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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mar. 16

May Green - Public Liaison:

I have the tape if you  
want to take it home.

I agree with Groves  
that it would be a  
good vehicle for a  
group showing in  
room 450.

Hank Olsen

MJD - pls see tape from Cohen



## AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM

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*President  
Focus on the Family*

### President

GROVER G. NORQUIST

Dear Hank,

I enclose the tape of the Angola public television show. I watched it again last night and you are right. It is an excellent primer and worth viewing.

As we discussed, I am willing to help work with you and Max Green and Kurt Anderson about getting a showing in the White House for Africanists and supporters of the Reagan Doctrine. I believe that such a showing with a briefing from yourself would be a powerful signal to those concerned with the U.S. relationship with Savimbi.

Have a productive trip to Africa and don't fly near Cuito.

Sincerely,

Grover Norquist

MEMORANDUM  
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

*Linda*

YOU WERE CALLED BY-  YOU WERE VISITED BY-

*Joan Hunter*

OF (Organization)

*328-1244*

PLEASE PHONE  FTS  AUTOVON

WILL CALL AGAIN  IS WAITING TO SEE YOU  
 RETURNED YOUR CALL  WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*coming 19<sup>th</sup> - 20<sup>th</sup> + 21<sup>st</sup>  
on 24<sup>th</sup> + 25<sup>th</sup>  
waiting to hear from Joan  
when*

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME
	<i>10/28/86</i>	<i>11</i>


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1986

Ann

*dis cannot come by work*



MEMORANDUM FOR LINAS KOJELIS

FROM: LINDA L. AREY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH JOAN HUETER AND SCOT FINCH - HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY CUBAN SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA



After the October 6 briefing, Joan Hueter introduced me to Scot Finch, a British commercial film writer, who lives in the South of France. While working on a film in Angola, he became aware of the brutality and heinous crimes committed by Cuban soldiers on Angolan women and children. It changed his life and caused him to dedicate himself to helping these people.

Several human rights commissions are sponsoring a trip on the part of some survivors to the U.S. around November 20. They are anxious to have their story heard. He would like for these women to meet with the First Lady "woman to woman". I suggested that he think of a range of options.

Mark Siljander inserted their stories in the Congressional Record. I have attached it for your perusal. I would appreciate it if you could talk to your contacts and then call Joan Hueter regarding whether or not and how we can be involved.

cc: Mari Maseng



United States  
of America

# Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 99<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 132

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1986

No. 121

## House of Representatives

Mr. SILJANDER. I appreciate the gentleman yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, we have worked hard over the last year or so attempting to untie the hands of President Ronald Reagan, in a decade of effort to repeal the infamous Clark amendment which prohibited any ability for America to assist those fighting for freedom in Angola.

I stand in general support of this bill but in deep opposition to the section that prohibits any covert assistance to UNITA in Angola.

One of the arguments ushered forth as to why we should eliminate covert aid is because we should not be in the business of overthrowing legitimate governments.

Well, let me remind the membership that the Government of Angola has never been elected. We have never recognized the Government in Angola by diplomatic means. Ford did not, Carter did not, and obviously President Reagan has not.

In terms of territory there is about equal control with UNITA and the so-called dos Santos government. The dos Santos government is totally, unequivocally propped up by Cuban troops.

It is a puppet government regime that could not exist without the help of 35,000 Cuban troops.

The other issue, "well, we should debate whether or not we should help any freedom fighters in an open format." Well, may I remind those who use that argument, we sat and stood on this floor for hours and debated whether or not the Clark amendment should be repealed. And it was, thank goodness, finally repealed. In the subcommittee where I serve as ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee, we debated the Clark amendment. Should it be overt or con-

vert aid to help Jonas Savimbi in Angola?

We had the same debate in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Committee, the same debates were engaged there. We debated on the floor.

I also had a bill. The gentleman from Indiana full well knows I had a bill to aid UNITA overtly. One hundred ten bipartisan cosponsors.

Mr. HAMILTON's name is not one of those cosponsors.

I also had resolution, sense of Congress, expressing the importance of at least assisting UNITA in Angola without any legal ties or binds. Mr. HAMILTON is not a cosponsor of that resolution either.

So I must wonder what is the real intention behind this section? I think the intention is clear, to cut off any hope of assisting Jonas Savimbi fighting for his freedom in Angola.

The other argument, if we help Savimbi the Cubans will stay and they will never leave. But the truth is when the Clark amendment a decade ago was implemented there were 12,000 Cuban troops. That was in 1975.

In 1985 there are 35,000 Cubans, nearly 3 times that number.

So did the Clark amendment stifle Castro's intentions? It did not.

Ten years ago Castro said he would leave when the MPLA stabilized the situation. And we believed him.

Seven years ago Castro said, "Well, we will leave when the Namibian independence has been finally secured." At the same time Andrew Young said that Cuban troops are a stabilizing factor in southern Africa.

And we believed him.

Now 1 week ago Castro has changed his tune for the third time in a decade and said he will not leave until the white apartheid regime in South

Africa has been dismantled and there is majority rule. A good goal, but obviously Castro's intentions are to remain.

When one uses the argument that by supporting a black freedom fighter we somehow are in bed with the white racist regime in South Africa, is, minimally, absurd. He fought for 25 years, Jonas Savimbi, against white Portuguese rule and now white Cuban domination in his country. Do you think for a moment that a black freedom fighter in Angola after 25 years of fighting for independence of his nation would somehow welcome in the white apartheid regime and say "please set up a racist apartheid regime in Angola. We welcome you."? This is an absurd notion.

Obviously, yes, he is accepting aid from South Africa. Why not? Because for 10 years this country was unwilling to do so.

We fought, as CLAUDE PEPPER, Senator PEPPER has said, with the Soviets in World War II and that did not make us Communists. Iran is helping the Mujahdeen in Afghanistan and so are we. That does not make us part of the Iranian-Khomeini madness. Every country in southern Africa relies on South Africa either economically, militarily, or in some way or other. Are we going to cut off ties to every country in the southern region of that continent?

We think the Cubans are such a wonderful force in Africa, I would like to close by reading an excerpt from the essay entitled "The Village of the Living Dead." These by the way are testimonials from Angolans, black Angolans living in villages where the Cubans have plundered and raped and murdered the townspeople.

Let me read from this article:

(From the American Spectator, August 1986) Vol. 19, No. 8 / AUGUST 1986

### THE VILLAGE OF THE LIVING DEAD

(By Nicholas Rowe)

I was in Angola earlier this year with a Canadian news team. Outside Jamba, the provisional capital of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement, is a small village housing refugee women from the regions under the control of the Luanda Communist regime. It is known as "the village of the living dead." Some of the women are mutilated, others have lost their mind, all are victims of Soviet-inspired barbarism. And yet they speak of themselves as the lucky ones: they have survived.

Through our interpreter we spoke to some of the women able and willing to recount their experiences. The first was Madalena Ngueve, who looked much older than her forty-five years:

"It was the second of November 1984 when the Cubans came to our village. I tried to stop them taking away my son. He was twelve, and from the age of ten and upwards they come and ship them off to Cuba. I tried to stop them but one of the Cubans cut off my arm with a bayonet. They were beating the children who didn't want to leave their parents, beating them with the butt ends of their rifles. So, while I was bleeding, they took away my son. He was my only child. I've had no contact with him since that day.

Severina Chilombo arms crossed tight over her stomach, rocked compulsively back and forth as she told us her story:

"The Cubans arrived at my village just at daybreak. They locked some of the people into the huts and burned them alive. Others, their limbs—arms and legs—were cut off. My father burned to death in one of the huts, also my uncle. They poured gasoline on the huts and with torches they lit the fires. They ripped the baby I was carrying off my back. They swung and smashed her against a tree. She died, her little head cracked open. I was pushed into a lorry with some of the other younger women and boys. Later they stopped. I was raped the first time by ten men. We were raped in front of the boys deliberately. The Cubans said to them, 'Look how we rape your mothers and sisters so they can't have any more children.' During the journey we could choose whether we wanted sex voluntarily or not. Those who resisted were stabbed by bayonets. Then they were raped. Then they were killed. At the end of the journey the boys were taken away and the women put into prison. We weren't allowed to wash or anything for the first seven days. But every day the Cubans came . . . and . . . violated us. I lost my father and my mother. Everybody. There are days when I don't have any more tears left to cry. Today is almost one of

those days. It was my first baby. My only baby.

Veronica Kahali was concerned that we would not believe her. She kept repeating to our interpreter, "I am not inventing a story. I saw what I saw with my own eyes." She would point to her companions in distress. "They know I am telling the truth. . . . We have all seen so much, been through so much." Reassured that we did not doubt her and that our tape-recorder would capture every word, she began in a flat, emotionless voice, as if memory of her Calvary would be erased by its telling.

"When the Cubans arrived at my village, all the people were rounded up. The older people were killed, the younger ones taken away, the boys to the army. The young women were separated from the men and taken to prison." Almost as an afterthought, she added, "The pregnant women in prison were killed by having their bellies cut open. The Cubans cut open the pregnant women by bayoneting them from just below the breast downwards."

There was an involuntary gasp of horror from our interpreter, herself a mother. Veronica Kahali was again immediately on the defensive. "But I saw it! My sister was close to her time and her belly was ripped open. She died next to her unborn baby. I saw it!"

Once calmed, she resumed her monotone monologue:

"Our people were sorted out into groups: old men, young men, old women, young women, children. The old men were killed right there on the spot. The children who gave problems were beaten to death with rifle butts . . . anything . . . hacked with choppers, pangas. The group of girls I was in, the Cubans and Fapla [soldiers of the Angolan Communist army] came every day. . . . five of them sometimes. They chose a woman and took her out of the cells. I was raped continuously. They had no mercy. If you screamed or made any noise they just gagged your mouth and held you down. Of course some of the women cried. That made it worse for them. They were beaten up and then, afterwards, they were killed."

Angelina Missoji was much more emotional; anxious that we should hear her story but ashamed of her part in it:

"It was a very sad morning. The people were walking down to the fields, it was harvest time. We walked into an ambush laid by the Cubans and some Fapla soldiers. When we fell into this ambush, I tried to run away but I was shot in my foot. Later I was taken away by the Cubans. The bone in my foot was not shattered by the bullet, but in prison the bottom part of my leg was amputated anyway."

At first undecided whether to display her mutilation or to conceal it, she finally tucked her truncated leg under the wooden bench where she was hunched.

"The villagers were divided into groups. The very old people were killed immediately, other old women taken to prison with them. The younger women were raped as the young men sent for military training. I saw with my own eyes two different ways: killing the old. Some were lined up and shot. Others who were very old were simply clubbed to death, or kicked to death with boots or bayoneted. Both my mother and father were killed by the Cubans. I was there, I saw it. Both were killed in more or less the same way. First they were clubbed and then shot. I was very sad and also angry with myself that I did nothing, said nothing. But I would have been killed as well, was afraid. It is very difficult for me to remember these things. No, I can't talk any more about this. I'm sorry. Forgive me."

The question we all asked ourselves was why: why attack these villages deep inside

the part of Angola nominally controlled by José Eduardo Dos Santos and his Cuban allies? The answer came from an unexpected source, a Cuban who deserted to join UNITA. Miguel Garcia Enamorado, from the Cuban province of Gran Ma, explained that any village more than ten kilometers outside a town was automatically considered to favor UNITA and was therefore subjected to punitive measures, "pour encourager les autres." Orders were, "Destroy everything, burn down the houses, kill the cattle, neutralize the population."

The above testimony makes me think that if Jonas Savimbi and UNITA lose their war, the village of the living dead may become the country of the living dead.

Now granted there are atrocities probably in any conflict. But, my colleagues, the issue is so abundantly clear: communism, Castro fanaticism versus fighting for freedom. The true intentions of this amendment are not just to have an open debate, because we are doing it now and we have done it before. It is time we faced what the truth is here. The truth is we need to help those fighting for freedom, and this amendment would tie our President's hands to do that.

country with considerable weight on the continent, of the importance of such a change.

Previously relations with Luanda were warm and for Nigeria's part, generous. They have now become tense and the Nigerian ambassador in Luanda, who recently finished his term there, was snubbed by President José Eduardo dos Santos, who did not offer him the customary farewell reception. The discreet, changes in position being adopted by a number of African states towards Angola, are mainly attributed to generalised weariness of the war and its effects on other countries in the region.

These states are also tired of Luanda's intractability over efforts to negotiate an end to the war.

Luanda's concern is that the changes undermine its own efforts (see page 10) to win backing for its cause on the continent.

It also fears that diminishing African support will weaken continued Soviet and Cuban backing for the regime. Moscow and Havana listen carefully to the views of African states about their involvement in Angola.

Luanda is also facing growing problems with the Congo — formerly its strongest ally in the region (Vol 1 No 1 page 8). Relations are increas-

ingly more formal. Brazzaville recently introduced restrictions on facilities granted to Angola — such as the use of its airspace and airports and freedom of movement for Angolan security officials through its territory.

Congolese President Sassou Nguesso is increasingly impatient with the "disasterous" policies of the ruling MPLA party in Angola. He has urged his contacts among party officials to open negotiations with UNITA. Another former fervent Congolese supporter of the MPLA, Finance Minister Moussa Pierre, now openly says he no longer believes in MPLA policies.

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*The MPLA regime in Angola continues a propaganda war attempting to downplay the overwhelming victories by UNITA in recent months as is documented by the following article from *informafrica*.*

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## Angola propaganda hides war reality

ANGOLA'S MARXIST government seeking to downplay recent rebel successes, has mounted a major propaganda effort to blame South Africa for all its military problems.

Luanda attributes only a secondary role to UNITA in the current conflict.

The war of words has been stepped up in the past two months and the Angolan public, has been flooded with propaganda via the state-controlled media.

The campaign has reached unprecedented levels of manipulation and counter-information clearly aimed at reducing UNITA's role to a minimum, enthroning the South Africans as the sole enemy and maximising the combat efforts of government forces to cover up serious setbacks suffered in recent weeks.

Luanda has gone as far as distorting irrefutable facts like UNITA's capture of two Cuban pi-

lots who ejected from a MIG-21 hit by a U.S.- supplied Stinger missile.

The government version for internal consumption, is that the pilots were captured by South Africa.

The state-owned newspaper "Jornal de Angola" announced they had been captured in areas "where South African troops operated" (i.e. province of Moxico, some 1000 kilometers from the Namibian border!)

Independent sources in Luanda report the government versions are far from convincing and do not appear to be beating traditional popular scepticism in regards to official propaganda.

Eugénio Friole Hernandez, head of the Cuban Communist Party's Department of Revolutionary Orientation, who visited Luanda in November — meeting with the ruling MPLA's chief ideologue Roberto de Almeida — subsequently drew up a highly critical report about Luanda's general in-

formation policies.

He said the policies were amateurish and ineffective.

Although the campaign meshes clearly with the efforts of the regime to discredit and isolate UNITA, it is also partly a result of exaggerated reports by Angolan military chiefs of staff seeking to justify their defeats and using South Africa as the scapegoat.

Externally Luanda's campaign is mainly directed at the rest of the continent (see page 9) where since 1987 many former MPLA allies have altered their policies towards Angola.

Luanda hopes to invert this tendency by raising the South Africa bogey and trying to persuade the Africans that UNITA is nothing more than an instrument of Pretoria

Dozens of Luandan emissaries have fanned out across Africa in recent weeks bearing this message raised also at the Franco-phone and OAU summits.

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The preceding three articles are reprinted from *informafrica*. Please direct any questions to Ken Pottinger, *informafrica*, Rua de Santo Antonio da Gloria, 35 r/c esq., 1200 Lisbon, Portugal; Telephone: 328357-328993.



# New Documentary Uncovers Plot to Prevent 1975 Elections

Portuguese Admiral says election call was power grab tactic.

A powerful, new documentary has, for the first time, revealed a plot by the Portuguese high commissioner to prevent elections and ensure the MPLA power grab in Angola in 1975.

"The New Liberation Wars: Angola," a one-hour documentary recently aired by PBS stations around the country, details the role of Rosa Coutinho, the so-called "Red Admiral," in the Marxist MPLA takeover in 1975. According to the documentary, Coutinho—who at that time was the most powerful man in Angola—devised a scheme to install the Marxist MPLA in power.

The documentary states that the Alvor Agreement was just a ploy that Admiral Coutinho used to buy time for the MPLA to mobilize their armies for a military takeover. To ensure that the MPLA would not be defeated, Coutinho personally arranged for Cuban troops to be sent to Angola and allowed the Sov-

iet weaponry to be shipped to Angola for use by the Cubans and the MPLA.

For the first time, after a 10-year period of silence, Admiral Coutinho confesses that his goal was to ensure that the MPLA succeed the Portuguese by any means necessary. In the Canadian-produced documentary, the "Red Admiral" states that "I knew very well that elections could not be held in the territory. I said at that time that the only solution was to recognize the MPLA."

"The New Liberation Wars" has been acclaimed by many influential critics throughout the country. Richard Grenier of the *Washington Times*, who has been to Angola, called the film "one of the most outstanding television documentaries of recent years . . . grimly accurate . . . with the most astonishing collections of interviews."

Barbara Amiel, a columnist for



*Maclean's*—one of the most popular news magazines in Canada—said that Rosa Coutinho displayed an "arrogant contempt for the niceties of democracy" in his interview in the film. Amiel said that the documentary exposes the "big lie" about Angola: "the concept that free elections are either a luxury in the Third World or not really a part of their culture. This has been used to excuse the lack of genuine elections in every independent African country," she writes.

"Third World people are not a breed of human beings distinct from the rest of us, with no interest in saying how their countries should be run," Amiel said.

"The New Liberation Wars: Angola" was produced by Stornoway Productions, 59 St. Nicholas St., Toronto, Ontario, M4Y1W6, Canada. □



↑  
Steve, pls find out  
who the film this co.  
has produced. The. max  
4/16-923-1104

The "Red Admiral," Rosa Coutinho (center with white uniform), the Portuguese High Commissioner of Angola in 1975, shakes hands with Dr. Jonas Savimbi while MPLA leader Agostinho Neto (front left) looks on. Coutinho had just completed negotiations in which the Portuguese pledged to supervise free elections in Angola.

Coutinho, who was in charge of the decolonization of Angola for the Portuguese, now admits that his goal was to put the MPLA in power with the help of Castro's troops.

# The U.S. and Angola



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

See it with  
- ps to. 50

*Following is a statement by Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., February 18, 1986.*

I welcome this opportunity to speak to this committee today about the complex situation in southwestern Africa. The Angola-Namibia negotiations form an essential part of our policy for the region. Our objectives are clear: to restore and advance U.S. influence in the region; to expand our cooperative relations with African states; and to deny to the Soviet Union the opportunity to use its influence to exacerbate already dangerous situations in Angola, South Africa, and the other countries of the area.

## Review of Progress

It is obvious, I believe, to all in this room that our interest and objectives are decidedly not served by a Namibia which is not free and by an Angola which is the scene of a bloody conflict and foreign intervention. Thus, we have worked hard to bring peace to Angola and independence to Namibia. In recent years we have made progress in pursuit of our goals. Allow me to review with you the path we have followed and where we are today.

In 1981, at the start of this Administration, there was no peace process at all underway in southwestern Africa. The quest for Namibian independence was moribund, South Africa sat seemingly unmovable on its side of the Angolan-Namibian border while some 30,000 Cubans sat across on their side of the same border. UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] was fighting an apparently endless civil war. No one was talking to anyone else.

This blocked situation posed real dangers to the region and U.S. interests there. The *absence* of a viable Western strategy for Namibia decolonization and the *presence* of a seemingly permanent Soviet-Cuban military in Angola risked heightened polarization and open-ended opportunities for Moscow to exploit African frustration over Namibia and fuel internal and regional tensions. It was essential that we regain the initiative.

It took 2 years to engage Luanda and Pretoria in a real negotiation. It took another year to begin to erode the mutual mistrust and build confidence in an American role. But with the Lusaka accord of February 1984, the South Africans began the process of disengagement from their military positions in Angola in return for restraint by SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization]. In November of the same year, the Angolans said they were ready to commit themselves to withdraw 20,000 Cuban troops over 3 years, starting with the beginning of implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, the internationally agreed independence plan for Namibia. While this proposal was, in itself, not sufficient to conclude an agreement, it was an important step forward in that Luanda had accepted the principle that the independence of Namibia could only take place in the context of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

It is, therefore, important to note that by early 1985, we had made real progress in devising and gaining acceptance for a framework for resolving the dual question of Namibian independence and Cuban troop presence in Angola. I would emphasize that this progress in the years 1981-85 helped thwart Soviet goals of advancing its positions in southern Africa. Moscow did not encourage our efforts on Angola and has clearly been placed on the defensive there, in Mozambique, and elsewhere.

However, the negotiating process has always moved in fits and starts and has been characterized by mutual suspicion among the parties to the conflict—South Africa, the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], UNITA, and SWAPO—and by continuing efforts, sometimes more intense than others, to pursue the military options. Moscow has fueled distrust and fear among the local parties.

Thus, after we tabled fresh compromise proposals—a synthesis of both South African and Angolan ideas on the timing and sequencing of Cuban troop withdrawal—in March 1985, each of the parties pulled back from taking the tough decisions needed to advance the process. In South Africa, a government—under heavy pressure from internal protest and increasing international isolation—pursued other means to accomplish its ends, including greater emphasis on military operations within Angola. The MPLA government in Luanda, buoyed by a massive infusion of Soviet equipment, also retreated from the negotiating path. The result was a major MPLA military thrust into southern Angola in late 1985 which was marked by greater Soviet involvement and South African participation in support of UNITA than had been witnessed before.

We believe that fighting brought home to both sides the dangers of military escalation. In recent months we have had several important meetings with both the MPLA and the South African Government in which the negotiating context has been further defined. We are not yet at the point of success, and frankly, prospects in such a complex enterprise and these negotiations must always be viewed as problematical.

## U.S. Reception of UNITA's Leader

These negotiations, and the continuing warfare inside Angola and across its borders into Namibia, represent the backdrop against which the visit of Dr. Jonas Savimbi of UNITA occurred. Dr. Savimbi's visit has generated a lot of public interest and some debate, much of it divorced from the political and military realities of southern Africa. Dr. Savimbi spoke effectively on his own behalf and most of you had the opportunity to hear him directly. He told us he had a very useful visit and was returning to Angola with high morale and no doubts about the Administration's support for his efforts.

We do support UNITA; it has sustained a long and brave fight against Soviet and Cuban political and military designs. Our reception of him here was an element of that support. It sent a strong signal to Luanda and Moscow that the United States views UNITA as a nationalist organization with legitimate aspirations of playing a role in the process of national reconciliation that must come about if Angola is eventually to achieve real peace. We intend to be supportive of UNITA in an effective and appropriate manner. As the President said in his State of the Union message, we want to support all those fighting for freedom.

And, as the President said in his important speech to the UN General Assembly in October of last year, we view the Soviet Union as having a responsibility to take action to defuse situations of regional tension which have been made worse by its own policies. We will continue to make that point to Moscow through direct communication and otherwise as well.

## Constant U.S. Goals

Some may perceive that the reception Savimbi received here signals a change in U.S. policy. It does not. Our strategy recognizes that the scene on the ground in Angola has changed, largely owing to Soviet actions, and that our ability to respond diplomatically and in other ways has been measurably increased by the repeal of the Clark amendment, effective October 1, 1985. However, I want to categorically state here that the basis and goals of our policy remain unchanged: we seek negotiated solution that will bring independence to Namibia and withdrawal of Cuban forces from

Angola. Such a solution opens the way for Angolans to reconcile and achieve peace.

Allow me to say a few words about the broader context of our policy. First, we do not believe that in a contemporary period, as in any other period, that diplomacy and pressure represent polar opposites or alternative strategies. This is also the case in southern Africa where virtually all parties pursue their interests through a wide variety of means.

Inevitably, perhaps, both the South Africans and the Angolans are pursuing several tracks of policy to advance their interests. The same can be said about UNITA and the MPLA as they contend over the future of Angola.

For our part, we recognize that our diplomacy plays out against a backdrop of real and tangible pressures that exist on the ground. For the past several years, we have worked to create a political framework for the ultimate resolution of the intertwined problems of Angola and Namibia. At the level of general principles, we have succeeded.

All of the parties now accept that there is a real connection between Cuban troop withdrawal and Namibian independence. They accept that lack of movement on one side is an obstacle to the solution of other problems. But we have not yet been able to translate that into detailed accords specifying the timing and sequencing of Cuban troop withdrawal in relation to South Africa's commitments under Resolution 435.

It remains our analysis that neither the South African Government nor the Government in Angola, nor SWAPO, nor UNITA can accomplish their goals through outright military victory. The only ones to benefit by continued warfare are the Soviets and Cubans; hence, the continuing relevance of a political framework. That framework offers a context for the multiple political, military, and economic pressures at play. However, that does not mean that the parties will not on occasion try to solve their problems via the deceptively easy way of escalating the war.

This past year we have seen the MPLA government, strongly backed by Moscow and Havana, pursue such an escalation. They sought to reverse 2 years of UNITA gains and deal a body blow to that movement. They failed. It is im-

portant in our view that they continue to fail. Just as we are determined that our diplomacy not be used by the South Africans as a cover for the pursuit of other objectives, we feel the same way about the government in Luanda.

The point I am making, then, is that diplomacy requires to be effective a degree of pressure that drives the parties toward a political compromise. But pressure—pure physical power—does not in itself represent solutions and, in our analysis, cannot be effective in the absence of a meaningful political context. As Secretary Shultz has put it, it takes both power *and* diplomacy.

While here, Dr. Savimbi stated his view that there is no possibility for either side in Angola to gain an outright military victory and that national reconciliation will have to come about through a process of negotiation. He emphasized that UNITA does not wish to destroy the MPLA. UNITA, he said, seeks rather to convince the leaders in Luanda of the need to compromise and reach a political settlement. We share Dr. Savimbi's belief that there are no military solutions in Angola. And he affirmed to us his support for our efforts, which focus on the linked issues of Resolution 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal, to provide the political context necessary to achieve peace and reconciliation in Angola.

## The Need for a Clear Statement From Congress

It is appropriate that this committee review the situation in Angola and U.S. policy to that troubled part of the world. It is, of course, up to the committee to decide what position it wishes to take on this issue. I would like to suggest, however, that America's best interests would be served by a clear statement from Congress that this country is committed to negotiated resolutions in southern Africa but that our willingness to negotiate should not be used by others to pursue their own aggressive ends. In this regard, and keeping in mind the words of Dr. Savimbi when he visited here, I think it important that our government, both the executive and legislative branches, make clear that we support those who fight for freedom and political solutions. How that support should be manifested is a topic for further legislative-executive cooperation and consultation. ■

THE WHITE HOUSE

9/10/87

Max -  
This fellow was at our CA  
briefing yesterday. He will  
call you regarding Angola. ]

- Libas

Angela

(202) 775-8523

*Government Relations International*

MAURICE A. DAWKINS  
PRESIDENT

1800 K ST., N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006



**THE  
PEACE  
IN ANGOLA  
INITIATIVE**



## “I am Jonas Savimbi, and I want Angola free!”

Those were the words spoken by the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to a group of Black Americans in Washington, D.C. in February 1986. For the first time, UNITA had an opportunity to present its case for freedom directly to Black America, free from outside interpretation.

More than 100 Black Americans listened intently to a message they had not heard before. They were told of the decades-long struggle against the Portuguese colonialists and of the suffering of the people under European domination. They also were told of how foreign forces, such as the Soviets, the Cubans and the South Africans, came to be new obstacles to the Angolan struggle for freedom.

Among those who listened and were impressed was Dr. Maurice Dawkins. He discussed what he heard that day with others and eventually travelled to Jamba, Angola, to UNITA headquarters to see for himself what Dr. Savimbi had spoken of. He and other Black Americans who travelled to Jamba saw a people determined to bring peace and democracy to a land torn by warfare for much of the 20th century. These Black Americans are now resolved to aid in the fight against recolonization of Angola by Soviets and Cubans instead of Portuguese. That is the mission of the group now known as Black Americans for Peace and Democracy in Angola.



Dr. Jonas Savimbi, founder and leader of UNITA, speaks to a group of Black Americans in Washington on February 2, 1986.



Dr. Savimbi (at right) makes a crucial point to a gathering of Black Americans, including Dr. Maurice Dawkins (center).

## MORE THAN EVER BEFORE...

There is a need for Black Americans to take an active role in the fight for freedom and democracy in Angola. The effort to educate Americans and influence policy on Angola has already begun in Washington and throughout the nation. Black Americans for Peace and Democracy in Angola, as a non-profit Virginia corporation, has launched a campaign for funds to underwrite the development of this nationwide network of Black American grassroots support.

We intend to mobilize Black public opinion and provide educational and informational material to churches, publications, schools and community organizations. Our objective is to support peace, free elections and democracy in Angola as effectively as other American ethnic groups support their native lands.

It is imperative that America's policy-makers realize that there are Black Americans who understand and support the struggle for freedom in Angola. Won't you help us convey that message with a tax deductible gift? Your "challenge" gift is to be matched by contributions from Black Americans and their freedom-loving friends doing business in the Black community.

Make your check payable to: Black Americans for Peace and Democracy in Angola; 1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 631; Washington, D.C. 20006.

BAFPADA, Inc., is a not-for-profit agency exempt from federal income taxes under Section 501 (3c) of the Internal Revenue Code.

You can help us make the difference!



Shown here following a successful discussion of legislative strategy regarding Angola are (from left to right): M.J. Anderson, House Speaker Jim Wright, Rev. L.B. George and Dr. Maurice Dawkins.



Attending a Congressional briefing on Angola held in the Capitol dome office of Rep. Claude Pepper are (from left to right): Figueiredo Paolo, Rev. John Riley, Robert Decatur, M.J. Anderson, Angela Hicks, Gregory Simpkins, M. Alvin Lockhart, Frank Francois, Rep. Pepper, State Rep. Willie Logan, Dr. Maurice Dawkins, Paulette Coleman, Rev. Hosea Williams, Rev. L.B. George, State Rep. Joseph Young, Jr., Albert Dunmore and Thomas Wilkins.



# Statement of Purpose

## Black Americans for Peace and Democracy in Angola

The fundamental purpose of the organization is to help create a positive, stable political environment that makes possible positive sustained U.S. legislative, economic and humanitarian support for Angola and southern Africa, mobilizing Black American public opinion in support of democracy in Angola through free elections and majority rule.

Objectives of the organization include the following:

- To establish a network for communication and the dissemination of information regarding the origin, history and current status of the war in Angola and the implications for U.S. policy with regard to the southern region of Africa.
- To motivate and influence Black American leaders of national Black organizations and grass roots groups to support United States—Africa policy which supports economic, trade, educational and cultural exchanges between Black Americans and Black Angolans.
- To develop a "Peace in Angola Educational Campaign" to influence the United States government policy through legislative and executive branches of the federal government.
- To foster reconciliation, good will and trust between the two Angola governments under the leadership of President DosSantos of occupied Angola and President Savimbi of Free Angola.
- To encourage a cease fire, a negotiated settlement and a political solution to the current warfare in Angola utilizing the good offices of African Heads of State, the General Secretary of the USSR, the President of the United States and His Holiness, Pope Paul of the Vatican.
- To assure the holding of free elections and the establishment of a democratic government by majority rule in Angola by launching and sustaining a peace initiative.
- To promote Pan-African philosophy and strategy for a post-war Angola with Black Angolans determining their own destiny free from all foreign interference.
- To support U.S. policy for Africa which provides economic aid for Angola and the southern region of Africa to assist the "front-line" nations to eliminate economic dependency on the Union of South Africa.
- To link U.S. economic aid to the "front-line" nations with their cooperation in supporting peace and free elections in Angola.
- To assure victory for the principles of democracy, individual freedom, individual security, local self-determination, economic self-help and political equality under the law for all Angolans.



Dr. Jonas Savimbi (far left) is joined at a news conference in Jamba, Angola, by (left to right): Dr. Maurice Dawkins, Rev. Thedford Johnson and M.J. Anderson



These Angolans work in one of the factories in Jamba making clothing. Angolans in UNITA-controlled territory all work at some trade, thus making themselves economically self-sufficient to as great a degree as possible.



An Angolan doctor tends to a young child whose leg was amputated. Due to the 12-year-long civil war, Angola has the highest rate of amputations in the world.

**Dr. Maurice Dawkins (left) and Gregory Simpkins discuss a recent victory by supporters of UNITA in Congress. Since 1986, there have been a string of legislative victories in Congress, including at least two successful efforts to prevent a cutoff of military and humanitarian assistance to UNITA.**



**Children in Jamba attend classes each day. There are more than 7,000 primary schools alone in UNITA-controlled territory.**



## Economic and Strategic Situation in Angola

Prior to independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola was one of the richest nations in Africa in terms of natural resources. Its major exports were: petroleum, coffee, diamonds, iron ore, sisal (hemp), fish and cement. Its major railroad, the Benguela railway, earned in excess of \$100 million annually from Zambian and Zairian traffic alone.

However, the disastrous civil war has reduced a potentially wealthy African nation to a pauper, and the ruling MPLA regime in Luanda has devoted 50 percent of its foreign exchange earnings to defense and another 25 percent to food imports. Over the past dozen years, industrial centers, power facilities, mining areas and agricultural projects have been in the direct line of fire of a civil war that today remains in a standoff despite the tremendous military investment by the Soviet Union of as much as \$2 billion in arms in the last year alone.

Angola is rich in mineral resources, but the civil war makes exploitation of those resources difficult, if not impossible. This African nation is well known for its oil, diamonds, and iron ore, and it also has significant deposits of copper, manganese, phosphates, salt and uranium. Unfortunately, the best mineral surveys of Angola are locked away in a vault in Lisbon, capital of the former colonial power. The civil war makes any new such survey too dangerous to attempt.

Still there are reliable estimates of Angola's mineral wealth. At the beginning of 1985, Angola had enough proven oil reserves to last for at least 30 years. It is the second largest petroleum producer in sub-Saharan Africa, behind only Nigeria. More than 200,000 barrels of oil are produced daily, largely due to increased production from the new Takula field off Cabinda. Oil revenues

now account for approximately 90 percent of Angola's revenues, an increasing percentage of which are now being committed to repay a rising defense-incurred debt to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc.

Diamonds are Angola's second largest foreign exchange earner. The country has between five and eight percent of the world's diamond production, a high proportion of which is gem quality. It is estimated that as many as one million carats are exported annually, but at least 30 percent of Angola's diamond exports are smuggled out of the country each year by Cubans and other Soviet surrogate forces and by corrupt MPLA officials. These exports threaten the constancy of the world diamond market.

Iron ore reserves of a high grade are estimated at more than one million metric tons. Unfortunately, production of high-grade ore was halted in August of 1975 when the Cassinga mines in southern Angola were partially destroyed, and the civil war has prevented the full reopening of those mines since then. The cost of rehabilitating the mines is estimated at between \$25 and \$28 million. Exploration of the Cassala and Quitongo areas has revealed aggregate reserves of iron and magnetite of about 200 million metric tons, but again, the civil war has prevented significant mining efforts.

Due to the civil war, there are at least half a million displaced persons from the central highlands, Angola's breadbasket. Fighting has reduced coffee exports to less than 300,000 bags annually, down from a pre-independence high of 3.4 million bags, and the war has held the production of sugar to 200,000 metric tons for the past five years. Fish, once a staple food of the Angolan diet, is seldom seen by many Angolans today because the MPLA regime has given the Soviets control of fishing off the Atlantic coast.

In fact, the Soviets have great influence in the Angolan economy, largely through military assistance and arms sales. In 1986, the Soviets gave the MPLA regime at least \$1 billion in military aid. Meanwhile, the regime is becoming increasingly indebted to the Soviets through the purchase of arms not given to them by the Eastern bloc. Much of the debt goes to pay for the 45,000 Cuban troops stationed in Angola, as well as the other Eastern bloc mercenaries propping up the MPLA regime. The Soviets signed a 10-year, \$2 billion economic cooperation agreement with the MPLA regime in 1982, but at the mid-point of that agreement, little economic assistance beyond military aid had been seen for the Angolans. Meanwhile, the Soviets, through joint corporations with the MPLA, have quietly been building monopolies. One of those firms, Gamek, currently is selling water in the capital city of Luanda, which has been in the throes of a water shortage. Rather than repair the infrastructure that caused the shortage, they are profiting from the misery of the Angolan people. Another venture is the Kapanda dam and hydroelectric project on the Cuanza River. This \$900 million project will be completed by 1988, although the power station won't be on-line until 1991 at the earliest. The power station will have a generating capacity of 520 megawatts, an invaluable asset to those expecting to become involved in industrial projects in Angola's northeastern region.

American supporters of Angola's MPLA regime often say that that nation is the U.S.'s third largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, but they fail to point out that U.S. investment there is concentrated in the petroleum sector and almost totally involves Chevron-Gulf. The U.S. oil giant pumps an estimated \$3.5 million worth of oil a day. Oil is America's primary import from Angola, which

imports from the U.S. mainly industrial goods and services, such as oil field equipment, mining equipment, transportation equipment (largely aircraft) and food. In 1984, U.S. imports from Angola totalled \$1.01 billion, while U.S. exports to Angola totalled only \$103 million.

Americans are being tempted by the prospect of investment in "pro-Western" Angola, while U.S. investment thus far only serves to aid the Soviets and other Eastern bloc nations whose aim is to build a monopoly over all industries in Angola. A free and independent Angola would be more open to investment by all nations and would not so willingly accommodate Soviet economic control of the southern African region.

Hegemony in Angola is the key to Soviet control of the southern African region. It provides a base of operation for Eastern bloc troops sustained by Angolan resources. Control over Angola's Benguela railway gives the Soviets and their allies control of a major transportation link in that region, which could net them, through their surrogates, hundreds of millions of dollars in profits annually. Many in Africa fear that such power could be turned toward the other centers of vast resources, such as Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, which are rich in minerals such as copper, gold, lead, cobalt, nickel, zinc and chrome. The United States gets three quarters of its imports of many strategic minerals from southern African nations. The only alternative source for some of these vital minerals is the Soviet Union itself and their nearly total control of these vital resources could drastically alter the current balance of power in the world.



## Black Americans for Peace and Democracy in Angola

<b>INCOME</b>	<b>1987<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>1988<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>1989<sup>3</sup></b>
Corporate Special Gifts National Contacts	\$ 150000	\$ 150000	\$ 150000
Corporate Special Gifts Regional Contacts	50000	70000	100000
Gifts 5000 and under	50000	50000	100000
Black Corporations	40000	50000	100000
Membership	2000	30000	9000
Souvenir Journal	30000	30000	60000
Special Projects	40000	40000	75000
<b>Total Income</b>	<b>\$ 362000</b>	<b>\$ 420000</b>	<b>\$ 594000</b>

Note 1: 1987 Budget for six (6) states.

Note 2: 1988 Budget for ten (10) states.

Note 3: 1989 Budget for fifteen (15) states.



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# Black Americans for Peace and Democracy in Angola

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**Executive Vice-Chairman**

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
**National Headquarters:  
1800 K Street, N.W.  
Suite 631  
Washington, D.C. 20006  
(202) 775-8266**



**Black Americans for Peace and Democracy in Angola**



# Religion



Pictured from left are the Rev. Milton Galamison, N.Y.; the Rev. Maurice Dawkins, Virginia; and Ambassador Vernon Walters, U.S. representative to the U.N.

## Prayer Pilgrimage Concludes At U.N.

A prayer pilgrimage which began last Easter at the site of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s grave in Atlanta concluded in New York recently with activities at the United Nations.

The pilgrimage took its participants to Washington, D.C.; southern Africa and Europe in search of support for a peaceful settlement of the civil war in Angola.


The Rev. Maurice A. Dawkins, the organizer of the prayer pilgrimage, joined with New York minister Rev. Milton Galamison in a prayer vigil at the Church Center for the United Nations. The pair also delivered letters to the ambassadors from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"Now is a particularly favorable time for these nations to work together toward a peaceful solution to the Angola problem," Dawkins said. "Both the ruling

MPLA regime and UNITA have shown a willingness to discuss the end to 12 years of Black fratricide in Angola, but that can't happen unless all foreign forces agree to allow them the room to come to a mutually agreeable settlement in the interest of all Angolans."

The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) seized power in November 1975 with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Eastern bloc forces. They have been opposed by UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), which has received limited support from the United States and South Africa.

The theme of the letters Dawkins and Galamison delivered is in keeping with the ongoing efforts to achieve an amicable end to the Angolan civil war. Similar letters have been delivered to a variety of world leaders, includ-



Rev. Maurice Dawson of Virginia and Rev. Milton Galamison of New York pray at the Ralph Bunche Memorial Park at the United Nations. The site was chosen because of the inscription from ISAIAH, "They shall beat their swords into plowshares . . ." and the prayers were for world peace and especially for an Iran-Iraq type cease-fire resolution in AFRICA.

PHOTO: Bert Andrews

ing Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos; Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev; and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

3/4

Linas Hajilas

Amk Cohen is free on Wed. 3/11  
(only has a scheduled lunch) and  
afternoon (2:00 and on) on  
Thurs 3/12 (Early part of day he is  
involved in MOI visit. Let me  
know what you come up with re  
his speaking at this. Thanks.  
Pat Carcoran 3393

30 REV MAURICE DAWKINS  
1800 K ST NORTHWEST  
WASHINGTON DC 20006 01PM  
March 11 & 12, 1987



1-0125728060 03/01/87 ICS IPMMTZZ CSP WH88  
7032767165 MGMB TDMT ARLINGTON VA 158 03-01 1115P EST

*Staff*

*skundes*

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN  
WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC 20500

*Scheduling*

*Clarence Baker  
John Smith. Mayor Pritchard Jr.*

DEAR MR PRESIDENT:  
CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR WISE CHOICE OF SENATOR HOWARD BAKER TO SERVE AS THE CHIEF OF STAFF IN THE WHITE HOUSE.  
AS A LOYALIST FOR THE REAGAN DOCTRINE, I HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING A "BLACK AMERICANS FOR FREE ANGOLA" NATIONWIDE.  
WE WILL HAVE, IN WASHINGTON, MARCH 11 AND 12, REPRESENTATIVES FROM TEXAS, FLORIDA, GEORGIA, NORTH CAROLINA, TENNESSEE, NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK, OHIO, MICHIGAN AND ILLINOIS.  
OUR HOPE IS THAT THE APPROPRIATE STAFF MEMBER FROM THE WHITE HOUSE CAN MAKE POSSIBLE A BRIEFING IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING FOR THIS GROUP. WE ESPECIALLY HOPE TO HEAR FROM AN AFRICA SPECIALIST IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.  
I DID HAVE A DE-BRIEFING WHEN I RETURNED FROM ANGOLA LAST FALL AND THIS IS THE LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP.

THANK YOU AGAIN,  
SINCERELY,  
REV MAURICE DAWKINS  
PRESIDENT - GOVERNMENT RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL  
TELEPHONE 202-775-8266  
REV MAURICE DAWKINS  
1800 K ST NORTHWEST SUITE 631  
WASHINGTON DC 20006

*20.  
→ Room  
→ Room 2pm*

23:18 EST  
MGMCMP

*Mult-1  
Does Lina know who those people are?  
Do we have a room?  
Who we have names etc?*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 3/3/87

TO: *Frank Loria*  
FROM: **FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.**  
*Director*  
*Presidential Appointments and*  
*Scheduling*

Information

Action

Let's Discuss

HC - 3/4

YOUR ACTION,

OPW (LINAS KUZEKIS, 6573)  
WILL DO THE LOGISTICAL  
END - YOU SPECIFIC

-FLL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1987

NOTE TO MEL BRADLEY

FROM: MATT ZACHARI

Mel, attached is a list of people who came in and met with Amb. Hank Cohen of NSC from 2:00-2:30 pm today. They discussed Angola and South Africa. It was a productive meeting and I think both parties left happy. (This is the Dawkins group I asked you about the other day).

REPORT NO: WAV034BS

WAVES

PAGE NO: 1

RUN DATE : 03/12/87

UIN : U98657 DATE: 870312 TIME: 1400 CANCEL DATE: CANCEL TIME:

VISITEE: COHEN TOTAL VISITORS: 20

AGENCY: LOCATION: DEOB AREA/ROOM: 324

REQUESTOR: CORCORAN

ROOM: PHONE: 000-3393

CHECKS: ID X NCIC/CCH

COMMENTS:

NAME		SSN	DOB
<del>ANDERSON</del>	A	M J	06/28/08
COLEMAN	C	BERNARD	05/25/13
<del>DANKINS</del>		MAURICE	01/29/21
DECATUR	D	ROBERT	03/04/21
FRANK	F	FRANCOIS	04/05/33
<del>GALAMISON</del>		MILTON	01/25/23
<del>GEORGE</del>	G	L B	01/18/16
<del>GREEN</del>		SARAH	02/22/12
<del>LOCKHART</del>		ALVIN	07/18/16
LOGAN	L	WILLIE	02/16/57
MCKEE		CLARENCE	11/16/42
NUNMORE	M, N	ALBERT	06/04/15
PARSONS		DONALD	09/18/57
PAULO	P	FIGUEREDO	08/30/41
RILEY	R	JOHN	04/06/20
SIMPKINS		GREGORY	07/26/54
<del>SMITH</del>	S	CREIGHTON	03/29/44
WILKINS		THOMAS	02/01/30
WILLIAMS	W	HOSEA	01/05/29
<del>YOUNG</del>	Y	JOSEPH	11/04/50

TOTAL VISITORS: 20

**CLASSIFIED**  
STARTS ON PAGE 4D

# COMMENTARY

**D**  
SECTION

**JONAS SAVIMBI**



**T**he age of European imperialism ended in 1975, when a military coup in Portugal led to independence for Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

Portugal had been the last European power to maintain sizable colonies overseas. Now that it was relinquishing its empire, the struggles for national liberation that swept Africa and Asia during the 1950s and 1960s finally appeared to be over. The former British, French, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, and Portuguese colonies could now develop themselves free of imperial exploitation. The peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America could live at peace, for the anti-colonial guerrilla wars had at long last been won.

But this dream of peace and national self-determination could not yet be achieved. In country after country, struggles for national liberation were betrayed and hijacked, and new nations found themselves once again the victims of colonialism.

This time they were assaulted by a new imperial power — the Soviet Union, acting directly or through its first overseas colony, Cuba. And so the nationalist struggles had to begin anew. Peoples tired of years of war and sacrifice were once again turned into soldiers; their nations became battlefields once more.

For eight years, the independence movement that I founded and led, UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), fought against Portuguese colonial rule. We expected to win the free elections that had been promised by the Portuguese in 1975, for we had strength in all Angola's tribes as well as overwhelming support among the Ovimbundu Tribe, which accounts for 40 percent of the nation's population. By contrast, the other non-Communist independence group, the FNLA (Angolan National Liberation Front), was supported exclusively by the Bakongo people of northern Angola. And the Moscow-controlled MPLA (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola) was supported only by urban leftists and portions of the Mbundu people liv-

# ANGOLA

## THE MUNICH OF AFRICA?

billion in arms to maintain their imperialist rule.

And so for 10 years more, UNITA has had to continue its guerrilla war — this time against the Cubans and Soviets who have replaced the Portuguese as the foreign rulers and exploiters of our people and land.

Today the peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are also waging wars of liberation against foreign troops and foreign secret police and the imposition of a foreign ideology on their nation. They are resisting tyrannical regimes that are kept in power only by the imperialist military force of the Soviet bloc.

This is a historic reversal of roles. For many decades, communism was identified with nationalism in the Third World, and many Communist parties came to power playing on the nationalist sentiments of the people. But the experience of countries ranging from Afghanistan to Laos to Angola to Nicaragua shows clearly that Marxist-Leninist regimes have no respect for the traditions of a people or for the tribal customs and lan-

guages turned for money, arms, training, and political support.

I know because I received my revolutionary education in China. In 1965, as I was preparing to found UNITA, I met Hua Hua, the Chinese ambassador to Nasser's Egypt. He invited me to Peking, where I met Mao Tse-tung and the other military and political leaders of the Chinese revolution. They advised me to return with 12 recruits, and late in 1965 we began a nine-month course in guerrilla warfare.

**F**rom Mao and the Communists, I learned how to fight and win a guerrilla war. I also learned how not to run an economy or a nation. Collectivist agriculture does not work. Peasants must be able to own their own land, their own houses, and their own cattle. People must be free to practice their religions and to observe their tribal traditions.

Lessons from Chairman Mao  
Today we who fight for these freedoms are using the strategv and tac-

**Hesitation, the refusal to aid UNITA in its fight against the Cubans and Soviets, will be taken as a signal by all the countries in the region that the United States has abandoned them to the Soviets as the West abandoned Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938.**

willingly share what they can. The guerrilla must therefore have strict discipline. To take food from villagers, to steal their land, to mistreat the people is to poison the waters in which the guerrilla army must swim. It is treason to the movement and is punished as such.

To gain the trust and support of the people, it is also important to establish schools and hospitals throughout liberated territory — if possible, even in areas where guerrillas operate but do not control. Today UNITA administrators 6,951 primary schools with 7,127 teachers and 224,811 students. We run nine secondary schools with 80 teachers and 1,860 teachers. Though the main hospital in Jamba, our provisional capital, has only three doctors, the French medical group *Medecins Sans Frontieres* has sent doctors and nurses to Angola to train our people and help administer inoculation programs. Every battalion has men assigned to treat and evacuate our wounded.

The second key to the success of a revolutionary movement is a clear political program. Soldiers cannot

were dying. No revolution or war can succeed unless the soldiers and their families know why they are fighting. Unity is a third vital point in the success of any guerrilla movement. Guerrillas can win only if their military and political and propaganda efforts are all working in the same direction. Fidel Castro makes unity of command a precondition for Cuban support of guerrilla movements.

We saw this in his insistence on a popular front in the struggle against Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Castro also insisted on unity among the guerrillas in El Salvador, withholding arms and even engineering a "suicide" or two to force the guerrillas to come together under a common command. Some anti-Communist freedom fighters have unfortunately hurt their effectiveness by a lack of coordination between guerrilla forces.

Fourth, it is essential that the guerrilla base of operations be within the territory of your own nation. This is to ensure self-reliance, as well as closeness to your own people. Another Angolan guerrilla group, the FNLA, was based in Zaire, and lost its base of operations when Zaire established relations with the MPLA. UNITA briefly had bases in Zambia, but we were expelled after we sabotaged the Benguela railroad through occupied Angola, over which Zambian copper is exported. Never again will we rely on bases on foreign soil.

**T**he Afghan freedom fighters are constantly threatened with losing their bases in Pakistan should Soviet pressure on President Zia ul Haq increase. The Nicaraguan resistance will face similar problems should Costa Rica or Honduras be pressured sufficiently by the Sandinistas or the Cubans or the Soviets. By contrast, a base within Angola — we now control a third of the land — allows our guerrillas a safe haven to rest. It gives us a place to train new recruits and it provides safety for the families of our fighters. UNITA was able to survive and grow, even during years without international support, because we were self-reliant. We

The first principle comes from

**JONAS SAVIMBI/Continued from page 1D**

has control of the nation. That is why UNITA has representatives in Washington, London, Paris, Munich, Geneva, Portugal, Morocco, and Senegal. It is why we regularly invite members of the international press to come to our capital to see our successes, and to interview our prisoners so they may know of the demoralization of the Cubans and the MPLA. Some reporters have traveled with our guerrilla forces and can report to the world the truth of our claims to travel freely throughout Angola, enjoying popular support and winning victories against the supposedly invincible Cuban forces.

At first it was difficult to get the world's attention. Anti-Soviet resistance movements were supposed to be doomed. The West had not yet learned that truly nationalistic movements can use the guerrilla tactics of Mao and Castro successfully against the Soviets. Some of our first propaganda victories came when we captured Western technicians who worked in the diamond mines on behalf of the Cubans and the MPLA.

Finally the West was forced to realize that UNITA was not limited, as is so often said, to the southeast corner of Angola. Governments that refused to recognize us had to come and negotiate for the release of their nationals. And prisoners who were treated well and safely transported thousands of kilometers to our base camps could report to the world that we were not bandits and that we moved freely through most of Angola.

Now it is unnecessary to prove these points and so we do not take Westerners when we overrun mines and power stations. But we try to warn Westerners that the Cubans and MPLA cannot guarantee their safety, and we ask them to stay out of all Angola, for it is a war zone.

**Guerrilla Strategy**

The goals of UNITA are clear and open for the world to see. We will drive the Cubans and Soviets and Eastern-bloc personnel from Angola. We will work with all patriotic Angolans to establish an independent, democratic, and free Angola. We reject foreign ideologies that presuppose masses of industrial workers and men without souls.

Our strategy is to raise the costs of the foreign occupation of Angola until the Cubans and Soviets can no longer bear the burden. A combination of rising military, financial, and political costs will finally drive the imperialist forces from our shores.

The French gave independence to Haiti, the first black republic, when Napoleon could no longer afford the financial costs of keeping the country enslaved. He had other uses for those resources.

The United States won its revolution when the cost in lives and material led to divisions among the British about whether to continue the war. Similarly, America left Vietnam as the result of rising political costs at home. America was never defeated on the battlefield in Vietnam; in fact, North Vietnamese strategist Gen. Giáp told me he never expected to defeat the Americans in battle. The guerrilla does not have to win decisively to drive out the foreign occupiers of his land. He simply has to raise the price of colonialism.

A central element of this strategy is deny the colonial forces the revenues that finance their occupation.

Today the Soviets and Cubans exploit Angola with a rapacity unrivaled by the Portuguese. Soviet fishing fleets have swept our coastlines, and fish has disappeared from the Angolan diet. Our diamonds, minerals, and oil from the Cabinda Province are taken in "payment" for arms and for support of the Cuban troops. The MPLA government pays Castro \$1,000 a month for each Cuban soldier in Angola, for a total of \$480 million a year. These mercenaries can afford to stay in our nation only as long as they are paid. So UNITA attacks the diamond mines, sabotages the bridges, and destroys the industries that support the Cuban occupation.

This policy does not harm our brothers in occupied Angola, for the wealth produced there does not go to them. It is taken by the Cubans and Soviets to pay for their repression here and to finance Cuban expeditions in other nations.

When enough Cuban officers are returned to Cuba in coffins, then Castro must face the wrath of his own people. Already we learn from Cuban prisoners of war that the war in Angola is unpopular in Cuba. The

**Communist Strengths**

UNITA's guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonialists was much easier than our struggle against the Soviets and Cubans. The Portuguese were perhaps better infantrymen than the Cubans, but by comparison with Angola's new colonialists, they suffered in both the quality and quantity of arms. The Portuguese used little armor and had no more



than five helicopters, whereas the Cubans and Soviets will send 15 helicopters to a single battle. The Soviet Union may not be able to feed its people or build advanced computers, but it knows how to build weapons (in fact, UNITA fighters rely on the AK-47 Kalashnikov, a low-cost automatic rifle that withstands dust and water better than anything the United States offers at comparable prices). The Soviets also deliver arms in large quantities; in Angola during the last 18 months, they have unloaded \$2 billion worth of MiG-23 and MiG-21 jets, Mi-24 helicopter gunships (the weapon used so effectively against the Afghan people), and T-62 and T-35 tanks, as well as trucks and armored personnel carriers.

Relative to the Soviets and Cubans, the Portuguese were as weak politically as they were militarily. They put almost no emphasis on the political side of waging war, and they had no international support. By contrast, the MPLA was winning endorsements and awards from Soviet-front groups long before it was a factor in the war against Portugal. Communist guerrillas and occupation forces benefit from an established worldwide propaganda network. And when the Cubans and Soviets seized power in Angola, sympathetic propaganda outlets immediately sprang into action in the Organization for African Unity, the United Nations, and front organizations around the world.

A third strength of the Communists in combating nationalist resistance movements is their ability to black out news coverage with surprisingly little television footage gets out of Cambodia or Afghanistan. And although UNITA works hard to bring Western journalists to Free Angola, the Cubans do not permit newspaper or television coverage of their atrocities in areas they control.

**Democratic vs. Marxist Guerrillas**

In countering these important advantages of Soviet and Cuban colonialists, the anti-Communist freedom fighter has some distinctive advantages of his own. The first is the religious faith and institutions of his country's people.

Marxism-Leninism is atheistic and materialistic. By definition it attempts to crush religious belief, and Communist governments demand a monopoly on the people's loyalty. But in deeply religious countries such as Afghanistan and Nicaragua and Angola, the suppression of religion has backfired and intensified the opposition to colonial regimes. The Constitution of the MPLA forbids membership to anyone holding "any religious belief"; this is one reason it is such a small political party, consisting of only 0.3 percent of the Angolan people.

The majority of Angolans are animists, 27 percent are Catholics, and 12 percent are Protestants; all have suffered from persecution. Church property has been expropriated by the Cubans, atheism is constantly preached in hospitals, schools, and political meetings. The Cubans and Soviets taunt animists by flying to the sky with their helicopters and jets, and then telling the local population that they looked and found no God in the heavens. All this has resulted in strong opposition to the regime of occupied Angola. In August 1985, the Catholic Church of Angola endorsed UNITA's call for an end to the war and for a negotiated settlement.

The second weakness of the Communists is economic. The Soviets may provide enormous quantities of arms but

lets would sell the rope with which to hang themselves. Today they are hanging the Angolan people. But tomorrow they come for you.

**On the Battlefield**

Between 1976 and the summer of 1985, UNITA was able to maintain its base securely in spite of 10 major offensives launched against its territory by Cuban and MPLA troops. Usually we stopped these offensives within little more than a month—by going behind the lines and cutting off supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition to the advancing enemy.

The offensive of 1985, lasting from June until October, saw a change in tactics, weapons, and intensity. Prior to the offensive, the Soviet Union greatly increased both the quantity and the sophistication of weapons it was sending to Angola. And this time, the offensive was directly coordinated by Soviet officers, 15 to a brigade.

The first prong of the offensive was aimed at Cazombo, a town near the Angola-Zambia border. It appeared at first that the goal was political: to cut off UNITA's border with Zaire and Zambia, to increase the pressure on these two nations and prevent them from aiding UNITA. UNITA moved men and resources up to meet this advance and to defend Cazombo as we had successfully defended it before.

But the Soviet-Cuban strategy was a radical departure from past offensives. The Soviet, Cuban, and MPLA troops brought a much larger


number of trucks and armored cars with them, and so they were able to carry much larger supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition. They were able to move faster and farther without leaving vulnerable supply lines in their wake.

For the first time, UNITA was forced to fight a conventional war, denied the ability to follow the guerrilla strategy of intercepting and cutting off supply lines. The occupation forces surrounded their "soft trucks" with armored trucks, so that we could not destroy their supplies, and then moved forward with armor in flanking moves attempting to surround our defensive positions.

By Oct. 3, the Soviet officers were airlifted out by helicopter. If we had had enough anti-aircraft missiles, we could have destroyed the entire Soviet high command. But they escaped by air, and the MPLA retreated, after leaving behind many tanks, Stalin Organ rocket launchers, and armored personnel carriers.

The offensive of 1985 was to have been the Soviets' final drive against UNITA.

They will not give up after their defeat. It is now the rainy season in Angola, but the Soviets will come again next March or April when the ground hardens and the skies clear for their MiGs and helicopters. The next offensive, like this one, will rely on heavy armor, tanks, concentrated artillery, and airpower. We look to the West for the anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons that will allow us to stop the next attack, to continue to build our base among the people of



Jonas Savimbi

Angola and move northward, to drive the Cubans and Soviets from Angola, and to win the true independence that was stolen from us 11 years ago.

Support from Abroad

The Soviets and Cubans and their friends around the world can be expected to continue their political and propaganda war against UNITA. Our success in defeating the offensive of 1985 will force them to redirect some of their propaganda. No longer can they claim that UNITA is weak, that we do not represent the popular will of the Angolan people. Too many journalists have traveled with our guerrillas and can testify to our support in the countryside. We have engaged the Cubans in virtually every province, and our support comes from every region and tribe

Under Soviet commanders, MiG-21s and 23s and Mi-24 helicopter gunships would arrive within 15 minutes of each engagement to provide air cover. Artillery shelling was also better coordinated and more accurate. It was a completely different war than the kind we had fought in the offensives of 1982 through 1984. The Soviet troops always remained in armored cars and tanks, and their commanders stood behind three lines of MPLA and Cuban troops.

Throughout the offensive, the So-

apartheid. Fortunately, it is a dead ideology. It cannot be exported. Even in South Africa everyone talks about how to move away from the apartheid system.

The Lord did not ask our permission when he put Angola on the southwest coast of Africa. We need outside help, even if it has to come across the Namibian border. I would remind the Communists that Stalin's acceptance of war material from America and Britain during World War II did not constitute an endorsement of liberal democracy on Stalin's part. Nor did my acceptance of Chinese military training and aid — when no other nation would help me — make me a Maoist in economics or politics.

**American Obligations**

Angola was the first nation to begin its guerrilla war against Soviet colonialism. But we are not alone. Today the brave peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia are fighting their own wars of national liberation.

We fought and carried on while the West went through a crisis of faith, wondering if its traditions, values, and civilization were worth fighting and dying for. I think that the Third World, through these struggles, has helped to give the West the courage to oppose the Soviet Union — to provide a cure for what Alexander Solzhenitsyn calls the Western disease. Our struggle in Angola, the battle of other freedom fighters, is the battle for the West and its values.

We who fight these wars of national liberation see the unity of our cause and the common enemy we face — Soviet imperialism. As a result, representatives of the freedom fighters of Angola, Laos, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua met in Jamba on June 12, 1985, to sign the Jamba Accord and announce the formation of the Democratic International. We who fight the battle for Western values of democracy, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to own one's home and some land, have joined together. Now we ask the West to join us.


We in UNITA call upon the West, and the United States as the leader of the Free World, to give us military and political support. The moral case is clear. UNITA is fighting for a free, independent and democratic Angola. We are fighting the Cubans and Soviets who would deny us our nation.

The strategic case, the self-interest of the West and America, is equally compelling. Should massive Soviet air and armor attacks succeed in defeating UNITA when the dry season begins next March, then 45,000 Cuban troops and advisers, thousands of Eastern-bloc "technicians," and an untold quantity of tanks, fighter planes, helicopters, and artillery will stand uncontested along the borders of Zaire, Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana. Not UNITA alone, but all of central and southern Africa awaits the decision by the United States.

We were all encouraged by the decision of the U.S. Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, which forbade U.S. assistance to the forces of freedom in Angola and left us for 10 years alone against the Cubans. Now the United States must take the next step and commit the military aid that will allow us to defeat the Cubans and Soviets in Angola — anti-aircraft weapons, the Red-eye missile and Stinger missile, and anti-tank weapons. With those arms we can protect our people from air and armor attacks and drive back the Cubans and Soviets through the continuation of the guerrilla war that we have waged for 11 years.

We ask also for your political and diplomatic support.

We need you to insist at the United Nations and other international forums that the Cubans and Soviets leave Angola and that the promised elections be held. With your military and political support, other nations will follow your lead and give us aid. Do not underestimate the importance of your decision. For Angola is the Munich of Africa. Hesitation, the refusal to aid UNITA in its fight



in Angola.

against the Cubans and Soviets, will



## Don't Sacrifice Angola on the Altar of Socialism

The democratic resistance in Angola has learned a great deal from the failure of African socialism, which has not brought prosperity, not even equality in misery. Socialism has been used by the elites to amass tremendous wealth and political power while at the same time the common people slide into abject poverty.

This pattern need not occur in post-colonial Africa. Despite an insurgency led by myself and other patriots, the Angolan economy boomed between 1960 and 1974. The average rate of growth was 7.8% a year. Oil, diamond, copper and agricultural production soared and the Angolan

### Africa

by Jonas Savimbi

people had every reason for optimism when, in 1974, Portugal announced that it would grant independence on Nov. 11, 1975. We believed that the economy would expand even further without the drain of a foreign colonial army and bureaucracy.

We in UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, had denounced the exploitation of Portuguese rule during our struggle for independence. But when the Cuban troops and East Bloc "advisers" arrived to recolonize Angola in the name of the puppet Marxist government, we soon discovered that there was something worse than colonialism: Soviet colonial exploitation and the imposition of socialism.

The large oil revenues generated by the Chevron/Gulf oil fields in Cabinda were siphoned off to pay for the Cuban army of occupation. Soviet fishing ships using vacuum technology took away the abundant fish off our coast and seafood disappeared from the Angolan diet.

Prior to the Cuban occupation, there were one million Angolan farms (with an

average size of 15 acres). There were also 7,000 commercial farms that averaged 1,500 acres in size. Angola, unlike other African nations, was completely self-sufficient in food. We even exported some \$260 million worth of foodstuffs a year.

But the Cubans and Soviets brought not only troops and bureaucrats, but socialism.

In March 1976, virtually all industry was nationalized and the process of taking all land from the Angolan farmers began. Farmers who fought against this saw their villages burned and their cattle and crops destroyed. Many of the refugees from socialism now fight with UNITA.

The imposition of socialism has had tragic results. By 1981 wheat production had fallen to 40% of 1974 levels. Corn yields fell by half. Cotton production fell to 13% of previous levels and sugar production fell 50%. Even diamond production was halved—the bulk of present production is smuggled out of the country.

Perhaps industrialized nations can "afford" the inefficiency and reduction in production and quality suffered under socialism. Agricultural nations with many subsistence farmers cannot. A lost crop means starvation. Our greatest fear in Angola is that the Soviets are prepared to turn us into another Ethiopia, to sacrifice our nation on the altar of scientific socialism.

Standing astride the wreckage of the Angolan economy, the Marxist government boasted in its 1981-85 five-year plan that its major accomplishment has been "the irreversible expansion of the socialist sector of the economy; the vigorous pursuance of the policy of nationalizations and confiscations; expansion of state control to agriculture through agricultural cooperatives to mold the peasant's life."

UNITA's first goal is to win the independence of Angola—to drive the Cuban and Soviet troops and "advisers" from our shore. But the tragic history of post-colonial Africa shows that independence is not

enough. (And certainly, nominal independence masking a Soviet client-state status would be a step backward.)

In addition to UNITA's commitment to a democratic, multiparty Angola with religious tolerance and freedom of speech, it is vital that we also recognize the critical importance of economic liberties.

The backbone of Angola's economy is not oil, but agriculture. More than 80% of the Angolan people earn their living as farmers. They must have the absolute right to own land and livestock; to market their cattle and food at market prices—not prices set artificially low by the government to subsidize city dwellers. We have seen the results of such price fixing in other African nations—low prices have driven farmers off their land, discouraged investment in fertilizer and machinery, and decreased production. Government-set prices misdirect the decisions of farmers as to what crops to raise and how much land to till.

I believe that in Angola the farmers must be exempt from all taxes. The state cannot claim the product of a farmer's hard work. This would be theft. The state does not need the money such taxes would raise. We can also drastically reduce government spending: An independent Angola would not need a large standing army, and certainly would not allow foreign troops to exploit our resources.

My call for a completely free market in agriculture comes from watching the horrifying experiences of neighboring African states that have attempted to fix prices and command farmers to move to areas where the government wants crops grown. Left alone, untaxed and unregulated, the bountiful Angolan cropland will bring forth abundance, an abundance that will not be siphoned off to Portugal, Cuba or the Angolan government.

The only role for the state that I can see would be to construct roads into the Ango-

lan countryside to give farmers access to a wider market for their goods.

Along with a completely free market in agriculture, Angola must eliminate all tariffs and other barriers to international trade. Such barriers have led to widespread smuggling across our borders and to inefficiencies as state-owned firms have faced no competition from abroad.

I realize that young nations are perceived as vulnerable to lower-cost products, but tariffs would increase that vulnerability by removing incentives for increased efficiency. No country can hide forever behind the false barriers of protection. The true victims of such policies are the consumers and later the firms themselves as they fail to keep up with technological changes.

Newly independent black nations have fallen victim to other economic vices as well. The first is to build, often with foreign aid, large steel mills or dams. They believe such white elephants are the sign of true nationhood and industrialization. Sadly, they usually represent badly placed priorities and drain capital from the agricultural sector and other areas where the nation has true potential. The second danger is that of overpromising. Some liberation movements in Africa have promised their people that independence will mean overnight prosperity.

They point to the Rolls-Royces and swimming pools of the colonialists and promise that soon all will have such wealth. The disappointment of economic realities has badly undermined the people's faith in their leaders.

Africans can look to the wealth and economic growth of the U.S. and see that "freedom works." We have looked at our neighbors and at what the Cubans have wrought here, and have learned that statism does not.

*Mr. Savimbi has been the president of UNITA since 1966.*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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For Immediate Release

April 21, 1988

STATEMENT BY MARLIN FITZWATER  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR PRESS RELATIONS

Today, on the 40th anniversary of Israel's independence, the United States and Israel have signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). This MOA formalizes and perpetuates the bilateral U.S. and Israeli consultative groups that meet periodically to discuss joint military, security assistance, and economic developmental questions.

The MOA reiterates for the public record our long-standing relationship of strategic cooperation with Israel. Strategic cooperation can only succeed when there are shared interests, including the commitment to building peace and stability in the region.

It reflects the enduring U.S. commitment to Israel's security. That commitment will never flag. The U.S. commitment to peace will also not flag. The President knows that a strong Israel is necessary if peace is to be possible. He also knows that Israel can never be truly secure without peace.

To that end, the President has asked Secretary of State Shultz to continue his peace-making efforts, seeking a comprehensive settlement which will assure Israeli security and provide for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The President remains convinced that our peace initiative is balanced and offers the only realistic basis on which to make progress.

The President reiterates his appeal to the leaders in the region not to miss this opportunity to move ahead and get to productive peace negotiations. This is an objective that Israel has fervently sought over the last 40 years.

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