ago: the past three years we have created.

One of the main advantages they opened great fields of where we had a clear advantage provided the means to obtain growing Soviet effort to institutions and individuals

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOG-114/11 #11931

Y KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

Armand Hammer in partnership with Jerry Weintraub recently established an organization to bring Soviet cultural and other attractions to the US, with no known guarantee of reciprocity. We are also aware the Soviets are working with some other impresarios or individuals on possible performing arts tours, including a visit by the Moscow Circus this fall. The ready access that Soviet propagandists have to US media without reciprocity is well known. The Soviets arranged a series of Soviet film weeks at the prestigious Smithsonian Institution last fall.

Under current circumstances we have no ready means of enforcing reciprocity in such endeavors. The present visa law does not permit us to refuse visas for that purpose. The result is that, according to the FBI, there is an increasing percentage of KGB agents in the groups the Soviets are unilaterally sending to the U.S. We can better control this problem with a better handle on visa issuance. We are seeking changes to visa procedures that would permit us greater latitude in refusing visas for policy reasons. That could facilitate control over visits by obvious propagandists, but it would still be a clumsy weapon, poorly suited to dealing with highly visible cultural visits. We should, nevertheless, use our anticipated new ability to refuse visas as leverage to get a more satisfactory overall official exchanges framework permitting us to compete more effectively in the ideological conflict in which we are engaged.

Our previous exchanges agreements with the Soviet Union basically repeated the form and content of the first, concluded in 1958, and were never altogether satisfactory. In approaching a new official agreement we would review the old agreements and our current interests to determine what our negotiating targets should be without regard for what we may perceive as Soviet negotiating requirements. (We would, of course, prepare an estimate of Soviet positions as part of the preparations for negotiations.)

In developing our negotiating targets, our aim will be to improve our penetration of Soviet society. During the negotiations on a new overall framework for exchanges, we would concentrate on the following specific areas in which the U.S. has the clear advantage or in which, through enforcement of strict reciprocity, we need to offset a current advantage held by the Soviets:

USIA Thematic Exhibits -- Our exhibits, when in the USSR, provide the U.S. Government its best opportunity to acquaint millions of people in all walks of life throughout the Soviet Union with the many aspects of American life: our democratic system, our foreign and domestic policies and our hopes and aspirations for peace and prosperity for all peoples of the world. As a communication medium, in contrast to radio broadcasting, our exhibits bring the Soviet people into a two-way face-to-face dialogue with our American Russian-speaking guides who staff the exhibits. The Agency's exhibits had such overwhelming ideological impact that the exchange of thematic exhibits under the previous official exchanges agreements became anathema to the Soviet authorities. Thus, it is clear that if the U.S. Government once again is to take advantage of this most effective ideological weapon against the Soviet Union, it will be able to do so only by adopting the same negotiating position we used during previous negotiations -- no USIA thematic exhibits, no official exchanges agreement.

Radio and TV -- Currently, Soviet propagandists have easy access to US media without reciprocity. We will insist on greatly improved access to Soviet nation-wide electronic media to reach the largest possible audience with our message. For example, we have in mind setting an annual minimum for US and Soviet appearances on political discussion programs on each other's television.

Publications -- The US has always enjoyed a clear advantage in the popularity and appeal of our Russian-language America Illustrated magazine in the Soviet Union compared with its Soviet counterpart in the U.S., Soviet Life. In fact, the note you sent Charlie with the "special introductory offer" for Soviet Life (mailer attached at tab A) illustrates how they have to push their product. Our magazine goes like hot cakes in the Soviet Union. Under a new agreement we would seek to negotiate a higher level of distribution of our magazine inside the USSR.

Educational and Academic Exchanges -- With these exchanges we reach elite audiences, build long-term contacts inside institutions producing future Soviet leaders and help build and maintain the base of US expertise on the Soviet Union.

Performing Arts -- Performing groups presenting the finest of American theater, dance and music in modern, classical and popular genre can provide large numbers of Soviet citizens with a view of the exciting possibilities of free cultural development, a process denied by their system.

American and Soviet Films -- The Soviets have been able to put on film weeks in a number of major American cities, but we have received no reciprocity for this. Under a new exchanges agreement we would insist on reciprocal film weeks in the Soviet Union.

Access to Soviet Elites -- Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have almost unlimited access to our institutions, for which we will insist on reciprocity under the framework of a new agreement.

Should you decide to seek to negotiate a new framework for exchanges along the above lines, we will find the Soviets receptive in certain respects, although there will be a long fight on specifics. Soviet authorities believe that they derive political benefits from agreements with us. Ironically, they also know that official agreements serve a very practical purpose -- in their rigidly planned bureaucratic society official agreements make it easier to obtain the necessary budgets to finance the concrete expenditures encountered by the Soviet ministries and organizations engaged in exchanges-type activities in the US and the USSR.

A decision to move toward a new bilateral exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union will encounter some opposition as well as considerable support domestically. We will want to make the point to our public and the Congress that a new agreement enforcing reciprocity is to our great advantage (there is a strong constituency on the Hill for the exchanges.) In general, we believe that our Allies will welcome such a decision as further evidence of our willingness to deal seriously with the Soviet leadership. We will, of course, want to consult with the Allies before announcing any decision, to ensure that they fully understand our reasons and that they understand it is not a move to initiate a rapprochement with the USSR.

If you agree with our view of the importance of building a new framework for conducting exchanges and enforcing reciprocity, USIA will develop, in cooperation with the Department of State and other interested agencies, a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. When that process is completed, we would then propose to you appropriate timing for an approach to the Soviets on opening negotiations.

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to develop a draft exchanges agreement and negotiating strategy.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

PAGE 01

027536 ICA462
19/12482

027536 ICA462

ACTION OFFICE EU-03
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 PDC-04 PGMG-01 PGF-02
PGMR-01 PGMP-02 PPF-01 ECA-08 BV0-01 BBCA-01 BBCX-01
BVBE-01 BVBU-02 BVG-01 PPHI-02 PFFE-01 /038 A2 2

R 191244Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUENIA/USIA WASHDC 4237
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6759
INFO RUFHGL/AMCONSUL Leningrad 2242

BT
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ MOSCOW #6276

EU FOR DILLEN, P/RSE

STATE FOR EUR/SOEX

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: MINCULT: PERSONNEL SHIFTS AND LOCAL RELATIONS

1. SUMMARY: IN TWO RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH MINCULT REPS, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD OF MAJOR PERSONNEL SHIFT OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WESTERN RELATIONS WITHIN MINCULT'S FOREIGN SECTION. IN ADDITION, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] END SUMMARY.

2. AT A RECENT SPASO HOUSE EVENT, MINCULT AMERICAN DESK OFFICER VLADIMIR I. LITVINOV COYLY TOLD US THAT WE HAD SENT INVITATIONS TO THREE MINCULT OFFICIALS WHO NO LONGER WORKED AT THE MINISTRY. WHEN PRESSED, HE TOLD US THAT VASILYI F. KUKHARSKII, DEPUTY MINISTER (MUSIC) WAS ILL AND WOULD NO DOUBT SOON RETIRE; SERGEI S. IVAN'KO, CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SECTION, HAD RECEIVED A PROMOTION AND WAS NOW DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NOVOSTI, AND THAT IVAN'KO'S DEPUTY, IVAN I. BODYUL, HAD LEFT TO TAKE UP A POSITION IN HUNGARY. LITVINOV COMPLAINED THAT ALL HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THINGS AMERICAN, BUT NOW HE AND HIS BOSS, ALLA BUTROVA, (WHO WAS IN LENINGRAD FOR A COUPLE OF WEEKS) WERE THE ONLY ONES LEFT. HE KNEW OF NO IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENTS AND HE WAS LEFT, HE SAID, ATTENDING ALL OF THE MEETINGS. WHEN QUERIED ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE CHANGES, LITVINOV SAID THAT IF THERE WERE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MOVES, NO ONE HAD TOLD HIM. DETAILS OF SOLUM/KIPNIS FOLLOW SEPTEL.

3. LITVINOV THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS SOME OF THE REQUESTS THAT THE MINISTRY HAD RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN IMPRESSARIOS, BUT INDICATED THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE ON THEIR FEASIBILITY. THE GILELS CONCERT HAD COME OFF VERY WELL, BUT HE WAS A SPECIAL CASE. NOW THAT THE QUESTION CONCERNED THE MOSCOW CIRCUS FOR THIS FALL OR POSSIBLE LARGE GROUPS FOR THE OLYMPIC ARTS FESTIVAL, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LITVINOV OPINED THAT IT WOULD ALL BE SO MUCH EASIER IF THERE WERE A NEW AGREEMENT, BUT SAID HE THOUGHT THAT WAS A LONG WAY OFF.

4. LITVINOV TOLD US THAT THE MINISTRY HAD RECEIVED AN URGENT TELEX FROM JERRY WEINTRAUB ASKING THEM TO FACILITATE A VISA, BUT SINCE THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHY HE WANTED TO COME, THEY ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION. EMBOFF REMARKED THAT MINCULT AND WEINTRAUB HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING A DEAL FOR THE MOSCOW CIRCUS AND DIDN'T IT SEEM REASONABLE THAT THIS WAS THE SUBJECT. LITVINOV SAID THAT IT PROBABLY WAS, BUT THEY NEEDED CONFORMATION BEFORE SUPPORTING A VISA.

5. SOLUM/KIPNIS CONCERT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] POST HAD STRESSED THAT CONGEN LENINGRAD HAD HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN GETTING HELP IN THE PAST. EMBOFF INDICATED THE IRONY OF THE CURRENT SITUATION WHERE THE "UPRAVLENIE KULTURY" IN LENINGRAD HAD SECURED A HARPSICHORD FOR THE CONGEN'S RESIDENCE, ARRANGED MEETINGS AT THE CONSERVATORY, AND AT THE MUSEUM OF OLD INSTRUMENTS, WHILE IN MOSCOW, OUTSIDE OF ONE MEETING, THE EMBASSY HAD ARRANGED EVERYTHING ON ITS OWN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LITVINOV SAID THAT THE PROBLEMS AT THE GLINKA MUSEUM HAD CAUSED HIM PERSONAL EMBARRASSMENT BECAUSE HE HAD SET UP THE ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE GLINKA MANAGEMENT HAD BEEN EXCITED ABOUT THE CONCERT, AND WERE SURE THAT THEY COULD RESCHEDULE ANOTHER CONCERT SLATED AT THE SAME TIME, BUT FOUND OUT THEY COULDN'T. HE SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS, WHEN WE REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD FOUND THE HARPSICHORD AND AGREED TO THE LOAN WITH THE MUSICIAN HIMSELF. NONETHELESS, LITVINOV ASSURED US THAT AS FAR AS HE COULD HE WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH US [REDACTED] AND MEETINGS WITH MINCULT INSTITUTIONS. BUT, HE REPEATED, [REDACTED] ZIMMERMANN

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NLRR E06-114/11 #11933

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

038790 ICA454
27/1414Z

ACTION OFFICE PDC-04
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 PGM-01 EU-03 PGMR-01
/015 A2 2

R 271408Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4282
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7054
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2346
BT

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USIA FOR EU (DILLEN), P/RSE, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UR, OEXC, SCUL

SUBJECT: VISIT OF FLUTIST JOHN SOLUM AND HARPSICHORDIST

SCORES GIVEN THEM BY DENISOV.

6. NEXT STOP WAS MAYKAPAR'S APARTMENT FOR TALK ABOUT HARPSICHORDS AND THE STATUS OF BAROQUE MUSIC IN THE U. S. S. R. OVER TEA KIPNIS AND SOLUM ASKED MAYKAPAR NUMEROUS QUESTIONS ABOUT EARLY MUSIC IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR AN ARTICLE THEY WILL SUBMIT TO THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY JOURNAL "EARLY MUSIC." THOUGH THERE ARE VERY FEW GOOD HARPSICHORDISTS IN THE U. S. S. R. AND RELATIVELY LITTLE MATERIAL TRANSLATED INTO RUSSIAN, MAYKAPAR HAS MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO KEEP CURRENT WITH THE LITERATURE, AND KIPNIS HAS PROMISED TO SEND HIM SOME MATERIAL THROUGH P AND C. THE DAY CLOSED WITH A RELAXING DINNER AT THE CAO'S RESIDENCE.

7. COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO BEING EXCELLENT MUSICIANS, BOTH KIPNIS AND SOLUM MADE A STRONG PERSONAL IMPRESSION ON THEIR SOVIET COLLEAGUES. THEY RELATED EASILY AND WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS ANY NUMBER OF PROFESSIONAL ISSUES IN A LOW KEY INFORMAL WAY. SOLUM CLEARLY CAPTIVATED THE FLUTE STUDENTS WITH HIS "LOOSE-LIPPED" AMERICAN STYLE AND APPROACH TO MUSIC, WHILE KIPNIS AND SOVIET HARPSICHORDIST ALEXANDER MAYKAPAR IMMEDIATELY ESTABLISHED A COMMON LANGUAGE AND HAD A LIVELY EXCHANGE THROUGHOUT KIPNIS' STAY IN MOSCOW. END COMMENT. HARTMAN
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NLRR E06-114/11 #11934

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

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INFORMATION AGENCY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01

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01/0916Z

#42849 ICAB86

ACTION OFFICE PDC-04
INFO TCO-01 DSD-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 EU-03 /013 A1 15

R #10905Z JUN 83
FM AMCONSUL Leningrad
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC #178
RUEHIA.USIA WASHDC #240
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW #329

BT
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ Leningrad #1354

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SCUL, UR, US
SUBJECT: VISIT OF JOHN SOLUM AND IGOR KIPNIS TO Leningrad

1. SUMMARY. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IT ENABLED US TO ESTABLISH NEW CONTACTS IN THE MUSICAL WORLD AND SHOW OFF TWO SUPERB ARTISTS TO A SELECT GROUP OF SOVIET OFFICIALS AND MUSICIANS. END SUMMARY.

2. WHAT HAD INITIALLY BEEN A PROJECT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] TURNED OUT TO BE ONE OF THE PAST YEAR'S MOST SUCCESSFUL EVENTS. ESPECIALLY UNUSUAL WAS THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION WE RECEIVED FROM THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE'S Leningrad ARM, THE UPRAVLENIYE KUL'TURY, WHICH, AFTER PRELIMINARY FOOTDRAGGING, PRODUCED A HARPSICHORD AND VISITS TO THE CONSERVATORY AND TO THE OLD INSTRUMENTS MUSEUM, WHICH HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR REPAIR. WHILE THEY WERE HERE, SOLUM AND KIPNIS NOT ONLY GAVE A SUPERB CONCERT, BUT SPENT A FRUITFUL MORNING AT THE RIMSKIY-KORSAKOV CONSERVATORY AND HAD VALUABLE VISITS AT TWO ESPECIALLY INTERESTING MUSICAL MUSEUMS.

3. AS FOR THE CONCERT ITSELF, IT ATTRACTED A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WE DO NOT NORMALLY SEE FROM THE MUSICAL WORLD. THEY INCLUDED THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF LENKONCERT, DIRECTOR OF THE THEATER AND MUSIC MUSEUM, A NUMBER OF SYMPHONY MUSICIANS (MAINLY FROM THE KIROV ORCHESTRA AS THE Leningrad PHILHARMONIC WAS ON TOUR), TWO ORCHESTRA CONDUCTORS AND A SPRINKLING OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA. THE PROGRAM WAS IDEALLY SUITED TO ITS AUDIENCE, INCLUDING WORKS BY BOTH SOVIET AND AMERICAN COMPOSERS AND A SELECTION WHICH SOLUM PERFORMED ON HIS COPY OF AN ANTIQUE WOODEN FLUTE, THE ORIGINAL OF WHICH IS IN THE MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS MUSEUM IN Leningrad. AN ESPECIALLY ARRANGED BRUBECK PIECE USED AS THEIR FINAL ENCORE BROUGHT THE PROGRAM TO AN EXCITING CLIMAX.

4. DURING THEIR 2 1/2 HOUR VISIT TO THE CONSERVATORY BOTH U.S. MUSICIANS HAD A CHANCE TO VISIT WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS AND COMPARE NOTES ON TEACHING METHODS. A NUMBER OF SOVIETS PROVED ANXIOUS TO EXCHANGE ADDRESSES AND MAINTAIN CONTACT IN THE FUTURE.

5. THE FIRST OF THE TWO MUSEUMS VISITED WAS THAT DEVOTED TO THE GREAT RUSSIAN BASSO FYODOR CHALYAPIN. IT WAS ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE IN THAT KIPNIS' FATHER IS GENERALLY REGARDED TO HAVE BEEN THE BEST "BORIS" ASIDE FROM CHALYAPIN, WHO, OF COURSE HAD NO PEER. IGOR KIPNIS GAVE THE MUSEUM SEVERAL RECORDINGS BY HIS FATHER, AND HE AND SOLUM WERE TREATED TO A LAVISH SPREAD WHILE LISTENING TO A NUMBER OF OLD CHALYAPIN RECORDS.

6. IT WAS AT THE MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS MUSEUM, HOWEVER, THAT THE MOST EXCITING EVENT TOOK PLACE. THAT WAS WHEN SOLUM PLAYED THE ORIGINAL OF THE FLUTE WHICH HE HAD PERFORMED ON THE PREVIOUS EVENING. THIS ORIGINAL IS

THE MOST VALUABLE FLUTE IN THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH IT WAS SLIGHTLY OUT OF PITCH, DUE TO A MINOR FAULTY ADJUSTMENT IN THE CORK BY THE MOUTHPIECE, SOLUM NEVERTHELESS PRODUCED A GORGEOUS SOUND FROM THE INSTRUMENT. THE DIRECTOR OF THE MUSEUM GAVE ALL MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AUTOGRAPHED COPIES OF HIS BOOK AND THE TWO AMERICANS LEFT WITH ADDRESSES AND PROMISES TO STAY CLOSELY IN TOUCH, ESPECIALLY WITH RAVDONIKAS, THE LEADING SOVIET FLUTE MAKER.

7. WE ARE SENDING, ON SOLUM'S REQUEST, COPIES OF ALL OF HIS RECORDS, AND THOSE OF KIPNIS AS WELL, TO THE Leningrad RADIO TV MUSICAL LIBRARY FOR THEIR POSSIBLE USE IN THE FUTURE. WE HAVE ALSO TRANSMITTED ON HIS BEHALF SCORES EDITED BY HIM TO THE FIRST FLUTE OF THE KIROV ORCHESTRA.

8. ONE MAY BE FORGIVEN FOR REGARDING MUSIC OF THE FLUTE AND HARPSICHORD AS NOT THE MOST EXCITING THIS MEDIUM FIELD HAS TO OFFER. THESE TWO TALENTED MUSICIANS NONE-THELESS SUCCEEDED IN STIRRING THE AUDIENCE -- SUBTLY BUT EFFECTIVELY. WE ARE GRATEFUL TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROFIT FROM THEIR ARTISTRY. SHINN

BT
#1354

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CIS NARA, Date 8/1/02

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Chow*

PAGE 01

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27/1413Z

030791 ICA453

ACTION OFFICE POC-04
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 PGM-01 EU-03 PGMR-01
/015 A1 5

R 271400Z MAY 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4281
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7053
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2345
BT

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USIA FOR EU (DILLEN), P/RSE, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UR, OEXC, SCUL

SUBJECT: VISIT OF FLUTIST JOHN SOLUM AND HARPSICHORDIST
IGOR KIPNIS TO THE U.S.S.R. -- MAY 12-15

REF: MOSCOW 6276

1. SUMMARY: FLUTIST JOHN SOLUM AND HARPSICHORDIST
IGOR KIPNIS GAVE AN EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE AT SPASO
HOUSE AND, [REDACTED] (SEE REFTEL, PARA. 5),
MANAGED TO PACK A GOOD DEAL OF PROFESSIONAL CONTACT
INTO THEIR SHORT STAY. THEIR PROGRAM INCLUDED A VISIT
TO THE CONSERVATORY, [REDACTED], AND
TALKS WITH COMPOSERS, MUSICIANS, AND STUDENTS, BOTH
FOLLOWING THE SPASO HOUSE CONCERT AND THE FOLLOWING
DAY. SOLUM AND KIPNIS WERE GIVEN MUSIC BY SOVIET
COMPOSERS EDISON DENISOV AND VYECHESLAV ARTEMEV AND
PROMISED IN THEIR TURN TO SEND MATERIAL TO THE U.S.S.R.
THEY WILL ALSO SUBMIT A SHORT ARTICLE TO THE OXFORD
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL "EARLY MUSIC". IN ADDITION SOLUM
LEFT A NUMBER OF RECORDS FOR THE GOSTELRADIO COLLEC-
TION. IN SHORT THEY WERE MOST GENEROUS WITH THEIR
TIME AND EAGER TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THEIR SOVIET
COUNTERPARTS. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER ARRIVING IN MOSCOW VIA THE NIGHT TRAIN
FROM LENINGRAD, SOLUM AND KIPNIS SPENT THE MORNING
OF MAY 12 AT THE CONSERVATORY, WHERE THEY MET WITH
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WIND DEPARTMENT, R. P. TEREKHIN,
AND ONE OF THE FOREMOST FLUTE INSTRUCTORS IN THE SOVIET
UNION YURIY N. DOLZHNIKOV. SOLUM ALSO LISTENED TO
SEVERAL FLUTE STUDENTS, AMONG THEM LEONID LEBEDEV,
THE 18-YEAR-OLD WINNER OF THE RECENT ALL-UNION FLUTE
COMPETITION. ALTHOUGH THE HARPSICHORD INSTRUCTOR
WAS NOT AVAILABLE, KIPNIS DID MEET BRIEFLY WITH ONE
HARPSICHORD STUDENT. SOLUM LEFT MUSIC SCORES AND
RECORDS FOR BOTH DOLZHNIKOV AND THE CONSERVATORY
LIBRARY.

3. THAT AFTERNOON, KIPNIS REHEARSED WITH SOVIET
HARPSICHORDIST ALEXANDER MAYKAPAR, WHO SAVED THE
DAY FOR US IN MANY WAYS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE ALSO VOLUNTEERED TO TURN
PAGES FOR KIPNIS, AND THEN REARRANGED HIS SCHEDULE
SO THAT KIPNIS COULD REHEARSE EARLIER THAN ORIGINALLY
PLANNED. THE REHEARSAL ITSELF WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE
OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE AS KIPNIS AND MAYKAPAR EXCHANGED
NOTES ON FINGERING, TECHNIQUE, AND ALL MANNER OF HARP-

SICHORD ARCANA.

4. THE NEXT DAY WAS DEVOTED TO SETTING UP, REHEARSING,
AND THEN A MARVELOUS CONCERT IN THE CHANDELIER ROOM
AT SPASO HOUSE, WHERE BOTH ATMOSPHERE AND ACOUSTICS
COMPLEMENTED THE VIRTUOSO PLAYING OF THE TWO AMERICANS.
AFTER THE CONCERT BOTH MUSICIANS TALKED AT LENGTH
WITH SOVIET COMPOSERS AND MUSICIANS WHO ATTENDED
THE CONCERTS. THE CONSERVATORY FLUTE STUDENTS ALSO
HOMED IN ON SOLUM. OFFICIAL ATTENDANCE WAS LIGHT, AND
APPARENTLY AT LEAST ONE INVITEE WAS DISCOURAGED FROM
ATTENDING, BUT THE AUDIENCE OF 100 OR SO GUESTS WAS
MOST APPRECIATIVE. DAVE BRUBECK'S "BIUELAGO A LA
TURK" REARRANGED FOR FLUTE AND HARPSICHORD BROUGHT THE
HOUSE DOWN.

5. ON MAY 14 KIPNIS AND SOLUM, ACCOMPANIED BY ACAO,
VISITED COMPOSER EDISON DENISOV [REDACTED].
[REDACTED] DENISOV DISCUSSED SEVERAL OF HIS COMPOSITIONS
WITH KIPNIS, WHILE SOLUM HELD COURT FOR THREE
ENTHUSIASTIC FLUTE STUDENTS INCLUDING DENISOV'S OWN
SON, WHO IS ALSO IN DOLZHNIKOV'S CLASS. SOLUM
LISTENED TO THEM PLAY, PLAYED A BIT HIMSELF, MADE A
FEW SUGGESTIONS, AND THEN ANSWERED A BARRAGE OF QUES-
TIONS ON EVERYTHING FROM HIS PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH TO
HIS CONCERT REPERTOIRE. THE STUDENTS WERE CLEARLY
INTERESTED IN MODERN FLUTE MUSIC, OF WHICH THERE IS
APPARENTLY PRECIOUS LITTLE IN THE U.S.S.R., AND WERE
OVERJOYED WHEN SOLUM PROMISED TO SEND MUSIC AND RECORDS.
THE GATHERING WAS SO WARM AND CONGENIAL THAT ACCO-
MPANYING EMBOFF ALMOST HAD TO TEAR KIPNIS AND SOLUM AWAY
FROM THEIR HOSTS. BOTH KIPNIS AND SOLUM DEPARTED WITH
BT
06700

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAJ NAVA
8/5/02

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

2672 *Mr. Meade* 55

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 9, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *jl*

SUBJECT: Reply to Representative Lujan on Possible Soviet Violations of Antarctic Treaty

Congressman Manuel Lujan wrote you a letter (Tab II) raising the possibility that the Soviets may have violated the Antarctic Treaty. Having talked with him over the phone, I ascertained that his principal concern was the fact that the Soviets have placed their research stations in locations of maximum strategic value -- at points nearest South America, South Africa and Australia, and that this might be an indication of a violation of the spirit of the military restrictions imposed by the Treaty. In any case, the Congressman wanted to raise our consciousness about the Soviets' presence there and the fact that they leave no stone unturned in their effort to establish political-strategic footholds -- even in the remotest areas.

As for actual Soviet violations of the Treaty, a recent U.S. Government on-site inspection of the Soviet stations revealed none.

At Tab I is a reply to the Congressman prepared by State conveying these findings, which has received all appropriate interagency clearances.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed reply to Congressman Lujan at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

After some concurs.

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed response to Congressman Lujan
- Tab II Incoming letter, dated April 18, 1983

56

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Lujan:

Thank you for your letter of April 18 regarding Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty. You touch upon issues of significant policy interest.

It was at U.S. initiative that the Antarctic Treaty was concluded in 1959. Since the Treaty entered into force in 1961, it has functioned well to promote freedom of scientific research in Antarctica and to reserve Antarctica exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Treaty has also proven to be a mechanism capable of stimulating solutions to new issues which have arisen in Antarctica, as demonstrated, for example, in the recent negotiation of a new treaty to conserve living resources found in Antarctic waters.

The Antarctic Treaty is also an important arms control agreement. It bans military activities, the testing of weapons, including nuclear weapons, and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Treaty area. Military personnel and equipment are permitted in Antarctica in support of scientific activities or any other peaceful purpose, and the U.S., and other Parties rely in part on military personnel in the conduct of their Antarctic programs. The Treaty also guarantees the U.S. and other Consultative Parties to the Treaty an unqualified right of non-site inspection of all stations and installations in Antarctica.

Support of the arms control provisions of the Treaty, including regular exercise of the rights of inspection provided under the Treaty, is a central element of U.S. Antarctic policy. To this end, we have conducted seven inspections of foreign stations and installations in Antarctica since the Treaty entered into force. Visits to such stations or installations take place with, at most, several hours prior notice. Inspections are planned

cooperatively by the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Science Foundation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Personnel from State, ACDA and DOD normally comprise the inspection teams.

Our inspections in Antarctica are designed, over time, to cover the stations of all countries active in Antarctica. Each inspection, however, includes visits to at least one Soviet station. Our most recent inspection took place January-March, 1983, and included four Soviet stations. This most recent U.S. inspection, like all the previous ones, revealed no violations of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty.

We are committed to ensuring observance of the obligations of the Antarctic Treaty and it is our intention to continue to work for adherence to the letter and spirit of the Treaty by all of its Parties.

We appreciate your interest.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

The Honorable Manuel Lujan, Jr.
U.S. House of Representative
Washington, D.C. 20515

MANUEL LUJAN, JR.
1ST DISTRICT, NEW MEXICO

COMMITTEES:
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

2672
Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

April 18, 1983

WASHINGTON OFFICE
1323 LONGWORTH BUILDING
(202) 225-6316

DISTRICT OFFICES:
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(505) 766-2538
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO
(505) 988-6521

Hon. William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Judge Clark,

As the Administration is reviewing various arms control agreements with an eye towards condemning Soviet violations, there is another area which I believe should receive your attention and public awareness.

The subcontinent of Antarctica was established by treaty, under the auspices of the United Nations, to be a military free area open to all signatory nations. The United States and other Western nations have adhered to the letter and spirit of the treaty.

As a member of the Science and Technology Committee, I visited Antarctica earlier this year. From installations which I saw and other information which was told to me, I have serious concerns that the Soviets have never truly adhered to the military free premise of the agreements. With the expanding technology of our day, and the increased importance of access to the South Pacific, South Atlantic and Indian oceans, I feel that Soviet violations of the Antarctic treaties should be exposed.

The American public does not doubt that the Soviets have consistently violated arms control agreements. An exposure of violations in the Antarctic would reveal a new pattern of mistrust. When shown in comparison to our own scientific research projects on the subcontinent, it could be startling.

I fully agree that our military technology and strategic capabilities should be classified. However, there is no reason to keep hidden such violations by the Soviets. They are fully aware of what they are doing or not doing. Why keep the American people in the dark?

Best regards,


Manuel Lujan, Jr.

MLJ/kl



UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8312208

Date May 4, 1983

For: Mr. William P. Clark
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: Mr. William P. Clark From: Congressman Lujan

Date: April 18, 1983 Subject: Soviet violations of Antarctic Treaty

WH Referral Dated: April 20, 1983 NSC ID# 8302672
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- X A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

*Drafted by Scully 2-3262
deans
Environment
OES*

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

MEMORANDUM

60
Fran, John dictated this memc
5/20, Orig given to Adm P.
Bud will dacom to P on Sat.

DE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

USSR
Treaties

INFORMATION

May 21, 1983

11927

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Decisions on New
Consulates, Cultural Exchange Agreement
and Reciprocity

In several memos in the past month, the State Department has recommended the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement. At the last meeting you had with Secretary Shultz on these and other bilateral issues, you agreed that these two issues be presented again with more elaboration of the pros and cons. State then sent such a memo to me. Unfortunately, it did not include the views of other agencies.

Specifically, Defense and the Intelligence Community are concerned with the hostile intelligence presence. As I understand it, however, views of both sides do not appear to be irreconcilable -- especially on the cultural exchange agreement -- as certain steps are taken, such as visa control, to help ensure strict reciprocity.

I have, therefore, requested State to produce an interagency approved paper taking all views into account, in preparation for an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10 to present these issues to you in the presence of your National Security Council.

JL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 # 11927

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

Treaty USSR FILE - CONSULATES 6
 National Security Council
 The White House

1830
 MAY 04 1983

Package # 90445

Dobriansky

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	J	A
Bud McFarlane	R		
Jacque Hill	S		
Judge Clark	A		A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>LENCZOWSKI</u>	2		A

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

632-3559
 To put the ball back in State's court suggest you recommend to the Judge that this issue be returned to State for further consideration by an IG under the SIG(FP) so it may receive proper interagency staffing. J

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 4, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *VL*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: New Consulates and Cultural Agreement

Attached (Tab I) is a State memorandum presenting various pros and cons of establishing new consulates in Kiev and New York and negotiating a new cultural exchange agreement.

Consulates

State is strongly in favor of establishing new consulates. However, while it presents mostly pros, it skips over the possible cons. Specifically it has not considered the counter-intelligence burdens that would have to be assumed by the FBI and fails to take into consideration the interagency recommendations to reduce the hostile intelligence presence. For this reason alone the proposal deserves to be deferred until we have sufficient interagency information.

There are political liabilities to the proposal as well. It would help erode support for the President's defense budget while sending a signal to the Soviets that we are prepared to ignore Afghanistan, Poland and other Soviet behavior and return to business as usual.

Exchanges

For the first time State has acknowledged that invoking the Baker Amendment (which would restrict visas to Soviet applicants) would be a possible option in seeking greater reciprocity and therefore ensuring greater leverage in negotiating a new cultural agreement. State, however, is clearly uncomfortable with the Baker Amendment and recommends that it be studied further.

Although State feels that a new agreement itself would ensure reciprocity, I have my doubts about this. Until we can gain the kind of flexibility that visa controls would afford us, I feel that reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet exchanges and relations in general will remain an elusive goal.

7
Paula Dobriansky concurs.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 # 11928

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

RECOMMENDATION

1. That a decision on new consulates be deferred until we have more information on the counterintelligence problem, and until the pros and cons have been studied and presented much more thoroughly by State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That a decision in favor of an exchange agreement be made contingent on invocation of the Baker Amendment.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I State memorandum of April 7, 1983.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 7, 1983

83 APR 7 P11:08

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Kiev/New York Consulates
and Cultural Agreement

We have been looking into the pros and cons of taking
action in two areas of our relationship with the Soviets:

- (1) Consulates General in Kiev and New York City;
- (2) Cultural Exchange Agreement.

We believe there are some clear benefits to be gained
by U.S. initiatives in these areas, but each also has some
public relations or foreign policy drawbacks. Attached are
our analyses of the options available to us on these issues
and the pros and cons of each.

Regarding cultural exchanges, you will recall that
NSDD 75 states, inter alia, that the exchanges framework
should not be further dismantled; and that those exchanges
that promote positive evolutionary change within the USSR
should be expanded at the same time that the U.S. will
insist on full reciprocity.


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Consulates General in Kiev and New York Options.
2. Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FOI-114/11 # 11932

BY KML NARA DATE 5/2/11

ISSUE: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City: Options

Option 1. Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to establish Consulates General in Kiev and New York City and propose a public announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this end.

Pros and Cons

FOIA(b)(1)

In terms of assets, we would gain substantially from the opening of a Consulate in Kiev; by comparison, the Soviet presence in New York City would increase only marginally. As matters stand, because of the UN presence, the Soviets have free run of New York and we have nothing comparable in the USSR. A reporting [redacted] presence in the heart of the Ukraine, expanded contacts with important minority nationality and religious groups, and consular access for our citizens would prove most advantageous to the U.S. Government. It would also respond to the wishes of the U.S. Ukrainian community and many in the U.S. Jewish community who have long stressed the need for a consulate in the area.

On the down side, the lifting of an Afghan sanction will evoke some criticism. While this move may effectively show the American public, the Allies and the Soviets that confrontation is not the only arrow in our quiver, it may at the same time raise unrealistic expectations both here and abroad about overall improvements in our relations.

Practical Steps

FOIA(b)(1)

Even if we were to agree in principle to open Consulates General, the timing and cost of our actions would be determined by decisions on several subsidiary issues. The first decision involves the type of establishment we wish to open in Kiev. We have the choice of a simple, unclassified operation which would constitute an American presence and give some consular protection to American visitors, or a full-scale post, with important [redacted] advantages in a key non-Russian area. Devolving from this decision will be the question of timing. An unclassified establishment in Kiev could be organized fairly easily and quickly in terms of personnel and money, whereas full-scale establishment would take years.

Establishing a full-scale post would entail a great deal of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

effort to secure the necessary personnel and funding, and to resolve numerous technical and logistical difficulties. However, depending upon how rapidly we would wish to implement this, several approaches are available. If quick results are crucial, we could immediately start the process of securing preliminary funding, TDY personnel for an advance team, and logistical support in order to have the consulates operational (through with a skeleton staff) within approximately a year. At the other end of the spectrum, we could do a limited amount of initial planning until Congressional support was assured and all funding requirements approved. A third approach would involve sending a temporary advance team as soon as possible and then developing an overall strategy for the selection of long-term personnel, the briefing of Congressional committees, the acquisition of funding, and the fulfillment of all the technical requirements of the facility. The implementation of this strategy would follow as soon afterwards as considered desirable or feasible.

Option 2: Propose to the Soviets that we resume discussions on the possibility of establishing Consulates in Kiev and New York, but not move quickly actually to open the Consulates and make no announcement at this time.

Pros and Cons

This approach would enable us to do the preliminary work both with the Soviets and within the U.S. Government necessary for the opening of the Consulates General at some future date. At the same time, it does not obligate us to take the more visible steps of actually putting an Advance Team in place now or allowing the Soviets to resume construction work on the building that will eventually house our Consulate General. The decision on whether or when to undertake these steps could depend on progress in the technical discussions and the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the discussions would be technical, no formal announcement would be required at this time. Similarly, no final decision would have to be made regarding the lifting of an Afghanistan sanction. On the other hand, the Soviets would regard this as a positive decision and it would allow us to begin allocating personnel and resources and setting up a logistical support system.

However, if Congress or the public becomes aware that we are identifying positions and earmarking funds for Kiev, we would probably be asked what this meant for our sanctions policy. Other disadvantages of this option are limited.

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-3-

Option 3. Tell the Soviets that we are actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

Pros and Cons

The main advantage of this option is that it simply allows us to await a more favorable moment. It also enables us to avoid any criticism, except from the Ukrainian-American community which is pushing us to open in Kiev. Its primary drawback is that it accomplishes little. In terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is devoid of benefits, since the Soviets would see it as a do-nothing statement. After the suspension of our agreement to establish these Consulates General in 1980, a weak consensus emerged on the policy level that on balance the suspension was an ill-advised move.

Option 4. Say nothing to the Soviets and adhere to the status quo.

Pros and Cons

The one advantage inherent in this position is that we are spared from justifying the lifting of an Afghan sanction. The costs of our current practices are high. Financially, we bear the burden of three apartments in Kiev for which we pay rent but have no use. (We have kept the apartments because we previously spent substantial money on reconfiguring them for U.S. use, and because if we gave them up, we would have a lot of trouble obtaining other adequate apartments later.) We also risk the loss of the office building which the Soviets have, to date, kept open for us. The cost of reconstructing an alternate building will be considerably higher in the future. Finally, we face criticism from U.S. visitors to Kiev, especially Jewish groups, whom we are unable to assist.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options

As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send performing artists here; otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major groups could be touring the US annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the Soviets are rethinking this policy, and may start sending performers again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.

To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see three basic options:

1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.

PROS: The exact form of an agreement would have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure that all USG interests would be considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would be an important part of an agreement, as would all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also require access to Soviet television.

CONS: This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation whether we are returning to a policy of detente.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

2. Combine negotiation of an exchanges agreement with a stricter visa regime, through legislation restoring our ability to refuse visas for foreign policy reasons or by invoking the "Baker Amendment." Such draft legislation is now at OMB for review and decision. The Baker Amendment involves an official determination, which can be made by the Secretary of State, that the USSR is not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

PROS: This would permit us to generate greater leverage to get the kind of truly reciprocal exchanges agreement we want. It has the additional virtue of allowing us to refuse visas for policy reasons and not have to justify refusals on national security grounds. We could choose which Soviets we would admit or exclude.

CONS: This has the same problems as Option 1, somewhat mitigated by combining it with instituting tougher visa controls. In addition, visa refusals are a crude tool, subject to easy retaliation not necessarily confined to the visa field. American sponsors of Soviet visits would criticize arbitrary refusals, and those who invested money in long-term planning to bring Soviet performers here might have a legal claim. Invoking the Baker Amendment raises issues of foreign policy and long-term US-USSR relations that require careful study.

3. Continue current practice.

PROS: This involves no change and is easy to administer, with few decisions having to be referred to senior levels for political decision.

CONS: This does nothing to ensure reciprocity and leaves the Soviets with easy access to US society.

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