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# AIPAC MEMORANDUM

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August 6, 1985

## WHY MORE ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA?

The Reagan Administration is again considering a sale of sophisticated American weapons to Saudi Arabia. Recent briefings given to members of Congress on the Middle East Arms Transfer Study, which called for additional sales of weapons to Saudi Arabia, are laying the foundation for a major arms package that could include M-1 tanks, 40 F-15 fighters, 3000 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, and other advanced weapons.

In 1981, President Reagan assured the Senate that the AWACS would not be delivered to Saudi Arabia unless

initiatives toward the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region have either been successfully completed or that significant progress toward that goal has been accomplished with the substantial assistance of Saudi Arabia.

Despite these assurances, the Saudis have opposed every significant American peace initiative in recent years. They worked to undermine the 1982 Reagan Plan and the May 17 Lebanon-Israel Accord of 1983 negotiated by the United States. They have opposed the Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel since 1979. They are opposing present U.S. peace initiatives in the region.

At the same time, the Saudis have worked against U.S. strategic interests by subsidizing Syria, by keeping oil prices as high as possible, by refusing to host American bases and by assisting in the Kuwaiti-led effort to bribe Oman to cancel its access agreements with the United States.

The Saudis already have enough weapons to defend themselves from Iran, as demonstrated by downing an Iranian fighter, and if existing inventories are insufficient additional supplies will not make a difference. Encouraging them to spend more on unnecessary armaments at a time of reduced oil income could increase internal dissatisfaction and lead to unrest like that which led to the fall of the Shah of Iran.

Yet, by selling the Saudis sophisticated weapons, the United States is diminishing Israel's ability to defend itself. The Saudis have provided military forces to fight Israel during three wars, and there is every reason to believe that they would use their new armaments in a future conflict.

The sale of advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia by the U.S., such as the AWACS, the F-15, and the M-1 tank, will give the Saudis capabilities never before possessed by Israel's enemies. Such weapons will raise the cost to Israel of maintaining an adequate level of superiority over hostile Arab forces.



## US-Egyptian Relations

August 1984

Background: Before 1967, US relations with Egypt went through several stages. Despite efforts by both sides following the 1952 "Free Officers" revolution to establish positive relations, US-Egyptian ties became strained for several reasons: Egypt's opposition to the Baghdad Pact, arms purchases from the Eastern bloc, and improving ties with the Soviet Union; US refusal to finance the Aswan High Dam; and differing US and Egyptian perspectives on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Relations improved somewhat in the late 1950s, and the US provided Egypt technical assistance, development loans, and food aid. In 1964, however, relations deteriorated again, and Egypt severed diplomatic ties on June 6, 1967, after the outbreak of the "Six-Day War." Nevertheless, unofficial diplomatic contacts, trade, and scientific exchanges continued.

After 1973: President Sadat's decision following the October 1973 war to opt for negotiations with Israel was accompanied by a turn toward the US. Restoration of formal US-Egyptian diplomatic relations on February 18, 1974, initiated a decade of close cooperation. The US helped Egypt and Israel negotiate two Sinai disengagement agreements (1974 and 1975), the Camp David Accords (1978), and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979), and took part in subsequent negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. Egypt's cooperation with the US in the search for Middle East peace opened the way for wider regional and bilateral cooperation.

Mubarak's leadership: Since his election in October 1981, President Mubarak has worked to expand and strengthen US-Egyptian relations. He has met on several occasions in Washington with President Reagan, received many senior US officials and Members of Congress in Cairo, and maintained an active dialogue with this country on Middle Eastern and regional concerns. Annual US aid to Egypt has increased from \$1,980.0 million in fiscal year 1982 to \$2,379.9 million in fiscal year 1984. Development projects constructed with US assistance are being completed, making the fruits of US aid more apparent to the average Egyptian. Delivery of weapons systems procured with foreign military sales credits and US-Egyptian joint military exercises have improved the capacity of both countries to respond to threats to regional security and stability.

Peace process: President Mubarak supports President Reagan's September 1, 1982, Middle East peace initiative and the Camp David framework on which it is based. He has called on Jordan's King Hussein and other Arab leaders to accept the President's call for negotiations for a just and lasting peace, and he has urged Israel to take "confidence-building measures" in the occupied territories that would facilitate progress toward peace. Although differing with the US on the Palestine Liberation Organization's role in the peace process and the option of a Palestinian state as the outcome of that process, Egypt continues to support resolution of the Arab-Israeli



conflict through direct negotiations. President Mubarak has made clear Egypt's firm adherence to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which has ensured 5 years of peace and security along their common border.

Since Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, Egyptian-Israeli relations have been strained, but the essential elements of their relationship appear intact: Egypt recalled its ambassador from Israel after the September 1982 massacres in Beirut refugee camps, but embassies remain at Tel Aviv and Cairo, with consulates at Eilat and Alexandria; trade has stagnated, yet Israel remains Egypt's largest Middle East trading partner (mainly through oil sales); and, although Egyptian tourism to Israel has failed to develop, tens of thousands of Israelis travel to Egypt each year. Egypt and Israel deal directly and peacefully with each other on these and other issues, and the US supports the improvement of their relationship as an integral part of the peace process.

Assistance programs: Between 1974 and 1984, the US obligated \$15,379.2 million in aid to Egypt--\$9,730.8 million in economic assistance and \$5,648.4 million in military aid. Economic aid helps reduce Egypt's balance-of-payments gap by funding such commodity imports as raw materials, capital equipment, and food. It also supports infrastructure projects and improvement of health, education, and other services. In 1983, the US undertook a 5-year, \$1 billion program to overhaul the water and sewerage systems of Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities. On the military side, the US has agreed to provide 35 F-4 jet aircraft, 80 F-16 jet fighters, more than 460 M60A3 tanks; over 1,400 armored personnel carriers, 12 I-Hawk anti-aircraft missile batteries, 4 E-2C aerial surveillance aircraft, and other equipment. This assistance is enabling Egypt to replace deteriorating Soviet-supplied weaponry with modern equipment and improve its ability to support regional security. The following table provides a breakdown of US aid in recent years (all figures in US \$million; figures for fiscal year 1985 denote Administration request):

	<u>Foreign Military Sales</u>			<u>Military</u>	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Food Aid</u>	
	<u>Grants</u>	<u>Credits</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Support Fund</u>	<u>(PL-480)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FY85	1,175	0	1,175	2.0	750	237.8	2,164.8
FY84	465	900	1,365	2.0	750	262.9	2,379.9
FY83	425	900	1,325	2.0	750	261.6	2,338.6
FY82	200	700	900	2.0	771	307.0	1,980.0
FY81	0	550	550	0.8	829	303.9	1,683.7

Partnership: Today, US-Egyptian relations are marked by continued partnership in the peace process, consultation on other regional issues, and high levels of US economic and security assistance. Working together in support of shared goals and common interests, the US and Egypt have made a meaningful contribution to Middle East peace and stability.