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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 6/8/2005

File Folder USSR: WORLD PEACE COUNCIL 5/5

FOIA

F06-114/13

Box Number 44

YARHI-MILO

4410

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13783	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO ARMACOST RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY ACTIVISTS AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND OTHER SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS <i>R 5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13</i>	1	9/12/1985	B1
13784	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO POINDEXTER RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY ACTIVISTS AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND OTHER SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	1	9/12/1985	B1
13785	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY ACTIVISTS AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND OTHER SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	3	7/7/1985	B1
13786	MEMO	MARTIN RE IBC MEETING AUGUST 21 <i>R 11/19/2009 F06-114/13</i>	1	ND	B1
13787	MEMO	RAYMOND/LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	3	8/8/1985	B1
13788	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	2	ND	B1
13789	LETTER	TAFT TO SENATOR GOLDWATER RE RADIO MARTI	2	7/29/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 6/8/2005

File Folder USSR: WORLD PEACE COUNCIL 5/5

FOIA

F06-114/13

Box Number 44

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13790	LETTER	WEINBERGER <i>D</i> 3/24/2008 F06-114/13	2	ND	B1
13791	MEMO	IKLE <i>D</i> 3/24/2008 F06-114/13	2	5/22/1985	B1
13792	MEMO	IKLE <i>D</i> 3/24/2008 F06-114/13	2	5/25/1985	B1
13793	MEMO	STILWELL TO CONGRESSMAN ADDABBO	2	2/15/1985	B1
13794	MEMO	IKLE RE RADIO MARTI	1	8/1/1985	B1
13795	MEMO	KIMMITT TO BROWN <i>D</i> 3/24/2008 F06-114/13	1	6/6/1985	B1
13796	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13789	2	7/29/1985	B1
13797	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH JERZY MILEWSKI <i>R</i> 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13	1	7/10/1985	B1
13798	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13784 <i>R</i> 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13	3	7/7/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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JET 6/8/2005

File Folder USSR: WORLD PEACE COUNCIL 5/5

FOIA

F06-114/13

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13799	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO POINDEXTER RE BRIEFING PAPER FOR PRESIDENT ON PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY WPC ACTIVIST <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	1	6/6/1985	B1
13800	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE BRIEFING PAPER FOR PRESIDENT ON PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY WPC ACTIVIST <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	2	ND	B1
13801	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13799 <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	1	6/6/1985	B1
13802	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13784 <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	3	ND	B1
13803	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13800 <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	2	ND	B1
13804	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13799 <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	1	6/6/1985	B1
13805	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13800 <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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JET 6/8/2005

File Folder USSR: WORLD PEACE COUNCIL 5/5

FOIA

F06-114/13

Box Number 44

YARHI-MILO

4410

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13806	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO POINDEXTER RE BRIEFING PAPER FOR PRESIDENT ON EAST GERMAN WPC ACTIVIST <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	1	5/21/1985	B1
13807	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY EAST GERMAN WPC ACTIVIST <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	1	ND	B1
13808	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #13800 <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	2	ND	B1
13809	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO ARMACOST RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY EAST GERMAN WPC ACTIVIST <i>R 3/21/2013 F2006-114/13</i>	1	5/17/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Dobriensky!
set up 7000
FILE - WPC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 12, 1985


MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations (S)

Over the past few months, the Department of State has forwarded us various visa application requests by members of the WPC and other Soviet front organizations. State has also expressed concern that the present policy has come under increasing congressional and judicial challenge. (S)

The President has reviewed our policy on handling visa requests by members of the WPC and other Soviet front organizations. He has reaffirmed the present policy which has been to utilize the discretionary authority of section 212 (a) (27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and handle visa applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of the applicant's involvement in Soviet front organizations, the purpose of the trip and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. This strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with executive authority and adequately protects our national security interests. (S)

Under this policy, it is anticipated that visits by senior World Peace Council officials to the U.S. would in almost all cases not be in the U.S. interest and that visas would be denied. (S)



J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 06-11/13 #13703
BY CW NARADATE 5/15/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

~~SECRET~~

September 12, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{AD}SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations (S)

Per our conversation, I have attached a follow-up memo from you to Mike Armacost reaffirming our policy on proposed travel to the U.S. by activists affiliated with the WPC and other Soviet front organizations. As you will recall, the President approved the continued implementation of our present policy on a case-by-case basis (Tab II). Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Armacost which clarifies our policy. (S)

^{kd}
Ken DeGraffenreid concurs. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum a Tab I. (S)

Approve f Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Armacost
Tab II Memo from McFarlane to President w/approval

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDle-114/13 #13784
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

3869

Received SS

Dobriansky

~~SECRET~~ JUL -8 AM 9 29

July 7, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOG-114/13 #13785

BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations

Issue

Whether to continue our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other Soviet front organizations.

Background

Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the Congress.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks ostensibly to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way. (Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)

Discussion

Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a)(27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been utilizing Section 212(a)(27) excessively and has refused visas when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also

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Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

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-2-

~~SECRET~~

been a number of court challenges to our use of 212(a)(27) authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applicability of 212(a)(27). However, because the purposes of the WPC are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.

We believe that these criticisms are also supported by those who seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part would change their opinions. In light of these considerations, it is important that we continue to implement our present policy which features the application of 212(a)(27) on a case-by-case basis.

The Administration's critics also contend that refusal to issue visas to communist or pro-Soviet spokesmen and active measures operators violates the constitutional guarantee of free speech. However, this is an absolutist interpretation. It ignores the fact that there are instances in which the exercise of free speech has been legitimately restricted to protect private and public interests (e.g., to prevent libel, to prevent the release of classified information, etc.). The exclusion of foreign nationals whose presence in the U.S. is likely to affect adversely U.S. interests clearly belongs to the category in which certain free speech restrictions are justified.

Moreover, WPC activists and leaders of other fronts are clearly agents of influence of the Soviet Union. Some are formally recruited and paid by Moscow, the KGB, or the International Department of the CPSU; others are what the Soviets call "trusted contacts" who follow Soviet direction without being paid. They are in no sense independent free-thinking individuals who are participating in rational open-minded debate. There may be times when it serves our interests to allow such individuals to enter the U.S. For the most part, however, their purpose is ultimately to destroy democratic institutions. They seek to mobilize U.S. support, usually unwitting, for this effort.

Additionally, such individuals impose a further obligation on our already strained counterintelligence capabilities. The FBI is tasked with ascertaining the scope of Soviet active measures in the U.S. as well as other Soviet intelligence activities. Permitting additional Soviet active measures personnel to enter the U.S. would further diminish the FBI's coverage of other Soviet activities. Unless the FBI specifically requests that we allow such personnel to enter so that they can take advantage of their presence, we should as a rule refuse to allow such persons to enter the U.S.

In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel

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~~SECRET~~

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-3-

for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a visa.

RECOMMENDATION

That we continue to implement our present policy on a case-by-case basis.

Approve RR

Disapprove _____

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky/
Ken deGraffenreid

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4312
Re-do

S

August 12, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI ^{JK}

SUBJECT: Request for the President to Speak to World
Anti-Communist League

Former General John Singlaub has invited the President to speak at the 18th annual conference of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) (Tab II). The host for this conference is the U.S. Council for World Freedom (USCWF) which is the WACL's U.S. affiliate. The leaders of eight anti-communist resistance movements will be featured there and the conference will be concluded by a banquet to raise money for the USCWF's Freedom Fighter fund.

In past years, we have had to decline invitations to the President from the WACL basically for one reason--the group had its origins in Taiwan and we did not want to be too closely associated with it. We have, however, sent a Presidential message to the group last year.

Within the last year or so, the USCWF has been one of the foremost supporters of the President's policy in Central America, and has raised millions of dollars to assist the democratic resistance movement in Nicaragua. Under these circumstances, I believe that this group has earned at least another strong message of support from the President, if not a video-taped message. A taped Presidential message would signal to this as well as a many other organizations involved in helping democratic resistance movements that their efforts are appreciated and welcomed. It would also signal the participants of the resistance movements themselves that the United States can be relied upon in some way to help them in their historic struggles.

The President, the Secretary of State and other senior officials have cited six major anti-communist resistance movements as clear evidence that the "correlation of forces" in the world is changing in favor of freedom and against communism. It is on the basis of such indices that we have proclaimed new confidence in

our ability to deal with the Soviets from a new position of strength. These movements, however, do not happen by accident. They require external moral, political and material assistance. If we fail to give our reasonable share of that assistance, those movements may no longer be there to support our side of the balance of forces.

Gaston Sigur recommended another written message on account of the continuing Taiwan connection. I would ^{use} ~~wage~~, however, that, if possible, we do the taped message.

North, ^{not available} Menges, ^{not available} Burghardt, Ringdahl and Raymond concur. *PR* *recommends written message.*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Martin to sign the attached schedule proposal (Tab I) to Fred Ryan.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - Martin Memo to Ryan (Schedule Proposal)
- Tab II - Singlaub Letter to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Video-taped message to World Anti-Communist League (WACL)

PURPOSE: To support the organization's efforts to help democratic resistance movements.

BACKGROUND: The U.S. Council for World Freedom (USCWF), the WACL's U.S. chapter, has been one of the foremost supporters of the President's policy in Central America and has raised millions to assist the democratic resistance in Nicaragua. Leaders from eight resistance movements world-wide will attend the conference.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Written message to this group last annual conference.

DATE & TIME: Needed by September 9, 1985
DURATION: 5 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Brief video-taping session.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be prepared.

MEDIA COVERAGE: None.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None.

4312

9

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

May 28, 1985

TO: BOB KIMMITT
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Invitation to attend the World Anti-Communist League Conference

DATE: September 9 - 12, 1985

LOCATION: Dallas, Texas

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept ___ Regret ___ Surrogate ___ Message ___ Other ___
Priority ___
Routine ___

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE June 1, 1985

TO Jean Appleby Jackson



United States Council For World Freedom

4/9-12/85 304414 10

Chairman
John K. Singlaub
Maj. Gen. USA (Ret.)

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John K. Singlaub
Maj. Gen. USA (Ret.)
Chairman
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Scheduling

May 14, 1985

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The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Mr. President:

As the leader of the free world and a symbol of hope to the freedom fighters around the world, I have the pleasure to invite you to attend the 18th World Anti-Communist League (WACL) Conference. The United States Council for World Freedom (USCWF), a chapter of WACL, will host the annual Conference on September 9 through 12, 1985, in Dallas, Texas.

Your presence at this conference would enhance the morale and motivation of the active democratic resistance movements currently fighting the menace known as communism. Our theme this year is "Counter-Offensive for World Freedom" and we hope to generate support for the freedom fighters around the globe.

We are anticipating leaders from eight resistance movements to address the assembly which will consist of delegates and guests from approximately 100 nations. The conference will conclude on the evening of September 12th with a Freedom Fighters Banquet which will serve as a major fundraiser for the Freedom Fighter's fund of the USCWF.

An address to the Conference by you, the leader of the Free World would serve as an inspiration to all who are struggling to maintain or regain their most important possession -- freedom.

Sincerely,

John K. Singlaub
John K. Singlaub
Maj. Gen. USA (Ret.)
Chairman

JKS:gms

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED W/SECRET
ATTACHMENT

ACTION

August 9, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: IBC Meeting

Walt Raymond and I would like to convene a meeting of the International Broadcasting Committee. At Tab I is a memo from you to the participating agencies calling the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to Agencies

UNCLASSIFIED W/SECRET
ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

101
3/10/05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRETVIA LDX

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. C. WILLIAM LaSALLE
Chief of the Executive
Secretariat
U.S. Information Agency

MS. HELEN ROBBINS
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. RICHARD C. MEYER
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

MR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. WALTER ROBERTS
Executive Director
Board for International
Broadcasting

SUBJECT: IBC Meeting (U)

There will be a meeting of the International Broadcasting Committee on Wednesday, August 21, at 10:00 a.m. in the Situation Room, West Wing, White House. Please advise Dr. Lenczowski's office at 395-5646 who will attend from your agency. (U)

The agenda will cover the following subjects:

1. Transmitter site negotiations: Israel, Turkey, Korea.
2. Status report on possibilities of a site in the Japanese islands.
3. Report by BIB on Albanian language service.
4. Status report on REAC consideration of RFE/RL's ideas on a "signal effectiveness" standard.
5. Status report on revised VOA modernization plan.
6. Discussion of revision of RFE/RL modernation plan. (S)

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-14/13 #13786

BY RW NARA DATE 11/19/09

S 13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

August 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WALT RAYMOND/JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Capability to Jam Cuban TV

We regret to have to inform you of a major dereliction on the part of the Defense Department in its assignment to develop the capability to jam Cuban TV. In short:

- 1) Nothing yet has been done to develop the capability.
- 2) Contrary to everyone's understanding that we do not go back to Congress on this issue, DOD has approached four Congressional committees to request a reprogramming of the \$14 million necessary to develop the capability.
- 3) DOD failed to coordinate with us when it encountered obstacles relating to Congressional strategy.
- 4) Deputy Secretary Taft sent letters to four committee chairmen which explicitly reveal our operational contingency plans and goals, expose our capabilities and vulnerabilities and gratuitously reveal details of a specific, sensitive Presidential decision.
- 5) the first reaction from the Hill has been a denial of our request by Chairman Les Aspin.

Background

As you recall, the decision was made earlier this year to approach Congress to request a reprogramming of some \$60 million to develop a capability to jam Cuban TV as a potential counter-measure. When we were turned down by Congressman Joseph Addabbo, we had to decide whether to go back to the Hill or not. At the NSPG meeting of May 17, it was clear to all concerned that DOD should develop an intermediate jamming capability that would cost \$14 million -- a figure small enough to avoid having to make another reprogramming request of Congress. Fred Ikle explicitly indicated that the job could be done without having to return to the Hill.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/13 #13787
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/83

Then, pursuant to the NSDD, Ikle sent two memos which specify that an "intermittent capability" could be achieved without going to Congress (Tab III). On June 6, we sent a memo officially tasking DOD to go ahead. Sometime later in June, however, DOD's Comptroller decreed that it would be illegal to reprogram even smaller amounts if reprogramming of larger sums for the same purpose had been denied by Congress. So, instead of informing us of this problem, DOD approached the staffs of four Congressional committees, and after working with them for some three weeks, sent formal requests to each committee chairman (see the letter to Senator Goldwater at Tab A). Not only were those actions in complete contravention of our NSPG strategy and of DOD's own memoranda of May 22 and 23, but we were kept completely in the dark about all this -- including the Comptroller's ruling -- until this week, when we received a new memo from Ikle (Tab V), and when we explored the matter further by convening a meeting of those responsible.

As you can see, the letter to Goldwater exposes so many of our cards that, if leaked, it could expose our entire game plan, our capabilities and our weaknesses to Castro. It utterly gratuitously reveals details of a sensitive Presidential decision. In contrast to this latest letter, General Stilwell's original correspondence to the Hill was positively artful in its discretion (see Tab IV).

The latest development is a report late yesterday that Congressman Les Aspin has denied our reprogramming request on the dubious grounds that our plan would allegedly constitute a violation of the ITU convention. DOD stated that it intended to apply its own lawyers and technical experts to addressing this problem. We advised them, however, to work with State on this.

Discussion

This ongoing debacle is the result of: an extraordinary series of ambiguous if not confused communications from DOD, a failure to comprehend a strategy whose simple purposes were clear to everyone else, a fit of absence of common sense and discretion, and a failure to pay sufficient managerial attention to one of the most important offices in the policy side of DOD.

Where Ikle's original memos obscurely spelled out the differences between an "intermittent" capability and a "sustained" capability, only yesterday did we learn that these are apparently two separate categories within the broader category of "intermediate" capability which we thought we were purchasing for \$14 million. Finally, needless to say, DOD has exceeded the bounds of proper conduct in its unilateral actions in approaching Congress.

What to Do

Given the situation with Congress, we may have to continue working with it if we still want to go ahead with acquiring this capability. If so, then we should develop a coordinated Congressional strategy to be implemented immediately rather than when Congress returns from recess. A case can be made, however, that our other capabilities have already successfully deterred Castro from retaliating and that acquiring this new capability may be unnecessary. Indeed, if Castro were to conclude that this jamming option is the most we were willing to do, he might be tempted to try to challenge us. In this sense, the absence of the jamming capability may have even been helpful.

Radio Marti has now been on the air for over two months and the longer it continues broadcasting responsibly and acquiring a credible track record, the harder it will be for Castro to win sufficient international (and even American) sympathy for any retaliatory action he might contemplate. On this score, then, continuing with a \$14 million expenditure may be unnecessary -- especially since we would not have the capability ready until January 1986 at the earliest. Nevertheless, on balance, prudence probably dictates that the President should have all the possible tools we can supply him for all possible contingencies.

Regarding DOD's handling of this issue, we have prepared a blast from you to Secretary Weinberger (Tab II). Although Admiral Poindexter asked us to have this letter sent to Ikle (see Tab V), we believe that since Taft has been involved in this business, Secretary Weinberger himself should be informed. We have also prepared a memo from you to the President informing him of this situation (Tab I).

^{for L}
Chris Lehman concurs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____
2. That you sign the letter to Secretary Weinberger at Tab II.
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Letter to Goldwater
- Tab II Letter to Secretary Weinberger
- Tab III Ikle Memos
- Tab IV General Stilwell's Correspondence to the Hill
- Tab V Ikle Memo of August 1 and Poindexter Comments

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR PDG-114/13 #13788
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE
SUBJECT: Capability to Jam Cuban TV

Issue

A major dereliction by the Defense Department that has caused a two month delay in our effort to acquire a capability to jam Cuban TV.

Facts

As you recall, earlier this year we decided to ask Congress to reprogram some \$60 million to acquire a capability to jam Cuban TV as a retaliatory option against potential Cuban counter-broadcasts. When we met with Congressman Joseph Addabbo's opposition, we decided at the May 17 NSPG meeting to acquire a lesser capability for \$14 million, which would enable us to reprogram the money without seeking Congressional approval. At that time Secretary Weinberger and Under Secretary Ikle indicated that going to Congress would not be necessary.

After receiving the details of the proposed plan, NSC formally tasked DOD to go ahead with the project on June 6. Later that month, however, and unbeknownst to us, DOD's Comptroller ruled that we could not proceed without Congressional approval, particularly since this was a slimmed down version of a reprogramming action already denied by Congress. So, then, without informing us, and contrary to all the understandings we had, DOD approached four Congressional committees, discussed this issue with their staffs for three weeks and finally sent letters such as the one at Tab A to the Committee Chairmen. As you can see, the attached letter from Deputy Secretary Taft to Senator Goldwater lays out explicitly our operational plans and objectives, it reveals our capabilities and limitations thus exposing potential vulnerabilities, and it gratuitously exposes details of a sensitive Presidential decision on a piece of paper whose wide dissemination risks compromising our entire contingency plan. We only learned about all of these developments on Wednesday, August 7.

The latest news is that Chairman Les Aspin has denied DOD's reprogramming request on the dubious grounds that our proposed contingency capability would allegedly violate the International

Telecommunications Union Convention. Now, over two months after your decision, DOD has not moved one inch toward acquiring the jamming capability. I have written to Cap Weinberger informing him of this unacceptable state of affairs and recommending that actions be taken to correct this matter.

Discussion

Not only have these DOD actions revealed a violation of understandings that were clear to everybody else at the time, they also reveal a remarkable absence of common sense. We have been put in a very uncomfortable position in our dealings with Congress and our proposed contingency plan has been placed at unnecessary risk. As things currently stand, if we were to secure Congressional assent within the next two weeks (which is an optimistic outcome), we would not have this capability until late January 1986.

Radio Marti has been on the air for over two months now, and the longer it continues broadcasting credibly and acquiring a responsible, defensible track record, the more difficult it will be for Castro to win any international (or American) sympathy for his grievances or for any retaliatory action he might contemplate. We have had intelligence reports indicating that he has not begun counter-broadcasting because he knows that he would be doing it illegally whereas Radio Marti is fully legal. Nevertheless, we probably should continue to be as prepared as we can to meet any undesirable changes in Castro's plans. Thus I would recommend pushing ahead as we had planned to acquire the jamming capability.

Recommendation

OK No

— —

That you authorize us to continue to proceed as expeditiously as possible with existing plans.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Goldwater

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

8/2

Walt Raymond,

This is totally correct.

I present in nine minutes

to the President that quotes

what was said at the USSR

about what they could do

and the status of things

now. They have not done

anything. Then I want

a listening memo back

to Shele.

Cheeks with all Keel

on what DOD authority is (over)

without going back to the
Bill. I thought that was
the whole reason for asking
the comment, Defense
management studies.

J

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5451

S 33

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 10, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Mr. Jerzy Milewski

At Tab I is a schedule proposal from Bill Martin to Fred Ryan recommending that the President meet with Jerzy Milewski, Director of the Solidarity Office Abroad (Brussels) and close confidant of Lech Walesa, sometime between July 29-August 2.

In the last several months, the overall political and human rights situation in Poland has deteriorated. The number of political prisoners has increased to over 185, church-state relations have become strained, and proposed higher education legislation has been introduced which would substantially restrict academic autonomy. Most recently, on June 14, three prominent dissidents received sentences ranging from 2½ to 3½ years for meeting "to plan an illegal strike."

Having reviewed the possible range of policy responses, I believe that a meeting between the President and Mr. Milewski would send a clear signal of our continued support for Solidarity and would provide us with an excellent opportunity to focus public attention on the recent repression in Poland. Moreover, such a meeting would be highly symbolic as it would coincide with the anniversary of the Warsaw uprising. I have coordinated my suggestions with State and have been apprised that Secretary Shultz concurs. (State may follow-up with a memo.)

Jack Matlock, ^{AM} Dave Wigg ^{DW} and Mary Wengrzynek ^{MW} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Martin to forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I - Schedule Proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOG-114113 #13797

BY AW NARA DATE 3/21/12

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Meeting with Jerzy Milewski, Director of Solidarity Office Abroad

PURPOSE: To underscore our commitment to the cause of free trade unionism in Poland; to manifest visibly our disenchantment with the recent intensified repression by the Polish Government.

BACKGROUND: In the last several months, the political and human rights situation in Poland has deteriorated. The number of political prisoners has increased, church-state relations have become strained, and three prominent dissidents have received sentences ranging from 2½ to 3½ years. A meeting with Mr. Milewski, a close confidant of Lech Walesa, would send a clear signal of our continued support for Solidarity and concern about Polish repression. Such a highly symbolic meeting would also be well received by both domestic (Polish-American community) and international audiences.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE & TIME: July 29-August 2, 1985
DURATION: 15-20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Robert C. McFarlane, Jerzy Milewski

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity; discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer. Possible press contact by Mr. Milewski after meeting with the President.

PROPOSED "PHOTO": The President and Mr. Milewski sitting across from each other in the Oval Office.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

~~SECRET~~The President has seen _____ 35
FILE WPC

THE WHITE HOUSE

3869

WASHINGTON

Dobriansky

Received S S

~~SECRET~~ JUL -8 AM 9 29

July 7, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

NLRR FOI-114113 #13798

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Soviet Front OrganizationsIssue

Whether to continue our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other Soviet front organizations.

Background

Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the Congress.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks ostensibly to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way. (Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)

Discussion

Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a)(27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been utilizing Section 212(a)(27) excessively and has refused visas when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also

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Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

~~SECRET~~

been a number of court challenges to our use of 212(a)(27) authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applicability of 212(a)(27). However, because the purposes of the WPC are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.

We believe that these criticisms are also supported by those who seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part would change their opinions. In light of these considerations, it is important that we continue to implement our present policy which features the application of 212(a)(27) on a case-by-case basis.

The Administration's critics also contend that refusal to issue visas to communist or pro-Soviet spokesmen and active measures operators violates the constitutional guarantee of free speech. However, this is an absolutist interpretation. It ignores the fact that there are instances in which the exercise of free speech has been legitimately restricted to protect private and public interests (e.g., to prevent libel, to prevent the release of classified information, etc.). The exclusion of foreign nationals whose presence in the U.S. is likely to affect adversely U.S. interests clearly belongs to the category in which certain free speech restrictions are justified.

Moreover, WPC activists and leaders of other fronts are clearly agents of influence of the Soviet Union. Some are formally recruited and paid by Moscow, the KGB, or the International Department of the CPSU; others are what the Soviets call "trusted contacts" who follow Soviet direction without being paid. They are in no sense independent free-thinking individuals who are participating in rational open-minded debate. There may be times when it serves our interests to allow such individuals to enter the U.S. For the most part, however, their purpose is ultimately to destroy democratic institutions. They seek to mobilize U.S. support, usually unwitting, for this effort.

Additionally, such individuals impose a further obligation on our already strained counterintelligence capabilities. The FBI is tasked with ascertaining the scope of Soviet active measures in the U.S. as well as other Soviet intelligence activities. Permitting additional Soviet active measures personnel to enter the U.S. would further diminish the FBI's coverage of other Soviet activities. Unless the FBI specifically requests that we allow such personnel to enter so that they can take advantage of their presence, we should as a rule refuse to allow such persons to enter the U.S.

In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel

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for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a visa.

RECOMMENDATION

That we continue to implement our present policy on a case-by-case basis.

Approve RR

Disapprove _____

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky/
Ken deGraffenreid

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 6, 1985

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY^{PD}

SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for President on Proposed Travel to U.S. by WPC Activist

Per your request (Tab II) and our recent conversation, I have attached a briefing paper (Tab I) for the President regarding proposed travel to the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council and other similar organizations. The paper defines our current policy, addresses the Congressional challenge and cites the Werner Rumpel (East German WPC activist) case as a recent example.

Ken deGraffenreid^{KD} and Chris Lehman^{CL} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you or Mr. McFarlane forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachment:

- Tab I Proposed Memorandum McFarlane to the President
- Tab II Your note of May 15, 1985

cc: Paul Thompson

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/13 #13799
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

National Security Council
The White House



System #

II

Package #

3869

85 MAY 15 P 4: 03

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	Advance
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat	4		Send to
Situation Room			Paula ASAP

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other Thompson / Pearson
Should be seen by: (Level copy of this auto)
(Date/Time)

Let's process this promptly and really give it some good analysis. I suspect Bud will want to take the issue on principle to the President.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

3869

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~NLRR FOI-114/13 #13800
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13INFORMATION ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Similar OrganizationsIssue*whether to continue*

^

Our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other similar organizations.

Background

Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the Congress.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way. (Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)

Discussion

Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a)(27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been utilizing Section 212(a)(27) excessively and has refused visas when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also

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been a number of court challenges to our use of 212(a)(27) authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applicability of 212(a)(27). However, because the purposes of the WPC are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.

We believe that these criticisms are symptomatic of the views of those who seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part would change their opinions. In light of these considerations, it is important that we continue to implement our present policy which features the application of 212(a)(27) on a case-by-case basis.

INSERT → In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a visa.

Change to action memo. I would like to get President's concurrence on continuation of this policy. In the discussion

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

section I want a paragraph or so of a philosophical discussion about freedom of speech in a democracy - a belief that applies to criticism

*forces that are hostile to our system
I think this is a serious issue*

WPC 92

3869 add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

June 6, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY^{PD}

SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for President on Proposed Travel to U.S. by WPC Activist

Per your request (Tab II) and our recent conversation, I have attached a briefing paper (Tab I) for the President regarding proposed travel to the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council and other similar organizations. The paper defines our current policy, addresses the Congressional challenge and cites the Werner Rumpel (East German WPC activist) case as a recent example.

Ken deGraffenreid^{KD} and Chris Lehman^{CLP} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you or Mr. McFarlane forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

- Tab I Proposed Memorandum McFarlane to the President
- Tab II Your note of May 15, 1985

cc: Paul Thompson

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR File 114/13 #13801
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

203

System # I

Package # 3869 A/D

1812

85 JUN 7 P 3: 54

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Paul Thompson	<u>[initials]</u>		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>[initials]</u>		<u>[initials]</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>further action</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Modify Tab I. - DONE.
P. Dobriansky 6/21/85

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

3869

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations

Issue

Whether to continue our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other Soviet front organizations.

Background

Section 212(a) (27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the Congress.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks ostensibly to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way. (Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)

Discussion

Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a) (27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been utilizing Section 212(a) (27) excessively and has refused visas when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/13 #13802

BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

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been a number of court challenges to our use of 212(a) (27) authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applicability of 212(a) (27). However, because the purposes of the WPC are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.

We believe that these criticisms are also supported by those who seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part would change their opinions. In light of these considerations, it is important that we continue to implement our present policy which features the application of 212(a) (27) on a case-by-case basis.

The Administration's critics also contend that refusal to issue visas to communist or pro-Soviet spokesmen and active measures operators violates the constitutional guarantee of free speech. However, this is an absolutist interpretation. It ignores the fact that there are instances in which the exercise of free speech has been legitimately restricted to protect private and public interests (e.g., to prevent libel, to prevent the release of classified information, etc.). The exclusion of foreign nationals whose presence in the U.S. is likely to affect adversely U.S. interests clearly belongs to the category in which certain free speech restrictions are justified.

Moreover, WPC activists and leaders of other fronts are clearly agents of influence of the Soviet Union. Some are formally recruited and paid by Moscow, the KGB, or the International Department of the CPSU; others are what the Soviets call "trusted contacts" who follow Soviet direction without being paid. They are in no sense independent free-thinking individuals who are participating in rational open-minded debate. There may be times when it serves our interests to allow such individuals to enter the U.S. For the most part, however, their purpose is ultimately to destroy democratic institutions. They seek to mobilize U.S. support, usually unwitting, for this effort.

Additionally, such individuals impose a further obligation on our already strained counterintelligence capabilities. The FBI is tasked with ascertaining the scope of Soviet active measures in the U.S. as well as other Soviet intelligence activities. Permitting additional Soviet active measures personnel to enter the U.S. would further diminish the FBI's coverage of other Soviet activities. Unless the FBI specifically requests that we allow such personnel to enter so that they can take advantage of their presence, we should as a rule refuse to allow such persons to enter the U.S.

In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel

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for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a visa.

RECOMMENDATION

That we continue to implement our present policy on a case-by-case basis.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky/
Ken deGraffenreid

National Security Council
The White House



85 MAY 15 P 4: 03

System # 21
Package # 3869

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	Advance
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat	4		Send to
Situation Room			Paula ASAP

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other Thompson / Pearson
 (Level copy of the memo)

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

Let's process this promptly and really give it some good analysis. I suspect Bud will want to take the issue on principle to the President.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

3869

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~BY fw NARA DATE 3/2/13
NLRR FOI-114/13 #13803INFORMATION ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Similar Organizations

Issue*whether to continue*

Our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other similar organizations.

Background

Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the Congress.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way. (Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)

Discussion

Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a)(27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been utilizing Section 212(a)(27) excessively and has refused visas when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also

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been a number of court challenges to our use of 212(a) (27) authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applicability of 212(a) (27). However, because the purposes of the WPC are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.

We believe that these criticisms are symptomatic of the views of those who seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part would change their opinions. In light of these considerations, it is important that we continue to implement our present policy which features the application of 212(a) (27) on a case-by-case basis.

INSERT →

In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a visa.

Change to action memo. I would like to get President's concurrence on continuation of this policy. In the discussion section I want a paragraph or so of a philosophical discussion about freedom of speech in a democracy - whether that applies to outside forces that are hostile to our system. I think this is main issue.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

WPC 50

3869 add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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June 6, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY^{PD}

SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for President on Proposed Travel to U.S. by WPC Activist

Per your request (Tab II) and our recent conversation, I have attached a briefing paper (Tab I) for the President regarding proposed travel to the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council and other similar organizations. The paper defines our current policy, addresses the Congressional challenge and cites the Werner Rumpel (East German WPC activist) case as a recent example.

Ken deGraffenreid^{KD} and Chris Lehman^{CL} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you or Mr. McFarlane forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

- Tab I Proposed Memorandum McFarlane to the President
- Tab II Your note of May 15, 1985

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NLRR FD6-114/13 #13804

BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED

BY FW NLRN #13805
F06-114/13
NARA DATE 3/21/13INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Similar Organizations

Issue

Our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other similar organizations.

Background

Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the Congress.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way. (Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)

Discussion

Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a)(27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been utilizing Section 212(a)(27) excessively and has refused visas when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also

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been a number of court challenges to our use of 212(a)(27) authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applicability of 212(a)(27). However, because the purposes of the WPC are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.

We believe that these criticisms are symptomatic of the views of those who seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part would change their opinions. In light of these considerations, it is important that we continue to implement our present policy which features the application of 212(a)(27) on a case-by-case basis.

In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a visa.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

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WPC 54

3869 add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 21, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{TD}

SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for President on East German WPC Activist

Per your request (Tab II), I have attached a briefing paper (Tab I) for the President regarding proposed travel to the United States by Werner Rumpel, an East German WPC activist.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to Mr. McFarlane.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

- Tab I Proposed Memorandum McFarlane to the President
- Tab II Your note of May 15, 1985

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NLRR E06-114/13#13806
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATIONNLRR Folio 14/13 #13807^{ru}BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by East German WPC
ActivistIssue

Whether we should grant a visa to Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the World Peace Council (WPC).

Background

Werner Rumpel, a senior WPC activist, recently requested a visa to visit the United States for two weeks, starting May 13, to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations.

Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." As you know, the WPC is a Soviet active measures front group which works against U.S. interests.

Discussion

State has recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel despite his WPC rank for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

While we agree with the State Department that such applications should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of WPC involvement and the purpose of the trip, we have recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and will be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State has been informed of our position.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

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National Security Council
The White House

85 MAY 15 P 4: 03

System #

21

Package #

3869

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	Advance
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat	4		Send to
Situation Room			Paula ASAP

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other Thompson / Pearson
 COMMENTS Should be seen by: (enc. copy of this memo)
 (Date/Time)

Let's process this promptly and really give it some good analysis. I suspect Bud will want to take the issue on principle to the President.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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INFORMATIONNLRR Fol-114/13 #13808
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Similar OrganizationsIssue

Our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other similar organizations.

Background

Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under Congressional challenge.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities.

Discussion

Our approach has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a)(27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

In the Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel

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for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State has been informed of our position.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1985

EAST Germany

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WPC


SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by East German WPC
Activist (S)

We have carefully reviewed your memorandum of May 14 on Werner Rumpel's visa application. While we concur with the view that such applications should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis taking into account the degree of World Peace Council (WPC) involvement and the purpose of the trip, we recommend against issuing him a visa. The President has publicly identified the WPC as a Soviet active measures front group. By definition, this group is working against U.S. interests. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and will be perceived both here and abroad as a step backward in our effort. Rumpel is not only a senior WPC activist but clearly would be engaged in anti-American activities during his proposed two-week stay in the U.S. (S)

With regard to Congressional pressures, we believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. (S)


J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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NLRR FD6-714/13 #13809
BY RW NARA DATE 3/21/13

WPC

May 28 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1984

Foreign Issues

Interview With Brian Farrell of RTE-
Television, Dublin, Ireland. May 28, 1984

The President's Trip to Ireland

Mr. Farrell. Good evening. Welcome to "Today-Tonight," the Library, White House, Washington, D.C. On Friday, the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, begins his European tour with a state visit to Ireland.

Mr. President, it's not your first visit to Ireland, of course. It is your first visit as President and in an election year. So, is it a sentimental journey? Is it electioneering?

The President. Well, it is true, I have been there more than once in a previous occupation when I was a performer in the entertainment business, and then, subsequently, when I was Governor—and when you and I met, when I was sent there by President Nixon on a mission for him. Actually, I would be going even if I were not a candidate, so it isn't a part of an election process. But I'm accepting an invitation that was first made by former Prime Minister Haughey and repeated by your present Prime Minister FitzGerald when he was here.

But there is another reason, a personal reason, why I'm going, also. I have known I would be going one day because up until I became President I had no knowledge of my father's family beyond him and his parents. He was orphaned at less than 6 years of age. So, he had no knowledge of his family roots. And I must say, the people of Ireland and the Government of Ireland have been very kind and generous, and I found when I arrived here in this job that they had gone to great lengths and have traced our family roots and found that Ballyporeen is the locale and so forth.

So, I've always known I was going to have to go there. I want to go there.

Mr. Farrell. But it's not going to do you any harm in an election year. So, how important is that Irish American constituency anymore?

The President. Well, I want the vote of all the Americans that I can get, and obviously, the Irish Americans constitute quite a sizable block in our country. There is a rich history of the millions of them that we have. I'm one of them. So, of course, I would like to have their approval, but I'm not making this trip for that purpose. I think that their votes will be based on their belief in whether I should be President for 4 more years or not.

Mr. Farrell. You're coming to us after the New Ireland Forum has finally reported. The Congress is already giving its backing to that report. What's your view of the findings of the report?

The President. Of the report?

Mr. Farrell. The forum—The New Ireland Forum.

The President. Oh, Well, I think that Prime Minister FitzGerald said it very eloquently, and that was that it was a practical agenda for a meeting of the minds and discussion. And I think so, too. But I believe to go beyond that would be presumptuous of me.

This is a problem to be settled there between not only the Governments of England and Ireland but also of the people in the north and the people of the south. They, too, must be considered, and their wishes—and I hope and pray we can find a solution that will bring peace.

Mr. Farrell. So, you wouldn't be proposing to pick up Mr. Haughey's suggestion that, in fact, the United States might intervene at this date?

The President. I don't think it's our place to do that.

Mr. Farrell. But will you be raising it with Mrs. Thatcher, for instance, in seeking—using your good offices to encourage her at least to begin a process of further discussion?

The President. Well, I confess to a curiosity, knowing her well, about this proposal from the forum that has been made, and a curiosity as to how she sees it and how she feels about it. And I could possibly ask a question about that.

Mr. Farrell. Mr. President, many Irish Americans still see what goes on in North-

Dec. 10, 1982
A

The President. Those were homemade mines that couldn't sink a ship. But let me ask you this. Right now, there is a Bulgarian ship unloading tanks and armored personnel carriers at a port in Nicaragua. That is the fifth such Bulgarian ship in the last 18 months. Just a week or two ago, there were Soviet ships in there unloading war materiel. Now, the Nicaraguan Government—the Sandinista government is funneling this through to the guerrillas in El Salvador. Indeed, the headquarters for the guerrilla movement in El Salvador is only a few miles from the capital of Nicaragua, in Nicaragua where the strategy is planned and the direction of their revolution is taking place.

Now, it seems to me that if you're going to justify people trying to bring this present Nicaraguan Government back to the original promise of the revolution, to modify its totalitarian stand, and you're going, at the same time—and one of the reasons we were offering help is to interdict those arms and weapons that were going to the El Salvador guerrillas, but you know that a flood of that materiel is coming in through the ports and being unloaded, that you're going to try to think of a way to interdict that.

And those were homemade mines, as I say, that couldn't sink a ship. They were planted in those harbors where they were planted by the Nicaraguan rebels. And I think that there was much ado about nothing.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Mr. Farrell. Mr. President, you have an image problem, don't you? You said it in your press conference last week that people think you've got an itchy finger.

The President. Yeah.

Mr. Farrell. Many people in Europe see you as a cold warrior. They see you as the man who started your Presidential years talking about the empire of evil. They see you as the President who, at this stage, is not involved in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union.

The President. But we didn't walk away from the table, did we?—the disarmament table. They did.

And let me point something out. There have been some 19 efforts by our country since World War II to enlist the Soviets into talks to talk about disarmament—the reduc-

tion of arms and the control of weapons. It was this country that, as far back as 1946, when we were the only ones who had a nuclear weapon, we made a proposal that an international commission be appointed to take charge of all nuclear materiel, all weapons turned over to them. The Soviet Union hadn't even completed one yet, but they turned down that proposal.

I am the first one since 1946 who has gone to the bargaining table and proposed the total elimination of the intermediate-range weapons system in Europe, and they wouldn't listen. So, we said, "All right. We still think that's the best idea—to free Europe of this threat. But we will then talk to you about what figure would you suggest that we could reduce the numbers to, to at least reduce the size of the threat." And their reponse is to walk away from the table.

Now, I think that—I know that the relations are bad right now.

Mr. Farrell. Very bad?

The President. Yes—well, not all that bad. They're maybe more unhappy than they've been in the past. But I think one of the reasons for that is that in the past, the Soviet Union has seen this country unilaterally disarm, cancel weapons systems such as the B-1 and other systems, close down our Minuteman missile assembly line. We don't even have the facility to make them anymore. And they've seen that while they were doing—while we were doing that, with some idea that maybe they would see we meant no threat and, therefore, they would follow suit—no, they continued with the biggest military buildup in the history of man.

Now, how can anyone—what I started to say, I guess, is that, sure, they're unhappy. They're unhappy because they see that we're preparing to defend ourselves if need be.

Mr. Farrell. Many West Europeans are very unhappy, though, because they see the danger that if the confrontation happens, if you don't get to talks in some shape or form, it is Europe where that war will be fought.

The President. Yes, but also there's some 300,000 American troops there which are

an indication of our standing by them in the Alliance.

They have lived almost 40 years now, since World War II, under an umbrella which has kept peace, and that umbrella is our nuclear capability in this country. I know that there are demonstrators and I know that there are people that are influenced by the Soviet-sponsored **World Peace Council**, but I don't think our alliance in Europe has ever been stronger than it is today.

But as I say, I think the Soviets—sure, they're unhappy because they liked it the other way when under a kind of détente, they were having things their own way. Now they know that we're not going to make ourselves vulnerable, as was done before. But they also know that we're willing anytime they want to sit down, we are willing to start reducing these weapons. And my ultimate goal is—I think common sense dictates it—the world must rid itself of all nuclear weapons. There must never be a nuclear war. It can't—shouldn't be fought, and it can't be won.

Mr. Farrell. When do you think that might happen? When do you think the process, the talks might begin?

The President. I don't know. We have kept the door open on any number of other negotiations. We've been doing business with them on some things of interest to them as well as us, and with some progress being made. It is only in this area—they did come back to the mutual balanced force—the conventional arms treaty, and we are discussing with them, as well as others, at the Stockholm disarmament talks. But it is on those two, the major nuclear weapons—the START talks, as we call them, and the intermediate-range weapons—where they are being intransigent.

Mr. Farrell. What about the boycott on the Olympics? Many people see this symbolically as just that further little bit of evidence of the Soviet Union and the United States pulling further apart.

The President. Well, I know that no one can really understand or fathom the thinking of the Politburo, the people in the Politburo of the Soviet Union, but I would hazard two ideas that stick in my mind as possibly an explanation for what they've done. One is retaliation for the boycott—

Mr. Farrell. 1980.

The President. —President Carter, in those Olympics when it was their Olympics. Number two, frankly, I think they don't want to be embarrassed by having revered athletes in their country come to this country and decide to stay.

Persian Gulf

Mr. Farrell. Different part of the world very much in the news this week—the Gulf. We're obviously teetering into a crisis there. Do you see, Mr. President, the possibility of a direct American involvement?

The President. Well, so far, it doesn't seem to be. The Gulf States have themselves said that this is their problem and they want to deal with it. Some have asked for some military assistance in the sense of weaponry, and this is why we are sending some weapons, some Stinger weapons to them and possibly augmenting our little squadron of tankers that are there. We have four there presently—have had for quite some time. That could be expanded to six. But they have not asked us to intervene, and certainly, we have not offered to intervene.

Mr. Farrell. Do you see this as essentially an American problem, or is it a problem for the West? Is this something that either regionally should be picked up by the Gulf States or is it something that the Western Alliance should come in, that you should stand back from?

The President. Well, if it comes to a complete shutdown of the sources of oil in the Middle East, this is a Western problem, and far more than for us. Actually, only about 3 percent of our oil comes from the Persian—or by way of the Persian Gulf. Many of our allies are not in that advantageous a position. They are very dependent on that. And I have said previously that I don't see how the Western World could let that be closed down. But at the moment, the Gulf States who are directly involved and who are on the firing line there believe that the problem can be solved and without outside interference.

Middle East

Mr. Farrell. What about the Middle East? You, after all, tried the Reagan plan in terms of resolving the West Bank problem.